Rathod Bhimjibhai Masrubhai Rajput and another vs The State of Bombay and others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No.327 of 1955

Decision Date: 7 December 1959

Coram: S.K. Das, J.L. Kapur, A.K. Sarkar

In the matter titled Rathod Bhimjibhai Masrubhai Rajput and another versus the State of Bombay and others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 7 December 1959. The opinion was authored by Justice S K Das and the bench was composed of Justices S K Das, J L Kapur and A K Sarkar. The case is reported in 1960 AIR 438 and 1960 SCR (2) 393. The substantive statutory framework involved the Bombay Land Revenue Code of 1879, specifically section 136(1); the Gujarat Taluqdars’ Act of 1888, sections 4, 5, 22 and 31; and the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act of 1949, sections 2(3), 2(4), 3, 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 5(2)(a) and 5(2)(c). The petitioners were the appellants who held certain parcels of land commonly referred to as “Lal-liti” lands, while the respondents were the State of Bombay and other parties.

The Court noted that the appellants, as holders of “Lal-liti” lands, had been assessed for land revenue under the Bombay Land Revenue Code after the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act of 1949 took effect. Historically, “Lal-liti” lands were originally granted by Gujarat taluqdars to cadets, widows, relatives for maintenance, village servants and other persons, either as reward for past services or as remuneration for future services. Prior to British rule, taluqdars functioned as semi-independent chiefs; after the advent of British administration they became proprietors of estates holding land directly from the Government, and the Gujarat Taluqdars’ Act of 1888 was enacted to regulate the revenue administration of such estates. The appellants contended that these lands had been enjoyed without payment of any “jama” since pre-British times and that the exemption from land-revenue payment was not altered by the 1949 Abolition Act. The High Court, however, held that the lands were liable to assessment under section 5 of the Abolition Act. The appellants argued, inter alia, that (1) the taluqdar retained no interest in the lands after the grant, so the lands could not be classified as taluqdar lands within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Act; (2) clause (a) of section 5(1) was merely declaratory, while clause (b) was the operative provision that made only (i) a taluqdar holding any taluqdar land and (ii) a cadet of a taluqdar family holding any taluqdar land for maintenance liable for revenue; and (3) even assuming clause (a) rendered taluqdar lands liable under the Code, a “Lal-liti” holder could not be liable because he was not an occupant of unalienated land as defined by section 136(1) of the Code. The Court held that, having regard to the history of “Lal-liti” lands, they formed part of a taluqdar estate and therefore fell within the ambit of section 2(3) of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, and that clause (a) of section 5(1) applied the Bombay Land Revenue Code to all taluqdar lands, while clause (b) operated as a specific deeming provision concerning the taluqdar and his cadet.

According to the provisions of the Gujrat Taluqdar’s Act of 1888, lands that form part of a taluqdari estate are deemed taluqdari lands even when no “jama” – that is, no land revenue – has actually been paid either to the taluqdar or to the Government. Consequently, such lands fall within the definition of taluqdari lands prescribed in section 2(3) of the Bombay Taluqdari Abolition Act of 1949. The Court further held that clause (a) of section 5(1) of the Bombay Taluqdari Abolition Act operates as a general provision that brings the Bombay Land Revenue Code into force for every piece of land classified as taluqdari. By contrast, clause (b) of the same section is a specific deeming provision that relates only to the taluqdar himself and to any cadet of the taluqdar’s family. Moreover, the Court observed that irrespective of what legal position a holder of “Lal-liti” land might have occupied before the enactment of the Abolition Act, once the Act abolished the taluqdari tenure, that holder became the actual possessor of land for which the Government had not, either wholly or partially, transferred its right to collect revenue to any private owner. The judgment was rendered in the civil appellate jurisdiction concerning Civil Appeal No. 327 of 1955, which arose by special leave from the Bombay High Court’s order dated 31 January 1955 in Special Civil Application No. 1100 of 1954. The appeal was argued on behalf of the appellants by counsel and on behalf of the respondent by separate counsel. The decision was delivered on 7 December 1959 by Justice S. E. Das, wherein the Court noted the procedural history and the essential questions presented for determination.

This appeal involved a writ application that had been dismissed with costs by the High Court. The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether the appellants, who were holders of lands described as “Lal-liti,” were liable to the State Government for land revenue after the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act of 1949 came into force. The question required an examination of the Bombay Land Revenue Code of 1879 and its applicability to the lands in question after the abolition of the taluqdari system. To resolve the issue, the Court considered the historical development of taluqdari tenures in the Ahmedabad district of Gujrat, focusing on legislative and other alterations that had occurred over time. While a comprehensive history of Gujrat’s taluqdari estates was not necessary for the resolution of the appeal, it was essential to explain the nature of “Lal-liti” lands. The Court referred to scholarly works such as Baden-Powell’s Land-systems of British India and Dandekar’s The Law of Land Tenure in the Bombay Presidency, both of which had been extensively cited by counsel for the parties, to provide a concise background on the origins and characteristics of the “Lal-liti” holdings in the region.

The Court set out the historical evolution of the estates that had been held by the former Taluqdars of Gujarat. It explained that the individuals later known as Taluqdars were originally Chiefs or Rulers prior to the advent of Mahomedan authority in Gujarat. When the Mahomedans invaded, they discovered the territory divided among the estates of various large and small Chiefs. The invaders forcibly stripped these chiefs of all but one-fourth of their possessions; the portion that remained was designated as a “wanta,” meaning divided. Some wantas were exempt from any payment of revenue, while other wanta estates were required to render a fixed tribute known as an “udhad jama.” After the Mughal period, Maratha domination succeeded, but this change did not materially alter the status of these semi-independent chiefs, except that the amount of the annual payments varied under Maratha rule. Subsequently the British assumed control. Initially the British continued to collect the annual payments on the basis of the earlier arrangements, but soon they effected a substantial modification: the tribute was recharacterised as rent or land revenue, and the rate of this rent or revenue was increased by approximately fifty percent. The increase placed the landholders in severe financial distress, rendering many of them impoverished and dependent. In response, the administration introduced a system of annual leases, a measure that proved to be more harmful than the original problem. To ameliorate the condition of the Taluqdars, legislative action was eventually taken, culminating in the Gujarat Taluqdars’ Act of 1888 (Bombay Act VI of 1888), which the Court described as a landmark in the history of Taluqdari tenures. By the time this Act was enacted, the Taluqdars in certain districts of Gujarat, including Ahmedabad, had effectively become simple owners of proprietary estates, holding their lands directly from the Government. The Act provided, inter alia, for the revenue administration of those estates and mandated the preparation of Settlement Registers for each village, which served as the Record of Rights for the estates. Within these estates, large tracts of land were granted by the Taluqdars to cadets, widows, relatives, village servants and others, either as maintenance, as a reward for past services, or as remuneration for services to be performed. The grantees of these lands paid no revenue either to the Taluqdar or to the Government. The Court noted that these grants fell into three chronological categories: (i) grants made prior to British rule; (ii) grants made between 1818 and 1888, i.e., after the commencement of British rule but before the passage of the Gujarat Taluqdars’ Act; and (iii) grants made after 1888. The lands transferred under these grants were referred to as “Lal-liti” lands because they were recorded in the Settlement Registers in red ink.

In the older “faisal patrakas” as well as in the Settlement Registers, the entries concerning these lands were written in red ink and were indicated as being subject to “jama” (land revenue) liabilities of various kinds. The transfers that had taken place before the advent of British rule were acknowledged by Mr. Peile, who later became Sir James Peile and served as the Taluqdari Settlement Officer in 1866; the owners of those pre-British lands generally did not pay any “jama”. The transfers that occurred between 1818 and 1888 were not recognised by prescription, and whenever such lands reverted to the Taluqdar, they were treated as ordinary lands of his estate and became liable to full payment of “jama”. Grants that were made after the passage of the Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act of 1888 fell within the scope of section 31 of that Act, as noted in the work “The Land Problems of Re-organised Bombay State” by Dr G D Patel (pages 174-175). This brief historical outline of the Taluqdari estates and the “Lal-liti” lands is given only to the extent that it informs the question that is before the Court at this stage.

The matter before the Court arose from a writ petition filed in the High Court by the appellants, who claimed to be holders of “Lal-liti” lands in the villages of Kharad and Rajka, situated in the Dhanduka taluq of Ahmedabad district. They asserted that they had been in possession of those lands without paying any “jama” since the period before British rule, although the exact circumstances under which their ancestors originally acquired the lands were lost in antiquity. The appellants contended that the exemption from land-revenue payment that they had historically enjoyed was not disturbed by the Abolition Act, nor by any subsequent legislation such as the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952 (Bombay Act LXII of 1953). They further argued that the demand issued by the State Government of Bombay for land-revenue for the years 1950-1953 lacked legal authority, and in the alternative claimed that they were not liable to any assessment of land-revenue until August 1953. Consequently, they sought a writ to set aside the revenue demands and to direct the State of Bombay, the Collector of Ahmedabad and the Revenue Officer of Dhanduka – who are now respondents – to refrain from any action to enforce payment of revenue on their “Lal-liti” holdings. Similar applications, apparently filed by other “Lal-liti” landholders, were also pending before the High Court; the record shows that there were three groups of such applications. The High Court, in its principal judgment on writ application No 1098 of 1954, dismissed the appellants’ request (No 1100 of 1954) with costs, relying on the reasoning set out in the leading judgment. In effect, the High Court held that owners of “Lal-liti” lands were liable to pay land-revenue under section 5 of the Abolition Act, read in conjunction with the provisions of the Revenue Code, and that the objections raised on their behalf were not legally valid.

Having been denied a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution, the appellants subsequently sought and were granted special leave by this Court on 29 June 1955, after which they filed the present appeal. The counsel appearing for the appellants contested the correctness of the High Court’s decision on a number of points, and the Court found it convenient to examine those points individually. The initial contention raised by the appellants was that the provisions of the Abolition Act should not be applied to the lands described as “Lal-liti”, because such lands do not qualify as “taluqdari lands” within the meaning given to that term in the Act. Accordingly, they argued, section 5 of the Abolition Act could not impose any liability for the payment of land revenue in respect of “Lal-liti” lands. At this juncture the Court decided to read the relevant sections of the Abolition Act to assess the validity of that contention.

The Act defines the expressions “Taluqdari land” and “Taluqdari tenure” in section 2, clauses (3) and (4). Section 2 reads as follows: “(3) ‘Taluqdari land’ means land forming part of a taluqdari estate and includes land forming part of such estate and held by a cadet of a taluqdar’s family for the purpose of maintenance; (4) ‘Taluqdari tenure’ means land tenure on which the taluqdari land is held.” Section 3 then stipulates that, with effect from the date the Act comes into force, “(i) the taluqdari tenure shall wherever it prevails be deemed to have been abolished; (ii) save as expressly provided by or under the provisions of this Act, all the incidents of the said tenure attaching to any land comprised in a taluqidari estate shall be deemed to have been extinguished.” Section 5, which is central to the appeal and is reproduced here as it stood before its amendment in 1953, states: “(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), (a) all taluqdari lands are and shall be liable to the payment of land revenue in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the rules made there-under, and (b) a taluqdar holding any taluqdari land or a cadet of a taluqdari family any taluqdari land hereditarily for the purpose of maintenance immediately before the coming into force of this Act, shall be deemed to be an occupant within the meaning of the Code or any other law for the time being in force. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to affect (a) the right of any person to hold any taluqdari land wholly or partially exempt from payment of land revenue under special contract or any law for the time being in force; (b) the right of any person to pay Jama under any agreement or settlement recognised under section 23 or under a declaration made under section 22 of the Taluqdars’ Act so long as such agreement, settlement or declaration remains in force under the provisions of this Act.” The appellants’ argument was then advanced on the basis of these provisions.

In the present case, the petitioners argued that the term “Taluqdari land” should be understood as land forming part of a taluqdari estate, while the expression “taluqdari estate” itself is not defined in the statute, even though “Taluqdari tenure” is defined. On that basis, they contended that a “taluqdari estate” could refer only to land or estate in which the taluqdar retained some subsisting interest. Because, in the case of “Lal-liti” lands, the taluqdar no longer possessed any interest after the grant was made, they asserted that “Lal-liti” land could not be classified as “taluqdari land” within the meaning of section 5 of the Abolition Act. The court first examined whether this line of reasoning was sound. Both the High Court and the present bench considered the respondents’ attempt to establish that the taluqdar retained a reversionary right over “Lal-liti” lands in the event that the holder died without an heir. The High Court correctly observed, and this bench concurs, that the material placed before the tribunal did not demonstrate the existence of such a reversionary right. The High Court then turned to the meaning of the expression “taluqdari estate.” It held that the phrase is used descriptively and is not synonymous with the expression “Taluqdar’s estate.” The High Court explained that “taluqdari estate” is a comprehensive term that includes all lands that at one time belonged to the taluqdar, even if those lands were later alienated. In the eyes of the law, alienated lands remain part of the estate, so the expression signifies a particular tenure rather than a specific interest enjoyed by the taluqdar. Accordingly, if the lands that are the subject of the petition had at any time been owned by the taluqdar and were subsequently alienated, they fall within the definition provided in the 1949 Act, irrespective of the fact that the taluqdar held no interest in them at the time the Act was enacted. This bench agrees with the High Court’s view. Turning to the historical background of the “Giga Lal-liti” lands and the provisions of the Gujarat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, it is evident that “Lal-liti” lands form part of a taluqdari estate even though no “jama” was ever paid for such lands to the taluqdar or to the Government. Section 4 of the Gujarat Taluqdars’ Act empowers the Government to order a revenue survey of any taluqdari estate, while section 5 prescribes the particulars that the Settlement Registers prepared by the Survey Officer must contain. Those particulars include the name, description, nature and extent of interest of every alienee and every encumbrancer of the estate or any portion thereof, together with specifications of the aggregate area over which such interest extends and the amount and nature of rent or land revenue, if any, payable or receivable by the alienee or encumbrancer. The Settlement Registers for the two villages involved in the present dispute, prepared under section 5, recorded the appellants’ interest in the “Lal-liti” lands as being part of the Dhanduka Taluqdari estate. This clearly demonstrates that the “Lal-liti” lands were components of a taluqdari estate, irrespective of any question as to the nature of the taluqdar’s interest after alienation. Section 22 of the Gujarat Taluqdars’ Act further corroborates this position by setting out the method of calculating the “jama” of a taluqdar’s estate, stating that the aggregate of the survey assessments of the lands constituting such estate, less any deductions directed by the Government, constitutes the “jama.”

In the records prepared under section 5 of the Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, the settlement registers for the two villages at issue listed the appellants’ interest in the lands described as “Lal-liti” as being part of the Dhanduka Taluqdari estate. This entry demonstrated unequivocally that the “Lal-liti” lands were incorporated within a recognised taluqdari estate, irrespective of any question concerning whether the taluqdar retained any residual interest after the alienation of those lands. Section 22 of the same Act further corroborates this conclusion by prescribing the method for calculating the “jama” of a taluqdar’s estate; it provides that the total of the survey assessments of all lands forming the estate, reduced by any deduction that the Government may order, constitutes the “jama”. Along with their petition, the appellants submitted an annexure marked “A”, which not only identified their lands as situated within a taluqdari estate but also displayed the amount of “jama” payable for each parcel. This annexure reinforced the position that, whether or not the “jama” had actually been paid, the “Lal-liti” lands remained part of a taluqdari estate. Accordingly, the Court held that the counsel for the appellants was incorrect in insisting that “Lal-liti” lands are not included in a taluqdari estate and therefore cannot be described as “taluqdari lands” within the meaning of the Abolition Act. The counsel for the appellants also referred to several Bombay High Court decisions concerning the phrase “taluqdar’s estate” in section 31 of the Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, arguing that the phrase denotes land held by the taluqdar in his capacity as taluqdar and, by analogy, that any land forming part of a “taluqdari estate” must be land in which the taluqdar possesses some interest as a taluqdar. He cited Khoda Bhai v. Chaganlal (1), Bichesbha Mansangji v. Vela Dhanji Patel (2) and Taluqdari Settlement Officer v. Chhagan Lal Dwarkadas (3) in support of this view. The Court found that those decisions did not assist the appellants because the analogy was inapplicable; the matter before the Court concerned the meaning of the expression “taluqdari estate” found in section 2(3) of the Abolition Act, not the meaning of “taluqdar’s estate” in section 31 of the Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act. Moreover, some of the authorities relied upon by the counsel themselves recognised a distinction between “taluqdar’s estate” and “taluqdari estate”. The Court also noted that extensive argument had been made regarding the effect of a taluqdar’s relinquishment of his land, but it was not necessary to address those issues in the present case.

In the earlier discussion the Court noted the case of Collector (Nathuram Hiraram Thakur v. The Secretary of State for India (4)) and also the case concerning the effect of an attachment of a village under section 144 of the Revenue Code when a taluqdar failed to pay the assessment (Tulla Sobharam Pandya v. The Collector of Kaira (5)). The Court expressed that it was not necessary to examine those questions in the present matter. The Court then turned to the second point raised by the appellants. This point had not been raised before, nor had it been considered by the High Court in the writ application that contained the main judgment. The appellants had attempted to raise the point in the High Court through a separate application, but were advised that any error in the High Court’s decision in Writ Application No. 1098 of 1954 could be corrected only by this Court. The argument relied upon section 5(1) of the Abolition Act, which had been quoted earlier, and was divided into two sub-arguments. First, the appellants contended that when clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of section 5 are read together, the proper construction is that clause (a) is merely declaratory while clause (b) is the operative provision. Under that reading, only two categories of persons become liable to pay land revenue: (i) a taluqdar who holds any taluqdari land, and (ii) a cadet of a taluqdari family who holds any taluqdari land with hereditary rights for maintenance that existed immediately before the Abolition Act came into force. Consequently, a person who holds “Lal-liti” lands, even if those lands are treated as taluqdari lands, would have no liability under section 5(1). Second, the appellants argued that even if clauses (a) and (b) are read distributively, the holder of “Lal-liti” lands still bears no liability because clause (a) merely makes all taluqdari lands liable to pay land revenue according to the Revenue Code, and the Revenue Code contains no provision that would impose such liability on a “Lal-liti” holder. The Court first addressed the initial part of the argument. It asked how clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of section 5 of the Abolition Act should be interpreted. Counsel for the appellants submitted that if clause (a) is read as imposing a charge of land revenue on all taluqdari lands, then clause (b) becomes unnecessary surplusage. Conversely, counsel for the respondents argued that if the legislative intent was to limit liability to only two categories of persons—taluqdars and cadets—then clause (a) would be superfluous. The Court expressed the view that both clauses possess meaning and

In this case, the Court explained that clause (a) of section 5 imposed a liability on every taluqdari land to pay land revenue according to the provisions of the Revenue Code. The Court noted that section 3 of the Abolition Act terminated the taluqdari tenure and eliminated all its associated incidents. It observed that if the legislation had merely abolished the tenure without providing any further direction, a legal vacuum would have resulted. Consequently, it was necessary to specify the fate of the taluqdari lands after the tenure’s abolition. Accordingly, clause (a) expressly declared that all taluqdari lands would remain liable for the payment of land revenue pursuant to the Revenue Code. The Court then turned to the meaning of clause (b). It described clause (b) as a deeming provision whereby the taluqdar and his cadet were to be considered “occupants” within the meaning of the Revenue Code; the term “occupant” under that Code was defined as a holder who is in actual possession of un-alienated land. The Court also explained that the word “alienated” carried a special definition in the Revenue Code, meaning a transfer—either wholly or partially—of the Government’s rights to receive rent or land revenue to the ownership of any person. The Court emphasized that clause (b) merely clarified the status of the taluqdar and his cadet under the Abolition Act and did not in any way diminish or limit the effect of clause (a). It further stated that the two clauses should be read together, but not in the manner suggested by counsel for the appellants. While clause (b) clarified the position of two specific categories of persons, it did not imply that a third category falling within clause (a) would escape liability on the erroneous assumption that clause (b) curtailed the scope of clause (a). The Court held that clause (a) was a general provision applying the Revenue Code to all taluqdari lands, whereas clause (b) was a specific deeming provision concerning only the taluqdar and his cadet. Turning to the second part of the argument, the Court referred to section 136(1) of the Revenue Code, which provides that for un-alienated land the occupant, and for alienated or taluqdari land the superior holder, shall be primarily liable to the State Government for the payment of land revenue, including all arrears, and that joint occupants or joint holders who are primarily liable shall be jointly and severally liable. The Court posed the question whether, after the Abolition Act, the holder of “Lal-liti” lands qualified as an occupant of un-alienated land within the meaning of section 136. If that were so, the holder would be liable to pay land revenue under clause (a) of section 5 read in conjunction with section 136 of the Revenue Code. The Court indicated that it would now address this issue.

The Court first recalled that the task required a careful interpretation of the expressions “occupant” and “alienated” as employed in the Revenue Code. The appellants argued that a holder of “Lal-liti” land could not be described as an occupant of unalienated land, whereas the respondents maintained that, once the Abolition Act was enforced, such a holder did become an occupant of unalienated land. After a detailed examination of the submissions, the Court concluded that the respondents’ position was the correct one. The Court observed that, with respect to “Lal-liti” lands, the Government never entered into a separate settlement with the individual holder; instead, the settlement was made with the taluqdar, and the “Lal-liti” lands were subsumed within that settlement. Consequently, the Government’s right to collect land revenue was never conveyed to the holder of the “Lal-liti” lands, even though it was true that some taluqdars obtained a deduction under section 22 of the Gujarat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, in respect of those lands. The submissions also set out, at length, the status of taluqdars and “Lal-liti” holders before the enactment of the Abolition Act. According to the respondents, a distinctive feature of the taluqdari tenure was that the taluqdari estate could not be classified as either alienated or unalienated within the meaning of the Revenue Code, because the taluqdars were not grantees of the British Crown but possessed proprietary rights in their estates even prior to British rule. Moreover, “Lal-liti” lands were ordinarily excluded from the calculation of the “jama” payable by the taluqdars to the Government, and therefore they were not covered by the settlement guarantee that operated for the benefit of the taluqdar. On that basis, the respondents argued that, from the date on which the Abolition Act came into force, the holders of “Lal-liti” lands became liable to pay the full revenue assessment on the ground that they had become occupants of unalienated land. Counsel for the respondents further drew the Court’s attention to Schedule 1 of the Abolition Act, which amended the Revenue Code, including section 136, thereby bringing the taluqdars and all taluqdari lands within the scheme of the Revenue Code.

The Court framed the precise issue before it as follows: whether a holder of “Lal-liti” land qualifies as an “occupant” of “unalienated land” within the meaning of the Revenue Code. In reaching its determination, the Court held that whatever the holder’s legal position might have been prior to the abolition, the enactment of the Abolition Act transformed him into a holder in actual possession of land for which the Government had not transferred its revenue-collection rights, either wholly or partially, to any private person. Accordingly, the Court found that the second point raised by the appellants failed on both of its sub-aspects. The Court therefore concluded that the holder of “Lal-liti” land must be treated as an occupant of unalienated land under the Revenue Code, and that the respondents’ contention was affirmed.

In this case the Court observed that the appellants had raised three additional points, but it agreed completely with the reasoning of the High Court on each of those points, and therefore found it unnecessary to repeat in detail the analysis already provided by the High Court.

The first point concerned the saving clause (c) of section 17 of the Abolition Act. The High Court had correctly described this provision as the ordinary saving clause, which essentially provides that the repeal of the Gujarat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, shall not be taken to affect any declaration, agreement or settlement that was made or recognised under the provisions of the repealed Act. The Court affirmed that this saving clause does not give any protection against the liability created by section 5 of the Abolition Act.

The second point relied on section 5(2)(a) of the Abolition Act, as it existed before being repealed by the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952 (Bombay Act 42 of 1953). The appellants argued that this provision gave them a special right to exemption from land-revenue liability. The High Court rightly noted that there was no specific contract granting the appellants any exemption from the payment of land revenue, and that after the repeal of the Abolition Act there was no statute in force that conferred any exemption, either wholly or partially, on a holder of “Lal-liti” lands. Consequently, the appellants could not claim protection under section 5(2)(a) of the Abolition Act for any period prior to 1 August 1953.

The third point asserted that a thirty-year settlement had been made with the concerned taluqdar estate in 1925-26, and that in the absence of a fresh settlement under the Revenue Code, a “Lal-liti” holder should not be liable for land revenue during that period. The Court explained that this contention is fully addressed by section 4 of the Abolition Act, which provides that all revenue surveys or revised surveys of taluqdar estates made under section 4 of the Gujarat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, and all settlements made thereunder, shall be deemed to have been made under Chapters VIII and VIII A of the Revenue Code. The settlement registers and other records prepared at those surveys are likewise deemed to have been prepared under the corresponding provisions of the Revenue Code. The Court noted that the “Lal-liti” lands involved in the present case were recorded in the Settlement Registers prepared under the Gujarat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, and that, in view of section 4 of the Abolition Act, no new settlement was required.

For the reasons set out above, the Court held that the appellants had not demonstrated any error in the decision of the High Court. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with costs, and the order of the High Court was affirmed.