Ranjit Singh vs The State Of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 1957

Decision Date: 21 April 1959

Coram: J.L. Kapur, Syed Jaffer Imam

In this case, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 21 April 1959 in the matter titled Ranjit Singh versus The State of Punjab. The opinion was authored by Justice J. L. Kapur, with Justice Syed Jaffer Imam also participating on the bench. The petitioner, Ranjit Singh, challenged the State of Punjab, the respondent. The decision is reported in 1959 AIR 843 and in the 1959 Supplementary Criminal Reporter, part 2, page 727, and it concerns provisions of the Indian Penal Code of 1860, particularly sections 191 and 193, which penalise false statements made in affidavits.

The Court explained that the dispute arose from a habeas-corpus application filed in the High Court, alleging that a person identified only as “S” had been arrested without lawful authority, held in illegal custody without any formal charge, and detained without the required remand from a magistrate. In response to that application, the appellant, who was a sub-Inspector of Police and the Station House Officer of the relevant police station, submitted a return that included an affidavit. That affidavit, the Court noted, contained false statements that contradicted the allegations made in the habeas-corpus petition. Consequently, the appellant was prosecuted and convicted under section 193 of the Penal Code for making a false statement in an affidavit.

The appellant contended that his conviction should be set aside on two grounds. First, he argued that he was not legally obliged to file an affidavit; therefore, the situation fell outside the scope of section 191, and conviction under section 193 was untenable. Second, he asserted that because the affidavit was sworn “to the best of his knowledge and belief,” it could not be said which portions were statements of knowledge and which were statements of belief, and thus the charge could not be sustained.

The Court held that the conviction was proper. It observed that section 191 does not require a statutory duty to file an affidavit; rather, if a person voluntarily chooses to execute an affidavit and swears to the truth of its contents, he becomes liable under section 193 if any statement therein is false. The Court rejected the appellant’s claim that a lack of compulsion to appear as a witness or to execute an affidavit could serve as a defence. In the present circumstances, the appellant was required to file an affidavit because he needed to set out the facts and circumstances justifying the detention, a task that could be performed only through an affidavit. The Court further explained that while an affidavit may not be necessary when a detention is ordered by a detaining authority exercising plenary powers or by a court, it becomes necessary when the authority must justify its action by disclosing factual details, thereby obliging it to file an affidavit.

Finally, the Court examined explanation 2 to section 191, concluding that a false statement affirmed on the basis of belief also falls within the mischief contemplated by section 191 and is therefore punishable under section 193. The Court referenced the earlier decision in Emperor v. Lachmi Narain, I L R 1947 All 155, and noted that it was disapproved. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of the sub-Inspector under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code.

The appeal, granted by special leave, challenged the judgment and order of the former PEPSU High Court dated March 7, 1956 in Criminal Revision No. 45 of 1956, which itself arose from the judgment and order dated February 22, 1956 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, in Criminal Appeal No. 175/36 of 1955-56. The appellant was represented by counsel identified as Pritam Singh Safe, while the respondent was represented by counsel identified as N. S. Bindra and T. M. Sen. The judgment of the Court was delivered on April 21, 1959 by Justice Kapur. This appeal by special leave contested the High Court decision, which had affirmed the conviction of a sub-Inspector of Police who, at the material time, was the Station House Officer in charge of Shehna police station in the erstwhile PEPSU State. The appellant had been convicted under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code by a First Class Magistrate; his appeal to the Sessions Judge, Patiala, had been dismissed except as to sentence, and his subsequent revision to the PEPSU High Court had also been dismissed. The factual background involved the arrest of Surjit Singh, son of Risaldar Waryam Singh, on 25 September 1953 at Barnala in PEPSU by Police Inspector Jaswant Singh. Surjit Singh was initially placed in the lock-up at Barnala and, on the following day, his custody was transferred to the appellant, who took him to Shehna and kept him in the police-station lock-up there, although the exact statutory provision under which he was detained was not specified. Surjit Singh remained in custody at Shehna from 26 September 1953 until 10 October 1953, when, at about 10 p.m., he was allegedly moved in a clandestine manner to Police Station Dialpur, thereafter to Police Post Hamirgarh, and subsequently to Police Station Baga Purana in Ferozepur District of the then Punjab. An application under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code and article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus and mandamus was filed in the PEPSU High Court, alleging that Surjit Singh was being detained unlawfully without any charge and without a magistrate’s remand. In reply, the appellant filed an affidavit dated 13 October 1953, in which he asserted that Surjit Singh had associations with notorious dacoits, that the appellant had never taken Surjit Singh into custody at any time, that Surjit Singh was absconding and had not been arrested despite the police’s best efforts, that at the time of making the affidavit the appellant was not in possession of Surjit Singh, and that it was incorrect to state that Inspector Jaswant Singh had ever entrusted Surjit Singh to the appellant’s custody. The affidavit further declared that no petition had been brought to the appellant and that he had received no telegram concerning the custody of Surjit Singh. The affidavit was affirmed with the following declaration: “I solemnly affirm that the facts stated from paragraphs 1 to 7 are true to the best of my knowledge and belief…”.

The Court recorded that “nothing which is relevant to this case has been kept back from this Hon’ble Court.” Both parties had conceded before the High Court that Surjit Singh was not in the appellant’s custody, and consequently the petition was dismissed. On 9 November 1953, the brother of Surjit Singh filed an application under section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code seeking prosecution of Inspector Jaswant Singh and the appellant for perjury under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that they had submitted false affidavits. Another learned Judge of that Court heard the application, ordered that the appellant be prosecuted, and directed the Registrar of the High Court to file a complaint, which was thereafter filed. The complaint was taken up by the First-Class Magistrate at Patiala, who convicted the appellant, sentencing him to nine months’ imprisonment and a fine of Rs 300, with default imprisonment of two months if the fine was not paid. The appellant appealed to the Sessions Judge, Patiala, who affirmed the conviction but reduced the sentence to three months’ simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs 50, with default imprisonment of one month for non-payment. A revision against this order was dismissed in limine by the Chief Justice, who nevertheless gave reasons for the dismissal. The appellant subsequently obtained special leave to appeal before this Court. On behalf of the appellant, the first substantive contention advanced was that the appellant was not obligated to file an affidavit and therefore could not be convicted under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code because his case did not fall within the ambit of section 191 of the same Code. In support of this contention, the appellant relied upon the Rules of the PEPSU High Court framed for proceedings under Article 226 and section 491(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code for the issuance of writs of habeas corpus. He further referred to the Rules made by that Court for the issuance of writs of mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari under Article 226, submitting that no rule existed for habeas-corpus writs that required a return on behalf of the respondent to be supported by an affidavit, whereas the rules for mandamus and similar writs did require an affidavit; consequently, he argued that section 191 was inapplicable. Rule 2 of the Court’s Rules stipulated that when a judge was of the opinion that a prima facie case existed for granting an application, a rule nisi should be issued, calling upon the person or persons against whom the order was sought to appear before the Court and show cause why the order should not be made. As had been observed in Greene v. Home Secretary¹, a case decided under Regulation 18-B of the Defence of the Realm Act, the entire purpose of proceedings for a writ of

The writ of Habeas Corpus is intended to be swift, free from unnecessary technicalities, and as simple as possible. As Lord Wright observed, its immeasurable value lies in its capacity to secure the immediate determination of a person’s right to liberty. The Court explained that when no factual dispute exists for examination, an affidavit is not required. However, the moment a fact arises that the Court deems worthy of inquiry, the need for an affidavit emerges. Ordinarily, an affidavit is unnecessary when the detention follows an order issued by the detaining authority exercising its full discretionary power, as illustrated in Liversidge v. Anderson and in Greene’s case, or when a person is held under a Court order. In contrast, where the detention, as in the present matter, is not clearly authorized, the detaining authority must justify its action by supplying facts that demonstrate to the Court that the custody is proper. If a prisoner declares, “I do not know why I have been detained, I have done no wrong,” the burden shifts to the detaining authority to justify the imprisonment. When factual issues are raised and the conduct of police officers is specifically challenged, and when facts are presented that, if left unrebutted, would substantiate the issuance of the writ, an affidavit becomes requisite. Consequently, the Court held that the appellant could not claim exemption from the legal obligation to present facts and circumstances before the Court to justify the detention of Surjit Singh; such justification could be effected through an affidavit. Section 4 of the Oaths Act establishes the authority to administer oaths and affirmations, specifying that all courts and persons legally empowered to receive evidence may do so either directly or through duly authorized officers. Section 5 identifies the persons authorized to administer oaths or affirmations, encompassing all witnesses who may lawfully be required to give evidence before any court. These provisions demonstrate that the High Court and its officers possessed the authority to administer oaths, and because the appellant was presenting factual evidence before the High Court, he was required to take an oath or affirmation and was bound to tell the truth. Section 14 of the same Act further provides that every person giving evidence on any subject before any court or any person authorized to administer oaths and affirmations is bound to state the truth on that subject. Accordingly, the appellant, while giving evidence on his own behalf, was obligated to adhere to this statutory duty.

The appellant denied the allegation set out in the affidavit of Surjit Singh’s brother and, by doing so, was required to speak the truth about the matter he was addressing. The argument that, under section 191 of the Indian Penal Code – “Whoever being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth … makes any statement which is false and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence” – the appellant was not legally bound by oath to tell the truth could not be sustained. At the stage of the High Court proceedings, the case involved a claim that Surjit Singh was being detained by the appellant without lawful authority. To respond to that claim, the appellant was compelled to file an affidavit as part of the return. Consequently, if the statements contained in that affidavit were false, as the Court found, the appellant would have committed an offence under section 193 of the Penal Code. The introductory phrase of section 191, referring to a person being “legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth,” does not support the submission that a person who is not statutorily required to file an affidavit may, if he chooses to do so, deliberately omit truthful facts that are within his knowledge.

The proper construction of those words is that whenever a person appears before a court and binds himself on oath to tell the truth, he is obliged to do so and cannot argue that he should not have taken the witness stand or filed the affidavit. Accordingly, the submission that any false statement made after taking the oath falls outside the scope of section 191 is untenable. Whenever a person makes a statement on oath in court, failure to speak truthfully makes him liable under section 193. It is not a defence to claim that he was not obliged to enter the witness-box; while a defendant or plaintiff is not forced to do so, if either elects to testify after taking an oath, he may not thereafter make a false statement. The very sanctity of the oath requires that a person who has been sworn must tell the truth. In the Court’s view, this contention lacked any merit and had to be rejected. The appellant also argued that the Deputy Registrar of the High Court of PEPSU, before whom the appellant swore the affidavit, lacked authority to administer oaths. However, the Deputy Registrar, who testified for the prosecution, affirmed that he could administer an oath, and therefore the appellant’s contention on this point was untenable.

It was further contended that the appellant’s affidavit was signed on the basis of a declaration that it was true to the best of his knowledge and belief, and that this wording prevented any distinction between the portions of the affidavit that were known to be true and those that were merely believed to be true. The Court examined the affidavit, which comprised seven separate paragraphs, each of which affirmed a factual statement that, if correct, could be said to be within the appellant’s actual knowledge. Nevertheless, the Court observed that a statement made on the basis of belief also falls within the ambit of Explanation 2 to section 191, which provides that a false statement concerning the belief of the person attesting is covered by the provision, and that a person may be guilty of false evidence by asserting a belief he does not, in fact, hold, as well as by asserting knowledge he does not possess. The appellant relied upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Lachmi Narain. The Court, however, noted that unless that case presented facts that were strikingly different, it could not be regarded as authoritative, particularly because the decision failed to consider Explanation 2 to section 191.

The appellant also argued that the magistrate’s procedure was defective because the magistrate did not conduct an enquiry as mandated by sections 200 and 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the former of which is expressly referred to in sub-section 2 of section 476 of the same Code. The Court rejected this contention, holding that under the proviso (aa) to section 200, a magistrate is not required to examine the complainant when a complaint is presented by a court, and that neither section 200 nor section 202 imposes a requirement of a preliminary enquiry before the magistrate can acquire jurisdiction to issue process against the accused. Consequently, the Court concluded that the conviction of the appellant was justified and ordered the appeal to be dismissed.