Rani Drig Raj Kuer vs Raja Sri Amar Krishna Narain Singh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 422 and 423 of 1958

Decision Date: 14 December 1959

Coram: S. K. Das, A. K. Sarkar, K. Subba Rao

In the matter of Rani Drig Raj Kuer versus Raja Sri Amar Krishna Narain Singh, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 14 December 1959. The judgment was authored by Justice S.K. Das, and Justice A.K. Sarkar sat on the bench. The citation for the decision is reported as 1960 AIR 444 and 1960 SCR (2) 431. The dispute involved statutory provisions of the Court of Wards-Estates, specifically the Uttar Pradesh Court of Wards Act 1912, section 56, and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, section 32. The petition was filed by the appellant, Rani Drig Raj Kuer, and the respondent was Raja Sri Amar Krishna Narain Singh.

The respondent, who owned the Ramnagar Estate, instituted a suit against the appellant, proprietor of the Ganeshpur Estate, seeking recovery of certain properties. The appellant responded with a cross-suit. During the litigation the appellant was declared a person of unsound mind, and consequently the Court of Wards assumed superintendence of her estate under the Uttar Pradesh Court of Wards Act. The Court of Wards placed the estate under the charge of the Deputy Commissioner of Barabanki. Accordingly, the cause title of the suit was amended, substituting the name “Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki I/C Court of Wards Ganeshpur Estate” in place of the appellant’s name. The trial court partially decreed in favour of the respondent and dismissed the appellant’s cross-suit. Both parties appealed the trial court’s orders to the High Court.

While the appeals were pending, the Court of Wards also assumed control over the respondent’s Ramnagar Estate and placed it under the same Deputy Commissioner. The cause titles of the appeals were consequently amended, replacing the respondent’s name with “Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki I/C Court of Wards Ramnagar Estate”. The Court of Wards thereafter passed a resolution settling the appeals on certain terms. Acting upon that resolution, the parties’ lawyers filed petitions before the High Court requesting that the compromises be recorded. The High Court entered decrees reflecting the terms of those compromises. Shortly thereafter, the Court of Wards released both estates from its supervision.

Subsequently, the appellant recovered her mental capacity, was declared of sound mind, and filed two applications before the High Court. In those applications she alleged that the compromise decrees were a nullity and sought a proper adjudication of the appeals. The High Court rejected the applications. The appellant’s contentions were threefold: first, that the Court of Wards had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of section 56 of the Uttar Pradesh Court of Wards Act; second, that a legal compromise requires two parties, whereas in this case only the Deputy Commissioner acted as a party; and third, that the High Court had not appointed a disinterested guardian for the appellant.

In this case the Court observed that the appellant was of unsound mind within the meaning of Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court, speaking through Judges S K Das and A K Sarkar, held that the compromise decrees issued in the appeals were not a nullity and that they remained binding upon both parties. Section 56 of the Oudh Estates Act, which provides that where two or more wards have conflicting interests the Court of Wards “shall appoint for each such ward a representative” to conduct or defend the suit on behalf of the ward, was described as a clear-cut directive. The Court stated that the failure of the Court of Wards to comply with that provision did not invalidate the compromise decrees. A directory provision, the Court explained, does not confer discretion to ignore the command; it must be obeyed, but a breach of the command does not render a deed performed in contravention of it a nullity. When the appeals were compromised, the compromise was entered into between the two proper parties to the appeals, namely the appellant and the respondent, and not a self-agreement made by the Deputy Commissioner of Barabanki who, although he represented both sides, was not acting as a private individual but as the guardian appointed under the Act. The Court observed that nothing in the statute barred the Court of Wards from entering into a contract on behalf of two wards. The Deputy Commissioner, having been appointed the guardian of the appellant under the Act, was entitled to act for her in the proceedings pursuant to Order XXXII, rule 4 of the Code. The Court distinguished the Court of Wards from a private guardian, noting that it could be trusted to act impartially, and affirmed that the High Court was correct in vesting the appellant’s interests in the Court of Wards even though the same body also looked after the respondent’s interests. In contrast, Justice K Subba Rao delivered a separate opinion holding that the compromise decrees were a nullity because the provisions of Section 56 were mandatory and their non-compliance vitiated the proceedings. He explained that the legislative intention, derived from the object of the Act, was to prevent a single person from representing two conflicting interests and to safeguard the wards’ interests under the supervision of the Court of Wards. He further argued that no inconvenience would arise from treating the word “shall” in Section 56 as mandatory rather than permissive, and he cited several authorities in support of this view. The judgment concluded the appeals numbered 422 and 423 of 1958, which arose from the decree of the Allahabad High Court dated 22 November 1957, were to be decided in accordance with the above reasoning.

The judgment dated 22 November 1957 was delivered by the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, in Civil Miscellaneous Applications numbered 54 and 56 of 1957. Counsel appearing for the appellant comprised Niamatullah, S. N. Andley and J. B. Dadachanji on behalf of O. N. Srivastava. Counsel for the respondent included H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, together with Bishun Singh and C. P. Lal. The Supreme Court rendered its judgment on 14 December 1959. The judgment of S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ., was delivered by Justice Sarkar, while Justice Subba Rao delivered a separate judgment.

Raja Udit Narain Singh was the proprietor of Ramnagar estate, a large taluqdari situated in Barabanki district of Uttar Pradesh, formerly the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. The estate was governed by the Oudh Estates Act of 1869, and in the absence of any disposition by the holder, it was deemed to devolve according to the rule of primogeniture. Raja Udit Narain died in 1927 leaving two sons: the elder, Raja Harnam, and the younger, Kanwar Sarnam. Kanwar Sarnam died in 1928 leaving a sole son, the respondent, and a widow, Parbati Kuer. Raja Harnam subsequently died in 1935 without issue, leaving his widow, the appellant, as his sole surviving spouse.

After the death of Raja Harnam, disputes arose between the respondent, who at that time was a minor represented by his certificated guardian, his mother Parbati Kuer, and the appellant. The appellant’s contentions were as follows: Raja Udit Narain had executed a will bequeathing certain villages of the Ramnagar estate to Raja Harnam absolutely, while the remainder of the estate, as listed in a schedule to the will, was to be held by Raja Udit Narain for life, thereafter by Kanwar Sarnam for life, and failing him, to pass absolutely to the respondent. The same will declared that the village of Bichelka had been given to the appellant for life as a “runumal” or wedding present, and that she was entitled to a monthly maintenance of Rs 500 out of the estate. The schedule to the will omitted five villages of the Ramnagar estate; because Raja Udit Narain died intestate with respect to those villages, they devolved upon Raja Harnam under the rule of primogeniture applicable to the estate.

Following Raja Udit Narain’s death, Raja Harnam entered into possession of the estate and executed a will in which he left all properties over which he possessed a power of disposition—including the seven villages bequeathed to him absolutely by his father and the five villages not disposed of by his father’s will—to the appellant in absolute right. Subsequently, Raja Harnam executed a deed of gift in favor of the appellant, gifting her most of the immovable properties covered by his will as well as several house properties situated in Lucknow. Relying on these allegations, the appellant asserted a claim to all the properties said to have been given to her by the aforementioned wills and the deed of gift of Raja Harnam. Parbati Kuer, on behalf of her son, the respondent, challenged the factum and validity of the wills and the gift purportedly made by Raja Harnam, thereby giving rise to the present dispute.

In this case, the party representing her son—the respondent—challenged both the substance and the legal validity of the wills and of the alleged gift purportedly made by Raja Harnam, and consequently opposed the appellant’s claim to the property. The disagreement between the parties therefore gave rise to litigation. To restore public order, the Deputy Commissioner of Barabanki stepped in and facilitated a family arrangement, which the parties executed on 22 January 1935. That arrangement was intended to settle all outstanding disputes and, under its terms, certain estates were transferred to the appellant; however, the specific details of those properties are not material to the present appeals and therefore are not recounted. The tranquility that the arrangement produced was short-lived. After attaining the age of majority on 12 September 1940, the respondent repudiated the family arrangement, providing reasons that are not relevant for the current discussion. Subsequently, on 6 September 1943, the respondent instituted a suit against the appellant seeking to set aside the family arrangement and to recover the portions of the estate that were then in the appellant’s possession. The appellant defended the suit by asserting that the family arrangement was binding upon the respondent. Anticipating a possible declaration that the arrangement might be void or voidable, the appellant filed a separate suit against the respondent, claiming title to various estates on the basis of the will of Raja Udit Narain as well as the will and the alleged gift of Raja Harnam. The respondent contested the appellant’s suit. The precise particulars of the claims and defences in each suit, and the merits thereof, are not the focus of these appeals and therefore need not be detailed. While both suits were pending, the appellant was, on 12 November 1945, declared by the District Judge of Lucknow, exercising powers under the Lunacy Act, 1912, to be of unsound mind. Following that declaration, the Court of Wards assumed supervisory control over the appellant’s properties pursuant to the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Court of Wards Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The Court placed the properties under the charge of the Deputy Commissioner of Barabanki, the district in which the majority of the lands lay, and designated the bundle of properties as the “Ganeshpur estate”. In accordance with section 55 of the Act, the cause titles in both pending suits were amended to substitute the appellant’s name with the description “Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki I/C Court of Wards, Ganeshpur estate”, where the abbreviation “I/C” signified “in charge of”. After these amendments, the respondent’s suit was dismissed by decree dated 3 June 1947, except insofar as it concerned his claim to two villages. The court found that in those villages Raja Harnam possessed only a life estate and that, upon his death, the appellant had no right to them; moreover, the villages had been transferred to the appellant under the family arrangement erroneously. As the family arrangement was substantially

The decree in the respondent’s suit affirmed the family arrangement, which made the appellant’s suit unnecessary because it rested on the premise that the arrangement was void or could be avoided; consequently the appellant’s suit had to be dismissed. Two appeals were then filed in the High Court at Lucknow. The first appeal, filed by the Deputy Commissioner of Barabanki on behalf of the appellant’s estate, sought to set aside the decree dismissing the appellant’s suit and was recorded as F.C.A. No. 99 of 1947. The second appeal, filed by the respondent, sought to overturn the decree dismissing his own suit and was recorded as F.C.A. No. 2 of 1948. The appeal identified as F.C.A. No. 99 appears to have been lodged merely as a precaution, intended to be pursued only if the respondent’s appeal, F.C.A. 2 of 1948, succeeded. While these appeals were pending, the respondent filed an application under the relevant Act requesting that his estate be placed under the charge of the Court of Wards. The application was granted, and the Court of Wards assumed superintendence of the respondent’s estate on 8 February 1950. Because the estate lay within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner of Barabanki, it was also placed under his charge, and the Court of Wards retained the estate’s former name, Ramnagar estate. In compliance with section 55 of the Act, the cause titles of the appeals were amended, and the name “Deputy Commissioner Barabanki I/C Court of Wards Ramnagar estate” was substituted for the respondent’s name. Consequently, the cause titles became: Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki I/C Court of Wards Ganeshpur estate as appellant versus Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki I/C Court of Wards Ramnagar estate as respondent; and Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki I/C Court of Wards Ramnagar estate as appellant versus Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki I/C Court of Wards Ganeshpur estate as respondent. This resulted in both the appellant’s and the respondent’s estates falling under the superintendence of the same Court of Wards and being placed in the charge of the same Deputy Commissioner, each party suing and being sued in that capacity. This situation gave rise to the present proceedings from which the appeals originated.

Before the present proceedings could be addressed, further developments occurred. On 3 December 1951 the Court of Wards passed a resolution to settle the appeals on specific terms, believing that such a settlement served the best interests of the two contending wards, especially in view of the heavy costs of the litigation and the imminent legislation concerning the abolition of zemindaries. Following the Court of Wards’ instructions, counsel for the parties filed petitions in the High Court on 28 April 1952, requesting that the compromises be recorded and that decrees be issued in accordance with those compromises. The High Court, on 2 May 1952, issued orders directing that the compromises be formally recorded and that appropriate decrees be passed in the appeals. Accordingly, the appeals were disposed of, and the related proceedings were terminated.

In the proceedings, the Court of Wards had ordered that the appeals be settled on certain terms, after which the appeals were considered disposed of and the related proceedings were terminated. While the paperbooks for those appeals were being prepared, the Court did not set out the specific terms of the compromise, deeming it unnecessary to detail them in the judgment. Nevertheless, it was noted that the petitions embodying the compromise bore the signature of Mr K A P Stevenson on two separate occasions. The first signature identified him as Deputy Commissioner of Barabanki, in charge of the Court of Wards for the Ramnagar estate, and also as the appellant in F C A No 2 of 1948 and respondent in F C A No 99 of 1947. The second signature identified him again as Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, in charge of the Court of Wards for the Ganeshpur estate, and as the respondent in F C A No 2 of 1948 and appellant in F C A No 99 of 1947. Thus, the same official signed each petition once representing the appellant and once representing the respondent. The petitions were presented in Court by Sri Sita Ram, who acted as advocate for the appellant’s estate, and by Sri Bishun Singh, who acted as advocate for the respondent’s estate. After the compromise decrees were passed, the Act abolishing zamindaris came into force in Uttar Pradesh, causing the zamindari estates of the parties to vest in the Government of Uttar Pradesh and leading to the cessation of the Court of Wards. Anticipating this change, the Court of Wards released the parties’ estates. However, because the appellant was adjudged to be of unsound mind, a lunacy proceeding before the District Judge of Lucknow on 27 April 1953 placed her estate under the charge of the Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, and Mr M L Sarin, appointing them as guardians of her person and property. Several years later, the appellant recovered her mental capacity, and on 6 October 1956 the District Judge, Lucknow, declared her to be of sound mind, discharged her guardians, and restored possession of her properties to her. After regaining competence, the appellant became dissatisfied with the earlier compromise, believing it had not served her interests, and sought a way to set it aside. Consequently, on 14 January 1957 she filed two applications before the High Court at Lucknow, one in each of the appeals numbered 99 of 1947 and 2 of 1948, requesting that the preparation of the paperbooks be resumed under Chapter XIII of the Rules of the High Court from the point where it had been interrupted by the compromise decrees. She argued that those decrees were a nullity and therefore did not terminate the appeals, which should be considered pending. The High Court heard both applications together and dismissed them by judgment and order dated 22 November 1957.

In these proceedings, the appellant challenged the judgment and orders that gave rise to the present appeals, which had been consolidated by an order of the High Court and were therefore heard together before this Court. The appellant did not contend that the compromise had been obtained by fraud or any other defect that would warrant setting it aside, and no relief was sought to avoid the compromise. Although the appellant’s original petitions alleged that the compromise resulted from fraud and collusion, she subsequently amended those petitions by removing the paragraphs containing such allegations and elected to rely solely on a purely legal argument that the compromise was a nullity. Consequently, the Court did not need to examine the specific terms of the compromise, and no issue was raised concerning the fairness of the compromise or whether it should be avoided on equitable grounds. The appellant maintained that, if the compromise decrees were indeed a nullity, she would be entitled to proceed as though those decrees had never existed, and on that basis her applications for the resumption of the preparation of the paper-books would be competent and should be granted. The central question, therefore, was whether the compromise decrees could be declared a nullity. The appellant argued that the decrees were null because the mandatory requirements of section 56 of the Act had not been complied with. Section 56 provides: “When in any suit or proceeding two or more wards being parties have conflicting interests, the Court of Wards shall appoint for each such ward a representative and the said representative shall thereupon conduct or defend the case on behalf of the ward whom he represents, subject to the general control of the Court of Wards.” It was acknowledged that no representative had been appointed under this provision for either party in the two appeals. The appellant contended that this omission rendered the compromise decrees void, asserting that the terms of section 56 were imperative. The Court examined whether section 56 imposes a mandatory duty. While the provision uses the word “shall,” the Court noted that such language is not determinative of a mandatory requirement, referring to the authority in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent must be discerned from the statute as a whole. The appellant advanced several grounds for treating section 56 as imperative, the first being that, otherwise, in view of section 55, the provision would be otiose. Section 55 states: “No ward shall sue or be sued nor shall any proceedings be taken in the civil court otherwise than by and in the name of the Collector in charge of his property or such other person as the Court of Wards may appoint in this behalf.” The appellant argued that the concluding words of section 55 grant the Court of Wards discretionary power to appoint a representative, and therefore, if section 56 were merely directory, it would also confer discretionary power, making it redundant. The Court found this contention unpersuasive, noting that for one provision to render another otiose, both must address the same subject-matter and serve the same purpose, an analysis the appellant’s argument failed to satisfy.

In this case, the learned counsel argued that the concluding words of section 55 gave the Court of Wards a discretionary authority to appoint a representative. The counsel further submitted that if section 56 were interpreted only as a directory provision, it would also grant the same discretionary power and therefore become unnecessary. The Court examined this submission and found it to be without merit, because for one statutory provision to be rendered redundant, or otiose, by the interpretation of another, the interpretation must cause both provisions to address the same subject-matter and pursue the identical legislative purpose. If the two provisions deal with different subjects or serve different objectives, they cannot necessarily render each other redundant. The counsel’s argument relied on the premise that, when read as a mandatory provision, section 56 would not be redundant and would therefore fulfil a purpose distinct from that of section 55. The Court could not discern any logical basis for claiming that section 56 becomes redundant merely because it is read as a directory provision, while it would not be redundant if read as mandatory. The Court emphasized that the subject-matter of a statutory clause does not change simply because the clause is described as directory rather than mandatory; the content and object of the provision remain the same. Consequently, if section 56 is not redundant when treated as a mandatory provision, it cannot become redundant merely by being treated as a directory provision. The Court further noted that the notion of redundancy depends on whether the two sections overlap in their operative scope. In the present case, the two sections clearly regulate different aspects of the law, so that one cannot be said to dispense with the other.

The Court also identified a further weakness in the opposing contentions, namely the assumption that interpreting section 56 as a directory provision would automatically give the Court of Wards an unfettered discretion. Specifically, the assumption suggested that the Court could decide at its pleasure whether or not to appoint representatives for the wards. The Court clarified that a provision which expressly confers discretionary power allows the holder of that power to elect either to exercise the power or to refrain from doing so. In contrast, a directory provision merely imposes a duty of compliance and does not grant free discretion. A directory clause merely requires that the mandated step be taken, and failure to comply does not automatically render the subsequent act null and void. Accordingly, the Court rejected the proposition that reading section 56 as merely directory would vest any discretionary authority in the Court of Wards. The Court further observed that sections 55 and 56 address wholly separate matters. Section 55 deals exclusively with the name in which a ward may institute or defend a suit. It prescribes that the suit be brought in the name of the Collector who is in charge of the ward’s property or any other person appointed for that purpose. By contrast, section 56 governs the appointment of representatives when two or more wards are parties to the same litigation and possess conflicting interests. It authorises the Court of Wards to appoint a suitable person to defend or conduct the case on the wards’ behalf. Section 56 applies irrespective of whether the wards are sued in the name of the Collectors responsible for their properties or in the name of persons appointed by the Court of Wards under section 55. The provision does not require that the appointed representatives be entered in the court record as representing the wards, and its language makes clear that it contemplates a stage at which the wards are already parties to the suit. Accordingly, the Court concluded that reading section 56 as a directory provision does not render section 55 redundant and does not bestow any additional discretionary power on the Court of Wards.

The Court observed that when a ward’s property was administered by a Collector, or when another person was appointed under section 55, the litigation could proceed in the name of that Collector or appointed person. However, the Court noted that section 56 did not stipulate that the representatives appointed under that provision must replace the Collector or the person appointed under section 55 on the official record of the case. Consequently, the Court found that if section 56 were interpreted merely as a directory provision, it would not render section 55 redundant or pointless. The Court then turned to the argument that sections 57 and 58 of the Act also dealt with the appointment of representatives by the Court of Wards for certain proceedings involving the wards, and that the language in those sections—“shall be lawful for the Court of Wards to appoint” in section 57 and “may appoint” in section 58—contrasted with the word “shall” used in section 56. The argument asserted that this linguistic difference demonstrated the legislature’s intention to make section 56 mandatory. The Court rejected this line of reasoning, stating that the mere presence of the word “shall” in one provision and softer terms such as “shall be lawful” or “may” in others does not automatically render the former provisions obligatory. Each statutory clause must be examined individually, taking into account the context, the purpose of the provision, and other relevant considerations, which may lead to the conclusion that even a provision containing the word “shall” can be directory. In this view, sections 57 and 58 suggested that if the appointments contemplated in those sections were merely directory, then the appointments under section 56 should also be understood as directory. The Court explained that section 57 empowered the Court of Wards, whenever a question arose between two or more wards that warranted adjudication by a civil court, to appoint a representative for each ward. Those representatives were required to prepare a statement setting out the points for determination and to file that statement in a civil court as a case seeking the court’s opinion. The civil court was then directed to hear and dispose of the case in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, and the case was to be conducted by the appointed representatives, subject to the overall control of the Court of Wards. Similarly, section 58 authorized the Court of Wards, when it deemed that a dispute between two or more wards was suitable for arbitration, to appoint a representative for each ward and to require those representatives to refer the dispute to arbitration before a person or persons approved by the Court of Wards. From these provisions, the Court concluded that the position of a ward under section 56 was essentially the same as under sections 57 and 58, indicating a consistent legislative approach to the appointment of representatives for wards in various types of proceedings.

In each case a ward had a dispute with another ward, and their interests conflicted. In the first two cases the conflict was referred to a civil court, and in the third case it was referred to arbitration. The Court observed that there was no reason to think that the legislature intended the wards’ interests to receive greater protection in a matter governed by section 56 than in a matter governed by sections 57 or 58. Consequently, if, as the argument admitted, the appointment of representatives was not made mandatory by the legislature under sections 57 and 58, the legislature could not have intended the appointment of representatives under section 56 to be mandatory. The Court then considered the argument that the purpose of section 56 was to protect the wards’ interests and that, unless the provision was obeyed, the wards’ interests would suffer, thereby requiring a mandatory construction of section 56. The Court noted that this argument ignored the portion of section 56 which made the representatives appointed under it subject to the general control of the Court of Wards in the performance of their duties. From this, the Court concluded that the legislature intended the Court of Wards to retain overall responsibility for the wards’ interests, despite the appointment of representatives and despite the existence of conflicting interests among the wards. Accordingly, the direction to appoint representatives was not inserted in section 56 for the purpose of safeguarding the conflicting interests of the wards or of removing those interests from the charge of the Court of Wards. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the very concept of the Court of Wards Act, which did not envisage a situation where the Court of Wards would retain control of the estates while the wards’ interests were taken out of its hands. The Court therefore agreed with the view expressed by the learned judges of the High Court that the reason for incorporating section 56 in the Act was to avoid embarrassment to the officers of the Court of Wards who might have been required, in certain cases, to represent rival interests. The Court found that nothing in the object of section 56 indicated that its terms were intended to be imperative. The Court also examined the matter from another perspective. Under section 15 of the Act, when the Court of Wards assumed superintendence of any property, it was required to nominate a collector or another suitable officer to be placed in charge of that property. In practice, the collector of the district, sometimes referred to as the Deputy Commissioner, in which the larger portion of the property was situated, was usually nominated for that purpose.

In the case under consideration, the estates of both the appellant and the respondent were located in the same district of Barabanki, and consequently the Court of Wards had placed them under the charge of the same officer, namely the Deputy Commissioner of that district. The Court observed that in other situations the estates of different wards might be placed under the charge of different Collectors or Deputy Commissioners. Section 56 of the Act would still be applicable in such circumstances if the two wards happened to be parties to litigation in which their interests conflicted. The Court found it would be anomalous to hold any decree issued in such a suit to be a nullity merely because the formal requirement of appointing representatives under section 56 had not been fulfilled. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the omission could not be said to have prejudiced the wards’ interests, because each Collector or Deputy Commissioner would be free to protect the interests of the ward under his own charge in the most effective manner. This line of reasoning reinforced the view that section 56 was not intended to be mandatory.

The Court then turned to the arguments presented in support of the contention that section 56 was an imperative provision. After a careful examination, the Court concluded that those arguments possessed no persuasive force. The determination of whether a statutory provision is imperative or discretionary ultimately depends upon the intention of the legislature, and the purpose of the rules of construction is to discover that intention. The Court found no interpretative rule or textual indicator that would lead to a reading of section 56 as imposing an obligatory duty. The provision, the Court held, existed solely to remove practical inconvenience in the conduct of a suit or its defence. By expressly providing that any appointed representatives would remain subject to the control of the Court of Wards, the provision made clear that the Court of Wards retained all powers with respect to the litigation, notwithstanding the appointment of representatives.

Section 38 of the Act empowers the Court of Wards to do anything it deems advantageous for the ward, including the conduct of litigation on the ward’s behalf. Consequently, the Court of Wards could direct the appointed representatives to settle the litigation on terms it decided. If the Court of Wards could compel the representatives in this manner, it would be unreasonable to suggest that the Court itself could not settle the dispute. The Court therefore concluded that even where representatives had been appointed under section 56, the Court of Wards retained the authority to settle the litigation directly. This analysis led the Court to hold that the appointment of representatives was not intended to be obligatory, and that section 56 must be characterised as a directory provision. Accordingly, the failure to comply with the formalities of section 56 did not render the compromise decrees in the present case void.

The party opposed the compromise by asserting that, in law, a compromise could not exist in this case because a compromise is a contract, and a contract requires two parties. It was contended that the sole party to the alleged compromise was the Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, and that no second party participated. The submission admitted the general principle that a contract needs two parties, but argued that this principle was misapplied to the present situation. It claimed that the presence of only one identified party meant that the compromise lacked the essential contractual element and therefore had to be declared a nullity. The argument further relied on the premise that, because the compromise was purportedly signed by the Deputy Commissioner alone, there could be no valid agreement between distinct parties, and consequently the decree based on that compromise should be set aside as void.

The Court rejected that contention, observing that the argument was based on a misunderstanding of the true nature of the compromise. It explained that the compromise was, in reality, an agreement between the two wards – the appellant and the respondent – and that the Court of Wards had facilitated the settlement by exercising its statutory authority. The Court noted that the power of the Court of Wards to conclude a compromise on behalf of a ward was undisputed and did not disappear when the Court was dealing with two of its wards. Accordingly, the settlement created a contract between the two wards, and the Court of Wards acted as the contracting party for each side. The provision of the Act, specifically section 61(1), expressly allows the Court of Wards to execute a contract for a ward either in its own name or on the ward’s behalf. Sub-section (3) of the same section provides that when both the transferor and the transferee are wards of the Court, the Court may enter into covenants on behalf of each ward respectively. Moreover, sub-section (2) of section 61 states that covenants made by the Court of Wards on a ward’s behalf bind that ward. The Court observed that without the power to create contracts between its wards, the efficient management of ward property would often be impossible. The statutory scheme did not contain any limitation preventing the Court from making a contract between two wards. Although the cause titles listed the Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, as both appellant and respondent, the Court clarified that this representation did not make the Deputy Commissioner a party to the dispute. Instead, the titles identified the Deputy Commissioner as the official representing the two actual parties – the appellant ward and the respondent ward – in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Consequently, the compromise was a valid settlement between the two wards, not a unilateral act of the Deputy Commissioner, and the decree based on that compromise could not be said to be a nullity.

The Court observed that Section 55 of the Act expressly states that the individual who is suing or who is being sued is the ward, and that such suit must be brought in the name of the Collector on behalf of the ward. Consequently, when the present appeals were settled by compromise, the settlement necessarily involved the two actual parties to the appeals, namely the appellant and the respondent. The settlement was not a self-agreement entered into by the Deputy Commissioner of Barabanki with himself, even though he alone signed the compromise petition. The contention that a valid compromise could not exist because there were not two distinct parties therefore fails. The Court further considered the argument that the compromise decrees should be treated as a nullity on the basis of Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, which governs suits involving minors and persons of unsound mind and requires the appointment of a guardian who has no interest in the litigation. The appellant argued that, being a person of unsound mind, a disinterested guardian should have been appointed for the appeals and that the Deputy Commissioner could not be considered disinterested because he also represented the opposing party. The appellant therefore claimed that the decrees issued without the appointment of another guardian were void.

The Court noted that Order XXXII, rule 4(2) provides that once a guardian has been duly appointed by a competent authority, no additional guardian may be appointed unless the court, after recording reasons, determines that appointing another person is necessary for the welfare of the disabled individual. Section 27 of the Act empowers the Court of Wards to appoint a guardian for a ward who is of unsound mind. In the present case, the Deputy Commissioner of Barabanki had indeed been appointed as the appellant’s guardian under the Act when her lunacy caused her estate to fall under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, and her estate was placed in his charge. Accordingly, under Order XXXII, rule 4, the Deputy Commissioner was lawfully entitled to act as the appellant’s guardian for the purpose of the appeals, and no order had been made directing the appointment of a different guardian. The Court further emphasized that the Court of Wards is a statutory body created specifically to protect the interests of wards, and that its institutional structure ensures impartiality that distinguishes it from a private guardian. Accordingly, no fault could be attributed to the Court of Wards for having retained responsibility for the appellant’s interests even though it was simultaneously overseeing the interests of the respondent.

The Court observed that the interests of the respondent were also being looked after and it was at least arguable whether the civil court, by any order it might have made, could have prevented the Court of Wards from performing its statutory duty of protecting the ward’s interests. Consequently, the Court held that the failure of the civil court to appoint another person as guardian of the appellant for the suits or the appeals did not render the compromise decrees void.

The Court then turned to another point raised on behalf of the appellant, namely the allegation that no compromise had been reached between the two wards. The Court classified this allegation as a question of fact that had not been raised before the High Court. Because the respondent had not been given an opportunity to meet this factual allegation, and because the Court lacked the High Court’s view on the matter, it would be unfair to permit the respondent to face a new factual challenge at this stage. Nonetheless, after reviewing the material, the Court was satisfied that a genuine compromise had indeed been effected by the Court of Wards. The Court noted that a resolution passed by the Court of Wards specifically directed that a compromise be made, and that such a resolution was, in the Court’s opinion, the only mechanism by which the Court of Wards could bring about a settlement between the wards. The Court further pointed out that the compromise petitions had been signed by the Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, on two separate occasions – once on behalf of each party – and that the petitions had been presented to the court by the lawyers engaged for each side. On the basis of these observations, the Court concluded that the contention that no compromise existed was entirely without merit.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeals and ordered that they be dismissed with costs.

Justice Subba Rao noted that he had examined the judgment of his learned brother, Justice Sarkar, and expressed his inability to agree with the conclusions reached in that judgment. He remarked that the facts of the case and the procedural history were fully detailed in Justice Sarkar’s judgment, and that it was unnecessary to repeat them at length. For clarity, Justice Subba Rao summarized the factual backdrop that gave rise to the principal dispute. He stated that the appellant owned the Ganeshpur estate while the respondent owned the Ramnagar estate, and that both estates had become wards of the Court of Wards, with their management placed under the charge of the Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki. Litigation had arisen between the two estates, and at the critical juncture two appeals – identified as F.C.A. No. 99 of 1947 and F.C.A. No. 2 of 1948 – were pending before the High Court at Allahabad. The cause-titles in those appeals listed the parties as follows: Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, in his capacity as the incumbent of the Court of Wards, as plaintiff for the Ganeshpur estate, district Barabanki, against the Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, in his capacity as the incumbent of the Court of Wards, as defendant for the Ramnagar estate, district Barabanki, with the respondent identified as the Deputy Commissioner.

In this case, the list of parties shown in the two appeals made it clear that the same individual acted for both estates, and that the Deputy Commissioner of Barabanki served simultaneously as appellant and as respondent. The Court of Wards had apparently arranged a settlement between the two wards to resolve the disputes that existed between them, and, apparently acting on directions from the Court of Wards, the Deputy Commissioner filed a petition in the High Court seeking to have the compromise recorded. The petition bore the signature of Sri K. A. P. Stevenson, I.A.S., Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, who signed on behalf of both estates. On 2 May 1952 the High Court entered a decree confirming the compromise. These facts raised a concise yet challenging question: whether the compromise that had been effected was a nullity, thereby allowing the appellant to disregard it and to have the appeals decided on their substantive merits. The principal submission of the counsel for the appellant was that Section 56 of the Uttar Pradesh Court of Wards Act, 1912 imposed a statutory duty on the Court of Wards to appoint separate representatives whenever two of its wards had conflicting claims in a suit, and that the Court lacked jurisdiction to proceed with any suit, to make any order on the merits, or to record any compromise unless such appointments were made. The counsel argued that, in the present matter, no such appointments had been effected and that the compromise petition had been filed by the Deputy Commissioner in his dual capacity as both appellant and respondent; consequently, the decree that resulted from that petition was a nullity. If the decree were indeed a nullity, the counsel maintained, the High Court should ignore it and dispose of the appeals as though they remained pending for determination on their merits, a result that would lead to the acceptance of the appeals. The counsel’s other arguments and the detailed findings on those points were therefore omitted as unnecessary for the present discussion. The respondent’s counsel, in turn, conceded that an application under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code would be maintainable if the decree were a nullity, but contended that despite the failure to comply with the provisions of Section 56, the High Court possessed jurisdiction to record the compromise that had been lawfully effected by the Court of Wards, and therefore the decree could not be characterized as a nullity and could not be ignored. The resolution of the matter required a true construction of Section 56 of the Act. Section 56 is situated in Chapter VII of the Act, which deals with suits, and it would be appropriate at the outset to consider both Sections 55 and 56 together. Section 55 provides that no ward shall sue or be sued, nor shall any proceedings be taken in a civil court except in the name of the Collector in charge of his property or such other person as the Court of Wards may appoint for that purpose.

Section 55 of the Act stipulated that a ward could neither sue nor be sued, and that no civil proceeding could be instituted against the ward except in the name of the Collector who was in charge of the ward’s property, or in the name of any other person whom the Court of Wards might, at its discretion, appoint for that purpose. Section 56 addressed the special circumstance in which two or more wards who were parties to the same suit had conflicting interests. In such a case the provision required the Court of Wards to appoint a separate representative for each ward, and each appointed representative was required to conduct or defend the suit on behalf of the ward he or she represented, subject to the overall control of the Court of Wards. The two sections were placed side by side in the statute and appeared to complement each other. Section 55 set out the general rule governing how a ward could be sued or could sue, normally by using the Collector’s name, while also allowing the Court of Wards to designate another person in place of the Collector when it deemed it appropriate. Section 56, however, dealt with the particular situation where the ward-parties possessed opposite interests. In that situation the statute imposed a duty on the Court of Wards to appoint distinct representatives for each ward so that the conflict could be managed. The purpose of Section 56 was obvious: if the general rule of Section 55 were applied mechanically in a suit where the plaintiff and the defendant were both wards, the result would be that the Collector would appear as both plaintiff and defendant, an outcome that could not be tolerated by any sensible system of law. Moreover, such a procedure would be harmful to the wards because their separate interests might not be adequately protected or properly presented before the court. To prevent this anomalous result and the attendant prejudice, Section 56 was enacted. Consequently, a combined reading of the two provisions indicated that, in the situation described by Section 56, the procedure prescribed by Section 55 gave way to the procedure laid down in Section 56.

The next issue before the Court was the meaning of the term “representative” used in Section 56. The learned Additional Solicitor General argued that the term referred to an agent whose function was merely to assist the Collector, whereas counsel for the appellant contended that the term denoted a person who would be entered on the court record as the ward’s own representative. In law the word “representative” can have several meanings. To represent means to stand in the place of another, and a representative is a person who stands in the place of someone else. When the word is used with qualifiers such as “legal” or “personal,” especially in matters concerning land ownership, it may denote an heir, an executor or a legatee. However, in the context of a suit, the word is also employed in the sense of a person who actually represents another party before the court. The Court therefore examined the ordinary legal construction of the term and considered whether the statute intended to create a statutory representative who would act in the place of the disqualified ward, similar to a guardian appointed for a minor or an insolvent, or whether it merely envisaged an auxiliary agent to aid the Collector who already bore the statutory authority to sue or be sued on behalf of the ward.

In situations where the party to a suit is a disqualified person, such as a minor or a lunatic, the law requires that a guardian be appointed by the court to act in that person’s place; the suit cannot lawfully proceed without such a guardian. A statute, however, may give power to an authority other than the court to appoint a representative for a disqualified person, and that is the factual position in the present case. A statutory representative therefore functions in the same way as a court-appointed guardian: the representative acts for and in the place of the disqualified ward, and the suit is invalid if a valid representative is not entered on the record, just as a suit involving a minor or a lunatic fails without a guardian. If the legislature had intended merely to create a separate agent to assist the Collector in performing his dual role, it would have employed the word “agent” in the provision. Moreover, the Collector does not need statutory authority to appoint an agent because, as a party to the suit, he may always engage separate advocates to represent each ward. Consequently, the term “representative” does not signify an agent but conveys the idea of a person who stands in the place of a ward and is recorded as such. This interpretation is reinforced by other sections of the Act that use the same word. Section 57 of the Act states: “(1) Where any question arises as between two or more wards of such nature that an adjudication upon it by a civil court is expedient, it shall be lawful for the Court of Wards to appoint a representative on behalf of each ward. The representative so appointed shall prepare a statement containing the point or points for determination and shall on behalf of the said wards file the statement in a civil court having jurisdiction in the form of a case for the opinion of the said court, (2) The civil Court shall then proceed to hear and dispose of the case in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the hearing and disposal of suits. (3) The case shall be conducted on behalf of the wards by their representatives appointed under subsection (1) of this section subject to the general control of the Court of Wards.” From this provision it is clear that the duty of the representative under section 57 is not to act merely as a clerk or assistant, but to actually represent the ward in the proceedings; the representative must be on the record, and it is impossible to argue that a proceeding under section 57 can be initiated or concluded without such an appointment. Section 58 of the Act reads: “When it appears to the Court of Wards that any question or dispute arising between two or more wards…” This wording again indicates that the Court of Wards must first recognise a dispute before appointing a representative, underscoring that the representative’s role is to act on behalf of the ward in the proceeding.

The provision stated that if a question or dispute between wards was a fit subject for reference to arbitration, the Court of Wards could appoint a representative for each ward and could require those representatives to submit the question or dispute to an arbitration appointed by the Court. Under this section the appointment of a representative for each ward was a pre-requisite for the initiation and conduct of arbitration proceedings. The representative was therefore not appointed to assist the ward but to actually represent the ward in the proceedings. A well-known rule of construction required that the word “representative” be given a similar meaning throughout the Act unless the context demanded otherwise. The object of appointing a representative under sections 56, 57 and 58 was the same, and the same meaning should be given to the term, namely that the appointed person was one who represented the ward in the proceedings and was placed on the record as such. Emphasis was placed by some counsel on the words “conduct” or “defend” in section 56 and on the omission of the word “compromise”, and it was contended that the representative appointed under that section had no power to enter into a compromise. The Court did not accept that construction. The first part of section 56 commanded the Court of Wards to appoint a representative for each ward and the second part then directed that such representative should conduct or defend the case. The later part of the section did not define the meaning of “representative” nor limit its scope; it merely expressed that the suit could not proceed until a representative was appointed. Consequently a person appointed to represent a disqualified person possessed all the powers of a party, subject only to the limitations imposed by the relevant statutes. The only limitation imposed by section 56 was that the representative was subject to the general control of the Court of Wards. Accordingly the Court held that the representative could enter into a compromise, subject to the general control of the Court of Wards.

The Additional Solicitor General attempted to rely on case law that drew a distinction between the powers of a solicitor and those of a counsel. Those authorities held that a solicitor, being merely a representative of a client, could not settle a suit by compromise without obtaining the client’s consent, whereas a counsel, who directed the entire litigation, possessed the authority to compromise. The Court examined those authorities and concluded that they were rooted in the unique professional attributes of solicitors and counsel, and therefore could not be imported to give a new meaning to section 56 of the Act. The Court further rejected the argument that the requirement of the representative being under the general control of the Court of Wards meant that the representative was stripped of the power to compromise. The Court emphasized that the limitation of general control did not negate the representative’s ordinary powers as a party, including the power to compromise, and that this limitation only operated after a representative had been duly appointed. The Court observed that the appointing authority could not disregard its statutory obligation to appoint a representative and could not pretend to perform the functions of a representative by merely exercising its general control over a non-existent representative. Consequently, the question of control became relevant only after a representative was in place, and it could not be used to defeat the operation of section 56 or to prevent a valid compromise.

In this case, the Court observed that once a representative has been appointed, the authority that appointed the representative cannot simply disregard its statutory duty and claim to perform the duties of the representative by invoking its general control over a representative who in fact does not exist. The Court further held that even if it were assumed that the appointed representative lacks the power to compromise the suit, such an assumption does not alter the principal question before the Court. Accordingly, the authority that is empowered to effect a compromise must do so by causing the compromise to be presented in court through the appointed representatives and must obtain a decree based on that compromise. Nevertheless, the Court stressed that this requirement does not eliminate the necessity of appointing representatives to conduct and defend the suit, because without such representation the suit could not proceed and a decree on the compromise could not be obtained.

The Court also addressed the argument that the provisions of the relevant section are merely directory and that failure to comply with them would not invalidate a compromise decree if the compromise was made in good faith by a competent authority. The Court noted that the ordinary meaning of the word “shall” is obligatory, but many decisions have interpreted “shall” to mean “may” in certain contexts. The High Court, relying on the observations of this Court in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh (1), quoted the following passage: “It is one of the well-recognised rules of interpretation that a provision like this should be held to be non-mandatory unless non-compliance with the provision is visited with some penalty.” The Court examined that judgment and found that it does not establish an inflexible rule of construction. The same Court had previously construed the word “shall” in section 82 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which mandates that a petitioner shall join as respondent all candidates duly nominated at the election other than himself. Considering other provisions of the Act, especially section 85, and the similar construction in Order XXXIV, rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, this Court held that the word “shall” in section 82 was only directory. The Court clarified that it has not laid down any broad proposition that every statutory use of “shall” must be read as directory unless the provision carries a penalty for non-compliance. Likewise, the decision in The Queen v. Ingall (2) does not establish such a sweeping rule.

Finally, the Court referred to section 42 of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act, 1869, which prescribes that various acts related to valuation must be performed within the times specified, such as completing all valuation matters before 31 March, with the valuation list coming into force on 6 April. The Court noted that other sections of the same Act provide for the preparation of valuation lists even when those lists have not been made in strict conformity with the statutory requirements. The Court observed that the observance of the prescribed times is not enforced by penal provisions.

In that case the Court observed that the prescribed times for completing certain acts were not backed by any penal provision, and therefore, even though section 42 of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869 used the word “shall,” the Court held that the provision operated only as a directory requirement. While interpreting the section, Lush, J. explained that the proper approach was to consider the purpose that the legislature intended when it enacted the Valuation (Metropolis) Act, 1869, and to balance two competing considerations: the inconvenience that would arise if a valuation list were declared null and void, versus the risk of harm that could result from a delay in preparing the list. He concluded that the former inconvenience represented a greater evil, and consequently the list should be deemed valid. This judgment thus serves as authority for the principle that the legislature’s intent must be discerned from the object of the statute, while also weighing the practical consequences of accepting one interpretative view over another. The decision in Caldow v. Pixwell (1) addressed section 29 of the Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Act, 1871, which required the bishop, within three calendar months after a benefice was avoided, to direct a surveyor to inspect the benefice’s buildings and to report the amount, if any, needed to remedy dilapidations attributable to the former incumbent or his estate. The Court held that the time-limit imposed on the bishop’s direction was only directory, not mandatory, and that a bishop’s instruction to inspect and report more than three months after the avoidance could still be valid. Denman, J. set out three guiding rules for construing such provisions: (i) the scope and purpose of a statute are the sole guides for deciding whether its provisions are directory or imperative; (ii) when there is no explicit provision, the legislature’s intention must be ascertained by weighing the consequences of treating the provision as directory versus imperative; and (iii) the statute imposes a public duty upon the bishop and does not confer a private power or privilege on the newly appointed incumbent. On these bases, the learned judge concluded that the provision was merely directory. Venkatarama Ayyar, J., speaking in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque (1), observed that the rules of construction are well known and need not be reiterated, but they merely serve as aids to discover the true legislative intention, which remains the decisive factor and must ultimately be derived from the context. The celebrated commentary in Craies on Statute Law, 5th edition, at page 242, is cited to stress that no universal rule exists for determining whether a statutory enactment is to be treated as directory or obligatory, and that courts must strive to ascertain the genuine intention of the legislature by carefully examining the whole statutory scheme.

The judgment first explained that the law does not contain a fixed rule to decide whether a statutory duty that uses mandatory language must be read as merely directory or as obligatory with an implied consequence of nullity for non-compliance. It emphasized that it is the responsibility of the courts to discern the true intention of the legislature by examining the entire scope and purpose of the statute that is being interpreted. With that principle in mind, the Court turned to the specific provisions of section 56 of the Act. The purpose of section 56, according to the Court, is to avoid the absurd situation where the same individual would be placed both as plaintiff and as defendant, and to create an effective mechanism for protecting the interests of persons who are wards under the supervision of the Court of Wards. The Court observed that if the appointment of a statutory representative were left to the discretion of the Court of Wards, the very object of the section would be frustrated, because the person for whose benefit the provision was enacted could end up being represented by the opposite party – an extreme anomaly. Conversely, the Court held that no harmful consequences are likely to arise if the provision is interpreted as mandatory. A statutory body such as the Court of Wards can be trusted to perform the duties imposed by section 56, and even if it fails, the suit or appeal can be heard on its merits or a fresh compromise can be arranged after following the prescribed procedure.

Considering the balance of convenience, the Court found that construing the provision as mandatory rather than merely directory best serves the legislative intent. Accordingly, the Court held that the legislature intended section 56 to be mandatory and that the word “shall” could not be read as “may,” rejecting the argument presented by counsel for the respondent. The Court also rejected the contention advanced by the learned Additional Solicitor General that a breach of a mandatory provision would not affect the validity of a compromise. Since the Court had determined that an appeal could not proceed without a statutory representative on the record, any proceeding—including the issuance of a compromise decree—carried out without such a representative was declared null and void. Before concluding, the Court referred to the Judicial Committee’s decision in Braja Sunder Deb v. Rajendra Narayan Bhanj Deo, a case that was heavily relied upon by the other side to argue that non-compliance with a mandatory provision would not invalidate a compromise decree. In that case, a suit between Raja Rajendra Narayan Bhanj Deo and Raja Braja Sunder Deb, the latter having become a ward of the Court of Wards, was settled by compromise. The compromise petition was filed, a decree was issued, and subsequently a technical objection was raised before the High Court. The Subordinate Judge then decreed the suit in accordance with the terms of the compromise.

In the matter before the Court, the parties had entered into a compromise and a formal decree dated December 22, 1922 was drawn. In the cause-title of that decree the manager of the Court of Wards was shown as the second defendant, although the proper description should have been that he was the representative of the first defendant. In the earlier decision reported as (1) (1937) L.R. 65 I.A.57, the body of the decree expressly stated that the manager of the Court of Wards had been substituted as guardian for the ward. The appellant in that earlier case contended that because the manager of the Court of Wards was made an additional defendant rather than a guardian ad litem of the appellant, the compromise decree could not bind him. The Judicial Committee rejected that contention and held that when the correct parties are placed on the record and are dealt with on the appropriate footing, a mere defect of form does not invalidate the bargain of the parties or the decree of the Court. In the present case, however, a mandatory statutory provision was not complied with. The suit was conducted with the Collector appearing both as plaintiff and as defendant, and the wards were not represented by separate statutory representatives because no such representatives had been appointed. Consequently, the Court found that the circumstances of the present case were not analogous to those in the earlier decision. For the reasons stated, the Court held that the compromise decree was a nullity and that the appeal should be considered as still pending in the file of the High Court. In reaching that conclusion, the Court expressed that it was relieved of the duty of addressing the other questions that had been raised and vigorously argued, namely whether the Court of Wards possessed the power to settle conflicting disputes between two wards and whether such a settlement would constitute a lawful agreement within the meaning of Order XXIII, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the order of the High Court was set aside and the parties were directed to dispose of the appeals in accordance with law. The appellant was awarded his costs both in this proceeding and in the High Court. In line with the majority opinion, the appeals were dismissed with costs.