Ramanlal Mohanlal Pandya vs The State Of Bombay

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 21 April, 1959

Coram: S. Jafer Imam, J.L. Kapur

Ramanlal Mohanlal Pandya v. State of Bombay was heard by the Supreme Court of India on 21 April 1959. The judgment was authored by Justice J. L. Kapur, and the bench comprised Justice S. Jafer Imam and Justice J. L. Kapur. The case presented an appeal against the order of the High Court of Bombay, which had upheld the conviction of the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code for allegedly receiving a bribe of two hundred and fifty rupees on 24 June 1954.

The appellant, Ramanlal Mohanlal Pandya, held the position of Police Prosecutor at Anand in the Kaira district. The background of the matter began on 21 July 1953 when a man identified as Fatesing Somabhai, together with certain associates, lodged a criminal complaint against Ramanbhai Harmanbhai, a resident of the village of Ajarpura, who was the original complainant in the case. The following day Ramanbhai Harmanbhai filed a counter-complaint against Fatesing Somabhai and his companions. The police proceeded to file charge-sheets in both matters, and the proceedings continued without resolution for several months.

On 17 June 1954 the parties discussed the possibility of settling and compounding the complaints. Ramanbhai Harmanbhai indicated a willingness to pay a sum of one hundred rupees, whereas Fatesing Somabhai and his co-accused demanded two hundred rupees, causing the settlement negotiations to break down. That same day three witnesses were examined, and the cases were subsequently adjourned to a later date of 24 June 1954. The appellant, acting in his capacity as Police Prosecutor, was responsible for conducting the prosecution on behalf of the State.

On 24 June 1954 the complainant was travelling back to his village and arrived at Umreth Railway Station. The appellant, who was also at the station and preparing to travel to Anand, was approached by the complainant who inquired whether a compromise could still be arranged. The appellant invited the complainant to visit his residence a day before the next scheduled hearing and, noting that the complainant did not know his address, provided it to him. The complainant complied and on the morning of 23 June 1954, at approximately nine-thirty a.m., he proceeded to the appellant’s house.

During this meeting the appellant assured the complainant that there was no cause for alarm regarding his case, but that he should pay the appellant a sum of two hundred and fifty rupees if he expected the complainant to be acquitted. The complainant expressed his inability to produce the full amount, yet the appellant refused to accept any lesser sum and instructed the complainant to return the following morning between eight and nine o’clock. After leaving the appellant’s house, the complainant reported the bribery demand to Ramanbhai Shankarbhai, who served as the secretary of the Taluka Congress Committee in Anand.

Ramanbhai Shankarbhai subsequently introduced the complainant to Sub-Inspector Kantilal Patel of the Anti-Corruption Branch based at Surat. The complainant reiterated the bribe demand to the Sub-Inspector, who then reported the matter to Deputy Superintendent of Police Pandya, also of the Anti-Corruption Branch. In response, Deputy Superintendent Pandya travelled to Anand accompanied by Sub-Inspector Patel. On the next morning Deputy Superintendent Pandya summoned the complainant, recorded his statement, and called upon two panch witnesses, Mohanbhai Shankarbhai and Rambhai Dahyabhai, to be present during the proceeding. Two panch witnesses, Mohanbhai Shankarbhai, were then called and the narrative continues beyond the present excerpt.

Rambhai Dahyabhai was also summoned, and while he and the other panch witness were present the complainant was searched. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Pandya, then handed the complainant a sum of Rs 250, which consisted of two ten-rupee notes and two one-hundred-rupee notes. One of the panch witnesses, Mohanbhai Shankarbhai, was instructed to accompany the complainant to the residence of the appellant. Both the complainant and Mohanbhai proceeded to the appellant’s house, and they were trailed by Sub-Inspector Kantilal, Sub-Inspector Rathod and Deputy Superintendent Pandya. At the house the complainant gave the money to the appellant; after receiving the notes the appellant placed them in the pocket of his shirt. At a pre-arranged signal the police officers together with the other panch witness, Rambhai Dahyabhai, rushed into the appellant’s home. Sub-Inspector Kantilal seized the appellant’s hands, and Deputy Superintendent Pandya demanded that the appellant produce the money he had just received. The appellant initially hesitated, but when Pandya showed him his identification card he removed the notes from his shirt pocket and threw them onto the floor. Mohanbhai Shankarbhai collected the scattered notes, and a comparison showed that the serial numbers matched those of the notes originally supplied by Deputy Superintendent Pandya. Following this operation the appellant was charged under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code.

The defence asserted that the prosecution case had been instigated by a man named Tribhuwandas and a lawyer called Bhailalbhai, with whom the appellant supposedly had an enmity. The appellant denied ever meeting the complainant at the railway station and also denied going to his own house on the 23rd of the month. According to the defence version, on the morning of 24 June 1954 the appellant was seated with his father and a Dr Mangaldas when the complainant, accompanied by another individual, arrived at the appellant’s residence to inquire whether his case would be taken up that day. When the appellant replied affirmatively, the complainant asked him to step outside. Outside, the complainant talked with the appellant for about seven or eight minutes and then produced a bundle of currency notes, urging the appellant to accept them. The appellant allegedly responded by striking the complainant on the hand, causing the notes to fall. At that moment other persons arrived, surrounded the appellant, forced him to sit on a chair and, according to the defence, the appellant subsequently lost consciousness. These two contrasting narratives formed the basis of the trial. The prosecution’s case relied on the testimony of the complainant and the witnesses Mohanbhai Shankarbhai, Rambhai Dahyabhai, Sub-Inspector Kantilal and Deputy Superintendent Pandya. Both the trial court and the High Court gave acceptance to the statements of these witnesses, and the High Court examined their evidence, particularly that of Deputy Superintendent Pandya, in considerable detail. The appellant’s counsel argued that the witnesses were partisan and that their testimony should be treated as that of accomplices, noting that the sum of Rs 250 had been provided by Deputy Superintendent Pandya.

The counsel for the appellant argued that the witnesses were not merely partisan but that their testimony should be regarded as evidence of accomplices because the sum of Rs 250 had been supplied by Deputy Superintendent of Police Pandya. In support of that contention, reference was made to the case of Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh,. However, that decision had been explained in a later judgment reported as State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh,, where Justice S.K. Das observed that the court did not intend to create a principle that the source of money offered as a bribe, even if it came from a person other than the bribe-giver, would affect the legal analysis. The judgment further explained that when assessing a witness’s testimony, many considerations must be taken into account and that each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances. The learned judge also stated the correct rule as follows: if any witness is an accomplice, that is, a particeps criminis with respect to the offence charged, then the witness’s evidence must be treated in the same manner as evidence of accomplices; if the witness is merely partisan or an interested person who is involved in the success of a trap, then the evidence must be tested in the same way as other interested evidence, applying a variety of considerations that may differ from case to case, and a proper court may even require independent corroboration before convicting the accused. The court noted that it is not established law that the provision of money by a particular police officer automatically renders the testimony of all witnesses to be that of accomplices and therefore suspicious. In the present matter, although Rs 250 had indeed been handed to the complainant by Deputy Superintendent Pandya with the intention that it be passed to the appellant as a bribe, the court held that even in such a circumstance the witnesses’ testimony must be evaluated like that of any other witness, with all relevant factors considered and weighed according to the specific facts of this case. In the present case, the money was given to the appellant in the presence of one of the search witnesses, Mohanbhai Shankarbhai, and when the appellant threw the notes on the ground they were picked up by that witness at the direction of Deputy Superintendent Pandya. Accordingly, the court could not conclude that these two witnesses were not independent, even though they had consented to act as search or Panch witnesses. The trial court had described Mohanbhai Shankarbhai as a respectable individual, formerly a teacher, then a businessman, who at the time of the incident served on the Agricultural Produce Market Committee and had no connection whatsoever with the complainant.

Rambhai Dahyabhai was described as a Bachelor of Agriculture with honours who held the position of Assistant Dairy Superintendent in the Kaira District Co-operative Milk Union Limited. The record showed that he had no relationship with either the complainant or any other individual that could be said to make him hostile toward the appellant. The trial court observed that it was highly improbable that persons of such standing would become willing tools in the hands of Shri Tribhowandas and Bhailalbhai to fabricate false evidence against an innocent man, and it quoted this view in the following words: “It appears to be highly improbable that such persons would be willing tools in the hands of Shri Tribhowandas and Bhailalbhai in fabricating false evidence against an innocent man.” The High Court also accepted the testimony of these witnesses. The case did not involve any action by the police or any other authority to coerce a particular person; rather, a complaint had been lodged alleging that the appellant was demanding a bribe from the complainant. The police had supplied the money and were themselves witnesses to the handing over of the money, but there was no suggestion that the police had induced anyone to offer a bribe to the appellant.

Even if corroborative evidence were required, the trial court had already obtained such corroboration from the statements of Mohanbhai Shankarbhai and Rambhai Dahyabhai. The Court recalled its earlier observation in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan that independent corroboration of every material circumstance is not necessary; it is sufficient that additional evidence makes the accused’s story probable and safe to rely upon, and that corroboration need not be direct but may be circumstantial. The Court further noted that, under Section 157 of the Evidence Act, a prior statement of a complainant can serve as evidence of conduct and as corroborative material. In Basawan Singh’s case, the Court had similarly held that corroboration need not be direct proof of the accused’s commission of the crime; it is enough if it is merely circumstantial evidence of a connection with the offence. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the lower courts had not applied any erroneous principle. Having accepted all essential facts constituting the offence, the conviction was deemed proper and correct. The offence was alleged to have occurred in June 1954, and the appellant had already served about three months of his sentence. He had first appealed to the High Court, whose decision on 10 September 1955 dismissed the appeal and upheld the trial-court sentence.

The appellant subsequently applied for and was granted special leave to appeal before this Court on 21 November 1955, and following that order he was released on bail. The record shows that after the grant of special leave a substantial period elapsed before the appeal could be listed and heard, and this delay was acknowledged by the Court. In spite of the elapsed time, the Court examined the facts and concluded that the sentence imposed by the trial Court could not be characterised as excessive or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court observed that, as a general rule, it does not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment fixed by the Courts below, particularly when exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Court also emphasized that a public servant who is found guilty of corruption commits a very serious offence, and the judiciary would not approach such a matter with undue leniency. On the basis of these considerations, the Court decided to dismiss the appeal filed by the appellant.