Ram Gopal vs Anant Prasad And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 284 of 1958

Decision Date: 21 April 1959

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, S.K. Das

In the matter titled Ram Gopal versus Anant Prasad and Another, the Supreme Court issued its judgment on the twenty-first day of April, 1959. The judgment was authored by Justice A K Sarkar, and the bench comprised Justices A K Sarkar, S K Das, Subbarao and K C. The case is reported in the 1959 volume of the All India Reporter at page 851 and also appears in the 1959 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports at page 692, with a subsequent citation in the 1963 volume of the Supreme Court Reports at page 64. The substantive issue before the Court involved the statutory framework governing the appeal and maintainability of applications for a permit to operate a stage carriage under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 (the Act), specifically sections 47, 57, 58 and 64.

The appellant, Ram Gopal, held a permit to run a stage carriage that was nearing expiration and therefore applied to the State Transport Authority for a renewal of that permit for an additional period. The respondent, Anant Prasad, opposed the renewal of the appellant’s permit and simultaneously submitted his own application seeking the grant of the same permit to himself. The State Transport Authority issued an order renewing the appellant’s permit for a term of three years, but it did not include any express decision on the respondent’s application. The respondent appealed this order to the Appellate Tribunal, which in turn cancelled the appellant’s renewed permit and granted the permit to the respondent. Dissatisfied with that outcome, the appellant approached the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya Pradesh seeking a writ of certiorari to set aside the Tribunal’s order on the ground that the appeal was not maintainable because the Act purportedly did not permit an appeal from a decision of the subordinate authority. The Judicial Commissioner, however, held that the appeal was competent and therefore dismissed the writ application. On behalf of the appellant, it was argued that the respondent’s appeal should be deemed non-maintainable for two principal reasons: first, because the State Transport Authority had not issued an explicit order rejecting the respondent’s application, section 64(a) of the Act allegedly did not confer a right of appeal; second, that sections 47, 57 and 58 of the Act stripped the State Transport Authority of jurisdiction to consider the respondent’s fresh application after the renewal of the appellant’s permit, rendering any order on the respondent’s request invalid. Additionally, it was contended that section 64 of the Act limited appeals by persons aggrieved by the renewal of a permit to those enumerated in clause (f) of that provision, a category that did not include the respondent, and that even assuming the appeal was permissible under section 64(a), the Appellate Tribunal lacked authority to set aside the renewal order. The Court, in its holding, began by examining the nature of the order issued by the State Transport Authority in the present case, focusing on whether the order amounted to a refusal to grant the permit to the respondent and consequently rendered the respondent’s appeal under section 64(a) maintainable.

The Court observed that the practical effect of the order issued by the State Transport Authority was, in essence, a refusal to grant the permit to the respondent. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal to the Appellate Authority was maintainable under section 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Court approved the decision in S. Gopala Reddi v. Regional Transport Authority, North Arcot [1955] 2 M.L.J. 130, and distinguished the decision in V. C. K. Bus Service Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, Coimbatore [1957] S.C.R. 663. The Court further held that section 58(2) of the Act demonstrates that an application for renewal of a permit and a fresh application for the same permit must be heard together, and that there was no provision in sections 47 or 57 indicating a contrary rule. Moreover, the Court explained that clause (f) of section 64 does not limit the power of the Appellate Tribunal to grant any reliefs that are available under clause (a) of the same section. Consequently, the order of the Appellate Tribunal setting aside the renewal order was deemed valid. The Court disapproved, to the extent it conflicted, the view expressed in Dholpur Co-operative Transport Etc. Union Ltd. v. The Appellate Authority, Rajasthan A.I.R. 1955 Rajasthan 19.

In the present appeal, which is Civil Appeal No. 284 of 1958 arising from the judgment and order dated April 21, 1956, of the former Judicial Commissioner’s Court at Rewa in Miscellaneous Civil Writ No. 27 of 1956, the Court noted that the appellant was the holder of a permit to operate a stage carriage on the Rewa-Singrauli stretch of the public highway in the former State of Vindhya Pradesh, now part of Madhya Pradesh. The permit was scheduled to expire on December 11, 1955, and the appellant applied for its renewal on September 12, 1955. The respondent, Anant Prasad, submitted a representation opposing the renewal of the appellant’s permit and also applied for a permit in his own name. On December 9, 1955, the State Transport Authority of Vindhya Pradesh issued an order stating “Renewed for three years,” which unequivocally renewed the appellant’s permit for a three-year period. No separate order was made on the respondent’s application for a permit. The respondent consequently filed an appeal against this renewal order before the Vindhya Pradesh Transport Appellate Tribunal, the appellate authority designated under the Act. The appellant contended before the Tribunal that the appeal was not within jurisdiction. The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s contention and issued an order that cancelled the permit previously granted to the appellant by the State Transport Authority and instead granted the permit to the respondent.

The respondent was the party to whom the original order of the State Transport Authority had effectively denied a permit. After the Appellate Tribunal cancelled the permit that had been renewed in favour of the appellant and instead issued the permit to the respondent, the appellant applied to the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya Pradesh for a writ of certiorari. The appellant contended that the Tribunal’s order should be set aside because, according to the Act, the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order issued by the subordinate authority. The learned Judicial Commissioner examined the question of jurisdiction and concluded that the appeal was, in fact, competent; consequently, the Commissioner dismissed the appellant’s petition for a writ. The present appeal therefore arose to determine whether an appeal could lawfully be taken to the Appellate Tribunal from the order made by the State Transport Authority in the circumstances of this case.

Section 64 of the Transport Act enumerated the categories of persons entitled to appeal to the prescribed authority, which had earlier been identified as the Appellate Tribunal. The relevant portion of the provision read as follows: “Section 64. Any person—(a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit… or (e) aggrieved by the refusal of renewal of a permit… or (f) being a local authority or police authority or an association which, or a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit is aggrieved by the grant thereof… may appeal to the prescribed authority.” The Court noted that the respondent did not fall within clause (e), which dealt with refusals of renewal, nor within clause (f), which listed local or police authorities and certain associations. The respondent therefore relied upon clause (a), which covered any person aggrieved by a refusal to grant a permit.

The Court held that the respondent’s reliance on clause (a) was well-founded. The respondent had applied for the issuance of a permit and his application had not been granted; instead, the permit had been awarded to the appellant, who was the competing applicant for the sole permit available. Because the authority’s order resulted in the permit being granted to the appellant, the effect was that the respondent’s application was effectively refused, even though the order did not contain an explicit statement of refusal. The Court explained that the absence of a formal phrase of denial could not prejudice the respondent, since the practical outcome was a denial of his request. The Court cited the earlier decision in S. Gopala Reddi v. Regional Transport Authority, North Arcot, where an identical situation was described and the court had observed that “the grant of a permit to one would automatically mean the refusal of the permit to the other.” Agreeing with that precedent, the Court concluded that the respondent was indeed a person aggrieved by the refusal to grant a permit under clause (a), and therefore his appeal to the Appellate Tribunal was fully competent.

The Court observed that the respondent was a person who had been aggrieved by the refusal to grant him a permit and that his appeal was fully competent. The appellant argued that, in the present case, it would be erroneous to imply that an order refusing the permit to the respondent existed, because the statute did not enable such an order to be made; consequently the appellant contended that there was no scope for applying section 64(a). The appellant framed its contention in the following manner: when several applications concerned the same permit, one of which is a renewal application that has attracted objections and the others are fresh applications, the fresh applications could not be taken up for consideration until the renewal application and the objections to it had been dealt with. If the objections to the renewal failed, the renewal had to be granted and the fresh applications could not at all be considered thereafter. Conversely, if the objections to the renewal succeeded, the renewal could not be granted and a choice would then have to be made among the new applicants for the permit. The appellant stated that, in the present case, the objection to the renewal of its permit raised by the respondent had failed, the appellant’s permit was therefore renewed, and the respondent’s application for a new permit had never been considered; consequently no order on that application had been made. The Court found this contention to be completely without substance. The appellant relied on sections 47, 57 and 58 of the Act, but the Court discovered nothing in those provisions to support the argument. Section 47 did not address the order in which renewal applications and fresh applications were to be heard and therefore offered no assistance. Section 57(3) merely authorised other persons to make representations against an application for a permit, and subsection (5) required that the application, together with any representations, be disposed of at a public hearing where both the applicant and the persons making representations were given an opportunity to be heard. This provision did not demonstrate that all other applications for the same permit and related representations could not be disposed of at the same hearing. Moreover, section 58(2) made it clear that a renewal application and fresh applications for the same permit had to be heard together. The relevant portion of section 58(2) read: “A permit may be renewed on an application made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit: (a)… (b)… Provided further that, other conditions being equal, an application for renewal shall be given preference over new applications for permits.” This language required that a renewal application be dealt with in the same manner as a new application and therefore be heard together with the new applications. The Court therefore concluded that there was no basis for holding that the State Transport Authority lacked jurisdiction to consider the respondent’s application or to make any order in respect of it merely because it had granted the appellant’s renewal. Accordingly, the order that had been made effectively amounted to a refusal to grant the permit to the respondent.

The provision in Section 58(2) states that if an application is treated as an application for a permit, it must satisfy the conditions listed in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) and, further, that, when all other conditions are the same, a renewal application shall be given preference over new permit applications. This language obliges the authority to handle a renewal request in the same manner as a fresh application for a permit. Consequently, the renewal request must be heard together with any new applications for the same permit. Moreover, the idea of giving the renewal request preferential treatment can arise only when the renewal and the new applications are considered in a single proceeding. Therefore, the Court was unable to accept the argument that the State Transport Authority lacked jurisdiction to entertain the respondent’s application simply because it had already granted the appellant’s renewal. The order issued by the Authority, in effect, amounted to a refusal to grant a permit to the respondent.

The parties contended that once a permit is renewed, it merely continues the earlier permit, and therefore no separate consideration of fresh applications is required. The Court found no basis for this view. Although the Court in V.C.K. Bus Service Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, Coimbatore held that a renewed permit is a continuation of the old one, that decision did not say that the competent authority is prohibited from examining applications for new permits alongside a renewal application. Hence, that precedent does not support the appellant’s position.

The respondent further argued that Section 64 does not allow an appeal by a person who is not listed in clause (f) of that section, and therefore, even if an appeal under clause (a) were permissible, the Appellate Tribunal would lack authority to set aside the renewal order made by the State Transport Authority. It was submitted that permitting the Tribunal to overturn a renewal order would, in effect, turn an appeal against a renewal into a permissible appeal, contrary to the statutory scheme. The appellant relied on the case of Dholpur Co-operative Transport Etc. Union Ltd. v. The Appellate Authority, Rajasthan, which stated that where an appeal is filed under clause (a) against a refusal of a permit, the Appellate Authority may grant relief by issuing a permit, but it does not acquire jurisdiction to cancel a permit already granted to another person unless a foundation for an appeal under clause (f) has been laid before the Regional Transport Authority.

In the Court’s view, once an objection of the type described in clause (f) of section 64 had been filed, the fact that the objector chose either to appeal or not to appeal became irrelevant. Consequently, even when an appeal proceeded under section 64(a), the appellate authority retained the power to examine the objection that had been presented to the Regional Transport Authority and to render its own decision on that matter. The Court noted, however, that the respondent in the present case, although having lodged objections, was not a person entitled to invoke the right of appeal provided by clause (f) of section 64. On that basis, the contention was advanced that no procedural foundation existed for an appeal under clause (f), and therefore the Appellate Tribunal should be barred from setting aside the permit that had been granted by the subordinate authority.

The Court rejected that contention. It held that an appeal that was valid under clause (a) of the same section could not be rendered powerless merely because the appeal did not also fall within the scope of clause (f). To adopt such a restrictive view would effectively nullify the right of appeal granted by clause (a) in situations where the sole form of relief available to the appellant was the cancellation of the order granting or renewing a permit, as was the circumstance in the case before the Court where only one permit could be issued. The Court therefore dismissed the interpretation that hinged on clause (f). It emphasized that clause (f) could not be read in a way that made another clause in the same provision ineffective, and it found no language in clause (f) to support such a construction.

The Court explained that the various clauses of section 64 each addressed distinct situations and operated independently of one another. Clause (f) specifically dealt with scenarios in which an objection had been lodged against a fresh grant or renewal of a permit, but the permit was nevertheless granted or renewed. That clause conferred upon the objector the right to appeal the dismissal of his objection, provided the objector belonged to one of the categories named in the clause. Importantly, the right under clause (f) was afforded irrespective of whether the objector also possessed a right of appeal under any other clause. Clause (f) did not stipulate that a permit once granted or renewed could be challenged only by the persons named in that clause, nor did it limit the rights of appeal established in the other clauses.

The Court further observed that when an appeal was grounded in any of the other clauses, it was by definition an effective appeal, and the appellate authority possessed the full range of powers necessary to grant the relief to which the appellant was entitled. Section 64, the Court noted, was not intended to define or curtail the powers of the appellate authority, and the Act contained no provision compelling a permit applicant to lodge objections against competing applications. Accordingly, the Court concluded that clause (f) did not restrict the Appellate Tribunal’s ability to grant all appropriate reliefs in an appeal that was competent under clause (a). The Tribunal therefore retained the authority to set aside the order of the State Transport Authority that had renewed the appellant’s permit.

In considering the effect of the requirement that an objector must have raised objections against competing applicants for the grant or renewal of a permit, the Court observed that the relief which may be granted in a competent appeal does not depend upon whether the appellant had previously objected to the applications of the competing applicants. Accordingly, the Court concluded that clause (f) of section 64 does not in any manner limit the power of the Appellate Tribunal to award all appropriate reliefs in an appeal that is competent under clause (a) of the same section. The Court further noted that, apart from clause (f), no other provision had been pointed out to them as having a restrictive effect on the Tribunal’s authority. In the Court’s view, there is nothing in the Act that prohibits the Appellate Tribunal from setting aside the order of the State Transport Authority that renewed the appellant’s permit.

The Court affirmed that this position was correctly articulated in the judgment of S. Gopala Reddi (1) at page 132, where it was stated: “The appeal was, in our opinion, perfectly competent as an appeal against the order of the Regional Transport Authority, refusing to grant a permit. The fact that such an appeal involved an attack on the order granting a renewal of a permit to the fourth respondent would not prevent the appeal being what it was, viz., an appeal against a refusal to grant a permit, to the appellant. The Central Road Traffic Board erred in presuming that it was not open to them in the appeal to consider the merits of the order granting renewal of the fourth respondent’s permit. Indeed, the first question which had to be determined in the appeal filed by the appellant would be the propriety of the action of the Regional Transport Authority in granting renewal to the fourth respondent. The filing of the appeal by the appellant set at large the order of the Regional Transport Authority granting the renewal.” (1) [1955] 2 M.L.J. 130. The Court therefore held that the appellate authority could examine the correctness of the renewal order and could set it aside if it was found to be improper.

The Court then turned to the decision in Dholpur Co-operative Transport etc. Union Ltd. (1), which the appellant relied upon. In that case, no objection had been lodged against any of the competing applications for a permit, and the appellate authority was held to have no power to grant relief by cancelling a permit that had been granted by the subordinate authority to another applicant when the appeal was filed by a person whose own application had been refused. The Dholpur decision appeared to be based on the earlier judgment in Nadar Transport, Tiruchirapalli v. State of Madras (2). The present Court, however, could not agree with that portion of the Dholpur decision. While it expressed no opinion on the remaining portions of the Dholpur judgment, it found no authority in the Nadar Transport case to support the conclusion reached in Dholpur. In fact, the Nadar Transport case observed that sections 64(a) and (f) were intended to apply to different situations and that “the power of the appellate authority is not restricted in any manner either by the provisions of s. 64 or by any of the rules made under the powers conferred by the Act.” Consequently, the Court concluded that the reasoning in Dholpur was misplaced and that the appeal must fail.

The Court observed that the provision identified as subsection (f) was, in its view, meant to address a situation different from that covered by subsection (a), and it further held that “the power of the appellate authority is not restricted in any manner either by the provisions of s. 64 or by any of the rules made under the powers conferred by the Act.” The Court then noted that, in an appeal filed under s. 64(a), the appellant could not raise grounds that had not been raised before the subordinate authority. However, the Court clarified that this limitation on the grounds of appeal does not imply that, even on proper grounds, the appellate authority may not grant all the reliefs necessary to render the appeal effective. The Court expressed the view that the earlier decision in the Nadar Transport case (2) had been misunderstood with respect to this point. Consequently, the Court concluded that the present appeal could not succeed. The appeal was therefore dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay costs. The order of dismissal was recorded as follows: Appeal dismissed. (1) A. I. R. 1955 Rajasthan 19, 26. (2) A. I. R. 1953 Mad. 1, 3.