Ram Dial vs Sant Lal And Others
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 108 of 1959
Decision Date: 23 April 1959
Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, M. Hidayatullah
In the matter titled Ram Dial versus Sant Lal and others, decided on 23 April 1959, the Supreme Court of India heard a petition filed by Ram Dial against Sant Lal and additional respondents. The bench consisted of Justices Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J. L. Kapur and M. Hidayatullah. The case was reported in 1959 AIR 855 and 1959 SCR Supl. (2) 748, with citator references R 1969 SC 734, D 1969 SC 851, E 1970 SC 2097, R 1984 SC 309, and RF 1986 SC 3. The petition concerned an allegation of corrupt practice under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, specifically section 123(2) with proviso (a)(ii), which deals with undue influence exercised through a religious leader’s mandate to voters.
The factual background revealed that a substantial portion of the electorate in the concerned constituency were Namdhari Sikhs. Acting under the authority of the supreme religious leader of the Namdhari community and his son, the appellant caused the preparation and widespread distribution of a poster that read: “A command from Shri Sat Guru Sacha Padshah to the Namdhari of Halqa‑Sirsa. Every Namdhari of this Halqa is commanded by Shri Sat Guru that he should make every effort for the success of Shri Ram Dayal Vaid, a candidate for the Punjab Vidhan Sabha, by giving his own vote and those of his friends and acquaintances, it being our primary duty to make him successful in the election. The election symbol of Shri Vaid is a riding horseman.” The poster was signed by Maharaj Bir Singh, son of Sat Guru Maharaj Pratap Singh, Jiwan Nagar (Hissar). Both the Election Tribunal and the Punjab High Court found that the religious leader not only issued the written command but also delivered speeches stating that every Namdhari must vote for the appellant, implying that disobedience would invite divine displeasure or spiritual censure, thereby leaving the Namdhari electors with no free choice.
The Supreme Court held that these actions clearly fell within the scope of proviso (a)(ii) to section 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act, and consequently dismissed the appeal. The Court further observed that English law relating to undue influence at elections differed from Indian law; English jurisprudence emphasized the individual effect of the influence, whereas Indian law focused on the act itself that was calculated to interfere with the free exercise of electoral rights. In support of this view, the Court referred to the English case North Durham’s case, (1874) 2 O’M. & H. 152, and concluded that decisions of English courts could not be treated as binding precedents in Indian election matters.
In this matter, the Supreme Court entertained Civil Appeal No 108 of 1959 that arose under its civil appellate jurisdiction. The appeal challenged a judgment and order dated 25 November 1958 rendered by the Punjab High Court in FAO No 173 of 1958. The appellant was represented by counsel A V Viswanatha Sastri and Naunit Lal, while counsel M C Setalvad, appearing as Attorney‑General for India, together with V A Syed Mohammad and M K Ramamurthi, represented respondent No 1. Respondent No 3 was represented by counsel R H Dhebar. The judgment was pronounced on 23 April 1959 by Justice Sinha.
When the hearing of the appeal concluded on 18 March 1959, the Court informed the parties and the counsel for the Election Commission of India that the appeal was dismissed with costs and that the reasons for the dismissal would be set out subsequently. The present reasons therefore form the substantive part of the judgment. The appeal concerned a certificate of fitness that had been granted by the High Court of Judicature for the State of Punjab at Chandigarh. That certificate was issued against the High Court’s own judgment and order dated 25 November 1958, which had dismissed an earlier appeal against an order of the Election Tribunal, Hissar, dated 14 September 1958. The Tribunal’s order had set aside the appellant’s election to the Punjab Legislative Assembly.
The appellant had been returned as the successful candidate from the general seat of the double‑member constituency of Sirsa. The other successful candidate from that constituency was a Harijan candidate, who is identified as respondent No 2 before this Court. The first respondent had contested the same general seat. During the pendency of the proceedings, this Court ordered that the Election Commission of India be added as a third respondent by an order dated 27 February 1959, when the matter was before the Court on a stay application. The Court further directed that the case be heard before the date fixed for a fresh election, which had been scheduled as a result of the Tribunal’s order.
The double‑member constituency of Sirsa attracted a large field of candidates. One of the two seats was reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes. After the usual withdrawals, sixteen candidates remained in the contest: eight candidates for the general seat and eight candidates for the reserved seat. The Court’s present consideration is confined to the general seat and does not extend to the seat reserved for Scheduled Castes. In the election for the general seat, the appellant secured 27,272 votes whereas the first respondent obtained 23,329 votes. The election was conducted on 12 and 14 March 1957 and the result was declared on 17 March 1957.
Subsequently, the first respondent filed an election petition on 28 April 1957 challenging the appellant’s election. The petition raised a multitude of grounds, essentially exhausting all the statutory bases available under the election law. However, the findings of both the Election Tribunal and the Punjab High Court limited the dispute to the allegations of “corrupt practices” set out in sub‑paragraphs I to III of paragraph 13B of the election petition. Those specific allegations formed the foundation of Issue No 4 before this Court. The relevant allegations are reproduced in full in the petition, and the Court will now consider them as the basis for its further analysis.
In the election petition the petitioner alleged that Respondent No 1, together with his agents and other persons acting with their consent, had committed the corrupt practice of undue influence by interfering, either directly or indirectly, with the free exercise of the electoral right of the electors of the constituency. The petition set out the particulars of those alleged corrupt practices in several sub‑paragraphs. The first sub‑paragraph stated that Sat Guru Maharaj Pratap Singh of Jiwan Nagar, who is the religious head of the Namdhari sect of the Sikhs, bore personal grievances against Shri Devi Lal of Chautala, a prominent Congress leader in the constituency and the chief supporter of the petitioner at the election. The petition claimed that Respondent No 1, being fully aware of the Sat Guru’s grievance, approached the Sat Guru and, through him, also approached Maharaj Charan Singh of Sikanderpur, the religious head of the Radha Swami Samaj. The petition alleged that both religious heads issued “Farmans” (orders) to their followers in the constituency, directing them to consider it their Dharma to give wholehearted support to Respondent No 1 and to oppose the candidature of the petitioner. The Farmans further warned that any follower who dared to act against the orders would incur the wrath of the Gurus and would become the target of divine displeasure.
The petition continued that the two Farmans were communicated orally through the “Subas” of the Namdhari community, namely Shri Bir Singh, the son of Sat Guru Partap Singh, and Shri Naginder Singh, as well as through Shri Purshotam Singh, a follower of Guru Charan Singh. These messengers travelled throughout the constituency, reaching every place where followers of the two sects lived, from the day of the withdrawal of the election until polling began. During their canvassing tours on behalf of Respondent No 1, Shri Bir Singh, Shri Purshotam Singh, and Shri Naginder Singh, together with Sant Teja Singh, a Member of the Legislative Council, held “Diwans” in various villages and towns. In those gatherings they not only repeated the content of the two Farmans but also threatened any follower who disobeyed the Gurus with expulsion from their sect or samaj.
The second sub‑paragraph alleged that Sat Guru Pratap Singh himself, in the presence of Respondent No 1, presided over a large “Diwan” of his followers on 25 February 1957 at Sirsa in the Radha Swami Sat‑Sangh Hall. In that meeting the Sat Guru reportedly preached that it was the primary Dharma of all his followers to support the candidature of Respondent No 1 and to oppose the petitioner with full force, by casting their own votes and by canvassing within their areas of influence in the constituency. The petition further recorded that the Sat Guru held additional Diwans at the village of Tharaj on 6 March 1957, at Dhiwan on 5 March 1957, at Rori on 6 March 1957, and at Phaggu on 6 March 1957. In each of these gatherings he repeated the previously issued Farmans and also appealed to his personal connection with the village of Tharaj, noting that he was the son of a daughter of that village. The petition concluded this sub‑paragraph with the words “A very”.
In this case, the Tribunal recorded that a large meeting of the Sat Guru’s followers, termed a “big diwan,” was convened at Khairpur on 26 February 1957 for the same purpose as the earlier gatherings. At that meeting the Sat Guru once again praised his followers and urged them, in the same manner as before, to support the candidature of the petitioner. The Tribunal also noted that on 26 February 1957 the respondent identified as No 1 caused the printing of thousands of posters on both sides, using Hindi and Gurumukhi scripts. These posters displayed the orders, referred to as “Farmans,” issued by Satguru Partap Singh and bore the signature of Shri Maharaj Bir Singh, who was the son of Satguru Partap Singh. The printing was carried out at the request of the respondent at Bansal Press, situated in Hissaria Bazar, Sirsa. The content of the posters, reproduced verbatim, directed every Namdhari in the constituency to consider it their primary Dharma to cast their own vote for the petitioner, Shri Ram Dayal, and to solicit votes from all acquaintances. An original copy of the poster together with an English translation was annexed to the petition and formed part of the record. The Tribunal observed that these posters were disseminated throughout the constituency, being distributed in every village where Namdhari residents lived, from the time of printing until the polling day.
The Tribunal further reported that the petitioner relied on a substantial volume of oral testimony as well as certain documentary materials to support his allegations. After evaluating the evidence, the Tribunal concluded that Maharaj Pratap Singh had issued farmans to his satsanghis warning that any person who would not vote for the petitioner would suffer consequences both in this life and in the next. However, the Tribunal found that it was not proved that the farmans or orders of the two religious heads of the Namdharis and the Radhaswamis were orally transmitted through Maharaj Bir Singh, Naginder Singh, or Shri Purshotam Singh to the followers of the two gurus within the constituency, nor that these messengers threatened the followers with expulsion from the sect for disobeying the gurus, except for the statements made by Naginder Singh at the diwan held in Sirsa and at other locations. The Tribunal recorded that the diwan meetings were held specifically for canvassing support for the petitioner at the times and places mentioned in the petition, and that these meetings were addressed by Maharaj Partap Singh and others. It also found that Maharaj Partap Singh actively supported the petitioner’s candidature, addressed his followers on religious grounds, and urged them to vote for the petitioner, actions that were undertaken at the petitioner’s request and in his presence. Additionally, the Tribunal established that posters such as exhibit P.1 were issued by the petitioner under the authority of Maharaj Bir Singh and his father, Maharaj Partap Singh, and were widely circulated throughout the constituency. Finally, the Tribunal examined whether, based on these findings, the provisions of section 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951—hereinafter referred to as “the Act”—pertaining to undue influence, were satisfied, and considered the alternative that the matter might fall within clause (3) of the same section, which addresses systematic appeal on the grounds of caste, race, community, or religion.
The Tribunal examined whether the provisions of section 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951—referred to in the judgment as the provision dealing with “undue influence”—had been satisfied by the material on record. It also considered, as an alternative, whether the findings brought the matter within clause (3) of the same section, which addresses systematic appeals based on caste, race, community or religion. The Tribunal was inclined to hold that a directive contained in exhibit P‑1, which originated from a religious leader described as the Sat Guru, and was addressed to his followers—who were largely illiterate and uneducated—could be interpreted as “undue influence”. Nevertheless, the Tribunal added that even if the conditions of clause (2) were not met, the case nonetheless fell clearly within the ambit of clause (3) of section 123. Other issues raised in the proceedings were either not pressed by the parties or were decided against the petitioner by the Tribunal. Accordingly, the Tribunal declared the election of the appellant to be void under section 100(1)(b) of the Act. Because the petitioner had failed to substantiate many of his allegations, the Tribunal ordered each party to bear its own costs.
The appellant challenged the Tribunal’s order before a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature for the State of Punjab at Chandigarh, the bench comprising Justices Falshaw and Dua. The High Court largely affirmed the Election Tribunal’s findings with respect to the fourth issue identified in the earlier proceedings. In particular, the High Court accepted the oral evidence presented on behalf of the respondent, giving considerable weight to the testimony concerning the publication and extensive distribution of the poster identified as exhibit P‑1. The High Court observed that the language of the command, the general background and the surrounding circumstances of the case—together with the evident awareness of both Maharaj Pratap Singh and Ram Dial regarding the probable impact of such commands on the illiterate, ignorant and credulous followers—could lead only to one conclusion: that the command was intended to convey a threat of divine displeasure and spiritual censure to any follower who dared to disobey the farman of their supreme spiritual and religious head. When the petitioner argued that the farman was motivated by personal grievance rather than religious sentiment, the High Court gave no weight to this distinction. It held that if the influence exercised by the religious and spiritual head creates in voters a feeling of divine displeasure or spiritual censure, the influence amounts to undue influence irrespective of the underlying motive. The Court further noted that the contents of the poster, as reproduced earlier, unequivocally demonstrated a mandatory command. The Court found that a religious sanction was implicit in the poster, and, on a reasonable construction of its terms, concluded that Maharaj Pratap Singh intended to communicate to his followers—who were predominantly illiterate, ignorant, credulous and unsophisticated villagers with blind and implicit faith—that failure to vote for Ram Dial would result in divine displeasure and spiritual censure.
In the matter before the Court, it was noted that the villagers, being largely illiterate, ignorant, credulous and unsophisticated, would perceive any displeasure of their religious head as being synonymous with divine displeasure. The Court examined the scope of section 123(2) of the Act and held that the wording of the poster reproduced as exhibit P. 1, when read together with the oral testimony, left no doubt that the farman issued by Maharaj Partap Singh necessarily implied divine displeasure and spiritual censure for any person who chose to disobey it. Consequently, the Court concluded that the factual findings fell squarely within the operation of section 123(2). Further, the Court found that the evidence demonstrated that the gatherings convened by Maharaj Partap Singh and his associates, in support of the appellant’s election, created a belief among the voters that non‑compliance with the Maharaj’s directive would expose them to divine displeasure or spiritual censure, thereby clearly establishing the commission of the corrupt practice described as “undue influence.” The High Court also considered whether the corrupt practice alleged under clause (3) of section 123 had been proved and, after some hesitation, decided that it had not. Moreover, the Court held that the publication of the second poster, exhibit P. 2, did not bring the case within the ambit of section 123(4). As a result, the High Court concurred with the Tribunal’s finding that the election was void and dismissed the appeal, ordering costs. The appellant then applied to the High Court for a certificate that the case was fit for appeal to this Court, and the certificate was granted, giving rise to the present appeal. After the Tribunal and High Court decisions, the sole issue left for determination was whether, based on the factual findings already recorded, the corrupt practice of “undue influence” as defined in section 123(2) had been established. Counsel for the appellant argued that the principal provision of clause (2) of section 123 was inapplicable because it concerned threats of injury to person or property and did not cover what might be termed “spiritual undue influence,” which, they said, was specifically addressed by sub‑paragraph (ii) of proviso (a) to clause (2). They further contended that the term “deemed” indicated that the proviso was an addition to the main provision of clause (2), thereby extending the definition to matters not originally covered. Additionally, they submitted that clause (2) targeted the undue influence of individual voters, relying on the authorities of Cheltenham, Nottingham and North Durham, and also referred to observations made in the work of Rogers.
In the proceedings, it was contended that a “electoral right”, as defined in section 79(d) of the Act, is a personal and individual entitlement that includes both the right to cast a vote and the right to abstain from voting in an election. On that basis, the petitioner was required to plead and the Court was required to find, on the basis of evidence, that specific named persons had been subjected to the corrupt practice of undue influence. The argument further asserted that, where such pleading or finding is absent, a mere general allegation of the corrupt practice of undue influence, without identifying any particular individuals, does not satisfy the legal requirement to invalidate an election.
The Court noted that the corrupt practice of undue influence is defined in element (2) of section 123 of the Act. The definition reads as follows: “(2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the candidate or his agent, or of any other person, with the consent of a candidate or his election agent, with the free exercise of any electoral right: Provided that— (a) without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of this clause, any such person referred to therein who— (i) threatens any candidate, or any elector, or any person in whom a candidate or an elector is interested, with injury of any kind including social ostracism and excommunication or expulsion from any caste or community; or (ii) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or an elector to believe that he, or any person in whom he is interested, will become or will be rendered an object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure, shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of such candidate or elector within the meaning of this clause; (b) a declaration of public policy, or a promise of public action, or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of this clause.”
The Court further observed that English law on undue influence at elections differs from Indian law. To illustrate the distinction, the Court cited the definition of “undue influence” found in section 2 of 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51, which substantially re‑enacted the former section 5 of 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102. That definition states: “Every person who shall directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person on his behalf, make use of or threaten to make use of any force, violence, or restraint, or inflict or threaten to inflict, by himself or by any other person, any temporal or spiritual injury, damage, harm, or loss upon or against any person in order to induce or compel such person to vote or refrain from voting, or on account of such person having voted or refrained from voting at any election, or who shall by abduction, duress, or any fraudulent device or contrivance, impede or prevent the free exercise of the franchise of any elector, or shall thereby compel, induce, or prevail upon any elector either to give or to refrain from giving his vote at any election, shall be guilty of undue influence.” The Court noted that the English statute emphasizes the individual aspect of undue influence, whereas Indian law does not require an individual focus but rather considers any influence that tends to achieve the result contemplated in the provision.
The English statute, as quoted, declares that any person who, by making use of or threatening to use force, violence, restraint, or by inflicting or threatening to inflict any temporal or spiritual injury, damage, harm, or loss, induces another to vote or to refrain from voting, or who, by abduction, duress, or any fraudulent device, impedes the free exercise of the franchise of any elector, or who thereby compels, induces or prevails upon any elector to give or to refrain from giving his vote, shall be guilty of undue influence. The language of that statute places primary emphasis on the individual’s exercise of undue influence. In the case of North Durham, Justice Bramwell observed that, when the Act’s language is examined, intimidation covered by the statute must be intimidation directed at an individual.
Indian law, by contrast, does not focus on the individual aspect of influence. Instead, it concerns itself with the use of influence that tends to produce the result contemplated in the statutory provision. Under Indian law, the material factor is not the actual effect produced but the performance of acts calculated to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right. Consequently, decisions of English courts, which are based on the wording of the English statute and are not strictly in pari materia with the Indian provision, cannot be cited as precedents in this jurisdiction.
In the case before the Court, the issue does not involve a threat of temporal injury, damage, or harm. The pleadings and the findings of both the Tribunal and the High Court focus on the undue exercise of spiritual influence. The High Court found that such spiritual influence was so potent that it induced electors to believe they would become objects of divine displeasure or spiritual censure if they failed to obey the command of their spiritual head. It was contended that Exhibit P‑1, which the Tribunal and the High Court emphasized, did not contain any direct threat that would bring the matter within the second paragraph of proviso (a) to section 123(2).
Exhibit P‑1, as officially translated, reads as follows: “A command from Shri Sat Guru Sacha Padshah to the Namdharies of Halqa‑Sirsa. Every Namdhari of this Halqa is commanded by Shri Sat Guru that he should make every effort for the success of Shri Ram Dayal Vaid, a candidate for the Punjab Vidhan Sabha, by giving his own vote and those of his friends and acquaintances, it being our primary duty to make him successful in the election. The election symbol of Shri Vaid is a riding horseman. Sd. Maharaj Bir Singh son of Sat Guru Maharaj Partap Singh, Jivan Nagar (Hissar).” The Court examined the original document and concurred with the High Court’s assessment of its contents.
The Court observed that the words printed on the document, such as “hukam of Shri Sat Guru Sacha Padshah,” were displayed in very bold lettering. That presentation gave a clear impression to the large number of Namdhari voters in the constituency that the instruction came directly from their spiritual guru, who possessed considerable local influence. The Court noted that the document conveyed to those voters that they had a solemn duty, imposed by the strict orders of their religious leader, not merely to cast their own votes for the named candidate but also to persuade their friends and acquaintances to vote for the same candidate. Further, the Court said that any failure to obey the instruction was portrayed as inviting divine displeasure or spiritual censure.
The appellant contended that a religious leader enjoys the same freedom of speech as any other citizen and therefore his encouragement of a particular candidate should not invalidate the election. The Court agreed that there is no doubt that a religious leader may freely express his opinion on the relative merits of the candidates and may canvass support for those he considers worthy of the electors’ confidence. In other words, the religious leader may exercise his influence by voting for a chosen candidate and by soliciting votes for that candidate from others. He may also voice his view on the individual merits of each candidate.
The Court explained that such conduct merely uses the leader’s influence among a specific section of voters and does not, by itself, constitute an abuse of that influence. However, the Court warned that an abuse occurs when the language used in a document or spoken in a speech leaves the addressed persons with no real choice in exercising their electoral rights. The Court illustrated that if the religious head had simply stated that, in his opinion, the appellant was more worthy of the electors’ confidence for any reasons and had addressed those words to his followers, he would have acted within his rights and his influence could not be described as misused.
In the present case, the Court found, based on the findings of the High Court and in agreement with the Tribunal, that the religious leader effectively denied the Namdhari electors any free choice. The Court noted that the leader issued a hukam or farman as set out in Exhibit P‑1 and also delivered speeches indicating that the electors must vote for the appellant, with disobedience attracting divine displeasure or spiritual censure. Accordingly, the Court held that the circumstance falls squarely within the second paragraph of the proviso to section 123(2) of the Act. The Court further observed that the High Court had already examined this aspect of the case in detail.
The Court observed that the earlier judgment was thoroughly considered and that it was unnecessary to reproduce all of the observations made therein, other than to state that the Court agreed with those observations. Consequently, the Court found no need to examine the additional issue of whether element 2 of section 123 of the Act, excluding the proviso‑paragraph (ii) that had been discussed earlier, would also apply to a situation such as the present case in which the alleged undue influence was of a spiritual nature rather than arising from threats of physical injury or damage to property. Since the principal ground advanced in support of the appeal against the High Court’s judgment was found to be unsupported, the Court held that the appeal could not succeed. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the costs of the proceedings were awarded to respondent No. 1. The final order expressly dismissed the appeal.