Naresh Chandra Ganguli vs The State Of West Bengal And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 59 of 1959

Decision Date: 20 May 1959

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Syed Jaffer Imam, J.L. Kapur, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo

In this matter, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on the twentieth day of May, 1959, in a petition filed by Naresh Chandra Ganguli against the State of West Bengal and certain other respondents. The bench hearing the case consisted of Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, Justice J. L. Kapur, Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar and Justice K. N. Wanchoo. The decision has been reported in the All India Reporter at page 1335 of the 1959 volume and also appears in the Supreme Court Reports, first series, page 412 of the 1960 volume. The principal question before the Court concerned the interpretation of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, particularly sections 3 and 7, and the distinction between the statutory objects of detention and the factual grounds on which a detention order must be based. The headnote summarised that the appellant had been detained under sub-clause (a)(ii) of clause 3(1) of the Act, that the copy of the order served on him set out four specific paragraphs purporting to explain why his conduct was prejudicial to public order, and that the High Court had upheld the detention while treating those paragraphs as evidential material rather than as the statutory grounds required under section 7. The case thus raised the issue of what content a detaining authority must include in the order served on a detainee to satisfy the legislative requirements.

The detention order served on Naresh Chandra Ganguli alleged, in its first paragraph, that at a meeting of refugees the appellant had publicly vilified the Prime Minister of India, criticised the Prime Minister’s unsympathetic attitude toward refugee suffering, and expressed violent feelings toward the Prime Minister while invoking the recent Nehru-Noon Pact. The second paragraph claimed that the appellant urged members of his political party to organise a vigorous movement opposing the implementation of that pact and sought to inflame passions by alleging that the Prime Minister lacked any sympathy for West Bengal. The third paragraph reported that at another gathering the appellant denounced the pact and advocated the formation of a militia composed of the nation’s youth to safeguard inhabitants of border areas. The fourth paragraph stated that the appellant intended to travel to Delhi on a specified date and was likely to devise plans that could endanger the personal safety of the Prime Minister. When the State was challenged through an application under sections 491 and 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a writ of habeas corpus, the High Court examined the order and, while affirming the legality of the detention, concluded that the four paragraphs were not the statutory grounds of detention but merely pieces of evidence supporting the single ground that the appellant was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The Court further held that the fourth paragraph constituted only an inference of fact that bore on that ground. On appeal, the petitioner contended that the language of the fourth paragraph was vague, lacked specific particulars, and bore no rational connection with the objects enumerated in section 3 of the Act, thereby depriving him of an effective opportunity to make a representation. The State denied these allegations. The High Court ultimately held that it had failed to appreciate the distinction between the legislative objects of detention specified in the Act and the factual statements that, under section 7, constitute the grounds of detention, a point that the Supreme Court was called upon to consider.

Sections 3 and 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, must be read together to determine the contents of the order that the detaining authority serves on a detainee. The Act requires that the copy of the order, issued under section 3(2), contain three essential parts. First, it must begin with a pre-amble that recites one or more of the sub-clauses (a) and (b) of section 3(1) as the object or objects of the detention. Second, it must set out the grounds contemplated by section 7, which are the factual conclusions that led to the order and that explain to the detainee why he is being detained. Third, it may include particulars where they are necessary, but it does not have to contain the details referred to in sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 3. In the present case the High Court mistakenly described the grounds of detention as merely recitals of fact, but this confusion does not invalidate its order. The grounds, when read together, are neither vague nor irrelevant to the stated object of detention, namely the maintenance of public order, and they do not deprive the detainee of his right to make a representation. The Court considered the precedent set in The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridhay Vaidya [1951] S.C.R. 167, and held that the earlier decision of Dwarka Das Bhatia v. The State of Jammu Kashmir [1956] S.C.R. 948 was not applicable.

This matter is before the Court as Criminal Appeal No. 59 of 1959, arising from the judgment and order dated 8 January 1959 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 126 of 1958, together with Petition No. 51 of 1959 filed under article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The appellant and petitioner was represented by counsel for the appellant, while counsel for the respondents appeared for the State. The judgment was delivered on 20 May 1959 by Justice Sinha. The appeal challenges the High Court order that refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus in respect of Ram Prasad Das, who is referred to as “the petitioner.” By an order dated 20 April 1959, this Court directed that the petitioner’s application under article 32 for a similar writ be posted for hearing immediately after the criminal appeal and that it would not be necessary for the petitioner to be produced before the Court at the time of the hearing. Consequently, both the criminal appeal and the petition, which concern the same subject-matter, have been heard together and will be disposed of by this judgment. It appears that an advocate practising in the Calcutta High Court made an application under sections 491 and 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure on behalf of the petitioner.

The counsel filed an application under sections 491 and 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, acting as a friend on behalf of the petitioner who was then detained in Dum Dum Central Jail in the 24 Parganas, pursuant to orders issued by the Government of West Bengal. The application was addressed to the Calcutta High Court and was based on several specific allegations. Firstly, the petitioner was identified as the Secretary of the West Bengal Committee of the Bharatiya Jana Sangha, which is one of the four major political parties recognised by the Election Commission of India. The factual narrative then described an incident that occurred on or about the evening of 7 October 1958. After concluding a public meeting at College Square, the petitioner was leaving the Basanta Cabin tea stall situated at the intersection of College Street and Surya Sen Street when police officers stopped him on the street. He was subsequently taken to the Special Branch office of the police located on Lord Sinha Road and from there was transferred to Dum Dum Central Jail. Within the jail, he was served with Order No. 83 dated 7 October 1958, which purported to have been issued by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, under the authority granted by the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950). The order read in part: “ORDER Dated 7-10-58. No. 83. Whereas I am satisfied with respect to the person known as Sri Ram Prasad Das, son of late Bepin Behari Das of Village P-S-P, District, and of 6 Murlidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta, that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order it is necessary so to do. Now therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950, I make this order directing that the said Sri Ram Prasad Das be detained. Given under my hand and seal of office. Signed—[illegible], Commissioner of Police, Calcutta.” On the following day, 8 October 1958, a second order, numbered 85, was served on the petitioner while he remained in Dum Dum Central Jail. This order set out the grounds for detention under clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the same Act. It alleged that the petitioner was being detained because he was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and it enumerated specific incidents to substantiate this claim. The first incident mentioned was that on 13 September 1958 the petitioner attended a meeting of the Eastern Indian Refugee Council held at the Refugee Office located at 6 Murlidhar Sen Lane and, during that meeting, he purportedly vilified the Prime Minister of India by accusing him of ignoring the suffering of refugees. The order continued with further particulars, which formed the basis of the government’s claim for preventive detention.

The order dated 8 October 1958 set out four specific grounds for the detention of Sri Ram Prasad Das, son of the late Bepin Behari Das, who was residing at 6 Murlidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta. The first ground alleged that on 13 September 1958 the petitioner had attended a meeting of the Eastern Indian Refugee Council held at the Refugee Office at the same address and, during that meeting, he had openly criticized the Prime Minister of India for allegedly ignoring the severe suffering of refugees. The order further recorded that, in reference to a recent agreement between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, the petitioner had expressed a desire for violent action against the Indian Prime Minister, stating that the preservation of refugees and Indian territory might require the assassination of the Prime Minister, and that a new figure like Nathuram Godse was now needed for that purpose. The second ground stated that on 17 September 1958, while discussing with members of his political party at the same location, the petitioner purportedly claimed that the Indian Prime Minister had ceded certain Indian enclaves to Pakistan as part of an appeasement policy that began with the late Mahatma Gandhi. He was said to have urged the party members to launch a vigorous movement opposing the implementation of the Nehru-Noon Pact and to have attempted to inflame passions by alleging that the Prime Minister showed no sympathy for the people of West Bengal. The third ground alleged that on 26 September 1958 the petitioner attended a meeting of the South Durtolla Branch of the Jana Sangh at Jatin Mitter Park, where he is said to have condemned the agreement between the two Prime Ministers and to have emphasized the necessity of forming a militia composed of the nation’s youth for the protection of residents in border areas, urging all present to enroll in this purpose. The fourth ground asserted that the petitioner intended to travel to Delhi on 9 October 1958 and that he was likely to devise or promote plans that could jeopardise the personal security of the Prime Minister of India, a circumstance that was claimed to be prejudicial to public order.

The same order additionally informed the petitioner that he could make a written representation to the State Government challenging the detention order, directing such a representation to the Assistant Secretary, Home (Special) Department, Government of West Bengal, and that it should be forwarded through the superintendent of the jail where he was detained. The order also advised the petitioner that, under section 10 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950), the Advisory Board would hear him in person if he expressed a desire to be heard, and that this desire should be indicated in his representation to the State Government. The order was signed by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta. Subsequently, on or about 11 October 1958, the petitioner received another order issued by the Home Department, Special Section, of the Government of West Bengal and bearing number 1882 H S. This order, dated 11 October 1958, stated that, in exercise of the power conferred by section 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, the Governor had approved order number 83 dated 7 October 1958, which had been issued by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, directing the detention of Sri Ram Prasad Das, son of the late Bepin Behari Das, of 6 Murlidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta. The order was signed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of West Bengal. The petitioner subsequently filed a written representation against the detention order, contesting and denying the grounds of his detention as set out in the earlier order.

The petitioner replied that each of the grounds stated for his detention was incorrect. He specifically rejected the first ground, calling it completely false, and asserted that no meeting had taken place on 13 September 1958 as alleged, nor had he delivered any speech mentioned in that ground. He also denied any advocacy for the formation of a militia. Nevertheless, he insisted that he possessed a legitimate right to voice his opinions concerning the Government’s policy, the Prime Minister’s stance on Pakistan, and the Nehru-Noon Pact or similar agreements. He further maintained that he had never delivered any violent speeches or attempted to stir public passions. Regarding ground four, the petitioner argued that it was excessively vague because it failed to specify where, when, how, or in what manner he might supposedly devise a plan that would harm the personal security of the Prime Minister of India, nor did it describe any such contemplated plan. In his petition to the High Court, he contended that the grounds supplied to him bore no rational connection to the objectives prescribed in section three of the Preventive Detention Act, thereby depriving him of an effective opportunity to make a representation. He also alleged that he was a member of a political party opposed to the ruling party and that he held strongly expressed views about the Government’s failure to address the refugee problem and about the relationship between the Government and Pakistan. Claiming to be a leader of the refugees, he said he had persistently criticized the present Government’s policies. Consequently, he described the detention order as a clear instance of political victimisation, malicious and contrary to his fundamental right to freedom of speech and association guaranteed by the Constitution. On 28 November 1958, he was taken to the Writers’ Buildings in Calcutta and placed before the Advisory Board constituted under the Act, where he was heard in person. The following day, 29 November 1958, after the Board’s hearing, the Governor of West Bengal issued order number 1967 H.S., dated 29 November 1958, confirming the earlier order of detention numbered 83 dated 7 October 1958 and extending the petitioner’s detention for a total period of twelve months from the date of his initial detention. The petitioner subsequently submitted to the High Court that the orders effecting his detention in Dum Dum Central Jail were illegal, invalid, beyond the authority of the government, void and inoperative. An affidavit in opposition was filed on behalf of the State of West Bengal and the other respondents.

The Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, who was identified as opposite party No 3 in the proceedings, swore an affidavit in which he asserted that, after reviewing the records and materials placed before him, he was convinced that the petitioner was a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Accordingly, he stated that it was necessary to issue an order of detention on the basis of the grounds set out in Order No 85 dated 8 October 1958, which had been reproduced earlier in the record. He further affirmed that he had reported the detention order together with its grounds and all other relevant particulars to the Government of West Bengal, and that the Government, after duly considering the information furnished, had approved the detention order. The affidavit also recorded that the petitioner had personally appeared before the Advisory Board on 28 November 1958. The Board, after examining the records and materials placed before it and hearing the petitioner's representation, reported to the Government of West Bengal that, in its opinion, there existed sufficient cause to detain the petitioner. The Commissioner further declared that he had executed and signed the detention orders after careful consideration of the petitioner’s records and materials, exercising the powers conferred by the Act in a bona-fide manner and without any malice, being satisfied of the necessity of the orders. He expressly denied all factual statements presented in the affidavit supporting the petition, and undertook to produce the original records before the Court at the hearing. The Commissioner also rejected the allegation that the detention was a victimisation on political grounds, saying that the order was not mala-fide and did not infringe the petitioner’s fundamental rights.

The matter was subsequently heard by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court comprising Justices Guha Roy and H K Sen. By an order dated 8 January 1958, the Bench discharged the rule that had been invoked. In delivering its judgment, the High Court observed that a close reading of the detention order revealed that paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 did not articulate separate grounds for detention. The Court held that the order contained only a single ground, namely that the petitioner was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and that the remaining paragraphs merely set out distinct pieces of evidence upon which the authority relied in reaching that conclusion. Consequently, the Court, construing section 3 of the Act, concluded that the order’s grounds were not vague and that the statements in paragraph 4 of Order No 85 dated 8 October 1958 were evidentiary rather than constitutive of a separate ground. The High Court thereby affirmed the validity of the detention order on the basis of this construction.

In its analysis, the Court concluded that the grounds of detention pertaining to the petitioner were not vague. The Court explained that the statement appearing in paragraph 4 of detention order No 85, dated 8 October 1958, which had been quoted earlier, did not constitute a separate ground of detention. Instead, that statement was treated as one piece of evidence among several pieces of evidence that together formed the factual basis for the ground of detention. Further, the Court noted that paragraph 4, by itself, was not a ground of the order; it was merely an inference of fact that had some relevance to the actual ground. The High Court also observed that there was no ambiguity in the recitals of the order, including the material set out in paragraph 4. On the basis of this reasoning, the order of detention was upheld. The Court also held that the issue of whether the entire order was invalid because one of its alleged grounds was too vague did not arise for consideration in the present case.

The petitioner subsequently applied to the Calcutta High Court for a certificate that the case was fit for appeal to this Court. The Chief Justice, delivering the order of the Division Bench, granted the required certificate and remarked that the High Court’s view—that paragraph 4 was not a ground of detention but merely an evidentiary item supporting the ground—raised a serious question for determination by this Court. The Chief Justice pointed out that several earlier decisions of this Court and of the Calcutta High Court appeared to adopt a view contrary to the one taken by the High Court in the present matter. Consequently, the appeal was brought before this Court. In addition to pursuing the appeal, the petitioner moved this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking a writ of habeas corpus. A Constitution Bench, by its order dated 20 April 1959, directed that the appeal be listed for hearing before a Constitution Bench on 11 May 1959, using a cyclostyled paper book, and that the filing of the appeal petition and the statements of case be dispensed with. The Court further ordered that the application under Article 32 be scheduled for hearing immediately after the criminal appeal, so that both matters would be heard consecutively before this Court. The order that is under appeal holds that the various grounds of detention are enumerated in section 3(1)(a)(i), (ii), (iii) and (b) of the Act, and that no other grounds may exist. Reading Order No 85, the High Court concluded that paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 are not the statutory grounds of detention contemplated by section 3 of the Act; rather, they constitute discrete pieces of evidence that led the authority to conclude that the petitioner was acting in a manner prejudicial to public order, which was the sole ground for the detention.

In this case, the court observed that the petitioner had been found to be acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and that this finding constituted the only basis for the order of detention. The High Court was held to be correct in its literal interpretation of the impugned order, which listed four numbered paragraphs introduced by the phrase “as evidenced by the particulars given below.” The precedent of The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya (1) was then cited, where clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution was interpreted to give the detainee two but related rights. The first right required that the detainee be informed of the specific grounds on which the detention order was made. The second right required that the detainee be afforded the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order. The Supreme Court had further indicated in that case that the grounds supplied must bear a rational connection to the objects listed in section 3 of the Act. Once such grounds were supplied, the first condition for a valid detention was thereby clearly and accordingly satisfied. The second condition was satisfied only after the detainee received information sufficient to enable him to make a representation.

If the information provided for making a representation did not contain enough particulars, the detainee was entitled to request additional details that would permit a meaningful representation. The court held that any breach of either of the two rights, or failure to meet the two pre-conditions for a detention, gave the detainee the right to approach the court for a habeas-corpus writ. The court explained that the grounds to be communicated to the detainee as soon as practicable were not a factual narration but conclusions of fact that had a rational nexus to the objects of section 3. These conclusions of fact had to exist at the moment the detention order was issued, and they had to be conveyed to the detainee without undue delay. The Supreme Court, and the High Courts, interpreted the recitals in detention orders as statements of the object sought to be achieved under the clauses and sub-clauses of section 3(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. The order of detention could also contain factual recitals on which the order was based, thereby providing a clearer factual foundation for the detention. When the detention order contained factual recitals, the court found that no further enquiry was required for the validity of the order. If such recitals were omitted, the detainee had to be informed of the basic facts underlying the conclusions of fact as soon as possible, now under section 7 within a maximum period of five days.

Within five days from the date of detention, the detained person must be informed of the basic facts or reasons on which the order of detention was founded. Section 3 of the Act obliges the authority that issues an order of detention to state that it is satisfied that detention is necessary to prevent the individual from acting in a manner that is prejudicial to one or more of the objects set out in clauses and sub-clauses of section 3(1)(a) and (b). Section 7 further requires that the detained person be communicated with the grounds on which the order was made, so that he may have the earliest possible opportunity to make a representation against the order before the appropriate Government. The facts contemplated by section 7 therefore constitute the “grounds” and are distinct from the matters listed in the clauses and sub-clauses of section 3(1)(a) and (b). Section 3 also mandates that, once an order of detention is made, the concerned State Government must be apprised of both the order and the grounds, together with any other particulars that bear upon the order and its grounds. After the State Government approves the order, it must, in turn, report to the Central Government the fact of the detention, the grounds on which it was made, and any other particulars that, in the State Government’s opinion, affect the necessity for the order.

Consequently, a careful reading of sections 3 and 7 shows that the detained person must receive a copy of the order issued by the authority referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3. That copy must contain, first, recitals drawn from one or more of the sub-clauses of clause (a) and (b) of section 3(1), which may be described as the “Preamble”, and second, the grounds envisaged by section 7, i.e., the factual conclusions that led to the issuance of the detention order and that explain to the detainee why he is being detained. If the grounds do not provide all the particulars necessary for the detainee to make a meaningful representation against the order, the detainee may request further factual details. The authority that issued the order is then required to furnish those details, subject to the limitation in sub-section (2) of section 7, which bars disclosure of any facts that the authority deems contrary to public interest. Thus, the order of detention must include at least the preamble and the grounds, and, when required, may also contain additional particulars, provided they are not excluded for public-interest reasons.

In this case, the Court explained that the document served on a detained person generally contained two mandatory parts: first, a preamble that set out the background, and second, the grounds that justified the detention. The Court added that a third part, called the particulars, could also be included when it was required or found to be necessary. However, the Court emphasized that the “particulars” referred to in sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 3 were not the same as the third part of the order that might be served. The Court observed that both the State Government and the Central Government possessed all the relevant facts and details on which the detention order was based, but some of those details might be withheld from the detained person if disclosing them would be against the public interest. The Court then noted that the High Court had made an error by treating the preamble as the grounds of detention contemplated by section 7 of the Act. Nevertheless, the Court held that this mistake did not affect the legality, propriety, or correctness of the order that the High Court had issued in the habeas corpus proceedings. After pointing out the error, the High Court had proceeded to state that there was no ambiguity in the recitals of facts, which it had labelled as the grounds. The Court recorded that the same contention was again raised before it, namely that the grounds set out in paragraph 4 were vague and indefinite and therefore did not enable the detained person to make a proper representation. The Court examined paragraph 4 and found that it indicated the petitioner’s intention to travel to Delhi on 9 October 1958 with a view to instigating plans against the personal security of the Prime Minister. The Court observed that the place, the date, and the purpose of the alleged illicit activity were stated as clearly as could be expected. The argument that the details of the plan also needed to be disclosed was considered. The Court explained that paragraph 4 referred to something that was merely apprehended and lay in the future. Because the alleged activity had not yet occurred, the Court held that it was not possible to disclose further details of the plan. Referring to the earlier decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, the Court reiterated that “vagueness” is a relative concept that depends on the facts and circumstances of each case; what may be vague in one situation may not be in another, and a ground cannot be declared vague merely because the detained person can deny it. The Court stated that if the statement of facts is clear enough to be understood and is sufficiently definite to enable the detained person to make his representation, it cannot be described as vague. The Court also noted that it is naturally more difficult to state particulars of events that are still in the future than to describe events that have already taken place. Finally, the Court addressed the contention that some of the grounds, specifically paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, were irrelevant to the main object of the detention order, which was the maintenance of public order. The Court rejected this contention, holding that there was no substance to the argument and that all four paragraphs of the grounds were relevant to the purpose of the Act.

In this case the Court observed that a detained person cannot be denied a clear statement of facts if that statement can be understood and is sufficiently definite to enable the detainee to make a representation; therefore such a statement cannot be described as vague. The Court further noted that it is natural for the particulars of past events to be stated more precisely than those concerning future or contemplated actions. The primary purpose of the preventive detention Act, according to the Court, is to stop persons from engaging in conduct that falls within any sub-clause of clause (a) of section 3(1) of the Act. The petitioners argued that at least some of the grounds for detention were irrelevant. The Court rejected that claim with respect to the first paragraph of the grounds, but considered the contention that paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 were irrelevant to the main object of the detention order—namely, the maintenance of public order. The Court found no merit in that contention. It held that the statements contained in all four paragraphs must be read together as a connected whole. The grounds called for the building up of a strong movement against the implementation of the Nehru-Noon Pact, for arousing public passions by alleging that the Indian Prime Minister lacked sympathy for West Bengal, for denouncing the agreement between the two Prime Ministers, and for urging the formation of a militia involving the nation’s youth. All of these actions, the Court reasoned, could affect public order and therefore were not wholly disconnected from the purpose of maintaining public order. Moreover, any incitement against the personal safety of the Prime Minister of India would inevitably have a detrimental impact on public order, as reflected in the cited precedent (1) (1951) S.C.R. 167. The petitioners further argued that any weak link in the chain of facts and circumstances forming the basis of the detention order would invalidate the entire order. They relied on observations of this Court in Dwarka Dass Bhatia v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir (1), which suggested that if some reasons for a detention order were found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the order should be quashed because the Court could not determine which reasons influenced the authorities. The Court, however, found that no such situation existed here because none of the grounds was vague or irrelevant. The Court also noted that the ground of irrelevance had not been raised before the High Court, yet the petitioners’ counsel was permitted to raise it before this Court, and after hearing on that aspect, the Court was unconvinced that any consideration taken by the authorities was irrelevant. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appeal and the application under Article 32 of the Constitution had no merit and were dismissed.

In the present proceedings, after the counsel for the petitioner was given an opportunity to address the Court on the specific point concerning the relevance of the factors examined by the authorities when they decided to detain the petitioner, the Court expressed absolute confidence that no justification could be found for the petitioner’s contention that any of those factors were irrelevant. The Court carefully reviewed the material placed before it and found that each of the considerations that had been relied upon by the detaining authorities was proper and material to the decision. Having therefore satisfied itself that the ground of irrelevance advanced by the petitioner was untenable, the Court turned to the earlier discussion of the case and applied the reasons already set out in the judgment. On the basis of those reasons, the Court held that the appeal brought before it did not possess any legal merit, and likewise the petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was without substance. In view of this conclusion, the Court ordered that both the appeal and the constitutional petition be dismissed. The order was rendered in accordance with the principles laid down in the earlier authority reported in (1) (1956) S.C.R. 948.