Narendra Kumar And Ors. vs The Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 3 December 1959

Coram: B.P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, K.C. Das Gupta, K.N. Wanchoo, S.J. Imam

The case titled Narendra Kumar and others versus The Union of India and others was heard by the Supreme Court of India on 3 December 1959. The judgment was authored by Justice Das Gupta and it was delivered by a bench composed of Justices B. P. Sinha, J. L. Kapur, K. C. Das Gupta, K. N. Wanchoo and S. J. Imam.

The petitioners, who were three businessmen engaged in trading imported copper, operated their enterprise in Jagadhri, a town located in the State of Punjab. Each of them had, on separate occasions before 3 April 1958, entered into purchase agreements for copper with importers situated in the cities of Bombay and Calcutta. Their intention was to take delivery of the copper under those contracts, but before they could do so the Government of India issued an order on 2 April 1958. This order, known as the “Non‑ferrous Metal Control Order, 1958,” was issued under the authority granted by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (referred to as “the Act”). The order defined the term “non‑ferrous metal” to include imported copper, lead, tin and zinc in any of the forms listed in the schedule annexed to the order, and it expressly applied to imported copper from its very inception.

The order contained a price‑control provision in clause 3. The first sub‑clause of clause 3 stipulated that no person was permitted to sell or even offer to sell any non‑ferrous metal at a price that exceeded the landed cost of the metal by more than three and a half percent. The second sub‑clause complemented this rule by prohibiting any person from purchasing or offering to purchase a non‑ferrous metal at a price higher than the price at which that other person was allowed to sell it under the first sub‑clause. Clause 4 regulated the acquisition of non‑ferrous metal by requiring that no individual or entity could acquire or agree to acquire any such metal unless a permit issued by the Controller, in accordance with principles that the Central Government might specify from time to time, was obtained. The order further imposed obligations on importers through clauses 5 and 6, which required them to give notice of the quantities of non‑ferrous metal that they imported and to maintain prescribed books of account. Finally, clause 7 granted the Controller the authority to enter and search any premises, to inspect any books or documents, and, in certain circumstances, to seize any non‑ferrous metal found.

The Non‑ferrous Metal Control Order, 1958 was officially published in the Gazette of India on 2 April 1958. However, the Central Government had not, on that date or at any later date, issued the specific principles required by clause 4 of the order for the issuance of permits. Some principles were later communicated by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in a letter dated 18 April 1958, addressed to the Chief Industrial Adviser. This communication outlined certain guidelines that the Controller was to follow when granting permits, but it was not a formal publication of the principles as required by the order itself.

In the communication addressed to the Government of India at New Delhi, the Deputy Secretary of the Government of India set out the principles that would govern the issuance of permits by the Controller. The communication stated that the following rules would apply: first, for the scheduled industries that were under the control of the Development Wing, the Controller would determine the six‑monthly requirements of actual users based on their production in the year 1956; second, for small‑scale industries, the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, on the certificate of the State Directors of Industries, would inform the Controller of the quantities to which the units would be entitled, and the Controller would then make those quantities available to the units from time to time; third, the Controller would normally release only one month’s requirements at a time to the consuming units, and each permit would be valid for a period of two months, although if heavy imports were reported the Controller would have the discretion to issue larger stocks. The effect of the Order issued on 2 April 1958 was that no person could purchase or sell imported copper at a price exceeding the landed cost plus three and a half percent, and no person could acquire or agree to acquire such copper except under a permit issued by the Controller. The issuance of permits was to be governed by the principles that the Central Government would specify. Once those principles were specified in the letter of 18 April, the Controller could no longer issue permits to dealers; permits could be granted only to certain manufacturers as indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of that letter. In accordance with the requirement of clause 4 of the Order, the petitioners applied on 14 April 1958 for permits that would enable them to take delivery of copper for which they had already entered into contracts with various parties. Although no formal order appears to have been made on those applications, it is not contested that the applications were refused and that no permits were issued to the petitioners. The petitioners advanced two principal contentions. First, they argued that clause 4 of the Order, read together with the principles specified in the letter of 18 April, infringed the constitutional rights guaranteed to them as citizens of India under Article 19(1)(f), which protects the right to acquire property, and Article 19(1)(g), which protects the right to carry on trade, and that such infringements were not saved by the provisions of Articles 19(5) and 19(6), rendering them void. Second, they contended that the fixation of the price at the landed cost plus three and a half percent as a maximum also abridged the rights conferred by Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g), and that this price ceiling likewise was not saved by Articles 19(5) and 19(6), and therefore was void. A further contention is that the principles specified

In the petition, it was asserted that the differential treatment of manufacturers and dealers in copper constituted discrimination that violated the right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioners further argued that the principles set out in the letter of 18 April formed an essential part of the “Order” through which the Central Government is authorised, under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, to regulate the distribution and supply of essential commodities. Because these principles had not been published in the Official Gazette as mandated by the fifth sub‑section of the Act, nor laid before both Houses of Parliament as required by the sixth sub‑section, the petitioners claimed that the principles possessed no legal force. Alternatively, they contended that if the principles were not regarded as part of the Order, then any regulation based upon them fell outside the scope of section 3, which empowers the Central Government to issue an order regulating or prohibiting the production, supply, and trade of essential commodities, and does not permit regulation by any other means.

The petitioners consequently sought a writ, order, or direction to restrain the respondents—including the Union of India, the Chief Industrial Adviser to the Government of India, and the Development Officer, Ministry of Industry—from enforcing clauses 3 and 4 of the Order; they asked that the order of the Development Officer rejecting their applications for permits be set aside and that the second and third respondents be directed to grant the permits; and they requested that the respondents be prevented from issuing permits to any parties other than the petitioners with respect to copper covered by their contracts with importers. The respondents opposed the application, maintaining that clauses 3 and 4 of the Order and the specified “principles” were lawful restrictions on the rights conferred by Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g), imposed in the public interest. They further argued that, since the petitioners had not challenged the validity of the Essential Commodities Act and had acknowledged the Central Government’s power to issue an order under section 3, the Court could not examine whether the non‑ferrous metal control order or the principles under clause 4 infringed any fundamental rights, because the Government acted within a valid statutory framework to regulate or prohibit production, supply, distribution, and trade of an essential commodity when it deemed such action necessary or expedient.

In this case the Court stated that an order issued for maintaining or increasing supplies of an essential commodity, or for securing its equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, could be challenged only if it exceeded the authority granted by the relevant statutory provision or if it was made in bad faith. The Court noted that no allegations of bad faith had been made and therefore proceeded on the basis that the Central Government honestly believed that it was necessary and expedient to issue an order regulating and prohibiting the supply and distribution of imported copper and the trade and commerce connected with it. The Court held that, provided the order did not go beyond the powers conferred by the statute, the order was valid and any question of infringement of fundamental rights under the Constitution was irrelevant. It rejected the argument that the order could be struck down on the ground of violating fundamental rights as an “extravagant” proposition. The Court further observed that if there were any reason to think that section 3 of the Act gave the Central Government power to do anything in conflict with the Constitution, such a conflict would render the section itself void for being ultra‑vires the Constitution. Since no challenge was made that section 3 was ultra‑vires, the Court assumed that the powers granted by that section did not violate the Constitution and did not empower the Government to act contrary to constitutional prohibitions. It was considered proper to presume that Parliament, when enacting the Act, could not have intended the words “may by order provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof, and trade and commerce in” to include a power that would contravene the Constitution. The absence of the phrase “in accordance with the provisions of the articles of the Constitution” in the section was held to be of no consequence, because such words are implied in every statutory provision and every law made after the Constitution came into force. Consequently, when section 3 confers power to regulate or prohibit the production, supply and distribution of any essential commodity, that power extends only to measures that do not violate any fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India. The Court then explained that, even though no bad‑faith conduct by the Government was alleged, it was necessary to examine whether the subordinate legislation issued by the Central Government, although it may abridge the rights guaranteed by Article 19(1)(f) and Article 19(1)(g), fell within the protective provisions of Article 19(5) and Article 19(6). On a preliminary reading, clause 4 of the order was therefore subject to this consideration.

The Court observed that when the Order was read together with the principles set out in the letter dated 18 April, the effect was to remove traders known as dealers completely from the market in imported copper. The Court further noted that, even if clause 4 and the principles were ignored, the provision fixing the selling price of copper at three and a half per cent above the landed cost would still force dealers out of the imported‑copper business. The Union of India, in paragraph 11 of its counter‑affidavit, explained that the three and a half per cent addition to the landed cost was included in paragraph 3 of the Order to allow importers to earn a profit margin. From this explanation the Court concluded that the amount stipulated would become the minimum price at which importers could sell the metal. Consequently, any dealer who wished to obtain copper from the importers would have to pay the landed cost plus the three and a half per cent markup. At the same time, the dealer would be barred from charging the ultimate consumer any amount above the same landed cost plus three and a half per cent. The Court therefore held that, as a result of the Order, a consumer would have to purchase copper directly from the importer and the traditional distribution channel that involved dealers would disappear. In order to determine whether this complete removal of dealers from the imported‑copper trade fell within the protective clauses of Articles 19(5) and 19(6) of the Constitution, the Court first examined whether such removal constituted merely a restriction on the rights guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g), or whether it amounted to something beyond a mere restriction. Counsel for the petitioners argued that a law that prohibits the exercise of a right must be distinguished from a law that merely restricts the exercise of that right, and that when the Constitution speaks of reasonable restrictions it does not protect statutes that altogether prohibit a right. They submitted that the total exclusion of dealers amounted to a prohibition of the right to engage in trade or to acquire property, and that therefore the provision fell outside the saving provisions of clauses 5 and 6 of Article 19. The Court then referred to observations made by Chief Justice Kania and Justice S. R. Das in Gopalan’s Case, which at first glance seemed to support the petitioners’ contention. Chief Justice Kania, quoting from page 106 of the report, observed that deprivation of personal liberty is not the same as restriction of free movement, and stated that Article 19(5) could not be applied to a substantive law that deprives a citizen of personal liberty, rejecting the view that “deprivation” includes “restriction” when interpreting Article 21. Justice Das, at page 301 of the report, made a similar comment concerning the qualification of sub‑clause (d) of Article 19, indicating that the constitutional provision was intended to qualify, not to eliminate, the right in question.

In this passage the Court explained that clause (1) must be read in the light of the preceding clause, which allows the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right of free movement throughout the territory of India. The Court emphasized that imposing a reasonable restriction does not annihilate the right of free movement; rather, it leaves a portion of the right intact while limiting it to a degree that is considered reasonable.

The Court observed that the earlier remarks concerning the relationship between Article 19(5) and Article 21 were made specifically in the context of a conflict between those two provisions and were not intended to be applied generally to every situation involving restriction of a fundamental right.

The Court then turned to the decision delivered in Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in [1950] S.C.R. 759, where the constitutionality of the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Manufacture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act was examined. Justice Mahajan, speaking for the Court, identified the principal issue as whether a total prohibition on the manufacture of bidis during the agricultural season could be regarded as a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g). He concluded that the impugned statute did not fall within the saving clause of Article 19(6) because the test of reasonableness was not satisfied; his conclusion was based on the absence of reasonableness rather than on any doctrinal distinction between “prohibition” and “restriction.”

Justice Mahajan further explained at page 764 of the Report that the provisions of the Act bore no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved and were “so drastic in scope that it goes much in excess of that object.” He observed that the statute not only exceeded the requirements of the case but also employed language that barred a bidi manufacturer from employing any person, irrespective of where that person resided. Consequently, a manufacturer located in the area could not import labour from neighbouring districts, provinces, or from outside the province. The Court described this blanket prohibition as “arbitrary in nature” because it bore no connection to the legislative objective and therefore could not be considered a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right.

Accordingly, the Court struck down the law on the ground that the restriction, which amounted to a prohibition, was unreasonable; the invalidity was premised on the lack of reasonableness rather than on the mere fact that the measure was a prohibition.

Subsequent decisions, such as Saghir Ahamad’s case and Chamarbaugwala’s case reported in [1957] S.C.R. 874, raised the question of whether a prohibition of the exercise of a right fell within the meaning of “restriction” under clause 6. In those cases the Court refrained from giving a definitive ruling and left the issue unresolved.

In Cooverjee’s case, reported in [1954] S.C.R. 873, 879, the Court extended the ambit of clause 6 of Article 19 to encompass a law that effectively prohibited the exercise of a particular right, thereby demonstrating a broader interpretation of the term “restriction.”

Mahajan, J., speaking for the Court, explained that when a court examines whether a restriction on the freedom to trade is reasonable, it must first look at the character of the business involved and the conditions that exist in that particular trade. He observed that these factors inevitably vary from one type of trade to another, and therefore it is impossible to lay down universal rules that apply to every trade. The judge also stressed that the State possesses the authority to forbid trades that are illegal, immoral, or harmful to public health and welfare. Consequently, statutes that ban the dealing in poisonous or dangerous substances, or that prohibit the trafficking of women, cannot be described as illegal simply because they create a prohibition rather than a mere regulation. Hence, the nature of the business itself is a crucial consideration in assessing the reasonableness of any restriction.

In the matter of Madhya Bharat Cotton Association Ltd., the Court was called upon to examine the constitutionality of an order that effectively barred a large segment of traders from engaging in their ordinary practice of forward contracts. Bose, J., delivering the judgment of the Court, held that because cotton is an essential commodity for the community, it is permissible for the State to impose restrictions that, in certain circumstances, may even rise to a total temporary prohibition of all normal trading in that commodity.

From the decisions in Chintaman Rao’s Case ([1950] S.C.R. 759), Cooverjee’s Case ([1954] S.C.R. 873, 879) and the Madhya Bharat Cotton Association Ltd. case, the Court consistently treated the core issue as whether the interference with the fundamental right to trade was reasonable in view of the interests of the general public. The Court affirmed that if the restriction satisfied the test of reasonableness, the law would be upheld; if it failed that test, the law would be invalid. In each of these instances, a prohibition was regarded merely as a form of restriction, and the Court warned that interpreting prohibition as something beyond a restriction would defeat the purpose of the Constitution.

Article 19(1) of the Constitution grants citizens a series of rights enumerated in its seven sub‑clauses. Immediately thereafter, Articles 2 to 6 act to prevent unreasonable obstacles to social regulation. The fundamental purpose of the State is to promote the welfare of its people through appropriate legislation and administration. If the enactment of these seven rights were to halt all legislative activity in the wide areas where they operate, the very objective of the State would be undermined. However, the Constitution anticipates this possibility and, through its saving provisions—especially those arising from Article 13—allows for the continuation and enactment of new laws even within the domains of these rights whenever such measures are necessary for the general welfare.

In this case, the Court explained that statutes which impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of constitutional rights are preserved by specific clauses of Article 19. Clause 2 preserves restrictions on the rights listed in sub‑paragraph (a) when the restriction is “in the interests of the security of the State” or for other matters expressly mentioned in that clause. Clause 3 preserves restrictions on the rights in sub‑paragraph (b) when the restriction is “in the interests of public order.” Clauses 4, 5 and 6 preserve restrictions on the rights enumerated in sub‑paragraphs (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) when the restriction is “in the interest of the general public.” Additionally, clause 5 preserves restrictions on the rights in sub‑paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) when the restriction is “for the protection of the interests of any scheduled tribe.” The Court noted that, without these saving provisions, such statutes would have been declared void under Article 13, which states that any law existing before the Constitution and inconsistent with the provisions of this Part shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void, and that the State may not make any law that takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part; any law made in contravention of this provision shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.

The Court observed that the purpose of these saving provisions was to remedy the harm that would otherwise arise from the strict operation of Article 13. Consequently, while interpreting the phrase “reasonable restrictions” in Clause 2, the Court held that the Constitution‑framers intended the term “restriction” to be sufficiently wide to encompass laws that are inconsistent with Article 19(1) or that take away the rights guaranteed by that article, provided that such inconsistency or deprivation is reasonable in respect of the matters listed in the relevant clause. The Court further clarified that the drafters deliberately included the possibility of a prohibition within the meaning of “restriction.” Therefore, the argument that any law prohibiting the exercise of a fundamental right can never be saved was rejected.

The Court cautioned, however, that when a restriction reaches the level of a total prohibition, as in the present matter, the judiciary must exercise heightened care to ensure that the restriction satisfies the test of reasonableness. The greater the extent of the restriction, the more demanding the requirement for strict scrutiny by the Court. In applying the reasonableness test, the Court must examine the factual and circumstantial background that prompted the enactment of the order, assess the nature of the evil the law seeks to remedy, and weigh the harm inflicted on individual citizens against the beneficial effect that the law is expected to produce for the general public. The Court also indicated that it must consider whether the restraint imposed by the law exceeds what is necessary to serve the public interest.

The Court observed that the state of the copper trade at the end of March 1958, within two days of the issuance of the impugned order, was clearly understood. Copper was extensively required by Indian industries for manufacturing a range of consumer goods as well as sheets and other articles that served as raw material for further industrial processes; consequently, its status as an essential commodity was uncontested. Domestic production of copper was extremely limited relative to the normal requirements of industry, compelling manufacturers to depend on imports for many years. Because of the metal’s importance, copper had long been placed in the Open General List, allowing unrestricted importation. However, when the country’s foreign‑exchange reserves deteriorated, the government deemed it necessary, in the larger national interest, to conserve foreign exchange. Accordingly, copper was removed from the Open General List effective 1 July 1957, and a licence became mandatory for its importation. During the period from July to September 1957, licences were granted both to established copper importers and to actual users who were not previously importers. From October 1957 through March 1958, licences were issued only to established importers. Regardless of the motive behind excluding actual users, the result proved disastrous. A small group of importers, having acquired a practical monopoly over the imported commodity, were able to dictate terms to consumers, and by March 1958 the domestic price of copper rose to Rs 3,477 per ton, compared with the international price of Rs 2,221. The Court noted that it was undisputed that this exploitation of the monopoly seriously harmed the interests of the general public. It was also undisputed that the legislation challenged – the Non‑ferrous Metal Control Order and the subsequently specified principles – was enacted in an honest effort to protect public interests. The Court explained that the primary evil the law sought to remedy was the surge in copper prices, which inevitably would be reflected in higher prices for consumer goods that relied on copper as a major input. While price control was the obvious first step, experience showed that price control alone would be practically ineffective unless accompanied by a system of permits. The permit system was intended to identify those acquiring copper and to ensure that the raw material was allocated to those industries where it was most needed, thereby maximizing benefit to the public.

In the judgment, the Court explained that the purpose of the order was to ensure that copper was supplied to the industries that needed it most and that it was distributed in quantities that would yield the greatest benefit to the public. Clause 3 of the Order fixed a price for copper, while clause 4 introduced a permit system to regulate the acquisition of the material. The Court held that fixing a price was essential to keep copper prices within reasonable limits and therefore constituted a reasonable restriction in the public interest. However, the Court questioned whether it was necessary to fix the price in a manner that completely eliminated the dealer, as had been done in the present case. The Court also affirmed that a permit system was clearly needed for the public good, but it examined whether it was required to specify principles that would drive the dealer out of business. The Court emphasized that such questions required careful consideration because the injury to the dealer caused by total elimination was substantial, and despite the presumption of constitutionality that normally attaches to statutes, the Court must scrutinise laws that impose a total restraint on constitutional rights.

The Court further observed that it is an established fact that the profits earned by middlemen increase the price of goods paid by consumers. The Court rejected the notion that middlemen obtain profits without effort and reminded that middlemen perform a valuable function by creating a distribution channel between producers and consumers. By doing so, they relieve producers of the burden and risk of storing goods for extended periods and relieve consumers from the inconvenience and expense of travelling to distant producers. The Court noted that, in the nature of the role, a middleman must charge for the interest on capital invested, for reasonable management remuneration, and for the risks undertaken, often referred to by economists as “entrepreneur’s risk,” and that these charges can amount to a considerable sum. Consequently, modern social‑control policies have sought to minimise the activities of middlemen and to replace them largely with co‑operative societies of producers and co‑operative purchase societies of consumers. While acknowledging that middlemen provide important services, the Court concurred that the public’s interests would be best served if those services could be obtained at a lower price than the middleman would normally charge. The Court concluded that if the price were fixed at landed cost plus three and a half per cent, thereby causing the dealer to cease operating, manufacturers requiring copper would need to establish direct contacts with importers. Although this would cause some inconvenience, the Court considered it reasonable to expect that the savings achieved on the cost of raw material would more than compensate the manufacturers for the additional trouble.

In this case, the Court observed that a reduction in the cost of copper, which is a raw material for many consumer goods, is likely to lead to lower prices for those goods in a competitive market, thereby benefiting the public at large. The Court therefore concluded that clause 3 of the Order, although it removes dealers from the trade, constitutes a reasonable restriction that serves the general public’s interest. The Court reached a similar conclusion regarding clause 4 when read together with the principles specified in the Order, holding that it also represents a reasonable restriction for the same public‑interest purpose. The parties argued that the principles discriminate between manufacturers and dealers and thus breach Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court noted that the principles indeed place manufacturers and dealers in separate classes, with permits being available to certain manufacturers but not to dealers. However, the Court explained that the distinction between the two classes bears a rational relationship to the objective of the legislation, which is to control the trade in the essential commodity. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the contention that the specification of the principles violates Article 14, as the classification is reasonably linked to the legislative goal.

The Court further examined whether clause 3 and clause 4 of the Order fall within the scope of the Essential Commodities Act. It held that clause 3 clearly operates within the Act, but the validity of clause 4, when read with the principles, is uncertain. The Court explained that if the principles had been incorporated directly into the Order or had been notified in the Official Gazette and laid before both Houses of Parliament in accordance with sub‑sections (5) and (6) of section 3 of the Act, then clause 4 would be a valid regulation under the Act. Since the principles were neither included in the Order nor notified or laid before Parliament as required, the regulation effected through those principles does not qualify as an order made under section 3 and therefore lies outside the Act. As a result, it does not enjoy the protection of the saving provisions of clauses 5 and 6 of Article 19. The Court emphasized that without the principles, clause 4 cannot function, because the permit system it envisages can exist only if permits are issued in accordance with the Central Government’s principles. The Court rejected the argument that the phrase “may specify” in clause 4 allows the Controller to issue permits based on his own discretion when principles are absent. The language of clause 4 obliges the conclusion that no permits can be issued until the Central Government formally specifies the principles, rendering the clause ineffective in the absence of such specification.

The Court observed that if the provision requiring a permit for any acquisition of copper were enforced while the statutory principles outlined in sub‑section (5) and sub‑section (6) of section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act remained unspecified, the result would be a complete cessation of all copper trade. This would not only halt transactions conducted by dealers but would also prohibit any transaction involving imported copper. The Court noted that, on its face, such a total stoppage could not be regarded as a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public. Consequently, the Court concluded that, until the Central Government issues an order specifying the required principles in the manner prescribed by sub‑section (5), and lays that order before both Houses of Parliament in accordance with sub‑section (6) of section 3, clause 4 of the Non‑ferrous Metal Control Order cannot fall within the constitutional safeguards of Articles 19(5) and 19(6). Because it fails to meet those safeguards, clause 4 is void to the extent that it deprives persons of the rights guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

The Court further held that clause 4 will become effective only when some principles are formally specified, published in the Official Gazette, and placed before the Houses of Parliament. The Court recognized that, from time to time, it may become necessary to introduce new principles in response to changed circumstances; each such amendment must also be notified in the Gazette and laid before Parliament to acquire legal effect. The Court explained that, in the absence of new principles, the last set of principles that were duly notified and laid before Parliament will continue to operate. The Court examined the letter dated 18 April, which purported to contain the required principles, and found that those principles had neither been published in the Gazette nor laid before Parliament. Moreover, no other principles had been specified before or after that date. Accordingly, the Court declared clause 4 of the order, as it presently stands, to be void. The petitioners were therefore entitled to relief limited to clause 4. The Court directed that an order be issued restraining the respondents from enforcing clause 4 of the Non‑ferrous Metal Control Order until the appropriate principles are published in the Official Gazette and laid before Parliament in compliance with sub‑sections (5) and (6) of section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. Finally, the Court ordered that each party bear its own costs, noting that the petition succeeded in part and failed in part, and issued the appropriate directions accordingly.