Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas vs The State Of West Bengal

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 1957

Decision Date: 7 May, 1959

Coram: Syed Jaffer Imam, J.L. Kapur

In this matter, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 7 May 1959 in the case styled Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas versus The State of West Bengal. The petition was presented by Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas and the respondent was the State of West Bengal. The judgment was authored by Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, who sat on a bench together with Justice J. L. Kapur. The formal citation of the decision appears as 1959 AIR 1118 and 1960 SCR (1) 93, with subsequent citations recorded as R 1961 SC 986 and RF 1977 SC 2401. The legal issues concerned the criminal trial procedure, specifically the moment at which a magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, and whether the issuance of a search warrant and an arrest warrant, in the circumstances, amounts to such cognizance. The offences in question related to attempting to take Indian currency notes abroad in violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, sections 19(3) and 23(3), together with procedural provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, sections 153, 155, 200‑203 and 204.

The factual background began on 7 September 1952 when the appellant travelled to Dum Dum Aerodrome intending to board a flight to Hong Kong. Customs officials, during a search, discovered a sum of Rs 25,000 in the appellant’s possession that he had failed to declare on the required declaration form and for which he possessed no permit from the Reserve Bank of India authorising its removal from the country. On 12 September 1952, the Reserve Bank authorised Inspector Mitra to approach the Additional District Magistrate of 24 Parganas under section 19(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act to obtain permission to proceed against the appellant. Subsequently, on 16 September 1952, Inspector Mitra applied to the magistrate for a search warrant and an arrest warrant; both were granted. The appellant was arrested, released on bail, and directed to appear before the magistrate on 19 September 1952. On that date the magistrate released the appellant on bail but declined to exempt him from personal attendance before the court, granting instead a period until 19 November 1952 to complete the investigation. This period was subsequently extended to 2 January 1953 and again to 2 February 1953. During this interval, on 27 January 1953, Inspector Mitra received authority under section 23(3)(b) of the Act to lodge a formal complaint against the appellant. The complaint was filed on 2 February 1953 before the Additional District Magistrate, who then transferred the matter to a Class I magistrate for trial. On the same day the Class I magistrate recorded the appellant’s presence, permitted a reduction of security, and scheduled the presentation of evidence for 26 and 27 March 1953. After the trial concluded, the magistrate acquitted the appellant. The Calcutta High Court, on appeal, reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellant. The appellant contended that the entire trial lacked jurisdiction because the magistrate had allegedly taken cognizance of the offence on 16 September 1952 without a written complaint from an authorised person as required by section 23(3) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that cognizance was in fact taken by the Additional District Magistrate on 2 February 1953, after the formal complaint had been filed, and therefore the trial was valid. The Court further clarified the point at which cognizance of an offence is taken.

The Court explained that the question of when a magistrate takes cognizance of an offence must be decided on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each individual case. It held that the mere issuance of a search warrant or a warrant of arrest for investigative purposes does not, by itself, constitute the taking of cognizance. Cognizance, according to the Court, is deemed to be taken at the moment a magistrate consciously decides to proceed under Section 200 and the subsequent provisions of Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or under Section 204 of Chapter XVII of the same Code. In the case before the Court, cognizance was taken on 2 February 1953 when the Additional District Magistrate examined the matter with a view to issuing a process and then directed that the case be sent to another magistrate for trial. The Court applied the authorities set out in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerji, A.I.R. (1950) Cal. 437, and R. R. Chari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1951] S.C.R. 312, in reaching this conclusion. The factual findings of the trial clearly established that the appellant had attempted to remove from India the currency notes that were seized, and that such an attempt itself amounted to an offence. The High Court, the Court observed, had correctly rejected the appellant’s explanation that he had applied to the Reserve Bank of India for a permit to take the notes abroad and, having not received the permit, had handed the notes over to the customs authorities for safe custody.

The judgment under review was a criminal appeal (No. 12 of 1957) filed against the order dated 5 September 1956 of the Calcutta High Court in Government Appeal No. 7 of 1954, which itself arose from the order of 3 April 1954 of the Court of First Class Magistrate at Alipore. Counsel for the appellant and counsel for the respondent were listed, and the judgment was delivered on 7 May 1959. The Court noted that the appeal was based on a certificate granted by the Calcutta High Court after it identified two substantive questions. The first question concerned the legality of the customs search that led to the discovery of the currency notes on the appellant; the High Court had rejected the appellant’s contention that the search was unlawful and therefore could not form the basis of any proceedings. The second question raised by the appellant argued that the warrant of arrest issued on 16 September 1952 could not have been valid because the magistrate had not previously taken cognizance of the offence, and that the required authorization under Section 23(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (VII of 1947) had not been obtained until 27 January 1953. Consequently, the appellant submitted that the cognizance taken on 16 September 1952 was beyond the magistrate’s jurisdiction, rendering the subsequent conviction untenable. The High Court held that this contention raised a question of law and therefore granted the certificate of appeal to this Court. The prosecution’s case was then set out for consideration.

According to the record, on 7 September 1952 the appellant travelled to Dum Dum Aerodrome intending to board a flight bound for Hong Kong. The scheduled departure time of the aircraft was 8 hours 30 minutes in the morning. Before he could embark, the appellant was required to comply with the customs formalities. When customs officers asked him whether he possessed any articles other than those he had listed in the customs declaration form, he replied in the negative. The officers then examined his baggage but found no prohibited items. During the examination they observed a pouch of unusual size, which raised their suspicion. Consequently, the appellant was subjected to a personal search. While the officers were about to conduct the search, the appellant inadvertently let his trousers drop. He was asked to lift the trousers and then replace them, which he complied with. Upon searching the trousers, the officers discovered a sum of Rs 25,000 in Indian currency notes hidden in two secret pockets. These pockets were concealed beneath the surface of the garment and could be opened only from the inside. Four days later, on 11 September 1952, the Reserve Bank of India authorised Inspector S. B. Mitra of the Special Police Establishment, Calcutta, to make a representation to the Additional District Magistrate, 24 Parganas, seeking permission to proceed against the appellant as required under section 19(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. Acting on this authorisation, Inspector Mitra applied to the Additional District Magistrate on 16 September 1952 for a search warrant, which the magistrate granted. On the same day Mitra also applied for a warrant of arrest against the appellant; this request was likewise approved. The Additional District Magistrate thereafter issued the arrest warrant, the appellant was taken into custody and subsequently released on bail with a direction to appear before the magistrate on 19 September 1952. On that date the magistrate released the appellant on bail of Rs 50,000, secured by ten sureties each of Rs 5,000.

After his release, the appellant applied on 19 November for exemption from appearing on the subsequent court dates fixed for his case, but this application was denied. Later, on 27 January 1953 the Reserve Bank of India again authorised Inspector Mitra to file a formal complaint against the appellant. Accordingly, on 2 February 1953 a complaint was lodged charging the appellant with an offence under section 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act read with section 19 of the Sea Customs Act and Notification No. FERA 105/55 RB dated 27 February 1951. The case was then tried before a different magistrate, Mr Sinha, who acquitted the appellant under section 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Following the acquittal, the currency notes that had been seized by the customs officials were ordered to be relassed. Unsatisfied with this outcome, the State of West Bengal filed an appeal before the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal and convicted the appellant of the offence with which he had originally been charged, setting aside the magistrate’s order directing the release of the seized currency notes.

In this matter the appellant was convicted of the offence with which he had been charged and was sentenced to pay a fine of one thousand rupees; the sentence provided that in the event of default he would suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months. The order of the magistrate that had directed the release of the currency notes seized by the customs officials was set aside. The principal submission made on behalf of the appellant before this Court was that the Additional District Magistrate, who had taken cognizance of the offence on 16 September 1952, acted without jurisdiction because the requirements of section 23(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act had not been complied with. Accordingly, the proceedings before that magistrate and before the magistrate who later tried the case were claimed to be illegal. The appellant further contended that the subsequent authorization by the Reserve Bank of India on 27 January 1953 and the filing of the complaint on 2 February 1953 could not confer jurisdiction upon proceedings that had already commenced without lawful authority. In addition, the appellant argued that the facts found did not bring the case within the ambit of section 19 of the Sea Customs Act (8 of 1878), since at the moment the customs officials searched him it could not be said that he was taking the currency notes out of India across any customs frontier defined by the Central Government.

The appellant also submitted that his explanation had been accepted by the trial magistrate, and therefore the High Court should not have set aside his acquittal because there was no good ground for rejecting his account. According to the appellant, the sum of twenty‑five thousand rupees in currency notes was not discovered through a search at the customs barrier. He claimed that he had removed the notes from his trouser pocket and voluntarily handed them to the customs officers, explaining the circumstances of his possession and requesting a receipt. The customs officers, he alleged, instead of issuing a receipt, falsely charged him with smuggling the notes out of India without a permit. The appellant said that he had applied to the Reserve Bank of India at Calcutta for a permit, addressing his application to a person named Joshi, but that the permit had not been received by the time of the incident. His intention, he maintained, was to deliver the money to the customs officers for safe custody. In substance his version was that, having failed to obtain the permit, he voluntarily surrendered the currency notes to the customs officers at the barrier for safekeeping and never intended to carry them out of the country without authority. The trial magistrate accepted this version and acquitted him. The High Court, however, rejected the appellant’s narrative. It was further urged that the present appeal was filed on a certificate and, because the High Court had arrived at a different finding of fact from that of the trial magistrate, the appellant was entitled to question the High Court’s conclusions.

It was observed that, although the trying Magistrate had acquitted the appellant, the appellant was still free to challenge the factual findings of the High Court. The High Court had arrived at a view that differed from that of the trial Magistrate and it had dismissed the appellant’s claim that he had voluntarily handed the currency notes over to the Customs Officers and that he had no intention of taking the money out of India without a permit. The Court emphasized that the High Court’s conclusion rested on a question of fact. No specific reason was identified that would justify overturning the factual findings reached by the High Court. The Court noted that the High Court had provided a thorough explanation for accepting the testimony of the prosecution witnesses concerning the circumstances under which the currency notes were recovered when the appellant was searched. An important factual issue that could have supported the appellant’s version was whether he had applied to the Reserve Bank of India for a permit to export currency notes amounting to Rs 25,000. The High Court examined the evidence of the Superintendent of the Reserve Bank, who testified that the Reserve Bank had not received any application from the appellant before 7 September 1952, nor had it granted any permission to export currency notes. The Reserve Bank only received an application on 16 September 1952, forwarded by a Mr G C Joshi in a letter dated 15 September 1952, although the application itself bore the date 2 September 1952. The High Court found grounds to suspect that the application had been antedated and concluded that there was no evidence showing that the appellant had actually written or submitted the application on 2 September 1952.

The Court considered it extraordinary that, if the appellant had indeed sent the application to Joshi on 2 September 1952, Joshi would have delayed forwarding it to the Reserve Bank until 15 September 1952. It was recalled that the incident in question had already occurred on 7 September 1952, and that on 15 September 1952 Inspector Mitra of the Special Police Establishment, Calcutta, had applied for a search warrant, followed by a warrant of arrest on 16 September 1952. After his arrest, the appellant was released on bail with a direction to appear before the court on 19 September 1952. Consequently, the appellant had ample opportunity after 7 September 1952 to fabricate an application for a permit and to have Joshi forward it on 15 September 1952. The Court found it inconceivable that a person who intended to travel to Hong Kong and to carry a sum as large as Rs 25,000 in currency notes would have applied for a permit on 2 September 1952, a date that fell after his scheduled departure. The Court therefore concluded that the High Court’s factual findings were sound and not open to being disturbed.

In this case, the Court observed that it was implausible for the appellant to have filed an application on September 2 when his scheduled departure was on September 7, 1952. The Court considered that the appellant would have arranged his arrival in Calcutta so that he could inquire of Joshi or the Reserve Bank whether the requested permit had been issued. It was deemed impossible that he could have reached Calcutta, proceeded directly to Dum Dum Aerodrome, and failed to make any enquiry with Joshi about the status of the permit. Ordinarily, a person in his position would have arrived early enough to allow such enquiries and, if the permit had not been granted, would have left the currency notes in safe custody with Joshi or another trusted individual. The Court found the appellant’s explanation—that he waited at the aerodrome until the last moment, failed to obtain the permit, and then asked Customs officers to keep the notes for safekeeping—entirely unacceptable. Moreover, the appellant did not call Joshi as a witness to support his version, and the Court inferred that a thorough examination of Joshi might have produced inconvenient revelations about the transaction. Consequently, the Court saw no reason to doubt the High Court’s suspicion that the application to the Reserve Bank had been antedated, rendering the foundation of the appellant’s defence false.

The Court further noted that several witnesses holding responsible positions, including P.W. 4, Panna Lal Dey, a money‑exchanger at Dum Dum Airport, testified that the appellant had not handed over the Rs 25,000 in currency notes at the customs barrier but was searched after completing the customs formalities. The High Court had accepted Panna Lal Dey’s evidence, and after reviewing his testimony, the Court found no basis to distrust it. By referring to specific evidentiary points, the Court confirmed that the High Court’s finding was the only reasonable conclusion. Although the appellant had not actually removed the currency notes from India across a customs frontier defined by the Central Government, the Court held that he had clearly attempted to do so, and therefore the question of crossing the frontier did not arise. The Court affirmed that an attempt to take out the currency notes constituted an offence under Section 167, Item 8 of the Sea Customs Act. It also referred to the Foreign Exchange Regulation (Amendment) Act 1952 (VIII of 1952), which had introduced Section 23B, making punishable any attempt to contravene the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act or its rules, directions, or orders.

The Court observed that the Foreign Exchange Regulation (Amendment) Act of 1952, which became operative in February 1952, introduced section 23B into the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. Section 23B makes it an offence to attempt to contravene any provision of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act or any rule, direction or order made thereunder. The Court noted that the issue of whether section 23B applied was not raised before the Tribunal that granted the certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court. Nevertheless, the factual findings demonstrated unequivocally that the appellant had attempted to take the currency notes out of India. He had entered the customs enclosure, signed the prescribed declaration form and, when asked whether he possessed any article other than those listed in the declaration, he replied in the negative. During a personal search he dropped his trousers on the ground; after being instructed to retrieve and don them again, the authorities examined the trousers and discovered concealed currency notes bearing a total value of Rs 25,000 in the inner pockets. The appellant also possessed a ticket for a flight to Hong Kong scheduled to depart from Dum Dum Airport at 8:30 a.m., and the requisite customs formalities for that flight had already been completed. Consequently, the only remaining step for him would have been to board the aircraft and leave the country. These circumstances, the Court held, established beyond any reasonable doubt that the appellant’s conduct had progressed beyond mere preparation and amounted to a clear attempt to export Rs 25,000 in currency notes without a permit from the Reserve Bank of India. The Court therefore rejected the appellant’s contention that his acts amounted only to preparation and not to an attempt.

Turning to the appellant’s principal argument, the Court noted that it centered on the claim that the proceedings before both the Additional District Magistrate and the trying Magistrate were void for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant contended that cognizance of the alleged offence had been taken on 16 September 1952, contrary to the requirements of section 23(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, because on that date no written complaint had been lodged by an officer authorized by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India pursuant to a general or special order. Accordingly, the Court found it necessary to determine the precise date on which cognizance of the offence was taken. In order to make that determination, the Court indicated that relevant provisions of both the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure must be examined. Under section 19(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, a District Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class is empowered, upon receipt of a written representation from a person duly authorized by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank, to issue a search warrant when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a contravention of any provision of the Act has occurred.

Inspector Mitra received authorization from the Reserve Bank of India on 11 September 1952. Acting on that authority, he applied to the Additional District Magistrate for a search warrant. The statutory provision under which the warrant could be issued required that it be used solely for the investigation of offences contemplated by the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. On 16 September 1952, Inspector Mitra submitted an application for a warrant of arrest against the appellant. That request was made in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, because the offence alleged to have been committed by the appellant was classified as a non‑cognizable offence. Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that a police officer may not investigate a non‑cognizable offence unless he obtains an order from a Magistrate of the first or second class who possesses the power to try the case, or from a Presidency Magistrate. Inspector Mitra’s application expressly sought such permission to investigate the non‑cognizable offence under section 155. The Additional District Magistrate subsequently issued a search warrant and used the term “permitted” in the order. In the context of the application, the word was interpreted to signify that the magistrate had granted the sanction required for the investigation. Under section 155(3) of the Code, a police officer who has been permitted to investigate a non‑cognizable offence may exercise investigative powers comparable to those of a police‑station officer in a cognizable case, with the sole limitation that he may not make an arrest without a warrant. Consequently, Inspector Mitra needed to secure a warrant of arrest from the Additional District Magistrate. From these facts it followed that, up to 16 September 1952, the Additional District Magistrate had not yet taken cognizance of any offence.

On 19 September 1952 the appellant appeared before the Additional District Magistrate, who recorded an order directing that the appellant provide bail of rupees 50,000 secured by ten sureties of rupees 5,000 each. The magistrate noted that he had examined the police report and allotted time until 19 November 1952 for the completion of the investigation. After reviewing the police report on 19 November 1952, the magistrate extended the investigation period to 2 January 1953, and subsequently further extended it to 2 February 1953. During this interval, on 27 January 1953, Inspector Mitra obtained authorization under section 23(3)(b) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act to file a formal complaint. Accordingly, a complaint was lodged on 2 February 1953. The Additional District Magistrate then entered an order stating that he had seen the complaint filed that day against the accused, Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas, under section 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act read with section 23B of the same Act, section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, and Notification F.E.R.A. 105/51 dated 27 February 1951, as amended, issued by the Reserve Bank of India. The magistrate also noted the presence of a letter of authority and directed the matter to Sri M. N. Sinha, Senior District Magistrate (Sadar), a first‑class magistrate specially empowered, for disposition according to law, and instructed that the accused appear before him.

On the same day that the complaint was filed, Mr. Sinha entered an order stating that the accused was present before him and that a petition seeking a reduction of bail had been filed. After considering all the material placed before him, he ordered that bail be granted in the sum of twenty‑five thousand rupees secured by five sureties. He further directed that the accused appear for evidence on the twenty‑sixth and twenty‑seventh of March, 1952. From these entries the Court observed that on 19 September 1952 the Additional District Magistrate had not yet taken cognizance of the offence, because he had merely allowed the police additional time until 19 November 1952 to complete their investigation. Subsequent extensions by the Magistrate pushed the investigation deadline to 2 February 1953. On that date the complaint was finally lodged, and the Additional District Magistrate’s order on that day expressly indicated that he was now taking cognizance of the offence and referring the matter to Mr. Sinha for trial. The order of Mr. Sinha further demonstrated that the magistrate must have taken cognizance, since the bail question could be addressed only after the offence had been formally noted, and the dates for presenting evidence were set accordingly.

The State argued that the magistrate had taken cognizance earlier, on 16 September 1952, when Inspector Mitra applied for a search warrant and the Additional District Magistrate issued an order reading “Permitted. Issue search warrant.” The Court rejected this submission. Inspector Mitra’s petition explicitly stated that the matter was a non‑cognizable offence and he was requesting permission to investigate the case under section 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus the magistrate was not being asked to take cognizance but merely to authorize the police officer to investigate a non‑cognizable offence. The request for a warrant of arrest and the magistrate’s order directing the issuance of such a warrant do not, by themselves, constitute taking cognizance of the offence. The petition made clear that the presence of the magistrate was required solely for the purpose of investigation. Moreover, Inspector Mitra did not possess the power to effect an arrest without a warrant, as section 155(3) of the Code requires a magistrate’s authority for that step. Consequently, the order of 19 September 1952 shows that the magistrate was still treating the matter as an investigation, not as a cognizable charge. There is no reasonable basis to conclude that the magistrate, either on 16 September or at any time before 2 February 1953, had considered issuing process against the appellant. The appellant later appeared before the magistrate on 2 February 1953, at which point the case was sent to Mr. Sinha for trial, marking the proper moment when the Additional District Magistrate finally took cognizance of the offence.

In this case the appellant appeared before the Additional District Magistrate on February 2 , 1953, and at that time there was no occasion to issue a summons to him. Nevertheless, the Additional District Magistrate must be considered to have taken cognizance of the offence on that very date because he transmitted the matter to Mr Sinha for trial. No legal impediment existed for the Magistrate to take cognizance on February 2 , 1953, since the complaint lodged by Inspector Mitra on that date was one that he was empowered to make by the Reserve Bank pursuant to section 23(3)(b) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. Accordingly, a proper reading of the series of orders issued by the Additional District Magistrate demonstrates that he did not assume cognizance of the offence until the February 2 , 1953, order. The contention that cognizance was taken as early as September 16 , 1952, lacks any foundation. The orders dated September 16 , 1952, September 19 , 1952, November 19 , 1952, and January 2 , 1953, were all issued while the police were still investigating a non‑cognizable offence. Had the investigation concluded without a complaint against the appellant, the police, under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, could have released him upon execution of a bond, with or without sureties, obligating him to appear before the Additional District Magistrate whenever required. In such a circumstance the Magistrate would not have been called upon to pass any further orders. Conversely, when the investigation was completed and a complaint was filed—as occurred here—it became the duty of the Additional District Magistrate to determine whether that complaint had been filed with the requisite authority of the Reserve Bank, as mandated by section 23(3)(b) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. Only after making that inquiry could the Magistrate decide whether to take cognizance of the offence. If the complaint had indeed been filed with the Reserve Bank’s authority, there would be no legal obstacle to the Magistrate taking cognizance. Conversely, if the complaint lacked proper authorization under section 23, the Magistrate would be barred from doing so. In the present matter, the Reserve Bank had granted the necessary authority on January 27 , 1953, to file a complaint. Consequently, the complaint lodged on February 2 , 1953, complied fully with the provisions of section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, and the Additional District Magistrate was therefore entitled to, and did, take cognizance of the offence on that date. The Court subsequently endorsed the observation of Das Gupta J. in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerji (1), which had earlier been approved by this Court in R. R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2).

In this judgment, reference was made to two earlier authorities, namely A.I.R. (1950) Cal‑437 and the reported decision in [1951] S.C.R. 312. The court reproduced a passage from the earlier case which stated: “What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and I have no desire to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under section 190(1)(a) Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter—proceeding under section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under section 202. When the magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.” The court observed that although the earlier ruling in Chari’s case involved a matter arising under the Prevention of Corruption Act, that circumstance did not alter the principle articulated by Justice Das Gupta, which had subsequently received approval. The court further explained that the precise moment at which cognizance is taken varies according to the facts and circumstances of each individual case, and that a universal definition cannot be imposed. It was emphasized that merely issuing a search warrant or an arrest warrant for investigative purposes does not, by itself, constitute taking cognizance of an offence. Only when a magistrate consciously decides to proceed under section 200 and the following sections of Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or under section 204 of Chapter XVII, can it be positively affirmed that the magistrate has applied his mind and thereby taken cognizance. Applying this reasoning, the court held that both the proceedings before the Additional District Magistrate and those before the trying magistrate were conducted within the proper jurisdiction, and that the trial of the appellant had been lawfully conducted. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.