Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji vs S. P. Sahi, Special Officer-In-Charge

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 343 of 1955

Decision Date: 15 April, 1959

Coram: S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah

In this matter the petitioner, Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji, who held the office of Mahant of the Salouna Asthal, brought an application before the Patna High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking the issuance of a writ that would set aside an order issued by the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts. The order of the Board required the petitioner to furnish a return of income and expenditure pursuant to section 59 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950. The petitioner contended that the Salouna Asthal was a private institution and therefore did not fall within the meaning of a “religious trust” as defined in the Act; consequently, the Act was inapplicable to it. The High Court examined the definition contained in section 2(1) of the Act, which it interpreted broadly so as to encompass both private and public trusts that were recognised under Hindu law. The Court further concluded that the Salouna Asthal did not qualify for either of the two exceptions expressly mentioned in the definition. On appeal, the Supreme Court, constituted by Justices S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo and M. Hidayatullah, held that a proper and true construction of the statutory provisions, read in the context of the legislative history concerning religious, charitable or pious trusts in India, demonstrates that the definition clause in section 2(1) was intended to exclude private trusts. Accordingly, the provisions of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act could not be applied to such private trusts. The Court explained the essential distinction recognised in Hindu law between public and private religious endowments: a public trust is characterised by a beneficial interest held by an uncertain and fluctuating class of persons, which may be the general public or a substantial segment thereof described by a particular characteristic; a private trust, by contrast, has beneficiaries who are specific, identifiable individuals or who can be ascertained with certainty at some point in time. The Court further observed that the mere fact that the uncertain and fluctuating class of persons belongs to a particular religious faith or constitutes a sect does not alter the classification of the trust, and such a scenario does not transform a public trust into a private one.

In this appeal, the Court noted that the matter arose under Civil Appeal No 343 of 1955, issued from a judgment and order dated 13 September 1954 of the Patna High Court in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No 39 of 1954. The appellant was represented by counsel L K Jha, B K P Sinha and R C Prasad, while the respondents were represented by the Advocate‑General for the State of Bihar, Mahabir Prasad, together with counsel Ishwari Nandan Prasad and S P Varma. The judgment was delivered on 1 April 1959 by Justice S K Das. The appeal was taken on a certificate granted by the Patna High Court and concerned a writ proceeding instituted by the appellant under article 226 of the Constitution. The writ petition alleged that a Hindu saint named Mahatma Mast Ram, who lived roughly two centuries earlier, owned substantial property in the Monghyr district of Bihar and, around the year 1800, constructed a modest temple at Salouna wherein he installed the deity Sri Thakur Lakshmi Narainji. This temple subsequently became known as the Salouna asthal. Mast Ram died circa 1802, and his spiritual succession passed to his disciples, one of whom was Mahant Lakshmi Dasji. In 1916 Mahant Lakshmi Dasji erected a new temple, transferred the original deity to this new shrine, and installed two additional deities, Sri Ram and Sita. Mahant Lakshmi Dasji died in 1919, leaving three disciples—Vishnu Das, Bhagwat Das and Rameshwar Das. A dispute over who should succeed to the gaddi was resolved in February 1919 by agreement that Vishnu Das would become the shebait, followed by Bhagwat Das, and thereafter the most suitable “bairagi” of the asthal born of Brahmin parents would be eligible for the shebait position. Bhagwat Das died in 1935, prompting a fresh contention between Rameshwar Das, the youngest disciple, and Ram Saroop Das, who was then the sitting Mahant and the appellant before this Court. Rameshwar Das filed an application under the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act (XIV of 1920) seeking an order directing Mahant Ram Saroop Das to render an account of the usufruct of the Salouna asthal. The Mahant opposed the application, asserting that the property of the Salouna asthal did not constitute a public trust within the meaning of the 1920 Act and therefore he owed no duty to account to any person. Subsequently, Mahant Ram Saroop Das applied for leave under section 5 of the same Act to commence a suit seeking a declaration that the Salouna asthal and its associated properties were not a public trust. That suit was instituted in the subordinate court of Monghyr.

The suit was initially brought before the Subordinate Judge of Monghyr, but that court dismissed the action. The appellant then appealed the decision to the Patna High Court. By the judgment and decree issued in First Appeal No. 10 of 1941, dated 5 March 1943, the High Court declared that the Salouna asthāl and the properties associated with it did not constitute a public trust within the meaning of the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, XIV of 1920. Approximately eight years later, the Bihar Legislature enacted the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act, 1950 (Bihar I of 1951), hereinafter referred to as “the Act.” The Act received the President’s assent on 21 February 1951 and came into force on 15 August 1951. Under this legislation, the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts—one of the respondents in the present proceedings—was created to discharge, with respect to religious trusts other than Jain trusts, the functions assigned to it by the various provisions of the Act. On 14 November 1952, exercising the powers granted to it by section 59 of the Act, the Board wrote to the appellant requesting that he furnish a return of the income and expenditure of the asthāl. The appellant responded by a letter dated 1 December 1952, asserting that the Salouna asthāl was a private institution to which the Act did not apply, and he also referred the Board to the High Court’s judgment and decree in First Appeal No. 10 of 1941. The Board replied that it was not bound by the High Court’s declaration and directed the appellant either to obtain a declaration under the provisions of the Act supporting his claim or to submit the requested return. Subsequently, on 22 January 1954, the appellant filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. In that application he averred that (a) the Salouna asthāl was not a religious trust within the meaning of the Act; (b) the properties belonging to it did not constitute a religious trust and consequently he was not a trustee within the meaning of the Act; (e) the Act did not apply to private trusts; and (d) the demand made by the respondent Board amounted to an infringement of his fundamental right to hold the asthāl properties. He prayed for a writ quashing the Board’s order requiring him to submit a return of income and expenditure, and also sought an order directing the Board and its officers to refrain from interfering with his right to manage the Salouna asthāl and its associated properties. The Patna High Court, by its judgment, dismissed the petition primarily on the ground that the wording of section 2(1) of the Act, which defines a “religious trust” for the purposes of the Act, is sufficiently wide to encompass the subject matter at issue.

In its interpretation the Court held that section 2(1) of the Act was intended to cover both private and public trusts that are recognised by Hindu law as religious, pious or charitable. The Court further observed that the Salouna asthal did not fall within either of the two exceptions listed in the section. The first exception relates to a trust created according to Sikh religion or solely for the benefit of the Sikh community. The second exception concerns a private endowment established for the worship of a family idol where the public has no interest. The High Court also found that the record did not contain sufficient material to determine conclusively whether the Salouna asthal and its property constituted a religious trust of a public character. Nevertheless, on the basis that the Act was applicable to private trusts, the Court expressed the view that the various restrictions imposed on a trustee by the provisions of the Act did not infringe the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that there was no legal justification for denying the State the power to exercise supervision and control over the administration of private trusts, just as it does over public trusts. In a judgment dated 5 October 1953, addressing the same issue in earlier cases, the High Court had expressed a slightly different opinion. At that time the Court referred to the principle that when a legislature possessing limited competence employs a word of broad and general meaning, the presumption is that the legislature intends the word to refer only to matters within its legislative competence. Applying that principle, the Court then held that section 2(1) of the Act should be read narrowly so as to include only Hindu religious or charitable trusts of a public character, and consequently the provisions of the Act would apply solely to such trusts. The appellant now urged the Court to resolve a question of construction: whether the provisions of the Act extend to private religious trusts. The appellant contended that they do not. At this stage it became necessary to refer to certain relevant provisions of the Act. In connected civil appeals numbered 225, 226, 228, 229 and 248 of 1955, which are also being decided today, the Court had examined the Act in greater detail. For the present appeal the Court will consider only those provisions that bear on the central issue. The definition clause in section 2(1) reads as follows: “religious trust” means any express or constructive trust created or existing for any purpose recognised by Hindu law to be religious, pious or charitable, but shall not include a trust created according to the Sikh religion or purely for the benefit of the Sikh community and a private endowment created for the worship of a family idol in which the public are not interested. The expression “trust property” in …

The Court explained that section 2(p) defined “trust property” as the property that belongs to a religious trust. Section 2(n) then gave a detailed definition of “trustee”. It stated that a trustee was any person, whatever designation he or she might have, who was appointed to administer a religious trust. Such appointment could be made verbally, by deed or any other instrument, in accordance with the trust’s usage, or by the District Judge or any other competent authority. The definition also covered any person appointed by a trustee to perform the duties of a trustee, any member of a committee, and any other person who was at that time managing or administering the trust property. The Court then turned to section 4, which had been amended by Bihar Act XVI of 1954 to give effect to certain amendments and repeals. Sub‑section 5 of that section declared that the Religious Endowments Act 1863 and section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 did not apply to any religious trust in the State, as defined by the present Act. Chapter V of the Act, the Court noted, contained a series of provisions that defined the powers and duties of the State Board of Religious Trusts. Section 28, the opening provision of the chapter, set out the Board’s general powers and duties. Section 29(1) was directly relevant to the question before the Court. It provided that when the supervision of a religious trust was vested in a committee or association appointed by the founder or by a competent court or authority, that committee or association would continue to operate under the Board’s overall superintendence and control, unless the Board superseded it under sub‑section 2 of section 29. If the Board issued a supersession order, the committee, association, or any other person interested in the trust could, within thirty days of that order, apply to the District Judge for a variation, modification, or setting aside of the supersession. The Court also referred to section 30, which dealt with situations where an object of a religious trust had ceased to exist or had become impossible to achieve. In such cases, the Board could act on its own initiative or on an application by any Hindu, after giving prescribed notice to the trustee and any other interested persons and after conducting an inquiry it deemed appropriate. The Board could then determine a new object, which should be similar or as nearly similar as practicable to the original, and direct that the trust’s funds, property or income, or the portion previously spent on the impossible object, be applied to that new object. Finally, the Court mentioned section 32, which defined the Board’s authority to settle schemes for the proper administration of religious trusts, including the power to modify or substitute such schemes provided they conformed to the law governing the trust and did not contradict the founder’s wishes as far as those wishes could be ascertained.

The Court explained that the Board possessed the authority to settle schemes for the proper administration of religious trusts. Section 32(1) provided that the Board could act on its own initiative or in response to an application made by two or more persons who were interested in a particular trust. In either case the Board was required to conduct an inquiry it deemed appropriate and to give notice to the trustee of the trust as well as to any other person who appeared to the Board to have an interest in the trust. After completing these steps the Board could settle a scheme for the trust. The same provision also authorised the Board, in a similar manner and subject to the same conditions, to modify any scheme that had been settled either under this section or under any other law, or to substitute a new scheme in place of an existing one. The Board was required to ensure that any scheme it settled, modified or substituted complied with the law governing the trust and did not contradict the wishes of the founder, to the extent that such wishes could be ascertained. Section 32(2) stipulated that a scheme settled, modified or substituted under this section would, unless the District Judge ordered otherwise on an application made under sub‑section (3), take effect on a date appointed by the Board and would be published in the official Gazette. Section 32(3) allowed the trustee or any other person interested in the trust to file an application with the District Judge within three months of the Gazette publication, seeking to vary, modify or set aside the scheme. However, the Court noted that subject to the outcome of such an application, the order of the Board under sub‑sections (1) and (2) was final and binding on the trustee and on every other person who had an interest in the religious trust. Section 32(4) further clarified that any order passed by the District Judge on an application made under sub‑section (3) was final.

The Court then turned to the definition of “person interested in a religious trust” found in section 2(g). This term was defined as any person who was entitled to receive a pecuniary or other benefit from the trust and it included, first, any person who possessed a right to worship, to perform any rite, to attend the performance of any worship or rite in a religious institution connected with the trust, or to participate in any religious or charitable activity carried out under the trust. The definition also covered the founder of the trust and any descendant of the founder, as well as the trustee. Finally, the Court quoted section 48 in full. Section 48(1) empowered the Board, or, with the Board’s prior sanction, any person interested in the trust, to apply to the District Judge for an order removing a trustee where the trustee acted in a manner prejudicial to the trust’s interest, repeatedly defaulted on statutory payments or on payments to beneficiaries, or was guilty of breach of trust. The same section authorised the Board or an interested person to seek the appointment of a new trustee, the vesting of property in a trustee, directions for accounts and inquiries, or any further relief that the nature of the case might require. Section 48(2) affirmed that any order of the District Judge made under sub‑section (1) was final.

The Court recorded that under the statutory provision a trustee could be removed when the trustee acted in a manner that was prejudicial to the interest of the trust; when the trustee defaulted on three or more occasions in paying any amount that was required by any law then in force in respect of the trust’s property or income, or any other statutory charge imposed on such property or income; when the trustee defaulted on three or more occasions in paying any sum that was due to any beneficiary under the trust, or in performing any other duty that the trust imposed on the trustee; or when the trustee was found to be guilty of a breach of trust. The same provision also empowered the authority to appoint a new trustee, to vest any property in a trustee, to direct the preparation of accounts and the conduct of inquiries, and to grant any further or other relief that the nature of the case might require. The statute further stipulated that an order passed by the District Judge under this sub‑section would be final.

The appellant then argued that a proper construction of the foregoing provisions, read in the context of the legislative history concerning religious, charitable or pious trusts in India, confined the definition clause in section 2(1) of the Act to trusts of a public character that were recognised as religious, pious or charitable trusts under Hindu law. To appreciate this contention, the Court noted that it was necessary first to explain the distinction made in Hindu law between public and private religious endowments. In Hindu law a public trust vested its beneficial interest in an uncertain and fluctuating class of persons, either the public at large or a substantial portion of it that fell within a particular description, whereas a private trust vested its benefits in definite, ascertained individuals or in persons who could be certainly identified within a prescribed period. The Court observed that the fact that the uncertain class comprised a segment of the public adhering to a particular faith or a sect of persons sharing a religious persuasion did not alter the character of the trust; such a trust remained public. This principle was supported by the observations in Nabi Shirazi v. Province of Bengal.

Further, the Court referred to the scholarly view expressed by Dr Mukherjea in his Tagore Law Lectures on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (1952 edition, pages 392‑396). Dr Mukherjea explained that under English law charitable trusts were synonymous with public trusts and that a religious trust was merely a form of charitable trust. He noted that the beneficiaries of a charitable trust were the general public or a section thereof, not a determinate group of individuals, and consequently the remedies available for enforcing a charitable trust differed from those available to beneficiaries of a private trust. He also pointed out that in English law the Crown, acting as parens patriae, served as the constitutional protector of all property subject to charitable trusts, which were essentially matters of public concern.

In this matter the Court observed that a principal difference between English law and Indian law is that Hindu law permits a religious trust to be of a private character, a situation that English law does not allow. The Court noted the quotation, “One fundamental distinction between English and Indian law lies in the fact that there can be religious trust of a private character under Hindu law which is not possible in English law.” On behalf of the appellant it was further pointed out that, with respect to public religious and charitable trusts, a series of legislative enactments—both general statutes and local statutes—have been enacted to regulate the management and administration of such trusts and to provide remedies when mis‑management occurs. In contrast, the appellant submitted that no specific statutory enactments exist for private religious trusts; these trusts are therefore governed solely by the general law of the land. The Court recounted that when the British Government first established its authority in India, it followed the practice of earlier rulers and, by virtue of its sovereign power, claimed the right to inspect public religious and charitable endowments and to correct any abuses in their administration. To give effect to this claim, a Regulation for that purpose was enacted in Bengal in 1810 (Regulation XIX of 1810), a similar Regulation was passed for Madras in 1817 (Regulation VII of 1817), and another Regulation (Regulation XVII of 1827) was issued in Bombay concerning endowments of the same nature. Later, in 1863, the Religious Endowments Act (Act XX of 1863) was enacted; this Act repealed the Bengal and Madras Regulations insofar as they related to purely religious institutions, and it transferred control of such institutions from the Board of Revenue to non‑official committees created under the Act. The Court emphasized that the 1863 Act applied only to public religious endowments. Over time it became apparent that the 1863 Act failed to give adequate protection to public religious trusts against misuse, leading to excessive State control, and that the remedies it provided were insufficient. Consequently, the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890 (Act VI of 1890), and the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920 (Act XVI of 1920) were enacted; both statutes dealt exclusively with public trusts. The 1890 Act concerned public trusts established for charitable purposes unrelated to religious instruction or worship, whereas the 1920 Act covered trusts set up for public purposes that were either charitable or religious. The Court also referred to the Civil Procedure Code of 1877, which introduced section 539, permitting a suit to be filed for any alleged breach of an express or constructive trust created for public religious or charitable purposes. That provision was later amended and now appears as section 92 of the current Civil Procedure Code. The Court explained that the first requirement for invoking section 92 is the existence of a trust—express or constructive—created for a public purpose that is religious or charitable in nature, and it affirmed that a private trust falls clearly outside the scope of section 92. Regarding local statutes, the Court observed that the earliest such enactment was the Bombay Presidency Act of 1863, and that more recent legislation includes the Orissa Act, although the excerpt ends before naming the later statute.

The judgment first observed that the Hindu Religious Endowments Act of 1939, the Bombay Public Trusts Act of 1950 and the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act of 1951 are statutes that deal exclusively with public religious institutions and with endowments intended for public benefit. The Court noted that, to its knowledge, no local legislation had been identified that expressly or unmistakably sought to bring private religious trusts within its scope. It was further recorded that the appellant’s counsel argued that, although the definition clause in section 2(1) of the Act is framed in very wide terms, the remaining provisions of the Act demonstrate that the Act is intended to apply only to public trusts. The Court highlighted that section 2(1) contains two specific exceptions. The first exception pertains to a trust created in accordance with the Sikh religion or for the exclusive benefit of the Sikh community. The second exception refers to a private endowment established for the worship of a family idol, an endowment in which the general public has no interest. The Court affirmed that there was no dispute that the second exception describes a private trust because it is not intended for public worship. The High Court, however, had held that because the definition clause enumerated only one type of private endowment as an exception, every other private endowment that is not created for the worship of a family idol must be read as falling within the definition, invoking the maxim of expression unius exclusionis alterius. The present Court expressed disagreement with that conclusion. It proceeded to examine other sections of the Act that refer directly to the definition clause in order to discern the legislature’s intended meaning. As an illustration, it considered section 4, as amended by the Bihar Act XVI of 1954. That provision repealed and amended earlier statutes such as the Charitable Endowments Act of 1890 and the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act of 1920, both of which, as previously noted, dealt solely with public trusts. Sub‑section (5) of section 4 expressly states that the Religious Endowments Act of 1863 and section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 shall not apply to any religious trust in the State as defined by the present Act. The Court pointed out that the 1863 Act and section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code are statutes that address public trusts and have no effect on private trusts. Consequently, if the definition clause were meant to encompass private trusts other than those created for the worship of a family idol, it would be difficult to understand why sub‑section (5) of section 4 was worded in the manner it was. That sub‑section, in effect, declares that two earlier enactments, which were applicable only to public trusts, shall not apply to any trust—emphasising the word “any”—as defined by the Act. The Court concluded that if private trusts not created for the worship of a family idol were already included in the definition of a religious trust, then sub‑section (5) would be completely redundant, because the earlier statutes never applied to those private trusts.

In this case, the Court observed that the plain implication of the definition clause was that every trust described in the Act fell within the category of public trusts. Consequently, it was necessary to remove the operation of the earlier statutes, which otherwise would have applied to such trusts. The Court considered the argument advanced by the Advocate‑General of Bihar that subsection 5 of section 4 was intended to carve out only certain trusts from the definition and therefore the use of the word “any” was inappropriate. The Court noted that subsection 5 had been amended by Bihar Act XVI of 1954. Before the amendment the wording read: “The Religious Endowments Act, 1863, and section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall not apply to any Hindu Religious Trust in the State of Bihar.” That earlier version referred only to any Hindu Religious Trust and made no reference to the definition clause. After amendment the provision specifically linked the exemption to the definition clause and stated that the two earlier enactments, which applied only to public trusts, shall not apply to any trusts as defined in the Act. The Court held that through subsection 5 the Legislature had clearly expressed the intended scope and effect of the definition clause.

The Court further examined why the Legislature, aware that the earlier statutes dealt exclusively with public trusts, had not inserted the word “public” before “purpose” in the definition clause. The Court explained that under both English and Indian law charitable trusts were regarded as public trusts; in England a religious trust, being a form of charitable trust, was likewise public. However, under Hindu law a religious trust could be either public or private. The most common form of a private religious trust, the Court said, was one created for the worship of a family idol where the public had no interest. The Court considered any other private religious trust to be extremely rare. Citing Sir Dinshah Mulla’s “Principles of Hindu Law,” the Court reiterated that religious endowments were classified as public when dedicated for the benefit of the public, and as private when set aside for the worship of a family deity without public interest. Accordingly, the definition clause merely quoted this typical example of a private endowment. The Court also pointed out that the exclusion of a trust created for the worship of a family idol was based on the adjectival clause that followed, namely “in which the public are not interested.” This indicated that the definition was designed to cover only public trusts.

The Court explained that the phrase “which the public are not interested” establishes the essential distinction between public and private trusts under Hindu law. Where a trust is created for the worship of a family deity and the public has no interest, the trust is classified as private. The test of public disinterest therefore characterises all private trusts in Hindu law. The Court further observed that a trust originally founded for a family idol may later become open to the public; such a trust would have begun as a private one but would subsequently acquire a public dimension. Consequently, the definition in the statute was intended to address only public trusts.

The Court then examined several provisions of the Act that had been cited earlier. Section 29(1) provides that supervision of a religious trust may be vested in a committee or association appointed by the founder or by a competent court or authority. The Court noted that this supervisory mechanism is normally appropriate only for a public trust. Section 30(1) embodies the doctrine of cypress and allows any Hindu to apply to the Board to determine the purpose to which the funds, property and income of a religious trust should be applied when the original purpose has ceased to exist or has become impossible to achieve. The Court held that this provision is unsuitable for a private trust because a private trust does not give every Hindu a standing to make such an application. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a private Hindu trust would fail, since a deity is considered immortal; even if an idol were broken, lost or stolen, another image could be consecrated, and the original object would not be said to have ceased.

Section 32 of the Act, which empowers the Board to settle schemes for the proper administration of religious trusts, was also considered. The provision states that the Board may act on its own motion or on an application made by “two or more persons interested in any trust.” The Court observed that this language mirrors the language of section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. It would be difficult to justify requiring two or more interested persons to apply for a scheme in the case of a private trust, because the beneficiaries of a private or family trust constitute a limited and defined class, such as members of a particular family. If a trustee or shebait mismanages, wastes, wrongfully alienates trust property, or otherwise neglects duties, the Court explained that a suit can be instituted to remedy those abuses without the need for multiple applicants. The requirement of “two or more persons” is therefore appropriate only for public trusts, which are matters of public concern.

In this case the Court observed that under the general law of the land the founder of an endowment or any of his heirs has the competence to bring a suit for the proper administration of the trust property, for the removal of the incumbent trustee and for the appointment of a new trustee. The Court emphasized that such a suit may be instituted by a single interested person and that it is not a requirement that two or more persons who are interested in the trust must join together in order to commence the proceedings. The stipulation that “two or more persons” must be present was judged to be appropriate only in the context of a public trust because a public trust constitutes a matter of public concern. The Court further explained that Section 48 of the Act is analogous to Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and one of the reasons for excluding the operation of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure from trusts defined by the Act is the existence of provisions within the Act that perform a similar function. Consequently, Section 48 is more suitably applied to public trusts than to private trusts. The Court noted that the Act expressly contains provisions, as stated in its preamble, for the better administration of Hindu religious trusts in the State of Bihar, for the protection and preservation of property belonging to such trusts, and that for this purpose certain earlier statutes—namely the Religious Endowments Act, 1863; the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890; the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920; and the Civil Procedure Code, 1908—have either been amended or excluded from operation. All of those earlier enactments dealt exclusively with public trusts; therefore, if the legislature had intended the Act to extend to private trusts, that intention would have been expressed in clear and unambiguous language. The Court found that, although the definition clause in Section 2(1) is expressed in comparatively broad terms, sub‑section (5) of Section 4 clearly delineates the true scope and effect of that definition. On that basis the Court held that the definition clause does not encompass private trusts and that the Act and its provisions are not applicable to such trusts. Counsel for the appellant, in an alternative argument, contended that if the Act were to apply to private trusts, several of its provisions would violate the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, because the restrictions imposed on trustees of private trusts—where the public has no interest—cannot be justified as reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public as required by Clause (5) of Article 19. The High Court rejected this argument by adopting the English‑law rule that, in the case of a charitable corporation founded by a private individual, the founder and his heirs become visitors in law, and where those heirs are extinct or incompetent, their powers devolve upon the Crown or the State, thereby placing the administration of private trusts under the control of the State in the interests of the general public.

In this case, the Court considered the High Court’s view that the State should exercise superintendence and control over the administration of private trusts in the same manner as it does over public trusts, essentially treating private trusts as though they were public trusts. The High Court further suggested that such supervision would be analogous to that exercised over trusts that are openly devoted to public purposes. That view was seriously contested before this Court, and counsel for the appellant argued that there is no warrant for adopting the rule of English law because of the fundamental distinction between English law and Hindu law with respect to private religious trusts. Counsel further referred the Court to the observations of Dr. Mukherjea in Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust (1952 edition, page 393), which state that English law attaches a ‘visitatorial’ power to all eleemosynary corporations. According to that source, a visitor possesses the authority to settle disputes among members of the corporation, to inspect and regulate their actions, and generally to correct abuses and irregularities in charitable administration. English law also permits the founder of an eleemosynary institution to make regulations for its creation, including the power to nominate visitors. Prior to 1926, English law deemed that if a private person founded a charitable corporation, that person and his heirs automatically became the visitors. The Administration of Estates Act, 1925 later abolished the descent of visitor rights to heirs, and it is unclear who would assume the visitor role in the absence of an appointment by the founder; the most probable result, according to Dr. Mukherjea, is that such rights would devolve upon the Crown, as happened when the founder’s heirs became extinct, could not be located, or were lunatics.

Counsel also submitted that, irrespective of the position under English law, the guarantee of a fundamental right must be derived from the terms of Article 19 of the Constitution and that this guarantee cannot be narrowed by importing artificial English‑law rules. The Court, having already constructed the definition clause read with section 4(5) and other provisions of the Act, found it unnecessary to finally pronounce on the contentions raised in the preceding paragraph. The Court merely noted that a serious question of constitutional validity of several provisions of the Act would inevitably arise if the Act were held to apply to private trusts. Since the Court has found that the Act does not apply to private trusts, the appellant is entitled to succeed in the appeal. The High Court had observed that the material on record was insufficient to decide whether the Salouna Asthal and the Mahant’s properties constituted a trust of a public character. However, that issue had previously been litigated, and the appellant had obtained a declaration in First Appeal No. 10 of 1941 that the Salouna Asthal and its associated properties did not constitute a public trust. The respondents were not parties to that earlier litigation and therefore may not be bound by that declaration.

In this case, the Court noted that, on the part of the respondents, no affidavit had been filed and no material had been produced to show that the factual position differed from the declaration made by the High Court. The High Court had earlier remarked that the appellant had failed to produce before it all the documents that were in his possession at that time. Subsequently, a petition was filed before the present Court seeking to adduce as evidence the documents that the High Court had examined in First Appeal No. 10 of 1941. The Court considered that, given the circumstances of the present case, it was unnecessary to reopen the evidence and to re‑examine those documents afresh. Therefore, as long as the declaration of the High Court in First Appeal No. 10 of 1941 remains unreversed, the appellant may rely on it. No contrary evidence has been produced, and consequently the appellant asserts that the Salouna asthal and its adjoining properties do not constitute a public trust. Because the trust is not public, the appellant further submits that the Act and its provisions are inapplicable to it. The Court noted section 43 of the Act, as amended by Act XVII of 1956, concerning disputes over trust status of immovable property. That provision states that any such dispute shall be investigated either on the authority’s own motion or on application by the authority appointed by the State Government through a notification in the official gazette. The Court did not express any view on the constitutional validity of section 43, noting that it was not required for the present determination. It further observed that no decision under section 43, either before or after its amendment, had been made against the appellant concerning the Salouna asthal and its properties. The Court further indicated that the respondents remained free to pursue any legal remedy available to them for obtaining a determination from a competent authority that the trust in question is a public trust. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the High Court dated 13 September 1954. It also directed the issuance of a writ quashing the order of the respondent Board that had required the appellant to file a statement of income and expenditure with respect to the Salouna asthal properties. The writ further prohibited the respondents from interfering with the appellant’s rights in managing the Salouna asthal and its associated properties. This prohibition remains in effect until the respondents obtain a proper determination that the Salouna asthal constitutes a public trust. The appellant was awarded costs for the entire proceedings, and consequently the appeal was affirmed by the Court.