Mahant Moti Das vs S. P. Sahi

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 225, 226, 228, 229 and 248 of 1955

Decision Date: 15 April 1959

Coram: S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah

In this matter the petitioner, Mahant Moti Das, challenged the actions of the respondent, S. P. Sahi, who held the office of Special Officer in Charge of Hindu Religious affairs, before the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was delivered on 15 April 1959 by a Bench comprising Justice S. K. Das, Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K. N. Wanchoo, Justice M. Hidayatullah and Chief Justice Sudhi Ranjan. The case is recorded in the law reports as 1959 AIR 942, 1959 SCR Supplement (2) 503 and is cited in subsequent authorities as R 1959 SC 951, R 1959 SC 1002, R 1959 SC 1073, R 1960 SC 554, E 1980 SC 161, RF 1991 SC 672. The dispute arose under the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar 1 of 1951), specifically invoking sections 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 28, 29, 32, 55(2), 60 and 70 of that statute. The petitioner contended that these provisions infringed several guarantees guaranteed by the Constitution of India, namely Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 19(5), 25, 26 and 27, and also alleged a violation of Article I33. The principal factual backdrop involved notices issued under section 59 of the Act by the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, directing the Mahants of various maths or asthals to submit statements and accounts of the properties under their possession.

The petition raised five distinct grounds of constitutional challenge. First, it was argued that sections 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Act discriminated against Sikh religious trusts by excluding them from the Act’s scope, thereby denying them equal treatment in comparison with Hindu trusts, and that a similar disparity existed between Hindu and Jain trusts, both of which fell within the Act. Second, the petitioner claimed that Chapter V of the Act, particularly sections 28 and 32, impaired the right to manage religious affairs protected under Article 19(1)(f), reducing the Mahant or Shebait to a mere servant of the Board. Third, it was asserted that the Act’s provisions contravened Articles 25 and 26 because the Board’s authority to alter budgets or give directions to trustees could interfere with the proper observance of religious practices in maths or temples. Fourth, the petitioner contended that section 70 imposed an unauthorised tax, and fifth, that section 55(2) violated Article I33. In its deliberation the Court held that, given the distinct needs of Sikhs, Hindus and Jains in the administration of religious trusts in Bihar, the legislature was justified in excluding Sikhs and in distinguishing between Hindus and Jains. Consequently, sections 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 were not held to infringe Article 14. The Court reaffirmed the principle that while Article 14 prohibits class legislation, it does not prohibit reasonable classification, provided that the classification is based on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes the group in question from those excluded, and that this differentia bears a rational relation to the purpose of the statute. The Court cited the authority in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tindollkar, [1959] SCR 279, in support of this test for permissible classification.

In this case the Court observed that the religious trusts of Jains and Hindus are administered differently because the needs of the two communities are not identical. Accordingly the Legislature of Bihar was at liberty to omit Sikhs from the protective scheme, on the ground that Sikhs did not require the same protection, and to draw a distinction between Hindus and Jains. On that basis the Court held that sections 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act do not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court reiterated the settled principle that while Article 14 bars legislation that creates classes without justification, it does not prohibit a reasonable classification that serves a legislative purpose. To satisfy the test of permissible classification, the Court explained that two criteria must be satisfied: first, the classification must be based on an intelligible differentia that separates the persons or things placed in the same group from those who are excluded; second, the differentia must have a rational nexus to the objective that the statute seeks to achieve. The Court relied upon the decision in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tcndollkar, [1959] S.C.R. 279, to support this analysis.

The Court further reasoned that, considering the role of a trustee with respect to the trust property and the purpose of the Act, the restrictions imposed by Chapter V of the Act are intended to further the objects of the trust and to promote better administration, protection and preservation of trust property. Such restrictions are therefore reasonable limits in the public interest within the meaning of clause (5) of Article 19 of the Constitution. The Court also concluded that the Act does not conflict with Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution because the Board’s authority to modify the budget and to issue directions to the trustee is subject to the condition that such powers be exercised only for proper administration of the religious trust. Moreover, none of these provisions interfere with matters of religion, including practices that a denomination regards as essential to its faith. Regarding section 70, the Court held that it is a valid provision, as it merely provides for the levy of a fee to meet the expenses incurred in implementing the Act and does not constitute an unauthorized tax. This view was supported by the precedent set in Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa, [1954] S.C.R. 1046. Finally, the Court found that section 55(2) does not contravene Article 133 of the Constitution because it does not seek to override that article or any other provision relating to appeals to the Supreme Court. The judgment concluded with a recital of the procedural posture: the appeals were civil appellate jurisdiction cases numbered 225, 226, 228, 229 and 248 of 1955, arising from judgments and orders dated 5 October 1953 in Miscellaneous Judicial Cases No. 418/52 and 124/53 and dated 8 October 1953 in T.S. No. 106/53, Miscellaneous Judicial Cases No. 188/53 and 235/53 of the Patna High Court.

For the appeal recorded as Civil Appeal No. 225 of 1955, counsel identified as R. C. Prasad represented the appellants. For the appeals numbered Civil Appeals No. 226, 228, 229 and 248 of 1955, the same counsel, R. C. Prasad, acted on behalf of the respective appellants. The State of Bihar was represented by counsel for the respondents, namely Mahabir Prasad in his capacity as Advocate‑General for the State of Bihar together with Tribeni Prasad Sinha and S. P. Varma. The same team of counsel also appeared for the respondents in the matters recorded as Civil Appeals No. 225, 226, 228 and 229 of 1955. In the separate appeal designated Civil Appeal No. 248 of 1955, the respondents were again represented by Mahabir Prasad, Advocate‑General for the State of Bihar, and S. P. Varma.

The judgment was delivered on 15 April 1959 by Justice S. K. Das. The Court noted that the five appeals were consolidated for hearing because they all raised the same fundamental issue: the constitutional validity of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar Act I of 1951), hereinafter referred to as “the Act.” Four of the appeals originated from writ proceedings instituted in the Patna High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The fifth appeal, Civil Appeal No. 228 of 1955, arose from a civil suit that had initially been filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Patna and was subsequently transferred to the High Court by order exercised under Article 228 of the Constitution.

The petitioners in the writ applications and the plaintiff in the civil suit challenged the Act on several constitutional grounds, which the Court indicated would be discussed in detail. The State of Bihar and, where applicable, the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts defended the Act and were the respondents before this Court. The Patna High Court, in three distinct judgments—two dated 5 October 1953 and one dated 8 October 1953—had held that the Act was a valid piece of legislation. On that basis, the High Court dismissed the writ petitions and the civil suit.

The petitioners and the plaintiff‑appellants sought and obtained certificates from the High Court under Article 132 of the Constitution. Those certificates declared that each case raised substantial questions of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution, thereby permitting the appeals to be taken to this Court.

The factual background of each appeal was narrow in scope. In Civil Appeal No. 225 of 1955, the appellant, Mahant Moti Das, claimed to be the head (Mahant) of a monastery (math or asthal) located in the village of Parbatta, district Monghyr, Bihar. He asserted that he adhered to the religion founded by Sri Kabir Sahib, that the property of the monastery was his private property, and that the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, acting under the Act, lacked authority to serve him with a notice issued under Section 59 of the Act. Mahant Moti Das contended that the Act was ultra vires, unconstitutional, and, even if valid, did not apply to his monastery.

In Civil Appeal No. 226 of 1955, the appellant, Mahant Ram Das, made similar allegations. He maintained that he was the Mahant of a monastery situated in the village of Bhuthari, also in the district of Monghyr, and that the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts did not have the power to serve him with a notice demanding statements and accounts of the property in his possession. The Court recorded these contentions as the basis of the appeal.

Mahant Ram Das, who resided in the district of Monghyr, described himself as a “bairagi sadhu” and a follower of the Ramanandi Laskari Sri Vaishnava Sampradaya. He asserted that he owned absolutely all the properties belonging to his math and that the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts lacked any authority to serve him with a notice requiring him to submit statements and accounts of the properties that he possessed.

In Civil Appeal No. 228 of 1955 the appellants raised claims that were essentially the same as those made by Mahant Ram Das. They contended that the Act was unconstitutional and that its validity should be questioned. Their cause of action specifically referred to the date on which the President of India’s assent to the Act had first been published in the Bihar Gazette.

In Civil Appeal No. 229 of 1955 the petitioner, Mahant Mahabir Das, declared that he was the Mahant of an asthal known as Bisanpur Asthal, which was located in the same district of Monghyr. He reported that he had also received a notice from the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts directing him to furnish statements and accounts of the property under his control. Like the other appellants, he challenged the constitutional validity of the Act on comparable grounds.

Civil Appeal No. 248 of 1955 was filed by Mahant Ram Krishna Das. He stated that the temple at issue, identified as Bhikam as Thakurbari in the town of Patba, had been constructed by a man named Benidasji using his own funds, and that Mahant Ram Krishna Das had installed certain deities in that temple. He argued that the temple and its associated properties did not constitute a “religious trust” as defined by the Act, and that the Act was ultra vires the Constitution because it infringed upon his fundamental rights.

The defence in each of these proceedings was uniform. It maintained that the Act was valid, that it applied to the asthals or temples that were the subject of the suits, and that the property of those institutions fell within the scope of the legislation.

The principal contentions raised on behalf of the appellants were that several provisions of the Act violated fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, namely article 14, article 19(1)(f), and articles 25, 26 and 27. In addition, the appellants contended that the Act imposed an unauthorised tax and contravened article 133 of the Constitution.

At this point the Court found it necessary to turn to the object and purpose of the Act and to set out its relevant provisions. The Act had been enacted by the Bihar Legislature and had received the President’s assent, which was subsequently published in the Bihar Gazette on 21 February 1951. Both the long title of the Act and its preamble articulate the purpose of the legislation. The long title declares that the Act is “an Act to provide for the better administration of Hindu Religious Trusts and for the protection and preservation of properties appertaining to such trusts.” The preamble echoes this purpose and further clarifies that the legislation is intended to ensure better administration of Hindu Religious Trusts within the State of Bihar. Section 1 of the Act provides the short title, sets out its territorial extent and specifies the date of commencement.

The Act became operative on 15 August 1951. Section 2, which contains the definitions, explains that the term “Hindu” refers to any person who professes a religion of Hindu origin; it expressly includes Jains and Buddhists but excludes Sikhs. The same section defines the expressions “religious trust” and “trust property.” According to Section 2(1), a “religious trust” means any express or constructive trust that has been created or that exists for any purpose that Hindu law recognises as religious, pious or charitable. The definition expressly excludes any trust that is created under the Sikh religion, any trust that is solely for the benefit of the Sikh community, and any private endowment that is intended for the worship of a family idol where the public does not have an interest. The term “trust property” is defined simply as the property that belongs to a religious trust.

Section 3 declares that the Act is applicable to all religious trusts, irrespective of whether they were created before or after the Act’s commencement, provided that any part of the trust’s property is situated within the State of Bihar. Section 4, which was amended by Bihar Act 16 of 1954, authorises the necessary amendment or repeal of certain earlier statutes that dealt with public religious trusts and charitable endowments, specifically the Religious Endowments Act 1863, the Charitable Endowments Act 1890 and the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act 1920. Sub‑section 5 of Section 4 is particularly important for the questions before the Court and is quoted in full: “The Religious Endowments Act, 1863, and section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall not apply to any religious trust in this State, as defined in this Act.”

Chapter II of the Act concerns the constitution of the Board. Section 5 provides for the establishment of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts. Section 5(3) stipulates that the Board shall be a body corporate, shall possess perpetual succession and a common seal, and shall have the authority to acquire and hold both movable and immovable property. Section 7 deals with the appointment of the President and the members of the first Board, as well as the length of their terms of office. Section 8 sets out the procedure for constituting the second Board and every Board that follows. Chapter IV deals with the appointment and qualifications of the Superintendent of religious trusts and also provides for the appointment of officers and servants who will work for the Board. Chapter V outlines the powers and duties of the Board. Section 28(1) provides that the general superintendence of all religious trusts in the State is vested in the Board, and that the Board shall take all reasonable and necessary steps to ensure that such trusts are properly supervised and administered, and that the income of the trusts is duly appropriated and applied to the objects of the trusts in accordance with their purposes.

The Board was required to ensure that each religious trust was administered in accordance with the purposes for which the trust was originally founded and continues to exist. Section twenty‑eight, sub‑section two, sets out in great detail the powers and duties that the Board may exercise with respect to various matters concerning the trusts. In particular, sub‑section two, clause e, provides that the Board has a duty to order an inspection of the property and the offices of any religious trust, including a review of the accounts, and to authorise the Superintendent, any member, officer or servant of the Board to carry out such inspection. Sub‑section two, clause g, further empowers the Board to issue directions that will ensure proper administration of a religious trust, so long as such directions conform to the law governing the trust and reflect the founder’s wishes insofar as those wishes can be ascertained. Section thirty‑two gives the Board authority to formulate and settle a scheme that will provide for the proper administration of religious trusts. Chapter six deals with the creation of regional trust committees and outlines the powers and duties that are imposed on those committees. Chapter eight concerns the transfer of immovable property and the borrowing of money by trustees. Section forty‑four in that chapter provides that any transfer of immovable property belonging to a religious trust, whether by sale, mortgage or lease for a period exceeding three years, shall be invalid unless the Board has granted its prior sanction. Section forty‑five similarly bars a trustee from borrowing money for the purposes of any religious trust without first obtaining the Board’s sanction. Chapter ten relates to trustees and their duties. Section fifty‑nine imposes upon each trustee a duty to furnish particulars concerning the religious trust over which they exercise control. Section sixty requires trustees to submit the trust’s budget to the Board, which may then alter or modify the budget in such manner and to such extent as the Board deems appropriate. Chapter eleven deals with the audit of accounts and authorises the recovery of irregular expenses from trustees who are in default. Chapter thirteen provides for the establishment of a trust fund that is to be vested in the seventy‑two Board. Section seventy states that, in order to meet the expenses incurred in administering the Act, each trustee must pay a fee to the Board not exceeding five per centum of the trust’s net income, a fee to be determined by the Board from time to time with the prior sanction of the State Government. Chapter sixteen contains provisions for the dissolution or supersession of the Board. Section eighty explains that if, in the opinion of the State Government, the Board defaults in performing its duties or exceeds or abuses its powers, the State Government may declare the Board to be in default and may direct that the Board be superseded. Finally, section eighty‑one provides that when an order of supersession is made, all members of the Board must vacate their offices, and all powers and duties previously exercised by the Board shall be performed by the person appointed by the State Government.

Section 81 gave the State Government authority to formulate rules, and section 83 authorized the Board to make bye‑laws provided those bye‑laws did not conflict with the Act or with the rules made under it. The Court then turned to the arguments presented for the appellants. The appellants argued that sections 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution. They observed that the definition of “Hindu” in section 2 expressly excluded Sikhs, and that section 5 created a Board for religious trusts other than Jain religious trusts, while also establishing two separate Boards—one for Śvetāmbara Jain trusts and another for Digambar Jain trusts. Furthermore, they pointed out that sections 6, 7 and 8 prescribed a composition for the Board dealing with non‑Jain religious trusts that differed materially from the composition of the two Boards dealing with Jain trusts. From these observations the appellants contended that there was unequal treatment between Hindu religious trusts and Sikh religious trusts, the latter being left outside the scope of the Act, and also unequal treatment between Hindu religious trusts and Jain religious trusts, even though both categories fell within the Act’s purview. The Court found that this contention lacked substance. It noted that the issues raised under Article 14 had already been examined by the Court in numerous earlier decisions, including those cited in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar, and therefore a detailed discussion of the meaning, scope and effect of the provision was unnecessary. The Court reiterated the settled principle that while Article 14 prohibits arbitrary class legislation, it allows reasonable classification for legislative purposes, provided two criteria are satisfied: first, the classification must be based on an intelligible distinction that separates those placed in a group from those left out; second, that distinction must have a rational connection to the objective the statute seeks to achieve. The Court explained that classifications may be founded on various bases such as geography, objects, occupations, and similar factors. It also emphasized that judicial precedent creates a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of legislative enactments, placing the burden on the challenger to demonstrate a clear breach of the constitutional guarantee. The presumption further assumes that the legislature understands and appropriately addresses the needs of the people, that its laws respond to problems evident from experience, and that any differential treatment rests on adequate justification, allowing the legislature to recognize degrees of harm and limit restrictions to situations where the need is most evident.

In this case the Court observed that a legislature may limit its restrictions to those situations where the need for protection is the most evident, and that it may differentiate the degree of harm involved. The Court noted that there is no dispute, as acknowledged by the High Court, that Hindus, Sikhs and Jains differ in several essential aspects of the faith they profess and the religious practices they observe. For example, Sikhism has no caste system or priests, although it employs grantis to officiate at marriages and other ceremonies, and Sikhs do not accept the Vedas, Puranas or Shastras in the same manner as Hindus do, a point supported by the citation (1) [1959] S.C.R. 279. Likewise, Jains do not recognize the divine authority of the Vedas, they do not perform sradhs or death‑related ceremonies, and they do not accept the spiritual authority of Brahmins, as noted in Maine’s Hindu Law, 11th Edition, p. 82.

The Court further explained that organizational structures governing religious trusts also vary among the three communities. It observed that Sikh religious trusts are few in Bihar and that their organisational pattern is essentially different from that of Hindu trusts. Jain communities are divided into two principal branches—Swetambar Jains and Digambar Jains—each possessing its own central organisation. Section 8 of the Act expressly recognises these differences. For instance, the Swetambar Jains have an assembly called the Shree Sangh, which, under s. 8(2)(c) of the Act, may elect five members to the Board of the Swetambar Jain Religious Trust. Similarly, the Digambar Jains have an assembly known as the Digambar Samaj, which, under s. 8(3)(c) of the Act, may elect five members to the Board of the Digambar Jain Religious Trust.

Because of these doctrinal and organisational distinctions, the Court concluded that it cannot be said that Hindus, Sikhs and Jains are situated alike for the purpose of religious trusts in the State of Bihar, nor that the needs of Jains and Hindus are identical with respect to the administration of their respective trusts. Accordingly, applying the well‑settled principles of legislative classification, the Court held that the Bihar Legislature was within its authority to exclude Sikhs—who may have no need of the protection afforded by the Act—and to differentiate between Hindus and Jains. Consequently, the contention advanced by the appellants that several provisions of the Act violate Article 14 of the Constitution was found to be without merit.

The Court then turned to the appellants’ second contention, which alleged that the provisions of Chapter V, especially sections 28 and 32, infringe the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f)—the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. The appellants argued that the properties in question are trust properties within the meaning of the Act, while simultaneously claiming that the same properties are their private assets. The Court noted this dual characterization and indicated that the aspect relating to the appellants’ claim of private ownership would be addressed later in the judgment.

In this proceeding, the Court examined the provisions of Chapter V of the Act, focusing especially on section 28, which enumerates the powers and duties of the Board. Earlier portions of the judgment had already referred to some of those powers. Section 32 further empowers the Board, either on its own initiative or upon an application made by two or more persons having an interest in any trust, to formulate schemes that ensure the proper administration of a religious trust. Additional sections in the same chapter authorize the Board to enter into contracts, to borrow money and to take other necessary steps for accomplishing the purposes of the Act or for giving effect to its provisions. Section 58 requires every trustee to obey any directions that may be issued to him by the Board under the various provisions of the Act. The specific authorities granted by section 28 include the preparation and settlement of a budget, the ordering of inspections of the property and offices of any religious trust, the requisition of information, reports and returns, and the issuance of directions for the proper administration of a religious trust in conformity with the law governing such trusts and the wishes of the founder. Section 28 also empowers the Board to remove a trustee from office in certain circumstances and to control and administer the trust fund.

The parties contended that the status of a maharani or shebait of a Hindu religious trust combines elements of an office with proprietary rights, and that under the Act the mahant or shebait is effectively stripped of his management authority and reduced to the role of a mere servant of the Board. They argued that this reduction infringes the appellants’ fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The Court referred to the decision in Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick, wherein Justice Mukherjea, speaking for the majority, observed that the precise legal definition of a shebait may be elusive, yet its practical implications are well‑established. He explained that under English law a trustee holds the legal estate in trust property for the benefit of the cestui‑que‑trust; in contrast, in a Hindu religious endowment the entire ownership of the endowed property vests in the deity or in the institution as a juristic person, and the shebait or mahant functions merely as a manager. Although the shebait is not a trustee in the technical sense, Justice Mukherjea cautioned against characterising shebaitship as a purely nominal office, noting that the shebait bears duties connected with the endowment and also enjoys a beneficial interest in the debutter property. He further observed that in almost all such endowments the shebait possesses a share in the usufruct of the debutter property, reflecting a hybrid of office and proprietary interest.

The Court observed that the shebait possesses a share in the usufruct of the debutter property, and that share is determined by the terms of the original grant or, in the absence of a specific grant, by prevailing custom or usage. Even in situations where the office of the shebait carries no salary or other emoluments, the shebait nevertheless enjoys a right or interest in the endowed property that, at least in part, resembles a proprietary right. Consequently, the concept of shebaitship blends together the characteristics of an official position with the attributes of property ownership, combining duties imposed by the office with a personal interest in the assets. The Court stressed that these two elements cannot be separated; the personal or beneficial interest that the shebait holds in the endowed property gives the shebaitship the nature of a proprietary right and attaches to it the usual legal incidents that accompany property rights. The Court further noted that, before the enactment of the statute that is presently under challenge, there already existed a statutory mechanism for enforcing the obligations and duties placed upon a mahant or shebait. Specifically, Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure allowed a suit to be instituted by the Advocate‑General or by two or more persons who had an interest in the trust and who obtained written consent from the Advocate‑General. Such a suit could seek a decree for any of the following reliefs: removal of any trustee; appointment of a new trustee; vesting of property in a trustee; direction of accounts and enquiries; declaration of the proportion of trust property or interest to be allocated to a particular object of the trust; authorisation to let, sell, mortgage or exchange the whole or part of the trust property; settlement of a scheme; or any further or other relief that the nature of the case required. This provision therefore supplied an important machinery for enforcing trustees’ obligations, granting the court a very wide jurisdiction in trust matters.

The Court then turned to the constitutional guarantee of freedom of movement under Article 19(1)(f) and observed that this right is subject to clause (5) of the same article, which expressly provides that nothing in sub‑clause (f) shall prevent the State from enacting reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right in the interests of the general public. Aligning with the view expressed by the High Court, the Court held that the restrictions imposed by the impugned Act on the powers of trustees are intended, as stated in the preamble of the Act, to promote better administration of Hindu religious trusts in the State of Bihar and to protect and preserve the properties belonging to such trusts. The Court further observed that the Act furnishes a more efficient and quicker remedy for enforcing the obligations and duties imposed on trustees than the protracted and cumbersome procedure of instituting a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Court observed that the Civil Procedure Code provides a mechanism for speedy enforcement of trustees’ duties, whereas the Board created under the Act possesses summary powers to intervene in various matters concerning a Hindu religious trust. These powers, however, are to be exercised only for the purpose of improving the administration of the trust and for safeguarding and preserving the property that belongs to the trust. In this context, the Court referred to sub‑section (1) of section 28, which obliges the Board to do all things that are reasonable and necessary to ensure that the religious trusts are properly supervised and administered, and that the income of such trusts is applied in accordance with the objects for which the trusts were established.

The Court then explained the scope of section 60. Sub‑section (2) of that section authorises the Board to alter or modify the budget of any religious trust in a manner and to the extent that it considers appropriate. Nevertheless, sub‑section (6) of section 60 makes it clear that the Board cannot alter or modify a budget in a way that conflicts with the founder’s wishes, insofar as those wishes can be ascertained, or with the provisions of the Act itself. Section 28(2)(h) further empowers the Board to remove a trustee from office under certain circumstances, but sub‑section (3) of section 28 requires that any order of removal be communicated to the trustee concerned, and gives that trustee a period of ninety days from the communication of the order within which he may apply to the District Judge for a variation, modification or setting aside of the order. Section 28(2)(j) permits the Board to sanction the conversion of any property of a religious trust into another form of property if the Board is satisfied that such conversion will be beneficial to the trust; this power, however, is subject to an important proviso that the conversion may be sanctioned only after a resolution is passed by a majority that includes at least three‑fourths of the Board members and that the resolution receives the approval of the District Judge. The Court also noted that, even with respect to the settlement of a scheme under section 32, sub‑section (3) provides a safeguard by allowing a trustee or any person interested in the trust to file an application to the District Judge for varying, modifying or setting aside the scheme within three months of the scheme’s publication. The Court held that these various safeguards clearly demonstrate that the Act imposes restrictions that are intended to further the objects of the trust, to promote better administration, and to protect and preserve trust property. Consequently, the Court concluded that the restrictions are reasonable in the interests of the general public within the meaning of clause (5) of article 19 of the Constitution, and that, in this respect, the provisions under challenge differ from those of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, and the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939, which had been held invalid for not meeting the same standard of reasonableness.

In the present matter the Court examined the Religious and Charitable Endowments Act of 1951 and the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act of 1939, as amended by the Amending Act 11 of 1952. Both statutes had previously come before this Court in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shri Shirur Mutt (1) and Mahant Shri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa (2). In those earlier cases the Court declared the challenged provisions to be invalid because they were not reasonable restrictions within the meaning of clause (5) of Article 19 of the Constitution. The present appellants raised a third contention, relying upon Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. They invoked Article 25(1), which provides, subject to public order, morality and health, that every person has the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion. They also relied upon Article 26, arguing that every religious denomination or any section thereof has (a) a right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, and (b) a right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion.

The Court found it difficult to identify any provision of the two Acts that would interfere with the right guaranteed by Article 25, namely the freedom of conscience and the freedom to profess, practice and propagate religion. Counsel for the appellants was unable to point to any specific clause of the Acts that would curtail that right. The appellants further submitted that the power of the Board to alter or modify the budget relating to a religious trust, or the power to give directions to a trustee, could be exercised in a manner that would affect the due observance of religious practices in a math or temple, thereby constituting an encroachment on the right protected by Article 25. To support this argument they cited The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1), relying on the pronouncement that freedom of religion in our Constitution is not confined to religious beliefs alone but also extends to religious practices, subject to the restrictions laid down by the Constitution. The Court responded that the submission required a two‑fold answer. First, the power to alter the budget is expressly limited by clause (6) of section 60 of the Act, and the Board is not authorised to alter or modify the budget in a way that conflicts with the wishes of the founder or with the provisions of the Act. Second, the power to give directions to a trustee is similarly constrained; any direction must be given for the proper administration of the religious trust, must be in accordance with the law governing such a trust, and must respect the founder’s wishes insofar as those wishes can be ascertained and are not repugnant to the governing law.

The Court noted that the provisions of the Act must be interpreted so that they are in accordance with existing law and are not inconsistent with it. It emphasized that the central purpose of all relevant provisions of the Act is to ensure that the objects of a religious trust are observed, rather than to permit any breach or violation of those objects. The Court further referred to the observation made in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shri Shirur Mutt (1) at page 1030, which stated that a fear that the powers granted by a statute might be misused in particular cases does not render the provision itself invalid or illegal.

With respect to Article 26, clauses (a) and (b), the Court held that the position remains unchanged. It found that no provision of the Act interferes with the right of any religious denomination or any of its sections to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes. Likewise, the Act does not impede the right of any religious denomination or its sections to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. The Court recorded that counsel for the appellants had drawn its attention to Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. The State of Mysore (2), where, following the earlier decision in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1), it was observed that matters of religion include practices that the community regards as part of its religion.

The Court also cited Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay (I [1954] S.C.R. 1005; II [1958] S.C.R. 895), which held that a religious sect or denomination possesses the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. That right encompasses the authority to spend trust property or its income for religious purposes and for objects specified by the founder of the trust or established by usage in a particular institution. The Court reiterated that the cited case further held that diverting trust property or funds to purposes deemed expedient or proper by the charity commissioner or the court, even when the original objects of the founder could still be achieved, constituted an unwarranted encroachment on the freedom of religious institutions in managing their religious affairs.

After considering these authorities, the Court concluded that the earlier decisions did not provide assistance to the appellants. While acknowledging that “matters of religion” may include practices regarded by a denomination as part of its religion, the Court found that none of the provisions of the Act interfere with such practices. Moreover, the Act does not seek to divert trust property or funds to purposes other than those indicated by the founder of the trust or those established by usage in a particular institution. On the contrary, the Court observed that the provisions of the Act aim to implement the purposes for which the trust was created and to prevent mismanagement and waste by the trustee. In other words, the Act, through its various provisions, seeks to fulfill the trust’s objectives rather than to defeat them. Consequently, the Court held that there was no substantive basis for the argument that the provisions of the Act contravene the constitutional provisions.

In this case the appellants raised a challenge to the constitutionality of section 70 of the Act, which provides that the trustee of every religious trust must, each financial year, pay to the Board a fee not exceeding five per cent of the net income of the preceding year, as may be determined by the Board with the prior sanction of the State Government. The appellants argued that this provision constituted an unauthorised tax. The Court referred to its earlier decision in Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa, where the distinction between a tax and a fee for legislative purposes under the Constitution was explained, and where a similar levy under section 49 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939, had been held to be a fee rather than a tax. The earlier judgment observed that the collections were not merged into the general public revenue nor appropriated in the manner prescribed for other public expenses; instead they formed a fund contemplated by section 50 of that Act. The Court further explained that such an imposition could not be said to fall foul of article 27 of the Constitution, because article 27 forbids the specific appropriation of tax proceeds for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or denomination. The contribution under section 49—paralleling the present provision—was intended to ensure proper administration of religious trusts and institutions, not to foster or preserve any specific religion. Accordingly, the Court concluded that article 27 did not apply, and the same reasoning was applied to section 70 of the present Act.

The appellants also contended that subsection (2) of section 55 of the Act violated article 133 of the Constitution and was therefore void. Section 55 reads: “(1) Unless otherwise provided in this Act, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against every order passed by the District Judge under this Act. (I) [1954] S.C.R. 1046. (2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section.” The Court examined whether subsection (2) was intended to override article 133 or any other constitutional provision relating to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It held that the provision did not seek to oust the constitutional right of appeal to the Supreme Court, nor did it affect the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, and therefore it did not contravene article 133.

In this matter the Court observed that a party may seek to appeal to the Supreme Court, and that such an appeal must indeed lie before the Supreme Court provided that the statutory conditions governing that mode of appeal are satisfied. The Court considered it to be clear that the legislation under review cannot diminish or otherwise affect the constitutional jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court. Having dealt with the question of appellate jurisdiction, the Court turned to the portion of the appellants’ contentions that asserted that the lands and buildings involved were their private assets, or alternatively that the entities holding those assets were private trusts rather than public ones.

The Court then examined the findings of the High Court in a series of related proceedings. In the matter designated M. J. C. 418 of 1952, which gave rise to Civil Appeal No. 225 of 1955, the appellants had claimed that the properties in dispute were not trust property. However, the State of Bihar filed a counter‑affidavit stating that the asthal concerned was a public asthal and that the lands attached to it fell within the definition of trust property prescribed by the Act. In another proceeding, M. J. C. 124 of 1953, which led to Civil Appeal No. 226 of 1955, the appellants again maintained that the mahant of the asthal possessed absolute ownership of the math’s properties, seeking to establish a private character for those assets.

In Suit No. 34 of 1952/106 of 1953, which later became Civil Appeal No. 228 of 1955, the plaintiffs—who are now the appellants before this Court—requested an adjournment so that they could file a petition to amend their plaint. The purpose of the proposed amendment was to argue that the institutions involved were of a private nature and therefore fell outside the scope of the Act. The High Court rejected that prayer, holding that the amendment would fundamentally alter the nature of the suit. A similar claim was raised in M. J. C. 188 of 1953, which resulted in Civil Appeal No. 229 of 1955, where the appellants contended that no express or implied trust existed over the property. In M. J. C. 235 of 1953, which gave rise to Civil Appeal No. 248 of 1955, the State of Bihar again submitted a counter‑affidavit asserting that the temple at issue was a public temple and that the Act applied to it.

The Court noted that in each of these cases the High Court correctly concluded, in the Court’s view, that determining whether the trusts were public or private, or whether the properties were private or trust property, required a detailed factual enquiry and the recording of evidence. Such investigative work, the Court held, could not be undertaken within the limited framework of writ proceedings. In the one suit that was actually tried before the High Court, the question of the trust’s nature never arose because the Court did not permit the amendment sought by the appellants. Consequently, there existed no material on the record that would enable the Court to decide the question of the trust’s character in those matters. The Court further observed that, in Civil Appeal No. 343 of 1955, which is also being decided today, it had previously held that, when the preamble to the Act, section 3 and sub‑section (5) of section 4 are taken into account, the definition clause of “religious trust” in the Act must be understood to refer to public trusts, whether express or constructive, that are recognised by Hindu law as religious, pious or charitable.

In interpreting the term ‘religious trust’ contained in the legislation, the Court explained that the term must be understood to refer to public trusts, whether expressed expressly or impliedly, that are recognized under Hindu law as being religious, pious, or charitable in nature. The Court further observed that this particular interpretation, while established in earlier discussion, did not provide any advantage or assistance to the appellants who were challenging the statutory provisions in the matters presently before the Court. Consequently, the resolution of the present appeals was required to rest upon a single decisive issue, namely whether the legislation itself was constitutionally valid. The Court then stated the exact conclusion, “We have held that the Act is constitutionally valid.” Based on that determination, the Court concluded that the appeals raised by the petitioners lacked any legal merit. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the appeals be dismissed, and that the costs of the proceedings be awarded against the appellants. The formal order recorded that the appeals were dismissed. The judgment also included a citation to Mahant Moti Das Saroop Dasji v. S. P. Sahi, see p. 583.