M/S. Diwan Sugar and General Mills (Private) Ltd. and Others vs The Union of India

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Writ Petition No. 134 of 1958

Decision Date: 23 January, 1959

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, Syed Jaffer Imam, S.K. Das, M. Hidayatullah

The matter before the Supreme Court of India was titled M/S. Diwan Sugar & General Mills (Private) Ltd. and Others versus The Union of India. The judgment was delivered on 23 January 1959. The author of the judgment was Justice K.N. Wanchoo, and the bench comprised Justices K.N. Wanchoo, Syed Jaffer Imam, S.K. Das and M. Hidayatullah. The petitioners were M/S. Diwan Sugar & General Mills (Private) Ltd. together with other respondents, while the respondent in the case was the Union of India. The case was recorded under citation 1959 AIR 626 and 1959 SCR Supplement (2) 123, with subsequent citations including R 1974 SC 366 (55) and RF 1981 SC 873 (18, 26). The statutory provisions involved were the Sugar (Control) Order, 1955, clause 5, the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (section 5), and constitutional articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

The headnote of the judgment summarized the factual backdrop and the legal questions raised. In exercising powers conferred by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and clause 5 of the Sugar (Control) Order, 1955, the Government of India issued a notification on 30 July 1958 fixing the ex-factory price per maund of sugar produced in the states of Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar. The petitioners challenged the legality of this notification on four principal grounds. First, they asserted that the notification exceeded the authority granted to the Central Government under the Essential Commodities Act and the Sugar (Control) Order, and further argued that it failed to achieve the purpose of the Act, namely the equitable distribution of sugar to consumers at a fair price. Second, they contended that neither the Act nor the Order authorized the Central Government to fix ex-factory prices, and that the notification did not address the price at the ultimate consumer level. Third, they claimed that the notification imposed an unreasonable restriction on the right to trade guaranteed by article 19(1)(g), because the price fixing was arbitrary and lacked safeguards against abuse of power. Fourth, they alleged that the notification was discriminatory because it fixed ex-factory prices only for factories in the three specified states and not for factories elsewhere in the country, without a reasonable classification or intelligible differentia to justify such regional distinction.

The Court’s holding addressed each of the petitioners’ contentions in turn. It held that the notification dated 30 July 1958 fell within the authority expressly conferred on the Central Government by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and by clause 5 of the Sugar (Control) Order, 1955. The Court observed that section 3 of the Act provides a broad power to control prices and permits the Central Government to fix ex-factory prices of sugar without the necessity of fixing wholesale or retail prices. By fixing ex-factory prices, the government ensured that fair prices would be available to consumers, thereby fulfilling the purpose of the Act. Consequently, the Court found the notification to be valid. The Court also noted that clause 5 of the Sugar (Control) Order, 1955, enumerates the factors to be considered in fixing prices, and that the government’s price fixation was in accordance with those factors. Therefore, the action taken by the Government in the public interest could not be struck down as an unreasonable restriction on the constitutional right to carry on trade under article 19(1)(g). Finally, while the notification directly fixed prices only for factories in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar, the Court explained that, in effect, the price fixation applied to the whole of India because the other states were in a state of deficit. Thus, the notification did not create any discrimination between regions.

Clause 5 of the Sugar (Control) Order required that certain factors be taken into account when fixing prices, and because the prices were fixed in accordance with those factors, the action taken by the Government in the interests of the general public could not be challenged as an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Although the notification fixed prices only for factories located in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar, the effect was that the prices applied to the entire country because the remaining states were in deficit; consequently, the notification did not create any discrimination between different regions. The Court recorded that the matter originated as Original Jurisdiction Writ Petition No. 134 of 1958, filed under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the petitioners appeared on behalf of the petitioners, while counsel for the respondent, including the Attorney-General for India, represented the Government. Separate counsel represented interveners numbered 1 to 10 and interveners 11 to 13. The judgment was delivered on 23 January 1959.

The petition challenged the legality of the notification dated 30 July 1958, hereinafter referred to as the impugned notification, which was issued by the Government of India to fix the ex-factory price per maund of sugar produced in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar. The petition was supported by two groups of interveners consisting of sugar factories in those areas that chose not to join the petition. The petitioners argued that the Essential Commodities Act 1955 (the Act), enacted by Parliament, was intended to control the production, supply, distribution, trade and commerce of certain essential commodities, including sugar. Section 3 of the Act empowered the Central Government, whenever it deemed it necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing equitable distribution and fair prices, to issue orders regulating or prohibiting the production, supply, distribution, trade and commerce of that commodity. Section 3(2) further authorized the Government to control the price at which any essential commodity might be bought or sold. Exercising these powers, the Central Government issued the Sugar (Control) Order 1955 on 27 August 1955. Clause 5 of this Order gave the Central Government authority, by notification in the Official Gazette, to fix either the price or the maximum price at which any sugar could be sold or delivered, and permitted different prices for different areas, factories, types or grades of sugar. The price or maximum price had to be fixed with due regard to various prescribed factors, which the Court noted would be addressed later. Subsequently, on 27 June 1958, the Central Government promulgated another notification that further exercised these powers.

The Government, by means of the Sugar Export Promotion Ordinance No V of 1958, granted itself authority to designate an export agency that would purchase sugar available in the Indian market and ship it to overseas destinations, as well as to determine the total quantity of sugar to be exported. The Ordinance further empowered the Government to allocate specific export quotas to each sugar factory and to impose an additional excise duty of seventeen rupees per maund on any factory that failed to meet its assigned export quota. On the same day the Ordinance was issued, three separate notifications were released. The first notification fixed the overall export target at fifty thousand tons of sugar for the period ending 31 October 1958. The second notification appointed the Indian Sugar Mills Association, Calcutta, to act as the export agency. The third notification delegated the powers conferred on the Central Government by the Ordinance to the Chief Director of Sugar and Vanaspati, Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Subsequent to these notifications, the Government issued the impugned notification that fixed the ex-factory prices of sugar produced by factories located in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar. The petitioners challenged this price-fixing notification on the ground that the prices fixed were substantially lower than the actual cost of production and failed to take into account a range of factors affecting production and distribution costs, including charges incidental to sale and distribution. They further contended that the notification did not prescribe any resale price for purchasers of sugar from the mills, thereby allowing middlemen who bought the sugar to sell it at any price they chose, creating discrimination both among factories and between the producers and the intervening traders. In addition, the petitioners alleged that the price fixation was arbitrary, ignored the cost structures of a large number of sugar units throughout the country, and did not ensure a fair and equitable distribution of sugar at a price related in any way to the price at which factories were compelled to sell their product. Consequently, the petitioners prayed for an appropriate order, direction or writ in the nature of mandamus, or any other suitable writ, that would set aside the Sugar (Control) Order of 1955 and all subordinate orders issued under it, including the impugned price-fixing notification. The Central Government opposed the petition, arguing that the entire purpose of fixing the price of sugar was two-fold: first, to make sugar available to consumers at a reasonable price, and second, to guarantee an adequate and smooth supply of this essential commodity to all parts of the country in accordance with the needs and requirements of the population, thereby checking speculative market practices and preventing the creation of artificial shortages by unscrupulous parties. The Government further pointed out that price control of sugar had first been introduced as early as 1942.

In this case, the Court recorded that the Government’s control over the price of sugar began during the Second World War and continued until 1947, when the control was withdrawn on 8 December 1947. During the subsequent period of deregulation, the Court found that internal sugar prices were raised on the pretext of subsidising an export programme that never materialised. Consequently, the Government re-imposed price control on 2 September 1949. This second period of control was lifted in 1952 after the authorities determined that sufficient stocks were available at the close of the 1951-52 season. Production, however, fell again in the 1953-54 season, prompting the Government to impose price control for that season; the control was subsequently lifted a year later.

In November 1956 a considerable surplus of sugar existed, and the Central Government consequently permitted the export of 1.53 lakh metric tonnes in 1957. The Government was approached in 1958 to make sugar export a permanent feature, and it agreed to allow exports during that year on the basis of the carry-over from the previous season and the need to earn foreign exchange for the country. Accordingly, the Central Government promulgated the Sugar Export Promotion Ordinance, No. V of 1958, on 27 June 1958. After the Ordinance came into effect, a tendency emerged in the sugar industry to raise prices after April 1958. As a result, prices increased by about one rupee per maund during May and June 1958, and there were fears that they might rise further in view of the export quota announced on 27 June 1958. The industry assured the Government that the sugar factories would offer their released stocks for sale at the prices prevailing in the week preceding the export policy announcement. Nevertheless, despite this assurance, a general rise in prices was observed during the four weeks preceding the impugned notification, a rise that was especially marked in Northern India.

The Court noted that, because of these circumstances, the Government decided to control ex-factory prices of sugar in the states of Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar. The authorities took into account all relevant factors in fixing the price, acting in the interest of the general public so that sugar would be available at fair prices. Since Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar were the principal surplus areas that supplied deficit regions, the Government deemed it unnecessary to control prices elsewhere or beyond the ex-factory stage, as wholesale and retail market prices are determined by ex-factory prices. The Court observed that there was no discrimination or unreasonable restriction on the trade of sugar, and the Government did not admit that the fixed price was below the cost of production. Accordingly, the petitioners’ prayer for dismissal of the petition was upheld.

Finally, the interveners contended that the impugned notification was illegal and invalid for several reasons. First, they argued that the notification was beyond the authority conferred on the Central Government by section 3 of the Act and clause 5 of the Order, and that it could not serve the purpose of ensuring equitable distribution of sugar to consumers at a fair price. Second, they asserted that the notification, which merely fixed ex-factory prices, was unauthorised because the Act and the Order do not empower the Central Government to fix ex-factory prices; even if such fixation were permissible, the notification would still be defective because it failed to fix prices for the ultimate consumer, a requirement of the Act. Third, the interveners claimed that the notification imposed an unreasonable restriction on the right to trade under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, on the grounds that it compelled factories to sell sugar at a loss, fixed the price arbitrarily, and provided no reasonable safeguard against abuse of power, nor any provision for appeal or other check.

The interveners contended that the notification issued by the Central Government was void for several reasons. First, they argued that the Central Government, acting under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act and clause 5 of the related Order, exceeded its statutory authority and therefore could not legitimately accomplish the purpose of the Act, which is to ensure an equitable distribution of the commodity to consumers at a fair price. Second, they maintained that the notification was infirm because it only fixed ex-factory prices. Their argument was twofold: the Act and the Order, they said, do not empower the Central Government to fix ex-factory prices, and even if such fixation were permissible, the notification remained defective because it failed to prescribe prices for the ultimate consumer, a requirement the Act imposes. Third, they asserted that the notification imposed an unreasonable restriction on the constitutional right to trade guaranteed under article 19(1)(g). In support of this claim they pointed out three specific grievances: it forced factories to sell sugar at a loss; it set the price arbitrarily; and it lacked any reasonable safeguard against abuse of power, offering no mechanism for appeal or review. Fourth, they argued that the notification was discriminatory because it applied only to factories located in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar and not to factories in other regions of India, and that no intelligible basis for such a geographical distinction could be identified.

The Court examined the content of the Act, noting that it deals with essential commodities as defined therein and that its preamble declares its enactment in the public interest for the control of production, supply, distribution, trade and commerce of such commodities. Section 3, the Court observed, authorises the Central Government to issue orders when it is necessary or expedient to maintain or increase supplies of any essential commodity or to secure equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. While the petitioners did not challenge the constitutionality of the Act itself, they attacked the validity of the Order relating to sugar, specifically the notification that fixed ex-factory prices in the three named regions. The Court held that clause 5 of the Order delineates the scope of the Central Government’s powers to fix prices, setting out the manner and the factors to be considered. Although the petitioners alleged that the Order granted the executive “uncontrolled, unguided and unfettered” power and imposed unreasonable trade restrictions, no arguments were presented concerning the constitutionality of the Order itself. Consequently, the Court limited its consideration to the price-fixation provisions of the Order, noting that clause 5 enumerates the relevant factors—such as the minimum price of sugarcane, manufacturing costs, taxes, a reasonable profit margin for producers or traders, and any incidental charges—that must be taken into account. The Court concluded that these provisions sufficiently restrain executive discretion, rendering the Order, insofar as it concerns price fixation, valid and within the authority conferred by section 3 of the Act and clause 5 of the Order.

The Order provides that, in fixing the price of sugar, the Government shall take into consideration five specific factors. These factors are: (i) the price or minimum price fixed for sugarcane, (ii) the manufacturing cost incurred by the mill, (iii) any taxes that are applicable, (iv) a reasonable margin of profit for the producer and/or the trader, and (v) any incidental charges that may arise. By enumerating these elements, the Order makes it clear that the price must be fixed after a careful assessment of all reasonable components that influence price determination. Consequently, it cannot be said that the Order grants the executive an unchecked, unguided, or unlimited power to fix prices arbitrarily. On this basis, the Court proceeds on the assumption that both the Act and the Order, insofar as they relate to price fixation, are valid.

The next issue for consideration is whether the contested notification exceeds the authority conferred on the Central Government by section 3 of the Act and by clause 5 of the Order. When section 3 is read together with the preamble of the Act, the purpose of the legislation becomes evident: it is intended to control the production, supply, distribution, trade, and commerce of essential commodities in the interest of the general public, so that the supplies of such commodities can be maintained or increased, their equitable distribution can be secured, and they can be made available to the public at fair prices. Given the historical background of sugar control and the market trends that emerged from April 1958, it is impossible to conclude that the impugned notification fails to further the objectives of the Act and the Order. Fixing the ex-factory price of sugar in the principal surplus areas would, in effect, stabilise the price of sugar for the ultimate consumer at a fair level and ensure that sugar remains available at reasonable rates. The affidavit filed on behalf of the Government states that, as a result of this action, prices have returned to normal levels, a fact that can be demonstrated with evidence if required. This demonstrates that the notification serves the purposes of the Act, and therefore the argument that it does not fails.

The argument raised under point (1)(b) is presented in two parts. First, it is contended that section 3 of the Act mandates that prices be fixed only for the consumer. While the objective of section 3 is undoubtedly to secure essential commodities at fair prices for the public, it is well-known that three distinct price levels exist in the market for a commodity such as sugar: the ex-factory price, the wholesale price, and the retail price. The consumer ultimately pays the retail price. The petitioners argue that when section 3 speaks of making essential commodities available at fair prices to the public, the price fixation must occur at the stage where the consumer purchases the commodity. They specifically point to clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 3, which provides for control of the price at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold.

In this case, the Court observed that clause (c) of section 3(2) of the Act speaks specifically of control of price but uses very general language. It provides for fixation of a price at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold, without indicating the stage at which such fixation must occur. The Court noted that the object of the Act is to secure essential commodities for the consumer, that is, the general public, at fair prices. However, the Court held that this objective does not require that price control be limited only to the retail stage. The Court explained that the wording of clause (c) does not restrict the control to the last stage of the transaction, namely the retail price, and therefore the control may be exercised at any of the three stages—ex-factory, wholesale or retail. The Court rejected the contention that section 3 authorises the Central Government solely to fix the retail price. The Court further considered the argument that, even if the power to fix prices exists at all stages, the Act demands that the price must be fixed for the consumer, regardless of whether it is fixed earlier. The Court found that there are no words in section 3(1) or section 3(2)(c) that compel such a narrow interpretation. Consequently, the Court concluded that the provision allows price fixation at any stage and does not limit the government to fixing only the retail price. The Court further observed that the object of the Act is to ensure fair prices for the consumer, and if fair prices can be achieved by fixing the ex-factory price, there is no necessity for the Government to also fix wholesale or retail prices. It pointed out that in the case of sugar, wholesale and retail prices are normally dependent on the ex-factory price. Therefore, if fixing the price at the ex-factory level is sufficient to secure a fair price for the consumer, the Government may stop at that stage and need not intervene further.

The petitioners then argued that the middleman who purchases sugar from the factory is not subject to control and could sell at any price, thereby defeating the purpose of the Act. The Court acknowledged that, in theory, a middleman might abuse his position, but it also noted that the Government possesses ample power to intervene and fix wholesale and retail prices if such abuse occurs. The Court emphasized that if the purpose of the legislation is already served by fixing the ex-factory price, there is no reason for the Government to also fix wholesale and retail prices. Moreover, the petitioners had not specifically alleged that wholesalers or retailers were profiteering or that sugar was unavailable to the public at a fair price. In the circumstances, the Court found that it was not necessary for the Government to fix wholesale or retail prices. The Court therefore concluded that the contention that the notification amounted to an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners’ right to trade under Article 19 (1)(g) was unsupported, because the statutory power to fix prices at any stage of the supply chain remained valid and was not confined solely to the retail level. In the circumstances, it was

In its reasoning the Court observed that it was not indispensable for the Government to prescribe wholesale or retail prices in addition to fixing the ex-factory price. The Court found no statutory authority in sections 3(1) and 3(2)(c) of the Act that mandated the Government to determine prices at all three stages of marketing. According to the Court, the price levels the Government chose to fix were to be based on its assessment of the circumstances that would best achieve the purpose of the Act, and consequently the petitioners’ contention that the law required wholesale and retail price fixation had no merit. Turning to the second ground of challenge, the petitioners maintained that the impugned notification infringed their right to trade guaranteed by article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. They advanced three sub-arguments: first, that factories were being forced to sell sugar at a price below the cost of production; second, that the price fixed by the Government was arbitrary; and third, that there was no protective mechanism to prevent abuse of power. Regarding the allegation of sub-cost selling, the petitioners relied on a press note dated 30 July 1958, contending that the Government had indicated that prices should be anchored to the level prevailing in the week preceding 27 June 1958, and that the Government’s subsequent fixation of prices at a lower level – or even at a level lower than that recorded at the end of May 1958 – meant that the prices did not cover the cost of production. The Court held that this inference misinterpreted the press note. The note merely recorded that prices had risen before 27 June 1958 in anticipation of a large export quota, and that the industry had assured the Government that prices would stabilise after that date. That assurance proved false, as prices increased by an additional rupee per maund by the end of July. The Court stressed that the press note did not contain any commitment by the Government to fix prices at the levels of late May or late June, nor did it assert that those levels represented proper or cost-covering prices. Consequently, the Government was under no obligation to align the notified price with the earlier figures, and the press note bore no relation to the cost of production. When the Government decided to intervene at the end of July, it acted within the powers conferred by the Act and the accompanying Order. Provided that the prices fixed were consistent with those statutory provisions, the Court concluded that the intervention could not be struck down on the basis that it imposed an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners’ constitutional right to trade.

The Court observed that the restriction on trade under Article 19(1)(g) could not be challenged merely because the Government fixed prices in July 1958. Clause 5 of the price-fixing Order prescribed the factors that must be considered, including a reasonable profit margin for producers or traders and any incidental charges. The Court noted that these factors were taken into account when the impugned notification was issued. The petitioners had submitted, by affidavit, a schedule showing their cost of production and claimed that this cost exceeded the price fixed by the notification. However, the Government had not admitted the schedule, and the Court found no basis to accept the petitioners’ uncorroborated statement of cost. The Court explained that the sugar-crushing season runs from the end of October to the end of May, so a price fixation in July 1958 would logically be based on the 1957-58 season. At the time of fixing, market prices were available to the Government. In the three states of Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar, the prices fixed by the notification were higher than the prices prevailing at the beginning of April and also higher than the average April prices, although in Punjab and western Uttar Pradesh they were slightly below the prices of 30 April. These market prices reflected a fair margin of profit for producers. The Court acknowledged that an individual factory might incur slightly higher production costs due to factors within its control, but concluded that the notified prices could not be shown to be below cost of production. The petitioners were not unaware of this situation; they later alleged distress sales early in the crushing season. The Court was not persuaded by this allegation and observed that distress sales in April were unlikely because the crushing season was nearly finished. Consequently, the Court found no reason to hold that the notified prices were below cost of production or that they imposed an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners’ right to trade under Article 19(1)(g). This reasoning also addressed the second ground of argument—that the prices were arbitrary—by noting that all factors required by element 5 of the Order had apparently been considered, and the resulting prices did not appear arbitrary. The petitioners also argued that there was no reasonable safeguard against abuse of power because no appeal mechanism existed against the Central Government’s order. The Court responded that such a safeguard was unnecessary so long as the Government exercised its power in accordance with the Act and the Order, and that the factors listed in element 5 themselves provided an internal check on potential abuse.

In this case, the Court considered the authority of the Central Government to fix prices for the benefit of the general public for the common good. In the circumstances presented, the Court found it unreasonable to expect that any provision for appeal or other challenge should exist against that governmental power under the Constitution. The Court held that as long as the Central Government exercised its price-fixing authority in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the relevant Order, no additional safeguard such as an appeal was required. The Court further explained that the safeguards built into clause five of the Order required the Central Government to consider all the relevant factors listed therein before fixing any price, and thus these factors acted as a check on any possible abuse of power as a safeguard. The Court further said that this requirement itself operated as a check on any possible abuse of power by the Central Government. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the notification that had been challenged did not constitute an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners’ right to carry on trade under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution under the constitutional guarantee. The Court therefore affirmed that the procedural requirements of the statute were satisfied and that the regulatory scheme remained valid. Consequently, no infringement of the constitutional guarantee of trade was found by the petitioners. The order therefore remained in force.

The Court then addressed the argument presented in Re. (3) that price control had been imposed only on factories located in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar as part of the policy. The Court noted that the argument claimed this classification lacked a reasonable basis, leaving factories in other parts of India uncontrolled and thereby creating discrimination. The Court examined the material supplied and observed that there were ninety-seven sugar factories in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar, located within those three states. The Court further noted that fifty sugar factories existed in the rest of India, and that eighteen of those were situated in the State of Bombay. The Court pointed out that in the other states the number of factories was very small, with the lowest count of one factory each in West Bengal, Orissa and Kerala at the time of the investigation. The Court added that the highest number of factories in those states was seven, which were located in Madhya Pradesh. The Court recognized that the majority of the country’s sugar production came from the factories in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar as reflected in the data. The Court observed that of the ninety-seven factories subject to control, ninety were situated in Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar, which were identified by the authorities as mainly surplus areas. The Court explained that the price of sugar throughout India depended on the price set for the factories in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar across the national market. The Court noted the Government’s contention that once the price was controlled in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the price for the entire country would be fixed. The Court added that the other states were deficit and therefore imported sugar mainly from those surplus regions and therefore depended heavily on those price controls. The Court concluded that in such circumstances, fixing the price in the surplus areas effectively fixed the price throughout India, making separate price control for the deficit states unnecessary for the purposes of the regulatory scheme. The Court expressed the opinion that although the formal wording of the notification limited price fixation to factories in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar, the practical effect was a nationwide price fixation as evidenced. The Court added that this nationwide effect occurred once production in those three regions was controlled by the Government's price-fixing measures. The Court finally stated that, in its view, there was no discrimination resulting from the notification as it applied uniformly to the sugar market and thereby ensured uniformity.

The Court observed that the effect of fixing sugar prices in the three specified regions did not create any discrimination. It held that the claim of discrimination was merely theoretical because the economic forces that determine the national price of sugar would override any differential treatment. Consequently, after the price control was applied to the three regions, the Court found that no discrimination existed. The suggestion that factories located outside those regions could sell sugar at any price was described as unfounded and not worthy of consideration. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the contested notification, in practical terms, did not introduce any disparity either among the various geographic areas or between the producers and the intermediaries, recalling its earlier observation in paragraph Re. 1(b). Because this conclusion addressed the core of the argument, the Court found it unnecessary to examine the remaining portion of the submission that dealt with alleged discrimination. The Court therefore determined that the impugned notification did not give rise to any discrimination and that the plaintiff’s contention on that ground failed. As a result, the petition was found to lack merit, and the Court ordered its dismissal with costs.