India General Navigation and Railway Co. Ltd. vs Their Workmen

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No.86 of 1958

Decision Date: 14 October 1959

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar

In the matter styled India General Navigation and Railway Company Limited versus Their Workmen, the Supreme Court rendered its judgment on 14 October 1959. The judgment was authored by Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, with Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar also sitting on the bench. The petitioner was India General Navigation and Railway Company Limited and the respondents were their workmen. The case citation appears as 1960 AIR 219 and 1960 SCR (2) 1, and it is referenced in various citator entries. The issues involved an illegal strike in a public utility service, the legality of a lock‑out, the dismissal of workmen, the function of an industrial tribunal, the measure of punishment, the finality of an award, and the Supreme Court’s power under Article 136 of the Constitution. The statutory provisions discussed included sections 17, 17A, 22, and 24(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

The headnote of the judgment explained that it is contradictory to claim that a strike in a public utility service, which is clearly illegal, could be justified, and the law does not permit such a position. It emphasized that workmen participating in an illegal strike cannot escape liability, and any attempt to condone the strike must be rejected. The primary practical question, according to the Court, is what kind and quantum of punishment should be imposed on the participants, and this must be decided based on the charge‑sheet served to each individual workman and adjusted accordingly. The Court noted that a distinction must be drawn between workmen who merely participated in the strike and those who obstructed others, engaged in violent demonstrations, or defied the law, because dismissing all workmen wholesale would be detrimental to the industry. The Court further held that if an employer, before dismissing a workman, gives him sufficient opportunity to explain his conduct and there is no evidence of malice or victimisation, the industrial tribunal should not re‑examine the sufficiency of the evidence or apply the same standard of proof as a court of law. In such circumstances, the tribunal’s duty is to uphold the dismissal order. Applying these principles to the present case, the Court observed that the appellants, who operated a water‑transport service notified as a public utility, dismissed their workmen for joining an illegal strike after an enquiry but without serving a charge‑sheet to each individual workman. The industrial tribunal had directed the reinstatement of the workmen, excluding only those convicted under section 143 of the Indian Penal Code but including those convicted under section 188, and awarded full back wages and allowances. The Court then held that the decision of the Tribunal to

In this case, the Court held that the order to reinstate workmen who had been convicted under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code must be set aside, and that the wages and allowances awarded to those reinstated should be reduced by fifty percent, with the award consequently modified. The Court further observed that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, must be interpreted as subject to the supreme law of the land, namely the Constitution, and that the finality attached to an award under sections 17 and 17A of that Act must yield to the overriding powers of this Court under article 136 of the Constitution. Because the award in the present case did not fall within the provisos to section 17 of the Act, it was incorrect to contend that the appellants possessed any other remedies under the Act that they were required to exhaust before seeking appellate review by this Court. It was also erroneous to argue that the Government of Assam was a necessary party to the appeal, since the Government had acted only under delegated legislative powers conferred by the Act in making the award enforceable as law. A State Government plays no role in such proceedings except to make a reference under section 10 of the Act, and it has no involvement in the publication of the award, which occurs automatically under section 17 of the Act, or in its operation, unless the case falls within the provisos to section 17A of the Act. Moreover, a lock‑out lawfully declared under subsection (3) of section 24 of the Act does not become illegal merely because it continues after the strike has ended, although such continuance may be unjustified. The judgment then set out the details of the appeal, noting that it is a civil appellate jurisdiction matter, Civil Appeal No. 86 of 1958, filed by special leave from the award dated 15 November 1956 of the Industrial Tribunal, Assam, at Dhubri. The appellant side was represented by counsel for the Indian General Navigation & Railway Company Limited and the Rivers Steam Navigation Company Limited, while the respondents were represented by counsel for the Dhubri Transshipment Labour Union and the Dhubri Local Ghat Transhipment Labour Union. The award had been published in the Assam Gazette on 19 December 1956. The Court then summarized the factual background, stating that the appellants are operators of inland water transport in North East India and Pakistan, commonly known as the Joint Steamer Companies, and that they jointly maintain a large number of wharves, jetties and godowns at various river stations, including Dhubri in Assam, where a substantial workforce is employed for loading, unloading and transshipping goods between vessels and railway wagons.

The joint steamer companies owned and operated a large network of wharves, jetties, godowns and similar facilities at numerous river stations across India and Pakistan for the purpose of their business. One of those stations was located at Dhubri in the state of Assam. At the Dhubri station a considerable number of workmen were engaged to load and unload the companies’ vessels and to transfer goods between railway wagons and the vessels in both directions. Prior to May 1954 those workmen were not employed directly by the companies; instead they were hired through a contractor known as the Assam Labour Supply Syndicate, which will hereinafter be called “the Syndicate.” The workmen were organized into two separate labour unions: the Dhubri Transhipment Labour Union, which was affiliated to the Indian National Trade Union Congress, a federation of trade unions, and the Dhubri Local Ghat Transhipment Labour Union. Differences soon emerged between the Syndicate and its employees, the employees making certain demands and threatening to strike in order to press those demands. Conciliation proceedings were instituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as “the Act.” During those conciliation proceedings agreements were reached between the Syndicate and the workmen on 23 February 1953 and on 30 March 1953; these agreements will be described in greater detail later. On 3 May 1954 the parties executed a memorandum that created an agreement between the appellant companies and the workmen. Under that memorandum the appellants undertook to cease employing a contractor for loading, unloading and transhipment work and, pending a proposed Tripartite Conference, to employ supervisors and agents to perform those tasks. The appellants further promised to preserve the continuity of service of the workmen and to retain the existing terms and conditions of their employment. The Tripartite Conference contemplated in the memorandum was to be composed of representatives of the appellant companies, representatives of the workmen and a representative of the Government of Assam. The conference was held on 9 and 10 July 1954, after which the appellants and the Indian National Trade Union Congress executed an agreement in the form of a letter dated 16 July 1954, addressed by the General Secretary of the Congress, Assam Branch, Dhubri Ghat, to the various unions at different stations, including Dhubri. By virtue of that agreement the appellants expressly undertook, among other matters, to introduce permanent direct employment for workmen at all transhipment ghats in Assam on a progressive basis, without prejudice to the May 3, 1954 memorandum. The Court will later consider several specific provisions of that agreement when addressing the points of controversy between the parties. After the agreement was implemented, internal disputes arose among the workmen represented by the two unions concerning the election of their office‑bearers. Those internal dissensions produced two rival groups, each claiming to represent a section of the workmen. The appellants, in response to the situation, subsequently took steps that are addressed in the proceeding.

Subsequently, the employer communicated to the Indian National Trade Unions’ Congress that it was withdrawing its recognition of the Dhubri Transhipment Labour Union until the internal differences among the workers were satisfactorily resolved. As a result of this withdrawal, a new trade union called the Dhubri Transhipment Workers’ Union was formed around July 1955. During the period from 2 May 1955 to 31 July 1955, the employer dismissed eight employees on five separate occasions, each dismissal being based on different charges. Before each dismissal the employer conducted inquiries it deemed necessary and gave each employee an opportunity to explain his or her conduct. On 21 July 1955, B. Chakravarty, the secretary of the Dhubri Transhipment Labour Union, served a notice on the employer invoking subsection (i) of section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The notice stated that a strike would be called on 11 August 1955 from zero hours unless the demands listed in an annexure were fulfilled within fourteen days of receiving the notice. The annexure contained ten specific demands, which are not reproduced here. On the same day, the secretary of the Dhubri Local Ghat Transhipment Labour Union also served a similar notice, attaching an annexure that set out eleven demands. On 26 July 1955 the Conciliation Officer of the Government of Assam received the strike notices and, on 6 August 1955, conducted conciliation proceedings. Those proceedings terminated abruptly without reaching any settlement. On 8 August 1955 the Conciliation Officer, who also acted as the Labour Officer of Gauhati, wrote to the Labour Commissioner of Assam informing him of the failure of the conciliation effort and sent copies of that letter to both the employer and the workers’ union at Dhubri. Despite the statutory requirement to wait seven days after the failure of conciliation, a large number of workers began the strike at midnight on 10 August 1955 in accordance with the earlier notices. The employer alleged that the strikers not only stopped work but also forcibly entered the employer’s jetties and other work sites, thereby preventing loyal workers who were prepared to continue the transhipment operations from doing so. Consequently, the employer claimed that the strike was illegal. On 11 August 1955 the District Magistrate of Goalpara issued an order under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibiting any meetings, processions, demonstrations, or any acts that might cause threat, obstruction, annoyance or injury to persons lawfully employed in specified areas of Dhubri town and its suburbs. The order listed the particular ghats to which the prohibition applied and stipulated that it would remain in force until 10 September 1955. Treating the strike as unlawful, the employer declared a lock‑out on 11 August 1955 affecting ninety‑one workers named in the employer’s notice. A further lock‑out notice was issued on 13 August 1955 concerning additional workers.

A much larger number of workmen who were said to belong to various groups identified as a particular Sardar’s gang were also served with lock‑out notices, and the respondents seriously challenged the legality of those notices. The Workers’ Union subsequently called off the strike effective from 19 August, and the appellants lifted the lock‑out effective from 27 August. After the strike was withdrawn, the appellants initiated proceedings against the employees who had taken part in the strike. They suspended those workmen who were alleged not only to have participated in the strike but also to have obstructed other workmen who were willing to work. In contrast, the workmen who were alleged to have merely participated in the strike were not suspended while the inquiry was pending. On 8 September 1955, thirty‑seven of the employees were convicted under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code for violating the order promulgated under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; consequently, on 9 September the appellants dismissed those thirty‑seven employees. A further group of fifty‑two employees was convicted under sections 143 and 188 of the Indian Penal Code on 17 February 1956. Meanwhile, on 13 September 1955 the Government of Assam had constituted a Board of Conciliation consisting of three members: the Labour Commissioner of Assam who acted as Chairman, D. N. Sarma of Gauhati who represented the employees, and P. J. Rayfield who represented the employers, the Board being created to promote settlement of the dispute between the appellants and their workmen at Dhubri. The appellants claimed that they had dismissed their workmen as a result of an inquiry conducted by their nominee into the conduct of those who had taken part in the alleged illegal strike and/or had caused obstruction, and that this dismissal occurred before the appellants became aware of the constitution of the Board of Conciliation. When the appellants learned of the Board’s constitution, they issued orders placing the dismissal orders of the two hundred and twenty‑three employees in abeyance, pending the outcome of their application to the Board for permission to dismiss those two hundred and twenty‑three employees. The Board of Conciliation, by a majority decision with P. J. Rayfield dissenting, concluded that, with respect to the dismissal of the thirty‑seven workmen, the management had violated section 33 of the Act because, in the Board’s view, the conciliation proceedings had actually commenced on 26 August rather than on 13 September. Regarding the management’s request for permission to dismiss the suspended two hundred and twenty‑three workmen, the same majority held that although the strike was prima facie illegal, it was not unjustified. The dissenting member, P. J. Rayfield, recorded a note of dissent stating that the conciliation proceedings had started on 13 September 1955 and not earlier as the majority had decided, and therefore the dismissal of the thirty‑seven workmen (referred to as “discharge” of thirty‑seven workmen in the dissent) was not in contravention of section 33 of the Act.

The Board of Conciliation concluded that section 33 of the Act had not been violated and that permission should have been granted to dismiss the two hundred and twenty‑three workmen on the basis that a departmental inquiry had found them guilty of taking part in an illegal strike and of using force to prevent other employees from attending work. The majority’s reasoning relied on the asserted legal position that the Board possessed neither authority to withhold the permission sought by management nor power to determine the specific punishment to be imposed on workers who had admittedly participated in a strike that the Board had unanimously declared illegal. The dissenting note argued that the majority’s finding that the strike was justified was not founded on a proper appreciation of the facts. The report of the Board of Conciliation was published on 5 December 1955. Because the parties could not reach an agreement, the Government of Assam issued an order on 7 December 1955, later amended by an order dated 23 January 1956, referring the dispute to Shri Radhanath Hazarika, who was to act as an Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal was tasked with deciding two matters: (a) whether the management of R.S.N. & I.G.N. Railway Company Limited was justified in dismissing eight named employees—Manzoor Hussain, Sudam Singh, Idrish, Tazmal Hussain (son of S.K. Gaffur), Jahangir Sardar, Keayamat Hossain, Panchu Shah and Ram Ekbal Singh—and, if not, what relief they might be entitled to; and (b) whether the management was justified in dismissing or, as appropriate, suspending two hundred and sixty workers at Dhubri Ghat on or about 29 August 1955, and, if not, what relief those workers might claim. Both parties submitted written statements to the Tribunal and presented oral and documentary evidence. The Tribunal issued its Award, which was published in the Assam Gazette on 19 December 1956. In its reasoning, the Tribunal held that although the strike was illegal, it was nevertheless justified. However, because there were no standing orders that made participation in an illegal strike a ground for dismissal, the appellants could not lawfully dismiss the workers whose cases were before the Tribunal. Consequently, the Award ordered the reinstatement of two hundred and eight of the two hundred and sixty dismissed workers, while refusing reinstatement to the remaining fifty‑two workers on the ground that they had been convicted under section 143 of the Indian Penal Code, an offence involving the use of criminal force. The Tribunal also directed the appellants to pay full wages and allowances to the reinstated workers from 20 August 1955 until the date of their reinstatement. Additionally, the Tribunal found that the dismissal of the eight workers referred to in issue 1(a) was improper and ordered their reinstatement with back wages.

In this case the Tribunal had found that the reference was defective and consequently ordered that the eight workmen who were the subject of issue 1(a) also be reinstated together with payment of back wages. The present proceedings arise from a special‑leave appeal that challenges the Tribunal’s award. Before addressing the substantive dispute between the parties, the Court first considered a series of preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents. These objections questioned both the maintainability and the competence of the appeal. The objections were threefold: first, that the appeal was not permissible; second, that the appellants had failed to exhaust the statutory remedies provided under section 17A of the Industrial Disputes Act; and third, that the appeal was incompetent because the Government of Assam had not been joined as a respondent‑party to the appeal. The Court found that none of these objections possessed any merit.

Regarding the first objection, the respondents argued that the Tribunal’s award, issued on 15 November 1956 and submitted to the Assam Government under section 15 of the Act, became final and could not be challenged in any court. They pointed out that the Government of Assam, on 8 December 1956, directed that the award be published in the Assam Gazette, which indeed occurred on 19 December 1956. According to the State’s order, the award became enforceable under section 17A thirty days after publication, i.e., on 18 January 1957, thereby acquiring the force of law. Section 17(2) of the Act further declared that the award was “final and shall not be called in question by any court in any manner whatsoever,” subject only to the provisions of section 17A. The respondents contended that, because the award had become enforceable before 18 January 1957, it had passed beyond the jurisdiction of any court and could not be litigated.

The Court rejected this line of reasoning by invoking the supremacy of the Constitution. It held that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are subordinate to the “paramount law” embodied in the Constitution. Article 136, which empowers the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal from decisions of tribunals, cannot be subordinated to the Act’s finality clause. Consequently, the Act’s provisions regarding finality must be read subject to the overriding constitutional power under Article 136. Therefore, any claim of finality rooted in sections 17 and 17A is necessarily subordinate to the outcome of the special‑leave appeal before this Court. The respondents also argued that the award had merged into the government’s order upon its publication in the Official Gazette, but the Court observed that this argument merely restates the same point in different terms and must similarly yield to the constitutional authority of the Court to entertain the appeal.

In this case, the Court noted that the argument that the Government orders become final upon publication in the Official Gazette under section 17 of the Act is merely a restatement of the same point in different words. The Court explained that any argument relying on the provisions of the Act to render the Award final and enforceable must always be read as subject to the Court’s decision, should special leave be granted against the Tribunal’s determination and as adopted by the Government. The Court further observed that the same argument was presented in yet another form, namely that the appellants ought to have approached the Court before the period prescribed by sections 17 and 17A of the Act expired, that is, before 18 January 1957. The Court pointed out that, apart from the effect of shortening the limitation period fixed by statutory rules, the operation of sections 17 and 17A does not automatically cease when an application for special leave is made. Only when the Court issues a specific order staying the operation of the Award, or a similar order, does the appellant obtain temporary immunity from the provisions of the Act that impose penalties for violating the terms of the Award. Turning to the second branch of the preliminary objection, the Court observed that the respondents had leaned on the provisos of section 17A, without recognising that the Award in question does not fall within any of those provisos. The Court noted that the State Government was not a party to the industrial dispute and that the Award was not issued by a National Tribunal; consequently, the contention that the appellants had failed to exhaust their statutory remedies under section 17A lacked substance. Regarding the third branch of the preliminary objection, the Court examined the claim that the Government of Assam was a necessary and proper party because it had acted under delegated legislative powers to make the Award enforceable. The Court found it difficult to see how the State Government could be deemed a necessary or proper party to the appeal. It observed that the State Government’s role was limited to referring the dispute to the Tribunal under section 10 of the Act, and that publication of the Award under section 17 occurs automatically upon receipt by the Government, with its commencement not dependent on any further action by the State Government unless the case falls within the scope of the provisos to section 17A. In view of these considerations, the Court held that the preliminary objection lacked merit and that the appeal should be decided on its merits. On the merits of the controversy between the parties, it has been argued by the learned counsel for

The appellants contended that the Tribunal had made a mistake when it declared the strike illegal yet held that the strike was justified; they argued that an illegal strike could never be be justified and that the Tribunal had completely overlooked the fact that the appellants were providing a service that had been officially notified as a public utility. They further submitted that, according to the proviso to section 10(1) of the Act, the State Government was obligated to refer the dispute to an Industrial Tribunal once a notice of strike under section 22 of the Act had been issued, and therefore the employer’s failure to commence direct negotiations with the employees after receiving the strike notice could not be taken by the Tribunal as a basis for concluding that the strike was justified. The appellants also maintained that the Tribunal was clearly wrong in holding that the lock‑out declared by the appellants was illegal, observing that in reaching that conclusion the Tribunal had ignored the provisions of section 24(3) of the Act. In addition, they argued that the Tribunal erred in holding that, in the absence of standing orders expressly stating that participation in an illegal strike amounted to gross misconduct, an employer could not dismiss workmen merely for taking part in such a strike. Assuming that this latter argument might not be well founded, the appellants nevertheless asserted that the standing orders governing the relationship between the Syndicate and its workmen should also govern the relationship between the appellants and the workmen, because of the agreement whereby the appellants had undertaken all liabilities of the Syndicate in respect of the workmen and had guaranteed the same conditions of service to them. Further, the appellants pleaded that the Tribunal had seriously erred on record by treating the Syndicate’s standing orders as only a draft and consequently as having no binding effect between the employer and the employees. They also argued that the Tribunal was mistaken in the case of the eight workmen who had been dismissed before the strike began, because the Tribunal had proceeded on the unfounded assumption that no charge‑sheets had been served on those workmen during the inquiry against them; as a result, the Award concerning those eight workmen was wholly erroneous. With respect to the two hundred and eight workmen whom the Tribunal ordered to be reinstated, the appellants submitted that the departmental inquiry conducted by the appellants had distinctly found that those workmen not only participated in the illegal strike but also encouraged loyal workmen to join the illegal strike and had obstructed the trans‑shipment work of loyal employees. Finally, the appellants contended that, in any view of the matter, the thirty‑seven persons who had been convicted by the criminal court under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code for violating the prohibitions contained in the prohibitory order under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, were clearly liable to be dismissed on the basis of the criminal court’s findings, apart from any other considerations relating to the regularity of the inquiries against them.

It was observed that the order issued under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure rendered the thirty‑seven persons who had been convicted by the criminal court clearly liable for dismissal on the basis of the findings of that court, notwithstanding any other considerations concerning the regularity of the departmental inquiry conducted against them. The Tribunal was held to have erred in concluding that the inquiry into the dismissal of those workmen had not been carried out in accordance with the prescribed procedure, and it was further emphasized that the present case did not call for reinstatement of the dismissed workmen but only for the award of compensation. Counsel for the respondents, after addressing the preliminary objection already considered, argued that the Tribunal was fully justified in holding that, although the strike was illegal, it was “perfectly justified” and essentially provoked by the appellants. While the original statement of the case had raised the contention that the strike could not be illegal because the notification declaring the service at the ghats to be a public utility service was ultra vires, that particular argument was not pursued before this Court. Instead, the respondents vigorously maintained that there were no standing orders, either of the Syndicate or of the appellants, capable of governing the service conditions of the workmen, and that, in any event, mere participation in an illegal strike could not lawfully entitle the employers to dismiss those who had joined the strike. The dismissals were characterised as acts of victimisation and unfair labour practice. Further, it was submitted that the lock‑out imposed by the appellants was wholly illegal and that its continuation after the strike had been called off was entirely unjustified and contrary to the principles of social justice. The respondents also alleged that the appellants had dismissed or suspended two hundred and sixty workmen without framing any specific charges against them, and that the dismissal of the eight workmen for incidents occurring before the commencement of the strike was likewise illegal and irregular because no specific charges had been framed. It was additionally contended that the unconditional notice inviting the workmen to resume their duties, without any reservations, amounted to a condonation of the strike and therefore rendered the dismissal orders against the two hundred and sixty workmen void under law. Several other arguments were raised on behalf of the respondents, but the Court chose not to address them as they were ultimately found to lack any foundation in the record. In fact, the submissions made by the respondents were noted to be insufficiently anchored to the factual record and the case presented before the Tribunal, a standard that should be observed by courts of justice generally, and certainly by the highest Court. Turning now to the merits, the Court first considered the issue of whether the dismissal of the eight workmen named in the amended Issue was justified and, if not, what relief they were entitled to.

In the matter that had been framed as the Issue as amended, the Court first examined whether the dismissal of the eight workmen named in that issue was justified, and if it was not, what relief they were entitled to receive. The Industrial Tribunal had considered each workman’s individual case and reached the conclusion that none of the dismissals was justified. Accordingly, the Tribunal ordered that all eight workmen should be reinstated and should receive all back wages and other benefits that had accrued from the date of their suspension and subsequent dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, after deducting any amounts that had already been paid to them. Thus, the Tribunal had decided the first issue completely in favour of the workmen. The Court therefore set out to review how far the Tribunal’s determination on that first issue could be questioned.

The Tribunal had dealt together with the cases of Manzoor Hussain, Sudama Singh, Idrish and Tazmal Hussain. These four workmen had been dismissed by the appellant companies on the basis of a report prepared by Rayfield, the enquiring officer employed by the appellants, who alleged that the four had assaulted their Labour Supervisor, S. P. Tevari, on 2 May 1955. The same allegation had been tried before a Magistrate, who acquitted the four workmen in a judgment delivered in April 1956 after finding them not guilty of the alleged assault. Rayfield had conducted a departmental inquiry on 17 May 1955, during which a number of witnesses were examined on behalf of the appellants. In a joint written statement, the four workmen explained that because a criminal case was pending against them in relation to the same charges, they were not in a position to make any further statement in their defence. The Tribunal, after reviewing the material before it, concluded that there was no proof that Tevari had actually been assaulted while on duty and that the dismissal order appeared to have been issued possibly to intimidate the other workmen and to satisfy the personal whims of Tevari. After examining the record, the Court found no basis on which to depart from the Tribunal’s conclusions in this group of cases.

With regard to the cases of Panchu Shah and Ram Ekbal Singh, the Tribunal had definitively held that their dismissals were vitiated because they constituted an act of victimisation and were mala fide. The Court noted this clear finding and determined that there was no ground to interfere with the Tribunal’s determination concerning those two workmen.

The cases of Jahangir Sardar and Keayamat Hussain, however, were assessed on a different footing. Jahangir was charged with two offences: (1) wilful insubordination and disobedience, and (2) conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. He objected to the charge‑sheet, stating that he could not understand the reasons for the charges. In response to his objection, a letter dated 7 May 1955 was sent to him, setting out the specific acts alleged against him, together with the time, date and place of each act. Keayamat faced a similarly structured charge consisting of (1) disorderly behaviour and incitement of others to disturbance and violence, and (2) conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. He also demurred, claiming the charge was vague and that he was unaware of any wrongdoing. On the same date, 7 May, Keayamat received a letter containing full particulars of the charges, including the relevant time, date and place. Several witnesses were examined by Raymond, who conducted the inquiry. The Tribunal refused to accept the result of the inquiry, primarily on the ground that no specific charge had been laid against the two workmen and that the allegations were overly vague. In reaching that finding, the Tribunal omitted to consider the letters of 7 May, which provided detailed particulars of the charges against both workmen. The Court identified this omission as a serious error in the Tribunal’s record‑keeping and reasoning.

In the case of Keayamat Hussain, the charge against him was also framed in two parts, namely, disorderly behaviour and inciting others to disturbance and violence, and conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. Keayamat raised the same objection as his co‑accused, asserting that the charge was vague and that he was unaware of any wrongdoing on his part. On 7 May, a letter was served on him that set out the particulars of the charge, indicating the time, place and date of each act that formed the essence of the allegation. The inquiry was conducted by an officer named Raymond, who examined a number of witnesses in respect of both workmen. The Tribunal, however, declined to accept the result of the inquiry, holding that no specific charge had been laid and that the allegations were excessively vague. In reaching that conclusion, the Tribunal committed a serious error of record by completely ignoring the May 7 letters that had been issued to both workmen and that contained full particulars of the charges. Had the Tribunal considered those letters, it would not have fallen into the grave mistake that vitiated its award against the two employees. The Tribunal also commented on the evidence placed before the inquiring officer, describing it as meagre or insufficient, and observed that the degree of proof required in a departmental enquiry was the same as that required in a Court of Law. In our view, the Tribunal misdirected itself by examining the sufficiency of proof as if it were acting on an appeal from the employer’s decision, rather than as a body determining the matter de novo. For these two employees, the Tribunal made no finding that the dismissal orders were motivated by mala fides or constituted victimisation. Accordingly, the dismissal orders issued by the appellants after a proper inquiry and after granting the workmen a reasonable opportunity to explain their conduct must be upheld. The appeal filed on behalf of the two workmen is therefore allowed, and the Tribunal’s orders concerning them are set aside. The Tribunal’s orders regarding the other six workmen are confirmed. Having dealt with the dismissal orders that arose from incidents occurring before the strike of 11 August 1955, the Court next considered the legality of the strike itself. The first issue was whether the strike was illegal, as alleged by the appellants and as found by the Tribunal. Counsel for the respondents sought to reopen the Tribunal’s finding on the strike’s illegality, contending that, on the date of the strike, no conciliation proceedings were pending either in fact or in law, and therefore the Tribunal’s conclusion was erroneous. It was not disputed that the workmen’s strike notices dated 21 July 1955 were duly received by the Conciliation Officer on 26 July 1955 and that conciliation proceedings were started on 6 August 1955. The respondents argued that those proceedings had to be halted because the workers’ representative expressed an inability to continue, raising a question of leave for other representatives, and that this breakdown should be examined to determine which party bore responsibility for the failure of conciliation.

The respondents contended that the notices of strike issued by the workmen on 21 July 1955 had been properly received by the Conciliation Officer on 26 July 1955 and that the conciliation proceedings were formally started on 6 August 1955. They further argued that the proceedings ought to have been halted because, as shown in the record, the workers’ representative announced an inability to continue participation owing to the absence of leave for the other representatives. The Court indicated that it would later examine which side was responsible for the early breakdown of the conciliation process. It was observed that, according to section 20 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the conciliation proceedings are deemed to have commenced on the date the notice of strike is received by the Conciliation Officer—in this case 26 July 1955—and are deemed to have concluded when the Conciliation Officer’s report reaches the Government. In the present matter the Conciliation Officer transmitted his report to the Government on 8 August 1955. Although the precise moment at which the Government actually received the report was not definitively established, it was clear that the conciliation exercise continued at least from 26 July until 8 August 1955. Since the strike began on 11 August 1955, it fell squarely within the period after the conclusion of the conciliation process and, under section 22 of the Act, was therefore illegal. Accordingly, the Court agreed with the Tribunal’s finding that the strike was illegal. The Tribunal, having held the strike illegal, subsequently examined whether the strike could be termed “perfectly justified” and arrived at that conclusion. The Court found this reasoning untenable: a strike that is illegal under the statute cannot simultaneously be described as perfectly justified. The law draws a clear line between a lawful strike and an unlawful one, but it does not create a sub‑category of an illegal strike that is justified. Such a distinction is not provided for by the Act and is especially inappropriate in the context of employees of a public utility service. All participants in an illegal strike are subject to departmental action, subject to review before an Industrial Tribunal, but it is not permissible to characterize the illegal strike itself as justifiable. The only practical issue that may arise in an illegal strike is the extent or nature of the punishment, which must be calibrated according to the specific facts and circumstances of each case. Consequently, the Court emphasized that any tendency to excuse conduct that has been expressly deemed illegal by statute must be rejected.

The Court observed that every person who participates in an illegal strike must understand that such participation makes them liable to disciplinary action by their employer. The Court noted that a distinction may be drawn between individuals who behave like “dumb‑driven cattle” and those who actively foment trouble, instigate other workmen to join the strike, or resort to violence. The Court further criticised the Tribunal for committing a basic error by treating the illegal strike as perfectly justified and for using language that does not reflect a judicial approach. In support of this criticism, the Court quoted extensive passages from the Tribunal’s unusually long award of about forty‑two printed pages, for example: “By this letter the Company's Joint Agent at Dhubri instead of taking a friendly attitude approached the District Magistrate asking for police help. If the Company's Agent at Dhubri had the honest intention he could have immediately moved the appropriate authority to come immediately to the spot to stop the proposed strike. But instead of that he has provoked the Union by adopting this back door policy to suppress the demands of the workers. It was really unfair on the part of the Agent. It seems that he [had] bad mala fide intention.” The Court explained that the Tribunal sought justification for this outburst by referring to a letter dated 9 August 1955, written by D. J. Milner, the Joint Agent of the appellants, to the Secretary of the Government of Assam, Transport and Industries Department, the Labour Commissioner of Assam, the Superintendent of Police, Goalpara District, the Labour Officer, Lower Assam, and the General Secretary of I.N.T.U.C., Assam Branch. The letter warned of a threatened strike and concluded: “In the interest of maintaining this vital link in Assam's flood‑stricken communications and protecting our property, and that of the Railway, as well as our own staff, Railway Staff and loyal laborers, we have to request that adequate police be available at each of our Ghats from shortly prior to midnight on the 10th instant in order that unlawful damage may not be caused by these illegal strikers who will be acting in defiance of Government regulations, and accepted industrial dispute procedure.” The Court found nothing sinister in this communication and regarded it as a routine request for the preservation of public peace and the prevention of violent acts by misguided persons, addressed also to I.N.T.U.C., the guardian of labour. On the same date, 9 August 1955, B. Chakravarty, Secretary of the Dhubri Transhipment Labour Union, sent a letter to the Superintendent of Police, Goalpara, and the Deputy Commissioner, Goalpara, alleging that the Joint Agent of the appellants had instructed the officers in charge of the jetties at the Ghats to raise a “hallah” after the zero hour of the strike, thereby implicating the Company in an alleged plan to create disturbance.

On August 11 1955 the Secretary of the Dhubri Transhipment Labour Union alleged that the labourers employed in the Transhipment Department were looting cargo from ships while they were on picket duty to reinforce their strike. The Tribunal accepted those allegations as proved and recorded its observation that “it is clear that Mr Milner hatched a plan to create a trouble and the Secretary of the Union got scent of all the secret arrangements made by the Company to create disturbance at the Ghats just immediately after the strike is declared.” On the basis of this finding the Tribunal offered its first reason for holding that the strike was “perfectly justified.” Its second reason was drawn from the report of the Conciliation Officer, which stated that the appellants had refused to grant leave to the labour representatives who were to sit in the conciliation proceedings scheduled for August 6 1955. The Tribunal further observed that the appellants’ refusal to grant leave to the five Union representatives indicated an unwillingness to provide facilities for the conciliation process. The question before this Court was whether that observation was supported by the record.

The Conciliation Officer had received a copy of the strike notice on July 26 1955 and had fixed the conciliation meeting for 10 a.m. on August 6 1955 at Dhubri. Both parties were informed of this meeting on August 1 1955 (exhibit O, page 119). In the course of the proceedings the Union applied to the appellants for leave for five workmen, who were officials of the Union, so that those workmen could represent the employees at the conciliation. The appellants indicated that they were prepared to grant leave even on a verbal request made by the individual workmen, whether the request came directly from them or through the Union, but they declined to grant leave on the basis of a petition submitted by the Union alone. Conversely, the Union maintained that it possessed the exclusive right to apply for leave on behalf of its members and would not accept an application made by the workmen individually. Following this impasse, the Union withdrew from further participation in the conciliation. It would therefore be a distortion of fact to suggest that the appellants were unwilling to grant leave to the five workmen. Firstly, the request for leave should have been made before the scheduled date of the conciliation. Secondly, the request needed to be submitted by the workmen concerned, either directly or through their Union. The Tribunal appeared to assume that the appellants’ stance amounted to a breach of the terms of the agreement resulting from the Tripartite Conference, an inference that is not warranted by the actual wording of the agreement.

In this case, the Court observed that the five workmen who had been chosen to represent the workmen in the conciliation proceedings were required to apply for leave from their employers well in advance of the scheduled conciliation. However, the record showed that the application, identified as exhibit M at page 118, was submitted on 6 August 1955 not by the selected workmen themselves but by the Secretary of the Union. A copy of that application was also sent to the Labour Officer and to the Deputy Commissioner for their information. The Court noted that the Union appeared to treat the matter as sufficiently important, yet it chose not to submit the application in a timely manner on behalf of the workmen, even though the Agreement allowed an application to be made through the Union. The Court then referred to the terms of the Agreement dated 23 February 1953 between the Syndicate and the workmen represented by the Dhubri Transhipment Labour Union, as reproduced at page 75, Part 1 of the record. Under Demand 5(f) of that Agreement, the parties had agreed that “All leave applications be submitted by a representative of the Union on Tuesday or Friday in a week before the Management, and the decision be communicated to the Union the next day of submission of the application.” By contrast, the Agreement reached with the Dhubri Local Ghat Transhipment Labour Union on 13 March 1953 provided that “the workers will submit leave applications to the management who will communicate their decision to the workers directly within three days of receipt of the applications and a copy thereof will be sent to the Union for information.” The Court concluded that the abrupt termination of the conciliation proceedings was not caused by any failure on the part of Management to grant leave to the five chosen representatives. Rather, the termination resulted from the insistence of B Chakravarty that the leave application should be made only by the Union and not by the individual workmen. The Court further observed that even the Union’s application was lodged after the deadline prescribed by the Agreement, thereby contravening its own terms. The Court reasoned that had the Secretary not adopted this unreasonable stance and had he been eager for the conciliation to proceed, the simplest course would have been to have the five workmen submit their leave applications directly, which Management had indicated it was prepared to approve even at a late stage. Consequently, the Court held that the failure of the conciliation process was attributable to the Secretary’s unreasonable attitude, not to any fault of Management. Accordingly, the Tribunal’s attribution of blame to Management was deemed erroneous. The Court also noted that the third ground of attack on the appellants’ bona fides concerned an alleged attempt by Management to interfere in the internal affairs of the Unions, and that the Tribunal’s remarks on this issue were another

The Tribunal’s award was criticised for employing language that was described as intemperate, and it even quoted a passage that read: “Curiously enough it appears that the Company’s Joint Agent at Dhubri dabbled in politics and meddled in internal administration of the Unions. He propped up another Union and backed it up to stand as a rival Union.” Upon examining the record, the Court observed that the Indian National Trade Unions’ Congress, to which the two Unions were affiliated, did not support the strike. This fact suggested that the relationship between the employer and the employees had not reached a breaking point, and that the Congress, as a matter of course, expected the conditions of service to be improved more effectively through peaceful negotiation rather than by resorting to a strike, especially because the service had been declared by the Government to be a public utility service. Nonetheless, the Secretary of one Union, B. Chakravarty, was found to have escalated the dispute without giving the Conciliation Officer a reasonable opportunity to reconcile the opposing views of the employer and the employees, as had been previously indicated. At the time of the dispute, the appellants had only recently taken over the workmen under their direct employment, and a Tripartite Conference involving the appellants, representatives of the employees, and the Government was still pending to settle all outstanding questions between the parties. Consequently, the emergence of two rival Unions could not be attributed to the appellants as an act of unfair labour practice. The Court therefore held that the Tribunal was not justified in concluding that the Management had meddled in the internal administration of the Unions, nor that it had dabbled in politics, and thus could not be found guilty of unfair labour practice. The Tribunal was seen as having been generous to the workmen while failing to be fair to the appellants. This imbalance was further highlighted by the Tribunal’s decision that, after declaring the strike illegal, it examined the legality of the lock‑out declared by the appellants on 11 August 1955 at one Ghat and on 13 August 1955 at another Ghat. In its own words, the Tribunal stated: “In this case the Company used the weapon of lock‑out just to intimidate and put pressure on the employees to withdraw the demands. The lock‑out is also prohibited under Section 22(2)(d) of the Act. Therefore, both lock‑out and strike are illegal. The Company had no justification whatsoever to declare a lock‑out.” This conclusion indicated that the Tribunal apparently ignored the provisions of Section 24(3) of the Act, which made the lock‑out clearly not illegal. The remaining issue, as noted by the Court, was whether the appellants had any justification for continuing the lock‑out after the strike had been called off on 19 August. The Joint Agent of the appellants, by a letter dated 17 August 1955 addressed to the two Unions, had intimated that, in view of the illegal strikes, the lock‑out would remain in force until disciplinary action could be instituted against those employees who were chiefly responsible for leading and continuing the illegal strikes.

In a letter dated 17 August 1955 the Joint Agent informed the two unions that, because of the illegal strikes, a lock‑out had been declared at the local Ghat on 11 August and at the Transhipment Ghat on 13 August, and that the lock‑out “will remain in force until disciplinary action can be instituted against those of our employees chiefly responsible for leading and continuing the illegal strikes.” The Court noted that although the continuation of the lock‑out after 19 August might be unjustified, that fact did not render the lock‑out itself illegal. It was on the basis of this order of the Joint Agent that proceedings were taken against the so‑called leading strikers, which ultimately led to their dismissal; those dismissal orders are the principal matters in dispute before the Court. Before any dismissal was effected, the Management issued a notice on 26 August 1955 announcing that the lock‑out would be lifted with effect from the following day. The notice required every employee to report personally to the Joint Agent’s office between nine and ten o’clock in the morning, and warned that any employee who failed to report on 30 August “will in the absence of a letter of explanation and good reason, be treated as having voluntarily terminated his services.” Subsequently the appellants appointed R. N. Biswas as the Inquiry Officer. Biswas conducted a series of departmental inquiries in five separate batches: the first batch comprised twenty‑six workmen, the second one hundred and fourteen, the third sixty‑eight, the fourth seventeen and the fifth seven. Each inquiry dealt with different incidents that had arisen in connection with the strikes. According to the record, Biswas recorded the statements of officers Milner, Rayfield, C. R. Das and S. P. Tewari, who were employed by the appellants, as evidence supporting the allegations against the strikers. The Court held that a detailed discussion of the evidence given by those officers was unnecessary, because it had concluded that the inquiries suffered from a fundamental defect: the record did not show that proper charges, specifying the alleged acts of violence or obstruction, had been served on the workmen who were the subjects of the inquiries. Nevertheless, after each inquiry Biswas reported that the charge against each workman had been proved to his satisfaction. Before any of these inquiries were held, the Joint Agent, on 9 September 1955, notified the thirty‑seven workmen who had been found guilty of a criminal charge under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code that their services were terminated from that date and instructed them to appear at his office by the 15th of the month to collect any dues and to vacate the appellants’ quarters. Regarding the remaining two hundred and twenty‑three workmen, orders dated 16 September stated that, because the departmental inquiries had resulted in the charges being proved, they were dismissed from the service of the appellants with effect from 29 August 1955 and were to report to the Labour Office on 18 September to collect their dues and to vacate the quarters. Recognising that a Board of Conciliation had been appointed on 13 September to resolve the dispute, the Joint Agent on 20 September 1955 informed the workmen that the dismissal and termination orders would be held in abeyance pending the Board’s permission and that the workmen would be deemed to be under suspension.

Because the departmental inquiry reported that the charges against the workmen had been proved, the Joint Agent dismissed the thirty‑seven workmen from the appellant’s service effective 29 August 1955 and ordered them to appear at the Labour Office on 18 September to collect their dues and vacate the appellants’ quarters. The same Agent also dismissed the two‑hundred and twenty‑three other workmen, effective the same date, and similarly directed them to report on 18 September to collect their dues and relinquish the quarters. When the Government subsequently constituted a Board of Conciliation on 13 September to settle the industrial dispute, the Joint Agent realised that the earlier dismissals might be illegal; consequently, on 20 September 1955 he notified the workmen that the dismissal orders would be suspended pending the Board’s permission to terminate their employment, and that the workmen would be treated as suspended. The Board of Conciliation comprised three members: H P Duara, the Labour Commissioner of Assam, who acted as Chairman, and D N Sarma and P J Rayfield, who represented the interests of employees and employers respectively. The Board examined both the dismissal of the thirty‑seven workmen and the suspension of the two‑hundred and twenty‑three workmen, and considered the management’s request for authority to dismiss the latter group for participating in an illegal strike and for forcibly preventing other workers from attending work. The Chairman and D N Sarma concluded that the dismissal of the thirty‑seven workmen was illegal because, in their view, conciliation proceedings had actually begun on 26 August rather than on 13 September. Regarding the suspension of the two‑hundred and twenty‑three workmen, they held that suspension without pay, pending Board permission to dismiss, did not constitute punishment and therefore required no further action. On the management’s application for permission to dismiss the suspended two‑hundred and twenty‑three workmen, the same two members, by majority, opined that although the strike was prima facie illegal, it was not unjustified; consequently, they were unwilling to grant the requested permission. The remaining Board member, P J Rayfield, submitted a minute of dissent. He argued that conciliation proceedings had indeed commenced on 13 September, so that dismissing the thirty‑seven workmen did not violate section 33 of the Act. He further contended that the Board lacked authority to withhold permission to dismiss the two‑hundred and twenty‑three workmen who had been found guilty, on departmental inquiry, of taking part in an illegal strike and of forcibly preventing other workers from attending work. Rayfield added that granting the permission would not prevent the Union from raising an industrial dispute on the matter. It may also be noted that the Board, in its unanimous view, agreed that dismissal was an appropriate penalty for participation in an illegal and unjustified strike.

The Court observed that dismissal constituted an appropriate punishment for any workman who participated in an illegal and unjustified strike. The Tribunal had expressed a similar view of the legal position when it stated, “If the strike is not justified and at the same time it contravenes the provisions of Section 22 of the Act, ordinarily the workmen participating in it are not entitled to any relief.” The Tribunal, in fact, closely followed the findings of the majority of the Board of Conciliation. The Court reiterated that an illegal strike cannot be regarded as justified. In agreement with the Tribunal, the Court held that the strike was illegal and not justified, even though the Tribunal had hypothetically entertained a scenario in which a strike could be both illegal and justified under the Act. Consequently, the Court needed to determine what punishment, if any, should be imposed on those workmen who had taken part in the illegal strike. To make this determination, a clear distinction was required between workmen who not only joined the strike but also actively obstructed loyal workmen, participated in violent demonstrations, or acted in defiance of law and order, and workmen who were essentially silent participants. The Court emphasized that it would not be in the interest of the industry to dismiss wholesale all workmen who merely participated in the strike, nor would such a measure serve the interests of the workmen themselves. Accordingly, an Industrial Tribunal must consider punishment while giving paramount importance to the efficient and uninterrupted operation of the entire industry. Dismissal or termination of service should be imposed only on those workmen who not only participated in the illegal strike but also fomented it, engaged in violence, or performed acts detrimental to the maintenance of law and order in the locality where work was to be carried out. While addressing this aspect, the Court assumed, without deciding, that the management possessed the authority to dismiss a workman who had taken part in an illegal strike. The parties presented extensive arguments concerning whether the management was entitled to dismiss the workmen involved in the illegal strike. Substantial debate also arose over the existence of certified standing orders between the Syndicate and the workmen, and later between the appellants and the workmen, and whether, notwithstanding such standing orders, the employer could lawfully take such drastic action against employees who participated in the illegal strike. The Court concluded that it was unnecessary to resolve these broader procedural questions in the present context.

In light of the conclusion that is to be set out concerning the regularity of the departmental inquiry conducted in multiple batches, the Court examined the role of Biswas, the officer appointed by the appellants to preside over that inquiry. The purpose of the inquiry was to determine, among those workmen who had taken part in the illegal strike, which individuals belonged to one of two categories that could be described for convenience as peaceful strikers and violent strikers. In order to make that classification, it was necessary to investigate the part each workman played during the strike. Such an investigation could be carried out only if a proper inquiry had been held, and that proper inquiry required the furnishing of a charge‑sheet to each workman against whom the inquiry was directed, specifying the allegations relating to his participation in the strike. While it was possible that both categories of workmen might have been equally culpable for taking part in the illegal strike, it was clear that they could not be subjected to the same kind of punishment. Consequently, the Court had to examine the nature of the inquiry that the appellants alleged had been conducted on their behalf. On the one side, the workmen asserted that no inquiry had been held at all, whereas the employers maintained that the Inquiring Officer had conducted a regular inquiry after providing a charge‑sheet to each workman whose case was being examined. It was not in dispute that an inquiry before Biswas had taken place; the proceedings before him and the evidence he recorded were placed on the record. However, the most serious issue for determination was whether a charge‑sheet, which would give notice to each concerned workman of the specific grievance, had actually been served. On this point, the record was admittedly incomplete. The appellants supported their position by quoting observations of the Tribunal that described the inquiry as entirely regular, stating: “The charges are for fomenting and participating in an illegal strike from the 11th August, 1955 and forcibly preventing other labourers from working on the same day.” In contrast, the workmen relied on a passage from the Tribunal’s Award which read: “In this case the Company has not framed any specific charge against those 260 workers alleging that they indulged in violence or acts subversive of discipline.” The Tribunal had found that no individual charge‑sheet had been delivered to the workmen. The appellants challenged this finding on the ground that, because the workmen’s written statement did not specifically raise the issue, the appellants had not produced those charge‑sheets in evidence and had merely presented the record of the proceedings before the Inquiring Officer. Because the Court attached great importance to this question, it was inclined to give the appellants another opportunity to remedy the gaps in the evidence concerning that issue, even at this advanced stage of the proceedings.

The Court decided to fill the gaps in the evidence concerning the existence of individual charge‑sheets, even though the matter was being considered at a very late stage. During the hearing, the learned Attorney‑General was repeatedly invited by the Court to produce any such charge‑sheets if they existed, so that the Court could be satisfied that the inquiry conducted by the employer had complied with the principles of natural justice. After carrying out the necessary inquiries, the Attorney‑General informed the Court on the final day of argument that no such documents could be produced because they did not exist. It was asserted before the Court that the entire bundle of papers which supposedly contained the individual charges had been lost, and consequently there was no way for the Court to verify by documentary evidence that the workmen had actually received individual charge‑sheets. After considering these submissions, the Court concluded that there were no satisfactory reasons to overturn the Tribunal’s finding that no individual charge‑sheets had been delivered to the workmen, despite the apparently conflicting observations quoted from the Tribunal’s report. The Court therefore held that the strikes were illegal, that there was no justification for those strikes, and that, assuming the strikers were liable to punishment, the nature and severity of the punishment must be calibrated according to the seriousness of each striker’s guilt.

The Court observed that it was necessary to separate the strikers into two distinct categories. The Tribunal had attempted to make this distinction by ordering that the fifty‑two workmen convicted under section 143 read with section 188 of the Indian Penal Code were not entitled to reinstatement, while the remaining two‑hundred‑eight workmen were to be reinstated. The Tribunal had also placed the thirty‑seven workmen who were convicted solely under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code, for violating prohibitory orders under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the same footing as the rest of the workmen. The Court disagreed with this approach, holding that those thirty‑seven workmen could not be treated as equivalent to the other labourers. The Court noted that those thirty‑seven individuals had been found guilty of breaching the prohibitory orders issued by public authorities to preserve public peace. Their convictions were based on evidence presented before a Magistrate, which showed that they had proceeded to the steamer flat via the jetty in direct defiance of the orders promulgated under section 144. Upon reviewing the record, the Court found sufficient indication that these thirty‑seven workmen were among the violent participants in the strike and could not be classified as peaceful strikers. Consequently, the Court concluded that these men not only participated in the illegal strike by refusing to perform their assigned duties but also willfully violated regularly issued orders intended to maintain peace and order. The Court therefore determined that such persons could not be regarded as peaceful strikers and could not be dealt with as leniently as the Tribunal had done. In the Court’s view, the Tribunal was wrong in taking the position that the appellants had

The decision observed that the thirty‑seven workmen had violated the order issued under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the District Magistrate, an order intended to preserve peace and order at the work site. Consequently, those thirty‑seven individuals should not have been ordered to be reinstated. Regarding the other workmen, the judgment examined whether the Tribunal was fully justified in directing their reinstatement with complete back wages and allowances dating from 20 August 1955 until the time of reinstatement. The judgment noted that such an order would amount to a full endorsement of the illegal strike carried out by the workmen. On the basis of the findings before the Court, it was concluded that the workmen had participated in an unlawful strike and therefore fell within the category of employees who could be dealt with by their employers. The inquiry conducted by the appellants was found to be not entirely regular, since individual charge‑sheets had not been served on the workmen against whom proceedings were instituted. When responsibility for the loss was shared by both parties, the Court held that the loss should be divided equally between them.

Accordingly, the Court directed that those workmen whose reinstatement by the Tribunal was upheld should receive only half of their wages for the period beginning on the date the illegal strike ceased (that is, from 20 August 1955) up to the date when the award became enforceable. From the date of enforceability onward, the workmen would be entitled to full wages upon reinstatement. The judgment also referred to the observations of the criminal courts, which had imposed nominal fines on the workmen and described them as “day labourers who earned their livelihoods by day‑to‑day labour.” It was therefore presumed that during the years in which the workmen were not employed by the appellants, they had earned their living through such day‑to‑day work and were not entirely unemployed. On that basis, the burden of paying back wages for the long interval between the termination of the strike and the issuance of the award was to be shared equally between the parties.

In the final order, the appeal was allowed in part. The Court set aside the reinstatement order concerning Jahangir Sardar and Keayamat Hussain, and likewise set aside the reinstatement order for the thirty‑seven workmen convicted under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code. The order directing payment of full back wages was modified by reducing those amounts by half for the period specified. Each party was directed to bear its own costs before the Court, and the appeal was thereby allowed in part.