Gullapalli Nageswara Rao Etc vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 198 to 200 of 1959

Decision Date: 21 August 1959

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, Subba Rao J.

In this matter, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 21 August 1959 in the case titled Gullapalli Nageswara Rao Etc versus The State of Andhra Pradesh and Others. The judgment was authored by a bench comprising Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, with Justice K. Subbarao also listed among the members of the bench. The official citation of the decision is 1959 AIR 1376 and 1960 SCR (1) 580. The dispute concerned the Road Transport Scheme of nationalisation enacted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as amended by Act 100 of 1956, Chapter IVA, Section 68D, and raised questions relating to the doctrine of bias when the Chief Minister himself heard objections to the scheme.

The appellants were operators of motor-transport services in Krishna District, Andhra Pradesh, and they objected to a nationalisation scheme published by the General Manager of the State Transport Undertaking. After the scheme was announced, the Secretary of the Transport Department conducted personal hearings with the objectors and also heard the representation of the State Transport Undertaking. Subsequently, the Chief Minister, who oversaw transport matters, issued an order approving the scheme. The appellants, invoking Article 32 of the Constitution, approached this Court seeking to have the scheme set aside. In the earlier decision of Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, this Court held that the Secretary of the Transport Department could not hear the objections because the principle that no one may be a judge in his own cause required the order to be quashed. Following that decision, the Government issued notices to the objectors, after which the Chief Minister personally heard the representatives of both the objectors and the Road Transport Corporation and again approved the scheme as originally published. The appellants then moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking writs of certiorari to quash the Government’s confirming order and the subsequent orders of the Regional Transport Authority that cancelled their stage-carriage permits. The High Court dismissed the petitions, prompting the appellants to appeal. Their contention was that the same infirmity which disqualified the Secretary on the earlier occasion also applied to the Chief Minister, rendering him incompetent to hear the objections. The Supreme Court affirmed two well-settled principles of the doctrine of bias that apply equally to judicial and quasi-judicial bodies: first, that no person shall act as a judge in his own cause, and second, that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done. The Court explained that any actual or perceived bias—whether financial or otherwise—must disqualify an authority from adjudicating, and it noted that a statute empowering an authority to act against these principles must be examined in light of the Constitution’s fundamental rights.

In this case the Court explained that a statute which permits a body to act as a judge in its own cause or to decide a dispute in which it has an official bias must be examined in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, unlike a statute passed by the English Parliament. The Court referred to the authorities The King v. Bath Compensation Authority [1925] 1 K.B. 685 and The King v. Leicester Justices [1927] 1 K.B. 557, which discuss the principle that a judge must not be a party to his own case. The Court then observed that, in the present matter, the relevant provisions of the Act do not sanction any breach of the established principles of natural justice and do not empower the Government to constitute itself as a judge in its own cause. Accordingly, the Court held that it could not be said that the State Government, in the circumstances before it, acted in contravention of those principles. The Court further noted that the appellants had never challenged the competence of the Chief Minister to consider the objections in the earlier proceeding, and they had relied upon that acceptance to obtain the earlier judgment of this Court; consequently, they could not at this stage reopen the controversy or adopt a contrary position. The Court clarified that the position of the Chief Minister was quite distinct from that of the Secretary of the Department, because the Secretary was the head of the department and therefore a part of it, whereas the Minister in charge was only primarily responsible for the disposal of the business relating to that department. For that reason the Court said it was incorrect to describe the Chief Minister as a part of the department that had been constituted as a statutory undertaking under the Act. The judgment then set out the formal details of the appeal, stating that the civil appellate jurisdiction was invoked by Civil Appeals Nos. 198 to 200 of 1959, which were appeals from the judgment and order dated 5 March 1959 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 1511, 1512 of 1958 and 23 of 1959. The record listed counsel for the appellants and counsel for the respondents, and recorded the date 21 August 1959. The judgment was delivered by Justice Subba Rao, who noted that these appeals on certificates were directed against the High Court’s dismissal of the petitions filed by the appellants under Article 226(4) of the Constitution, seeking writs of certiorari to quash the Government of Andhra Pradesh’s orders confirming a scheme of nationalisation of transport and the subsequent orders of the Regional Transport Authority cancelling the appellants’ stage-carriage permits. The Court observed that the present appeals were the off-shoot of the earlier judgment of this Court in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, delivered on 5 November 1958, and that the facts of that case had been fully stated therein. Consequently, the Court said it would be only necessary to recapitulate briefly the facts relevant to the present enquiry, namely that the appellants had been carrying on motor-transport business for several years in Krishna District of the State of Andhra Pradesh, and that Shri Guru Pershad, styled as the General Manager of the State Transport Undertaking of the Andhra Pradesh Road Transport, had published a scheme for the nationalisation of motor transport in the State.

From a date to be announced by the State Government, the scheme was to take effect. The State Government invited objections to the proposed scheme, and the appellants, among others, submitted their objections. On 26 December 1957, the Secretary responsible for the Transport Department provided a personal hearing to those who had objected and listened to the representations made on behalf of the State Transport Undertaking. The Secretary compiled all material gathered during that hearing and placed it before the Chief Minister, who was also in charge of transport, and the Chief Minister then issued an order approving the scheme. The approved scheme was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette on 9 January 1958, and the Gazette directed that the scheme should become operative from 10 January 1958. Subsequently, the Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, created under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, assumed control of the Undertaking and began to implement the scheme according to a phased programme. The appellants approached this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking to have the scheme set aside on several grounds. This Court dismissed most of the appellants’ objections, except for two matters relating to the hearing conducted by the Secretary of the Transport Department; those two objections led to the quashing of the Government’s order approving the scheme and to a direction that the Government should refrain from taking over any routes on which the appellants were carrying out transport business. Following that order, the Government issued notices to all objectors stating that a personal hearing would be conducted by the Chief Minister on 9 December 1958 and that the objectors could file further objections up to 30 November 1958. The Chief Minister heard the representatives of the objectors and of the Corporation and, on 19 December 1958, issued orders rejecting the objections and reaffirming approval of the scheme as originally published. The Government published the order confirming approval of the scheme in the official Gazette on 22 December 1958. On the following day, 23 December 1958, the Corporation applied to the Regional Transport Authority for permits to operate stage-carriage services and for the cancellation of permits previously granted to private bus operators. On 24 December 1958, the Authority issued orders that rendered the appellants’ permits ineffective from that date and granted new permits to the Corporation for the routes that had formerly been operated by the appellants. Those orders were communicated to the appellants on 24 December 1958, and the appellants were instructed to cease operating their buses on the affected routes from 25 December 1958 onward. Aggrieved by both the Government’s order and the Authority’s order, the appellants filed petitions in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking to have the orders set aside. A Division Bench of that High Court, comprising Chief Justice Chandra Reddy and Justice Srinivasachari, heard the petitions and rejected the appellants’ contentions, dismissing the petitions.

The High Court dismissed the petitions filed by the appellants, and consequently the appellants filed the present appeals. The counsel representing the appellants, Mr. Chatterjee, summarized the arguments advanced on their behalf as follows. First, the appellants relied upon a previous decision of this Court in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, reported in the 1959 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports at page 319. In that decision, the Court held that the Secretary who headed the Transport Department was disqualified from adjudicating the dispute between the Transport Department and the private bus operators. The disqualification was based on the well-established principle that a party cannot act as a judge in its own cause. The Court further observed that, because the Chief Minister also exercised the transport portfolio, the same infirmity attached to him; consequently, the Chief Minister should likewise be disqualified from hearing objections to the scheme issued by the Undertaking.

The second branch of the appellants’ submission was that the Chief Minister, by initiating the scheme and by delivering speeches in support of it, had manifested a clear bias in favour of the Undertaking and against the private bus operators. Relying on the principles of natural justice accepted by this Court, the counsel argued that such a bias precluded the Chief Minister from deciding the dispute between the parties.

The learned Advocate-General, for the opposite side, drew a distinction between what he described as “official bias” and “personal bias.” He explained that official bias could be inherent in a statutory duty imposed on an authority, whereas personal bias required a preference or prejudice of the authority in favour of, or against, one of the parties. The Advocate-General contended that the mere fact that the Chief Minister supported the policy of nationalisation, or that the Government initiated the scheme, did not automatically disqualify him from adjudicating the dispute. He further maintained that unless it could be established that the Chief Minister was personally biased, and that such bias was proven by legal evidence, there was no ground for disqualification.

At this juncture, it was appropriate to recall the authorities cited by counsel that set out the relevant principles governing the doctrine of bias. The principles applicable to judicial tribunals are well settled. Firstly, no person shall act as a judge in his own cause. Secondly, justice must not only be done but must appear to be done, manifestly and undeniably. From these maxims follows the rule that any member of a judicial body who is subject to bias—whether financial or otherwise—in favour of or against any party, or who is in a position where bias must be presumed, must not participate in the decision or sit on the tribunal. Moreover, any direct pecuniary interest, however small, in the subject matter of inquiry disqualifies a judge, and even a non-pecuniary interest will have the same effect if it is sufficiently substantial to create a reasonable suspicion of bias. The same standards apply equally to authorities that, although not courts of justice, are required to perform quasi-judicial functions and to decide the rights of individuals.

The Court noted that both sides’ counsel accepted the general principles concerning bias, yet the matter before it required determination of whether those principles become moderated when a statute endows an authority with a specific power and simultaneously imposes upon that authority a duty to act as a judge in a matter in which it may have an official bias. In other words, the Court had to decide whether the doctrine of bias is limited to the extent that the statute expressly authorises such a dual role. To illustrate the issue, the Court referred to the earlier decision in The King v. Bath Compensation Authority (1). In that case, the licensing justices of a county borough referred an application for renewal of a hotel licence to the borough’s compensation authority. The justices also resolved that a solicitor should be instructed to appear before the compensation authority and to oppose the renewal on behalf of the licensing committee. The instructed solicitor indeed appeared before the compensation authority, presented arguments opposing the renewal, and, as a result, the compensation authority refused to renew the licence unless compensation was paid. It is relevant that a majority of the judges who sat on the compensation tribunal and voted against the renewal were themselves members of the licensing committee that had passed the resolution referring the renewal question to the compensation authority. The Court of Appeal, by a majority with Atkin, L.J. dissenting, held that, in view of the provisions of the Licensing Act, 1910, the facts did not disclose a bias or a likelihood of bias sufficient to disqualify those justices from sitting on the tribunal. However, that decision was set aside by the House of Lords on appeal, as reported in 1926 A.C. 586. The House of Lords held that the tribunal’s decision must be annulled because three justices who had referred the matter to the compensation authority subsequently sat as judges of that authority, thereby breaching the rule that no one can be both a party and a judge in the same cause (1) [1925] 1 K.B. 685. Viscount Cave, L.C., addressed the argument that the statutory duty might excuse the bias. He observed at page 592 that the statute indeed contemplated the possibility of licensing justices appearing before the compensation authority and taking part in the argument, since section 19, subsection 2, required the authority to give any interested person, including the licensing justices, an opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, the statute did not provide that justices who chose to appear as opponents of the renewal and who took active steps, such as instructing a solicitor, could subsequently act as judges in the same dispute. In the absence of any clear statutory provision to that effect, Viscount Cave concluded that the ordinary rule—that no one can be both a party and a judge in the same cause—remains applicable. Accordingly, this decision stands as authority for the proposition that, unless the legislature expressly provides otherwise, the principles of natural justice cannot be set aside. The Court then turned to the subsequent case of The King v. Leicester Justices (1) for further analysis.

The King’s Bench Division considered a case that arose under the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910, on the question of renewal. It held that merely originating an objection to a licence renewal did not disqualify a licensing justice from sitting as a member of the authority that decided the licence. Justice Salter explained the difference between that decision and the earlier Bath Justices’ Case, noting at page 565 the wording of the judgment. He quoted the passage that read, “the distinction is that, in that case, Parliament had not sanctioned what was done; in this case it has.” When counsel argued that the mere performance of a statutory duty created a risk of bias, the judge rejected the submission. He observed that “some risk of bias is inseparable from the machinery which Parliament has set up.” At first glance the present judgment seemed to conflict with the House of Lords decision in Bath Justices’ Case (1) [1927] 1 K.B. 557, (2) [1925] 1 K.B. 685. However, a close reading reveals a material difference, namely that in the earlier case the justices had actively opposed the renewal, whereas in the present case they were performing a statutory function. In Bath Justices’ Case the licensing justices had actively opposed the renewal before the compensation authority and had even instructed a solicitor to present their opposition. That conduct was not imposed by the statute, whereas in the present case the licensing justices were merely performing duties that the legislature had prescribed when the renewal question was referred to the compensation authority. These English authorities demonstrate that a statutory exception can permit an intrusion on the common-law rule against bias, but that intrusion is strictly limited to the scope authorized by the statute.

The English position reflects the principle that Parliament is supreme, so even a statute that offends natural-justice principles remains valid. By contrast, Indian law requires that legislation, whether enacted by Parliament or a State Legislature, must satisfy the fundamental rights protected in Part III of the Constitution. In the case before this Court, the relevant statutory provisions do not permit any departure from the principles of natural justice. The statute creates a statutory body known as the Transport Undertaking and assigns specific functions to it under the Act. The Undertaking is tasked with preparing a scheme that provides for road-transport services in a defined area that it will operate. Any person who is affected by the proposed scheme must promptly file an objection with the State Government. After receiving the objections and the accompanying representations, the State Government must conduct a personal hearing for both the objectors and the Undertaking. Following the hearing, the State Government may either approve the scheme as submitted, modify it, or reject it, according to the circumstances. Consequently, the provisions of the Act do not empower the Government to originate the scheme and thereafter sit as a judge in the same matter.

The Court observed that the whole framework of the Act contemplated that, when a conflict arose between the statutory Undertaking and private bus operators, the State Government should act as the adjudicator and settle the dispute. The Act therefore did not empower the State Government to disregard the principles of natural justice. The Court then turned to the question of whether the State Government, in the present matter, had contravened those principles. An argument was raised that, because the Court had previously held that the hearing conducted by the Secretary of the Transport Department violated the principles of natural justice, the same defect should logically extend to the Chief Minister’s role. The Court rejected this contention on two grounds. First, in the earlier proceedings the appellants had not challenged the Chief Minister’s authority to consider objections to the scheme; they had even acknowledged his undisputed right to do so. Their challenge had been directed solely at the validity of the Chief Minister’s order on the basis that the Secretary, being a member of the Transport Department, had conducted the hearing, thereby making a party to the dispute a judge of his own cause. Second, if the same reasoning were to disqualify the Chief Minister from deciding the dispute, that issue should have been raised at the earlier stage. Instead, a distinction had been drawn between the Secretary of a Department and the Chief Minister, and the Court had accepted the argument that the validity of the Chief Minister’s order could be examined on that basis. Having obtained a judgment on that foundation, the appellants could not, at this stage, reopen the settled controversy and adopt a contrary position. Moreover, the Court found no merit in the new contention.

The Court further explained that a clear distinction existed between the role of a Departmental Secretary and that of the State’s Chief Minister. Under the Constitution, the Governor was required to act on the advice of the Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. In exercising the powers conferred by clauses 2 and 3 of Article 166 of the Constitution, the Governor of Madras had framed the “Madras Government Business Rules and Secretariat Instructions.” Rule 9 of those rules, without prejudice to Rule 7, stipulated that the Minister in charge of a department was primarily responsible for disposing of the business of that department. Likewise, the Governor of Andhra, exercising constitutional powers, directed that, until other provisions were made, the business of the Andhra Government would be conducted in accordance with the same rules. Consequently, it was evident that, under the Constitution and the rules made thereunder, a Minister in charge of a department bore primary responsibility for handling the business pertaining to that department, while the ultimate advice rested with the entire ministry. This constitutional and procedural framework underscored the separation between the functions of a Secretary, who is part of the departmental machinery, and a Minister, who is primarily responsible for the department’s business.

The Court explained that a Minister who heads a department bears the primary duty of disposing of the business that falls within that department, while the overall responsibility for providing advice on such matters rests with the whole ministry. In contrast, the position of the Secretary of a department is different. Under the Rules referred to, the Secretary is the head of the department and is therefore a part of that department. Accordingly, there is an essential distinction between the functions of a Secretary and those of a Minister; the Secretary, being an integral part of the department, carries out the department’s administrative work, whereas the Minister is only primarily responsible for the disposal of the department’s business. The Court noted that the earlier judgment of this Court was founded on this very distinction. In that earlier case, after describing the role of the Secretary in the relevant department, the Court held that although the formal orders were issued by the Chief Minister, in substance the enquiry and the personal hearing were actually conducted by one of the parties to the dispute itself. On the basis of this distinction, the Court held that it could not accept the argument advanced by counsel that the Chief Minister forms part of the department created as a statutory undertaking under the Act. The Court then turned to the next issue, namely whether the Chief Minister, by his own acts and speeches, had disqualified himself from acting for the State Government in deciding the dispute. In the affidavit filed by Nageswara Rao, one of the appellants, in connection with the writ petitions before the High Court, the appellant set out at ground (8) of paragraph (14) that the Chief Minister is the Minister in charge of the Transport Department, under whose authority the Scheme was first published pursuant to Section 68C of the Act. The affidavit further alleged that the Chief Minister was not only the initiator of the Scheme but also a person who had a direct interest in its approval and implementation, and therefore possessed a direct and specific connection with the dispute, effectively acting as a judge in his own cause when he gave a personal hearing and considered the objections. Counsel for the State, Mr Chatterjee, contended that this allegation contained in ground (8) had not been contradicted by the respondents. The Court observed that it would be incorrect to say that these allegations were left unchallenged. In paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, the State set out its objections. The counter-affidavit stated that the contentions made by the petitioner in paragraph 14 of his affidavit were without substance and that the Scheme, as approved by the Government, was neither illegal nor beyond jurisdiction. In sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 6, the State further alleged that the claim that the hearing and determination of the questions in issue were not conducted in accordance with law or the principles of judicial procedure, but were merely a farce undertaken to satisfy the direction of the Supreme Court, was incorrect. Sub-paragraph (7) of the same paragraph asserted that the Minister in charge, that is, the Chief Minister, could hear and decide the matter, and that the State Government itself could not be regarded as having an interest in the cause and therefore was not disqualified from deciding. Finally, sub-paragraph (8) of paragraph 6 contended that the argument that the Chief Minister was incompetent to give the hearing and consider the objections because of bias or pre-judgment was not well-founded.

The Court observed that the contention that the Chief Minister lacked competence to conduct the hearing and consider the objections because he was biased and had prejudged the issue was not well founded. The Court noted that on 9-12-1958 there was no Road Transport Department; instead there existed a Road Transport Corporation, which was a completely autonomous body over which the Chief Minister exercised no control. Consequently, at the time of the enquiry the Corporation was an entirely independent entity and there could be no possibility of bias on the part of the Chief Minister in hearing the objectors. The Court likened the Chief Minister’s bearing to that of a court hearing after a remand by a superior court. It further held that the allegation that the Chief Minister had closed his mind and was biased was absolutely baseless; the Chief Minister had kept an open mind and had considered all the objections fully. The counter-affidavit was examined in detail and it set out how the scheme had been initiated by Guru Pershad and how the various steps had been taken in compliance with the provisions of the Act. From this it was clear that the Government did not accept the allegations made by the appellants in their affidavits. The Court observed that, irrespective of whatever policy the Government might have pursued regarding the nationalisation of bus transport, it could not be said that the Chief Minister had personally initiated the scheme in question. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon certain extracts from newspaper reports that were said to contain speeches of the Chief Minister. Exhibit IV was described as a summary of a speech delivered by the Chief Minister on 14 October 1957, and the relevant portion read: “I do not have any prejudice against the Krishna District. The bus transport in Telangana was nationalised 25 years ago. The Bus Transport nationalisation was extended to Krishna District since it is contiguous to Telangana in regard to transport services. It will be extended to the other districts gradually. It requires 12 crores of rupees to introduce nationalisation in all the districts at the same time. The Government is aware that Nationalisation of Bus Transport is not profitable. But we should fall in line with other States and move with the times. There are 360 buses in Krishna District. I cannot give an assurance that all these would be taken over. It is regrettable that these should be subjected to severe criticism when they are being done in public interest.” The Court held that this speech merely reflected the Government’s policy. Exhibit V was said to be an extract from the Indian Express dated 18 October 1957, the material part of which ran: “Nationalisation of road transport services in the Andhra area was a settled fact and there was absolutely no question of going back on it …...” The Court noted that this excerpt also only stated Government policy and made no reference to Krishna District or its transport services. Finally, Exhibit VI was mentioned as an extract from a report in the

In a newspaper dated 25 October 1957, the report alleged that the Chief Minister, Mr N Sanjiva Reddy, announced that the nationalised road-transport service in Krishna would be placed under a Corporation. The article recorded that, while addressing a press conference, the Chief Minister stated, “There is no question of postponement of the decision to nationalise bus transport in that district,” and further added, “There is no public support to the contention of the private bus operators that there should be no nationalisation.” The report therefore linked the Chief Minister’s remarks directly to the nationalisation of bus transport in Krishna District and described his determination not to defer the action.

Another newspaper extract, identified as Exhibit IX, came from the Indian Express of 13 December 1957. It quoted the Chief Minister as telling the press, “The State Government would go ahead with the implementation of its decision to extend nationalisation of bus transport to Krishna district from April I next.” This passage again demonstrated the Chief Minister’s resolve to implement the nationalisation scheme on a specified date. A further report, labelled Exhibit X, appeared in the Mail of 1 April 1958 and purported to contain a speech delivered by the Chief Minister at the inauguration of the first phase of extending nationalised road-transport services to Guntur and Krishna districts through the State Road Transport Corporation. The cited portion of that speech said, “He (the Chief Minister) considered the implementation of the scheme simple first, but he regretted to find it difficult since bus operators filed writ petitions in the High Court, raised a huge noise and fought till the very end against the scheme and finally even approached the Congress President Mr U N Dhebar to save them.” The same extract continued, “Mr Sanjiva Reddi affirmed that the Government was determined to implement the scheme of nationalisation of bus transport services against all opposition and persons like him trained by the late T Prakasam were never afraid of opposition.”

The learned counsel for the appellants argued that, if it could be established that the Chief Minister had indeed made the statements recorded in Exhibits VI, IX and X, the argument in their favour would be considerably strengthened. However, the record shows that no evidence was adduced to prove that the Chief Minister actually delivered those speeches. Although the newspaper cuttings were submitted before the Chief Minister, they were accepted only subject to proof. No person who allegedly heard the Chief Minister utter those words presented an affidavit, and the Chief Minister himself did not acknowledge making the statements attributed to him. In the order in which the Chief Minister approved the nationalisation scheme, he observed, “As regards the paper cuttings, I may mention that in the course of a long and varied, political career I have made hundreds of statements on many an occasion.” This remark underscored the Chief Minister’s denial that the specific statements cited in the cuttings could be conclusively attributed to him.

In his response, the Chief Minister observed that many of the remarks attributed to him could have been merely personal opinions and that journalists did not always verify the accuracy of statements before publishing them. He explained that the newspaper clippings presented to the Court were not official communications issued or approved by the Government, but rather published records of various statements allegedly made by him on different occasions. He further noted that, as a matter of common knowledge, such clippings, when extracted and taken out of context, could produce a wholly distorted picture of a person’s true intentions. Consequently, he stated that he could not give any definitive comment on the truthfulness of the statements said to have been made by him at various times. He added that it was quite possible that he had indeed made many such remarks on several occasions, and that some of those remarks might have been reproduced in newspaper headlines, but that it was neither possible nor appropriate to treat these newspaper cuttings as admissible legal evidence in a judicial inquiry.

Notwithstanding the Chief Minister’s refusal to accept the correctness of the statements attributed to him in the newspapers, the appellants had made no effort to file any affidavit in the High Court sworn by individuals who had actually attended the meetings addressed by the Chief Minister and who could testify that they heard him make the alleged statements. In view of this omission, the Court held that the appellants had failed to establish that the Chief Minister had delivered speeches demonstrating a closed mind on the question of nationalising bus transport in Krishna District. The Court further observed that if the newspaper cuttings were excluded from evidence, the factual foundation of the appellants’ argument would disappear. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Chief Minister was not disqualified from hearing objections to the scheme of nationalisation.

A subsidiary point raised by the appellants relied on rule 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules. They contended that the Road Transport Authority had issued an order that rendered the appellants’ permits ineffective without providing the due notice mandated by that rule, and therefore claimed that the order was invalid. The Court reproduced rule 11, which provides that, in giving effect to an approved scheme, the Regional Transport Authority or any concerned authority must, before eliminating existing services, cancelling any existing permit, or modifying the conditions of an existing permit so as to render the permit ineffective beyond a specified date, reduce the number of authorised vehicles, or curtail the area or route covered by the permit, give due notice to the persons likely to be affected in the manner prescribed in the rules. The Court indicated that this rule must be read in conjunction with section 68-F, subsection 2, which prescribes the procedure for giving effect to an approved scheme in a notified area or route, thereby confirming that any order contemplated under that subsection could be made only after the required notice had been given to the affected parties.

The statute authorises the Regional Transport Authority, when giving effect to an approved scheme concerning a notified area or route, to issue an order that may include any of the following actions: firstly, the authority may refuse to consider any application for renewal of a permit; secondly, it may cancel an existing permit; and thirdly, it may modify the terms of an existing permit so as to render the permit ineffective after a specified date, to reduce the number of vehicles authorised under the permit, or to curtail the area or route covered by the permit where the permit relates to the notified area or route. A combined reading of section 68F(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act and rule 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules makes it clear that any such order may be issued by the Regional Transport Authority only after the authority has given due notice to the persons who are likely to be affected by that order.

On 24 December 1958 the Regional Transport Authority issued an order stating that the permits of certain buses were rendered ineffective beyond 24-12-1958. The order quoted section 68F(2)(c)(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as amended by Act 100 of 1956, and it explained that the order was made for the purpose of giving effect to the approved scheme of nationalisation in respect of the notified routes. The routes on which the appellants were operating their buses were among those listed in the order. On the same day, 24 December 1958, the authority also issued a separate directive to the operators, instructing them to cease plying their buses on the respective routes from the following day, 25 December 1958, and this directive was served on the appellants on the very same day.

The learned Advocate-General contended that the requirements of rule 11 had been satisfied in the present case. The Court, however, found it impossible to accept that contention. It identified two procedural defects in the manner in which the Regional Transport Authority acted. First, rule 11 mandates that notice must be issued to the persons affected before the authority makes the relevant order; in this case the authority made the order first and only afterwards communicated it to the affected persons, thereby violating the rule. Second, rule 11 requires that the notice be reasonable so that the persons affected have an opportunity to make representations against the proposed order; the authority gave the appellants merely one day to comply with the order, which could not be regarded as reasonable or “due” notice within the meaning of the rule.

Consequently, the Court held without hesitation that the Regional Transport Authority had not strictly complied with the provisions of rule 11. Nonetheless, the High Court, after observing this procedural defect, chose not to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Following the authority’s order, the appellants withdrew their vehicles from the concerned routes, and the vehicles of the Road Transport Corporation subsequently began plying on those routes. The judgment of this Court thus conclusively decided all the questions raised in the matter.

The Court observed that even if the order issued by the Regional Transport Authority were set aside and the appellants were permitted to present fresh representations before that Authority, such a step would amount only to an empty formality, as the High Court had previously described. The Court noted that the appellants’ vehicles had already been withdrawn from the affected routes and that the services on those routes were now being provided by the vehicles of the Road Transport Corporation. Because of this complete substitution, any subsequent order directing the reinstatement of the appellants’ vehicles would not confer any practical benefit on them, and it would also create unnecessary complications and avoidable confusion in the operation of transport services. In the Court’s view, the appellants had persistently failed to achieve any relief, and to intervene now on a purely technical point that lacked any practical utility would be comparable to “straining at a gnat after swallowing a camel.” Accordingly, the Court concluded that there was no basis to hold that the High Court had exercised its discretion improperly. As a result, the Court held that the appeals could not succeed, dismissed them, and ordered that they be dismissed without any order for costs.