Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. vs Their Workers Represented By The Dalmia...
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Not extracted
Decision Date: 16 October, 1959
Coram: B.P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo
The Supreme Court of India heard this appeal by special leave on 16 October 1959. The judgment was authored by Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, and the bench was composed of Justices B.P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar and K.N. Wanchoo. The matter arose from an industrial dispute between M/s Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd., referred to as the appellant, and its workmen, referred to as the respondents. The dispute was initially referred for adjudication to an industrial tribunal. While the respondents had raised several items of claim before the tribunal, the present appeal concerns only one of those items, namely the respondents’ claim for gratuity. The industrial tribunal examined the objections that the appellant had raised against the gratuity scheme then in force and concluded that those objections lacked substance. The respondents suggested certain alterations to the scheme, some of which the tribunal accepted. Consequently, the tribunal issued an award directing a suitable revision of the gratuity scheme. The appellant appealed against this award, repeating the same contentions before the appellate tribunal, which likewise found no reason to interfere with the original award. The present appeal challenges that part of the award which upheld the tribunal’s decision to revise the gratuity scheme.
The records show that the appellant suggested two modifications to the existing gratuity rules. The second modification was not presented before the tribunal and therefore does not require consideration. The first modification sought to exempt from the applicability of the gratuity rules any worker who was entitled to gratuity under a law or a special award that was then in force and applicable to him, so that such a worker would receive gratuity according to that law or award rather than under the appellant’s rules. By proposing this amendment, the appellant intended to raise a general question of law that the Court had previously examined in the case of Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, Civil Appeal No. 169 of 1958, decided on 16 October 1959. Although the amendment referred only to gratuity payable under any award then in force and did not expressly mention retrenchment compensation, the omission is explainable because the amendment was suggested on 1 December 1953, when Ordinance V of 1953 governed the matter. As observed in the Indian Hume Pipe Co. case, Section 25 E of that Ordinance itself used the term “gratuity,” a term that was later replaced by “retrenchment compensation” by Section 25 F of the subsequent Act. Hence, it is clear that the appellant’s contention, expressed through the proposed amendment, was based on the argument that workmen should not receive a double benefit of gratuity and retrenchment compensation.
In this appeal, the Court observed that the proposed modification rested on a general contention that the workmen should not receive both gratuity and retrenchment compensation as a double benefit. The Court agreed that the learned Solicitor-General was correct in stating that the appellate tribunal should not have ruled that the appellant could not raise the general issue under the heading of the modification, but the Court noted that this point was only of academic interest. The Court explained that, on the broader question raised by the appellant, it had already decided that workmen are entitled to claim what is described as a double benefit of gratuity together with retrenchment compensation. Consequently, the Court held that, on the merits, the decision of the appellate tribunal confirming the award originally passed by the tribunal was correct.
The Court added that the present appeal did not concern any specific claim by a retrenched workman for gratuity in addition to the compensation due under Section 25F. Rather, the appeal focused on the general issue of whether the gratuity scheme originally devised by the appellant should be altered in the manner suggested by the appellant. Having adopted the view that the general question did not require interference, the Court saw no reason to disturb the order issued by the appellate tribunal on that point. The Court further explained that if the appellant maintains that its scheme already provides for retrenchment compensation, it may be entitled to raise that defence at a later stage when a retrenched workman asserts a claim for both gratuity and retrenchment compensation. Any such dispute would then be resolved by interpreting the relevant clauses of the existing scheme, as indicated in the cited decision of Brahmachari Research Institute, Calcutta v. Its Workmen.
The Court noted that the learned Solicitor-General also attempted to argue that a contract dated 26 May 1949 continued to bind the parties and that, because of that contract, the tribunal should not have accepted the respondents’ request to modify the gratuity scheme. The Court observed that this contractual argument had not been raised before the tribunal nor in the appeal before the appellate tribunal, and therefore it could not be permitted to be introduced for the first time at this stage. In the final analysis, the Court dismissed the appeal, ordered it to fail, and awarded costs against the appellant.