Bhinka And Others vs Charan Singh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 78 to 83 of 1959

Decision Date: 24 April 1959

Coram: S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, Subba Rao

In this case the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 24 April 1959. The matter was styled Bhinka and Others versus Charan Singh. The bench that heard the appeal comprised Subbarao, K. Das, S. K. Das, S. K. Sarkar and A. K. Sarkar. The petitioners were the group identified as Bhinka and others, and the respondent was Charan Singh. The decision is reported in the 1959 All India Reporter at page 960 and in the 1959 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports at page 798, and it has been cited subsequently in R 1964 SC 136, R 1965 SC 364, R 1982 SC 149, R 1984 SC 1471 and RF 1991 SC 2072. The legal issues arose under the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act of 1939, specifically section 180, and under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The case concerned the jurisdiction of the revenue court to entertain a suit for ejectment of a person occupying land without title, and the effect of a provisional order of a magistrate regarding possession when a proper defence exists. The headnote summarises the factual background. The respondent, who was a zamindar, instituted ejectment suits in the revenue court against the appellants, alleging that the land in dispute was his sir land and that the appellants were trespassing on the basis of an erroneous order of a criminal court. The appellants contended that they were hereditary tenants admitted by the respondent. Earlier, a criminal proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been instituted between the parties, and the magistrate found that the appellants were in actual possession and directed that they should remain in possession until they were lawfully evicted. The revenue court, after trying the ejectment suits, concluded that the land was indeed the sir land of the respondent, that the appellants were not hereditary tenants, and that they had taken possession without the respondent’s consent. The Additional Commissioner, on appeal, affirmed the revenue court’s findings, and the Board of Revenue, on second appeal, also upheld the decision and dismissed the appellants’ appeals. The Board rejected the appellants’ contention that the suits were not within the jurisdiction of the revenue court. Section 180 of the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act, 1939 provides that any person who takes or retains possession of land without the consent of the person entitled to admit him into occupation, and otherwise contrary to the law in force, is liable to punishment under the Act. Given the lower courts’ finding that the appellants had not taken possession with the respondent’s consent, the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the magistrate’s order under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure alone could have removed that lack of consent. The Court held that the provisions of section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empower a magistrate only to record the factual state of possession on a specified date. The magistrate does not have the authority to grant possession or to permit any party to take possession. Moreover, the magistrate cannot determine questions of title or right to possession, matters which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of a civil court. The Court further observed that the terms “taking” and “retaining” used in section 180 refer respectively to the initial acquisition of possession and the continued holding of possession, and that both concepts must be examined in light of lawful title.

The Court explained that section 180 of the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act must be given an independent and exclusive meaning. The statute uses the word “taking” to refer to acquisition of possession in violation of law, and it uses the word “retaining” to refer to a situation where a party initially acquires possession lawfully but later continues to hold it in breach of law. Because the tribunals below had found that the appellants’ possession was illegal from its very inception, the appellants could not be said to be lawfully retaining possession so as to lie outside the operation of the said section. The Court further held that possession “in accordance with law,” as contemplated by section 180, necessarily means possession that is supported by a lawful title. Accordingly, a provisional order of a magistrate concerning possession, without reference to the parties’ lawful rights, could not enable the appellants to resist a suit filed under section 180 of the Act. The judgment relied on the earlier authority of Dinomoni Chowdhrani v. Barojo Mohini Chowdhrani, (1901) L.R. 29 I.A. 24, to substantiate this interpretation.

The judgment recorded that this matter fell within the civil appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, bearing Civil Appeals Nos. 78 to 83 of 1959. The appeals were filed by special leave against the order of the Uttar Pradesh Board of Revenue dated 28 July 1954, which itself arose from the judgment of the Court of the Additional Commissioner, Meerut Division, dated 28 April 1954, in turn reviewing the order of the Additional District Magistrate, Meerut, dated 16 March 1954, in Cases Nos. 389-394 of 1950. The respondent was a zamindar of Gadhi, Baghu and Santokpore villages in Uttar Pradesh, who claimed ownership of the lands described in the plaint-schedule. The appellants asserted that they had been admitted by the respondent as hereditary tenants and that they were in possession of the lands. To prevent a breach of the peace, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Baghpat invoked section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, attached the disputed lands on 8 October 1948 and ordered that they be placed in the possession of a superintendent pending disposal of the proceedings. After inquiry, the magistrate, by an order dated 20 March 1950, found that the appellants were indeed in possession and declared that they were entitled to remain in possession until lawfully evicted. On 30 June 1950, the respondent instituted six suits in the Revenue Court (Additional Collector, Meerut) against the appellants under section 180 of the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act, 1939, seeking their eviction. Counsel for the appellants then raised a series of contentions before the Court, the first of which concerned the propriety of the appeal presented to the Commissioner.

In this case the counsel for the appellants advanced six separate submissions. The first two submissions, namely that the appeal by the legal representatives of Jahana had been properly presented to the Court of the Commissioner and that, assuming the appeal had abated, the decision of the Additional Collector in the suit giving rise to the appeal would not operate as res judicata in the connected appeals, were not examined further. The remaining four submissions were addressed and rejected by the Court. The Court observed that because it was rejecting the appellants’ contentions on all the other points, the correctness of the Revenue Board’s decision on the two issues concerning the alleged abatement of the suits would not affect the final outcome of the appeals; consequently the Court did not feel it necessary to express any opinion on those matters. The fifth submission raised the question of whether the appellants were hereditary tenants of the disputed lands. The three lower courts, after considering both oral testimony and documentary evidence, had uniformly concluded that the appellants were not hereditary tenants. The appellant’s counsel sought to overturn that finding by alleging a series of legal errors: first, that the courts had failed to apply the statutory presumption that a certified copy of the khatauni of 1355 fasli, which the appellants had produced, was genuine and that the signatory possessed the official authority claimed; second, that because the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had issued an order in favor of the appellants under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the burden of proving the tenancy status should have been shifted to the respondent; third, that material evidence presented by the appellants had been disregarded; fourth, that the courts had applied disparate standards of proof to the appellant and the respondent with respect to the certified copies of the khatauni and the khasra prepared by the same patwari, Ahmed Ali; and fifth, that the courts had ignored the rights that accrued to the appellants under sections 10, 16 and 20 of the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act. For clarity, the Court referred to these alleged errors as “points.” The Court noted that the first point, as framed before it, had not been raised in any of the three lower courts. The Court then turned to the relevant statutory provision, namely section 79 of the Evidence Act, which provides that the Court shall presume every document purporting to be a certified copy and declared admissible as evidence to be genuine, and that the officer who purportedly signed or certified it held the official character claimed, provided that the document is substantially in the form prescribed by law. The Court highlighted that this presumption is contingent upon the certified copy being substantially in the prescribed form and executed in the manner required by law, and that section 4 of the Evidence Act delineates the limits of such a presumption.

Section 79 of the Evidence Act provides that the Court shall presume to be genuine every document that purports to be a certificate and that is by law declared to be admissible as evidence of any particular fact, and that purports to be duly certified by any officer of the Central Government or of a State Government, provided that such document is substantially in the form prescribed and purports to be executed in the manner directed by law for that purpose. The provision further stipulates that the Court shall also presume that any officer who is shown to have signed or certified such a document held, at the time of signing, the official character which he claims in the paper. Accordingly, a court is bound to draw a presumption that a certified copy of a document is genuine and that the officer who signed it did so in the official capacity alleged, but this presumption is permissible only when the certified copy is substantially in the form required by law and appears to have been executed in the manner prescribed. Section 4 of the Evidence Act delineates the limits of this presumption, stating that whenever the Act directs the Court to presume a fact, the Court shall regard that fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved. In other words, if a certified copy is executed substantially in the form and manner mandated by law, the Court raises a rebuttable presumption in favour of its genuineness. The khatauni of the year 1355 fasli that is before this Court contains the relevant particulars and purports to have been signed by Ahmed Ali, the patwari of the village. It is undisputed that the patwari was an officer appointed by the State Government and that he possessed the authority to issue certified copies of the record of rights. The Uttar Pradesh Land Records Manual prescribes the rules governing the form and manner in which a certified copy of the record of rights must be issued. Paragraph 26 of that Manual vests in the patwari the power to provide applicants with certified copies from his records, and sub-paragraph (d) obliges him to enter a note of such extracts in his diary and to record the amount of fee realised both in the diary and on the extract itself. In the present matter, neither the diary was produced to demonstrate that the prescribed procedure had been followed, nor was any extract produced to show that the officer had noted any payment. Consequently, it cannot be said that the certified copy was issued by the patwari in substantial compliance with the legal provisions governing such issuance. This inability to establish compliance means that the Court is not bound to draw the presumption of genuineness. Moreover, even when the presumption arises, it is only a rebuttable presumption. The three lower Courts rejected the document on the ground that it was not genuine, a conclusion they reached after examining the internal evidence of the document together with other evidence, thereby effectively rebutting any such presumption.

In that case the courts rejected the document not only on the basis of the internal evidence presented by the document itself but also on the basis of other evidence. They provided convincing reasons for this conclusion, and even assuming that a rebuttable presumption of genuineness existed, that presumption was overcome in the present facts. The second argument advanced by counsel also lacks merit. An order issued by a magistrate under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can, at most, shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff; however, in the present matter the question of burden of proof was irrelevant because the three courts reached their conclusions after examining the whole body of evidence. Although counsel claimed that material evidence had been ignored, he was unable to identify any specific evidence that had been excluded. The courts had indeed considered all evidence placed before them and their findings were based on an appreciation of that evidence. The Court was also unable to accept the contention that different standards of proof were applied to the various parties. That contention relied on the observation that the Additional Commissioner, while rejecting the certified copy of the khatauni of 1355 fasli filed by the appellant, relied on the certified copy of the khasra dated 28 June 1948 filed by the respondent, even though both copies had been issued by the same patwari, Ahmed Ali. No inconsistency is seen in the Commissioner’s action. He rejected the former document for reasons other than authenticity, deeming it not genuine, and accepted the latter document because he considered it genuine.

The final point raised by counsel was not addressed in any of the lower courts and does not arise from the finding that the appellants are not tenants. Sections 10, 16 and 20 of the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act presuppose that a person invoking those provisions is a tenant; since the courts found that the appellants are not tenants, those sections cannot be invoked, which explains why the lower courts did not consider them. The concurrent finding of the three courts that the appellants are not hereditary tenants is a factual determination and is not affected by any error of law. Following the usual practice of this Court, that finding must be accepted. The sixth contention raised by the appellants is not available for consideration at this stage. The Additional Collector had awarded damages despite noting that no witness had testified regarding damages and despite the respondent’s counsel not arguing the point. Nevertheless, the Collector based the award on the annual rent of the holdings. This assessment was not challenged in either the first or the second appellate courts, and the present petition does not disclose any grievance on that point. Consequently, the Court finds no basis to entertain that plea.

In the present matter, the Court observed that, considering the surrounding circumstances, it was not appropriate to permit the appellants to revive the particular plea before this Court. The Court then turned its attention to the principal and substantive contention raised by the appellants, namely that the suits they had instituted were not maintainable in a Revenue Court. The resolution of this issue depended upon the interpretation of section 180 of the Agricultural Tenancies Act. Before analysing the wording of that provision, the Court found it useful to set out briefly the overall scheme of the Act as it related to the question at hand. The preamble to the Act makes clear that the legislation was enacted in order to consolidate and amend the laws governing agricultural tenancies, also described as proprietary cultivation. Its purpose is to regulate the relationship between landlords and tenants with respect to agricultural holdings. The Act expressly confers exclusive jurisdiction on Revenue Courts over rights that arise between a landlord and his tenant. At the same time, the Act seeks to reconcile the otherwise conflicting jurisdictions of Revenue Courts and Civil Courts. In simple terms, every dispute that arises between a landlord and his tenant concerning the tenancy itself must be tried exclusively by a Revenue Court, whereas disputes concerning proprietary rights are to be decided by a Civil Court. Consequently, when a question that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a Revenue Court appears in a suit filed in a Civil Court, that civil suit is stayed and the specific issue is referred to the Revenue Court for determination. Conversely, if a question of proprietary right emerges in a proceeding before a Revenue Court, that issue is referred to a Civil Court for decision. The Act further provides that Revenue Courts have authority, among other matters, to entertain suits for ejectment where the grounds for such ejectment are specified by statute. Section 180 forms part of the series of provisions that deal with ejectment; sections 155 through 179 already provide for suits for ejectment against tenants on various specified grounds, and section 180 adds to that framework. The substantive portion of section 180 reads as follows: “(1) A person taking or retaining possession of a plot of land without the consent of the person entitled to admit him to occupy such plot and otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force, shall be liable to ejectment under this section on the suit of the person so entitled, and also to pay damages which may extend to four times the annual rental value calculated in accordance with the sanctioned rates applicable to hereditary tenants. – Explanation II.– A tenant entitled to sublet a lot of land in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force may maintain a suit under this section against the person taking or retaining possession of such plot otherwise than in the circumstances for which provision is made in section 183.” The provision continues: “(2) If no suit is brought under this section, or if a person in possession shall become a hereditary tenant of such plot, or if such person is a co-sharer, he shall become a khudkasht-holder, on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for such suit or for the execution of such...” The Court therefore set out the legislative context and the exact language of section 180 before proceeding to decide whether the suits in question fell within the jurisdiction of a Revenue Court.

Section 242 provided that any suit described in the Fourth Schedule must be heard and determined by the Revenue Courts. Schedule 4, Group B, listed the description of each type of suit, the limitation period applicable to it, and the court-fee payable. Serial number 8 in that schedule corresponded to a suit brought under section 180 of the Act. The schedule described the nature of that suit as “for the ejectment of a person occupying land without title and for damages.” The schedule also prescribed the limitation period within which such a suit had to be instituted. Section 180 itself authorized a person who had the right to admit another onto a plot of land to file a suit in a Revenue Court seeking the ejectment of the occupant. The occupant could defend the suit on only two grounds: first, that he had taken or retained possession of the plot with the consent of the person entitled to admit him; and second, that he had taken or retained possession in accordance with the law then in force. The provision further stated that if no suit was filed against the occupant, or if a decree obtained against him was not executed, the occupant would become a hereditary tenant after the expiration of the limitation period prescribed in the Fourth Schedule. The lower courts had found that the appellants had not taken possession of the lands with the respondent’s consent, but it was alleged that they had taken possession in compliance with the law then in force. To support that allegation, reliance was placed first on the statements made in the plaints and second on the provisions of section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The plaints asserted that a criminal court had, on 20 March 1950, declared the appellants to be in possession of the land, and that following that order the appellants had forcibly harvested the crops grown by the respondent. The cause of action was said to have arisen after that date or around the time the appellants took possession of the land. The allegations in the plaints, however, did not support the appellants’ case. The respondent did not concede that possession had been taken pursuant to the magistrate’s order; instead, the respondent alleged that the appellants had taken advantage of an erroneous order declaring their possession and had trespassed onto his land. Assuming those allegations were true, the appellants could not be said to have taken possession in accordance with the law then in force. The Court examined whether the appellants could have relied on section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to claim lawful possession. It concluded that section 145 did not give a magistrate the authority to issue an order directing the delivery of possession to a person who was not already in possession on the date of the preliminary order.

In this case, the Court explained that the preliminary order issued by the magistrate under section 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure only empowered the magistrate to determine which party was in actual possession of the disputed land on the date of that preliminary order. The function of the order was solely to record the factual possession at that specific date; it did not create a right to possession, nor did it authorize any party to take possession of the land. Even when a party had been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months before the date of the preliminary order, the magistrate could merely deem that dispossessed party as if it had been in possession on the specified date. Accordingly, if this legal principle is applied, the appellants could not have acquired possession of the contested lands by virtue of an order made under section 145. The magistrate’s order could only reflect whether the appellants were already in possession on the relevant date; if they were not, any later acquisition of possession could not be justified under the provisions of the Code. The Court then considered whether the appellants, having not taken possession, might nevertheless be said to be retaining possession in accordance with the law then in force. It observed that the terms “taking” and “retaining” are mutually exclusive. “Taking” refers to acquiring possession in a manner not authorized by law, whereas “retaining” refers to maintaining possession that was lawfully obtained but later held illegally. Since the appellants’ possession was illegal from its inception, they could not be characterised as persons who were retaining possession in conformity with any law, and therefore they fell within the ambit of section 180 of the Act. The Court further examined whether possession obtained by a magistrate’s order under section 145 could be described as “possession in accordance with the law then in force”. It held that the phrase, in the context, signifies possession with a legal title. The suit contemplated by the section is intended to be brought by a landlord against an occupier who lacks any right to possession. Earlier sections, as previously noted, dealt with evicting various categories of tenants on specified grounds, and section 180 provides for the eviction of a person who, but for such eviction, would become a hereditary tenant.

In this case, the Court observed that the provision of section 180 contemplated the eviction of a tenant who, by the lapse of the prescribed time, would become a hereditary tenant. The Court found that there was no ambiguity in the provision; any doubt was removed by the heading of the section and by the description of the suit in the Schedule. The heading states “Ejectment of person occupying land without Title”. Reference is made to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th edition, page 50, which explains that headings placed before sections in modern statutes function as preambles. Although headings cannot override the plain words of the statute, they may be used to explain ambiguous language. Consequently, if any doubt existed about the meaning of the words in the section, the heading assists in resolving it. The Court held that unless the person sought to be evicted possesses a title or a right to possession, his possession cannot be said to be in accordance with the law then in force. Therefore, the appellants were required to demonstrate that the order issued by the Magistrate under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure conferred upon them a title or a right to possession. The Court then examined the legal effect of a magistrate’s order made under section 145. Section 145(6) authorises a magistrate to issue an order declaring a party entitled to possession of land until such time as the party is evicted in accordance with law. The magistrate, however, does not determine the party’s title or right to possession; instead, the question of title is expressly reserved to be decided later, in due course of law. The magistrate’s jurisdiction is founded on the apprehension of a breach of the peace, and for that purpose he makes a temporary order irrespective of the parties’ rights, an order that must be contested and finally disposed of according to legal procedure. The duration of that order ends when a civil court passes a decree; at the moment a civil court orders eviction, the criminal court’s order is displaced. The Privy Council in Dinomoni Chowdhari v. Brojo Mohini Chowdhari (1901) L.R. 29 I.A. 24, 33, summarised the effect of orders under section 145, stating that they are merely police orders intended to prevent breaches of the peace and do not decide any question of title. Accordingly, the Court held that a provisional order of a magistrate concerning possession, irrespective of the parties’ rights, cannot be used by a person to resist a suit brought under section 180 of the Act. Having disposed of that contention, the Court turned to the fourth contention based on the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. To assess that contention, certain pertinent facts were recapitulated, beginning with the stays granted on 14 August 1951 to six suits in view of the Uttar Pradesh Government Notification dated 9 August 1951 issued under Ordinance No. III of 1951. The suits remained stayed under rule 4 of those rules. The appellants later filed an application under sub-rule (3) of rule 5 seeking to restart the trial, and the Additional Collector, Meerut, on 22 September ordered the restart. The appellants preferred a revision of that order to the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue rejected the appellants’ contention that the suits had abated under clause (v) of rule 4, holding that the suits fell within the exception to rule 5. It is noted that the rules were amended on 8 October 1952, after the order directing the restart had been made.

The stays of the suits were based on the Uttar Pradesh Government Notification dated 9 August 1951, which had been issued under Ordinance No III of 1951. After that notification the suits remained stayed in accordance with rule 4 of the applicable Rules. The appellants then filed an application under sub-rule (3) of rule 5 seeking to restart the trial of the suits. An order directing the restart of the suits was issued by the Additional Collector of Meerut on 22 September 1952. Following that order the appellants filed a revision before the Board of Revenue. Before the Board they contended that the suits had already been abated under clause (v) of rule 4 of the Rules. The Board of Revenue rejected this contention, holding that the suits fell within the exception provided in rule 5. It is also necessary to note that the Rules were amended on 8 October 1952, which was after the order directing the restart of the proceedings had been made. On the basis of these facts the first issue for determination was whether rule 5 of the amended Rules could be applied to a case that had been restarted under the provisions of the original Rules. To answer that question the Court set out the relevant provisions from both the original and the amended Rules. The original Rules, as published in the Gazette dated 30 June 1952, provided in rule 4 that all suits and proceedings of the first instance, appeal or revision, concerning an area for which a notification under section 4 had been issued and that were pending in any court on the date of vesting, shall be stayed. Clause 4(v) specifically listed suits, applications and proceedings, including appeals, references and revisions, that were filed under section 180 of the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act, 1939, as subject to stay. The amended Rules, which came into force on 8 October 1952, contained a similar provision in rule 4. The amended wording again stayed all suits and proceedings of the first instance, appeal or revision concerning an area for which a notification under section 4 had been issued and that were pending in any court for hearing on the date of vesting. Clause 4(v) of the amended Rules likewise stayed suits, applications and proceedings, including appeals, references and revisions, under section 180 of the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act, 1939, or of a similar nature pending in a civil court, except where the plaintiff was a tenant or where the land was the ‘Sir, khudkhast’ or grove of an intermediary and in which rights were involved. Rule 5(1) of both the original and the amended Rules provided that every suit or proceeding, whether of the first instance, appeal or revision, stayed under clauses (i) to (iv) of rule 4, shall be abated by the court or authority before which it is pending after giving notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard. Rule 5(2) clarified that the abatement of any suit or proceeding under sub-rule (1) would not prevent any person from establishing his right in a competent court of law in accordance with the law then in force. This exposition set the stage for deciding the applicability of the amended rule 5 to the restarted suits.

The Court explained that where a suit has been stayed under clause (v) of rule 4, any party to that suit may, within six months of the date of vesting, apply to the appropriate court for a restart of the issue. It further noted that a suit or proceeding stayed under rule 4 (a)(1) must, together with any appeal or revision, be abated by the court or authority before which it is pending after giving notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard, as provided in sub-rule 5(1). The Court also observed that the abatement of a suit or proceeding under sub-rule (1) does not prevent any person from establishing his right in a competent court in accordance with the law then in force for any matter in issue in such suit or proceeding, as set out in sub-rule 5(2). In comparing the original rules with the amended rules, the Court identified two fundamental differences relevant to the present enquiry. First, while the original rules provided that all suits under section 180 of the Act were stayed, the amended rules created an exception for lands that are Sir, Khudkast or the grove of an intermediary where rights have not accrued to the defendant under section 16 or any other provision of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Second, the original rules contained a procedure for restarting a suit stayed under rule 4, a procedure that is absent in the amended rules. The Court then turned to the facts of the present case, noting that the suits had been restarted under the old rules and that no stay order had been made under the amended rules thereafter. Consequently, the Court held that there was neither a subsisting stay under the old rules nor any stay order under the new rules. Because rule 5 of the amended rules can be invoked only where a suit is stayed under rule 4 (a)(i), the Court concluded that rule 5 could not be applied in the present circumstances. Moreover, the Court observed that clause (v) of sub-rule (2) of rule 4 of the amended rules does not apply to a land which is Sir unless rights have accrued to a person in possession thereof under section 16 or any other provision of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. On the basis of the findings that the appellants were trespassers on the Sir land, the Court affirmed that they had not acquired any rights under the aforesaid provisions, and therefore the operation of rule 5, which is conditioned by clause (v), could not be invoked.

In this matter, the Court observed that sub-rule (2) of rule 4 does not permit reliance on the earlier provisions unless clause (v) of that same sub-rule is applicable to the case and an order of stay has been issued under it. The Court noted that the lands involved in the suits had been identified as Sir lands, and that the appellants had failed to acquire any of the rights specified in clause (v) of sub-rule (2) of rule 4. Consequently, the Court held that the conditions for the operation of sub-rule (2) of rule 4 were not satisfied, and therefore rule 5 of the amended Rules could not be invoked. The Court further pointed out that the appellants had raised this same contention in revision petitions presented to the Revenue Board. The Revenue Board, by its order dated 6 September 1953, had rejected the appellants’ submissions, and that order had become final. On the basis of these findings, the Court concluded that the suits could not be terminated under rule 5 of the amended Rules. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed, the parties were ordered to bear costs, and the Court entered a final order of dismissal of the appeals.