Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 125 and 164 of 1958

Decision Date: 28 January 1959

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K. Subbarao, Subba Rao

In this matter the Supreme Court of India rendered a judgment on twenty-eight January, 1959, concerning a dispute between Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd., a company situated in Calcutta, and its workmen who were identified as the respondents. The case was recorded under the citation 1959 AIR 633 and also appeared in the Supreme Court Reports Supplement (2) 136. The bench that delivered the opinion comprised Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice A. K. Sarkar and Justice K. Subbarao. The parties before the Court were expressly designated as the petitioner, Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd., and the respondent, their workmen. The judgment was filed on the same day as the hearing, namely twenty-eight January, 1959. In addition to the primary citation, the case has been referenced in numerous later reports, including but not limited to RF 1961 SC 100, R 1966 SC 976, RF 1967 SC 284, F 1967 SC 948, RF 1969 SC 360, APL 1969 SC 513, R 1972 SC 1552, R 1974 SC 136, R 1974 SC 526, R 1976 SC 758, R 1979 SC 75, F 1989 SC 1972, and RF 1990 SC 1050. The matter invoked provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act 14 of 1947), specifically sections 2(r) and 7A, as well as amendments effected by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (Act 36 of 1956) under section 30, and the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1957 (Act 18 of 1957) under section 2. The Court also considered the scope of its own jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, which confers discretionary power to grant special leave to appeal from orders of tribunals.

The factual matrix presented to the Court showed that the workmen, dissatisfied with an award rendered in 1951, submitted a fresh charter of demands to the employer. These demands were negotiated and culminated in a written agreement that expressly preserved the existing rate of dearness allowance, while providing that the allowance could be adjusted in the event of any substantial change in the cost-of-living index applicable to the working class. Subsequent to the agreement, the cost of living rose, giving rise to a new dispute despite the existence of the 1951 award, which had not been terminated in accordance with the statutory procedure. The Government, exercising its reference power, directed the dispute to be adjudicated by the Second Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta in September 1956. In April 1957, the Government transferred the reference from the Second Tribunal to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal. The employer contended that the Government lacked authority to effect such a transfer and that the reference itself was defective because the 1951 award remained in force without lawful termination. The Court examined the legislative scheme, noting that the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956, which came into force on twenty-eight August, 1956, expressly empowered the Government to transfer a reference from one tribunal to another. This empowerment was further reinforced by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1957, which introduced a new definition of “tribunal” under section 2, thereby encompassing tribunals constituted prior to ten March, 1957, under section 7A of the 1947 Act. Accordingly, the Court held that, as a result of these statutory amendments, the Government possessed the requisite authority to transfer the dispute from the Second to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, and that the definition of “tribunal” as amended validated such a transfer.

Section 36 of 1956, when read together with the amending Act 18 of 1957, gives the Government the authority to move a reference from one Tribunal to another. The Court observed that when employees, after making fresh demands, conclude a new agreement with the employer that creates a fresh chapter governing their relationship, the earlier award, even though it has not been formally terminated according to statutory requirements, must be considered superseded. The earlier award therefore loses its operative effect once the parties have entered into the new agreement that regulates their rights and obligations.

Article 136 of the Constitution, expressed in the broadest possible terms, confers a discretionary power on the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal against an order of a Tribunal. The Court held, however, that this discretion may be exercised only in limited situations. Such circumstances include (a) a breach of the principles of natural justice, (b) the emergence of an important question of industrial law that requires authoritative clarification by the Supreme Court, or (c) any other exceptional or special situation that justifies a final decision by the apex Court. The Court stressed that this discretionary power cannot be interpreted as creating a general right of appeal for any party where the law does not already provide such a right.

The Industrial Disputes Act is intended to be a self-contained framework that seeks social justice through collective bargaining, conciliation and arbitration. Awards are made according to the unique facts of each dispute, and Tribunals are largely free from the technical constraints that bind ordinary courts. The Court warned that a free and liberal exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction could disturb the essential purpose of the Act, namely the speedy resolution of industrial disputes to preserve industrial peace. When an Industrial Tribunal, after examining the whole material before it and considering the overall picture, arrives at a factual conclusion, the Supreme Court will not interfere with those findings of fact, nor will it entertain a fresh case on the same matter. The Court referred to the decisions in Pritam Singh v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 453; Hem Raj v. State of Ajmer, [1954] S.C.R. 1133; and Sadhu Singh v. State of PEPSU, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 272 to support this approach.

The matter before the Supreme Court concerned Civil Appeals Nos. 125 and 164 of 1958, filed under the civil appellate jurisdiction. Both appeals were taken by special leave from the award dated 26 August 1957, rendered by the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, in Case No. VIII-264/56. Counsel for the appellants in Appeal No. 125/58 and respondents in Appeal No. 164/58 were S. C. Issacs and S. N. Mukherjee. Counsel for the respondents in Appeal No. 125/58 and appellants in Appeal No. 164/58 were N. C. Chatterjee and Dipak Datta Choudhri. The judgment was delivered on 28 January 1959 by Justice Subba Rao. The Court noted that the appeals were filed by special leave against the award made by Shri G. Palit, Judge of the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, in the matter of a dispute between the company and its workmen.

In this case, the dispute involved Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Limited, Calcutta, and its employees who were represented by the Bengal Chemical Mazdoor Union, Calcutta. The Government of West Bengal issued an order on 13 September 1956 directing that the dispute between the two parties be referred to the Second Industrial Tribunal pursuant to section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act 14 of 1947). The question presented to the Tribunal was whether the employees’ demand for an increase in dearness allowance was justified and, if so, at what rate. The Act had been amended by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment & Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (Act 36 of 1956), which became effective on 28 August 1956. On 9 April 1956 the Government issued an order transferring the matter from the file of the Second Industrial Tribunal to that of the Fifth Industrial Tribunal. After conducting the requisite inquiry, the Fifth Industrial Tribunal rendered an award on 26 August 1957, and this award was published in the Calcutta Gazette on 26 September 1957. Because a procedural error was discovered, the Tribunal modified the award by issuing an order on 29 November 1957, and the modified award was likewise published in the Calcutta Gazette on that date. The Tribunal held that the cost-of-living index had risen and, to offset this increase, the employees should receive an additional dearness allowance of Rs 7 on pay scales up to Rs 50 and Rs 5 on pay scales above Rs 50. The dearness allowance payable to the employees was therefore calculated on the basis of this determination. The correctness of the award is the subject of the present appeals. The Company filed Civil Appeal No. 125 of 1958 challenging the portions of the award that were adverse to it, while the Union filed Civil Appeal No. 164 of 1958 challenging the portions that were unfavorable to the employees. For ease of reference, the parties will be described in the judgment as the Company and the Union. Counsel for the Company raised several points before the Court: first, that the Government’s order dated 9 April 1957 transferring the dispute from the Second to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal was illegal; second, that the earlier award made by the Tribunal on 26 April 1951 and confirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal on 30 August 1951 had not been terminated in accordance with section 19(6) of the Act, rendering the present reference void and without jurisdiction; third, that there had been no change in the circumstances existing at the time of the earlier award compared with those at the time of the present reference, and therefore a new award could not be justified; fourth, that the Tribunal erred by using the increase in the cost-of-living index between 1954 and 1957 instead of using the fluctuating rate between the date of the earlier award, 30 August 1951, and the date of the present reference in 1957; fifth, that the Tribunal incorrectly relied on the Second Engineering Award of 1950, which had already been considered in its earlier award of 1951; and sixth, that, regardless of the other contentions, the Tribunal applied an incorrect criterion in computing the amount of dearness allowance. The Court indicated that these contentions would be examined one by one after a brief discussion of the scope of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution in relation to Tribunal awards.

The counsel for the Company presented six specific objections: first, the transfer order dated 9 April 1957, which moved the dispute from the Second Industrial Tribunal to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, was said to be illegal; second, the earlier award issued on 26 April 1951 and confirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal on 30 August 1951 had not been terminated in accordance with section 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, rendering the present reference void and beyond jurisdiction; third, it was asserted that there had been no material change in circumstances between the time the earlier award was made and the time of the present reference, and therefore a new award could not be justified; fourth, the Tribunal was alleged to have erred by using the rise in the cost-of-living index between 1954 and 1957 instead of applying the fluctuating rate of the index between the date of the earlier award, 30 August 1951, and the date of the present reference in 1957; fifth, the Tribunal was said to have incorrectly relied on the Second Engineering Award of 1950, which had already been considered in the Tribunal’s earlier 1951 award; and sixth, it was contended that the Tribunal employed wrong criteria in computing the amount payable. The Court indicated that these contentions would be examined one by one, but before doing so it deemed it useful to set out briefly the scope of its jurisdiction under article 136 of the Constitution with respect to Tribunal awards. Article 136 does not confer a statutory right of appeal on any party against a Tribunal decision; rather, it confers a discretionary power on the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal from any Tribunal order made anywhere in India. This discretionary power is inherently limited and cannot be exhaustively defined, nor can it be interpreted as granting a right of appeal where none exists under the applicable law. The Industrial Disputes Act is designed as a self-contained scheme aimed at achieving social justice through collective bargaining, conciliation and arbitration, and the awards it produces are based on the unique facts of each dispute, free from the technical constraints that bind courts. Consequently, a liberal exercise of article 136 could interfere with the fundamental aim of industrial tribunals, which is to provide swift resolution of disputes and maintain industrial peace. Although article 136 is expressed in the broadest possible terms, the Court limits its discretionary jurisdiction to cases where an award is made in violation of natural-justice principles, causes substantial and grave injustice to the parties, raises an important question of industrial law that requires clarification, or where exceptional circumstances exist that warrant the Court’s intervention. The Court observed that, apart from perhaps the first ground, the points raised by the Company’s counsel do not satisfy any of these criteria. The Company’s counsel further argued that once special leave is granted, the initial limitations on the exercise of article 136 cannot be applied at the stage of disposing the appeal. The Court rejected this view, noting that the limits on the exercise of article 136 cannot depend on whether the appellant has obtained special leave, for two reasons: first, at the stage of granting leave the Court may not possess the complete material facts necessary to form a final judgment; second, the order granting leave is an ex parte order issued without the presence of the respondent. Therefore, the same principle must govern the exercise of the Court’s power under article 136, whether the question arises at the time of granting special leave or at the time the appeal is finally decided.

The Court observed that it would be unreasonable to allow interference with the awards of tribunals on the basis of whether the question arises at the stage of granting special leave or at the stage of disposing the appeal, and that applying two different standards at two different moments of the same case would be illogical. The same principle had been endorsed by this Court in the decisions of Pritam Singh v. The State of Madras, Hem Raj v. State of Ajmer and Sadhu Singh v. State of Pepsu. The principal issue, the Court noted, concerned the construction of the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act as amended by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956. The amendments introduced several new sections. Section 2(r) defined “Tribunal” as an Industrial Tribunal constituted under section 7A. Section 7A then provided that the appropriate Government could, by notification in the official Gazette, constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for adjudicating industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule. Sub-section (2) stipulated that a Tribunal shall consist of one person only, appointed by the appropriate Government. Sub-section (3) laid down the qualifications for the presiding officer, requiring that the person be, or have been, a Judge of a High Court, or have held the office of Chairman or any other member of the Labour Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, or of any Tribunal, for a period not less than two years. Sub-section (4) allowed the Government, if it deemed fit, to appoint two assessors to advise the Tribunal. Section 33B(1) authorized the appropriate Government, by written order stating reasons, to withdraw any proceeding pending before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and to transfer it for disposal, permitting the receiving body to proceed either de novo or from the stage at which it was transferred, subject to special directions. The provision also allowed transfer of a proceeding pending under section 33 or section 33A from a Tribunal or National Tribunal to a Labour Court. Section 30 of the Amendment provided that if, immediately before the commencement of the Act, a proceeding concerning an industrial dispute was pending before a Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as then in force, the dispute could continue to be adjudicated and the proceeding disposed of by that Tribunal after commencement as if the new Act had not been enacted. Finally, the Court recalled that before the amendment, section 7 empowered the appropriate Government to constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes, without specifying the limited composition later introduced by the amendment.

The judgment explained that the Industrial Disputes Act authorised the appropriate Government to constitute an Industrial Tribunal for the adjudication of industrial disputes in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 7 stipulated that a Tribunal could consist of any number of members that the Government thought appropriate. Whenever a Tribunal had two or more members, one of those members was to be appointed as the chairman. Every member of the Tribunal was required to be an independent person who either had served as a Judge of a High Court or a District Judge, or who was otherwise qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court. In cases where a person who did not satisfy the first qualification was to be appointed, the appointment had to be made after consultation with the High Court of the Province in which the Tribunal was situated or intended to sit. The Court observed that the Amending Act, which became effective on 28 August 1956, altered the composition of Tribunals to some extent and, for the first time, gave the Government the authority to transfer a proceeding that was pending before one Tribunal to another Tribunal. The Act further empowered the Government to transfer a proceeding that was pending under sections 33 or 33A from a Tribunal to either another Tribunal or a Labour Court. Section 30 of the Amending Act contained a saving clause: it preserved any proceeding that was pending before a Tribunal constituted under the Act before the Amending Act came into force, and directed that such a dispute should continue to be adjudicated and finally disposed of by that same Tribunal after the commencement of the Amending Act, as if the Amending Act had never been enacted.

The Court noted that a balanced reading of these provisions led to the argument that section 33B, which was inserted by the Amending Act, was intended to operate prospectively. In other words, the provision would apply only to proceedings that were initiated in Tribunals constituted under the amended Act, while proceedings that were already pending before Tribunals formed under the earlier version of the Act would be completed as though the Amending Act had not been passed. To clarify this position, Parliament enacted a further amendment, the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 1957 (Act 18 of 1957). Among other changes, this amendment replaced the definition of “Tribunal” contained in section 2(r) of the original Act. The new definition stated that “Tribunal” means an Industrial Tribunal constituted under section 7A and also includes an Industrial Tribunal that had been constituted before 10 March 1957 under the original Act. Sub-section (2) of section 1 of the 1957 Amendment declared that section 2 would be deemed to have come into force on 10 March 1957. Consequently, the Court held that section 33B should be read together with this new definition of “Tribunal” as if the definition had been part of the statute from 10 March 1957 onward. If the definition is substituted for the word “Tribunal” in section 33B, the relevant provision must be understood in the context of the expanded meaning of “Tribunal,” affecting the application of the transfer powers conferred by the amendment.

In this case the Court examined the language of section 33B, part of which stated: “(1) The appropriate Government may, by order in writing and for reasons to be stated therein, withdraw any proceeding under this Act pending before a Tribunal constituted before the 10th day of March, 1957, and transfer the same to another Tribunal constituted under section 7A of the Act.” The Court interpreted this provision to mean that for proceedings that were pending before a tribunal that had been constituted prior to 10 March 1957, the Government possessed the authority to transfer those proceedings, from that date onward, to any other tribunal created under section 7A. The argument that such an interpretation would render section 30 of the Amending Act 36 of 1956 otiose or nugatory was rejected. The Court noted that section 30 contained only a saving clause, was never inserted into the principal Act, and had already fulfilled its purpose; even if it lost operative force after the 1957 amendment, that fact did not affect the impact of the amendment to the definition of “Tribunal” on the operation of section 33B. The Court then turned to the facts of the present dispute. It observed that the Government issued the order of transfer on 9 April 1957, which was after section 2 of Amendment Act 18 of 1957 had been deemed to have come into force. Consequently, the Court held that the Government acted within its statutory authority when it transferred the dispute pending before the Second Industrial Tribunal to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal. The Court further considered the second contention raised by the Company, namely that the award of 1951 had not been terminated in accordance with law. The Court found that this issue had not been properly raised before the Tribunal. The applicable provision was section 19(6), which provides that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation under sub-section (3), an award remains binding on the parties until two months have elapsed after any party bound by the award gives notice to the other party or parties of its intention to terminate the award. The Court noted that in the Company’s first written statement filed before the Tribunal, no plea based on section 19(6) was made. In the second written statement filed on 20 December 1956, the Company alleged that the award dated 21 June 1951 had not been terminated under section 19(6), claimed that the award was still binding, and therefore asserted that the reference was legally untenable. The Court observed that, despite this allegation, the award itself recorded that no issue was raised on that ground and no argument was advanced in support of it. The Court suggested that the Company may have refrained from relying on the technical point in order to obtain a substantive decision on the merits, or that the Company perhaps had no factual basis for the contention because it might already have received the requisite notice under section 19(6). The Court added, although it was not directly relevant, that even in 1951, when the dispute between the parties was first referred to the Industrial Tribunal, a similar contention was theoretically available but the Company chose to seek a merits-based award.

In the earlier proceedings, the dispute had been referred to the Industrial Tribunal. Although the Tribunal had suggested that the Company could have raised a technical objection under section 19(6) of the Act, the Company instead urged the Tribunal to decide the case on its merits. The Court observed that, had the Company pressed that objection seriously, the Tribunal would have been obliged to examine the separate issue and the Union would then have been in a position to demonstrate that the required notice had been served on the Company as mandated by section 19(6). Because the resolution of that question required further factual investigation, the Court concluded that it would not be appropriate to allow the Company to resurrect the plea at this stage. Consequently, the Court declined to permit the Company to rely on that argument before it.

The fourth point before the Court concerned the interpretation of the terms of the agreement dated 15 September 1954 that the parties had executed. The underlying dispute originated earlier, and besides the present reference there had been four separate references and four awards, the last of which was dated 3 April 1951. The Company had appealed that award to the Labour Appellate Tribunal at Calcutta, which, with certain modifications, confirmed the Tribunal’s award on 30 August 1957. The modified award fixed the basic wages and the rate of dearness allowance that were payable to the employees. Dissatisfied with that award, the employees presented the Company with a new charter of demands seeking higher rates of dearness allowance and wages. The dispute was ultimately settled, and the parties entered into the September 1954 agreement, under which the Company introduced an incremental scale into the wage structure. Clause 11 of that agreement provided that “The existing rate of D. A. will prevail unless there is a substantial change in the working class cost of living index, in which case the rate will be suitably adjusted.” The Court noted that the meaning of this clause was pivotal to the Union’s claim for an enhanced dearness allowance. If the cost-of-living index of 1951 were taken as the benchmark, the index had fallen by 1957; however, if the 1954 index were the benchmark, the index had risen substantially by 1957. To determine the parties’ intention, the Court examined the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement, referring to Exhibit 6, the agreement itself. The preamble to the agreement stated that “The Company and the Union came to a settlement in respect of the Pay Scales and Grades in the Charter of Demands dated 25th June, 1953, at the intervention of Shri A. R. Ghosh, Asstt. Labour Commissioner during the Conciliation proceedings ending on the 30th August, 1954.” This wording indicated that the entire situation prevailing on the date of the agreement had been reviewed and that the parties had mutually accepted the settlement terms.

The preamble of the agreement notes that the Assistant Labour Commissioner was involved during the Conciliation proceedings that concluded on 30 August 1954, indicating that the entire situation existing on the date of the agreement was examined and that the parties accepted the settlement terms set out therein. Clause 1 of the agreement provides that the pay scale and grade specified in Annexure B were to apply for a period of three years as an experimental measure, and that after those three years the scale could be reviewed, modified, suspended or withdrawn depending on the Company’s business and financial condition. Clause 2 records that the employees undertook not to raise any dispute that would impose an additional financial burden on the Company with respect to pay scale and grade during the ensuing three-year period. Clauses 3 to 5 deal with increments and the retirement age. Clause 6 addresses the increments applicable to piece-rated (contract) workers, while Clause 7 pertains to increments for daily-rated workers. Clause 8 concerns the grade, pay scale and increments for chemists, engineers, doctors and similar categories. Clause 9 states that employees who become permanent thereafter will be placed into two divisions for the purpose of applying the scale of pay. Clause 11, previously extracted, relates to the dearness allowance. Clause 12 contains the wording: “ barring the question of bonus for 1358 and 1359 B. S. the Union withdraws its claim in respect of other items in the Charter of Demands dated 25th June, 1953.” The full text of the agreement has been reproduced solely to demonstrate that all disputes arising out of the Charter of Demands dated 25 June 1953 were settled between the parties and reduced to writing. The agreement is self-contained and inaugurates a new chapter governing the parties’ relationship concerning the matters covered by it, thereby superseding the earlier award. In this regard, the expression “existing rate of D. A.” relied upon by both learned counsel can have only one meaning. The question is whether “existing rate” refers to the date of the award or to the date of the agreement. While it is true that the existing rate of dearness allowance originated in the award and was incorporated into the agreement as a rate the parties regarded as reasonable on the agreement date, it would remain effective only until a substantial change occurred in the working-class cost-of-living index. If the counsel for the Company were to succeed, the agreement would not be self-contained but merely a partial modification of the earlier award. The Court is satisfied that, with respect to the matters covered, the agreement replaced the earlier award and that the date of the agreement is therefore the decisive reference point for determining the applicable rate.

The Court examined whether there had been a substantial change in the working-class cost of living index during the year 1957 and found no basis to accept the contention raised. Accordingly, the Court rejected that contention. The submissions identified as Contentions 3, 5 and 6 were determined to be pure questions of fact. After reviewing all of the material placed before it, the Tribunal concluded that a change of circumstances had occurred which entitled the employees to seek an increase in their dearness allowance. The Tribunal also fixed the rate of increase in the dearness allowance by relying on the rise in the cost of living index. In arriving at that rate, the Tribunal took into account the difficulties confronting the industry as well as the impact that a higher dearness allowance would have on consumers in general. Considering the whole picture, the Tribunal held that it could not permit a full neutralisation of the deficit created by the rise in the cost of living index through the dearness allowance; consequently, it allowed the employees only seventy-five per cent of the increase in dearness allowance to which they would otherwise have been entitled solely on the basis of the index rise. The Tribunal’s finding was one of fact, and the Court saw no permissible ground on which to interfere with that finding in the present appeal filed under special leave. Before concluding, the Court addressed a point that the counsel for the company had pressed with great intensity. That point was essentially another attempt to challenge the Tribunal’s factual finding from a different perspective. The counsel argued that the Tribunal had wrongly relied on Exhibit 3, which had been corrected on the basis of information supplied by the State Statistical Bureau of West Bengal, for ascertaining the working-class cost of living index from August 1954 to March 1957. According to Exhibit 3, the Tribunal had held that the index stood at 344.1 in August 1954 and rose to 400.6 in May 1957, indicating a rise of fifty-six points, which the Tribunal described as a substantial increase in the cost of living index. The Court noted that Exhibit 3 indeed supported the Tribunal’s finding. However, the counsel for the company, referring to the relevant entries in the Monthly Statistical Digest of West Bengal, contended that the figures in Exhibit 3 related only to working-class menials and that the corresponding entries for the overall working-class cost of living index did not show as large an increase as that shown for the menial class. The counsel also presented the relevant figures from the Digest. The Court observed that those entries from the Monthly Statistical Digest had not been filed before the Tribunal. Moreover, when the Union’s witness, Shri Satyaranjan Sen, was examined before the Tribunal, the counsel did not cross-examine him in order to elicit information indicating that Exhibit 3 did not pertain to the working-class cost of living index. When Shri Chatterjee, the Assistant Manager of the Company, was examined after Shri Sen, he did not object to the entries in Exhibit 3, nor did he raise any issue regarding their relevance to the working-class cost of living index.

The assistant manager testified concerning Exhibit 3, stating that he was unaware of any notable rise in the working-class cost-of-living index and objecting that comparable entries for all the relevant years had not been produced. The record shows that, even before the Tribunal, no party raised an argument challenging the relevance of Exhibit 3 on the basis that it did not pertain to the working-class cost-of-living index. Accordingly, the Court found that it would be improper to permit the counsel for the Company to introduce a fresh contention at this stage, thereby disturbing the Tribunal’s established basis for its calculations and requiring new and different computations. On that footing, the Court affirmed the Tribunal’s award and ordered the dismissal of the appeal, directing that costs be awarded against the appellant. The counsel representing the Union was noted not to have pressed the appeal identified as No 164 of 1958, which had been filed by the Union. Because that appeal was not pursued, the Court also dismissed it with costs. In sum, the Court dismissed all appeals and ordered the payment of costs to the respective parties.