Balvantrai Chimanlal Trivedi vs M.N. Nagrashna And Ors.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 29 October, 1959

Coram: B.P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo

The case titled Balvantrai Chimanlal Trivedi versus M.N. Nagrashna and others was decided on 29 October 1959 before the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was written by Justice K.N. Wanchoo, and the bench comprised Justices B.P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar and K.N. Wanchoo. The matter before the Court arose from an appeal by special leave against an order of the Bombay High Court, which had dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant without a detailed hearing.

The appellant in this appeal was a cotton mill situated in Ahmedabad. The respondents numbered fourteen individuals, identified as employees of the appellant and classified in the industrial records as “grey‑folders.” Under the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act of 1938—later repealed by the Bombay Industrial Relations Act No XI of 1947, which became effective on 15 April 1947—the Registrar issued a notification that listed various occupations found in cotton textile mills. In that notification the occupation of “folders” was placed in group F, while the occupation of “clerks” was placed in group H.

In December 1946 the Textile Labour Association of Ahmedabad served a notice of change upon the Mill‑owners’ Association, seeking a standardisation of wages for the different occupations employed in the cotton textile industry. The State Government responded in June 1947 by referring the matter to the industrial court. By the first part of its award the industrial court fixed the wage for grey‑folders who performed cut‑looking work at the rate of Rs 42‑4‑0 per month. The same court later dealt with the wages of clerks and issued the second part of its award in October 1948.

In April 1949 the Textile Labour Association issued a notice, in accordance with Section 116 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, terminating the earlier award; consequently the award ceased to operate in June 1949. Subsequently, under Section 42(2) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, the Textile Labour Association issued a further notice calling for a revision of the existing pay scales. Pursuing that notice, the Ahmedabad Mill‑owners’ Association and the Textile Labour Association executed an agreement on 22 June 1949 which was intended to apply to every cotton mill in Ahmedabad.

The agreement contained several clauses concerning pay scales. Clause 4 set out the wage scales for clerks, dividing them into three distinct categories. Clause 5, which is the focus of the present appeal, provided for a separate wage scale applicable to employees whose position was lower than that of a full‑fledged clerk but higher than that of an operative. The clause specified the scale as “40‑3‑70/EB‑4‑90‑5‑105” and enumerated the categories of employees to which it would apply, namely ticket boys, ticket checkers, coupon sellers, tally boys, production checkers, thread counters, cloth measurers, department store‑men, cut lookers and any other persons who could properly be said to fall within that intermediate grade.

Although the agreement expressly listed a number of occupations, it did not specifically mention grey‑folders. As a result, grey‑folders continued to receive the wage of Rs 42‑4‑0 per month that had been fixed by the first part of the industrial court’s award. In January 1950 the fourteen respondents, who were grey‑folders, filed an application under Section 79 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act before the labour court. They contended that they were entitled to the wage scale prescribed in Clause 5 of the 1949 agreement, and that the continued payment of the lower wage amounted to an unlawful alteration of their terms of employment. The labour court dismissed their application in April 1952, holding that the evidence demonstrated beyond any doubt that the applicants were operatives and not clerks performing routine writing, copying or calculation work. The Court further observed that the grey‑folders had not claimed to be clerks, which would have placed them under Clause 4; instead their claim was that they occupied an intermediate position between clerks and operatives, which should bring them within the ambit of Clause 5.

In this case, the fourteen grey‑folders filed an application under Section 79 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act before the labour court, contending that they were not being paid the grade prescribed by Clause 5 of the 1949 agreement and that the employer’s practice amounted to an unlawful alteration of their wages. They prayed that the court order the employer to withdraw the illegal change. The labour court dismissed the application in April 1952, holding that the evidence established beyond doubt that the applicants were operatives and therefore could not be classified as clerks who performed routine writing, copying, or calculation work. This finding was erroneous, the Court noted, because the grey‑folders had never claimed to be clerks; had they done so, they would have relied on Clause 4 of the agreement. Instead, they asserted that they occupied an intermediate position between clerks and operatives and were thus covered by Clause 5, which created a separate wage scale for such an intermediate grade. No appeal or other challenge to the labour court’s order was pursued by the grey‑folders.

Subsequently, the grey‑folders sought modification of the industrial court’s award relating to folders by filing an application under Section 116A of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. This application was withdrawn on 22 April 1953 when the parties agreed to refer the dispute to private arbitration, and the application was consequently dismissed. The private arbitrators heard the matter and, on 27 November 1953, rejected the grey‑folders’ demand for an increase in their wages.

After the arbitrators’ decision, the grey‑folders approached the Authority constituted under the Payment of Wages Act in April 1954. In that application they affirmed that Clause 5 of the 1949 agreement governed their employment and that, given the nature of their duties, they were entitled to the wages specified in that clause. They alleged that they were being paid only Rs 42‑4‑0 per month, which was lower than the amount due under the clause, and therefore sought recovery of Rs 1,863 as wages withheld for the period from September 1953 to February 1954. The appellant opposed the application, raising various technical objections, but principally argued two points: first, that the Authority lacked jurisdiction to entertain the grievance; and second, that, in view of the earlier decisions of the industrial court in 1948 and the labour court in 1952, the grey‑folders were estopped from claiming wages under Clause 5. The Authority rejected both objections, holding that it possessed the jurisdiction to consider the application and that no estoppel arose from the previous judgments. On examining the merits, the Authority concluded, based on the duties performed by the grey‑folders, that they were clearly covered by Clause 5 of the agreement. It further held that the claim for withheld wages for

In the matter before the Court, the authority had held that the wage claim for September 1953 was barred by the limitation period and therefore ordered that delayed wages of Rs 1,552‑8‑0 be paid only for the period from October 1953 to February 1954. The appellant, dissatisfied with that decision, filed a writ petition in the High Court in April 1955. The High Court dismissed the petition summarily and also refused to grant a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court. Consequently, the appellant applied to the Supreme Court for special leave to appeal, which was granted, and the appeal now stands before this Court. Counsel for the appellant reiterated two principal points. First, he argued that, pursuant to Section 42(2) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act read with item (5) of Schedule III, the question raised in the original application concerned the construction and interpretation of the agreement and therefore could only be addressed in the manner prescribed by that provision, not before the authority. Second, he contended that, in view of the earlier decisions of the industrial court in 1948 and the labour court in 1952, the folders were estopped from raising the wage claim at all, and he relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in A V D’Costa v B C Patel for guidance on the extent of the authority’s powers. The Court heard the arguments of counsel for both sides at length and acknowledged that the appellant’s submission concerning the authority’s jurisdiction possessed some merit. However, the Court declined to adjudicate the jurisdictional issue in this appeal because the appellant had already approached the High Court by way of a writ petition, and that petition had been dismissed. The present appeal is therefore directed not against the authority’s order itself but against the High Court’s dismissal of the writ petition. Even if the authority’s order contained certain infirmities, the Court reasoned that there was no justification for interfering with the High Court’s dismissal so long as the authority’s order had not caused a miscarriage of justice. The folders had consistently claimed entitlement to a wage scale provided in Clause 5 of the agreement, seeking the intermediate grade between clerks and operatives rather than claiming to be clerks. The agreement, which was executed after the 1948 industrial court decision, must be regarded as having varied that decision by mutual consent, thereby negating any claim of estoppel. Consequently, the Court found no basis for the estoppel argument and proceeded to consider the matter on its merits.

In this case the grey‑folders had applied to the labour court seeking to be placed in the grade that was prescribed by Clause (5) of the agreement, and they were therefore entitled to expect that the labour court would examine whether, considering the nature of the duties they performed, they could be assigned to the intermediate grade. However, the judgment delivered by the labour court in April 1952 appears to have been based on a misunderstanding of what the grey‑folders actually claimed. The court seemed to assume that the grey‑folders were asking to be treated as clerks, which was not their contention. Their genuine claim was for the intermediate grade that lies between clerks and operatives, a point that the labour court did not fully appreciate, even though it recognised that there seemed to be some conflict between the award of the industrial court and the terms of the agreement. The matter was then examined in detail on its merits by the Authority. After a careful assessment of the type of work performed by the grey‑folders, the Authority concluded that, although the grey‑folders were not full‑fledged clerks, they were nevertheless entitled to the intermediate grade. The Court agreed with this conclusion and held that the Authority’s view was correct. The next issue that arose was whether the Court should intervene under Article 136 of the Constitution, given that it was satisfied there had been no failure of justice. In similar situations this Court has declined to interfere and has not entertained a question of jurisdiction where it is not convinced that the interests of justice require such interference, as illustrated in the earlier decision of A.M. Allison v. B.L. Sen. Applying the same reasoning, the Court found that it was not satisfied that the interests of justice demanded intervention in the present circumstances. Consequently, the Court refused to disturb the order of the High Court that dismissed the appellant’s writ petition. The appeal was therefore dismissed. Nevertheless, because of the unusual facts of the case that had been discussed, the Court ordered that each party should bear its own costs of this appeal.