Balkrishna Savalram Pujari and Others vs Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharajsansthan and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 220 to 223 of 1953

Decision Date: 26 March 1959

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar

In this matter the Supreme Court of India considered an appeal filed by Balkrishna Savalram Pujari and several others, who were hereditary worshippers, commonly known as Guravs, of the Shree Dnyaneshwar Sansthan located in Alandi. The respondents were the trustees of that Sansthan. The judgment was rendered on 26 March 1959. The opinion was authored by Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, who was joined by Justices A. K. Sarkar, Subbarao K. and others. The case is reported in the 1959 All India Reporter at page 798 and also in the Supreme Court Reporter Supplement, volume 2, page 476, and it is cited in later authorities such as 1981 SC 1106 (18). The statutory framework discussed involved the Indian Limitation Act of 1908, specifically Articles 120, 124 and Section 23, in relation to a suit for possession of the Sansthan that had been ousted by the trustees.

The background of the dispute was that the Guravs claimed ownership of the Sansthan by virtue of their hereditary status. In 1911 the trustees dismissed eleven of the Guravs, served notice upon the remaining Guravs demanding that they comply with the orders of the Temple committee, and appointed six Brahmin priests to carry out the services of the Sansthan. The Guravs refused to comply and instituted litigation seeking a declaration of their ownership rights and related reliefs. The High Court, in a decision delivered in 1921, rejected the Guravs’ claim of ownership but left their hereditary worshipper rights unresolved. Subsequently, on 25 July 1922, the Guravs took forcible possession of the temple premises. The trustees responded by filing a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act on 12 September 1922, and obtained a decree on 4 November 1932. In execution of that decree the Guravs were displaced from the premises.

Following those events, the present suits, which gave rise to the present appeals, were filed by the Guravs against the trustees. The plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration of their hereditary servant rights over the Sansthan, a permanent injunction restraining the trustees from interfering with the exercise of those rights, and an order for accounts. The trustees counter-claimed that the Guravs were merely servants of the Temple committee and possessed no hereditary rights; even assuming such rights existed, the trustees argued that any claim was barred by the limitation period. The trial court decreed in favour of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the High Court upheld the merits of the trial court’s decision but diverged on the issue of limitation, holding that the suits were barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, with the cause of action arising either at the filing of the trustees’ section 9 suit or, at the latest, at the date of the decree, and that Section 23 did not apply. The High Court consequently allowed the appeals filed by the trustees.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellants contended that the suits should be governed by Article 124 of the Limitation Act, and that even if Article 120 applied, Section 23 would save the action from limitation. The Court examined the appropriate article and concluded that the High Court was correct in applying Article 120 rather than Article 124, and that Section 23 of the Limitation Act had no relevance to the suits in question.

The Court observed that Article 124 of the Limitation Act applied to the suits and that Section 23 did not apply to them. It explained that Article 124 is relevant only when the cause of action arises from wrongful dispossession of the plaintiff and from the defendant’s adverse possession of a hereditary office. In such actions, the dispute is normally between rival claimants to the hereditary office, rather than between a claimant and trustees. The Court emphasized that the provision of Column 3 to that article could not be ignored in determining its applicability. It held that the decisions in Kunj Bihari Prasadji v. Keshavlal Hiralal, reported in 1904 I.L.R. 28 Bom. 567, and Jalim Singh Srimal v. Choonee Lall Johurry, reported in 1911 15 C.W.N. 882, were inapplicable. The Court approved the earlier judgment in Thathachariar v. Singarachariar, A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 377, distinguished Annasami v. Advarachari, I.L.R. 1941 Mad. 275, and referred to Jhalandar Thakur v. Jharula Das, reported in 1914 I.L.R. 42 Cal. 2444. In this way, the Court clarified the limited scope of Article 124 for the matters before it.

The Court further explained that Section 23 of the Limitation Act relates to a continuing wrong rather than a continuing right. It defined a continuing wrong as one that creates a source of ongoing injury, as opposed to a wrong that is completed and merely results in continued damage. The Court illustrated that a completed injury does not constitute a continuing wrong even though it may cause ongoing consequences. Applying this principle, the Court found that the injury to the appellants, which stemmed from the decree obtained by the trustees in the Section 9 suit and amounted to an ouster, was a complete injury at the moment of ouster. Consequently, Section 23 could not be invoked to save the limitation period. The Court referred to the authorities in Choudhury Bibhuti Narayan Singh v. Maharaja Sir Guru Mahadeu Asram Prasad Saki Bahadur, reported in 1930 I.L.R. 19 Pat. 208, and Khair Mohammad Khan v. Mst. Jannat, reported in 1940 I.L.R. 22 Lah. 22. It distinguished and held inapplicable the cases of Maharani Rajroop Koer v. Syaed Abdul Hossein, reported in 1880 L.R. 7 I.A. 240, and Hukum Chand v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh, reported in 1933 L.R. 60 I.A. 313.

The judgment was delivered in the Civil Appellate Jurisdiction for Civil Appeals Nos. 220 to 223 of 1953. These appeals arose from the judgments and decrees dated 14 April 1943 of the Bombay High Court in Appeals Nos. 183, 184, 185 and 186 of 1942, which themselves originated from the judgments and decrees dated 16 February 1942 of the Court of the 1st Class Sub-Judge, Poona, in Suits Nos. 900/37, 392/35, 875/36 and 1202/33. Counsel for the appellants were V. P. Rege and Naunit Lal, while counsel for respondents 1 to 6 included N. C. Chatterjee, K. V. Joshi and Ganpat Rai. The judgment was pronounced on 26 March 1959 by Justice Gajendra Gadkar. The Court described these four appeals as representing the final stage of a prolonged and complex litigation between the appellants, known as Waghmares or Guravs, who claimed hereditary worshipper rights in the Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan at Alandi, and respondents 1 to 6, who were the trustees of that Sansthan. The Court noted that Alandi is a small town on the banks of the river Indrayani, located about fourteen miles from Poona, and is regarded as a holy place of pilgrimage.

In this case, the Court described Alandi as a place of pilgrimage visited by thousands of Hindu devotees. The Court noted that in the last quarter of the thirteenth century the great Maharashtrian saint and philosopher Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj lived in Alandi. He was a spiritual teacher and reformer; through his saintly life and his illuminating commentary on the Bhagavad Gita, known as the Dnyaneshwari, he generated a popular desire for religious and social renewal. This movement led to the formation of a devotional cult whose followers are called Warkaris in Maharashtra. The Court observed that the Warkaris reject caste and class barriers and that among them there exists a sincere feeling of spiritual brotherhood.

The Court further explained that each year, during the months of July and November, thousands of Warkaris undertake a pilgrimage on foot and join the annual palanquin procession that proceeds from Alandi to Pandharpur. Pandharpur, the Court noted, is the chief centre of pilgrimage in Maharashtra and is regarded by devotees as the Banares of Southern India. The Court recorded that Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj took Samadhi at Alandi around the year 1300 A.D., and that from that time Alandi also acquired the status of a pilgrimage site. Around 1500 A.D., a large temple was constructed in front of the Shiva idol known as Siddeshwar, the place where Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj had taken Samadhi.

According to the Court, the Maratha kings and the Peshwas of Poona subsequently granted the village of Alandi as an inam for the upkeep of the temple and the Samadhi. About the year 1760 A.D., the Court said, Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao prepared a budget called the Beheda or Taleband in order to regulate the management and worship of the shrine and to provide for proper administration of its annual revenue, which amounted to Rs 1,725. The appellants claim that their ancestors then possessed the temple and were responsible for managing its affairs, especially the worship of the shrine. The Court pointed out that the budget shows that out of the total sum of Rs 1,725, an amount of Rs 361 was assigned to the worshippers for certain services.

The Court continued that after the decline of Maratha power, the management of Alandi passed into the hands of the East India Company, which continued the existing arrangement without interference. In 1852, the Court noted, the Collector of Poona, acting under orders of the Government of Bombay, prepared a memorandum (referred to as a yadi) appointing six persons as Punchas, that is, trustees, and gave them directions for managing the temple in accordance with the old tradition and practice, as well as for administering the village revenue, subject to the control and sanction of the Collector. This arrangement became known as “the scheme of 1852.” The Court observed that the Religious Endowment Act was passed in 1863 and, consequently, the Government of Bombay withdrew its superintendence over the affairs of the Alandi Sansthan in 1864; thereafter the trustees continued to manage the temple without any governmental supervision. During this period, the Court recorded, the appellants’ ancestors began to assert that they were the owners of the shrine, while the trustees maintained that the worshippers were merely servants of the shrine. This disagreement gave rise to a series of disputes between the worshippers and the trustees, ultimately leading to the litigation described in the present case.

In the controversy that arose, the trustees maintained that the Guravs were only the servants of the shrine, while the Guravs asserted that they were the owners of the shrine. This opposition inevitably gave rise to several disputes between the worshippers and the trustees. The situation escalated to a crisis in 1911 when the trustees dismissed eleven Guravs from temple service on the ground that the Guravs had been found guilty of gross misconduct. The dismissed Guravs, nevertheless, contended that they were the owners of the shrine and that the trustees possessed no authority to dismiss them. Acting on that claim of ownership, a number of the dismissed Guravs instituted Civil Suit No. 485 of 1911 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Poona, against the trustees. That filing marked the commencement of the protracted litigation that subsequently unfolded between the parties.

In the 1911 suit the Guravs sought a declaration that they were the owners of the temple and not merely the servants of the temple committee. They further claimed that, as owners, they were entitled to perform worship at the shrine and to appropriate the offerings made to the idol of the saint. The trustees opposed this claim and pleaded that the Guravs were only the servants of the temple committee and had no ownership rights at all. On 20 April 1917 the trial judge dismissed the suit, holding that the Guravs were not the owners of the shrine and therefore were not entitled to the declarations they sought. The Guravs appealed the decision, but all of their appeals were dismissed on 3 August 1921.

While dismissing the appeals, the High Court expressed the view that the Guravs were free to negotiate with the temple committee and that the terms of any reinstatement could appropriately be decided in a suit filed under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court also observed that the temple committee did not dispute the fact that the Guravs were hereditary pujaris and that they possessed certain rights in that capacity. The committee, however, maintained that under the scheme framed in 1852 it was competent to dismiss hereditary servants for a substantial cause such as gross misconduct. Rather than following the High Court’s suggestion and instituting a suit under section 92, the Guravs chose to take the law into their own hands. On 25 July 1922 they obtained forcible possession of the temple premises, resumed the performance of puja and began to take the offerings placed before the deity, as they had done before their dismissal.

In response, the trustees filed a suit on 12 September 1922 (Suit No. 1075 of 1922) under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. That suit concluded with a decree in favour of the committee on 4 November 1922. Pursuant to the decree, the committee recovered possession of the temple on 16 November 1922, thereby ending the Guravs’ brief period of occupation.

The Guravs remained in possession of the temple precincts for roughly three and a half months. When the committee, acting on the decree it had secured, removed the Guravs from the premises, a number of them instituted Suit No 19 of 1922 in the District Court at Poona. Although the suit was presented as one brought under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it sought exactly the same reliefs that the Guravs had pursued in their earlier suit of 1911. On 25 April 1927 the District Court dismissed Suit No 19, holding that the Guravs could not revive the same questions that had already been decided. The court ruled that the claim was barred by the decree rendered in the earlier Suit No 485 of 1911. The Guravs appealed this dismissal by filing First Appeal No 507 of 1927 before the High Court. The High Court affirmed the District Court’s decision, dismissing the appeal on 20 June 1933 and observing that the suit was not properly constituted under section 92 of the Code.

Subsequently, a correctly framed suit, identified as No 7 of 1934, was filed under section 92 of the Code by the general public of Alandi together with two Guravs in the District Court at Poona. This suit asserted that a proper scheme should be formulated for the management of the temple. Within the plaint, one allegation referred to the Guravs’ status as hereditary worshippers. Anticipating that this particular allegation might be treated as falling outside the ambit of a scheme suit under section 92, the Guravs prudently instituted four separate suits on behalf of four branches of the Waghmare family. These suits were numbered 1202 of 1933, 392 of 1935, 875 of 1936 and 900 of 1937, with the plaintiffs being, respectively, members of the third, fourth, first and second branches of the Waghmare family. The hearing of each of these suits was stayed by an order of the District Judge, pending the final determination of the principal scheme suit that was then before him.

The scheme suit itself was taken up for hearing in 1937. In that proceeding as many as twenty-two issues were framed and a voluminous body of evidence was recorded. After considering the material, the learned judge essentially affirmed the original scheme of 1852, while issuing certain directions that modified specific aspects of that scheme. The decree confirming this finding was pronounced on 11 December 1937. Dissatisfied with the decree, the trustees filed an appeal, numbered No 92 of 1938, before the Bombay High Court. On 16 November 1939 the High Court dismissed the trustees’ appeal, although it incorporated some amendments to the scheme, made with the consent of the parties, as framed by the District Judge. Following the disposal of the scheme suit by the High Court, the four separate suits filed by the pujaris were then taken up for trial.

After the scheme suit was concluded, the four suits filed by the pujaris were placed before the learned Subordinate Judge, First Class, at Poona, for trial. In each of these suits the appellants asserted that they possessed hereditary rights as vatandar Pujari-Gurav servants of the Sansthan. They pleaded that they were bound by a duty to perform worship according to specific rites in the Shree Dayaneshwar Sansthan and that they were also required to carry out other incidental duties which they set out in their plaints. In addition, the appellants claimed that, as remuneration, they were entitled to receive coins and perishable articles offered by devotees and by the committee, as well as yearly emoluments payable by the committee. On the basis of these allegations the appellants sought a declaration of their respective rights and a permanent injunction restraining the trustees from any obstruction in the exercise of those rights. They further asked the court to order the trustees to render accounts of the offerings received both before the institution of the suit and those received after the suit was filed but before the decree was passed. The respondents, numbered one through six, denied every allegation. Their principal contention was that the appellants were merely servants of the temple committee and therefore held no hereditary rights at all. Alternatively, they submitted that even if any hereditary right existed, it had been lost because of misconduct by the appellants’ ancestors and, moreover, that any such right had been extinguished by the operation of limitation. The respondents also pleaded that the present suits were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel. In response, the trial court framed twenty-one issues for determination. After hearing the parties, the trial court decided in favour of the appellants on each of the twenty-one issues. The learned judge held that the Guravs had successfully established the hereditary rights they claimed, and he expressed the view that the respondents could not deprive the appellants of those hereditary service rights merely because some of their ancestors had engaged in misconduct. The judge further found that the pleas of estoppel and res judicata lacked any substance and that the suits were not barred by limitation. Consequently, the court decreed in favour of the appellants on 16 February 1942. The respondents then filed appeals against those decrees in the Bombay High Court, which were recorded as First Appeals Nos. 183, 184, 185 and 186 of 1942. The High Court, after reviewing the matters, concurred with the trial court that, on the merits, the appellants had established their case and that their claim was not barred by res judicata or estoppel. However, the High Court addressed the question of limitation and held that the suits were governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, which prescribed a six-year period for filing. Finding that the suits had been instituted beyond that six-year period, the High Court set aside the trial-court decrees, allowed the respondents’ appeals, and dismissed the appellants’ suits. Nevertheless, considering the special facts of the case, the High Court directed that each party should bear its own costs throughout the proceedings.

The High Court ordered that each party should bear its own costs for the entire litigation, and that order was pronounced on 14 April 1943. In the same manner as the trial court, the High Court addressed all four suits together by delivering a single common judgment. After the judgment was announced but before it was formally signed, the appellants filed a motion before the High Court on 2 July 1943 seeking a rehearing of one of the appeals, specifically Appeal No. 186 of 1942. In that motion the appellants contended that, even assuming that article 120 of the Limitation Act applied, the claim raised in that appeal—which originated from Suit No. 1202 of 1933—could not be held to be barred by limitation. The High Court found this argument unconvincing and consequently dismissed the motion for rehearing. Thereafter the appellant in the same appeal filed a Civil Application, No. 1039 of 1944, again attempting to raise the same limitation point, but the High Court rejected that application on 12 September 1944. Following these setbacks the appellants applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council on 15 August 1944. Their applications were heard together, and an order dated 26 March 1946 granted them leave to appeal to the Privy Council and also permitted the consolidation of all the appeals. However, the Privy Council was unable to dispose of the matters before its jurisdiction over Indian appeals terminated, and consequently the appeals were transferred to this Court, where they were numbered as Appeals Nos. 220 to 223 of 1953. For clarity, these four appeals arose respectively from Suit No. 907 of 1937, Suit No. 392 of 1935, Suit No. 875 of 1936, and Suit No. 1202 of 1933. Thus, a dispute that had begun between the parties in 1911 had now reached its final stage before this Court. Both courts below had decided in favour of the appellants on most of the substantive issues that had been raised, but the appellants had been unsuccessful in the High Court on the ground of limitation. In the trial court the respondents had argued that the suits were governed by article 124 of the Limitation Act, contending that because the Guravs had been dismissed from service in 1911 and other Guravs had refused to serve in 1913 and 1914, limitation began to run against them at least from 1914, rendering the suits time-barred. The learned trial judge rejected the applicability of article 124. He further held, alternatively, that even if that article were applicable, the trustees had not possessed continuous possession of the suit properties for twelve years from either 1911 or 1914, and therefore the suits could not be said to be barred by limitation. The trial judge concluded that the matter was properly covered by section 23 of the Limitation Act, and consequently the plea of limitation could not succeed.

The High Court concurred with the trial judge that article 124 of the Limitation Act was inapplicable. However, the High Court concluded that the suits were governed by article 120 of the Limitation Act. According to the High Court’s findings, the limitation period began to run against the appellants either on 12 September 1922, when the trustees instituted a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, or, in any event, in November 1922, when the appellants were removed from the temple precincts in execution of the decree in that suit. The High Court also held that section 23 of the Limitation Act could not be applied to the present matters. Based on those determinations, the High Court declared that the appellants’ suits were barred by time under article 120. Consequently, the matters before this Court required a decision on two limitation issues: first, whether the High Court was correct in holding that article 120 applied and that the cause of action had accrued more than six years before the filing of the present suits; and second, whether the High Court was also correct in holding that section 23 did not apply to the suits. Counsel for the appellants argued that, in substance, the present suits sought a claim for possession of a hereditary office and therefore should be governed by article 124 of the Limitation Act. To support that contention, counsel cited the relevant allegations in the plaint, showing that the appellants’ prayer for a declaration of their hereditary rights and a consequential permanent injunction amounted to a claim for possession of the hereditary office. Counsel relied on the Bombay High Court decision in Kunj Bihari Prasadji v. Keshavlal Hiralal, (1904) I.L.R. 28 Bom. 567. In that case, the plaintiff claimed the gadi of the Swaminarayan temple at Ahmedabad and sought a declaration that the will of the last Acharya, which purported to appoint the defendant as his adopted son and successor, was null and void, together with a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from obstructing the plaintiff’s occupation of the gadi. The lower courts dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to claim the further relief required under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The Bombay High Court held that section 42 did not empower the court to dismiss the suit, and it examined the nature of the plaintiff’s claim in detail.

In this case the Court recorded that Chief Justice Jenkins had observed that, in the plaintiff’s own view, the action was not a suit for possession of land that belonged to the gadi but rather a suit to determine which party should occupy the gadi and thereby become the human agent of the deity. He further explained that, if that characterization was correct, an injunction restraining any interference with the plaintiff’s occupancy of the gadi would provide the plaintiff with the fullest possible protection of the rights he claimed. The learned Chief Justice also noted that the plaintiff could alternatively have sought a declaration of possession of the office he alleged to be his, but he questioned how such an award of possession could be given practical effect except by preventing interference with the rights that constituted that office. Despite having set aside the decree of the lower courts, the Court observed that when the High Court remanded the matter for a new trial, the plaintiff was directed to amend his pleadings and to specify more precisely the terms of the injunction he desired. The Court then turned to the present appeals and observed that, by seeking a declaration of their rights together with an appropriate injunction against the respondents, the appellants were in effect seeking possession of the hereditary office. The Court expressed doubt as to whether the claims advanced by the appellants were precisely analogous to the claim in Kunj Bihari Prasad’s case (1). It noted that the appellants had not only prayed for an injunction but also demanded accounts of the income received by the trustees from 23 July 1933 to the date of the suit and from the date of the suit to the date of the decree. The Court observed that a claim for accounts in the manner presented might not be entirely consistent with the appellants’ contention that their suits were solely for possession of the hereditary office (1) (1904) I.L.R. 28 Bom. 567, yet for the purposes of deciding the appeals it assumed that, in substance, they were indeed claiming possession of the office. Consequently the Court posed the question whether such a claim for possession attracted the operation of article 124 of the Limitation Act. It explained that article 124 governs suits for possession of a hereditary office and prescribes a limitation period of twelve years, which begins to run when the defendant takes adverse possession of the office. The Court clarified that possession of a hereditary office is deemed to exist when its profits are ordinarily received, or, if there are no profits, when its duties are ordinarily performed. It further stressed that before article 124 can apply, it must be shown that the suit seeks possession of a hereditary office and that the claim is made against a defendant who has taken adverse possession of that office, distinguishing this requirement from the provisions of article 142.

In this case the Court observed that the mere fact that the plaintiff had been out of possession of the hereditary office for a period exceeding twelve years prior to the filing of his suit did not by itself defeat his claim to recover possession of that office. What could defeat his claim was the defendant’s adverse possession of the office for the period prescribed by the limitation provision. The Court explained that possession is ordinarily established by the receipt of the profits that normally accrue to the holder of the office; however, if the defendant only received the profits and failed to perform the duties that are customarily performed by the office-holder, the receipt of profits alone would not constitute possession of the office. The cause of action for possession under the statutory article arose from the plaintiff’s wrongful dispossession and the defendant’s adverse occupation of the office in question. Typically, suits that fall within the ambit of the article are brought by a holder of a hereditary office against another person who claims adverse possession, meaning that the dispute usually involves two competing claimants to the same hereditary office.

In the present appeals the claim for possession was asserted by the appellants against the trustees of the Sansthan. The Court noted that the individuals who actually performed the worship duties were not parties to the suit and did not contend that they held the office as hereditary officers. Those individuals had been appointed by the trustees in the capacity of servants of the institution and performed worship solely as servants. Conversely, the trustees could not be said to have taken possession of the hereditary office in adverse fashion against the appellants because they neither received the profits nor performed the duties associated with the office. By exercising their authority, the trustees had dismissed the predecessors of the appellants and had appointed new servants to carry out worship at the Sansthan, thereby destroying the hereditary character of the office. The dispute, therefore, was between worshippers who claimed hereditary rights and trustees who asserted that they had lawfully terminated the services of certain predecessors and had validly appointed new persons to the office. Consequently, the Court found it impossible to accept the argument that the appellants’ suits fell within the scope of the statutory provision. The counsel for the respondents conceded that if the provision did not apply, the suits would be governed by the residuary article, which is a different limitation rule. The Court remarked that it might appear unusual that a suit against a person who holds the hereditary office adversely to the plaintiff is subject to a twelve-year limitation, whereas a claim against trustees, who have dismissed hereditary worshippers, would be subject only to a six-year limitation. The Court further indicated that such artificial limitation periods do not always conform to logic or equity, but emphasized that the trustees’ conduct did not satisfy the statutory definition of adverse possession required for the application of the twelve-year rule.

The Court observed that, unlike the earlier dispute which was subject to a twelve-year limitation, the present claim against the trustees should be governed by a six-year limitation period. Although one could argue that the two disputes differ substantially in character, the Court noted that statutory limitation periods are sometimes arbitrary and may fail to satisfy principles of logic or equity. Counsel for the petitioners, Mr Rege, contended that in interpreting the scope of article 124 it was unnecessary to refer to column 3 of that article. He maintained that once a suit is characterised as seeking possession of a hereditary office, article 124 must apply even if the suit does not allege that the plaintiff’s claim is against a person who has taken possession of the office to the plaintiff’s detriment. He further suggested, alternatively, that the trustees could be deemed to have taken possession of the office adversely to the appellants. The Court replied that it had already found that the trustees’ conduct did not amount to adverse possession within the meaning of column 3 of article 124, and that ignoring the provision of column 3 in deciding the applicability of article 124 was untenable. The Court then referred to Jalim Singh Srimal v. Choonee Lall Johurry (1), where, although the plaintiff’s claim was found timely under both articles 115 and 120, Chief Justice Jenkins observed that the purpose of the third column of the Second Schedule is to determine the point from which the limitation period commences, not to define the cause of action. The Court held that this observation did not support the appellants’ argument that article 124 should govern the suit when column 3 is inapplicable. The Court also cited the Madras High Court’s decision in Thathachariar v. Singarachariar (2), where Justice Srinivasa Aiyangar examined the terminology of the three columns of article 124 and concluded that the article is intended for suits filed by a plaintiff who claims the office from a person who, at that time, actually holds the office. The Court agreed with that interpretation. Finally, the Court referred to another Madras High Court precedent, Annasami v. Adivarachari (3), a Full Bench case concerning an injunction restraining trustees and archakas from interfering with the duties of a hereditary office, underscoring the relevance of the earlier authorities to the present matter.

The suit that is the subject of the Full Bench decision concerned the hereditary office of mantrapushpam belonging to a temple. The plaintiff filed the suit in the year 1929, asserting his right to occupy that office and to perform its duties. The office of mantrapushpam was a hereditary post that the plaintiff inherited upon the death of his father in 1906. The emoluments attached to the office consisted of a ball of cooked rice each month together with a payment of twelve annas. It emerged that the plaintiff belonged to the Vadagalai community while the archakas of the temple were Thengalais, and that long-standing animosity existed between the two groups. Because of this animosity the plaintiff had never been able to exercise the duties attached to his hereditary office. All parties agreed that the plaintiff was the lawful holder of the office and that he had received its emoluments month after month until the year 1927. The archakas who opposed the plaintiff’s claim did not assert that they themselves possessed the office or that they had performed its functions. Thus the factual matrix presented a situation where the plaintiff was recognized as the legitimate office-holder but was prevented from exercising the associated responsibilities. The Full Bench was called upon to determine whether the plaintiff’s receipt of the emoluments was sufficient to establish possession of the office for limitation purposes. The Court observed that a person who is admittedly the lawful holder of an office and who enjoys its emoluments must, in law, be deemed to be in possession of the office itself. This presumption applied especially where no other individual was performing the duties of the office in question at that time.

Consequently, under article 124 the plaintiff needed only to prove that he had been receiving the monthly emoluments in order to defeat the bar of limitation. The Court also rejected the argument that article 120 would bar the suit because each act of obstruction by the trustees and archakas gave rise to a fresh cause of action. Accordingly, the Court held that every time the plaintiff was prevented from performing his hereditary duties a new cause of action arose, preventing the operation of the limitation period. The decision therefore rested on the principle that the plaintiff’s continual receipt of the emoluments meant he remained in legal possession of the office, making each obstruction a continuing wrong. In other words, the Full Bench concluded that section 23 of the relevant statute supported the plaintiff and saved his suit from the limitation defence. The Court, however, indicated that the same reasoning could not be extended to the present appeals, and that the Annasami Iyengar judgment could not assist the appellants. To illustrate the limitation of the principle, the judgment referred to the Privy Council decision in Jhalandar Thakur v. Jharula Das, where article 124 was held inapplicable. In that case the defendant Jharula Das had obtained a decree for money on a mortgage that had been executed in his favour by Mst. Grihimoni, the widow of the shebait of the temple. In execution of that decree, the defendant was the party who actually carried out the enforcement of the judgment.

In the earlier proceedings the defendant caused the one-and-a-half share of the judgment-debtor, which comprised her right to the net income of the daily offerings presented before the idol, to be offered for sale, and he himself purchased that share at the auction. As the successful purchaser he acquired possession of the income that belonged to that share. The judgment-debtor then attempted to contest the sale by filing two separate suits, but both attempts failed, and the auction purchaser continued to retain the income. After the death of Mst Grihimoni, Bhaiaji Thakur, who succeeded to the hereditary office of the shebait, instituted a suit against the defendant seeking possession of certain lands and also demanding a declaration that he was entitled to receive the one-and-a-half share of the net income arising from the temple offerings, together with other reliefs. The defendant, Jharula Das, opposed this claim. Regarding the plaintiff’s demand for the one-and-a-half share, the High Court held that article 124 of the relevant statute applied and consequently regarded the claim as barred by that article. For that reason the High Court reversed the trial court decree that had been entered in favour of the plaintiff concerning the income. The plaintiff appealed this decision before the Privy Council, contending that article 124 was inapplicable. The Privy Council accepted that contention and upheld the appeal. The Council observed that the office of the shebait of the temple was a hereditary position that could be held only by a Brahmin Panda; Jharula Das was not a Brahmin Panda but belonged to a lower caste and therefore was not competent to occupy the shebait office or to perform its duties (see (1) I.L.R. 1941 Mad. 275; (2) (1914) I.L.R. 42 Cal. 244). On these facts the Privy Council held that the periodic appropriation by Jharula Das of the income deriving from the one-and-a-half share did not deprive Mst Grihimoni, and after her death Bhaiaji Thakur, of their possession of the shebait office, even though the income was receivable by them in right of the shebaitship. The basis of the decision was that each time Jharula Das received and wrongfully appropriated for his own use a share of the income to which the shebait was entitled, he committed a fresh actionable wrong, giving rise to a separate suit by the shebait, but such acts did not make him the shebait nor did they affect the title to the hereditary office. Consequently the decision emphasized that for article 124 to apply, the defendant must be in adverse possession of the hereditary office in question. Accordingly, the present court must hold that article 124 does not apply to the suits filed by the appellants, as previously observed.

If article 124 does not apply, then the case must be examined under article 120. The next issue for determination was whether, under article 120, the suits were barred by the limitation period. Article 120 provides that the limitation clock starts to run against the plaintiffs from the moment the right to sue accrues to them. Consequently, the Court had to decide precisely when the appellants’ right to sue had arisen. To answer this question, the Court found it necessary to briefly revisit the material facts concerning the earlier disputes between the appellants and the trustees.

These disputes had their origin in the year 1911. On 31 January 1911, the trustees prepared a yadi, which is a memorandum, and addressed it to the Collector of Poona. In that memorandum they sought the Collector’s permission to dismiss eleven Guravs who were then in the service of the institution. The trustees enumerated several specific acts of misconduct that they alleged the Guravs had committed and argued that, for the proper administration of the institution’s affairs, it was essential to terminate the employment of the eleven Guravs who were then offending (Exhibit 407). On 1 April 1911, the Collector replied to the trustees. He informed them that, pursuant to Government Resolution No. 4712 dated 29 November 1864, the trustees were not required to obtain the Collector’s sanction for such dismissals because the trustees possessed the authority to settle their own internal matters without external approval.

Following the Collector’s response, the trustees convened a committee meeting on 18 September 1911. At that meeting the committee resolved to dismiss the eleven Guravs from service. The resolution described the Guravs as violent and arrogant and warned that they might raise a riot when the committee attempted to take over their responsibilities. The committee further feared that the remaining Guravs might join forces with the dismissed ones and refuse to serve the Sansthan. Despite these concerns, the committee decided to temporarily appoint six Brahmins to carry out the necessary duties. The committee also indicated that it would be willing to allow the rest of the Guravs to continue serving the Sansthan provided they accepted the committee’s authority, entered into a formal agreement, and complied with the committee’s orders.

Acting on the committee’s resolution, a notice was served on the eleven Guravs on 13 October 1911. That notice terminated their employment, demanded that they hand over all articles in their charge, and barred them from entering the temple in their capacity as servants. A similar notice was issued to the remaining Guravs, inviting them to accept the conditions outlined in the notice and to continue serving the Sansthan under those terms. The Guravs found the conditions unacceptable. Consequently, on behalf of two Guravs, Eknath and his brother Ramachandra, a counter-notice was sent to the trustees on 26 October 1911. That notice protested the trustees’ actions in forcibly removing the Guravs from the temple and asserted that the trustees were wrongfully denying the Guravs’ rights. The notice warned the trustees that unless they withdrew their actions and restored possession to the Guravs, the Guravs would initiate appropriate legal steps against them.

After the notice warned that legal steps would be taken against them, the Guravs filed Suit No. 485 of 1911. In that suit the plaintiffs sought a declaration affirming their ownership rights over the temple and asked for consequential relief. The trustees opposed the claim, asserting that they had the authority to dismiss the Guravs and contending that some of the plaintiffs had already been dismissed while others had resigned, thereby losing any rights they might have claimed. The matter was vigorously contested, but the trial court dismissed the Guravs’ suit on 31 January 1918. Subsequently, the Guravs appealed to the High Court, but that appeal was also rejected on 3 August 1921.

While dismissing the appeals, the High Court observed that the Guravs might still possess hereditary rights of worship and suggested that such rights could be determined in a suit filed under section 92 of the Code. Accordingly, at the time the appeals were dismissed, the Guravs’ claim of ownership had been rejected, yet the question of whether they were entitled to the lesser right of hereditary worship remained undecided. Later, the Guravs forcibly entered the temple, prompting the trustees to commence suit No. 1075 of 1922 under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act on 12 September 1922. In that suit the trustees alleged that the defendants’ relationship as servants of the Sansthan had terminated as of September 1911, and therefore the defendants possessed no right to occupy the temple. The defendants disputed this allegation, asserting that they were hereditary vatandar pujari servants, but the court rejected their claim and passed a decree for possession on 4 November 1922. The decree was executed and the defendants were dispossessed.

On the basis of these facts, the High Court ruled in favour of the appellants, a view that this Court also accepts. The Court found it difficult to sustain the respondents’ argument that the cause of action for the present suits, which were expressly based on the Guravs’ status as hereditary servants, arose in 1911. Instead, the High Court concluded without doubt that the cause of action accrued either on 12 September 1922, when the trustees filed their suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, or at the latest on 4 November 1922, when the decree was passed and the Guravs were dispossessed. This Court concurs with that conclusion. During the present litigation one of the examined Guravs stated, “If in any year, when it is the turn of any takshim to serve, a person outside the Gurav family is appointed by the trustees, all the takshims have a right to object.” There is no dispute that

In the period beginning with the dismissal of eleven Guravs in 1911 and extending to the filing of the present suits, no member of the Gurav family performed any service for the temple except for a brief interval of three and a half months in 1922, during which the Guravs had erroneously taken possession of the temple. In that same year the Guravs were aware that their claim to ownership had been rejected and that the only entitlement they could assert was that of hereditary worshippers of the temple, not that of owners. The trustees expressly denied this entitlement in their plaint, while the Guravs specifically raised it as a defence in their written statement; the decree that followed affirmed the trustees’ position and rejected the claim of the defendants. On the basis of these facts the conclusion was unavoidable that the Guravs’ right to sue could not have arisen later than 4 November 1922, the date on which a decree under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act was pronounced. Even if the plaint itself did not create a cause of action, the decree itself clearly threatened the Guravs’ alleged hereditary worshipper rights, and therefore the cause of action to enforce those rights arose unmistakably at that moment. Consequently, the suits, which were instituted long after the six-year period that would have begun in 1922, were barred by the limitation provision of article 120. Counsel for the appellants then contended that the suits could not be said to be barred under article 120 because section 23 of the Limitation Act was applicable; according to that provision the conduct of the trustees constituted a continuing wrong, thereby restarting the limitation period each time the alleged wrong persisted. The question before the Court was whether the trustees’ conduct indeed amounted to a continuing wrong within the meaning of section 23. In addressing this argument it was necessary to remember that section 23 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong. A continuing wrong is, by its very nature, an act that generates an ongoing source of injury and holds the actor responsible for the persistence of that injury. When a wrongful act produces an injury that is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the consequences of the injury may endure. Conversely, when the wrongful act is of a character such that the injury it causes continues unabated, the act is deemed a continuing wrong. It is essential to distinguish between the injury caused by the wrongful act and the subsequent effects of that injury; only those acts that can properly be described as continuing wrongs may give rise to the operation of section 23.

In this matter, the Court examined whether the trustees’ conduct in completely denying the Guravs’ hereditary rights as worshippers and in acquiring possession through a suit filed in 1922 could be characterized as a continuing wrong. The decree that the trustees obtained in that litigation was found to have wholly and effectively injured the appellants’ rights, although the consequences of that decree persisted thereafter. The Court considered whether, after the appellants were removed from the temple in the execution of the decree, the ongoing state of dispossession could be attributed to a series of repeated tortious acts committed by the trustees on a moment-by-moment basis. It concluded that once the decree was issued and the execution proceedings dispossessed the appellants, the appellants’ rights were completely injured at that moment. While the dispossession continued, the trustees were not engaged in fresh wrongful conduct or new torts each instant that would revive a cause of action de die in diem. The Court held that where the alleged wrongful act consists of an ouster, the injury to the right is complete at the date of the ouster, leaving no room for the application of section 23 of the statute. This reasoning aligns with the view adopted by the High Court, and the Court found no justification to depart from that position.

The Court then turned to the authorities cited on the question of section 23. The leading case normally referred to is the Privy Council decision in Maharani Rajroop Koer v. Syed Abdul Hossein. To understand that decision, the Court briefly recounted the material facts. The plaintiff had succeeded in establishing his entitlement to a pyne, an artificial watercourse, and to the use of the water flowing through it, except for the water that passed through a branch channel. The plaintiff, however, could not establish a right to the water in the tal, except for overflow after the defendants, who were owners of the mouzah Morahad, diverted the water for irrigating their own land. The Court noted that all the obstructions created by the defendants were unauthorized. The plaintiff had obtained favorable rulings in the lower courts regarding every obstruction except two, identified as No. 3 and No. 10. Obstruction No. 3 was a khund, a channel cut into the side of the pyne below a bridge, and obstruction No. 10 was a dhonga, also below the bridge, consisting of hollow palm trunks placed to draw water from the pyne for the defendants’ irrigation. The question of a continuing wrong arose specifically with regard to these two obstructions, and the Privy Council held that the obstructions, by interfering

In the case under consideration, the interference with the flow of water to the plaintiff’s mehal was held to be a continuing nuisance, meaning that a cause of action arose anew each day for as long as the obstructions remained in place. Because of this, the Privy Council allowed the plaintiff’s claim concerning the two specific obstructions and set aside the decree that the High Court had previously issued in that respect. The Privy Council observed that the defendant’s conduct demonstrated that whenever the defendant diverted water through the alleged diversions, he was effectively taking water that belonged to the plaintiff, thereby committing a fresh wrong each time the diversion was used. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the situation did not constitute a case of exclusion or ouster. (1) (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 240. In a similar vein, the Privy Council’s decision in Hukum Chand v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh (1) dealt with a situation where the defendants’ acts amounted to a continuing wrong that enabled the plaintiff to rely on the benefit of section 23. The dispute in that case arose because the Swetambaris had altered the charans in certain shrines, and the Digambaris objected, alleging that those alterations interfered with their rights. Indian courts had found that the original charans in the old shrines were impressions of the saints’ footprints, each bearing a lotus mark. The Swetambaris, who preferred to worship the feet themselves, created a new form of charan that was difficult to describe accurately without models or photographs; the new charans showed toenails and were intended to represent a part of the foot. The Digambaris refused to worship these new representations, arguing that they depicted a detached part of the human body. The courts also held that the Swetambaris’ placement of the new charans in three shrines constituted a wrong for which the Digambaris could complain. The Privy Council had to determine whether the Swetambaris’ action of placing the new charans in those shrines was a continuing wrong. In favor of the plaintiffs, the Council referred to its earlier decision in Maharani Rajroop Koer (2) and concluded that the act was indeed a continuing wrong. There was no doubt that the impugned action did not amount to an ouster or the complete dispossession of the plaintiffs; rather, it was an act of a continuing wrong that gave rise to a cause of action renewed each day. The present Court expressed the view that neither of the two cited decisions could assist the appellants. Conversely, the Court noted the decision of the Patna High Court in Choudhury Bibhuti Narayan Singh v. Maharaja Sir Guru Mahadev Asram Prasad Sahi Bahadur (3) (1) (1933) L.R. 60 I.A. 313. (2) (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 240. (3) [1939] I.L.R. 19 Pat. 208.

The Court noted that the decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Khair Mohammad Khan v. Mst. Jannat supported the respondents’ argument that when the impugned act amounts to an ouster, section 23 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied. After considering the authorities, the Court was satisfied that the appellants’ claim that section 23 could rescue their suits from limitation was without substance. The Court expressed that the outcome was certainly regrettable because the appellants had been successful before both lower courts in establishing their status as hereditary worshippers. Nevertheless, the Court held that the appellants’ cause of action had to be dismissed because the suits were filed outside the period prescribed by law. The Court observed that during the present proceedings the parties had attempted to resolve the protracted litigation by agreeing on reasonable terms, but those negotiations did not bear fruit. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appeals could not succeed and ordered that they be dismissed. In addition, the Court directed that each party bear its own costs for the entire litigation. The final order thus dismissed the appeals and left the parties responsible for their respective expenses.