Andheri Marol Kurla Bus Service and Another vs The State of Bombay

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 1957

Decision Date: 21 April 1959

Coram: J.L. Kapur, Syed Jaffer Imam

In this case the petitioner, Andheri Marol Kurla Bus Service and another, challenged a conviction imposed by the State of Bombay. The matter was decided by a bench of the Supreme Court of India consisting of Justice J. L. Kapur and Justice Syed Jaffer Imam. The judgment was delivered on 21 April 1959 and is reported in the 1959 AIR 841 and the 1959 Supplement 2 of the Supreme Court Reports at page 734. The citation also appears in the 1961 Supreme Court Reports at page 304. The dispute concerned the application of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), specifically sections 12(6), 20(2), 31(1) and 33(1), and dealt with the question of whether conciliation proceedings terminate after the expiry of fourteen days from their commencement.

Conciliation proceedings had been initiated in January 1952 to resolve certain disputes between the first appellant and its workmen. On 9 May 1952 the Union informed the conciliation officer that negotiations had failed, and on 2 June 1952 the first appellant reiterated this position to the officer. In the interval, on 18 March 1952 the first appellant dismissed one of its workmen, an act that later formed the basis of prosecution. The two appellants together with three other individuals were prosecuted under section 31 of the Industrial Disputes Act for contravening section 33 by dismissing a workman while the conciliation process was still pending. The appellants argued that section 12(6) required the conciliation officer’s report to be submitted within fourteen days of the start of the proceedings; consequently they contended that the proceedings had automatically terminated after that period and that the dismissal therefore did not occur during the pendency of the conciliation proceedings. The Court held that where a settlement is not reached, the conciliation proceedings continue until the conciliation officer’s report is received by the appropriate Government, and that the commencement and termination of the proceedings are governed by section 20 rather than by section 12(6). Accordingly, the dismissal was held to have taken place during the pendency of the conciliation proceedings, rendering the appellants guilty under section 31(1) of the Act. The Court relied upon the decisions in Workers of the Industry Colliery, Dhanbad v. Management of the Industry Colliery (1953) S.C.R. 428 and Colliery Mazdoor Congress, Asansol v. New Beverbhoom Coal Co. Ltd. (1952) L.A.C. 219. The criminal appeal, numbered 46 of 1957, was filed by special leave against the Bombay High Court’s order dated 4 February 1955, which had reversed the judgment of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, and had convicted accused numbers 1 and 5 under sections 31(1) and 33(1) of the Act. Counsel for the appellants and counsel for the respondent were instructed, and the judgment was pronounced by Justice Kapur.

In this case the Court considered the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and the conviction of two accused persons under that statute. The first accused, identified as accused No 1, was sentenced to a fine of rupees two hundred and fifty, while the second accused, identified as accused No 5, was sentenced to a fine of rupees fifty. The parties identified as appellant No 1 and appellant No 2 were respectively the Andheri Marol Kurla Bus Service, which had been accused No 1, and its manager, H. M. Khan, who had been accused No 5. A dispute arose between the bus service and its work‑men. On 13 December 1951 the Conciliation Officer addressed a letter to appellant No 1, enclosing the demands of the labour union that were dated 9 August 1951. Subsequently, on 31 December 1951 the Conciliation Officer directed appellant No 1 to appear before him on 9 January 1952. After obtaining a single adjournment, appellant No 1 finally appeared on 17 January 1952, filed a written statement and raised several objections. The next scheduled hearing took place on 31 January 1952, and the conciliation proceedings continued intermittently until 2 June 1952, when appellant No 1 wrote to the Conciliation Officer stating that further meetings would serve no useful purpose. The union, on 9 May 1952, also informed the Conciliation Officer that negotiations had collapsed. During these ongoing proceedings, on 18 March 1952 the appellant dismissed Louis Pereira, a bus conductor. A complaint was then lodged by the Assistant Commissioner of Labour under section 33 read with section 31 of the Act against five persons: the two appellants and three partners of appellant No 1. The Chief Presidency Magistrate acquitted all the accused, holding that because the conciliation process had continued for more than fourteen days from 17 January 1952, any further conciliation was illegal, and consequently the accused could not be convicted under section 31(1) of the Act.

The State appealed the magistrate’s order to the High Court, which reversed the acquittal and convicted the two appellants while acquitting the remaining three persons. The two appellants then obtained special leave to appeal this conviction. The central issue for determination was whether the conciliation proceedings could be said to have been pending at the time of Louis Pereira’s dismissal. The Court explained that if the dismissal occurred while conciliation was still pending, the convictions would stand; if not, the convictions would have to be set aside. Section 31(1) of the Act makes it an offence to contravene the provisions of section 33, punishable by imprisonment for up to six months, a fine, or both. Section 33(1) provides, in its entirety, that “During the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall: (a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter to the prejudice of the work‑men concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the …” The Court therefore needed to interpret the meaning of “pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer” to resolve the question of liability.

Section 33(1) of the Act provides that, during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer, a Board, a Labour Court, Tribunal, or National Tribunal, an employer may not, with respect to any matter connected with the dispute, (a) alter the conditions of service applicable to the workmen concerned in a manner prejudicial to them, nor (b) discharge or punish any workmen concerned for misconduct connected with the dispute, except with the express written permission of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. Consequently, the essential question became the interpretation of the phrase “pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer.” The appellant argued that the purpose of conciliation is to achieve a settlement promptly; therefore, under section 12 the Conciliation Officer was obliged to submit his report within fourteen days of the commencement of the conciliation proceedings, or within a shorter period that might be fixed by the appropriate Government. From this contention the appellant submitted that, because fourteen days had elapsed before 18 March 1952, the dismissal could not be said to have occurred while the conciliation proceedings were still “pending.” The Act, however, sets out the commencement and conclusion of conciliation proceedings in section 20. While the first sub‑section of section 20 deals specifically with utility services, sub‑section 2 applies to all conciliation proceedings, irrespective of the nature of the service. Sub‑section 2 provides that a conciliation proceeding shall be deemed to have concluded (a) when a settlement is reached and a memorandum of settlement is signed by the parties, (b) when no settlement is reached, upon receipt of the Conciliation Officer’s report by the appropriate Government or, as the case may be, when the Board’s report is published under section 17, or (c) when a reference is made to a Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, or National Tribunal under section 10 during the pendency of the conciliation proceedings. Accordingly, in situations where no settlement is achieved, the proceeding is deemed to end not at the moment the Conciliation Officer makes his report under section 12(6), but only when that report is actually received by the appropriate Government. The appellant further contended that the termination of the conciliation proceedings should be fixed at the time the officer is required by section 12(6) to submit his report. The Court, however, observed that the provisions quoted above do not support this view; the statutory language makes it clear that the termination occurs upon receipt of the report by the appropriate Government. This interpretation of section 20(2)(b) had previously been adopted in the case of Workers of the Industry Colliery, Dhanbad v. Management of the Industry Colliery. The appellant then argued that, on this construction, the conciliation proceedings could be prolonged far beyond what the Act originally contemplated, since the termination would hinge on how promptly the appropriate Government receives the officer’s report.

The Court noted that section 12(6) of the Act merely required the Conciliation Officer to forward his report to the appropriate Government within fourteen days, and that this timing requirement did not determine the continuance of the conciliation proceedings. The Court explained that even if the Officer delayed his submission, such delay might be reprehensible, as indicated in the earlier decision reported in [1953] S.C.R. 428, but it did not alter the construction to be placed on section 20(2)(b) of the Act. Section 12 set out the duties of the Conciliation Officer, obligating him to endeavour to achieve a settlement between the parties and to commence his investigation without delay. Where settlement could not be obtained, the Officer was required to present his report to the appropriate Government. Although the provision contemplated that the report should be prepared and the proceedings concluded within a fortnight, the Court held that a failure to close the proceedings within that period, or a failure by the Officer to submit his report within the prescribed fourteen days, could constitute a breach of duty. However, such a breach did not cause the proceedings to terminate automatically; termination occurred only as prescribed by section 20(2)(b). The Court referred to the authority in Colliery Mazdoor Congress, Asansol v. New Beerbhoom Coal Co. Ltd (1) to support this view. Because the conciliation proceedings remained pending when Louis Pereira was dismissed, the Court concluded that the appellants had been correctly convicted under section 31(1) read with section 33 of the Act. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.