Thakur Raghubir Singh And Others vs The State Of Ajmer (Now Rajasthan) And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 14 November 1958

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha

Thakur Raghubir Singh and others filed a petition against the State of Ajmer, which is now part of Rajasthan, together with other respondents. The petition was heard by the Supreme Court of India, and the judgment was delivered on 14 November 1958. The judgment was authored by Justice K. N. Wanchoo, who sat on the bench together with Justices Natwarlal H. Bhagwati and Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha. The case is reported in the 1959 volume of the All India Reporter at page 475 and also appears in the Supreme Court Reporter Supplement 1 at page 478. Subsequent citations of the decision include references such as R 1960 SC 796, R 1962 SC 50, R 1962 SC 137, R 1962 SC 1044, and RF 1992 SC 1277. The dispute concerned the Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and Land Reforms Act, 1955 (Ajmer III of 1955), particularly sections 8 and 38 of that Act. The constitutional provisions that were examined in the case involved Article 32 of the Constitution, the Seventh Schedule entries—List I entry 33, List II entry 36, and List III entry 42—and the power of the State legislature to enact land‑reform legislation within the scope of entry 36 of List II.

The petitioners challenged the validity of section 4 of the Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and Land Reforms Act, 1955, which provided for the vesting of all estates held by intermediaries in the State from a date to be notified. They argued that the provision effectively transferred ownership of those estates to the President of India after acquisition, thereby making the purpose of the Act one of acquiring property for Union purposes, which they claimed fell outside the competence of the Ajmer legislature under entry 36 of List II. The petitioners further contended that section 8, which allowed the Collector to retrospectively cancel leases that had been granted when the land‑owner retained an unrestricted right to dispose of his property under Article 19(1)(f), violated that constitutional right because there was no lawful restriction on such disposals. In addition, they asserted that section 38, which imposed a maximum rent on the land, constituted an unreasonable restriction on the land‑owner’s right to let his holding. Some petitioners who were assignees of land‑revenue or owners of land also argued that the definition of “intermediary” in the Act included a jagir, and that a jagirdar was merely an assignee of land‑revenue; therefore, only the revenue assignment could be said to have been acquired under the Act. The Court examined these contentions in the context of the Constitution’s division of powers and the protective clauses of Article 31‑A, ultimately addressing the scope of the State’s authority to enact land‑reform measures and the constitutional validity of the challenged provisions.

The Court observed that, in determining the scope of the legislature’s authority under the relevant entry, the acquisition itself was not the decisive factor; rather, the purpose of the legislation was essential. It held that the provisions of section 8 of the Act, which authorised the Collector to cancel leases that had been executed in anticipation of the abolition of intermediaries and were therefore fraudulent, served the objectives of the Act. Consequently, those provisions formed an integral, though ancillary, part of the legislation and fell within the protection of article 31‑A (1)(a) of the Constitution. The Court further explained that the Act intended intermediaries who received land allocations to cultivate the land personally, and that section 38 was designed to discourage them from leasing the land and thereby creating a new class of intermediaries. Because this section was necessary to achieve the Act’s purpose, it too was protected by article 31‑A (1)(a). Finally, the Court noted that the original title holders, known as jagirdars, could not be distinguished between those who were merely assignees of land revenue and those who were land owners. Accordingly, the State was empowered to acquire the entire interest in such estates under section 4 of the Act.

The judgment originated in original jurisdiction and addressed petitions numbered 230‑239, 241, 249‑251, 256, 257, 290, 303, 306‑349, 351, 352, 355‑357 of 1955, and numbers 33 and 36 of 1956, all filed under article 32 of the Constitution of India. Counsel for the petitioners included representatives for the various petition numbers, while the respondents were represented by the Additional Solicitor‑General of India and other counsel. The Court delivered its judgment on 14 November 1958, with Justice Wanchoo presiding. The sixty‑nine petitions were brought by land‑owners from the former State of Ajmer, challenging the validity of the Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and Land Reforms Act, 1955, also referred to as the Act. Although the petitions raised numerous grounds of challenge, the petitioners’ counsel limited their arguments to selected points. The Court therefore confined its consideration to those specific grounds. The Act had been enacted by the Ajmer Legislative Assembly and received the President’s assent on 29 May 1955; section 4 of the Act provided for the vesting of all estates held by intermediaries in the State Government.

In this case the Court observed that the legislation provided that all estates held by intermediaries, as defined in the Act, would vest in the State Government on a date to be notified. The Act was brought into force on 23 June 1955, and the government subsequently notified 1 August 1955 as the date on which the estates of intermediaries would vest in the State. The petitions presently before the Court were filed in response to the fixing of that vesting date. It was not contested that the Act fell within the protection of Article 31‑A(l)(a) of the Constitution because it was a law for acquisition by the State of any estate or any rights therein. Nevertheless, the petitioners contended that, despite this constitutional protection, either the whole Act or certain of its provisions were invalid for reasons advanced by their counsel. Counsel for the petitioners, Mr Achhru Ram, limited his attack to sections 8 and 38 of the Act. Counsel for the petitioners, Mr Sharma, challenged the competence of the Ajmer Legislature to enact the Act and further submitted that, in any event, the Act could not be applied to the situation of jagirdars, one of whom was a petitioner in Petition No. 33 of 1956. These four arguments constituted the only grounds raised before the Court, and the Court proceeded to examine them one by one. Regarding section 8, the Court reproduced its language: “Where an intermediary has on or after the first day of June 1950 (a) granted a lease of any land in the estate or any part thereof for any non‑agricultural purpose other than mining for a period of three years or more; or (b) granted a lease or entered into a contract relating to any forest, fishery or quarry in his estate for a period of three years or more; or (c) granted a lease for the cultivation of any area of bir, pasture or waste land; and the Collector is satisfied that such lease or contract was not made or entered into in the normal course of management but in anticipation of legislation for the abolition of intermediaries, the Collector may, subject to any rules made under this Act, by order in writing, cancel the lease or the contract as the case may be.” The provision therefore authorised the cancellation of certain leases granted on or after 1 June 1950 where the lease was for three years or more under clauses (a) and (b), and for any period under clause (c), provided the Collector was satisfied that the lease was not made in the ordinary course of management but in anticipation of the abolition legislation. The petitioners argued that such retrospective cancellation could not be permitted because, at the time the leases were granted, the land‑owner possessed the right to dispose of his property as he wished under Article 19(1)(f), and no limitation on that right existed. They further submitted that, in some circumstances, cancelling a lease might expose the land‑owner to liability for compensation to the lessee, especially where the land‑owner had received the entire lease‑money in a lump sum for a lease lasting more than three years.

In this case the Court observed that allowing a land‑owner to face the prospect of having to pay compensation to a lessee—especially where the land‑owner had received the entire lease‑money as a single lump sum for a lease lasting more than three years—did not constitute a valid ground for resisting the legislative provision. The Court held that this argument carried no weight. It noted that the legislature was plainly competent to enact the provision in question under entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, which deals with land matters, and that the Constitution does not forbid a legislature from passing legislation that operates retrospectively where such power is appropriate. The Court further pointed out that the law already contains examples of statutes that permit the annulment of instruments that have already been executed, citing the Insolvency Acts as an illustration of provisions that allow transfers made by insolvent persons to be set aside under certain conditions. Consequently, the Ajmer Legislature possessed the authority to enact the clause permitting cancellation of leases, and, given the circumstances under which this clause was inserted into the Act, the provision could not be said to fall outside the protection afforded by Article 31‑A. The provision was described as not being an independent legislative creation but rather an ancillary measure intended to facilitate the effective achievement of the Act’s objectives. The legislative intent, as explained by the Court, was to empower the Collector—once estates had vested in the State Government—to examine leases entered into after 1 June 1950, the date from which the contemplated legislation was to take effect, and to determine whether such leases were the kind that a prudent land‑owner would have entered into in the ordinary course of management. Leases that met this standard would be immune from cancellation; however, if the Collector found that a lease had been executed not in the normal course of management but deliberately to enable land‑owners to reap as much benefit as possible before the estate was transferred to the State, the Collector was given authority to cancel the lease because it would constitute a fraud on the Act. Such cancellations would further the purposes of the Act, making the provision an integral, though ancillary, part of the legislation and thereby placing it within the protection of Article 31‑A (1)(a) of the Constitution. The Court then turned to Section 38 of the Act, which reads: “Notwithstanding any agreement, usage, decree or order of a court or any law for the time being in force, the maximum rent payable by a tenant in respect of the land leased to him shall not exceed one and a half times the revenue payable in respect of such land.” This section fixes the maximum rent at fifty per cent above the land revenue. The argument was raised that this limitation was unreasonable and infringed on the land‑owner’s right to let his property. However, the Court indicated that the purpose of the legislation was to eliminate intermediaries, which had led to the vesting of intermediary estates in the State Government under Section 4. Chapter VI of the Act further provides for the allocation of lands for personal cultivation to intermediaries whose estates had been taken over, thereby supporting the objective of ending rack‑renting and ensuring that the land is cultivated by those to whom it is allotted.

The Act provides that intermediaries who receive land allocations under section 29 are designated either as Bhuswamis or as Kashtkars, depending upon the character of the land that has been allotted to them, as explained in section 30. Both Bhuswamis and Kashtkars acquire their holdings directly from the Government and are required to pay land revenue to the Government, a relationship set out in section 32. The purpose of the legislation, therefore, is to ensure that those intermediaries who have been allotted land actually cultivate the land themselves. Section 37, however, creates a distinction: it authorises Bhuswamis to lease the whole of the land allotted to them or any portion of it, whereas it prohibits Kashtkars from leasing any part of their land except in limited situations where they are afflicted by a disability that prevents personal cultivation. To achieve the primary objective of the Act—that the land be personally cultivated by the person to whom it is allotted and that rent‑seeking or rack‑renting be eliminated—section 38 fixes a ceiling on rent at fifty per cent above the land revenue. Consequently, the profit a Bhuswami could obtain by letting his land is deliberately reduced to a level that is less attractive than the earnings from personal cultivation, thereby discouraging the emergence of a new class of intermediaries. Section 38, like section 8, is therefore an ancillary provision intended to advance the core goals of the Act, namely the abolition of intermediaries and the promotion of self‑cultivation. On this basis, the Court held that section 38 is protected by article 31‑A(l)(a) of the Constitution as an ancillary measure necessary for the effective implementation of the Act’s objectives.

The second point of contention concerned the constitutional competence of the Ajmer legislature to enact the Act, which deals with the acquisition of estates. Before the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956 took effect on 1 November 1956, the Seventh Schedule contained two entries relating to the acquisition of property: entry 33 of List I, which concerned acquisition or requisitioning of property for Union purposes, and entry 36 of List II, which dealt with acquisition or requisitioning of property for purposes other than those of the Union, subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III. The argument advanced was that the Ajmer legislature had acted under the authority granted to it by entry 36 of List II read in conjunction with section 21 of the Government of Part C States Act 1951 (Act XLIX of 1951). However, entry 36 of List II only empowers a State legislature to acquire property for non‑Union purposes. The land acquired under the Ajmer Act, once taken, vested in the President and therefore in the Union. Accordingly, the acquisition was effectively for Union purposes, which, under the constitutional scheme, fell outside the legislative competence of the Ajmer legislature. To support this position, counsel cited various constitutional articles, arguing that the Ajmer legislature lacked the power to pass a law effecting such acquisitions because the ultimate ownership rested with the Union.

In this case, the Court noted that the argument relied on provisions of Part XII of the Constitution relating to finance, property, contracts and suits, as well as Articles 73, 239 and 240. The argument asserted that before the Government of Part C States Act of 1951 was enacted, the Union possessed the legislative power over the areas that composed Part C States, and that the President exercised executive power over those subjects on which Parliament could legislate for Part C States. The argument further claimed that, after the enactment of the Government of Part C States Act, the executive power in Part C States remained vested in the President by virtue of Article 240, and that any property acquired for the purposes of a Part C State therefore vested in the President or the Union. Consequently, it was contended that the Ajmer legislature lacked authority to enact a law under entry 36 of List II for acquiring estates, because the property so acquired would in fact be for the purposes of the Union, and entry 36 did not permit acquisition for Union purposes. The Court held that, although the argument was plausible, it must be rejected. Assuming, without deciding, that property acquired for a Part C State vested in the Union Government under Part XII, the Court observed that the remaining issue was whether the Ajmer legislature could legislate under entry 36 of List II to acquire estates even if those estates legally vested in the Union Government after acquisition. The Court explained that entry 33 of List I authorises acquisition of property for the purposes of the Union but does not prescribe the subsequent vesting of the property, while entry 36 of List II authorises acquisition of property for purposes other than those of the Union and likewise makes no reference to the future vesting of the property. Entry 42 of List II, which deals with compensation for acquisition for any public purpose, also omits any requirement concerning the vesting of the property. Therefore, the Court concluded that the determination of legislative competence under entries 33 and 36 does not depend on who ultimately holds the title after acquisition, but rather on whether the acquisition is intended for Union purposes or for purposes other than those of the Union. Accordingly, the competency of the Ajmer legislature to enact the law under entry 36 of List II was to be assessed on the basis of the purpose of the acquisition, not on the eventual vesting of title. Section 21 of the Government of Part C States Act created a Legislative Assembly for Ajmer and conferred upon it the power to legislate on matters enumerated in List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule.

In this case, the Court noted that Section 21 of the Government of Part C States Act created a Legislative Assembly for Ajmer and gave that Assembly the authority to make laws for the whole or any part of the State with respect to any matter enumerated in List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. By this provision, the Ajmer Legislature was consequently empowered to pass legislation dealing with the acquisition of property for purposes other than those of the Union. In other words, the Legislature possessed the power to enact a law authorising the acquisition of property for the purposes of the State of Ajmer or for any other public purpose. The Court then turned to the question of whether the Act in dispute was enacted for the purpose of acquiring estates situated in the State of Ajmer for the purposes of that State, irrespective of the ultimate location of title after acquisition. The Court held that the answer could only be affirmative; the Act was framed by the State legislature specifically to acquire estates located within Ajmer, and such acquisition could only have been intended for the purposes of the State. There was no justification for limiting the plain meaning of the expression “the purposes of the State” by importing the concept of where the title might vest after acquisition. The Court observed that the purpose of the acquisition was unmistakably the purpose of the State of Ajmir, a conclusion reinforced by the fact that, after Ajmer became part of Rajasthan, the estates acquired under the Act passed to Rajasthan and were not retained by the Union on the ground that title vested in the Union. Accordingly, because the estates were acquired for the purposes of the State of Ajmer, the Act fell squarely within the competence of the Ajmer Legislature under the explicit wording of entry 36 of List II. The petitioners further contended, in petition No. 33 of 1956, that the word “intermediary” in the Act should be read to include a jagirdar. The Act provides that definitions in the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, 1950 (Ajmer XLII of 1950) will be imported where the words used in it are not defined. That earlier Act defines “jagirdar” as a person to whom the revenue of any land has been assigned under a sanad issued by the Chief Commissioner before the commencement of the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation of 1877 (see section 2(15)). It was not disputed that a sanad had been issued to a predecessor of the petitioner before 1877. However, the petitioners argued that a jagirdar is merely an assignee of land revenue and, insofar as that assignment is concerned, the interest may be said to have been acquired under the present Act. The petitioners also pointed out that, besides being an assignee of land revenue, the petitioner owned the land itself and that this ownership interest had not been acquired under the Act. The Court rejected this line of argument, concluding that it possessed no persuasive force.

The Court observed that the term “estate” is defined in section 2(v) of the Act as having the meaning assigned to it in the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation of 1877. Although the Ajmer Regulation does not provide a specific definition of “estate,” it defines the term “Malguzar” as a person who, under section 64, is liable for payment of the revenue assessed upon an estate, as provided in section 2(d). Section 64 further provides that all persons bound by the agreement prescribed in section 61, together with their successors‑in‑interest, while they continue to own land in the estate to which such agreement relates, shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of the entire amount of revenue assessed on that estate. The Ajmer Regulation also enumerates particular types of estates such as “Istimrari Estate” and “Bhum,” but its general meaning of “estate” is an area of land that is separately assessed for revenue, the payment of which is the responsibility of the holder of the estate. The term “intermediary,” as defined in section 2(viii) of the Act, denotes a holder of an estate and expressly includes a jagirdar. Under section 4, all estates held by intermediaries vest in the State Government upon issuance of a notification. Consequently, if jagirdars are classified as intermediaries—that is, as holders of estates—then their estates likewise vest in the State Government pursuant to section 4 of the Act. The Court rejected the distinction drawn by counsel for the petitioner between the jagirdar’s interest as a jagirdar and his interest as a land‑owner, deeming it wholly unfounded. A review of annexures B, C and D, filed by the petitioner, clarified this point. Annexures B and C consist of sanads relating to the jagirs held by the petitioner; the remarks column of annexure B begins with the words “Grant of this estate lasts…,” while annexure C opens with “The Grant is to the Dudhadhari for the time being. No part of the estate is transferable by sale or mortgage….” These grant clauses expressly designate the jagirs as estates. The estates were assessed for revenue, which was subsequently remitted, resulting in the classification of the jagirs as revenue‑free and the holder being termed a jagirdar. This remission of land revenue led to the definition of “jagirdar” in the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act of 1950 as an assignee of land revenue. The annexures also reveal that, when the grants were made prior to 1877, a substantial portion of the granted area was uncultivated. Annexure D records disputes between jagirdars and Biswedars concerning these uncultivated lands, one of which was adjudicated as late as 1954. In that judgment, the history of jagir tenure was examined and it was held that the jagirdar was the owner of the uncultivated land within his jagir, not the Biswedar. This assessment confirms that the jagirdar’s role as an assignee of revenue does not separate him from his ownership of the jagir‑estate granted before 1877, and therefore the petitioner, as holder of the jagir‑estate, is liable to resumption under the Act.

In this case the Court found that the distinction drawn by counsel between the jagirdar, described in the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, 1950 as an assignee of land revenue, and the same individual as the land‑owner, had no basis in law. The Court observed that although the definition of jagirdar as an assignee of land revenue stemmed from the historical remission of land revenue granted by sanads before 1877, the jagirdar nonetheless possessed full ownership of the jagir and was the grantee of the estate designated as a jagir. Consequently, there was no legal basis for separating the jagirdar’s interest as an assignee of land revenue from his interest as the holder of the jagir‑estate created by the pre‑1877 grant. Accordingly, the petitioner, who appeared in Petition No. 33 of 1956, was identified as the holder of the jagir‑estate, and the Court held that his entire interest in that estate was subject to resumption under the Act. The Court referred to the Ajmer Regulations (Vol. H to L) at pages 564‑6, where the two estates in question were discussed, their histories recorded, and they were expressly termed jagirs. The Court also recalled its earlier decision in Thakur Amarsinghji v. State of Rajasthan (1), beginning at page 330, where the term “jagir” was interpreted to include all grants that conferred upon the grantees rights in respect of land revenue. The present two jagirs, as shown in annexures B and C, had land revenue remitted and were granted as estates for specific purposes, which confirmed their status as estates by virtue of the title held by the jagirdar. Accordingly, the State was empowered to acquire them under section 4 of the Act. The Court concluded that none of the arguments advanced by the petitioners possessed any merit, that the petitions therefore failed, and that they should be dismissed. The Court ordered the dismissal of the petitions with one set of costs awarded to the contesting respondent.