Shree Vinod Kumar and Others vs State of Himachal Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 10 October 1958

Coram: Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, K.N. Wanchoo, DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ)

In Shree Vinod Kumar and Others versus State of Himachal Pradesh, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 10 October 1958. The case was heard by a bench comprising Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and Justice K. N. Wanchoo, with Chief Justice Das, Sudhi Ranjan also listed as part of the bench. The petitioners were Shree Vinod Kumar and other land-owners of Himachal Pradesh; the respondent was the State of Himachal Pradesh, including a connected petition. The decision was reported in 1959 AIR 223 and in the 1959 Supreme Court Reports Supplement (1) page 160, and later cited in E 1968 SC 360, RF 1975 SC 2299 (606). The dispute concerned the constitutional validity of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 (referred to as Himachal 15 of 1954). The petitioners argued that the Act, which sought to abolish large landed estates, violated Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution and was also void because it had not been enacted by a legislature properly constituted under the law. The Act had been introduced as a bill in the first session of the Legislative Assembly of the old Himachal Pradesh, which had been elected under the Government of Part C States Act, 49 of 1951. Before the bill could be passed, the Himachal Pradesh and Bilaspur (New State) Act, 32 of 1954 came into force on 1 July 1954, thereby abolishing the earlier Act and merging the two states into a single entity. While the Legislative Assembly for the newly formed state had not yet been constituted, the Governor issued a notification on 7 July 1954 directing that the second session of the Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly would commence on 16 August 1954 at 9:30 a.m. in the Council Chamber, Simla-4, pursuant to the powers conferred by Section 9 of the Government of Part C States Act, 49 of 1951. It was at that session that the impugned Act was passed. The respondents contended that, under the new Act, the members of the old Legislative Assembly should be deemed to constitute the legislature of the new state and therefore the Governor’s convening of the assembly was valid. The Court held that this contention lacked substance. It observed that the assembly convened by the Governor was not the Legislative Assembly of the new state as constituted under the Himachal Pradesh and Bilaspur (New State) Act, 32 of 1954, and consequently the Act could not be regarded as a valid piece of legislation.

In the original jurisdiction, the Court listed thirty-two petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The petitions were numbered 120-122, 164, 199, 213, 255, 260, 363, 378, 402 and 407 of 1955; 6, 7, 43, 120, 126, 142, 153, 154, 198, 216 and 223 of 1956; 32, 49, 60, 61, 141 and 143 of 1957; and 3, 7 and 104 of 1958. Counsel for the petitioners appeared in the various matters as follows: counsel for the petitioners in Petition No. 120/55; counsel for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 120, 121, 122, 164, 199, 213, 255, 260, 363, 402 and 407 of 1955, 6, 7, 43, 125, 142, 154, 198, 216 and 223 of 1956, 32, 60 and 143 of 1957, and 7 and 104 of 1958; counsel for the petitioner in Petition No. 378 of 1955; counsel for the petitioner in Petition No. 120/56; counsel for the petitioner in Petition No. 49/57; counsel for the petitioner in Petition No. 153/56; counsel for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 61 and 141 of 1957 and 3 of 1958. Counsel for the respondent, including the Additional Solicitor General of India and other appointed representatives, also appeared. On 10 October 1958, Chief Justice Das delivered the judgment. By hearing all thirty-two petitions together, the Court noted that each petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 (reported as Himachal 15 of 1954). The petitioners alleged that the Act had been passed by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Himachal Pradesh, which was purportedly created by the Himachal Pradesh and Bilaspur (New State) Act, 32 of 1954. The Court recorded that the President of India gave assent to the Bill on 23 November 1954, after which it became law as the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953, hereinafter referred to as the Abolition Act. The Act was brought into force on 26 January 1955 by a notification issued under section 1(3). For clarity, the Court referred to several key provisions of the Abolition Act. Section 11 granted a new right to tenants, allowing them, notwithstanding any existing law, custom or contract, to apply to the compensation officer at any time after the commencement of the Act and, on payment of compensation, to acquire the right, title and interest of the landowner in the land held under tenancy, subject to the terms and conditions specified in the section. Section 14 authorised tenants to acquire the landowner’s rights in a portion of the tenancy lands under certain specified circumstances, provided the tenant surrendered the remaining portion of the lands as required by the provision.

The Court set out the operative provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953. Section 15 authorised the State Government, by means of a Gazette notification, to declare that from a specified date and in respect of a specified area the right, title and interest of a landowner in any tenancy held by a tenant would be transferred to and vested in the State, free from all encumbrances created by the landowner. Section 16 directed that the landowner whose interests were acquired under Section 15 should be paid compensation, the amount of which was to be calculated, as far as practicable, in accordance with Sections 12 and 13 of the Act. Section 27 provided that, notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding sections of the same chapter, if a landowner held land whose annual land revenue exceeded rupees 125, the owner’s right, title and interest in such land would be deemed to have been transferred and vested in the State Government, free from all encumbrances. Sub-section (3) of Section 27 further stipulated that the landowner whose right was acquired in this manner was entitled to compensation determined by the Compensation Officer on the basis of Sections 17 and 18, in accordance with Schedule II, but that where the occupancy tenant was liable to pay rent measured as a multiple of land revenue, the compensation payable to the landowner would be computed according to Schedule I. The Court noted that the compensation prescribed in Schedule II could, in some cases, amount to no more than twice the land revenue. Section 39 fixed the maximum rent at one-fourth of the crop, a level that the Court observed might not even cover the land revenue together with local rates and cesses. Section 80 empowered the State to manage lands in certain specified circumstances. The Court observed that it was unnecessary for the present purpose to refer to any other provisions of the Act. On a cursory examination of the foregoing sections, the Court recognized the natural apprehension of landowners that the provisions were excessively harsh, that they substantially abridged the rights to property guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution, and that they infringed Articles 14, 19 and 31. Consequently, the Court noted that it was not surprising that the petitioners, all of whom were landowners, had approached the Supreme Court by separate petitions under Article 32 seeking enforcement of their fundamental rights to their respective properties. In each of the several petitions heard together, the petitioners advanced two broad points, the first of which alleged that the Abolition Act was entirely void because it had not been passed by a duly constituted legislature.

In the petitions, the petitioners advanced two principal arguments. The first argument contended that the legislation was invalid because it had not been enacted by a duly constituted legislature. The second argument asserted that, irrespective of any procedural infirmity, the provisions contained in Chapter III and Chapter VIII of the Act were inconsistent with the Constitution. Regarding the first contention, the Court examined the constitutional schedule that listed the Part C States at the time the Constitution was originally adopted. The First Schedule enumerated ten Part C States, assigning Bilaspur the third position and Himachal Pradesh the seventh. These two entities were distinct, each with its own territory described in the schedule’s footnote as territories that, by virtue of an order made under section 290A of the Government of India Act, 1935, were administered as if they were Chief Commissioner’s Provinces of the same name immediately before the Constitution came into force. The Government of Part C States Act, 49 of 1951—hereinafter referred to as the Part C States Act—provided for Legislative Assemblies, Councils of Ministers and Councils of Advisers for the Part C States. However, section 2(1)(g) of that Act defined “State” to include any State specified in Part C of the First Schedule except Bilaspur, thereby excluding Bilaspur from the operation of the Act and placing it under a separate legal regime. In contrast, the Part C State of Himachal Pradesh, as it then existed and which the Court described as the old Himachal Pradesh, fell within the scope of the Part C States Act. Section 3 of the Act mandated the creation of a Legislative Assembly for each State and stipulated the allocation of seats in the Assemblies of the six States listed, as set out in the Third Schedule. According to the original Third Schedule, the total number of seats apportioned to the old Himachal Pradesh was thirty-six, of which eight were reserved for Scheduled Castes. Section 4 empowered the President, by order, to determine the constituencies into which the State would be divided, to define the extent of each constituency, to allocate the number of seats to each constituency, and to specify the number of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Section 5 prescribed that, unless dissolved earlier, a Legislative Assembly would continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting. Section 8 incorporated the provisions of Part I and Parts III to XI of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, along with any rules and orders made thereunder, to apply to elections for a Legislative Assembly of a Part C State in the same manner as they applied to elections for a Legislative Assembly of a Part A State, subject to any modifications the President might direct after consulting the Election Commission. Section 9 authorized the Chief Commissioner to summon the Legislative Assembly from time to time.

In this case the Court explained that the Part C States Act provides that the Legislative Assembly may be summoned at any time, but it also requires that no interval of more than six months may elapse between the last sitting of one session and the date fixed for the first sitting of the next session. Section 10 of the same Act obliges the Assembly, as soon as practicable, to select two of its members to hold the offices of Speaker and Deputy Speaker respectively. Section 14 mandates that every member, before taking his seat, must make and subscribe an oath or affirmation before the Chief Commissioner or a person authorized by him, using the form prescribed in the Fourth Schedule. The Fourth Schedule concludes with a declaration that the member “will faithfully discharge the duty upon which I am about to enter,” which aligns with the requirement that the oath be taken prior to assuming the seat. Section 16 deals with the vacation of seats upon the occurrence of certain events specified therein. Section 18 imposes a penalty of up to five hundred rupees for each day a member sits or votes before having made and subscribed the required oath or affirmation. According to Section 35, the validity of any proceeding of a State Legislative Assembly cannot be challenged on the basis of alleged procedural irregularities. The Court observed that reference to other provisions of the Part C States Act was unnecessary for the purpose of its present analysis. Exercising the authority granted to him by Section 4 of the Part C States Act, the President issued an order delineating the constituencies into which the former Himachal Pradesh would be divided. Following that order, elections were held in 1952 and thirty-six members were duly elected by the electorate of the newly defined constituencies. The Court presumed that the results of those general elections, together with the names of the members elected from each constituency, were published under Section 74 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, in the official Gazette by the competent authority as soon after the final date for the completion of the elections as practicable. The Court noted that there was no dispute that, exercising the powers conferred on him by Section 9 of the Part C States Act, the Chief Commissioner summoned the Legislative Assembly of the former Himachal Pradesh, as constituted, to convene at the appointed time and place. It was also uncontested that every member of that Assembly, before taking his seat, made and subscribed the prescribed oath or affirmation under Section 14 of the Part C States Act. The members then elected Shri Jaiwant Ram as Speaker, and the first session of the Assembly, thus constituted, commenced its functions as the Legislative Assembly of the former Himachal Pradesh. This first session marked the inauguration of the newly elected Assembly and set the stage for its subsequent legislative business.

In 1953 a Bill numbered Himachal 15 of 1953 was introduced in the legislature of the old Himachal Pradesh. That Bill, once passed, became the Abolition Act. While the Bill was still pending a separate statute was enacted on 8 May 1954. This statute, passed by Parliament, was titled the Himachal Pradesh and Bilaspur (New State) Act, 1954 and is hereinafter referred to as the “New State Act”. The President gave his assent to this Act on 28 May 1954 and the Act was brought into force by a notification dated 1 July 1954 that was issued by the Government of India in the official gazette pursuant to paragraph 1(2) of the Act. For the purpose of understanding the Court’s decision it is necessary to set out the operative provisions of the New State Act. Section 3 of the Act declares that, from the date of commencement, a new Part C State shall be formed by uniting the existing States and shall be called the State of Himachal Pradesh; the Act therefore refers to this entity as the “new State”. Section 12 provides two important stipulations: subsection (1) directs that the new State shall have its own Legislative Assembly, and subsection (2) fixes the total number of seats in that Assembly to be filled by direct election at forty-one. Section 14 is a key provision dealing with the composition of the Assembly constituencies. Subsection (1) states that, until any other law makes a different provision, the new State shall consist of the Assembly constituencies enumerated at the commencement of the Act in the Delimitation of Assembly Constituencies (Himachal Pradesh) Order, 1951, together with the constituencies into which the portion of the new State comprising the former State of Bilaspur shall be divided. Subsection (2) further requires the President, as soon as practicable after the Act’s commencement and after consulting the Election Commission of India, to amend the 1951 Delimitation Order so that it incorporates the Bilaspur constituencies; the amended order shall, until it is superseded, serve as the delimitation order for the new State.

Sections 15 and 16 of the New State Act elaborate on the transition of membership and the term of the Assembly. Section 15(1) provides that every sitting member of the Legislative Assembly of the existing State of Himachal Pradesh who represented a constituency of that State shall, from the date of commencement of the New State Act, continue to represent the constituency of the same name in the new State and shall be deemed to have been elected to the Legislative Assembly of the new State by that constituency. Section 15(2) mandates that, as soon as practicable after the Act’s commencement, elections shall be held to fill the seats allocated to the constituencies into which the part of the new State comprising the former State of Bilaspur is divided. Section 16 addresses the five-year term prescribed in section 5 of the Government of Part C States Act, 1951, stating that for the Legislative Assembly of the new State that term shall be deemed to have commenced on the date on which the five-year period actually commenced for the Legislative Assembly of the existing State of Himachal Pradesh. These provisions collectively form the statutory basis upon which the Court’s analysis of the creation of the new State and its Assembly is founded.

According to the Government of Part C States Act, 1951 (XLIX of 1951), the period prescribed for the Legislative Assembly of the new State was to be deemed to have commenced on the same day on which the corresponding period for the Legislative Assembly of the existing State of Himachal Pradesh actually began. After the New State Act became operative, the President exercised the authority vested in him by section 14(2) of that Act and issued an order that delineated the constituencies covering the territory that had formerly formed the Part C State of Bilaspur. Following the commencement of the New State Act, that territory became part of the new Part C State of Himachal Pradesh, hereinafter referred to as the new Himachal Pradesh. Subsequent to the delimitation order, elections were held on 13 May 1955, whereby voters in the newly defined constituencies elected five representatives. Those five members joined the pre-existing legislators, thereby raising the total strength of the Legislative Assembly of the new Himachal Pradesh to forty-one members, as mandated by section 12 of the New State Act.

In the interim, a formal notification dated 7 July 1954 was published in the official Gazette. The notice, issued by the Lieutenant-Governor, stated that, in accordance with the powers granted by section 9 of the Government of Part C States Act, 1951 (XLIX of 1951), the second session of the Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly was scheduled to commence at 9.30 a.m. on Monday, 16 August 1954, in the Council Chamber at Simla-4. The notification, on its face, convened the second session of the Legislative Assembly of Himachal Pradesh. It is undisputed that, prior to the issuance of that summons, no declaration had been made by any competent authority identifying the thirty-six individuals who had served as members of the former Legislative Assembly of the old Himachal Pradesh as members of the newly constituted Legislative Assembly created under the New State Act. Equally undisputed is the fact that those thirty-six former members neither took a fresh oath nor affirmed their allegiance as required by section 14 of the Part C States Act, a requirement analogous to articles 99 and 108 of the Constitution, nor did they elect a Speaker pursuant to section 10 of the same Act. The Court observed that the New State Act unquestionably gave rise to a new State, also called Himachal Pradesh. The respondent’s contention that merely an additional territory from the former Part C State of Bilaspur was added to the old Himachal Pradesh and that the old Himachal Pradesh continued to exist was rejected.

It was argued by one side that the territory of the former State of Bilaspur had merely been merged into the area of the old Himachal Pradesh and that the old Himachal Pradesh had consequently continued to exist. The Court, however, noted that the correct legal position was that the New State Act caused the cessation of both the old Himachal Pradesh and the old State of Bilaspur, and that a fresh State called Himachal Pradesh was created, possessing the combined territory of the two erstwhile States. Under section twelve, clause one, of the New State Act, and in parallel to section three, clause one, of the Part C States Act, the newly formed Himachal Pradesh was required to have its own Legislative Assembly, the total strength of which, according to section twelve, clause two, of the New State Act, was prescribed to be forty-one members to be elected directly by the people. The learned Additional Solicitor General placed reliance on section fifteen of the New State Act, which had previously been reproduced in full. Sub-section one of that provision provided that every sitting member of the Legislative Assembly of the existing State of Himachal Pradesh – that is, the old Himachal Pradesh – who occupied a seat for a constituency of that State immediately before the commencement of the New State Act, would, from the moment the Act came into force, continue to represent the constituency bearing the same name in the new Himachal Pradesh and would be deemed to have been elected to the Legislative Assembly of the new State by that constituency. Sub-section two of the same section dealt with the conduct of elections, as soon as practicable after the Act’s commencement, to fill the seats that, under section fourteen, clause two, would be allotted to the constituencies into which the portion of the new Himachal Pradesh that had formerly formed part of the old State of Bilaspur would be divided. The Additional Solicitor General also relied on section sixteen of the New State Act, which determined the life of the Legislative Assembly by directing that the five-year period mentioned in section five of the Part C States Act, for the purpose of calculation, should be measured from the date on which the old Legislative Assembly of the old Himachal Pradesh had first been constituted. On the basis of these provisions, his contention was that the thirty-six members who had previously been elected to the Legislative Assembly of the old Himachal Pradesh were, by operation of the New State Act, transformed into the members of the Legislative Assembly of the newly created Himachal Pradesh, and that the Act made provision for the addition of five further members, to be elected by the electorate of the constituencies created out of the territory that had formerly been the old State of Bilaspur. In essence, he argued that, at the exact moment the New State Act came into force, the Legislative Assembly of the newly constituted Himachal Pradesh was duly constituted and had come into existence.

In this case, the judgment noted that the legislature of the newly created Himachal Pradesh was initially composed of thirty-six members designated as “persona designate,” and that only five additional members needed to be elected in order to bring the total strength of the Assembly to forty-one. The learned Additional Solicitor General argued that, at the moment the New State Act came into force, a Legislative Assembly of the new Himachal Pradesh existed consisting of those thirty-six members, and that it was this Assembly which had been summoned by the Lieutenant Governor. He further maintained that the fact that the five seats allotted to the constituencies formerly forming the State of Bilaspur had not yet been filled did not invalidate any of the Assembly’s proceedings, because section fifteen, clause three of the Part C States Act empowered the Assembly to function notwithstanding any vacancy in its membership. To support his view of the meaning of “vacant” and “vacancy,” the learned Additional Solicitor General referred to Webster’s Dictionary and the Oxford Dictionary. He also cited section one hundred and forty-seven, clause two of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and section twenty-five of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, to illustrate that a post may be described as vacant both when it has never been filled after its creation and when it has been filled and later becomes empty. While acknowledging that, strictly speaking, the thirty-six members of the old Legislative Assembly of the former Himachal Pradesh who, by the fiction created by section fifteen, clause one of the New State Act, became members of the new Assembly should have taken a fresh oath or affirmation, the learned Additional Solicitor General characterised the failure to observe that formality as a mere irregularity. He contended that such an irregularity did not vitiate the Assembly’s actions because section fifteen, clause three of the Part C States Act, corresponding to articles one hundred and two and one hundred and eighty-nine, clause two of the Constitution, expressly allowed the Assembly’s proceedings to remain valid. Section fifteen, clause one of the New State Act provided that each of the thirty-six sitting members of the old Assembly would, from the commencement of the Act, represent the constituency of the same name in the new Himachal Pradesh and would be deemed to have been elected by that constituency. The purpose of this provision, the judgment explained, was to avoid the necessity of conducting a fresh election for those thirty-six individuals. In effect, the provision exempted those members from the ordinary electoral process and, by statutory fiction, treated them as having been duly elected to the Legislative Assembly of the new state. Consequently, the operation of the deeming clause placed the thirty-six members in the same legal position they would have occupied had they been elected through the normal electoral procedure.

In this case, the Court explained that the provision in section 15(1) merely treated the thirty-six members as if they had been elected, but it did not itself create the Legislative Assembly. The Court noted that if the members had actually gone through a full election, the legal requirements that follow the completion of an election would still have to be observed. The language of section 15(1) that states the members shall represent the constituencies of the same name and shall be deemed to have been elected does not mean that those thirty-six individuals alone formed the entire Assembly of the new Himachal Pradesh. The provision only creates a statutory fiction that the members are considered elected without the actual poll. Apart from assigning representation and deeming election, section 15(1) does not say that these persons alone constitute the Assembly. Consequently, the Court held that all statutory steps required after an election, such as issuing a notification under section 74 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, remained necessary. That notification, as indicated by section 73 of the amended Act, gives life to the Assembly. The Court then examined what the Lieutenant Governor intended by issuing the notification dated 7 July 1954. The Court observed that the Lieutenant Governor did not intend to summon a meeting of the new Legislative Assembly, because the notification described the meeting as the second session of the Assembly. Since the new Himachal Pradesh had just been created, there had been no prior session of its Assembly; therefore any meeting convened at that time would have been the very first session. The Court found it wholly inappropriate and factually incorrect to label the convened meeting as a second session. Further, the Court considered section 16 of the New State Act, which calculated a five-year term from the commencement date of the old Legislative Assembly. The Court said that this provision could not alter the reality that the old Assembly and the old state had ceased to exist. Hence, the first meeting of the new Assembly after the commencement of the New State Act had to be regarded as the first session, not the second. The Court noted that the Lieutenant Governor might have believed that the new Assembly would not become operational until five members from the Bilaspur area were elected, raising the total strength to forty-one as required by section 12. The Court refrained from accepting that view as a justification for the erroneous description of the session.

The Lieutenant Governor apparently intended that the membership of the Assembly be increased to forty-one as prescribed by section 12, and that, until such increase occurred, the old Himachal Pradesh and its old Legislative Assembly would continue to exist. Consequently, the Court observed that the Bill introduced in the first session of the old Legislative Assembly of the old Himachal Pradesh had not lapsed under section 25 of the Part C States Act. The Lieutenant Governor could reasonably have thought that, according to section 9 of the Part C States Act, no more than six months may elapse between the last sitting of one session and the date appointed for the first sitting of the next session, and therefore he may have considered it appropriate to convene what he termed the second session of the old Assembly. This inference is reinforced by two further facts. First, when the thirty-six members assembled in response to the summons, no oath or affirmation was administered to them, contrary to the requirement of section 14 of the Part C States Act. Second, the Assembly summoned under section 9 did not elect any member as Speaker. The official record of the work of the Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly during the 1954 second session, published by the Secretary, shows that the House granted leave of absence to Sri Jaiwant Ram, identified as Speaker for the duration of that session. Sri Jaiwant Ram was the same individual who had been elected Speaker of the old Legislative Assembly of the old Himachal Pradesh. The Court noted that, at this stage, it was not necessary to discuss whether the irregularities concerning the absence of an oath or the lack of a Speaker could be remedied under sections 15(3) and 35 of the Part C States Act. Assuming, for the purpose of argument, that the term “vacancy” in the relevant provision carries the broad meaning suggested by the learned Additional Solicitor General, the provision nevertheless presupposes the existence of a duly constituted Legislative Assembly that has been brought into being, and then discovers that some members have sat and voted without taking the prescribed oath or affirmation. The provision therefore applies only where a valid Assembly has been constituted by a proper notification and subsequently summoned by the Lieutenant Governor. It does not extend to a situation where no such notification has been issued and consequently no Assembly has been lawfully constituted. Whether the lack of such a notification would invalidate proceedings, even if all properly elected members were summoned, took oath and elected a Speaker, was deemed unnecessary to consider at this juncture. The present analysis was undertaken solely to determine what the Lieutenant Governor had in mind when he issued the notification convening the second session of the Legislative Assembly and what action he purported to take.

When the Lieutenant Governor issued the notification convening a second session of the Legislative Assembly, his intention was examined in detail. The act of summoning the Assembly to a second sitting indicated that he had the former Legislative Assembly of the erstwhile Himachal Pradesh in mind, an Assembly that had already met once before and was being called again. The absence of any oath or affirmation administered to members, coupled with the failure to elect a Speaker, clearly showed that the Lieutenant Governor was not calling the newly constituted Legislative Assembly of the newly created State of Himachal Pradesh. Moreover, it was evident that the Lieutenant Governor must have been aware that the old Himachal Pradesh had ceased to exist, and consequently its Legislative Assembly had ceased as well. Any bill that was pending before that dissolved Assembly would have lapsed under section 25 of the relevant statute, and the first meeting of the new Legislative Assembly of the new State of Himachal Pradesh could not proceed on the basis of a lapsed bill. In this factual backdrop, the question whether the procedural irregularity could be remedied under section 15(3) of the Part C States Act or insulated from challenge under section 35 does not arise. The core issue before the Court was to determine which Assembly the Lieutenant Governor had actually convened. The Court held that the so-named Legislative Assembly that was convened and that purported to pass the Abolition Act was not the Assembly created by the New State Act. Accordingly, the impugned Act cannot be regarded as a valid piece of legislation, and any interference with the petitioners’ rights in respect of their property could not be justified. The first question raised on behalf of the petitioners therefore had to be decided in their favour.

The Court consequently issued a mandamus in each of the petitions directing the respondent to refrain from giving effect to, or acting upon, the impugned Act. The order also restrained the respondent, its servants and agents from taking any action based on that Act, from interfering in any manner with the petitioners’ properties, from disturbing the petitioners’ possession, or from infringing any rights the petitioners have in respect of their properties. The petitioners were awarded the general costs of each petition. The respondent was ordered to pay three separate sets of costs for the hearing: one set to the counsel representing the petitioners and one set of hearing fees to each advocate on record. The petitions were allowed.