Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. vs Bai Valu Raja And Ors.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 28 April 1958

Coram: N.H. Bhagwati, S. Jafer Imam, P.B. Gajendragadkar

In the matter titled Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. versus Bai Valu Raja and others, decided on 28 April 1958, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment. The opinion was authored by Justice S. Jafer Imam, and the bench was composed of Justices N. H. Bhagwati, S. Jafer Imam and P. B. Gajendragadkar. The Court granted special leave to appeal on the condition that the appellant, Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co., entered into an undertaking not to claim any refund of the compensation sums that had already been paid pursuant to the order dated 31 January 1953 issued by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation at Junagadh, and further undertook to pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal in any event.

The appellant, Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co., operates a salt‑manufacturing establishment that employs both temporary and permanent labourers. The salt works are situated on a tract of land adjacent to a creek that lies opposite the town of Porbandar. Access to the works from Porbandar can be achieved by two distinct routes. The first is an over‑land road extending approximately six to seven miles, a route whose details are not material to the present dispute. The second, which is relevant, involves crossing the creek by boat. At the Porbandar side of the creek the crossing point is marked as Asmavati Ghat, designated point A on the map. A boat departs from point A and lands on the opposite bank at point B, which rests on a stretch of sandy ground. From point B, after traversing the sandy area, workers can proceed to the jetty and then to the salt works themselves. In addition, a public footpath runs across the sandy area near point B and leads to the works at point D, a distance of one and one‑fourth mile. For the purpose of the case, reference to the over‑land route was deemed unnecessary, although that route is shown on map Exhibit 35 prepared by H. V. Vaishnav, who had been appointed as Commissioner to produce the map.

During the hearing, the Court considered it appropriate to record findings on two specific questions. The first question was whether any arrangement existed between the appellant and the ferry‑operators, known locally as ferry‑walas or Kharvas, for transporting the appellant’s workmen to and from the salt works, and, if such an arrangement existed, what its terms were. The second question concerned whether any such arrangement, if it existed, also covered the casual labourers who were the subject of the present proceedings, irrespective of whether they were travelling to the works or returning from them. To aid in answering these questions, the Court ordered that a detailed map or plan be prepared, showing the location of the creek, the sandy patch, the salt works and their surrounding area in relation to the town of Porbandar. Consequently, map Exhibit 35 was produced in accordance with the Court’s direction.

On the evening of 12 June 1952, a boat that was carrying several workmen who had been employed by the appellant on that very day was crossing the creek from point B back toward point A when it capsized. The capsizing was attributed to adverse weather conditions and the over‑loading of the vessel. The accident occurred when the boat had nearly reached point A, as indicated on Exhibit 35. The tragic incident resulted in the drowning of several workmen, an event that later gave rise to compensation claims under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Court recorded these factual circumstances as the background to the questions of liability and compensation that were before it.

In the evening of 12‑6‑1952 a boat that was carrying several workmen employed that day by the appellant set off to cross the creek from point B to point A. The boat was overloaded and, while it was almost reaching point A as shown on the map marked Ext. 35, it capsized due to bad weather. As a result of the capsize a number of the workmen drowned. The drowning gave rise to seven separate claims for compensation that were filed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. One of those claims was dismissed, while compensation was awarded to the dependants of the workmen who had died in the remaining six claims.

The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation examined the circumstances of the accident and held that the incident arose out of and in the course of the employment of the workmen. Accordingly, the Commissioner granted compensation to the claimants. Dissatisfied with that finding, the appellant appealed the Commissioner’s order to the High Court of Saurastra, which is now known as the High Court of Bombay. After a detailed discussion of the applicable law, the High Court affirmed the Commissioner’s conclusion that the accident was in the course of employment and dismissed the appellant’s appeal, ordering the appellant to pay the costs of the proceedings. In the present appeal before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that, although compensation had already been paid to the dependants and the appellant was not seeking a refund, the appellant nevertheless required a definitive ruling on whether, under the law, it was liable to pay any compensation in the circumstances disclosed.

The record showed that from the town of Porbandar there were two possible routes for travelling to and from the appellant’s salt works, but it was not contested before the High Court that the ordinary and customary route was the one that involved crossing the creek at points A and B. The workmen who lost their lives were not regular employees for whom the appellant provided quarters near the works; nevertheless, they fell within the definition of “workman” in the Workmen’s Compensation Act. In determining whether the fatal accident arose out of and in the course of their employment, the Court found it unnecessary to examine which route a workman might have chosen to reach the works or whether the workmen were engaged on a temporary basis. The general rule is that employment begins when a workman reaches his place of work and ends when he leaves it, the journey to and from the workplace being excluded. However, this rule is qualified by the doctrine of a notional extension of the employer’s premises, which may include areas that the workman traverses in travelling to or from the actual site of work. Under this doctrine a reasonable extension in both time and space may be recognized, allowing a workman to be considered still in the course of his employment even though he has not yet arrived at, or has already left, the physical premises of the employer.

The Court explained that, under the doctrine of notional extension, a workman may be regarded as being in the course of his employment even though he has not yet arrived at, or has already departed from, his employer’s premises. Consequently, the factual matrix and surrounding circumstances of each case must be scrutinised meticulously to decide whether the injury occurred out of and during the employment of the workman, always keeping this notional‑extension principle in mind. The Court observed that it was unnecessary for the present appeal to set out the various decisions of English and Indian courts that expound the same principle, because even if, on that basis, a workman could be considered to be in the course of employment at point B while travelling to or returning from the salt works, the decisive issue for the Court was whether the workman remained within the course of his employment while he was travelling between points A and B as shown on the map. While the matter was pending before the High Court, the learned judges were drawn to the Commissioners’ failure to call witnesses who could establish an alleged arrangement between the appellant and the Kharvas (ferry‑walas) for transporting the appellant’s workmen by boat across the creek to and from the salt works. The High Court initially inclined to remand the case for the recording of such evidence, but, after considering recent decisions of the House of Lords, concluded that the existing record was sufficient and ordered that the accident be deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of the deceased workmen’s employment. The Supreme Court, however, deemed it necessary to obtain fresh evidence on this point and to record findings thereon. The evidence taken after remand made it clear that no arrangement existed between the appellant and the Kharvas for ferrying the appellant’s workmen across the creek. Instead, the Kharvas charged any person who crossed the creek in their boats, the only exemption being a fellow Kharva‑caste individual, who was allowed to cross without payment. The record further showed that the boats were used by the general public, each passenger being required to pay the fare unless he belonged to the Kharva caste. To reach point A on the map, a workman had to travel through the town of Porbander on a public road and then board, at point A, a boat that was also employed by the public, for which he was required to pay the boatman’s dues before proceeding to point B.

In the facts before the Court, a workman first paid the boat‑man's dues in order to travel from point A to point B. From point B to the salt works there lay an open sandy tract measuring roughly four hundred fifty to five hundred feet in length and two hundred to two hundred fifty feet in width. This tract was also open to the public. From this sandy area a footpath led to the salt jetty, identified as point C, and a foot‑track led to the salt works themselves, identified as point D. The foot‑track to the salt works was unmistakably a public way. The footpath from the sandy area to the salt jetty might or might not have been used by the public, but for the purposes of the present dispute it could be assumed that a workman had to use that footpath in order to reach the jetty and, from there, to the various salt pans and reservoirs that formed part of the salt‑works complex. It was well settled that when a workman is on a public road, a public place or traveling by public transport, he is present in the same manner as any other member of the public. He is not considered to be acting in the course of his employment unless the very nature of his job makes his presence there necessary. Accordingly, a workman was not regarded as being in the course of his employment from the moment he left his home and set out for work. He was said to be in the course of his employment only when he actually reached his place of work or arrived at a point or area that fell within the doctrine of “notional extension”; outside that notional extension the employer was not liable to pay compensation for any accident that might occur to the workman.

Applying these principles to the present case, even if the notional‑extension doctrine were assumed to extend up to point D, it could not be stretched beyond that point. The moment a workman left point A in the boat, or left point A before reaching point B, he could not be said to be acting in the course of his employment. Consequently, any accident that occurred between points A and B could not be said to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. The Court therefore concluded that both the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation and the High Court had erred in holding that the deceased workmen were still in the course of their employment while they were crossing the creek between points A and B. Although the accident that occurred when the boat was near point A resulted in the death of many workmen and was indeed tragic, the appellant could not be held liable for that accident. The appeal was consequently allowed, the order of the Commissioner directing the appellants to pay compensation was set aside, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondents in the appeal. The appellant was not entitled to recover the compensation money that had already been paid, and each party was directed to bear its own costs in any further proceedings.

The Court indicated that the matter was to be returned for further consideration pursuant to its own directive dated 9 October 1957. In that order the Court expressly required that the proceedings be remanded, meaning that the case should be sent back to the appropriate lower authority for continuation in accordance with the instructions specified on that date. Accordingly, the parties were obligated to follow the procedural step prescribed by the Court, ensuring that the case would proceed on remand as ordered. The remand order of 9 October 1957 therefore dictated the next phase of the proceedings, directing the lower tribunal or relevant body to resume the matter under the conditions set by the Court. All further actions were to be taken in compliance with that specific order, and the continuation of the case depended upon the implementation of the remand as directed by the Court on the aforementioned date.