S. Veerabadran Chettiar vs E. V. Ramaswami Naicker and Others on 25 August, 1958

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 1956

Decision Date: 25 August 1958

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Syed Jaffer Imam, K.N. Wanchoo

In the matter titled S. Veerabadran Chettiar versus E. V. Ramaswami Naicker and others, the judgment was delivered on 25 August 1958 by a bench of the Supreme Court of India consisting of Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam and Justice K.N. Wanchoo. The case was reported as 1958 AIR 1032 and 1959 SCR 1211. The issue concerned the interpretation of section 295 of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), which deals with insult to religion.

The headnote of the judgment explained that the phrase “any object held sacred by any class of persons” appearing in section 295 is of a broad, general character and cannot be restricted solely to idols placed in temples or idols carried during festivals. The Court held that the provision embraces not only idols or sacred books but also any other object that a particular class of persons regards as sacred, irrespective of whether the object is actually worshipped. The Court referred to the earlier authorities Queen Empress v. Imam Ali (1887) I.L.R. 10 All. 150 and Romesh Chunder Sannyal v. Hiru Mondal (1890) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 852 in reaching this conclusion.

The factual backdrop involved a petition of complaint in which the petitioner alleged that one of the accused had broken a mud image of the deity Ganesa in public and that two other accused had aided and abetted the act with the intention of insulting the religious feelings of the complainant and his community, which venerated the deity. Upon receiving a police report confirming the alleged occurrence, the trial magistrate dismissed the complaint under section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, holding that the breaking of a mud image of Ganesa did not constitute an offence under section 295. The Sessions Judge and the Madras High Court, in revision, concurred with the magistrate’s view and declined to order any further inquiry.

The Supreme Court, however, held that the lower courts were clearly in error in their interpretation of section 295. The Court observed that, although the complaint had been dismissed, no further enquiry was required because the dismissal had already been effected. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that courts must exercise caution in matters involving religious sentiment and must give due regard to the sensitivities of various classes of persons, whether or not those persons share the beliefs in question or whether the courts consider those beliefs rational.

This criminal appeal, numbered 49 of 1956, was filed by special leave from the judgment and order dated 13 October 1954 of the Madras High Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 267 (Criminal Revision Petition No. 249 of 1954), which arose from the judgment and order dated 12 January 1954 of the Court of the District and Sessions Judge at Tiruchirappalli in Criminal Revision Petition No. 17 of 1953. Counsel for the appellant were R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrishnan. No representative appeared on behalf of the respondents.

On 25 August, the judgment was delivered by Justice Sinha. The sole issue for resolution on the special leave appeal was whether the complaint‑petition disclosed a prima facie offence under section 295 of the Indian Penal Code. The lower courts had held that it did not, and consequently they dismissed the petition summarily before any evidence for or against the accused was taken.

The appellant had filed a complaint‑petition in the court of the Additional First‑Class Magistrate at Tiruchirappalli against three respondents. The petition alleged, among other things, that the first accused was the leader of the Dravida Kazhagam, described as a community of persons who consider themselves religious reformers and whose creed includes a policy of campaigning against idol worship. According to the petition, the first accused was intent on “vilifying a certain section of the Hindu community and doing propaganda by holding meetings and writing articles.” The petition further claimed that the first accused had publicly announced his intention to break the image of the god Ganesa, an object sacred to the Saiva section of the Hindu community, and that this announcement had caused “terror‑commotion in the mind of the Saivite section of the Hindu community.” The complainant identified himself as a Saivite.

The petition asserted that on 27 May 1953, at about 5:30 p.m., the first accused broke an idol of the god Ganesa in public at the Town Hall Maidan. Before breaking the idol, he allegedly delivered a speech in which he expressly stated his purpose was to insult the feelings of the Hindu community by breaking the idol. The petition further alleged that the other two accused persons actively abetted the act by providing instigation and aid and that they also addressed speeches. It was claimed that the breaking of the idol was performed with the intention of insulting the religious feelings of certain sections of the Hindu community who venerate the god Ganesa, and that these acts amounted to offences under sections 295 and 295A of the Indian Penal Code.

The complaint‑petition, dated 5 June 1953, prayed that process should be issued against the three accused. The list of witnesses attached to the petition included the Additional District Magistrate, the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate, the Town Sub‑Inspector of Police at Tiruchi Fort, and the Sub‑Magistrate of Tiruchy Town. On the same day, the learned magistrate examined the complainant under oath, and the complainant reiterated the statements supporting the allegations. Following this, the magistrate directed that the petition be sent to the Circle Inspector of Police, Trichy, for an inquiry and report pursuant to section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On 26 June 1953, after receiving the police report which “showed that though the occurrence as”

In the matter before the learned magistrate, the police report had indicated that the alleged incident had indeed occurred, but the magistrate held that the essential question was whether the conduct of the accused could be characterized as an offence under the law. Accordingly, the magistrate issued an order dismissing the complaint pursuant to section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code. While making this order, the magistrate recorded several observations. First, he stated that the mud figure of Ganesa which the accused were alleged to have broken was not an object that any class of persons held as sacred or worshipped. He explained that the mere resemblance of the mud figure to the deity Ganesa, who is venerated by a section of the Hindu community, does not transform the mud figure into an object that is regarded as sacred. The magistrate further observed that if an idol of Ganesa is abandoned by the people because it is considered unworthy of worship, it loses its sanctity and ceases to be an object held sacred by anyone; such abandoned idols are commonly found in places regarded as defiled. Consequently, he concluded that there is no offence if a person steps on, or in any way treats, such an abandoned idol. On this basis, the magistrate held that the breaking of the mud figure of Ganesa did not constitute an offence under section 295 of the Indian Penal Code.

Turning to the speeches delivered by the accused, the magistrate acknowledged that the statements were made with deliberate and malicious intent to outrage the religious feelings of a community and, therefore, would prima facie amount to an offence under section 295‑A of the Indian Penal Code. However, he pointed out that a complaint under this section can only be entertained when the appropriate sanction from the Government has been obtained. The magistrate noted that the complaint expressly mentioned section 295‑A and that the inclusion could not be described as an oversight. In the absence of the required governmental sanction, an offence under section 295‑A cannot be sustained. Consequently, the magistrate found no sufficient ground to proceed with the complaint and dismissed it under section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

The complainant subsequently filed a petition in revision before the learned Sessions Judge of Tiruchirappalli on July 9 1953, invoking sections 435 and 436 of the Criminal Procedure Code, seeking to set aside the magistrate’s dismissal order. In the revision petition, the complainant specifically confined his relief to the allegation of an offence under section 295 of the Indian Penal Code and expressly stated that he was not challenging the dismissal of the complaint with respect to the alleged offence under section 295‑A. The Sessions Judge, by an order dated January 12 1954, dismissed the revision petition, agreeing with the magistrate that the acts alleged did not constitute an offence under section 295. In his reasoning, the Sessions Judge observed that he concurred with the magistrate’s view that the acts complained of did not amount to an offence. He described the accused as individuals who claimed to be religious reformers engaged in a campaign against idolatry. He noted that they had organized a public meeting at which they broke an earthen image of the deity Ganesa. The Judge emphasized that the particular image that was broken was the private property of the accused and, in itself, was not an object held sacred by any class of persons; moreover, he expressed that he did not consider such an idol to be an object that any community regarded as sacred.

After the Sessions Judge dismissed the petition, the complainant approached the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A learned single Judge of that Court heard the matter and, agreeing with the reasoning of the lower courts, also dismissed the complaint and refused to order any further inquiry. In his judgment the Judge examined whether a mud image of the god Ganesa could be considered an “object held sacred by any class of persons” within the meaning of section 295 of the Indian Penal Code, and he concluded in the negative. To support this view he cited the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Queen Empress v. Imam Ali (1887) I.L.R. 10 All. 150, which holds that the word “object” in section 295 does not include animate objects. In that case Edge C.J. observed that the term “object” should be interpreted ejusdem generis with the words “place of worship,” and he gave an idol as an example of a suitable inanimate object. The Judge noted that this observation did not prejudice the complainant. He also referred to Romesh Chunder Sannyal v. Hiru Mondal (1890) I.L.R. 117 Cal. 852, a case concerning a dedicated bull, which he considered not directly applicable, but from which he derived the following inference in his own words: “Interpreted like that, it would mean that the section would apply only to cases where an idol in a temple is sought to be destroyed, damaged, or defiled. The words ‘any object held sacred by any class of persons’ even otherwise will apply only to idols in a temple or when they are carried out in processions on festival occasions. The ‘object held sacred’ will mean only the idols inside the temple and when they are taken out in processions on festival occasions. In such circumstances as in the present case the breaking is nothing more than a doll taken from the shop.”

The Judge further observed that, although the respondents may have intended to offend the feelings of a large segment of the population, intention alone could not establish an offence unless it was manifested by an act falling within the scope of section 295. He stressed that the dolls obtained from the shop, although resembling various deities, could not be regarded as “objects held sacred” because they were not installed in a temple nor taken out in procession on a festival. Accordingly, the act of breaking the mud image was deemed equivalent to destroying a mere doll, and therefore did not satisfy the ingredients of the offence under section 295. The Judge concluded that the offence was not made out and that the dismissal of the complaint was justified.

In the present matter the Court observed that in contemporary society many households display pictures or representations of deities in their drawing rooms, but such pictures cannot reasonably be described as objects that are held sacred. The Court explained that a distinction must be drawn between these domestic images and objects that are truly sacred, which, according to existing law, are those that have been properly installed in a temple and subsequently taken out in procession on festival occasions. Accordingly, the Court held that the item broken by the respondents was merely a doll obtained from a shop or specially fashioned for the occasion; it could not by any stretch of language be classified as an object held sacred. Because the alleged conduct did not satisfy the statutory elements of the offence, the Court concluded that the charge could not be sustained and that the dismissal of the complaint was therefore proper. The petitioner then applied to the High Court for a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court. The learned judge hearing the matter on its merits also considered the petition for a certificate and declined to certify that the case was fit for appeal under Article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution. The petitioner subsequently obtained special leave to appeal before this Court, while the respondents chose to remain ex parte at this stage. Counsel for the appellant contended that the tribunals below had unduly narrowed the meaning of section 295, particularly the phrase “any object held sacred by any class of persons.” According to the counsel, the legislature intended that the phrase be given its fullest amplitude, encompassing any object—whether consecrated or not—that is regarded as sacred by any class of persons, irrespective of whether the persons belong to a different religion or creed. The Court noted that the first question is whether any object is indeed held sacred by a particular class of persons, a determination that must be made on the basis of the evidence presented. The Court also addressed the significance of the words “with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion.” In the present case, the facts alleged in the petition were not contested; however, the learned magistrate, the learned Sessions Judge, and the learned High Court judge all dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that the image of the god Ganesa, as alleged by the complainant to have been treated by the respondents, could not be said to be an object held sacred by any class of persons. The alleged insult consisted of the destruction of an image of the god Ganesa. Apart from the evidentiary issue, which had not yet been fully developed, the Court pointed out that it is a well‑known fact that representations of Lord Ganesa, or similar depictions, are regarded as sacred by certain sections of the Hindu community, even when such images have not undergone formal consecration. The Court therefore concluded that the lower‑court judge had given an unduly restricted interpretation to the phrase “any object held sacred by any class of persons.”

In the Court below, the phrase “any object held sacred by any class of persons” was narrowly construed to refer only to idols that are situated in temples or that are carried in processions on festival occasions. The lower court imposed this limitation despite the fact that section 295 of the Indian Penal Code contains no express words restricting the meaning of “object” to such idols. In the present opinion the Court finds that the learned Judge misdirected himself by importing a limitation that the statute does not contain. The reference to idols is merely illustrative and does not exhaust the class of objects intended by the legislature. A sacred book, for example the Bible, the Koran, or the Granth Saheb, plainly falls within the scope of the general words used in the provision. If the lower courts’ interpretation were to be accepted, the burning, destruction, or defilement of such sacred texts would fall outside the operation of the penal provision, a result that is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute. The Court therefore holds that a restricted construction of such broadly phrased language runs contrary to established canons of statutory construction. Any object, however trivial or of little intrinsic value, that is regarded as sacred by a particular class of persons, must fall within the meaning of the section. It is not necessary that the object be the subject of actual worship; an object may be considered sacred by a group without being worshipped by its members. Consequently, the lower courts were overly dismissive of the religious sensitivities of the class to which the complainant professes belonging. Section 295 was enacted to protect the religious susceptibilities of persons belonging to diverse faiths and creeds. Courts therefore must proceed with great caution and accord due respect to the feelings and religious emotions of different classes, irrespective of whether the judges themselves share those beliefs or consider them rational. On this basis, the Court concludes that the lower courts erred in their interpretation of the essential words of section 295. Nonetheless, the Court must consider whether, despite this strong disagreement, a fresh inquiry into a complaint that has remained dismissed for approximately five years should be ordered. The alleged act by the accused, if it indeed occurred, was at best a foolish act, and the passage of time has rendered the matter stale. Accordingly, the Court declines to order a further inquiry into the complaint. The Court notes that, should similar conduct recur, the authorities responsible for maintaining law and order will apply the law consistent with the interpretation set forth herein. For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.