Rameshwar Proshad Khandelwal and Ors vs Commissioners Land Reforms and Jagirs
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Writ Petition (civil) 172 of 1955
Decision Date: 13 November, 1958
Coram: N.H. Bhagwati, B.P. Sinha, K.N. Wanchoo, S.R. Das, K. Subbarao
In the matter titled Rameshwar Proshad Khandelwal & Ors. versus Commissioners Land Reforms & Jagirs, a judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court of India on 13 November 1958. The opinion was authored by Justice K.N. Wanchoo, who sat on a bench that also included Chief Justice S.R. Das, Justice N.H. Bhagwati, Justice B.P. Sinha, Justice K. Subbarao, and Justice K.N. Wanchoo himself. The case was recorded as Writ Petition (civil) 172 of 1955, with the petitioners identified as Rameshwar Proshad Khandelwal & Ors., and the respondents as the Commissioners of Land Reforms & Jagirs, Madhya Bharat (now Madhya Pradesh) and others. The formal citation of the decision is AIR 1959 SC 498, and the judgment also addressed related writ petitions numbered 173, 177-183, 430, 431 of 1955 and 4, 5, 14, 18, 19, 30, 31, 34, 77-89, 92, 99, and 232 of 1956.
The Court observed that the twenty-four petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution shared a common substantive issue, and therefore it chose to dispose of all of them in a single judgment. It categorized the petitions into three distinct groups for analytical convenience. The first group comprised ten petitions that concerned the Sirsi jagir, and these are hereinafter referred to as the Sirsi petitions. The second group consisted of nine petitions dealing with the Pohri jagir, which the Court will call the Pohri petitions. The third and final group contained five petitions relating to the Palpur jagir, designated as the Palpur petitions. While the three groups were united by the overarching question of the legality of certain actions affecting jagirs, each group presented its own factual nuances. Accordingly, the Court planned to set out the factual background of each group separately after first addressing certain preliminary matters that were common to all of the petitions.
To understand the backdrop against which these petitions arose, the Court explained that the abolition of jagirs was being considered in the former State of Madhya Bharat, which later became part of Madhya Pradesh. In anticipation of the need to protect forest resources that existed within jagirs slated for abolition, the State enacted the Jagir Forests (Prevention of Indiscriminate Cutting) Act, No. 55 of 1950, commonly referred to as the Cutting Act. This legislation was brought into force on 3 July 1950. Section 3 of the Cutting Act imposed restrictions on a jagirdar’s authority to handle forested areas within his jagir. The provision stipulated that, except for the jagirdar’s own genuine personal purposes or those of villagers residing in the jagir, no jagirdar could cut, cause to be cut, or authorize anyone else to cut any tree in the forested portion of the jagir without first obtaining written sanction from the Commissioner for Jagirs. Moreover, the Commissioner was required to consult the Chief Conservator of Forests before granting such sanction, and any permission could be conditioned or limited by the Commissioner as he deemed appropriate. The Court further noted that the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, No. 28 of 1951, known as the Abolition Act, was passed in that same year and received presidential assent on 27 November 1951. However, before a specific date could be fixed for the resumption of jagirs pursuant to Section 3 of the Abolition Act, an injunction dated 7 December 1951 was issued, restraining the Government of Madhya Bharat from implementing the Act. This injunction remained effective until 4 December 1952, when the writ petitions that had prompted its issuance were dismissed, and on that very day a notification under Section 3 of the Abolition Act was issued, resulting in the resumption of all jagirs in Madhya Bharat.
In the matter of the resumption of jagirs under Section 3 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, the Court recorded that an injunction had been issued on 7 December 1951 which restrained the Government of Madhya Bharat from bringing the provisions of that section into operation. The injunction remained in force until 4 December 1952, at which point the writ petitions that had obtained the injunction were dismissed. On the same day, a formal notification was issued under Section 3 of the Abolition Act, and consequently all jagirs in Madhya Bharat were deemed to have been resumed.
The Court then turned to Section 6 of the Abolition Act, which it reproduced in full. Section 6 provides that where, on or after 29 January 1949, a jagirdar (a) grants a lease of any part of his jagir land for a non-agricultural purpose for a term of three years or more, or (b) enters into a lease or any contract concerning any forest in his jagir land for a term of three years or more, and where the Jagir Commissioner is satisfied that such lease or contract was not made in the ordinary course of management but was entered into in anticipation of legislation for the abolition of jagirs, the Commissioner may, in accordance with rules made by the Government, cancel the lease or contract by a written order.
The factual background of the petitions arising out of Sirsi was then set out. The jagirdar of Sirsi had applied to the Commissioner of Jagirs on 12 July 1952 seeking permission to cut forest trees covering approximately three thousand bighas of his jagir. While that application was still pending, the jagirdar entered into contracts with ten petitioners during various dates in November 1952, authorising them to cut forest in specified portions of the jagir in return for certain premiums. Each of those contracts was limited to a period ending on 30 June 1954, and the petitioners made partial payments to the jagirdar shortly after the contracts were signed. The Commissioner’s formal sanction for these contracts was only received on 19 January 1954, except for one contract for which sanction had been granted earlier in 1953. After the receipt of the Commissioner’s sanction, the petitioners commenced exploitation of the allotted forest areas.
On 1 March 1954, the Collector of Guna declared that the contracts were illegal and unconstitutional, and consequently ordered the petitioners to cease all further work. The Collector referred the issue to the Government for clarification, a request that was apparently addressed shortly thereafter. On 5 April 1954, the Divisional Forest Officer informed the petitioners that they could resume their work provided they obtained pass-books from the forest office. The original contracts expired on 30 June 1954, and the petitioners sought an extension of the contract period. According to the record, the Conservator of Forests issued an order on 31 August 1954 extending the contracts to 30 June 1955. The outstanding balances due from the petitioners were demanded on that date, paid, and on 9 October 1954 the petitioners were notified, in line with higher-authority orders, of the continuation of the arrangements.
The authorities informed the petitioners that because they had not completed the work by the original deadline of June 30, 1954, the period for performing the work was being extended to June 30, 1955. The petitioners were directed to finish the work within this extended period and were required to sign new agreements to that effect. Accordingly, the petitioners signed the agreements and resumed their activities in November or December 1954. On March 25, 1955, they received a notice ordering them to cease all further work, including the cutting of timber, the manufacture of charcoal, and the export of forest produce, and they were instructed to return the pass-books to the forest office. The petitioners apparently made representations to the Jagir Commissioner, who issued an order on May 25, 1955, prohibiting any further cutting of trees. Nevertheless, the petitioners were permitted to collect the trees that had already been felled, to complete the manufacture of charcoal that was already in process, and to export timber, wood and charcoal from the forests provided that they furnished security as determined by the Divisional Forest Officer. Similar conditions were imposed on those engaged in the production of kattha. The petitioners furnished the required securities, but they did so under protest. Subsequently, on September 11, 1955, they were informed, in accordance with a decision of the Madhya Bharat High Court in a case to which they were not parties, that all timber, wood, charcoal and kattha present in the forests had been confiscated by the Government and that they were required to hand over all such goods to the Range Officer.
The present petitions were filed after these events. The petitioners contended that the goods ordered to be confiscated by the September 11, 1955 order were their property and that the confiscation order, lacking any legal foundation, was unlawful and violated their fundamental right to hold and dispose of property. Consequently, they prayed that the State of Madhya Bharat (now Madhya Pradesh) be restrained from giving effect to the confiscation order and further restrained from interfering with the petitioners’ right to complete the work in the area assigned to them.
The facts relating to the Pohri petitions were as follows: The jagirdar of Pohri applied for permission to cut trees in his forest, and the Jagir Commissioner granted this permission on November 19, 1951, subject to certain conditions, including a directive that contracts for the sanctioned area should be issued up to May 31, 1952. The jagirdar subsequently granted contracts to the nine petitioners of this group on various dates in October and November 1952, with the contracts extending to May 31, 1955. On October 16, 1952, the period of sanction had been extended to June 30, 1953, which explained why the contracts were granted in October and November 1952. The petitioners asserted that they commenced work soon after the contracts were issued by the jagirdar; however, the State presented a contrary position.
According to the record, the nine petitioners did not actually commence any work in the forest until December 1954, even though they had received contracts from the jagirdar in October and November 1952. In November 1954 the petitioners approached the Divisional Forest Officer of Shivpuri seeking permission to continue work in the forest. The officer responded by directing the petitioners to execute written agreements in the usual format, to pay the outstanding balance of the money due, and assured them that thereafter they would be allowed to carry on their work. The petitioners contend that new agreements were prepared by the Divisional Forest Officer and subsequently sanctioned by the Chief Conservator of Forests; the State, however, disputes the existence of such agreements. The petitioners further assert that on 29 December 1954 the Forest Officer granted them permission to start work, and that they indeed began working at that time. Their activities were abruptly halted when the Jagir Commissioner issued an order on 3 March 1955 directing them to stop all work. The petitioners then appeared before the Commissioner, who on 24 March 1955 issued orders dividing all contractors into two separate groups and ordering a complete cessation of further cutting for both groups. Both groups were permitted to continue handling the trees that had already been felled. One group was authorized to remove timber, wood, charcoal and kattha provided that it furnished security; the other group, to which the petitioners belonged, was allowed to remove the same materials only upon payment of their value. Following these orders, the petitioners applied to various authorities, including the Government of Madhya Bharat, requesting cancellation of the Commissioner’s order dated 24 March 1955. They argued that fresh contracts had been entered into between them and the Government of Madhya Bharat, and that the Commissioner had no power to interfere with those contracts in the manner he did. The Government of Madhya Bharat gave no relief, prompting the petitioners to file the present petitions before this Court. The petitioners maintain that they are the owners of the timber, charcoal, kattha and related forest produce, and that the State of Madhya Bharat cannot dispossess them of this property without lawful authority supporting the order of 24 March 1955. Consequently, they prayed that the Government of Madhya Bharat (now Madhya Pradesh) be restrained from giving effect to that order and from interfering with their right to hold and dispose of the forest property. The record then turns to the facts of the five petitions from Palpur. The jagirdar of Palpur had applied to the Jagir Commissioner for permission to cut forest in his jagir, and the Commissioner granted sanction on 30 October 1952 for working 5,698 bighas of forest land for the year ending 30 June 1953. Acting on that permission, the jagirdar awarded a contract to one Fateh Singh on 15 November 1952, with the contract intended to run until 30 June 1955. Fateh Singh, however, did not commence work in the area granted to him.
In January 1954 the contract originally held by Fateh Singh was transferred to the five petitioners of this group on the twelfth day of that month. In the following month, October 1954, the petitioners submitted a request to the Divisional Forest Officer of Shivpuri seeking permission to commence work and also asking that the authorised working period be extended until the thirtieth day of June 1955. The Divisional Forest Officer responded by requiring the petitioners to deposit certain sums of money and to obtain the necessary passbooks as a condition for approval. After complying with these requirements, the petitioners began a limited amount of work under the permission that had been granted. Subsequently, in November 1954 they filed another application asking for authority to work an additional area of forest land. The Divisional Forest Officer approved this second request on the eighth day of November 1954, conditioned upon the payment of further amounts, and he also affixed his signature to the agreement that existed between the jagirdar and Fateh Singh. While the petitioners continued their activities under the Divisional Forest Officer’s sanction, they received an abrupt order to cease work on the third day of March 1955, issued by the Jagir Commissioner. The petitioners promptly presented representations against this order, but the Jagir Commissioner subsequently issued final orders on the twelfth day of April 1955 that mirrored the directives previously issued in the Pohri petitions. Additional representations were made by the petitioners after this date, yet none produced any effect. Consequently, the petitioners resorted to filing the present petitions, asserting that the order dated twelve April 1955 stripped them of their property without any legal authority and thereby violated their fundamental right to hold and dispose of property. They therefore sought a directive restraining the State of Madhya Bharat, now known as Madhya Pradesh, from interfering with their entitlement to hold and dispose of the timber, wood, charcoal, kattha and similar forest products situated in the forest. The State opposed the petitions, acknowledging the factual background concerning the various orders but contending that ownership of the trees never transferred to the petitioners; consequently, the forest materials such as timber, wood, charcoal and kattha did not become their property, and they possessed no fundamental right to maintain the petitions. The Court then turned to the case of the Sirsi petitioners. The learned Additional Solicitor General argued that, since all jagirs were abolished as of the fourth day of December 1952, the Jagir Commissioner no longer possessed authority under Section 3 of the Cutting Act to sanction any contracts entered into by jagirdars before that date. However, for the purposes of the present case, the Court found it unnecessary to resolve that issue and proceeded on the assumption that the sanction granted by the Jagir Commissioner on the nineteenth day of January 1954, concerning the petitioners’ contracts of November 1952, was valid. Those contracts, the Court observed, all expired on the thirtieth day of June 1954, and the property now claimed by the petitioners could, if at all, have been acquired only after that date.
In this matter the Court examined whether the forest authorities’ alleged extension of the contractual period on 31 August 1954, as communicated to the petitioners by a letter dated 19 October 1954, was sufficient to vest ownership of the trees in the petitioners. The Court noted that all jagir forest had become the property of the State on 4 December 1952, and consequently only the State possessed the authority to extend the terms of any contracts after the original expiry date of 30 June 1954. The Court explained that an extension granted by the forest authorities could create a property right in the trees for the petitioners only if the authorities had been expressly delegated by the Government with the power to sell the forest trees. The petitioners relied upon a notification issued on 5 August 1954, which purported to allow the Chief Conservator of Forests, Conservators of Forests, Divisional Forest Officers and District Forest Officers to execute contracts for the sale of forest coupes and leases of forest lands on behalf of the Rajpramukh. The Court observed that this notification was issued under Article 299(1) of the Constitution and merely identified which officers could draw up contracts in the name of the Rajpramukh. The notification did not, however, confer upon those officers the authority to sell the State’s property. The Court further clarified that the notification only authorized the officers to execute contracts after a sale had already been approved by the proper authority empowered to sanction such a sale. The Court then turned to the source of the authority to make sales. It pointed out that the power to sell forest produce by auction was granted by a letter numbered 770/XV/1951 (102)/50, dated 7 March 1951, from the Development Secretary to the Chief Conservator of Forests. That letter authorized Divisional Forest Officers, Conservators of Forests and the Chief Conservator of Forests to sanction auction sales of forest produce up to specified monetary limits of Rs 2,000, Rs 10,000 and Rs 25,000 respectively. No evidence was presented to demonstrate that the forest officers possessed any authority to grant extensions of contract periods. The Court noted that, although the petitioners may have signed certain agreement forms, those forms were never completed or signed by any forest department officer, and no auction sale of timber took place. Consequently, the Court concluded that, despite the forest officers permitting the petitioners to work in the forest, there was no legal transfer of title to the trees either through a new contract or through an extension of the contracts that had expired on 30 June 1954. The petitioners therefore could not claim that ownership of the trees in the areas they worked had passed to them by any lawful sale made by the State or by any duly authorized officer. Finally, the Court addressed the petitioners’ argument that the transaction involved the sale of movable property—namely standing timber—and that a written registered instrument was not required, asserting that a subsequent ratification by the State Government rendered the sale binding. The Court found no basis for this contention, as no ratification of the forest officers’ actions had occurred, and the alleged extension did not create a valid transfer of property.
The Court observed that the petitioners could not rely on a claim that the property in the trees had been transferred to them. The petitioners had cited the decision in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas v. Moreshwar Parashram, 1954 SCR 817 at p. 836 (1954 AIR (SC) 236 at p. 243), where it was held that when a government officer exceeds his authority, the government becomes bound only if it ratifies that excess. The Court noted that there was no ratification of the forest officers’ actions, which were clearly beyond the officers’ authority. The petitioners also referred to Section 6 of the Abolition Act, but the Court found that this provision was irrelevant because the contracts of the petitioners had expired on 30 June 1954, and the issue before the Court was whether any ownership of the trees passed to the petitioners after that date. Based on the facts, the Court concluded that there was no extension of the contracts beyond 30 June 1954, no sale of the trees to the petitioners, and consequently the ownership of the trees never passed to them under law.
In an alternative argument, the petitioners contended that they had been given a license by the forest officers to work in the forest areas, and that, under Sections 26(2)(a) and 34 of the Madhya Bharat Forest Act, No. LXXIII of 1960 (referred to as the Forest Act), the property in the trees should be deemed to have passed to them. The Court examined the definition of “license” in Section 52 of the Easements Act (V of 1882), which states: “Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a license.” The Court explained that a license merely confers permission to act on the grantor’s immovable property and does not itself transfer any interest in the property. Accordingly, even though the forest officers had permitted the petitioners to enter the forest and work, a license alone could not convey ownership of the trees unless it was coupled with a grant of that property. The petitioners relied on the case of Ramakrishna v. Unni Check, I L R 16 Mad 280, where a license to capture elephants was argued to give the licensee the right to remove the elephants. The Court noted that the transfer in that case failed because it was done without the licensor’s permission, and that the license in the present case did not include any grant of the trees. Consequently, the Court held that the license issued by the forest authorities could not, in the circumstances, transfer ownership of the trees to the petitioners.
The Court observed that the language of the license in the earlier case was not limited to a simple permission; it expressly authorised the digging of fifty pits for elephants, the removal of the captured animals from those pits, and the performance of all acts necessary to effect that removal. Because the licence in that earlier case combined a right to act upon land with an authority to take away movable property, the document functioned both as a licence and as a conveyance of the elephants themselves. In the present matter, however, the permission obtained from the forest authorities was only a licence in favour of the petitioners. The authorities had no statutory power to vest ownership of trees, and consequently no grant of the trees could arise from the licence. Accordingly, the Court held that the licence issued by the forest authorities could not transfer any property right in the trees to the petitioners under the facts of this case.
The Court then considered whether sections 26(2)(a) and 34 of the Forests Act could furnish the petitioners with a basis to claim title to the trees. Section 26(2)(a) belongs to the chapter dealing with “Reserved Forests,” which are created only by a declaration made under section 4. No evidence was placed on the record that the forests involved had been declared as reserved forests. Moreover, the provision merely shields a person from certain penalties when he has obtained permission; it does not create a property right. Section 34 pertains to “Protected Forests,” which require a notification under section 29 before the provisions can apply. The Court found no such notification issued before the relevant dates. Although section 34 permits a person, by written authority of a forest officer, to do what would otherwise be prohibited under chapter IV, that power does not extend to the transfer of ownership in the trees. The Court further noted that the Forests Act is concerned solely with the management of forests and contains no provisions for the sale of forest produce or the lease of forest lands for exploitation. Consequently, the Court concluded that the petitioners could not be deemed to have acquired legal ownership of the trees from which they produced charcoal, kattha, or other items by virtue of the licence granted by the forest authorities.
Turning to the petitions filed by the Pohri and Palpur claimants, the Court treated their cases together. The permission granted to the jagirdars in those matters allowed them to issue contracts for cutting trees in specified areas only until 30 June 1953. Nevertheless, the jagirdars extended the contracts to 31 May 1955. The Court identified the initial issue as whether the jagirdars possessed the authority to grant contracts for a period longer than that authorised by the original permission. The Court indicated that the analysis of section 3 of the Cutting Act, which bars the cutting of trees rather than the granting of contracts, was not essential to resolve the petitioners’ claim. The Court emphasized that, absent any fresh permission after 30 June 1953 or any subsequent grant of contracts by the Government of Madhya Bharat, the petitioners could not claim a right to continue working the forests beyond that date, nor could they claim ownership of the trees felled or of the kattha and charcoal produced from those trees.
In this part of the case the Court examined whether the jagirdars were authorized to grant cutting contracts that extended beyond the period that had been expressly sanctioned. The petitioners argued that Section 3 of the Cutting Act prohibited only the actual felling of trees and did not forbid the jagirdars from entering into contracts for a longer duration. The Court observed that it was unnecessary to resolve the precise scope of Section 3, that is, whether the provision barred only the physical cutting of trees or also the grant of contracts for periods exceeding the limit set by the jagir commissioner. Even assuming that the provision restricted merely the cutting activity, such an interpretation would not assist the petitioners’ position. The permission originally granted to the jagirdars covered tree cutting only up to 30 June 1953. Consequently, unless a fresh permission or a new contract was issued by the Government of Madhya Bharat after that date, the petitioners could not lawfully continue to work in the forests beyond 30 June 1953, nor could they claim ownership of the trees felled after that date or of the kattha and charcoal produced from those trees. The petitioners did not contend that the jagir commissioner had extended the original permission beyond 30 June 1953; instead they relied on certain actions taken by forest officials, which they claimed amounted to the issuance of new contracts and thereby the transfer of ownership of the trees to them. The same line of argument had been raised earlier by the Sirsi petitioners, and the Court had already examined those submissions. After reconsidering the arguments in light of the Sirsi opinion, the Court concluded that, for the same reasons, ownership of the trees did not pass to the petitioners in the present matters. The Court noted that the remaining issues raised in the petitions had not been contested and therefore required no further discussion. Accordingly, the Court held that in none of the cases before it did any legal right to the trees vest in the petitioners. The Court reiterated the settled principle that a petition under Article 32 is maintainable only when the petitioner demonstrates a violation of a fundamental right. The petitioners claimed a fundamental right to retain and dispose of the forest products that the State of Madhya Bharat, now Madhya Pradesh, refused to allow them to remove. Such a right could exist only if ownership of the trees, kattha, or charcoal had transferred to the petitioners, which the Court found was not the case. In the absence of any such transfer, the petitioners lacked a basis to invoke a fundamental right to hold and dispose of the property, and there was no statutory authority permitting the State to deprive them of it. For these reasons the Court dismissed the petitions as unmaintainable. Although the petitions were dismissed, the Court observed that the actions of the State officials had created a mistaken impression in the minds of the petitioners that they possessed a right to the trees.
The Court observed that the conduct of the State officers had created in the minds of the petitioners an impression that they possessed some right in respect of the trees. In view of that observation, the Court ordered that the expenses incurred in the present proceedings shall be borne by each party individually. Accordingly, the petitioners were required to meet their own legal expenses, and the respondents were likewise required to bear their own costs. No award of costs against either side was made, and each side was left responsible for the fees, charges and other expenditures it had incurred during the litigation. The order therefore meant that the burden of the legal expenditure incurred by each side would not be shifted to the other side, and that each party would carry the financial consequences of its own conduct in the case.