Raghubar Sarup Nawab Jamshed Ali Khan vs State of U.P.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Writ Petition (civil) 202 of 1955

Decision Date: 18 December 1958

Coram: S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, S.R. Das, M. Hidayatullah

In the writ petition numbered 202 of 1955, the petitioner identified as Raghubar Sarup Nawab Jamshed Ali Khan challenged actions taken by the State of Uttar Pradesh. The petition and the subsequent appeals on certificates issued by the Allahabad High Court were filed under Article thirty-two of the Constitution of India. The petitioners questioned the validity of measures undertaken by the State under two statutes: the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, numbered I of 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Abolition Act, and the Rampur Thekedari and Pattedari Abolition Act, numbered X of 1954, hereinafter referred to as the Thekedari Act. The bench that heard the matter comprised Chief Justice S.R. Das together with Justices S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo and M. Hidayatullah. The judgment was pronounced on the eighteenth day of December, 1958, and the decision was reported in the All India Reporter for the year 1959 at page 909. The Court indicated that it would dispose of all of the petitions and the related appeals in a single judgment because they raised common legal questions and, in some instances, involved lands that were subject to both of the statutes that were being contested.

The Court then traced the historical background of the former State of Rampur. Before the year 1947, Rampur existed as an independent princely state under the paramountcy of the British Crown. Following the passage of the Indian Independence Act of 1947, Rampur acceded to the Dominion of India in August 1947 by executing an instrument of accession. Subsequently, on the fifteenth day of May, 1949, the ruler of Rampur entered into a merger agreement with the Dominion, agreeing to transfer the entire administration of the state to the Dominion effective from the first day of July, 1949. In accordance with this agreement, the Governor-General issued the Rampur (Administration) Order on July 1, 1949, which appointed a Chief Commissioner to administer the former princely territory on behalf of the Government of India. Later, on the twenty-ninth day of November, 1949, the Governor-General promulgated the States Merger (United Provinces) Order, 1949, which transferred the administration of Rampur to the Government of Uttar Pradesh, thereby converting Rampur into a district of that state. Uttar Pradesh enacted the Abolition Act in 1951, but initially the Act did not apply to Rampur. Section two of the Act, however, reserved the power to extend the whole Act or any of its provisions to Rampur, as defined in the 1949 administration order, subject to necessary exceptions or modifications that would not alter the substance of the law. Exercising that power, the State issued notification number 3168/1-A-559/1951 on June 30, 1954, thereby applying the Abolition Act to Rampur. The very next day, on July 1, 1954, notification number 3169/1-A-559/1951 declared that all estates situated in Rampur vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh. These two notifications formed the specific subject of the challenges raised in the petitions and the appeals, which concerned the status of jagirs, zamindaris and other related interests in the former Rampur State.

The Court explained that the land-tenure system in the former Rampur State comprised three distinct categories. First, within a region called Ileqz Jadid, which the Government of India transferred to Rampur in 1857, the land was held by intermediaries known as Zamindars; these Zamindars were, in every respect, comparable to the Zamindars operating in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Second, the Ruler of Rampur had granted certain parcels of land to individuals in the form of jagirs or muafis. Holders of these jagirs or muafis were exempt from the general land-revenue that Zamindars were required to pay; instead they paid only a modest local rate referred to as abvab. Third, a large portion of the territory consisted of what were termed Ehau villages—lands owned directly by the State where no intermediaries stood between the State and the actual cultivators. Many of these villages were nearly deserted, and only a small fraction of their land was under cultivation. In March 1949 the Ruler of Rampur resolved to lease a number of these under-utilised villages to persons identified as Thekedars or Pattedars. The purpose of the leases was to encourage these lessees to bring in tenants, to invest capital in the villages, and thereby to convert uncultivated land into productive farmland for the cultivation of food grains. Each lease was initially set for a term of ten years, with a provision allowing the State to extend the lease for an additional ten-year period. The lease documents specified the obligations of the Thekedars to bring the leased lands under cultivation and stipulated the share of the agricultural profit that the State was to receive as revenue. Moreover, the leases required periodic reviews after three, six and ten years to assess compliance with the stipulated conditions and to permit an increase in the State’s share of the profit at each review. The leases also contained a clause that, should the lessee fail to fulfil the conditions, the lease would be terminated and the State would assume direct administration of the village. Many of the petitioners and appellants before the Court were Thekedars or Pattedars who had been granted such leases, and the original ten-year period of those leases had not yet expired. The Court noted that the Abolition Act did not evidently apply to these leases. In 1954 the Government of Uttar Pradesh decided to abolish the thekedari and pattedari arrangements that existed in Rampur in order to facilitate land-reform measures. Accordingly, the State enacted the Thekedari Act, which received the President’s assent on 18 April 1954 and was to become effective on 1 July 1954. Section 2(6) of the Thekedari Act expressly defines the term “lease” so as to encompass the leases previously granted in Rampur. Section 3 of the Act prescribes the procedure for the determination of such leases, while Section 4 outlines the consequences that follow such a determination. Sections 7 through 17 set out the principles and the procedural framework for awarding compensation to the lessees. The Court also observed that the constitutional validity, or vires, of the Thekedari Act had been challenged.

The Court first examined the petitions that concerned jagirs, zamindaris and muafis. The petitioners advanced two separate contentions. Firstly, they relied upon the agreements that had been executed between the Ruler of Rampur and the Dominion Government and argued that, because of those agreements, the State of Uttar Pradesh was not authorised to abolish the estates situated in Rampur. Secondly, they contended that section 2(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Abolition Act was ultra vires, alleging that it amounted to an excessive delegation of essential legislative functions to the executive and, furthermore, that the notification dated 30 June 1954 was invalid because it brought about substantial alterations in the meaning of the word “estate” within the Act. The Court was of the opinion that neither of these submissions possessed any merit. It observed that the petitioners and appellants could not, in the first place, depend upon the provisions of the agreement entered into by the Ruler of Rampur and the Dominion of India, since Article 363 of the Constitution barred any dispute on the basis of that agreement, a principle that had been affirmed in Maharaj Umeg Singh v State of Bombay (1955-2 SCR 164; AIR 1955 SC 540). Even assuming that the parties examined clauses (iii) and (x) of the collateral letter, the Court found no substantive basis for the argument. Clause (iii) was quoted in full: “All contracts and agreements entered into by your Highness before the date on which the administration is made over to the Government of India will be honoured except in so far as any of these contracts or agreements may either be repugnant to the provisions of a law made applicable to the State or inconsistent with any general policy of the successor Government.” The Court reasoned that, if the jagirs, zamindaris and muafis at issue were indeed the product of contracts or agreements concluded by the Ruler of Rampur, clause (iii) made clear that such contracts would be honoured only so long as they were not inconsistent with the general policy of the successor Government. When the State of Uttar Pradesh, acting as the successor Government, adopted a comprehensive policy to abolish all estates throughout the state, those contracts necessarily fell into inconsistency with that policy, and consequently the benefits arising from them could not be invoked against the State’s policy. Clause (x) was also reproduced: “The present grants and allowances to the Ruler’s mothers, brothers, sisters, and other members of the Ruling family, list attached, will be continued during their lifetime and will be charged on the revenue of the State.” Nawabzada Zafar Ali Khan, identified as a brother of the Ruler, attempted to rely on this clause. The Court concluded that the citation of clause (x) was insufficient to support his claim.

In examining the provision under consideration, the Court observed that, as the High Court previously noted, the clause is expressly concerned with cash allowances granted to members of the Ruler’s family. This intention is evident both from the schedule that accompanies the clause, which enumerates the individuals entitled to such payments, and from the explicit wording that these grants and allowances are to be funded out of the State’s revenue. The name of Nawabzada Zafar Ali Khan does not appear anywhere in the attached list of beneficiaries. Consequently, the Court concluded that Nawabzada Zafar Ali Khan cannot invoke the clause to claim any entitlement. The argument that relied on a prior agreement therefore fails to establish a valid right. The Court also turned to Articles 7 and 8 of the States Merger (Governors’ Provinces) Order 1949, which were concurrently applicable to the States Merger (United Provinces) Order 1949. Those Articles were held to be irrelevant to the matters of jagirs, zamindaris and muafis. Their purpose was to transfer obligations relating to loans, guarantees and other financial liabilities of the Dominion Government, arising from the administration of the merged State, to the provinces that absorbed the territory. Moreover, they provided that any contract entered into before the appointed day on behalf of the Dominion of India, for purposes connected with the governance of the merged State, would be treated as if it had been made by or on behalf of the absorbing State unless the contract was wholly or partly for central purposes. Because these provisions address financial and contractual liabilities rather than the substantive rights over estates, the Court held that they have no bearing on the issues presently before it.

The second question presented concerned the constitutional validity of Section 2(1) of the Abolition Act and the notification issued on 30 June 1954. The Court expressed the view that a detailed exploration of this issue was unnecessary in view of the subsequent amendment effected by the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms (Amendment) Act No. XIV of 1958. The original challenge argued that, even assuming the delegation of power under Section 2(1) was not excessive, the 30 June 1954 notification altered the definition of “estate” while extending the Abolition Act to the former Rampur State, thereby effecting a substantive change. However, this contention was rendered moot because the 1958 Amendment Act retrospectively rewrote the definition of “estate” contained in Section 3(8) of the Abolition Act. Section 1(2) of the Amendment Act stipulated that the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on 1 July 1952. Section 2 of the same Act declared that the new wording shall be and shall be deemed to have always been substituted for clause (8) of Section 3. The revised definition begins with the phrase “estate means and shall be deemed to have always meant”. By making this amendment, the change previously effected by the 1954 notification has been incorporated into a legislative provision that is deemed operative from 1 July 1952. It is not disputed that, with this retroactive definition in force from that date, all jagirs, zamindaris and muafis in Rampur fall within the scope of the term “estate” as now defined, and consequently are subject to the provisions of the Abolition Act.

In this case the Court observed that the amendment to the definition of “estate” brought about by the Uttar Pradesh Act XIV of 1958 meant that all jagirs, zamindaris and muafis in Rampur fell within the scope of the word “estate” as now defined. The Court held that the power granted to the State Government to extend the Abolition Act to additional areas of the State did not constitute an excessive delegation of legislative authority, because it is well established that a legislature may entrust the executive with the discretion to apply the provisions of a statute to different geographical regions at different times, based on varying considerations. Consequently, this argument also failed in view of the provisions of Act XIV of 1958. The Court further rejected the contention that pending litigation could be saved, stating that the new law applied uniformly to all estates and that no saving clause could be implied for cases already in progress, referring to the earlier authority of K. C. Mukherjee v. Mt. Ramratan Kuer. No other points were raised before the Court. Accordingly, the Court directed that all petitions and appeals concerning jagirs, zamindaris and muafis be dismissed, while ordering that each party bear its own costs because the amendment had been effected in 1958. Turning to the petitions and appeals relating to thekedari and pattedari holdings, the Court noted that the parties had again relied on the agreements between the Ruler of Rampur and the Dominion of India; having already examined those agreements earlier in the judgment, the Court rejected the arguments founded on them. The Court also considered the submission that the leases granted to the thekedars and pattedars could not be determined under the Thekedari Act because, according to the argument, the leaseholders were merely “managers”. The Court found this reasoning unconvincing. After briefly summarising the terms of the leases, the Court pointed out that the documents expressly referred to the instruments as leases and to the grantees as lessees, indicating that they were not simple state employees but individuals who possessed a proprietary interest in the leased lands. The lease conditions required the lessees to invest their own money, to pay revenue, and to enjoy a heritable interest, while also providing that the lease could be terminated and the management of the land taken over by the State if certain conditions were not fulfilled. In light of these terms, the Court concluded that the lessees could not be characterized as mere managers and therefore could not claim that the Thekedari Act, which applies to lessees of such leases under the definition in Section 2(6), did not apply to them. The Court noted that there was no dispute on this point.

The Court observed that the Legislature of Uttar Pradesh possessed the constitutional authority to enact the legislation in question because it fell within the scope of Entry eighteen of List two of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Court further noted that none of the parties before it had raised any objection concerning the adequacy of the compensation stipulated in the Thekedari Act. In view of the absence of such a contention, the Court held that the Act was enacted by a legislature exercising a power that was expressly conferred upon it. The Court further examined the requirement of Article thirty-one clause two of the Constitution and found that the compensation provision contained in the Act complied with that provision. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Thekedari Act was a valid piece of legislation and that no exception to its validity could be entertained. The Court also observed that no other point or argument was presented before it that might affect the foregoing conclusion. Because the Act was valid and no further matter was raised, the Court found that the petitions and appeals that concerned thekedari and pattedari lands were devoid of any legal force. Accordingly, the Court determined that those petitions and appeals must be dismissed.

The Court proceeded to dispose of the remaining proceedings by ordering the dismissal of all petitions and appeals that related to jagirs, zamindaris and muafis, while expressly refraining from passing any order as to costs in those matters. With respect to the petitions and appeals concerning thekedari and pattedari lands, the Court likewise ordered their dismissal and directed that a single set of costs be awarded to the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Court then turned to the specific civil appeals listed in the record and observed that civil appeals numbered five hundred thirty, five hundred forty, five hundred sixty-nine, six hundred, six hundred one and six hundred seventeen of the year nineteen fifty-seven had become abated. In view of their abatement, the Court declared that those six civil appeals were hereby dismissed. The Court further noted that civil appeals numbered five hundred forty-seven, five hundred fifty-three, five hundred fifty-five, five hundred seventy-eight, five hundred ninety-five and five hundred ninety-eight of the year nineteen fifty-seven had not been prosecuted. Accordingly, the Court dismissed each of those six civil appeals on the ground of non-prosecution. Thus, the Court concluded the adjudication of all the pending matters listed in the present applications.