Nagendra Nath Bora and Another vs The Commissioner Of Hills Division

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 668, 669, 670 and 672 of 1957

Decision Date: 7 February 1958

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Syed Jaffer Imam, J.L. Kapur, P.B. Gajendragadkar

In the matter titled Nagendra Nath Bora and Another versus the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, a judgment was delivered on 7 February 1958 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and was pronounced by a bench consisting of Justices Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Syed Jaffer Imam, J. L. Kapur and P. B. Gajendragadkar.

The petitioners, identified as Nagendra Nath Bora and another individual, challenged the respondent, the Commissioner of the Hills Division and Appeals, Assam. The case is reported in the 1958 volumes of the All India Reporter at page 398 and the Supreme Court Reports at page 1240. The legal issue concerned the powers of a High Court to issue a writ of certiorari for correcting an error of fact that appears on the face of the record, in the context of the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act of 1910, as amended by amendment 23 of 1955, specifically Section 9 and Rule 343.

The Court observed that a High Court does not possess authority under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of certiorari merely to set aside an error of fact, even when such error is evident on the face of the record. The Court clarified that the High Court may intervene only when the error is one of law that is apparent on the face of the record. An error of law or fact that the High Court could correct in its capacity as a court of appeal or revision cannot serve as a ground for exercising the power conferred by Article 226. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon the earlier decision in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque and others, reported in the 1955 Supreme Court Reports at page 1104, as well as English authorities including Queen v. James Bolton (1841) 1 Queen’s Bench 66, King v. Nat Bell Liquors, Limited (1922) 2 A.C. 128, and the cases of Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal (1951) 1 K.B. 711 and (1952) 1 K.B. 338.

The Court further explained that the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 is confined to ensuring that judicial or quasi‑judicial tribunals and administrative bodies exercising quasi‑judicial powers do not exceed the jurisdiction granted to them by statute and that they apply the law correctly as laid down in the relevant enactment. So long as the hierarchy of officers and appellate authorities created by a statute operates within its prescribed limits, the manner in which they exercise their functions cannot become a ground for High Court interference. The supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not broader than that under Article 226 and must also be limited to verifying that the tribunal functions within the scope of its statutory authority. In support of this view, the Court referred to the decision in Waryam Singh and another v. Amarnath and another, reported in the 1954 Supreme Court Reports at page 565.

Consequently, the Court held that when a High Court, exercising the powers under Articles 226 and 227, interfered with certain orders issued by the Excise Appellate Authority under the Assam Excise Act on the premise that those orders were beyond jurisdiction because they were tainted by errors of fact apparent on the face of the record, such interference was beyond the Court’s authority. The orders passed by the High Court in that circumstance were therefore set aside.

The Court observed that the High Court had interfered with the jurisdiction of the appellate authority on the premise that the latter’s orders were tainted by errors of fact that were apparent on the face of the record. The Court held that such interference was beyond the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court and therefore the orders issued by the High Court had to be set aside. The Court further explained that when an appellate authority, as in the present case, is created by the statute as the highest authority for adjudicating disputes between rival parties, the statute confers upon it full and uncurtailed powers. Consequently, the authority’s powers cannot be limited, nor can its actions be characterised as exceeding its jurisdiction, on the basis of considerations that lie outside the statutory framework or the rules prescribed by it. In support of this proposition the Court referred to Raman and Raman Ltd. v. The State of Madyas, [1956] S.C.R. 256.

The Court went on to state that, in the absence of any material showing that the appellate authority had breached any rule of natural justice, and recognising that the rules of natural justice must be understood within the context of the statutory provisions that govern the authority, it would be erroneous to claim a failure of natural justice merely because another tribunal might have reached a different conclusion on the matter. The Court relied on New Prakask Transport Co. Ltd. v. New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd., [1957] S.C.R. 98, to reinforce this point.

Turning to the nature of the power exercised by the authority, the Court declared that the question of whether an administrative body acts solely in an administrative capacity or in a quasi‑judicial capacity must be answered by a careful examination of the statute and the rules under which the body operates. Upon such examination, the Court found that the authorities mentioned in section 9 of the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910, as amended by Assam Act 23 of 1953, are not merely administrative bodies. Their orders therefore fall within the supervisory and control jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

In the judgment that follows, the Court noted the civil appellate jurisdiction over Civil Appeals Nos. 668, 669, 670 and 672 of 1957. The appeals were filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated 6 August 1957 of the Assam High Court in Civil Rule No. 65 of 1957. Counsel for the appellants in Appeals Nos. 668 and 669 of 1957, and for respondent No. 2 in Appeal No. 670 of 1957, appeared, as did counsel for the State of Assam and counsel for the appellants in Appeal No. 670 of 1957 and respondent No. 2 in Appeal No. 669 of 1957.

The Court delivered its judgment on 7 February 1958, with Justice Sinha authoring the opinion. The Court explained that these special‑leave appeals were directed against the orders of the Assam High Court, which had exercised its constitutional powers under Articles 226 and 227 in reviewing orders passed by the Revenue Authorities under the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The appeals raised several common questions of constitutional law; therefore, they were heard together and would be disposed of by a single judgment. Although the proceedings shared certain common features in the settlement of country‑spirit shops, the Court noted that the factual matrix of each case differed and would be addressed separately where necessary.

In the present batch of appeals, each case concerning country spirit shops proceeded through the statutory hierarchy established under the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, yet the factual circumstances of each dispute differed and therefore had to be narrated separately. The first appeal, numbered Civil Appeal No 668 of 1957, involved the petitioners Nagendra Nath Bora and Ridananda Dutt, who operated as partners in a firm created pursuant to a Government notification dated 30 November 1956. That notification amended rule 232 of the Assam Excise Rules and prescribed that the settlement of any country spirit shop designated by the Government as a “big shop” must be effected by two or more partners who were neither members of the same family nor related to each other, as reflected in the correction slip on page 106 of the Assam Excise Manual, 1946. Following the procedural requirements of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner of Sibsagar issued invitations to tender in December 1956 for the settlement of the Jorhat country spirit shop for the financial year 1957‑58. The petitioners, acting in their capacity as partners under the newly formed firm, submitted a tender in the prescribed format. Competing tenders were also filed by Dharmeshwar Kalita and Someswar Neog, identified in the record as respondents 3 and 4 respectively. The first and second respondents in the present suit were the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, and the Commissioner of Excise, Assam. It is necessary to note that for the preceding financial year 1956‑57 the shop in question had been ordered by the first respondent, acting as the Excise Appellate Authority, to be settled in favour of the first petitioner, Nagendra Nath, as an individual, thereby overturning the earlier orders of the Deputy Commissioner and the Excise Commissioner. Dissatisfied competitors challenged that decision before the Assam High Court, alleging that the settlement favouring the first petitioner was invalid. Similar writ petitions contesting settlements made by the Excise Appellate Authority were concurrently filed, and the High Court heard all such matters together. By its judgment dated 22 May 1956, the High Court set aside the orders of the first respondent, principally on the ground that the Appellate Authority had been illegally constituted. The aggrieved parties subsequently obtained special leave to appeal to this Court, where a Constitution Bench heard the matter and delivered its judgment on 31 January 1957. That judgment held that the constitution of the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals as the ultimate appellate authority under the Act was not unconstitutional, and the decision was reported as State of Assam v. A N Kidwai. For convenience, the present judgment will refer to that decision as “the ruling of this Court.” The effect of the ruling was to overturn the High Court’s determination that the orders of the first respondent were void, thereby restoring the settlement made by that authority.

The Court observed that the orders issued by the first respondent, who acted as the Excise Appellate Authority, had been declared void and set aside, thereby restoring the settlement that had been made by that Authority. Nevertheless, while the High Court judgment had nullified the first respondent’s orders, the direction issued by the Excise Commissioner to resettle the shop in question was nevertheless carried out, and the settlement was concluded with the third respondent as an individual. The third respondent continued to occupy the premises until 26 February 1957, when the first appellant was placed in possession pursuant to the ruling of this Court reported in 1957 S.C.R. 295. The first appellant was therefore able to exercise his rights as lessee of the shop only for a few months during the financial year that ended on 31 March 1957. For the subsequent financial year 1957‑58, the Deputy Commissioner, after consulting the local Advisory Committee, settled the same shop with the third and fourth respondents. The licensing authority did not consider the tender submitted by the appellants because it erroneously relied on the view that the orders of the first respondent, as the ultimate revenue authority for excise‑shop settlements, had become null and void as a result of the High Court decision. Consequently, the appellants, together with other competitors for the settlement, filed appeals before the Excise Commissioner. The Excise Commissioner set aside the settlement that had been made in favour of the third and fourth respondents and ordered that the shop be settled with the appellants. In reaching this decision, the Commissioner took note of the fact that the High Court order nullifying the proceedings before the first respondent had itself been overturned by the ruling of this Court, and therefore the alleged disqualification of the appellants as competent tenderers was vacated.

The third and fourth respondents, along with other dissatisfied tenderers, subsequently filed appeals before the first respondent against the order of the Excise Commissioner. The first respondent dismissed those appeals and confirmed the order that settled the shop with the appellants, an order dated 10 June 1957. The respondents then approached the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, seeking a writ to quash the order issued by the first respondent. By its order dated 6 August 1957, the High Court set aside the settlement in favour of the appellants and directed that all tenders be reconsidered in light of its observations. The High Court’s principal basis for the decision was that the Excise Appellate Authority had acted beyond its jurisdiction and that its order was tainted by errors apparent on the face of the record. After the High Court refused the prayer for a certificate that the case was fit for appeal to this Court, the appellants obtained special leave to appeal.

In this matter, the appellants were granted special leave to appeal to this Court after the High Court refused to issue a certificate that the case was fit for appeal. The appeal, designated as Civil Appeal No. 669 of 1957, concerned the settlement of the Murmuria country spirit shop in the Sibsagar district for the financial year 1957‑58. The appellant, Lakhiram Kalita, together with the first respondent, Bhanurani Pegu, and other parties, had each submitted tenders for the shop's settlement. After reviewing the tenders, the Deputy Commissioner, consulting the Advisory Committee, awarded the shop to the first respondent, Bhanurani Pegu. The Excise Commissioner dismissed the appeals of the appellant and other disappointed tenderers by an order dated 25 March 1957. Subsequently, the appellant and another party appealed to the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, who on 30 May 1957 set aside the previous settlement and directed that the shop be settled in favor of the appellant. In accordance with that order, the appellant took possession of the shop effective 5 June 1957. The first respondent sought a review of the Commissioner’s order, but the review application was dismissed on 11 June 1957. Challenging the Commissioner’s orders, the first respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, requesting a writ to quash those orders. On 17 June 1957, the High Court heard the petition ex parte and issued a rule directing the first respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, fixing a three‑week return period. The High Court also ordered that, pending determination of the writ petition, the status quo ante would be maintained. The first respondent and his advisers misread this interim order as granting them immediate possession of the shop, and they threatened the appellant with eviction based on that interpretation. Consequently, the appellant applied to the High Court for clarification of the order, prompting the Court to explain that maintaining the status quo ante meant that the party in possession on 17 June 1957 would continue to remain in possession until the petition was finally decided. Nevertheless, on 21 June 1957, the Deputy Commissioner issued an ex parte order directing that the first respondent be placed in charge of the shop forthwith, and that order was implemented. When the appellant approached the Deputy Commissioner requesting restoration of possession in line with the High Court’s observation, the Deputy Commissioner advised the appellant to obtain another order from the High Court. The appellant therefore filed a further petition in the High Court on 28 June 1957, setting out the circumstances of his alleged wrongful dispossession and seeking appropriate relief, but the High Court did not issue any order on that petition. Ultimately, the High Court, by its order dated 31 July 1957, set aside the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals’ order, leading the appellant to seek a certificate for appeal to this Court, which was denied, and consequently he obtained special leave to appeal.

On July 31, 1957, a order was issued that set aside the earlier order of the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals. The appellant had previously asked the High Court for a certificate that his case was suitable for appeal to this Court, but that request was denied. Consequently, the appellant approached the Supreme Court and was granted special leave to appeal. The matter then proceeded as Civil Appeal No 670 of 1957. This appeal was instituted by the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, challenging the judgment and order of the High Court that dealt with the Murmuria shop, which had also been the subject of Civil Appeal No 669 of 1957 as mentioned earlier. The first respondent in this appeal was Bhanuram Pegu, who was likewise the first respondent in Civil Appeal No 669 of 1957. The second respondent was Lakhiram Kalita, who had been the appellant in Civil Appeal No 669 of 1957. Both respondents were the competing tenderers for the shop in dispute. The factual background of the case had already been set out in relation to Civil Appeal No 669 of 1957. This present appeal was filed chiefly to obtain clarification of the legal position, especially in view of the frequent appeals that were being made to the appellant concerning the settlement of excise shops.

Separate from the foregoing, Civil Appeal No 672 of 1957 concerned the Tinsukia country spirit shop located in the district of Lakhimpur. The appellants, identified as Rafiulla Khan and Mahibuddin Ahmad, were partners who had an interest in the settlement of that shop for the financial year 1957‑58. Historically, the shop had been jointly settled with the first appellant and his father over several years, and for the year 1956‑57 the lease had also been granted to them by the Deputy Commissioner after consultation with the Advisory Committee. Several unsuccessful tenderers lodged appeals before the Commissioner of Excise, challenging the settlement that involved the first appellant and his father for the year 1956‑57. The Commissioner of Excise responded by setting aside that settlement and ordering a resettlement. The first appellant and his father then appealed to the Excise Appellate Authority against the Commissioner’s order. The Appellate Authority allowed their appeal and consequently nullified the orders of both the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner. One of the competitors, Rafiqul Hussain, filed a writ petition before the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. This writ, together with similar applications, was heard and decided by the High Court in a judgment dated May 23, 1956. The first appellant and his father challenged that High Court judgment by obtaining special leave to appeal to this Court, and the outcome of that appeal was as previously indicated. While that appeal was pending before this Court and no stay order had been granted, the Commissioner’s direction for resettlement was implemented. Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner, acting on the unanimous advice of the Advisory Committee, settled the shop with the first appellant on July 25, 1956. The first respondent

During the period when special leave appeals were pending before this Court, several persons, including the first respondent and others, filed appeals before the Commissioner of Excise challenging the order that the Deputy Commissioner had issued. Because the Supreme Court had refused to grant an interim stay, the Excise Commissioner, mistakenly believing that the Supreme Court’s order allowed a stay, set aside the Deputy Commissioner’s order and directed that the settlement be made with the first respondent. At that time the Excise Appellate Authority was not functioning, since the High Court had declared the constitution of that Authority to be void. Consequently, the first appellant approached the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, asserting that the Commissioner’s order was tainted by an error apparent on the face of the record, namely a misinterpretation of the Supreme Court’s stay decision. The High Court admitted the application but declined to maintain the status‑quo, i.e., it refused to order that the first appellant retain possession of the shop. When the High Court rejected the stay petition, the first respondent entered into possession of the shop pursuant to the Commissioner’s order in his favour. The High Court ultimately dismissed the writ application by an order dated 6 December 1956.

The appeal filed by the first appellant and his father, which was already before this Court, was heard and decided in January 1957. This Court set aside the High Court’s decision, restored the Excise Appellate Authority, and thereby nullified the resettlement order and the actual resettlement that had taken place under it. Following that ruling, the Excise Appellate Authority issued an order on 25 February 1957 directing that possession be returned to the first appellant and his father, holding that the earlier settlement and its execution were completely cancelled. In response, the first respondent filed another petition before the High Court under Articles 226 and 227, seeking to quash the delivery‑of‑possession order on the ground that the Authority lacked jurisdiction and also requesting an ad interim stay. The High Court first issued a rule and an interim stay on 26 February 1957, and subsequently made the rule absolute by an order dated 26 March 1957, observing that this Court had not been alerted to the interim settlement of the shop in the absence of a stay order. It further appeared that, while the appeal remained pending before this Court, a fresh settlement for the financial year 1957‑58 was effected towards the end of 1956 and the beginning of 1957. The Tinsukia shop was settled in favour of respondents I and II, although the appellants had also jointly submitted a tender for the same. The appellants and other interested parties appealed against that settlement order issued by the Deputy Commissioner. The Excise Commissioner then set aside the Deputy Commissioner’s settlement and directed that the settlement be made in favour of the appellants by his order dated 16 April 1957.

In that proceeding, the Excise Commissioner issued an order on 16 April 1957 granting possession of the shop to the appellants. Respondents I and II, together with other interested parties, appealed that order before the Excise Appellate Authority. The Authority dismissed those appeals by an order dated 3 June 1957, and consequently the appellants took possession of the shop on 7 June 1957. Shortly thereafter, respondents I and II returned to the High Court seeking to set aside the Authority’s order, to confirm the earlier order of the Excise Commissioner, and to obtain a direction that the status quo be maintained. The High Court admitted the petition and, on 10 June 1957, directed that “the status quo ante be maintained.” In compliance with that direction, the appellants were dispossessed of the shop only three days after having taken possession. The dispossession occurred because the High Court’s order was misunderstood; the wording, which the Court acknowledged was not simple enough for clear comprehension in that region, led the officials to believe that possession should be removed even though the order merely sought to preserve the previous state of affairs. The appellants thereafter filed another petition in the High Court contesting the Commissioner’s subsequent order that directed possession to respondents I and II. The Court issued a rule but declined to stay the operation of that possession order. During the final hearing of the rule, the appellants filed a fresh petition on 5 July 1957 requesting that the possession order be vacated on the ground that it was based on a misinterpretation of the High Court’s status‑quo direction. No order was rendered because possession had already been transferred to respondents I and II. While the rule was being heard, an unfortunate incident arose that caused one of the judges of the bench, Justice Deka, to express unwillingness to continue hearing the case. Consequently, the hearing was adjourned on 15 July 1957 pending the constitution of a new bench. The appellants renewed the application they had filed on 5 July, seeking to undo the unintended consequence of the High Court’s status‑quo order. On 30 July 1957, the Chief Justice ordered that the matter be placed before a Division Bench. As there was no third judge available at that time, the disposal of the case was necessarily postponed until a third judge could be appointed. The division bench, comprising the Chief Justice and Justice Deka, again considered the delivery of possession. The High Court rejected the appellants’ application on reasons that could not withstand close scrutiny. The appellants also approached the Excise Appellate Authority, but the Authority declined to reconsider the matter because the case was still pending before the High Court.

At the time the matter was still pending before the High Court, the petitioners filed a fresh application on 14 August 1957. In that application they included a copy of the orders that had been issued by the Excise Appellate Authority and by the Deputy Commissioner of Lakhimpur, which orders directed that possession be delivered to respondents 1 and 2. When the fresh application was presented, Justice Deka declined to hear the case. Consequently, the Chief Justice ordered that the matter be placed before Justice Deka, who would sit alone to consider it. On 19 August 1957 the case was again placed before the Chief Justice, this time also sitting singly, and he directed that a rule be issued requiring the opposite party, which had been cited before the Court, to show cause. The learned Chief Justice apparently regarded the application as a completely new case rather than as a continuation or off‑shoot of the proceedings that were already pending before the High Court. The High Court then went on a long vacation, closing on 2 September and scheduled to reopen on 3 November 1957. During that interval the vacancy of the third judge on the Bench remained unfilled. Because the appellants believed that an erroneous interpretation of the High Court order dated 10 June had wrongfully deprived them of the right to continue operating their shop, and because there was no realistic prospect that the case would be disposed of promptly, they approached this Court and obtained special leave to appeal.

The factual background of each of the appeals, as set out above, shows a common pattern. All the matters arise from the non‑prohibited areas of the State of Assam where the sale of “country spirit” is regulated through licences issued by the authorities under the provisions of the Act. The settlement of licences for shops that sell such liquor is made for a period of one year, running from 1 April to 31 March. According to the present practice embodied in Executive Instructions, candidates who wish to obtain licences must submit tenders to the Deputy Commissioner of the Sadar Division or to the Sub‑Divisional Officers for the various Sub‑Divisions, in accordance with the terms of notices published for that purpose. These tenders are treated as strictly confidential. The settlement of licences is carried out by the Deputy Commissioner or the relevant Sub‑Divisional Officer, after consulting an Advisory Committee that may consist of up to five local members. The choice of a particular tenderer is largely a matter of administrative discretion exercised by the officer responsible for the settlement. Under the Act, an appeal against an order of settlement made by a Deputy Commissioner or Sub‑Divisional Officer lies to the Commissioner of Excise; an appeal against an order of the Commissioner of Excise lies to the Excise Appellate Authority, whose decision is final. Section 9 of the Act, which deals with appeal and revision, has been amended several times and, as it stands after the latest amendment by the Assam Act 23 of 1955—assented to by the Governor of Assam on 22 December 1955 and published in the Assam Gazette dated December—the provisions now applicable are those set out in that amendment.

In the judgment the Court examined the amendment made by the Assam Act 23 of 1955, which received the Governor’s assent on 22 December 1955 and was published in the Assam Gazette dated 28 December 1955. The amendment added Section 9 of the Act, which reads in full as follows: “9. (1) Orders passed under this Act or under any rule made hereunder shall be appealable as follows in the manner prescribed by such rules as the State Government may make in this behalf—(a) to the Excise Commissioner, any order passed by the District Collector or a Collector other than the District Collector, (b) to the Appellate Authority appointed by the State Government for the purpose, any order passed by the Excise Commissioner. (2) In cases not provided for by clauses (a) and (b) of sub‑section (1), orders passed under this Act or under any rules made hereunder shall be appealable to such authorities as the State Government may prescribe. (3) The Appellate Authority, the Excise Commissioner or the District Collector may call for the proceedings held by any officer or person subordinate to it or him or subject to its or his control and pass such orders thereon as it or he may think fit.” As a result of this amendment, Rules 339, 340, 341 and 345 of the Assam Excise Manual became obsolete and were deleted. The power to hear appeals and revisions under the Act, which had previously been vested successively in the Board, the Assam Revenue Tribunal, and the Commissioner for Hills Division and Appeals, was now vested, under the amended provision, in the Appellate Authority. The Court noted that the evolution of the highest revenue authority under the Act had been traced in its earlier decision in State of Assam v. A.N. Kidwai, and therefore it did not repeat that history. The Court then turned to the public questions raised in Civil Appeal No. 670 of 1957. The principal argument presented on behalf of the Appellate Authority was that the various bodies dealing with the settlement of excise shops, such as those whose orders were under scrutiny in the present appeals, were merely administrative entities. Consequently, their orders, whether at the first instance or on appeal, should not be subject to the writ jurisdiction or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The Court observed that, if the matter were confined solely to the provisions of the Act and the rules made under section 36 of the Act, the argument might appear persuasive. However, the Court referred to its earlier ruling in Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. The Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer and others, where it was held that there is no inherent right of a citizen to sell liquor. The Court also cited its recent decision in State of Assam v. A.N. Kidwai, page 301, stating that a perusal of the Act and rules demonstrates that no person possesses an absolute right to sell liquor and that the purpose of the Act and the rules is to control and restrict the consumption of intoxicating liquors, a control deemed necessary for the preservation of public health and morals, as well as for the purpose of raising revenue. While acknowledging that no one has an inherent right to the settlement of liquor shops, the Court noted that when the State, by public notice, invites candidates to submit tenders for settlement, multiple persons submit competing claims. The public authorities responsible for settlement must then select among these candidates. The Court emphasized that had the selection rested solely on the discretion of a single authority, such as the District Collector, without any avenue for appeal or revision, the situation might be different. However, section 9 of the Act establishes a regular hierarchy of authorities, each with the right to hear appeals or revisions, thereby ensuring that the orders are not final without judicial scrutiny.

In this case the Court explained that the purpose of the Act and its rules was to restrict the consumption of intoxicating liquors because such control was evidently required for the preservation of public health and morals and also for the purpose of raising revenue. The Court acknowledged that no individual possessed an inherent right to the settlement of liquor shops. Nevertheless, when the State issued a public notice inviting candidates to submit tenders for settlement, a number of persons responded by filing their own tenders and each claimant asserted a right that conflicted with the claims of the others. Consequently, the public authorities responsible for making the settlement had to select a suitable candidate from among the competing tenders. The Court observed that if the decision‑making power had rested solely with a single authority such as the District Collector, who could act on personal satisfaction regarding the fitness of a particular candidate and whose orders were not open to appeal, revision or any supervisory scrutiny, the situation might have been different. However, section 9 of the Act established a hierarchical structure of authorities, each positioned above the other, and each endowed with the statutory right to entertain appeals and revisions. Although the Act and its rules did not expressly mandate that the authorities record reasoned orders, the Court held that, given the nature of the subject matter, it became necessary for several authorities—referenced in [1954] S.C.R. 873, 880—to issue what are described as speaking orders. When a statutory authority, whether administrative or quasi‑judicial, possessed the power to hear appeals or revisions, the Court said it was obliged to discharge that power judicially, meaning it must act objectively, impartially and after providing a reasonable opportunity for the parties in dispute to present their respective cases. In support of this principle, the Court quoted the observations of Lord Haldane at page 132 and Lord Moulton at page 150 in Local Government Board v. Arlidge (1), stating that an appeal imposes a duty on the deciding authority to act judicially, to consider the matter without bias, and to afford each party a fair chance to present their case. The decision, the Court noted, must be reached in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal tasked with dispensing justice, though the procedure need not be identical for every such tribunal. The Court further cited Lord Moulton, who explained that although the Legislature had provided an appeal, that appeal was directed to an administrative department of the State rather than to a judicial body. Lord Moulton clarified that the requirement for the administrative body to act judicially merely meant that it must retain a judicial temperament, perform its duties conscientiously, and bear a proper sense of responsibility, especially because its actions affect the property and rights of individuals. The Court concluded that Parliament had wisely prescribed certain rules that must be observed by the administrative department when it carries out its functions in these matters, and that those statutory rules were beyond the scope of judicial criticism.

In this case the Court observed that the statutory rules must be complied with solely because Parliament has enacted them, not for any other purpose. The extent to which those rules permit what the Court described as a quasi‑litigious procedure depends entirely on Parliament’s judgment about what is appropriate. The Court further stated that such rules lie beyond the scope of judicial criticism. The courts do not have the authority to add to, remove from, or even debate whether individual judges consider the rules to be adequate. Consequently, the judiciary is bound to apply the statutory scheme exactly as written, without attempting to alter its scope or content. The Court emphasized that any assessment of whether the legislative choices are satisfactory belongs to the legislature itself, not to the courts. The judgment cited the authority (1) [1915] A.C. 120 in support of this proposition.

The Court then referred to the legal position summarized in Halsbury’s Laws of England, which explains that an administrative body that makes a decision wholly or partly on policy questions may be required to act judicially while reaching that decision. If the body must examine proposals, objections and evidence, and if at any stage of the proceedings there exists a dispute resembling a lis, the body is at that point under a duty to act judicially. Conversely, where the body never encounters a lis and instead resolves the matter solely on considerations of policy and expediency, it cannot be said to be under any judicial duty at any time. Moreover, even when the body is at some stage required to act judicially, the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction does not extend to assessing the sufficiency of the reasons for the decision or to challenging the decision itself. The Court explained that the provisions of the Act aim to protect the State’s interests in two ways: firstly, by preventing or at least checking illegal distillation, and secondly, by maximizing revenue while observing temperance regulations. The Act assigns these responsibilities to a hierarchy that begins with Sub‑divisional Officers and culminates in the Appellate Authority. Although the Act itself contains rules, additional executive instructions—though not having statutory force—guide officers to ensure that liquor shops are allocated to individuals of suitable character and experience. These instructions are subject to certain reservations in favour of tribal populations, as noted in (1) Vol. II. 3rd Edn., PP. 56‑57. Aside from these general considerations, there are no specific rules governing the grant of leases or licences for liquor shops; in some cases the Manual provides for drawing lots, as set out in Executive Instructions 110 at page 174. The wording of sub‑section (3) of section 9, as amended, confers complete discretion on the Appellate Authority.

The Excise Commissioner or the District Collector were authorised to “pass such orders thereon as it or he may think fit.” The statutory provisions of the Act, however, contained no requirement that evidence be recorded, that the parties be heard, or that reasons for the orders be set out in writing. Nevertheless, counsel appearing before the authorities reported that, as a matter of practice, the officials under the Act did conduct hearings, listened to the arguments of the parties, and issued reasoned judgments so that the superior authorities could understand the basis of each decision. This practice was evident from the several orders that the authorities had issued in the handful of cases currently before the Court. When the Court examined the rules governing appeals and revisions, it observed that the legislation granted the broadest possible right of appeal or revision to any interested person. Rule 344 expressly excluded only appeals against composition orders, thereby leaving every other type of order open to challenge. Rule 343 stipulated that a memorandum of appeal must be filed within one month of the date of the order appealed against, but the time required to obtain a certified copy of the order was not counted as part of that period. Rule 344 further required that the memorandum of appeal be accompanied by a certified copy of the order that was being appealed, and that the memorandum bear the appropriate court‑fee stamp. Rule 343 was subsequently amended by a Notification dated 14 March 1957, which added a proviso and two explanations. The proviso provided that the competent appellate authority could admit an appeal filed after the prescribed limitation period if the appellant satisfied the authority that there was sufficient cause for the delay. Explanation (1) stated that being misled by any order, practice, or judgment of an appellate authority in calculating the limitation period could constitute sufficient cause. Explanation (2) clarified that if an appellate authority was unable to function for any period because of a judicial pronouncement, that circumstance could also be regarded as sufficient cause. The amendment was deemed to have been made on 23 May 1956 and to have retrospective effect from that date. Read together with the recent amendments referred to earlier, these rules closely mirror the procedural framework normally followed by courts of justice in hearing appeals. Finally, as indicated by the Court’s ruling on page 304, the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948, divided ultimate appellate jurisdiction between the Assam High Court and the authority created under section 3(3) of that Act, with each body vested with authority over different categories of cases.

The judgment explained that the legislation divided appellate jurisdiction between two distinct schedules. Cases that fell under the enactments listed in Schedule A were required to be heard by the Assam High Court. In contrast, appeals and revisions arising from the enactments enumerated in Schedule B were assigned to the authority created under section 3(3) of the Act, which for the present appeals was the Excise Appellate Authority. Consequently, the Excise Appellate Authority possessed the power of the highest appellate tribunal for matters that originated under the Act, while the High Court retained the same status for the other group of matters. The Court clarified, however, that this allocation of powers did not automatically make the Excise Appellate Authority a tribunal of equal standing with the High Court, nor did it exclude the authority from the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. By placing two parallel highest tribunals—one dealing mainly with civil disputes and the other with primarily revenue issues—the scheme demonstrated that the Excise Appellate Authority was not merely an administrative body devoid of judicial or quasi‑judicial functions.

The judgment further observed that neither the Act nor the rules issued under it specified the precise grounds on which the first appellate authority, the Excise Commissioner, or the second appellate authority, the Excise Appellate Authority, could exercise their appellate or revisional powers. There was no textual distinction between the grounds for interference on appeal and those for revision. Because of this absence of limitation, the powers of the appellate authorities in matters of settlement were held to be co‑extensive with the powers of the primary authority, namely the District Collector or the Sub‑Divisional Officer. The Court referred to the observations of the Federal Court in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul and others v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri and others (1) and to its own earlier decision in Ebrahim Aboobakar and another v. Custodian‑General of Evacuee Property (2). In the latter case, while examining the powers of the Tribunal under section 24 of Ordinance No. 27 of 1949, the Court quoted: “Like all courts of appeal exercising general jurisdiction in civil cases, the respondent has been constituted an appellate court in words of the widest amplitude and the legislature has not limited his jurisdiction by providing that such exercise will depend on the existence of any particular state of facts. Thus, on a review of the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder, it cannot be said that the authorities mentioned in section 9 of the Act, pass purely administrative orders which are beyond the ambit of the High Court’s power of supervision and control. Whether or not an administrative body or (1) [1940] F.C.R. 84, 102. (2) [1952] S.C.R. 696, 704. authority functions as a purely administrative one or in a quasi‑judicial capacity, must be” determined by examining the relevant statute and the rules made thereunder. This analysis led the Court to conclude that the Excise Appellate Authority could not be characterized as a body exercising only administrative powers, and its decisions were therefore subject to judicial review by the High Court.

The Court explained that the scope of jurisdiction of any authority must be decided in each case by examining the relevant statute and the rules framed under it. Consequently, the first contention advanced on behalf of the appellant was rejected. Turning then to the merits of the order issued by the High Court, the appellant argued that the High Court had erred in concluding that the Appellate Authority had acted beyond its jurisdiction when it passed the impugned order. The Court acknowledged that, without dispute, when an Appellate Authority, whose duty is to determine questions affecting the right to settlement of a liquor shop in a judicial or quasi‑judicial manner, exceeds the authority granted by the Act and the rules made thereunder, such an order becomes subject to the supervisory control of the High Court. The real question, therefore, was whether the High Court was correct in holding that the Appellate Authority had overstepped its legal power. In order to answer that, the Court reproduced the High Court’s own description of the limits of appellate jurisdiction, which stated that the Appellate Authority could not make a fresh selection because the choice had already been made by the officers below; it could intervene only where the lower choice was perverse, illegal, or not in conformity with the Rules. The High Court further warned that if the appellate body were to disregard the recommendations of the Deputy Commissioner or the officer conducting the settlement and freely make its own choice, it would plainly exceed the jurisdiction conferred by law and go beyond the scope of authority contemplated by the Rules. The Court held that by construing the powers of the Appellate Authority so narrowly, the High Court had erred. The Court then referred to the precedent set in Raman and Raman Ltd. v. The State of Madras, where it had held that the State Government, vested as the final authority under the Motor Vehicles Act to decide between rival claimants for stage carriage permits, could not have its decision interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution merely because its view might have been erroneous. Applying that principle to the present matters, the Court observed that Section 9 of the Act designates the Appellate Authority as the highest authority for deciding questions of settlement of liquor shops between competing claimants. Because the statute provides the appeal or revision as undefined and unlimited in scope, the Court concluded that the highest authority under the Act could not be stripped of the full extent of its powers by introducing considerations that are not contained in the Act.

It was observed that the Appellate Authority should not readily overturn a selection made by the primary Authority, such as that made by a Sub‑Divisions Officer or a District Collector. Those officials were afforded considerable weight because they possessed a far greater opportunity to understand local conditions and the characters of local business people than the Appellate Authority could obtain. This principle was likened to the rule that appellate courts are enjoined from lightly interfering with findings of fact recorded by original courts, which had the chance to see witnesses testify in person and to observe their demeanour while doing so. Nevertheless, the Court held that it was incorrect to conclude, merely because the High Court thought the Appellate Authority had failed to exercise such caution, that the Appellate Authority’s decision was beyond its statutory power or without jurisdiction. The Court therefore rejected the contention that the High Court’s view on the Appellate Authority’s lack of caution automatically rendered the latter’s choice ultra vires.

The second ground of attack on the High Court’s order was the claim that the High Court had erred in finding a breach of natural justice. The High Court had referred to several affidavits filed by both sides, the sequence in which those affidavits were presented, and the manner in which the affidavits or counter‑affidavits were used. The Court noted that the applicable rules contained no provisions for the admission of oral or documentary evidence, for the hearing of oral arguments, or even for giving notice of a hearing to the parties concerned. Consequently, the entire proceedings were characterised by a complete lack of formality, leaving the various authorities to rely on their own resources to make the best possible selection. The Court then cited its earlier observations in New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd. v. New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd., wherein it had held that the rules of natural justice vary according to the constitution of the statutory body and the rules prescribed by the governing Act, and that any alleged breach of natural justice must be assessed in the light of those specific statutory rules rather than by any preconceived notion. In the present case, no statutory rules were identified that the Appellate Authority could have contravened. Simply because the Appellate Authority viewed the case from a perspective that might not be acceptable to another independent tribunal did not constitute a ground for interference under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution. Finally, the Court turned to the appellants’ last contention, namely whether there was any error apparent on the face of the record in the Appellate Authority’s order that would attract the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction. In this regard, the Court referred to the High Court’s own observation: “But the most glaring error on face of”.

In the order issued by the Appellate Authority, the Court observed that the decision failed to mention the report prepared by the Deputy Commissioner, a report on which the Excise Commissioner had placed strong reliance. The Court held that, according to the governing Rules, the Appellate Authority was obligated to consider that report before reaching a conclusion on the appeal. By neglecting to do so, the officer named in the order acted arbitrarily and exceeded the powers vested in an Appellate Authority. During the extended hearing of these matters before the High Court, counsel for the various parties presented their arguments, citing numerous documents. The High Court was reportedly impressed by the settlement order concerning the Murmuria shop, an order originally made by the Deputy Commissioner and subsequently affirmed by the Excise Commissioner, deeming it correct. In contrast, the High Court found the choice made by the Appellate Authority to be unsatisfactory. The Court further noted that its factual conclusions appeared to be more consistent with the overall record of the proceedings, whereas the final decision of the ultimate Revenue Authority was deemed erroneous. Nevertheless, the Court asserted that, under the existing law, the High Court had overstepped its jurisdiction by adjudicating on the merits of a dispute that the legislature had reserved for the discretion of the Appellate Authority. The Court then posed the question of whether such an overreach constituted a “mistake apparent on the face of the record” within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution. To answer this, the Court examined the nature of an error that could be described as apparent on the face of the record, an error that would trigger the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The Court referred to the ancient writ of certiorari, now known in England as an order of certiorari, which may be issued only on limited grounds. Those grounds have been discussed by this Court in several decisions, including Parry & Co. v. Commercial Employee's Association, Madras (1), Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., and others (2), Ibrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property (3), T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa (4), and Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others (1). In the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath, Justice Venkatarama Ayyar, speaking for the full Court, articulated four propositions concerning the character and scope of the writ of certiorari as derived from authority. The third proposition, quoted by the learned Judge, states: “The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous.” While considering these principles, the Court continued its analysis of the appropriate grounds for invoking certiorari.

In considering the fourth proposition, the Court examined whether a writ of certiorari could be issued when a decision contained an error of law. Relying on recent authorities, the learned Judge observed at page one thousand one hundred twenty‑three that the law on this point was settled. The Court stated that a writ of certiorari could indeed be issued to correct an error of law, but stressed that the error must be more than a mere mistake; it must be a mistake that is manifest on the face of the record. The Court noted that the High Court seemed to have interpreted the expression “error apparent on the face of the record” as also applying to findings of fact, an interpretation that the Court found erroneous.

The Court illustrated this point by referring to Civil Appeal No. 668 of 1957, which involved the Jorhat shop. In that appeal, the High Court had remarked that the Appellate Authority had reinforced its suspicion by mentioning that Dharmeswar, his father and brother were summoned in connection with a complaint, describing the matter as “purely extraneous, to speak the least,” and suggesting that the complaint had been filed after the settlement. The High Court labeled these observations as “errors apparent on the face of the record.” Later in the same judgment, the High Court further complained that the Excise Appellate Authority had mis‑conceived its powers and had decided the appeal based on errors of record, speculation, or irrelevant considerations, ignoring earlier proceedings. The High Court cited an “apparent error of record” where it claimed the Excise Commissioner’s judgment contained a clear admission that Shri Garela Kalita, father of Shri Dharmeswar Kalita, was a suspected smuggler, a statement that the Court found to be untrue. The Commissioner had in fact held that the learned Deputy Commissioner and members of the Advisory Committee thought that the son, who possessed an excellent character, should not be punished for the alleged sin of his father. These excerpts, though not exhaustive, demonstrate that the High Court treated errors of fact as equivalent to errors of law apparent on the face of the record. The Court therefore raised the question of whether an error of fact could be invoked to support the High Court’s power to quash an order of a subordinate court or tribunal. It observed that the High Court appeared to have equated this notion with the “error apparent on the face of the record” found in Rule 1 of Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, a position the Court held to be incorrect. Ordinarily, a mistake of law in a judgment or order is not a ground for review; only a mistake or an error of fact apparent on the face of the record may attract the review power contemplated by Rule 1 of Order 47. The Court then questioned whether the High Court’s power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of certiorari is triggered by such a mistake, or whether only an error of law apparent on the face of the record can invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of a High Court.

In this discussion the Court observed that an error of law contained in a judgment or an order of a court does not ordinarily constitute a ground for review. By contrast, a mistake or an error of fact that is apparent on the face of the record may invite the exercise of the power of review as provided in Rule I of Order 47. The Court then asked whether the supervisory jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, when exercised by way of a writ of certiorari, can be invoked on the basis of such a factual mistake, or whether, conversely, only an error of law apparent on the face of the record can attract that jurisdiction. The Court noted that, to the best of its knowledge, this precise question has not been framed in any earlier decision of this Court concerning the scope and character of the writ of certiorari. Consequently, the Court deemed it necessary to examine the question directly, because each appeal in the present batch required the High Court to be called upon to use its powers under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari on the specific ground that the orders under attack were purportedly vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record – errors that were not legal in nature but factual. The Court therefore set out to consider whether such factual errors could form a sufficient basis for the High Court to intervene.

The Court referred to the historic decision in Queen v. James Bolton (1841) 1, which is regarded as a landmark authority on the power to issue a writ of certiorari. That case involved an order of justices directing the delivery of a house to parish officers under a statute, which was challenged by certiorari. Lord Denman, C.J., while disposing of the rule, made several observations that have continued to be treated as authoritative. He explained that the principle involved is of great importance and of very general application, though its difficulty lies in its application. He illustrated the point by describing a situation similar to the present, where the Legislature had entrusted the original – and possibly final – jurisdiction on the merits to lower magistrates, and the higher court possessed no jurisdiction to review the merits either initially or on appeal. In such circumstances, the higher court’s role is limited to ascertaining whether the lower authority acted within its jurisdiction and whether its proceedings, on their face, were regular and in accordance with law. Even if the decision proved unwise or unjust on the merits, the higher court could not set it aside. While addressing the counsel’s argument concerning the unsoundness of the magistrates’ conclusions and the hardship that might ensue from their erroneous order, the Court reiterated that all courts entrusted with administering law must keep these principles in mind, so that they do not deviate from the straight path of enforcing law by letting considerations of hardship or vague notions of justice of the cause dictate their actions.

The Court stressed that the administration of justice must not be diverted from the straight path of enforcing the law by considerations based on hardship or on vague ideas of what is sometimes described as the justice of the cause; beyond this the Court could not proceed. The affidavits that lay before the Court were used in the argument, and much was said about the unreasonableness of the conclusion drawn by the magistrates and about the hardship that the defendant would suffer if the Court would not review the decision, especially since there was no appeal to the sessions. The Court refrained from expressing any opinion on matters that were not before it, particularly the propriety of the conclusion drawn from the evidence by the magistrates, because the magistrates alone were the competent authority to reach that conclusion, and the Court must not transform itself into a Court of Appeal where the statute does not confer such jurisdiction. The Court held that it is far more important to keep the rule of law straight than to intervene on the basis of a perceived hardship of any particular decision, which would risk creating a precedent that would bring inconvenience and uncertainty to future cases. The case of Reg v. Bolton, cited in the earlier judgment, was approved and followed by the Privy Council in the case of The King v. Nat B. Liqutors, Limited. In that case the Lords of the Judicial Committee held that a conviction by a magistrate for a non‑indictable offence could not be quashed by certiorari on the ground that the record showed no evidence to support the conviction or that the magistrate had misdirected himself in considering the evidence. It was further declared that the absence of evidence did not affect the magistrate’s jurisdiction to try the charge. In the course of their judgment the Lords observed that the law laid down in Reg v. Bolton has never been seriously questioned in England and that the same rules apply to other parts of the Commonwealth, except where modified by statute. They also noted that the decision in Reg v. Bolton is a landmark in the history of certiorari because it summarises the principles of its application in an impeccable form. However, later the rule articulated in Bolton’s case, reported in (1) [1922] 2 A.C. 128, appears to have been diluted in some English decisions that suggested a writ of certiorari could be issued only where the order impugned disclosed an error of jurisdiction—such as a complete lack of jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction, or refusal to exercise jurisdiction—and not to correct an apparent error of law on the face of the record. The issue was brought to a head in the case of Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, which arose out of an application for an

In the present matter an application for an order of certiorari was made seeking to set aside a decision rendered by the Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal. Lord Goddard, Chief Justice, opened his judgment by stating that the issue before the Court was of the utmost significance, a circumstance that required a thorough examination of many authorities and a careful consideration of the principles governing the doctrine of certiorari. He further emphasized that certiorari is a remedy possessing a highly specialised character. Subsequently, he explained the purpose and the extent of the writ of certiorari, tracing the historical development of the jurisdiction as it had been exercised by the English courts. He then addressed directly the specific contention raised for determination, namely whether an order of certiorari could be issued only to correct a defect of jurisdiction and whether it could not be employed to set aside an order merely because of a mistake of law that was apparent on the face of the record. After reviewing the relevant case law, the Court concluded that it was erroneous to hold that the only ground for interference by certiorari was an error or excess of jurisdiction, and that the remedy did not extend to the correction of an error of law apparent on the face of the record.

The Lord Chief Justice thereafter highlighted that a careful examination of the authorities concerning the exercise of the power of certiorati revealed that the High Court was indeed empowered to inspect the record and to determine whether an error of law apparent on its face existed. He concluded his observations with a reference to a decision reported in the 1951 volume of the King’s Bench Reports, wherein the tribunal had set out the factors it had considered, the matters it had disregarded, and the contentions it had accepted, and had expressed its view of the law. The Court noted that it was of the opinion that the tribunal’s construction of a complex set of regulations was erroneous. That decision was subsequently challenged, and on appeal the Court of Appeal considered the same point in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal. The Court of Appeal affirmed the principle articulated by the High Court that an order of certiorari could be granted to quash the decision of an inferior body, such as a statutory tribunal, on the ground of an error of law apparent on the face of the record. In his judgment, Justice Singleton observed that an error apparent on the face of the proceedings, which in that case was an error of law, has always been recognised as a valid ground for the issuance of a certiorati order. Justice Denning, likewise, examined whether the High Court could intervene to correct a statutory tribunal’s decision that was erroneous in point of law, and, after reviewing authorities dating back to ancient times, the Lord Justice affirmed the Court’s position on the matter.

In the passage quoted, the Court recorded that during recent years the application of the writ of certiorari had been somewhat neglected. It had been widely assumed that certiorari was limited to correcting an excess of jurisdiction and did not extend to the correction of errors of law, a view that had been expressed by several judges. The Court noted, however, that the Lord Chief Justice, in the case before him, reinstated the proper scope of certiorati and demonstrated that the writ could be employed to correct errors of law that were evident on the face of the record even when such errors did not relate to jurisdiction. The Court further observed that a review of the historical development showed that earlier decisions fully supported the Lord Chief Justice’s position. Up to about one hundred years ago, certiorati were regularly used to correct errors of law apparent on the record. It was only in the last century that the writ fell into disuse, a decline that occurred because there had been little occasion for its exercise until recently. The Court cited the authority (I) [1952] 1 K.B. 338 and explained that, with the emergence of many new tribunals and the obvious need for supervisory oversight over them, recourse to this well‑tested mechanism of control must again be made available.

The Court also reported the observations of another Lord Justice, Morris L.J., who participated in the appeal. He held that certiorati would not be issued in the guise of an appeal. The writ was not intended to provide a rehearing of the issues raised in the original proceedings; rather, its purpose was to correct an error of law that was manifest on the face of an order or decision, to address irregularities, or to remedy an absence of jurisdiction or an excess of jurisdiction where such defects were shown. From an examination of the authorities of this Court as well as those of the English courts, the Court concluded that one of the grounds upon which the High Court may exercise jurisdiction under certiorati is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The Court emphasized that this ground does not extend to every error of law or fact that a higher court might correct by exercising its statutory powers as a court of appeal or revision. To the Court’s knowledge, no party had previously contended before it that an error of fact, even if apparent on the record, could serve as a basis for interference by a court exercising its writ jurisdiction. No authority was cited that supported the proposition that a court exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could set aside an order of an inferior tribunal on the ground of a factual mistake apparent on the face of the record. The Court therefore identified the remaining question of the precise legal meaning of the expression “error of law apparent on the face of the record,” and whether it encompassed every error of law capable of attracting the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.

In this case, the Court explained that to invoke its supervisory jurisdiction and set aside the impugned order, the error must be more than a simple error of law; it must be an error that is evident on the face of the record. The Court noted that Indian law and English law share this principle. Examination of the authorities cited earlier, both from this Court and from England, showed that the common‑law writ of certiorari, which has been incorporated into the Constitution, was not intended to replace an appeal where the statute does not provide a right of appeal. Its sole purpose was to examine the record and determine whether the lower tribunal had acted beyond its jurisdiction or had failed to follow the essential legal requirements that it was required to apply. The Court further stated that mere formal or technical mistakes, even if they involved a point of law, were insufficient to attract this extraordinary jurisdiction. The underlying principle for issuing a writ of certiorari was therefore clear, but the difficulty lay in applying that principle to the facts of a particular case. The Court observed that, in the judgments and orders that were under challenge in these appeals, the High Court had exercised its supervisory jurisdiction over errors that could not be described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. If any errors existed, they were errors in the appreciation of documentary evidence or affidavits, errors in drawing inferences, or failures to draw inferences. Such errors, the Court explained, were matters that a court sitting as an appellate court could have examined and, if necessary, corrected. The Court reminded that the Appellate Authority possessed unlimited jurisdiction to examine and assess the evidence while exercising its appellate or revisional powers, and that Section 9(3) of the Act empowered it to issue any order it considered appropriate. Those words were described as having very wide amplitude. The Court affirmed that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority to entertain appeals had never been doubted; only the manner in which it exercised that jurisdiction was contested. No evidence had been shown that the Appellate Authority, in exercising its powers, had ignored any mandatory legal provisions. At most, it had been suggested that the Authority had failed to follow certain Executive Instructions, for example, instructions that tribal persons should receive certain preferences or that individuals listed as debarred, such as smugglers, should be excluded, as mentioned on page 175 of the Manual. The Court noted that those instructions were merely Executive Instructions and did not have statutory force. Consequently, even assuming that those instructions had not been observed, the Court held that such non‑observance could not affect the Authority’s power to make its own selections or the validity of the order it issued.

In this case, the Court observed that even if it were not absolutely certain that the executive instructions were ignored, such failure could not diminish the Appellate Authority’s power to select candidates nor invalidate its order. The High Court, through many judgments and orders, had examined in great detail the orders issued by the Excise Authorities under the Act. The present Court deemed a detailed review of the record or of the lower courts’ orders unnecessary, because such review does not fall within the proper function of either the High Court or this Court. Article 226 of the Constitution limits jurisdiction to ensuring that tribunals, administrative bodies, or other quasi‑judicial entities do not exceed the statutory limits of their authority and that they apply the law created for them. The Act itself establishes a hierarchy of officers and Appellate Authorities, as previously described, to administer the law. Provided those authorities operate within both the letter and the spirit of the statute, the High Court is not entitled to interfere with the manner in which they exercise their powers. In the present matters, the High Court appears to have acted beyond the scope of its authority granted by Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. In one appeal, the High Court noted that although it could have intervened by issuing a writ under Article 226, it chose instead to rely on its power of judicial superintendence under Article 227. It expressed this choice in its judgment dated 31 July 1957 concerning the Murmuria shop appeals, namely Civil Appeals Nos. 669 and 670 of 1957. Exercising that superintendence, the High Court set aside the order of the Appellate Authority and directed that the appeal be reheard in accordance with the law and the principles outlined in that judgment. A Constitution Bench of this Court later examined the scope of Article 227 in the case of Waryam Singh and another v. Amarnath a‑rid another, and at page 571 made the following observation. It quoted Justice Harries C.J., who, referring to Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, said that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 should be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases. The purpose, it explained, is to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Thus it is clear that the judicial power of interference granted by Article 227 over orders of a judicial or quasi‑judicial nature is not greater than the power conferred by Article 226. While Article 226 permits a court to quash an impugned order on the basis of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. Article 227, by contrast, is limited to ensuring that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.

The Court explained that the supervisory power of the High Court under Article 227 was confined to ensuring that the tribunal operated within the limits of its jurisdiction. Consequently, any intervention by the High Court, whether invoked under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution, could not be justified in the present circumstances. After addressing the general arguments that were common to all of the matters before it, the Court turned to the specific issues raised on behalf of the respondents in Civil Appeal No 672 of 1957, which concerned the Tinsukia country spirit shop. The respondents contended vehemently that the appeal was incompetent because the rule issued by the High Court remained pending, and because the Supreme Court did not ordinarily entertain appeals against interlocutory orders. The Court acknowledged that, as a general principle, it refrained from interfering in cases that had not been finally decided by the High Court. However, the Court observed that this case possessed extraordinary features that had drawn its special attention when it granted leave to appeal. As previously mentioned, the shop in question had been allotted to the appellants by the Excise Commissioner, and that order had subsequently been affirmed by the Appellate Authority. Accordingly, the appellants, whose citations appear as (1) [1954] S.C.R. 565 and (2) A.I.R. (1951) Cal. 193, had taken possession of the shop on 7 June 1957. While issuing the rule, the High Court also passed an order on a stay application; this order was later misunderstood by the District Excise authorities, leading to the dispossession of the appellants and the restoration of possession to respondents I and II without any legal authority. The Court described this as a flagrant interference with the appellants’ rights that arose from the settlement made in their favour by the highest revenue authorities.

The Court further noted that the High Court neither possessed nor could have possessed the authority to order the removal of persons who were rightfully in possession of the shop. The appellants repeatedly brought this grave abuse of power to the attention of the High Court, yet the High Court felt unduly constrained and allowed the wrongful situation to persist. The Court heard the counsel for the respondents at length to determine whether any justification existed for maintaining this undesirable and unfortunate state of affairs. It was important to recall that, as a result of fortuitous circumstances, the appellants had been deprived of possession of the shop for the greater part of the financial year 1956‑57. Consequently, the appellants were denied the benefits of their hard‑won victory in the revenue courts, and no legal authority supported the High Court’s inaction despite several motions. In view of these facts, the Court found it necessary to hear both parties on the merits of the orders issued by the Commissioner of Excise and the Appellate Authority in favour of the appellants, against which the respondents had obtained a rule. After hearing both sides, the Court concluded that no grounds existed to justify interference by the High Court under its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court’s intervention was not warranted in this case.

In this batch of cases, the Court observed that the matter shared the same fate as the other cases before it, namely that each had proceeded through the full range of the statutory hierarchy established under the Excise Act, together with the amendments to that Act and the rules made thereunder. The Court found no basis in any of the orders issued by the Excise authorities that would invite the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. Specifically, the Court saw no evident error of law on the face of the record and no jurisdictional defect in the authorities whose orders were challenged before the High Court. Nevertheless, the Court clarified that it was interfering with the interlocutory order issued by the High Court in this particular case because that order possessed unusual and exceptional characteristics. The Court explained that its decision on the principal points raised in the other appeals inevitably led to the conclusion that, even assuming that all of the allegations set out by the respondents in their petition before the Assam High Court were true, there was no basis at all for the High Court to grant a rule. The respondents themselves struggled to counter the appellant’s argument that, should the other appeals be decided in favour of the appellants on their general contentions, the dismissal of the respondents’ petition before the Assam High Court would become inevitable. Owing to these special circumstances, the Court chose to intervene in the interlocutory order in the interests of justice. Consequently, the Court ordered that all the appeals be allowed and that the orders passed by the High Court in the various cases be set aside. Regarding costs, the Court directed that the appellants in each case should be awarded costs both in this Court and in the High Court, with the exception of the appellant in Civil Appeal No 670, who had not succeeded on the principal issue and therefore was required to bear his own costs. The appeals were therefore allowed.