N. T. Veluswami Thevar vs G. Raja Nainar and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 231 and 232 of 1958

Decision Date: 24 November 1958

Coram: P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, Venkatarama AIyar

In the matter titled N. T. Veluswami Thevar versus G. Raja Nainar and others, the judgment was delivered on 24 November 1958 by a bench of the Supreme Court of India composed of Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice A. K. Sarkar and Justice T. L. Venkatarama, with the opinion recorded under the citation 1959 AIR 422 and reported in the Supreme Court Reporter Supplement (1) 623. The petition was filed by N. T. Veluswami Thevar as the petitioner, while G. Raja Nainar and several additional respondents were named as respondents; the case also involved an appellant who was the second respondent in the election petition.

The factual background concerned the rejection of the nomination paper of the fourth respondent, who was a candidate for election to the Legislative Assembly of the State, by the returning officer on the ground that the respondent, being a headmaster of a government‑aided school, was disqualified under sections 7(d) and 7(e) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. A voter from the constituency filed an election petition seeking to declare the election of the appellant void under section 100(1)(c) of the same Act, arguing that the rejection was improper because the respondent had ceased to be headmaster at the time of filing his nomination and because the school was in fact a private institution. The appellant, who was also the second respondent, contended that the rejection was proper not only on the basis raised before the returning officer but also because the respondent was interested in government contracts and had agreed to serve as a teacher under the District Board. The principal question before the Tribunal was whether, in an election petition invoking section 100(1)(c), the parties could introduce grounds of disqualification that had not been raised before the returning officer. The respondent argued that the election tribunal proceedings were essentially an appellate review of the returning officer’s decision, and therefore the enquiry should be limited to the grounds originally presented. The Court held that an election petition is an original proceeding instituted under section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in hearing such a petition, even when it involves a question under section 100(1)(c), does not amount to an appeal of the returning officer’s decision. Consequently, the Tribunal was competent to consider additional grounds of disqualification beyond those originally put forward, and the expression “improperly rejected” in section 100(1)(c) was interpreted in accordance with earlier authorities.

In deciding whether a nomination paper had been improperly rejected under section 100(1)(c), the Court explained that the core issue was whether the candidate met the qualification criteria and was free from any disqualification listed in section 36(2) of the Representation of the People Act. Consequently, the Tribunal possessed the authority to consider disqualification grounds that were not raised before the returning officer. The phrase “improperly rejected” in section 100(1)(c) was therefore given a specific meaning, as clarified by earlier authorities such as Mengh Raj v. Bhimandas (1952) 2 E.L.R. 301, Tej Singh v. Election Tribunal, JaiPur (1954) 9 E.L.R. 193, and Dhanraj Deshlehara v. Vishwanath Y. Tamaskar (1958) 15 E.L.R. 260. The judgment concerned civil appeals numbered 231 and 232 of 1958, filed by special leave against the Madras High Court order dated 21 October 1957 in writ petitions 675 and 676 of 1957. Counsel for the appellant were engaged, while counsel for respondent No. 1 also appeared. Delivered on 24 November 1958 by Justice Venkatarama Aiyar, the appeals raised an important question about the scope of inquiry in an election petition that challenges an election under section 100(1)(c) on the basis that a nomination paper had been “improperly” rejected. The factual backdrop involved the 1957 general elections in which six individuals, including the appellant Veluswami Thevar, the second respondent Chellapandian, and the fourth respondent Arunachalam, were nominated for the Madras Legislative Assembly from the Alangulam constituency in Tirunelveli district. During the scrutiny on 1 February 1957, Chellapandian objected to Arunachalam’s nomination, contending that Arunachalam, as Head Master of the Government‑aided National Training School at Tiruchendur, held an office of profit disqualifying him under sections 7(d) and (e) of the Act. The returning officer upheld the objection, noting Arunachalam’s absence at the scrutiny and the lack of a reply, and consequently disqualified him under the cited sections, resulting in the rejection of his nomination. Of the five remaining nomination papers, two candidates later withdrew, while the remaining three contested the poll; on 10 March 1957 the appellant, having secured the highest vote count, was declared elected. On

On 18 April 1957, Raja Nainar, who was a voter and not a candidate, instituted election petition No. 109 of 1957 seeking to have the election of the appellant declared void. He argued that the returning officer had improperly rejected the nomination of S. Arunachalam because Arunachalam had ceased to be a headmaster at the time of his nomination and because the school was a private institution. The appellant responded by filing a written statement in which he contended that Arunachalam was disqualified not only on the basis raised by Chellapandian before the returning officer but also because Arunachalam was a partner in contracts for the execution of government works and because he had entered into an agreement with the District Board of Chittoor to serve as a teacher for that Board; consequently, the appellant maintained that the rejection of Arunachalam’s nomination was proper. Subsequently, Raja Nainar filed application No. 5 of 1957, the proceedings now before this Court, requesting that the additional grounds of disqualification set out in the appellant’s statement be struck out on the basis that the Election Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to consider any disqualification ground that had not been raised before the returning officer. By an order dated 17 August 1957, the Tribunal held that its principal task was to determine whether a valid nomination paper existed and that, in doing so, it could examine grounds beyond those presented to the returning officer; accordingly, it dismissed the application. Raja Nainar challenged that order by filing writ petitions Nos. 675 and 676 of 1957 under Article 226, reiterating his claim that the Tribunal was not empowered to examine any ground not previously raised before the returning officer. He prayed for a writ of certiorari to set aside the order in application No. 5 of 1957 and for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Tribunal from investigating the new grounds. A bench of the Madras High Court, comprising Justices Rajagopalan and Rajagopals Ayyangar, heard those petitions, upheld Raja Nainar’s contention, and observed that the Tribunal’s inquiry must be confined to the objections that the returning officer was required to consider, although the Tribunal may assess the truth and validity of those objections on material even if that material was not placed before the returning officer at the stage of the summary enquiry; however, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to investigate the truth or validity of objections which

The Court observed that the Election Tribunal possessed no authority to examine objections that had not been presented to the returning officer, because the officer had never had an opportunity to consider such matters. It further clarified that the discussion pertained solely to the situation of a candidate whose nomination had been rejected, and that it did not extend to the circumstances of a candidate who had already been returned. A further contention was raised before the learned judges that, since the decision of the Election Tribunal could be appealed under section 116A of the Act, the Court should, exercising its discretion under article 226, refuse to entertain writ petitions against interlocutory orders of the Tribunal. However, the learned judge rejected that line of reasoning, holding that because the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to consider any grounds other than those put forward before the returning officer, writs under article 226 were indeed permissible. Consequently, the Court set aside the order of the Election Tribunal in 1 A No. 5 of 1957 and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Tribunal to dispose of the application anew, in accordance with the legal principles articulated in the judgment. The present appeals arise against that judgment, having been filed with the leave of this Court under article 136. The question that now requires resolution is whether, in an election petition that challenges the propriety of a nomination paper’s rejection under section 100(1)(c) of the Act, the parties are entitled to raise grounds of disqualification that were not originally raised before the returning officer. For the purpose of addressing this issue, the Court found it useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 32 of the Act provides that any person may be nominated as a candidate for election to fill a seat if he or she is qualified to be chosen for that seat under the Constitution and the Act. Section 33(1) requires the candidate to deliver to the returning officer a nomination paper that is completed in the prescribed form and signed both by the candidate and by an elector of the constituency who acts as proposer. Section 33(4) mandates that, upon presentation of a nomination paper, the returning officer must verify that the names and electoral‑roll numbers of the candidate and of the proposer as entered in the nomination paper correspond exactly with those entered in the electoral rolls; the provision further allows the officer to permit correction of any clerical or technical error in the names or numbers so that they conform to the electoral‑roll entries, and, where necessary, to overlook any clerical or printing mistake in those entries. Section 35 stipulates, among other things, that the returning officer shall cause a notice of the nomination to be affixed in a conspicuous place in his office, the notice containing descriptions that are similar to those contained in the nomination paper for both the candidate and the proposer. Section 36, omitting material that is not relevant, is reproduced as follows: “36. (1) …”.

On the date that had been fixed for the scrutiny of nominations in accordance with section 30, the candidates, their election agents, one proposer for each candidate, and one additional person who had been given written authority by each candidate were permitted to be present; no other persons were allowed to attend. The returning officer was required to provide reasonable facilities for all of those present to examine the nomination papers of every candidate that had been delivered within the time and in the manner prescribed by section 33. After that, the returning officer was to examine the nomination papers and to decide any objections that might be raised to any nomination. The officer could, either on the basis of an objection or on his own motion, after conducting any summary inquiry that he considered necessary, reject a nomination on any of the following grounds: (a) that the candidate was either not qualified or was disqualified from filling the seat under any of the applicable provisions, namely Articles 84, 102, 173 and 191 of the Constitution or Part XI of this Act; (b) that there had been a failure to comply with any of the requirements of section 33 or section 34; or (c) that the signature of the candidate or the proposer on the nomination paper was not genuine. The returning officer was required to hold the scrutiny on the date appointed for that purpose under clause (b) of section 30 and was not to allow any adjournment of the proceedings except when the proceedings were interrupted or obstructed by a riot, open violence, or causes beyond his control. The provision further stipulated that if an objection was made, the candidate concerned could be given time to rebut the objection, but not later than the day following the date fixed for scrutiny, and that the returning officer should record his decision on the date to which the proceedings were adjourned. After reaching a decision, the returning officer had to endorse each nomination paper with his decision either to accept or to reject it; if a nomination paper was rejected, he was required to record in writing a brief statement of the reasons for such rejection. The case then turned to the construction of section 100(1)(c), which was the principal point for determination. Section 100(1) provided, “Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), if the Tribunal is of opinion— (c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected … the Tribunal shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.” The entire controversy between the parties concerned the meaning of the expression “improperly rejected” in section 100(1)(c). The appellant argued that if a nomination paper of a candidate who was not disqualified under the grounds listed in section 36(2) was rejected, that constituted an improper rejection within the meaning of section 100(1)(c). The respondent, on the other hand, contended that a rejection of a nomination paper by the returning officer on the ground that the candidate was subject to a specified disqualification was improper only when it turned out that such disqualification did not actually exist.

The Court observed that a rejection of a nomination may be deemed improper only if the alleged disqualification on which the returning officer relied is found not to exist. Accordingly, if the view that any rejection of a nomination lacking the disqualifications listed in section 36(2) is improper is accepted, the Tribunal’s enquiry must cover every matter mentioned in that provision. Conversely, if the opposite view is accepted, the Tribunal’s inquiry would be confined solely to the question of whether the specific ground relied upon by the returning officer was well‑founded. To determine the precise meaning of the expression “improperly rejected” in section 100(1)(c), the Court found it necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Act and the context in which the clause appears. Section 32 of the Act provides that any person who satisfies the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution and the Act may be nominated as a candidate for election. Section 36(2) empowers the returning officer to reject a nomination paper either because the candidate is not qualified under sections 3 to 7 of the Act or because the candidate is disqualified under any of the grounds referred to therein. Where no ground for rejection exists under section 36(2), the returning officer must accept the nomination and the candidate’s name must be entered in the list of candidates, as stipulated in section 36(8). Sections 100(1)(c) and 100(1)(d)(1) grant relief to persons aggrieved by an order that improperly rejects or improperly accepts a nomination. In the Court’s view, the notion of “improper rejection” or “improper acceptance” must be read with reference to section 36(2). Thus, the rejection of a nomination of a candidate who is qualified and who does not fall within any of the disqualifications listed in section 36(2) constitutes an improper rejection under section 100(1)(c). Likewise, the acceptance of a nomination of a candidate who is unqualified or disqualified amounts to an improper acceptance under section 100(1)(d)(1). Section 32 confers a substantive right on a duly qualified candidate to be elected to the legislature, subject only to the limitations imposed by Articles 84, 102, 173 and 191 of the Constitution and sections 3 to 7 of the Act. Sections 36 and 100 provide the procedural machinery for exercising and enforcing that substantive right. The Court reiterated the well‑established rule of construction that procedural statutes should be interpreted liberally so as to give effect to substantive rights. Reading section 100(1)(c) in the context of the entire statute, the Court concluded that the Tribunal’s enquiry must encompass all questions of qualification and disqualification enumerated in section 36(2) and cannot be restricted to the particular ground raised before the returning officer. The respondent contended that the proceedings before the Tribunal amounted to an appeal against the returning officer’s decision, and therefore the scope of the election petition should be co‑extensive with that appeal. The Court rejected this contention, holding that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under section 100(1)(c) is not that of an appellate body but of a forum to conduct a full inquiry into the qualifications and disqualifications of the candidate as provided by the Act.

In this case, the argument advanced by the respondent was that the Tribunal’s enquiry should be confined only to the ground that had been raised before the returning officer and therefore the Tribunal could examine only the material that had been before the returning officer. It was contended that a decision of the returning officer could be described as improper only if the ground on which the decision was made had been specifically put forward and decided by the returning officer, and that consequently the phrase “improperly rejected” should be interpreted to limit the Tribunal’s scrutiny to that same ground. The Court did not accept this submission. The Court observed that the jurisdiction exercised by a Tribunal when it hears an election petition, even where the petition invokes section 100(1)(c), is not an appellate jurisdiction over the returning officer’s order. An election petition is an original proceeding that is commenced by filing a petition under section 81 of the Representation of the People Act. Once the petition is filed, the respondents are entitled to file written statements in reply, the issues are framed, and, subject to the provisions of the Act, the trial of the petition is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. All parties are therefore entitled to adduce evidence, and the ability to present evidence is a hallmark of an original proceeding, distinguishing it from a proceeding by way of appeal. Because the proceeding is of original character, the general rule that governs the trial of original proceedings applies: a party may raise any ground in support of or in opposition to the claim, subject only to the limitations expressly contained in the Act. The Court further noted that if a petition seeking to set aside an election on the ground of “improper rejection” of a nomination paper were treated as an appeal against the returning officer’s decision, then logically the Tribunal’s decision would have to be based solely on the material that had been before the returning officer with respect to the ground he had considered, and no fresh evidence could be admitted except in accordance with Order 41, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code. However, the learned judges of the lower court correctly observed that although the Tribunal’s enquiry is limited to the specific ground that was raised before the returning officer, it is not limited to the material that was before the returning officer. The Tribunal may consider any evidence that bears on that particular ground. The Court agreed with this view. The Court explained that the enquiry that a returning officer must make under section 36 is of a summary nature. The returning officer may conduct “such summary enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary” and may act suo motu. Because the returning officer’s enquiry is summary, the right conferred on a party by sections 100(1)(c) and 100(1)(d)(1) to challenge the propriety of an order of rejection or acceptance of a nomination paper would become meaningless if the Tribunal were restricted to relying only on the materials placed before the returning officer.

In this case the respondent argued that, even when the ground taken before the returning officer is considered, the Tribunal could not entertain any evidence beyond that which had been placed before the returning officer, and he supported this contention by citing the observations of the learned judges in Charanjit Lal v. Lehri Singh (1). The cited passage stated that the question of whether a nomination has been improperly rejected must be examined in relation to the state of evidence that was before the returning officer at the time of scrutiny, and that the returning officer’s testimony showed that he rejected the nomination because, in his view, the candidate Shri Pirthi was not qualified on the question of age. The citation was from A.I.R. 1958 Punj. 433‑435. In that earlier decision a nomination paper had been rejected on the ground that the candidate did not appear to possess the age qualification required by Article 173. The order of rejection was challenged in an election petition, and evidence regarding the candidate’s age was taken before the tribunal. After consideration, the tribunal held that the returning officer’s order was correct. The returning officer, in the order of rejection, had also stated that the nomination was rejected because the age was not mentioned in the nomination paper and because neither the candidate nor the proposer nor any person duly authorised on his behalf was present to testify to his age. Before the High Court, the argument was raised that the failure to mention the age in the nomination paper was a mere formal defect that should have been condoned under section 36(4) of the Act. The learned judges rejected that argument, holding that the defect was not simply the omission of the age but the lack of the requisite age qualification itself, and that such a defect could not be cured under section 36(4). In the present context, the observations relied upon in Charanjit Lal v. Lehri Singh could not be read to mean that no evidence could be adduced even with respect to a ground that was raised before the returning officer, because the tribunal in that case had indeed taken evidence and made a finding. If those observations were to be understood in the narrow way suggested by the respondent, the Court expressed disagreement with that interpretation. The Court also noted that, in many cases that came before it, for example Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and others (1), the tribunal’s findings were based on fresh evidence admitted before it, and the propriety of admitting such evidence had never been questioned. Consequently, if it is indeed open to the parties to adduce fresh evidence on the matter in issue, it is hard to regard the tribunal’s proceedings as merely an appeal against the returning officer’s decision. The respondent’s contention that only the ground raised before the returning officer may be considered before the tribunal was therefore found to be unsupported.

In this case, counsel for the respondent relied on the provision contained in section 36(6) of the Representation of the People Act, which requires that when a nomination paper is rejected, the returning officer must record the reasons for such rejection. The counsel argued that the purpose of this provision is to enable the Tribunal to determine whether the returning officer’s order is correct, and therefore the Tribunal’s inquiry should be limited only to the ground that was raised before the returning officer. The Court found this contention to be unsound. The provision in section 36(6) applies only when a nomination paper is rejected; it does not oblige the returning officer to record any reasons when a nomination paper is accepted. If the respondent’s argument were accepted, it would follow that an accepted nomination could never be questioned, a result that would be contrary to section 100(1)(d)(1), which allows an acceptance to be challenged on any of the grounds listed in section 36(2). Section 100(1)(d)(1) deals with the improper acceptance of a nomination paper, and if the term “improper” in that provision refers to the matters mentioned in section 36(2), the same meaning must be read into the word “improper” in section 100(1)(c). The Court therefore held that the word “improper” appearing in both sections 100(1)(c) and 100(1)(d)(1) must carry the same meaning, unless the surrounding context clearly indicated otherwise, which it did not. Another difficulty with the respondent’s argument is that a candidate may be subject to more than one disqualification and the nomination paper may be challenged on each of those grounds. Suppose the returning officer upholds one objection and rejects the nomination on that basis without considering other objections, even though section 36(2) obliges him to decide all objections. The question then arises whether the respondents in the election petition may adduce evidence on the other objections. The respondent contended that they could not, so that if the returning officer’s decision on the objection leading to the rejection is found to be erroneous, the Tribunal would be forced under section 100(1)(c) to set aside the election, even though the candidate was in fact disqualified and the rejection was proper. Counsel for the respondent acknowledged that this outcome would be anomalous, but asserted that the law of elections contains many anomalies and that this should not prevent interpreting the statute on its plain terms. The Court observed that while it is true that when a statute, on its proper construction, inevitably leads to anomalous results, the judiciary must give effect to it and leave any amendment to the legislature, the situation here presented two possible constructions—one producing an anomaly and the other avoiding it. In such circumstances, the Court affirmed its duty to adopt the construction that does not result in an anomaly.

In this case the Court preferred the later approach, which avoided the anomaly, rather than the earlier approach that accepted it. The Court explained that the existence of anomalies in the law should not be used as justification for allowing an anomalous result in a specific case. It observed that the apparent anomalies will disappear and the law will become simple and logical once it is understood that, when an election petition raises the question of whether a nomination paper was properly rejected, the issue to be decided is the propriety of the nomination itself. The Court emphasized that the decision of the returning officer must be examined in light of whether the candidate was duly qualified and free from any disqualification provided for in section 36(2) of the Representation of the People Act. Thus, the focus was on the qualification of the candidate rather than on the returning officer’s assessment of the material placed before him.

The Court then turned to another contention raised on behalf of the respondent, which relied on a passage from the earlier judgment in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others (1) that stated: “Under this provision R. 47(4), the Tribunal is constituted a court of appeal against the decision of the returning officer, and as such its jurisdiction must be co‑extensive with that of the returning officer and cannot extend further.” The respondent argued that because the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is co‑extensive with that of the returning officer, the Tribunal’s inquiry should be limited to the grounds that were actually raised before the returning officer. The Court noted that the quoted observation was specifically made in relation to Rule 47, and it could not be automatically extended to an inquiry under section 100(1)(c). Consequently, the Court examined the scope of the returning officer’s jurisdiction in hearing objections to nomination papers, which is defined in section 36(2). Since the returning officer’s jurisdiction includes every question that can be raised under that provision, the Tribunal must also possess the authority to decide all such questions. The Court clarified that the failure to raise a particular ground before the returning officer does not extinguish his jurisdiction to consider that ground, and the Tribunal may address it when it is raised in the petition. Counsel for the appellant highlighted the decisions of various Election Tribunals on whether grounds not raised before the returning officer could be introduced in an election petition. Apart from a single exception, those decisions held that such grounds could indeed be considered, and the case of Mengh Raj v. Bhimandas (1) was cited as establishing the settled law that a nomination can be rejected on grounds not previously raised before the returning officer. The Court observed that, if the legislature had intended to depart from this settled position, it would have expressed that intention in clear terms. In the absence of any such express language, it was appropriate to interpret section 100(1)(c) as not intended to alter the existing jurisprudence. The Court therefore indicated that it would now turn to the decisions that had been cited earlier for further analysis.

In the case of Durga Shankar Mehta (2), the election concerned a double‑member constituency. The appellant, who received the highest number of votes, was declared elected to the general seat, while a candidate named Vasantarao was declared elected to the reserved seat. The election was challenged on the ground that Vasantarao was under twenty‑five years of age and therefore disqualified from standing. The Election Tribunal accepted this objection and set aside the entire election. The matter was taken on appeal to this Court, where the issue to be decided was whether the appellant’s election could be set aside because of Vasantarao’s disqualification. The Court held that the situation fell within section 100(2)(c) as it then stood, not within section 100(1)(c), and consequently the appellant’s election could not be declared void. The judgment cites the authorities (1) [1952] 2 E.L.R. 301, 310 and (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 267. The Court acknowledged that this decision does not directly pronounce on the precise point now in controversy, a fact that was conceded by the parties. In Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra and others (1), a question arose concerning the meaning of “improper acceptance” under section 100, but this Court did not express any opinion on that question. The present issue was directly considered by the High Court of Rajasthan in Tej Singh v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur (2), where it was held that a respondent to an election petition may plead that a nomination rejected by the returning officer on one ground is also defective on other grounds enumerated in section 36(2) of the Act, and that such a plea must be examined by the Election Tribunal. A Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dhanraj Deshlehara v. Vishwanath Y. Tamaskar (3) observed that, in determining whether a nomination was improperly rejected, the Tribunal is not bound to limit its enquiry to the ground on which the returning officer rejected the nomination; even if that ground cannot be sustained, the rejection may still be proper if the Tribunal discovers other fatal defects. An unreported judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Badrivishal Pitti v. J. V. Narsing Rao (4) likewise held that, during an enquiry before the Election Tribunal, parties may support an order of rejection on grounds other than those put forward before the returning officer. The Court agrees with these decisions. The question has also been raised regarding the propriety of interfering, through writ petitions under Article 226, with interlocutory orders issued during an enquiry before the Election Tribunal, and the Court indicated that it will express its opinion on that matter. The jurisdiction of the

The Court noted that the authority for a High Court to issue writs against orders of the Tribunal is established by several decisions, namely (1) the 1955 case reported in volume 1 of the Supreme Court Reports at page 509, (2) the 1954 decision reported in volume 9 of the Eastern Law Reports at page 193, (3) the 1958 decision reported in volume 15 of the Eastern Law Reports at page 260, and (4) Special Appeal No 1 of 1957, and observed that this authority is undisputed. Nevertheless, the Court observed that it is a well‑settled principle that when an alternative remedy is available, a court may rightly decline to intervene under Article 226. The Court reminded that before the amendment of 1956, the election law permitted only preliminary dismissal of election petitions, and aggrieved parties could challenge the correctness of such dismissals through applications under Article 226 and, subsequently, through appeals to this Court. By the time any final decision was rendered, the legislative term for which the election had been held was almost expired, rendering the proceedings ineffective. The Court referred to the decision in Bhikaji Keshao Joshi and another v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani and others as a clear illustration of this problem. To correct this deficiency, the legislature amended the law by inserting section 116‑A, which confers a right of appeal from a Tribunal decision to the High Court. The purpose of the amendment, according to the Court, is to ensure that the Tribunal’s proceedings proceed quickly and without interruption, and that any mistake in its decision can be rectified through the statutory appeal. Consequently, the Court held that it is appropriate to exercise discretion under Article 226 to refrain from interfering with interlocutory orders of the Tribunal. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the orders of the lower court, dismissed the respondent’s writ petitions, and awarded costs both in this Court and in the lower court. The appeal was allowed, and the decision is reported in volume 2 of the Supreme Court Reports at page 428.