M. Ramappa vs Sangappa And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 251 of 1958

Decision Date: 21 August 1958

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, P.B. Gajendragadkar, AIYYAR, T.L. Venkatarama

In the matter titled M. Ramappa versus Sangappa and others, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 21 August 1958. The decision was recorded by Justice A. K. Sarkar, who authored the opinion, and the bench also included Justices A. Iyyar, T. L. Venkatarama, P. B. Gajendragadkar and P. B., who together heard the appeal. The decision is reported in the law reports 1958 AIR 937 and 1959 SCR 1167. The case involved a petition filed by M. Ramappa against Sangappa and others, seeking a declaration that the election of the petitioner was void. The dispute arose under the provisions of the Election Dispute Act concerning disqualification for holding a hereditary village office that might constitute an office of profit under the Government. The statutory framework relied upon included the Mysore Village Offices Act of 1908, sections six, seven and eight, and the Representation of the People Act of 1951, section one hundred paragraph one sub‑c. In addition, Article one ninety‑one of the Constitution of India was invoked as the constitutional basis for disqualification. The nomination papers of three candidates—Hanumanthappa, Siddappa and Guru Rao—were rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that the first two were Patels and the third a Shanbhog. The Returning Officer further held that each of them held an office of profit under the Mysore Government, rendering them disqualified under Article one ninety‑one. The electors of the constituency challenged the rejection by filing an election petition under section one hundred paragraph one sub‑c of the Representation of the People Act, asserting that the rejection was erroneous. The petitioners argued that the candidates could not be considered holders of offices of profit because they occupied their positions by hereditary right rather than by appointment of the Government. They also contended that the Government made no direct payment of the remuneration due to the office‑holders, and therefore no profit arose. It was not contested that village offices were governed by the Mysore Village Offices Act, 1908, and the Court found that Patels and Shanbhogs held their offices by virtue of appointment by the Government. The Court further observed that, although the statute in some instances permitted the heir of the previous holder to be appointed when statutory conditions were fulfilled, the office remained subject to Government control, supervision and the power of removal, and the remuneration was paid from Government funds and assets. Consequently, the Court held that a holder of a village office, even when possessing a hereditary claim, does not acquire the office until appointed by the Government under whose authority the office exists. Accordingly, the Patels and Shanbhogs were deemed to be holders of offices of profit under the Government, and the Returning Officer’s rejection of their nomination papers was affirmed as proper. The matter was presented before the Civil Appellate Jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 251 of 1958, arising from the Mysore High Court judgment dated 26 February 1958 in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 142 of 1957. Counsel for the appellant and counsel for the respondents were instructed to argue the respective positions before the Court. The judgment was delivered on 21 August 1958, and Justice Sarkar posed the pivotal question of whether the individuals in question were indeed holders of offices of profit under the Government. He further asked whether such status rendered them disqualified under Article one ninety‑one of the Constitution.

Because the returning officer classified the three candidates as holding offices of profit under the Mysore Government, their nomination papers were rejected, which meant they were disqualified under Article 191 of the Constitution from being chosen as members of a legislative assembly. The dispute arose from a petition filed under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, seeking a declaration that the election of the appellant should be set aside as void. The election in question took place on 8 March 1957 to choose members of the Mysore State Legislative Assembly, and one of the constituencies was Harihar. The returning officer rejected the nomination papers of three aspirants—Hanumanthappa, Siddappa and Guru Rao—on the ground that the first two were Patels and the third a Shanbhog of certain Mysore villages, and therefore each was a holder of an office of profit and consequently disqualified from Assembly membership under Article 191. As a result of the rejection only two candidates remained in the contest; the appellant, being one of them, secured the larger number of votes and was declared elected.

Six electors of the Harihar constituency then instituted an election petition under section 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, asking that the appellant’s election be declared void on the premise that the returning officer had improperly rejected the three nomination papers. The petition alleged that Patels and Shanbhogs were hereditary village officers, not holders of offices of profit, and that they merely represented the village community, acting as agents or liaisons between the community and the Government. It was further contended that the remuneration attached to those offices was minimal and disproportionate to the work performed, and thus could not be regarded as an office of profit. The Election Tribunal dismissed the petition by order dated 10 September 1957. The tribunal held that the conditions of service of Patels and Shanbhogs were governed by the Mysore Village Offices Act, 1908, and that hereditary status alone did not exclude them from being offices under the Government. It also observed that Hanumanthappa, Siddappa and Guru Rao received considerable remuneration, which qualified their positions as offices of profit. The petitioners appealed the tribunal’s decision to the High Court of Mysore. By its judgment dated 26 February 1958, the High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the offices of Patels and Shanbhogs were not offices under the Government and consequently declared the appellant’s election void. The present appeal arises from that High Court judgment.

In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered a petition that had been taken up under the certificate provided by Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. One of the original six petitioners had died, leaving the remaining five individuals as respondents before the Court. The factual matrix established that Hantimanthappa and Siddappa had occupied the positions of Patels, and that, as remuneration for their duties, they had been allotted land and were provided with cash allowances. Likewise, it was undisputed that Guru Rao served as a Shanbbog and received cash remuneration for his services. The record further confirmed that both Patels and Shanbhogs possessed defined responsibilities and that they were indeed holders of offices. The sole issue for determination, therefore, was whether these offices qualified as offices under the Mysore Government. The counsel representing the respondents advanced the contention that the offices of Patels and Shanbhogs were not government offices. He argued that these posts originated under ancient customary law and were transmitted through hereditary succession. According to his submission, under that customary framework the officers acted as agents of the village community, collecting village revenue and forwarding it to the entitled authority, thereby serving as intermediaries between the community and the government. He further maintained that the Mysore Land Revenue Code of 1888 permitted the government to appoint Patels and Shanbhogs only in the absence of hereditary holders, and consequently, since Hanumanthappa, Siddappa, and Guru Rao were hereditary office‑bearers, they could not be considered government officers. The respondent’s counsel also asserted that the Mysore Village Offices Act of 1908 was a consolidating statute that did not modify the hereditary right to the offices but merely preserved the existing law, and that because the offices were hereditary, they were not government offices. He noted that the present election petition was filed on this basis and that both the lower courts had accepted this view, with no contrary argument raised before this Court. The Act itself classified the offices of Patels and Shanbhogs as “village offices,” a description that, in his view, settled the matter definitively. While the Act inevitably recognised a limited hereditary right to village offices, the respondents did not claim an extensive hereditary entitlement for the individuals in question. Consequently, the counsel held that an examination of the customary law within the Madras Land Revenue Code was unnecessary. The remaining question, he said, concerned the effect of the provisions of the Mysore Village Offices Act that dealt with hereditary rights. He explained that Section 6 of the Act stipulated that when two or more villages or portions thereof were merged to form a new village, or when a village was divided, the existing village offices ceased to exist and new offices had to be created. In filling these new offices, the government was required to select candidates from among the former office‑holders or their families, thereby limiting full hereditary succession because the abolished offices could have been held by members of different families. Accordingly, Section 6 allowed the appointment of a person who was not the direct heir of the last holder of the abolished office. He concluded by emphasizing that Section 8 of the Act, which dealt with the filling of vacancies in the offices of Patel or Shanbhog, was the pivotal provision for determining any hereditary right to the office.

In this part of the judgment, the Court explained that when a village office ceases to exist because villages are merged or divided, the government must select the best qualified person either from the last holders of the abolished office or from members of their families. The Court noted that in such circumstances a complete hereditary right to the office is not recognised, because the abolished offices may have been held by members of different families, and the statute merely requires that the new appointment be made from among those families. Consequently, the provision allows the appointment of an individual who is not the heir of the last holder of the abolished office. The Court then turned to the provision that is crucial for establishing a hereditary right, namely section 8 of the Mysore Village Offices Act, which governs the filling of a vacancy in the office of a Patel or a Shanbhog. Under sub‑section (1) the Act disqualifies certain persons from appointment, specifying that anyone who has not attained majority, lacks the required physical or mental capacity, does not possess the prescribed educational qualification, has been convicted by a criminal court of an offence that, in the opinion of the prescribed officer, disqualifies him, or has been declared by that officer after a prescribed enquiry to be of general bad character, shall be ineligible for appointment. Sub‑section (2) provides that, in the case of a permanent vacancy, succession shall be governed by the ordinary provisions of the personal law applicable to the last holder, subject to the condition that succession devolves upon a single heir. Where more than one person would, under the ordinary provisions of that personal law, be entitled to succeed, the Act directs that preference be given to the eldest member of the eldest branch among those persons. This creates a right in the heir of the deceased holder to succeed to the office, but the Court stressed that this right is not absolute. The heir cannot be appointed if he fails to satisfy the eligibility criteria of sub‑section (1), nor if, under section 7(v), the prescribed officer, in dismissing a holder of office, has declared that the dismissal results in forfeiture of the right of succession of all undivided members of his family. The Court described this as the entirety of the hereditary right to an office that the Act provides. For the purpose of analysis, the Court proposed to disregard the statutory restriction on the hereditary right and to assume that the eldest heir in the eldest branch of the last holder is entitled to succeed to the office when it becomes vacant. The key question then was whether such an assumption would render the office one that does not fall under governmental control. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that it would, and the High Court had accepted that contention. The learned Chief Justice, in his judgment, posed the question, “Can the Government prevent him from succeeding to the permanent vacancy? Such a person gets to that post,” thereby indicating his view on the matter.

In this case, the Court observed that the heir of the last holder of an office could not acquire the position merely by virtue of a hereditary claim because the appointment must be made by the Government. The Court referred to the earlier decision in Mangal Sain v. State of Punjab (1), which had held that the mere fact that the Government participates under a statute in appointing and dismissing the executive officer of a municipality does not convert that officer into a servant of the Government. The Court found that view untenable, noting that it ignored the essential role of the Government’s appointment in perfecting the heir’s right to the office. The statute, while granting the heir a right to be appointed in certain circumstances, nevertheless required the Government’s formal appointment before the heir became the officer; without such appointment the heir did not hold the office. Even where the statute compelled the Government to appoint the heir if the statutory conditions were satisfied, the act of appointment remained the decisive factor that conferred the office and made the holder an officer of the Government. The Court emphasized that the fact that the Government could not refuse to make the appointment did not change the nature of the office, because an office cannot exist without being held under some authority, and the only authority in this context was the Government. Consequently, the office was held by virtue of the Government’s appointment, not solely by hereditary right. The Court rejected the argument of counsel for the respondent that the office was held under the village community, stating that village communities had long since ceased to possess any corporate existence, making such a claim impossible. The Court also found that the citation of Mangal Sain v. State of Punjab (1) was of no assistance, since that case involved a municipality under which the office could be held, whereas here the appointment was made by the Government. Counsel for the respondent further relied on other sections of the Act, first pointing to section 11, which allows a person entitled to an office under section 8 to sue the prescribed authority for the office or for the recovery of its emoluments. The Court held that this provision merely confirmed a right to be appointed and did not, by itself, make the person the officer; actual appointment remained indispensable. The Court also examined section 8, sub‑section (4), which provides that when the heir of the last holder is a minor, the prescribed officer shall register him as a successor and appoint another qualified person to discharge the duties during the minority. The Court noted that the minor is only registered as a successor and does not hold the office until he attains majority and is formally appointed, reinforcing the principle that appointment by the Government is the essential step that creates the officer’s relationship to the Government.

Section 8, sub‑section (4) provides that when a minor is entitled to succeed to a village office, the prescribed officer must record the minor as the successor of the last holder and must appoint another qualified person to perform the duties of the office during the minor’s minority. The Court found this provision unhelpful because it merely registers the minor as a successor; the minor does not actually hold the office until he reaches majority age, or, if he becomes qualified within three years after attaining majority, until he is appointed. During the period of minority the minor neither occupies the office nor exercises its powers. Consequently, the Court concluded that although a hereditary right to an office may exist, the office is not effectively held until the Government makes a formal appointment, and only the Government can confer such holding of the office.

The Court then turned to the provisions concerning dismissal and other sanctions. Section 7 of the Act authorises the prescribed officer of the Government to suspend, dismiss or remove any holder of a village office on any of the grounds specified in that section, and the Act contains no other power of dismissal. It had been argued that because the holder of a village office is not removable at the pleasure of the Governor under Article 310 of the Constitution, the office must not be held under the Government. The High Court accepted that argument, but the Court considered it unsubstantial. The argument rests on the assumption that Section 7 shields a village officer from dismissal at the Governor’s pleasure. The Court deemed it unnecessary to resolve whether that assumption is correct and proceeded on the basis that the view is acceptable. However, the Court noted that a statute may lawfully prevent a Government officer from being dismissed at pleasure, as illustrated in Gould v Stuart, which the Judicial Committee referenced in R Venkata Rao v Secretary of State for India. In Gould v Stuart the Committee observed that, except where a law provides otherwise, a contract of service under the Crown implicitly includes the Crown’s power to dismiss at pleasure. The Court therefore questioned whether the absence of dismissal at pleasure necessarily means that a village officer does not hold office under the Government.

The Court first considered whether the Civil Service Act, 1884, created a departure from the usual principle that a civil servant serves at the pleasure of the Government. It held that the Act indeed made such an exception. Consequently, the respondent who had entered the service of the Government of New South Wales under, and in accordance with, the provisions of the Civil Service Act, 1884, could not be dismissed at the pleasure of the Government because of those statutory provisions. The Court expressly declined to address whether the rule articulated in Gould v. Stuart (1) would be applicable in this country in view of the constitutional safeguard found in Article 310. That issue had not been raised before the Court and therefore did not require resolution in the present proceedings. The Court observed that if the principle from Gould does not apply, then a village officer, assuming he is a servant of the Government, remains subject to dismissal at the Government’s pleasure despite section 7 of the Act. Conversely, if the principle does apply, the officer’s immunity from dismissal does not demonstrate that he does not hold office under the Government. Thus, the mere fact that an officer is insulated from dismissal at the Government’s pleasure does not, by itself, establish that he does not occupy a Government office. The discussion then turned to the question of the remuneration of a village officer. The High Court, in its judgment, referred to the rules made under the Act concerning the mode of payment of emoluments and concluded that there was no direct payment of the officer’s dues by the Government, and that this suggested the officer did not hold office under the Government. The Court disagreed with that view, stating that Government lands are allotted to officers as part of their emoluments for services rendered and that cash allowances are also fixed by the Government. Although the rules provide that cash allowances are not paid directly by the Government to the officers, the officers are authorized to deduct the amounts from the revenue they collect. This arrangement does not indicate that the cash remuneration is not funded by the Government, because the revenue collected belongs to the Government. The Rules further provide that when an officer deducts the cash allowance from the revenue collected and deposits the balance in the Government Treasury, the receipt for the deducted amount is treated as equivalent to a cash payment into the Treasury of an equal sum, as set out in rule 75‑XIII of the Rules framed under the Act. The practical effect of this rule is that the entire revenue collected is deemed deposited into the Treasury, and a portion of it is subsequently paid back to the officer as cash remuneration.

In this case the Court observed that, notwithstanding the procedural steps prescribed for the disbursement of cash allowances, the allowance paid to the officer was nevertheless a payment made by the Government out of its own funds. The Court further noted that the duties assigned to the village officers were fixed by the Government and that these officers performed their functions under the direction, control and supervision of the Government, a point that was expressly conceded. The Court then turned to the status of Patels and Shanbhogs, holding that they were officers because they were appointed to their respective offices by the Government; although on some occasions the Government might have been compelled to appoint the heir of the previous holder, the appointment itself originated with the Government. Their continued tenure depended solely upon that appointment, they operated under the Government’s control and supervision, their salaries and other remuneration were drawn from Government funds and assets, and they could be removed by the Government. The Court found that no other authority had the power to appoint or remove them, and that therefore the offices of Patel and Shanbhog were offices of profit under the Government. On this basis the Court concluded that the nomination papers of Hanumanthappa, Siddappa and Guru Rao had been lawfully rejected by the Returning Officer and that the election petition lodged against that decision lacked merit. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the judgment and order of the High Court were set aside, the orders of the Election Tribunal were restored, the election petition was dismissed, and the respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the appellant throughout.