K. S. Srinivasan vs Union of India

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 78 of 1957; Petition No. 81 of 1956

Decision Date: 18 February, 1958

Coram: S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, Venkatarama Aiyar, Bose

In the matter titled K. S. Srinivasan versus Union of India, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 18 February 1958. The judgment was authored by Justice S. K. Das and was decided by a bench comprising Justices S. K. Das, A. K. Sarkar, A. K. Sarkar, and a separate list that includes Justice A. K. Sarkar, Justice Bose, Justice Vivian Das, Justice Sudhi Ranjan (Chief Justice), Justice Ayyar, and Justice T. L. Venkatarama Sarkar. The case is reported in the 1958 All India Reporter at page 419 and in the Supreme Court Reports at page 1295, and the citation includes references to the Union Service, Termination of a servant in quasi‑permanent status, and the post being kept in abeyance. The petitioner, K. S. Srinivasan, had been serving as a Public Relations Officer in All India Radio and was declared to be in quasi‑permanent service under rule 3 of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949. During a period of war economy, the Government placed his post “in abeyance” and subsequently appointed him to act as Assistant Station Director on a temporary basis, instructing that he retain his quasi‑permanent status while holding the new position. The Union Public Service Commission objected to this arrangement, leading to the termination of the petitioner’s service and his reassignment to a temporary post of Assistant Information Officer, which was of a lower grade. The petitioner challenged the termination before the High Court by seeking a writ of certiorari, contending that his removal without a show‑cause notice violated Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. The respondent, the Union of India, argued that the order allowing the petitioner to carry his quasi‑permanent status to the new post was based on a misapprehension that the Assistant Station Director post was of the same grade as the Public Relations Officer post, and therefore his service could be lawfully terminated under the applicable service rules.

The Court held that the post of Assistant Station Director did not belong to the same grade as the Public Relations Officer post, and consequently the petitioner could not lawfully retain his quasi‑permanent status in the new appointment. Because the order permitting the carry‑over of status was issued under a mistaken belief and was never intended to bestow independent quasi‑permanent status in the new post, the petitioner’s service was terminable under rule 6(1) of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1947. The Court observed that when a servant lacks a right to a post and his service can be terminated under the service rules, Article 311(2) does not apply. Accordingly, the petitioner, who was serving purely in a temporary capacity, could not invoke the constitutional protection of Article 311(2). The decision relied upon the earlier judgment in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 828, emphasizing that an admission does not constitute conclusive proof of the matter admitted, although it may have evidentiary effect. The Court therefore dismissed the petition, confirming that the termination of the petitioner’s service was valid under the relevant service regulations.

In this case the Court observed that an admission may sometimes operate as an estoppel, but it found no estoppel because the appellant was not misled by the Government’s mistaken order concerning his quasi‑permanent status. The Court further held that the term “reduction” in clause (ii) of rule 6(1) of the Service Rules does not refer only to abolition of a post; it also includes keeping a post in abeyance, and that the word “certify” in the same provision does not require a formal order. The Court clarified that having the same scale of pay is not the sole test for determining whether two posts belong to the same grade under the proviso to clause (ii) of rule 6(1), and that belonging to the same class does not by itself resolve the question. It stressed that quasi‑permanent status is created by the Rules, and any servant who wishes to rely on rule 3 must also comply with the proviso to rule 4(b). The Court rejected the applicability of State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, [1958] S.C.R. 533. In a separate opinion, Bose J. held that the Government’s order allowing the appellant to retain his quasi‑permanent status in the new post was intended to confer that status, and therefore the Government could not retract it even if made under a mistake later discovered. The Court applied the principle from Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, [1952] S.C.R. 135, and noted that rule 4(a) gave the Government authority to confer such status without prior consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission, because the phrase “is required to be made” in rule 4(b) is directory, not mandatory. The Court referred to State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, [1958] S.C.R. 533; Biswanath Khemka v. The King Emperor, [1945] F.C.R. 99; and Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin, [1917] A.C. 170 as supporting authorities.

The judgment concerned a civil appellate jurisdiction involving Civil Appeal No. 78 of 1957 and Petition No. 81 of 1956, which were taken on special leave from the Punjab High Court judgment dated 25 November 1955 in Civil Writ No. 209‑D of 1955. Counsel for the appellant were K. S. Krishnaswamy Aiyanger and C. V. L. Narayan, while the respondent was represented by P. A. Mehta, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar. The judgment was delivered on 18 February 1958. The Court noted that the judgment of Das C.J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ., was read by S. K. Das J., and Bose J. delivered a separate judgment. The factual background stated that on 1 May 1946 the appellant, Shri K. S. Srinivasan, was appointed as Liaison Officer, All India Radio, with a salary of Rs. 350 per month under the pay scale Rs. 350‑20‑450‑25/2‑550. The appointment was made on the recommendation of the Federal Public Service Commission, and a memorandum of information—referred to as an advertisement—was issued by the Public Service Commission inviting applications for nine posts of Listeners’ Research Officers and nine posts of Liaison Officers. The memorandum described the posts as permanent and pensionable, though they would initially be filled on a temporary basis, and indicated that successful candidates retained and confirmed in the posts would become eligible for pension benefits and contributions to the General Provident Fund. The initial appointments were provisional for six months, subject to termination on conditions outlined in paragraph 4 of the memorandum, and the duties of the Liaison Officer, set out in paragraph 5, involved organising and conducting publicity for radio programmes and related activities. The designation Liaison Officer was later changed to Public Relations Officer, together with the other related posts.

The Public Service Commission issued a memorandum inviting applications for the post under discussion, which was part of the recruitment drive for nine Listener’s Research Officers and nine Liaison Officers in All India Radio. The memorandum expressly described those positions as permanent and pensionable, yet it clarified that they would initially be filled on a temporary basis. It further informed that any person who was retained in service and subsequently confirmed in the position would become entitled to pension benefits and would also be eligible to contribute to the General Provident Fund. Accordingly, the first appointments were made on a six‑month probationary period, subject to termination on conditions specified in paragraph four of the memorandum, the details of which need not be reproduced here. Paragraph five of the same memorandum set out the duties of a Liaison Officer, the principal responsibility being the organization and conduct of publicity for the programmes and other activities of a radio station. Subsequently, the designation ‘Liaison Officer’ was altered to ‘Public Relations Officer’. Together with the posts of Listener Research Officer and Assistant Station Director, the Public Relations Officer positions were upgraded to the pay scale of Rs. 450‑25‑500‑30‑800 with effect from 1 January 1947. On 23 May 1952, the Director‑General of All India Radio issued Order No. 2(1)A/50, stating that the appellant had continuously served the Government for more than three years and that a declaration had been issued to him pursuant to rules 3 and 4 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949. The order further noted that an appointment to the grade of Public Relations Officer required consultation with the Union Public Service Commission and that such concurrence had indeed been obtained. Consequently, the appellant was appointed to the Public Relations Officer grade in a quasi‑permanent capacity, effective from 1 May 1949. However, on 3 September 1952 the appellant received a further order from the same Director‑General indicating that his services would no longer be required after 6 October 1952. Surprised by this communication, the appellant filed a representation on 8 September 1952, asserting that, as a quasi‑permanent Public Relations Officer, he possessed a right to an alternative post of the same grade, provided that any such post was held by a government servant who was not in permanent or quasi‑permanent service. By way of an order dated 13 September 1952, the appellant was then informed that he was appointed to officiate as Assistant Station Director, Madras—while he was then serving as Public Relations Officer, All India Radio, Madras—in a purely temporary capacity pending further orders. Finally, on 19 September 1952 the appellant was told that his representation of 8 September 1952 was under consideration, and he was advised that, in the interim, he should apply for one of the Assistant Station Director positions that had been advertised by the Union Public Service Commission.

On 4 October 1952 the appellant filed an additional representation in which he asserted that, according to the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, he was entitled to remain in service in a post of the same grade and under the same appointing authority. Consequently, he argued, it was unnecessary for the Union Public Service Commission to re‑select him for the post of Assistant Station Director. In the concluding part of that representation, the appellant expressed his willingness to follow the suggestion made in the Director‑General’s letter of 19 September 1952. He attached an application to the Union Public Service Commission for the vacancy of Assistant Station Director and requested that, should the Director‑General decide that he must apply for that post, his application be forwarded to the Commission.

While the Government examined the appellant’s representation, the Union Public Service Commission conducted interviews in March 1953 for the Assistant Station Director positions. The appellant appeared before the Commission on 26 March 1953. On 18 April 1953 he received a notice stating that the Commission had not selected him and that, therefore, it was not possible to continue him in service. The appellant then submitted fresh representations contending that the order terminating his service on the ground of non‑selection by the Commission was illegal, because his quasi‑permanent status entitled him to retain a post in the same grade as long as any post in that grade was occupied by a government servant who was not in permanent or quasi‑permanent service. The Government replied that the post of Public Relations Officer held by the appellant had been kept in abeyance, making it impossible to retain him in that position. Accordingly, he was given an opportunity to show cause why his service should not be terminated as of 18 July 1953, with a request to respond within fifteen days. In his reply the appellant reiterated that his quasi‑permanent status, governed by the applicable rules, obligated the Government to retain him and that terminating his service would contravene Article 311 of the Constitution. On 3 July 1953 he received a memorandum dated 9 June 1953 stating that his representation had been considered and that the posts of Public Relations Officers constituted a separate cadre, not belonging to the cadre of Assistant Station Directors. Therefore, the memorandum concluded, he could not claim any protection in the Assistant Station Director post on the basis of his quasi‑permanent status as a Public Relations Officer.

On July 10 1953 the appellant submitted a new representation to the Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs. In that representation he reiterated the objections he had previously raised and argued that the contemplated termination of his employment was irregular, unjust and illegal. He maintained that the termination order violated Article 311 of the Constitution and further asserted that, although the posts of Public Relations Officer and Assistant Station Director were not declared to belong to the same cadre, there could be no dispute that both posts were situated in the same grade.

Subsequently, on August 17 1953 the appellant received a memorandum informing him that the notice of termination of his service as Assistant Station Director dated April 18 1953 — which had been amended by corrigenda dated May 12 1953 and July 3 1953 — was withdrawn. The memorandum also indicated that the earlier notice dated May 26 1953, which had required him to show cause why his service should not be terminated, had been cancelled. Following this, an order dated December 14 1953 was issued, an order that bears directly on the matters raised before the Court and therefore is reproduced in full:

“S. No. 41(R) Government of India, Director General, All India Radio. No. 1 (113)‑SI/52. New Delhi, the 14th December, 1953. ORDER. In Directorate Order No. 2(1)‑A/50 dated 23 May 1952, Shri K. S. Srinivasan, then officiating Public Relations Officer, All India Radio, was appointed to that post in a quasi‑permanent capacity effective 1 May 1949. Subsequently, in August 1952, all posts of Public Relations Officers, except the one in the External Services Division, were held in abeyance. As the post of Public Relations Officer belongs to the same grade as Assistant Station Director and carries identical scales of pay, Shri Srinivasan was appointed Assistant Station Director in the External Services Division effective 22 September 1952. Under the provision contained in Ministry of Home Affairs Office Memorandum No. 54/136 /51‑NGS dated 24 April 1952, Shri Srinivasan will retain the quasi‑permanent status of his former post of Public Relations Officer while holding the post of Assistant Station Director. (Sd.) M. Lal, Director‑General.”

A copy of this order was also transmitted to the Secretary of the Union Public Service Commission. Nevertheless, the appellant soon discovered that the difficulties did not cease with the December 1953 order. On August 31 1955 the appellant was informed by the then Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting that the Union Public Service Commission had objected to his appointment as Assistant Station Director, holding that such an appointment was contrary to the regulations. Accordingly, he was asked either to relinquish the post of Assistant Station Director and accept a temporary posting as Assistant Information Officer in the Press Information Bureau, or, alternatively, to “clear out”. It may be noted that the post of Assistant Information Officer offered to the appellant carried a lower scale of pay than that of an Assistant Station Director, thereby depriving him of his quasi‑permanent status and amounting to a reduction in rank.

The Government offered the appellant a post of Assistant Information Officer in the Press Information Bureau at a pay scale lower than that of an Assistant Station Director, namely Rs. 350‑25‑500‑30‑620. Because this new offer removed the appellant’s quasi‑permanent status and also reduced his rank, he promptly sent fresh representations to the Home Ministry, the Director‑General, and the Minister for Information and Broadcasting. On 7 September 1955 the appellant received the final order of the Government, which formed the subject of the present appeal. The order read as follows: “Shri Srinivasan was declared quasi‑permanent in the grade of Public Relations Officer, All India Radio (Rs. 450‑25‑500‑EB‑30‑800) with effect from 1 May 1949. In 1952, all the posts of Public Relations Officer excepting one in the External Services Division were held in abeyance as a measure of economy. The only post that survived the economy drive was assigned to the permanent incumbent. Shri Srinivasan would have had to be retrenched in 1952; for quasi‑permanency does not preclude retrenchment and there was no other officer in the grade of Public Relations Officer who was non‑quasi‑permanent and who could have been discharged in preference to him. He was irregularly transferred as Assistant Station Director, in an officiating capacity. He applied for one of the posts of Assistant Station Director when they were advertised by the Union Public Service Commission in 1953, but was rejected. Subsequently, he was allowed to carry also irregularly the quasi‑permanent status in the grade of Public Relations Officer while holding the post of Assistant Station Director, vide Directorate General, All India Radio’s order No. I (I 13) 81/52 dated 14 December 1953. The Union Public Service Commission has not accepted this transfer as it is in contravention of the Union Public Service Commission (Consultation) Regulations. Since he has been rejected for the post of Assistant Station Director in an open selection and also since the Union Public Service Commission has not accepted his transfer, the Government of India regrets that it is unable to allow him to continue in the post of Assistant Station Director. He is, therefore, required to relinquish charge of the post of Assistant Station Director immediately.”

To spare the appellant the hardship of retrenchment, the Government considered offering him alternative employment. It stated that there was no intention of reviving the Public Relations Officer posts that had been placed in abeyance in 1952. For the publicity and public relations work of All India Radio, a few posts of Assistant Information Officer in the scale of Rs. 350‑25‑500‑EB‑30‑620 had been sanctioned on the strength of the Press Information Bureau, and it was proposed to absorb the appellant on a temporary basis against one of these posts. The absorption in this post was also made subject to approval by the Union Public Service Commission, to which a reference had been made. Meanwhile, after relinquishing the charge of the post of Assistant Station Director, the appellant was directed to report for duty to the Principal Information Officer, Press Information Bureau, New Delhi. The order further indicated that the question of fixation of his grade as Assistant Information Officer would be taken up after he had joined duty, with a view to protecting his present salary.

In the communication sent to the appellant, the administration indicated that he would be placed in the grade of Assistant Information Officer and that, “With a view to protecting his present salary, the matter will be taken up after he has joined duty.” The appellant subsequently made additional representations, all of which were rejected. Consequently, on 11 October 1955 an order was issued transferring the appellant to the Press Information Bureau as an officiating Assistant Information Officer with immediate effect. The same order directed the appellant to relinquish charge of the post of Assistant Station Director without delay and to assume his new post in the Press Information Bureau forthwith. The legality of this order, which is also the subject of the present appeal, necessarily depended on the legality of the earlier order dated 7 September 1955. The appellant declined to accept the lower post of Assistant Press Information Officer and, on 19 October 1955, handed over charge of his former post while protesting the transfer. On 25 November 1955 the appellant filed Writ Petition 209‑D of 1955 in the Punjab High Court, seeking a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ to set aside the orders dated 7 September 1955 and 11 October 1955 and requesting an order for his reinstatement as Assistant Station Director in the External Services Division of All India Radio—the position he held when the disputed orders were made. The Punjab High Court dismissed the petition summarily on the same day. The appellant thereafter applied to the High Court for a certificate of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court; this application was rejected on 16 March 1956. Undeterred, the appellant applied to the Supreme Court for special leave, which was granted on 23 April 1956.

While seeking special leave, counsel for the appellant stated, without prejudice to the contentions of either party, that the appellant would occupy the post of Assistant Information Officer in the Press Information Bureau pending the final disposal of the appeal. On 22 April 1956 the appellant also filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the order dated 7 September 1955 on the ground that it infringed the provisions of Articles 14 and 16. The present judgment is intended to decide both the special‑leave appeal and the Article 32 petition, and it will be convenient to consider the appeal first. The principal issue for determination in the appeal is whether the impugned orders contravene the constitutional protection afforded by Article 311(2) to the appellant, who is acknowledged to be a holder of a civil post under the Union. The precise scope and operation of Article 311 of the Constitution had been examined in detail in the recent decision of this Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, pronounced on 1 November 1957, and the majority observations in that case are quoted here only insofar as they bear upon the present proceedings.

The Court explained that the governing principle was that when a government servant possessed a right to a particular post or rank—whether that right arose from the explicit terms of his employment contract, from an implied understanding, or from the rules that regulated his service—then the termination of his service or his demotion to a lower post constituted, by its very nature, a punishment. This was because such termination removed his entitlement to hold the post or rank and to receive the salary and other benefits attached to it. Conversely, the Court noted that if the servant did not have a bona‑fide right to the post—such as when he occupied a permanent or temporary position appointed on probation or on an officiating basis, and where his temporary service had not matured into a “quasi‑permanent set‑vice” as defined in the Temporary Service Rules—then ending his employment did not deprive him of any right and therefore could not be deemed a punishment. The Court said that one way to determine whether a termination amounted to a punishment was to examine whether, but for the termination, the servant would have retained the right to hold the post. If the servant did have such a right, as illustrated in the three cases previously cited, the termination would automatically be a punishment and the servant would be protected by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. In broader terms, the Court held that Article 311(2) applied to situations where a government servant, if employed by a private employer, would be able to bring an action for wrongful dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank. The Court further clarified that if the government, under an express or implied contract or under the applicable service rules, retained the authority to terminate the employment at any time, then such termination—being carried out in the manner authorized by the contract or rules—was prima facie not a punishment and did not invoke the safeguards of Article 311. The crucial issue, therefore, was whether the appellant possessed a right to the post of Assistant Station Director that he held at the time the impugned orders were issued. If the appellant had such a right, the orders would unequivocally be invalid because they stripped him of that right by terminating his service in that post and demoting him to a lower position. The Court observed that there had been no disciplinary proceeding against the appellant and that he had not been given an opportunity to show cause. Conversely, if the appellant lacked a right to the post he occupied and the rules governing his service allowed for termination, then he could not claim protection under Article 311. On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that under the Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, he held a quasi‑permanent status in the post of Public Relations Officer, to which he had been initially appointed, and that this status continued when he was later appointed as Assistant Station Director; consequently, he argued that he could not be deprived of his right except in accordance with those rules and that the impugned orders violated those provisions. The appellant further argued that the Union Public Service Commission had not correctly appreciated the legal position and that its opinion, whether officious or not, was neither decisive nor binding on the Government or the appellant. The Union of India, as respondent, conceded that the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 were the applicable rules governing the appellant’s service, but maintained that the impugned orders were consistent with those rules and that the appellant’s service, which was in quasi‑permanent status as Public Relations Officer, was subject to termination under Rule 6(1)(ii) because a reduction had occurred in the number…

The appellant claimed that he was first appointed to the post of Public Relations Officer. He asserted that he carried the quasi‑permanent status of that appointment into his later posting as Assistant Station Director. Accordingly, he maintained that he possessed a right to remain in the post that could not be withdrawn except in accordance with the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949. He further argued that the orders impugned before this Court were issued in violation of those Rules. The appellant further contended that the Union Public Service Commission had failed to appreciate the correct legal position. He argued that the Commission’s opinion, whether offered as advice or otherwise, was neither decisive nor binding on the Government or on himself. The Union of India, appearing as the respondent, conceded that the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 were the applicable framework governing the appellant’s service. Nevertheless, the respondent submitted that the impugned orders were fully consistent with those Rules because the appellant’s appointment did not meet the criteria for continued quasi‑permanent status. The appellant therefore sought relief on the ground that the termination violated his quasi‑permanent right under the Rules. The respondent, on the other hand, maintained that the termination was fully authorized by the Rules because the appellant’s post no longer satisfied the statutory conditions for quasi‑permanent status.

The respondent argued that the impugned orders conformed to Rule 6(1)(ii) of the Temporary Service Rules. Rule 6(1)(ii) permitted termination of quasi‑permanent service when a reduction occurred in the number of posts of Public Relations Officers available to non‑permanent servants. The rule also required that the officer not be occupying a post of the same grade as the specified post that gave rise to the quasi‑permanent status. Accordingly, the respondent contended that a reduction in the quota of Public Relations Officer posts had taken place. It further maintained that the appellant’s appointment as Assistant Station Director was a purely temporary posting of a lower grade, thereby depriving him of the benefit of the proviso to Rule 6(1)(ii). The respondent also submitted that the order dated 14 December 1953 had been issued on a mistaken understanding of the legal position. After the Union Public Service Commission correctly clarified the position, the Government issued the impugned order on 7 September 1955. To mitigate the hardship that the appellant would face from immediate unemployment, the Government created the post of Assistant Information Officer and assigned duties similar to those previously performed by the Public Relations Officer. The Government then offered this newly created post to the appellant as a means of alleviating his loss of employment. These contentions represented the rival positions that the Court needed to consider in order to determine whether the termination of the appellant’s service complied with the applicable Temporary Service Rules.

According to Rule 3, a Government servant is deemed to be in quasi‑permanent service when two conditions are satisfied. First, the servant must have been in continuous Government service for a period exceeding three years. Second, the appointing authority must be satisfied that the servant is suitable in terms of age, qualifications, work performance and character for employment in a quasi‑permanent capacity, and must thereafter issue a declaration to that effect in compliance with any instructions that the Governor‑General may from time to time issue. For the analysis before us, Rules 4 and 6(1) are also material and therefore the full text of those rules is reproduced. Rule 4 provides that a declaration issued under Rule 3 shall specify the particular post or the particular grade of posts within a cadre to which it applies, and shall state the date from which the declaration takes effect. Moreover, where recruitment to a specified post is required to be made after consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission, no such declaration shall be issued unless the Commission has been consulted. Rule 6(1) then governs the termination of service of a Government servant in quasi‑permanent service. It provides that such service may be terminated (i) in the same circumstances and in the same manner as the service of a Government servant in permanent service, or (ii) when the appointing authority certifies that a reduction has occurred in the number of posts available for Government servants who are not in permanent service. However, the termination under clause (ii) shall not apply so long as any post of the same grade and under the same appointing authority as the specified post held by the servant continues to be occupied by a Government servant who is neither in permanent service nor in quasi‑permanent service. Furthermore, where termination is required because of a reduction of posts, it shall ordinarily be effected in order of junior‑ness among those Government servants in quasi‑permanent service whose specified posts are of the same grade and under the same appointing authority, as recorded in the list referred to in Rule 7.

Rule 7, which is invoked by Rule 6(1), sets out the conditions for eligibility for a permanent appointment. Sub‑rule (1) declares that, subject to the provisions of the rule, a Government servant for whom a declaration has been made under Rule 3 shall become eligible for a permanent appointment when a vacancy arises in the specified posts that may be reserved for filling from among persons in quasi‑permanent service, and such eligibility shall be guided by any instructions that the Governor‑General may from time to time issue. The accompanying explanation makes clear that the issuance of a declaration under Rule 3 does not bestow upon any person a right to claim a permanent appointment to any post. Sub‑rule (2) obliges every appointing authority, from time to time and after consultation with the appropriate Departmental Promotions Committee, to prepare a list, in order of precedence, of all persons in quasi‑permanent service who are eligible for a permanent appointment. In preparing this list, the appointing authority must take into account both the seniority and the merit of the Government servants concerned. All permanent appointments that are reserved under sub‑rule (1) and that fall within the control of any such appointing authority shall be made in accordance with the aforementioned list.

It was noted that the governing provision allowed the Government to direct that a permanent appointment to any grade or post could be made solely on the basis of seniority. The factual matrix established that the appellant unquestionably occupied a quasi‑permanent position in the grade designated as Public Relations Officer. An order dated 23 May 1952 expressly recorded three points: first, that a declaration had been made concerning the appellant pursuant to rules 3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules; second, that the Union Public Service Commission had concurred with the declaration; and third, that the grade in which the appellant enjoyed quasi‑permanent status was the Public Relations Officers grade. Rule 4 required that a declaration issued under rule 3 specify either the particular post or the particular grades of posts within a cadre to which it applied, together with the effective date. The term “cadre,” as defined by Fundamental Rule 9(4), referred to the strength of a service or a portion of a service sanctioned as a separate unit. To elucidate the concept of a grade, the Court referred to Article 29 of the Civil Service Regulations, which explained that appointments belong to the same class when they are in the same department, bear the same designation, or have been declared by the Government of India to be in the same class, and that such classes may be subdivided into grades according to pay. The article further emphasized that appointments do not belong to the same class or grade unless they have been so constituted or recognised by proper authority, and that ministerial officers possess no classes or grades. Consequently, the Court found it clear that the positions known as Public Relations Officers in All India Radio constituted a distinct grade, and that the appellant held a quasi‑permanent status within that grade.

Rule 6(1) of the Temporary Service Rules addressed the manner in which the service of a Government servant in quasi‑permanent service could be terminated. The present dispute centred on clause (ii) of that rule, which provides that termination may occur when the appointing authority certifies that a reduction has taken place in the number of posts available for Government servants who are not in permanent service. Counsel for the appellant strongly asserted that no such reduction, as contemplated by the clause, had occurred in the present circumstances, and that no certification of reduction had been made. Conversely, counsel for the respondent vigorously contended that a reduction, within the meaning of the clause, had indeed taken place and that the appointing authority had certified that reduction. Before analysing the precise scope and legal effect of clause (ii), the Court indicated the necessity of briefly discussing the Temporary Service Rules themselves. It was also noted that, contemporaneous with the publication of the Rules, the Government had issued an explanatory memorandum, which would be considered in the subsequent analysis.

The memorandum that accompanied the Temporary Service Rules explained that the expression “quasi‑permanent” service was introduced to provide certain benefits to those servants who occupied such positions. Regarding Rule 4(a), the memorandum clarified that a government servant must be designated as quasi‑permanent with respect to a specific post. That post may be a solitary posting or it may belong to a cadre that contains several posts. If a cadre is divided into multiple grades, the post may be assigned to any one of those grades. A servant who has been declared quasi‑permanent for a particular post is permitted to be transferred from that post to another post within the same cadre or grade when a reduction in posts or other causes require such movement. The memorandum further emphasized that this internal shifting does not prejudice the servant’s rights under the quasi‑permanent status.

With respect to Rule 6(1), the memorandum provided a detailed explanation concerning the security of tenure for a quasi‑permanent servant. It stated that, apart from situations where there is a reduction in the number of posts within the relevant cadre or grade, the termination of a quasi‑permanent servant’s service must follow the same procedure applicable to a permanent servant. For instance, if the termination is sought on grounds of indiscipline or inefficiency, formal disciplinary proceedings must be instituted against the servant. Moreover, a quasi‑permanent servant enjoys a superior right of retention in service compared with purely temporary employees occupying the same grade. The Court was asked to consider whether the order dated 7 September 1955 complied with Rule 6(1). This enquiry involved two components: first, determining the true scope and effect of clause (ii) of Rule 6(1); and second, assessing the impact of the proviso attached to that clause. The analysis therefore began with clause (ii) to ascertain whether a reduction, as contemplated by the rule, had occurred in the present circumstances.

The Court concluded that a reduction did indeed occur within the meaning of clause (ii). The order of 14 December 1953, which was favourable to the appellant, expressly recorded that in August 1952 all posts of Public Relations Officers, except the one in the External Services Division, were placed in abeyance. The challenged order of 7 September 1955 reiterated that in 1952 every post of Public Relations Officer, other than the single post in the External Services Division, was held in abeyance as an economy measure, and that only one post survived the economy drive, being assigned to a permanent incumbent. Furthermore, in a representation dated 10 July 1953, the appellant acknowledged that, according to a memorandum issued by the Director‑General of All India Radio on 21 May 1953, he had been informed that “it was decided to keep the post in abeyance.” Counsel for the appellant attempted to distinguish between “keeping a post in abeyance” and “reducing a post,” arguing that “reducing” implies permanent or temporary abolition, whereas “abeyance” merely denotes a temporary non‑filling of the post. The Court noted, however, that the meaning of such terms must be derived from the context in which they are employed.

The Court explained that the phrase “keeping a post in abeyance” merely meant that the post would not be filled for the time being. It emphasized that the meaning of any word or expression depends on the context in which it appears. In clause (ii) the expression used was “reduction… in the number of posts available for Government servants not in permanent service.” The Court noted that counsel for the respondent correctly urged that the entire clause should be read to determine the meaning of “reduction.” In that context, reduction was not limited to permanent abolition of a post. To illustrate the point, counsel described a situation where a permanent holder of a post goes on deputation, thereby making the post temporarily available for temporary or quasi‑permanent officers. When the permanent officer returns from deputation, the number of posts available for non‑permanent officers falls, which constitutes a reduction. The Court agreed with this reasoning and held that the term “reduction” in clause (ii) could include the practice of keeping certain posts in abeyance. The Court further observed that the order dated 7 September 1955 clearly stated that the Government had no intention of reviving the Public Relations Officer posts that had been kept in abeyance since 1952; consequently, for all practical purposes those posts were considered abolished. Regarding the word “certifies” in clause (ii), the Court found no special significance attached to it. It pointed out that the appellant had been informed, as early as May 1953, through a memorandum from the appointing authority, that the post he occupied was to be kept in abeyance. The Court held that the clause did not preclude the appointing authority from certifying the status of a post by means of a memorandum rather than a formal order. Turning to the more significant issue of the proviso to clause (ii), the Court examined whether the post of Assistant Station Director, to which the appellant had been appointed on a purely temporary basis on 13 September 1952, belonged to the same grade or cadre as the posts of Public Relations Officer. If both were in the same grade or cadre, the appellant would retain his quasi‑permanent status and the shift described in the explanatory memorandum would not affect his rights. After careful consideration, the Court reluctantly but inevitably concluded that the Assistant Station Director post was not in the same grade or cadre as the Public Relations Officer posts. To support this conclusion, the Court referred to the re‑organisation of All India Radio in 1944, as detailed in letter No. K‑404/2397 dated 15/28 December 1944 from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The re‑organisation was carried out in three parts: (1) revision of the scales of pay of certain existing posts; (2) creation of additional posts; and (3) creation of new categories of posts, which included the Liaison Officer and Listeners’ Research Officer positions.

The Court explained that the reorganisation of All India Radio in 1944 was carried out through a letter numbered K‑404/2397 dated 15/28 December 1944, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. That reorganisation was divided into three parts: first, the revision of the pay scales of certain existing posts; second, the creation of some additional posts; and third, the creation of certain new categories of posts. Within the third category, the posts of Liaison Officer and Listeners’ Research Officer were introduced, with nine posts created for each head. The posts of Assistant Station Director were placed in the first two categories.

Subsequently, in 1950 the Government issued a declaration concerning the cadres on the programme side of All India Radio, recorded in letter No. 17(83)/49‑BI dated 20 March 1950. That declaration constituted a specific cadre for Assistant Station Directors, which comprised the following posts: (a) Assistant Station Directors; (b) Instructor (Programmes); (c) Assistant Director of Programmes; (d) Listener Research Officer; (e) Officer on Special Duty (Kashmir); and (f) Officer Special Duty (Hyderabad), the last two being temporary. The declaration made clear that Public Relations Officers were not placed in the Assistant Station Directors cadre.

The Court then referred to paragraph 129 of Chapter IV, Section 1 of the All India Radio Manual, Volume 1, which mirrors the same position. Under Fundamental Rule 9(31)(c), a “post is said to be on the same time‑scale as another post on a time‑scale if the two time‑scales are identical and the posts fall within a cadre, or class in a cadre, such cadre or class having been created in order to fill all posts involving duties of approximately the same character or degree of responsibility, in a service or establishment, or group of establishments.” The Court noted that two conditions must be satisfied for this rule to apply: the time‑scales must be identical, and the posts must belong to the same cadre or class in a cadre. Paragraph 129 expressly limits the cadre of Assistant Station Directors to only four categories of posts, which do not include Public Relations Officers.

Learned counsel for the appellant cited Appendix I of the All India Radio Manual, Volume 11, which lists the scales of pay and classification of posts. That appendix places the posts of Assistant Station Director (no. 77), Listener Research Officer (no. 78) and Public Relations Officer (no. 79) within Central Services, Class II, giving them the same pay scale and locating them on the programme side. The Court acknowledged this classification but emphasized that identical pay scale or belonging to the same class is not the sole test for determining whether posts are in the same grade or cadre. The Court reiterated the 1950 constitution of the Assistant Station Directors cadre, which clearly shows that Public Relations Officers were excluded. The Court warned that relying only on pay scale or service classification would yield many anomalous results in determining grade or cadre relationships.

It was observed that sharing the same scale of pay and belonging to the same classification, namely Class 11, does not by itself establish that two posts are in the same grade or cadre. The appendix cited by counsel for the appellant indicates that the post of Assistant Director of Monitoring Services enjoys the same pay scale and classification as the posts of Assistant Station Directors, yet no suggestion is made that this post has any grade or cadre relationship with those Assistant Station Director posts. A further illustration was provided by comparing a chemist (post 106) with an Assistant Engineer (post 105). Both positions have identical pay scales and are placed in Class 11, but they are not considered to be in the same grade or cadre; otherwise an absurd result would follow, whereby a chemist holding a quasi‑permanent status could be appointed to the Engineer post simply by downgrading the chemist’s position.

The appellant further contended that the order dated 14 December 1953 contained an explicit admission that the post of Public Relations Officer belonged to the same grade as an Assistant Station Director, and that this order was issued after an informal consultation with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. It was argued that this admission should be treated as a factual admission and therefore be binding on the respondent, especially because the respondent had not produced any order establishing a separate cadre for Public Relations Officers to refute the admission. The Court was unable to accept this line of argument. It was explained that an admission, while it may sometimes give rise to estoppel, does not amount to conclusive proof of the matter admitted. No question of estoppel was raised in the present case; at most, the respondent’s earlier admission that the Public Relations Officer post fell within the same grade shifted the burden onto the respondent to demonstrate that the statement made on 14 December 1953 was not accurate. The Court noted with regret that the High Court had dismissed the case summarily without requiring the respondent to file an affidavit or produce the necessary documents at that stage. The Court now possessed copies of a letter dated 15/28 December 1944, which created nine new posts of Liaison Officer (subsequently designated Public Relations Officer), and a letter dated 20 March 1950, which declared the cadre of Assistant Station Directors. These documents, already referenced, left little doubt that the Public Relations Officer posts did not belong to the same grade or cadre as the Assistant Station Director posts. This position was affirmed by the respondent in its memorandum of 9 June 1953, although a contradictory statement appeared on 14 December 1953. It was also submitted that even the impugned order of 7 September 1955 did not...

The respondent contended only that the appellant had been transferred irregularly to the post of Assistant Station Director and that he had been allowed irregularly to retain a quasi‑permanent status in that new post; the respondent did not admit that any mistake had been made. The Court, however, concluded that the order dated 7 September 1955 must be read in its entirety. When read as a whole, that order demonstrates that the Government had initially erred in assuming that the posts of Public Relations Officers were in the same grade or cadre as the posts of Assistant Station Directors, and that this error was corrected after the Union Public Service Commission pointed it out. The Court then set out to examine whether the order dated 14 December 1953 could be regarded as a separate or independent declaration in favour of the appellant regarding the post of Assistant Station Director under rules 3 and 4(a) of the Temporary Service Rules. Four aspects were considered: first, whether the language of the order itself permits it to be read as an independent declaration under the relevant rules; second, whether the authority that issued the order intended it to operate as such a declaration and whether the parties understood it in that manner; third, assuming it could be read as a declaration, whether consultation with the Public Service Commission was required under rule 4(b); and fourth, whether any estoppel arose from the order. The Court found the order to be clear and, when contrasted with the earlier order of 23 May 1952 – which expressly declared in favour of the appellant under rules 3 and 4 for the post of Public Relations Officer – it became evident that the 14 December 1953 order was not a declaration under those rules. The order expressly states that the appellant was appointed in a quasi‑permanent capacity to the post of Public Relations Officer; that all posts of Public Relations Officer were held in abeyance except one; that, because the Public Relations Officer post was of the same grade as Assistant Station Director with identical pay scales, the appellant was appointed Assistant Station Director in September 1952; and that, pursuant to instructions contained in a specific memorandum issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the appellant was entitled to retain the quasi‑permanent status of his former Public Relations Officer post while serving as Assistant Station Director. Accordingly, the order must be given the meaning expressed by its terms and applied according to its tenor, and, read as a whole without distorting its language, it does not constitute a declaration under rules 3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules but merely gives effect to the Home Ministry memorandum.

The memorandum issued by the Home Office, which is referred to in the order of 14 December 1953, stated that the appellant would retain the quasi‑permanent status of his former post while serving as Assistant Station Director. It is clear that a quasi‑permanent status cannot be declared for two posts that belong to different grades or cadres at the same time. The order dated 14 December 1953 makes it abundantly clear that the appellant continued to enjoy his quasi‑permanent status in the former post of Public Relations Officer and, based on the mistaken assumption that the post of Public Relations Officer was in the same grade as Assistant Station Director, he was permitted to carry the same status while occupying the new post. This conclusion is supported by a reference to Home Office memorandum No 54/136/51 N.G.S. dated 24 April 1952, a copy of which was placed before the Court. That memorandum observed, “A question has been raised whether a quasi‑permanent Government servant on transfer from one office to another should be allowed to retain a lien on the post to which he has been appointed in a quasi‑permanent capacity. A reference in this connection is invited to sub‑paragraph (c) of the Explanatory Memorandum of Rule 2 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, under which a government servant who is declared as quasi‑permanent in respect of a particular post can be shifted from one post to another within the cadre or grade concerned due to reduction or other causes without his rights being affected. In other words, if a quasi‑permanent employee is transferred from one office to another within the same grade, he will carry with him his quasi‑permanent status.” The order of 14 December 1953 was intended to give effect to the decision embodied in the aforesaid memorandum and was not, in any sense, an independent declaration under rules 3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules. If the order had been an independent declaration concerning a different and new post, reference to the Home Office memorandum would have been unnecessary; likewise, it would have been unnecessary to repeat that the appellant held a quasi‑permanent status in his former post and that the former post belonged to the same grade as the new post, thereby allowing him to carry his former status to the latter. The order itself contains no reference to rules 3 and 4 and stands in sharp contrast to the order dated 23 May 1952, which was in fact a declaration under those rules. To construe the order of 14 December 1953 as an independent declaration under rules 3 and 4 would run counter to the overall tenor of the document. It is noteworthy that rule 4(a) requires a declaration issued under rule 3 to specify the particular post or grade of posts within a cadre to which it applies and the date from which it is to take effect. The order, therefore, does not meet the requirements of an independent declaration under the Temporary Service Rules.

In this matter the Court observed that the order dated 14 December 1953 did not state that the appellant was declared to hold a quasi‑permanent status with respect to the post of Assistant Station Director; rather, the order indicated that the appellant would carry with him the quasi‑permanent status of his former post. The Court noted that, had the 14 December 1953 order been an independent declaration concerning the post of Assistant Station Director, it would have expressly identified that post and would have specified the date from which the declaration was to take effect. Consequently, the Court was satisfied that the terms of the 14 December 1953 order could not be treated as a declaration made under rules 3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules. The Court further recorded that counsel for the appellant had not pleaded that the 14 December 1953 order was an independent declaration under rules 3 and 4, nor had the appellant himself understood the order in that manner. Examination of the documents on record demonstrated that the order was never intended to operate as a declaration under those rules. Instead, the appellant regarded the order as giving effect to the office memorandum cited within it, and the central thrust of his case was that the post of Assistant Station Director belonged to the same grade as the post of Public Relations Officer. The appellant had been appointed to officiate as Assistant Station Director on a purely temporary basis until further orders on 13 September 1952. Even before that appointment, he had been invited to apply for the Assistant Station Director position through the Public Service Commission. On 9 June 1953, long after his appointment to officiate, the appellant was informed that he could not claim any protection in the Assistant Station Director post on the basis of his quasi‑permanent status as Public Relations Officer. Moreover, a letter dated 22 June 1954 from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to the Public Service Commission stated that the Commission had not been consulted when Shri Srinivasan’s quasi‑permanent status was shifted from the grade of Public Relations Officer to that of Assistant Station Director, invoking sub‑paragraph (c) of the Explanatory Memorandum to Rule 2 of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules. That provision permits the shifting of a quasi‑permanent officer within the same cadre or grade without affecting his rights, and because both posts carried the same grade of pay, consultation with the Commission was deemed unnecessary. The letter thus made it abundantly clear that the competent authority never intended the 14 December 1953 order to operate as a declaration under rules 3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules.

The Court observed that the order of 14 December 1953 was issued under rules 3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules, and that the appellant never treated that order as a separate declaration of quasi‑permanent status. In every written submission, the appellant maintained that the post of Public Relations Officer, in which he held a quasi‑permanent position, belonged to the same pay grade as the post of Assistant Station Director, and therefore his quasi‑permanent status simply followed him to the new post. He never alleged that the order dated 14 December 1953 was an independent declaration establishing his quasi‑permanent status in the Assistant Station Director post.

To illustrate this point, the Court referred first to paragraph 17 of the appellant’s writ petition filed in the Punjab High Court. In that paragraph the appellant stated that after four months of careful consideration and discussion among the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, the Home Ministry and the Union Public Service Commission, the Government issued an order on 14 December 1953 declaring that the petitioner would retain his quasi‑permanent status in the new post of Assistant Station Director in accordance with the rules governing the transfer of quasi‑permanent officers. Later, in paragraph 30, the appellant again emphasized that the two posts were constituted and recognised as being in the same grade, and under rule 2(c) of the Temporary Service Rules a shift from one post to another within the same grade did not affect his status. In other words, the appellant understood the December 1953 order not as a fresh declaration of quasi‑permanent status in the Assistant Station Director post, but merely as an implementation of rule 2(c) because, as he believed at the time, the two posts were of the same grade. He even expressed this view in his statement of the case, noting that the Government, in its order of 14 December 1953, reiterated his quasi‑permanent status in the Assistant Station Director post not on the basis of any representation he made, but on the authority of Home Ministry order No 54/136/51, dated 24 April 1952, relating to the lien of quasi‑permanent employees. The reference to the Home Ministry’s memorandum demonstrated how the appellant interpreted the December 1953 order.

The Court then examined rule 4(b) of the Temporary Service Rules, which provides that where recruitment to a specified post requires consultation with the Public Service Commission, no declaration under rules 3 and 4(a) shall be issued unless the Commission has been consulted. The Court held that, in the present case, it was unnecessary to decide whether the provisions of rule 4(b) are merely directory or mandatory. It was sufficient to note that the Public Service Commission had not been consulted before the issuance of the order dated 14 December 1953, and that the appointing authority did not intend that order to operate as a declaration under rules 3 and 4. Consequently, the order could not be construed as an independent affirmation of the appellant’s quasi‑permanent status in the new post.

In the earlier decision of the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, the Court had observed that the provisions of article 320 (3) (c) of the Constitution, which required consultation of the Public Service Commission in every disciplinary matter affecting a person serving the Government of India or a State Government, were not mandatory despite the use of the word “shall”. The Court based this conclusion on three considerations. First, the proviso to article 320 itself expressly indicated that there existed certain cases or classes of cases in which the Commission need not be consulted. Second, the requirement of consultation did not extend to making the Commission’s advice binding on the Government with respect to disciplinary matters. Third, when the article was properly construed, it did not create any enforceable right or privilege in favor of an individual public servant. The Court pointed out that none of these reasons applied to rule 4 (b) of the Temporary Service Rules. Although article 320 might not be compulsory as against the President, a subordinate appointing authority who was required to make a declaration under the Rules could not disregard or override the very Rules that governed the declaration. The quasi‑permanent status was a creation of the Rules, and rule 4 (b) expressly mandated that no declaration under rule 3 could be issued unless the Public Service Commission had been consulted when recruitment to a specified post was required to be made in consultation with the Commission. Consequently, an officer could not selectively enjoy the benefit of rule 3 while simultaneously refusing to be bound by the condition laid down in rule 4 (b); in other words, one could not accept the advantage of one part of the Rules and reject the obligations of another part. Regarding the question of estoppel, the Court held that the appellant had not been misled about his quasi‑permanent status, which he undeniably possessed in the post of Public Relations Officer. The error lay in his assumption that the post of Assistant Station Director belonged to the same grade as that of Public Relations Officer, and in the subsequent reliance on the Home Office memorandum on the basis of that mistaken belief. The Court therefore found that no issue of estoppel arose and, in fairness to the appellant’s counsel, observed that the appellant’s case was not founded upon the doctrine of estoppel. The appellant’s counsel had challenged the correctness of the Union Public Service Commission’s opinion and alleged that the Commission had issued an officious opinion, contending that under the Union Public Service Commission (Consultation) Regulations it was not necessary to consult the Commission. The Court’s attention was drawn to regulation 3 of those Regulations, which provided that consultation with the Commission was not required in respect of selection for appointment to certain categories of posts, the relevant portion of the regulation being quoted for this purpose.

The Court began by reciting Regulation 3 of the Union Public Service Commission (Consultation) Regulations, which provides that it is not necessary to consult the Commission in respect of selection for appointment to a Central Service, Class I, for any officer in the Armed Forces of the Union, or any officer already belonging to an All‑India Service, a Central Service, Class I, or a Railway Service, Class I; and that it is likewise unnecessary to consult the Commission for selection to a Central Service, Class II, where the candidate comes from another Central Service, Class I, or from a Central Service, Class II, or from the Armed Forces of the Union, or from a Railway Service, Class II. The regulation further contains a note stating that the term “officer” does not include a person in “temporary employment”. The Court then examined the correspondence placed before it from the Union Public Service Commission. That correspondence indicated that the Commission considered Regulation 3 not to apply to an officer who was in “temporary employment” as understood at the time the Regulations were framed, and that the expression “quasi‑permanent servant” as defined in the Temporary Service Rules also denoted temporary service, albeit with certain leave benefits and safeguards regarding termination.

The Court observed that it was not required to determine whether the Commission’s view on the applicability of the regulation was correct, especially since the Commission itself was not before the Court. It was sufficient to hold that the post of Assistant Station Director does not belong to the same grade or cadre as the post of Public Relations Officer. Consequently, the appellant did not enjoy a quasi‑permanent status in the post of Assistant Station Director, and his service could lawfully be terminated when the number of Public Relations Officer posts was reduced under clause (ii) of the relevant provision. The proviso to clause (ii) likewise did not extend to the post of Assistant Station Director.

On the basis of these findings, the Court concluded that there was no breach of the constitutional guarantee contained in Article 311(2) in the appellant’s case, and accordingly dismissed the appeal. Regarding the petition filed under Article 32, the Court found no discrimination as contemplated by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It noted that other individuals who, like the appellant, did not possess a quasi‑permanent status were subsequently appointed to the post of Assistant Station Director through selection by the Union Public Service Commission. While the Court expressed regret that the appellant was not chosen, it held that this circumstance did not amount to a violation of any fundamental right.

In its concluding remarks, the Court described the matter as a difficult case apart from any legal right considerations. It recorded that the appellant had served approximately nine years without any blemish, that his service was terminated due to the reduction of certain posts, and that he had been erroneously informed that he possessed a quasi‑permanent status in the post of Assistant Station Director.

The appellant argued that the Union Public Service Commission had not examined his suitability for the position of Assistant Station Director because he asserted that he possessed a quasi‑permanent status in that post. The documents exchanged with the Commission indicated that his case was not placed within the promotion quota of twenty percent, since, in the language of the Commission, his post was not “in the field for promotion.” If the appellant’s allegation is correct—that he was excluded from direct recruitment on the ground that he claimed quasi‑permanent status—then a clear injustice would appear to have occurred. In that circumstance the appellant would have been denied the opportunity to be considered under either the promotion quota or the direct recruitment quota. The Court therefore called upon the relevant authorities to give careful and sympathetic consideration to this aspect of the matter and to grant the appellant appropriate relief. Nevertheless, after making these observations, the Court dismissed both the appeal and the petition, while noting that, in the present circumstances, no order for costs would be issued.

Justice Bose expressed a respectful dissent from the majority view. He noted that the appellant’s employment as Public Relations Officer with All India Radio had been terminated because the post itself was abolished, and that there was no other vacancy of comparable rank or cadre to which he could be transferred; consequently, the appellant had no entitlement to continued service. However, Justice Bose pointed out that the appellant had been appointed to act as Assistant Station Director on a purely temporary basis, “until further orders,” by an order dated 13 September 1952 (Order No. 1 (101) 51/52). Subsequently, on 14 December 1953, the same authority issued further orders (Order No. (113)‑51/52) that confirmed the earlier appointment and expressly stated that, pursuant to the Ministry of Home Affairs Office Memorandum No. 54/136/51 NGS dated 24 April 1952, Shri Srinivasan would retain the quasi‑permanent status of his former post of Public Relations Officer while serving as Assistant Station Director. Justice Bose held that this later order unequivocally conferred a quasi‑permanent character on the new post. He acknowledged that the designation arose from a mistake later discovered, but he emphasized that an error committed by the Government should not be borne by the appellant. Citing the decision in The Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhan (1952) S.C.R. 135, he reiterated that public orders issued under statutory authority must be interpreted objectively, without resorting to subsequent explanations or the personal intent of the issuing officer.

In considering the order, the Court noted that the observations regarding the language employed in a public order were equally applicable to the present case. The individual concerned was a man who bore no responsibility for the adverse circumstances that arose. He had rendered faithful service in several capacities beginning on 1 May 1946. His employment was terminated on 3 September 1952, with the termination taking effect from 6 October 1952. Neither the individual nor the Government was at fault for this termination; it was merely a consequence of the circumstances of war, which led to the reduction of his post and the elimination of any vacancy for him. No reasonable party could dispute that fact. However, prior to the effective date of termination, the individual was retained in another position on 13 September 1952, appointed in a purely temporary capacity “until further orders.” Consequently, there was no interruption in his service, and he remained employed on 14 December 1953, when he was informed that he was now quasi‑permanent in the post of Assistant Station Director. He accepted this appointment, acted upon it, and continued to serve in that role for almost two years. This continuation, as recorded in the citation (1) [1952] S.C.R. 135, 140, inevitably reduced his prospects of obtaining alternative employment, because once a person reaches a certain age, securing new work becomes increasingly difficult. The Court did not attribute this difficulty to any fault on the part of the Government; it recognized that no one could be blamed for navigating a complex wilderness of rules, regulations, and technical terminology. Moreover, the Court observed that the Government had taken steps to mitigate the hardships of the unfortunate situation. Equally, the Court emphasized that the appellant himself bore no blame, and that, under a broad principle of equity, the party who is least at fault should not be allowed to suffer. The Court explained that the rigid, technical concepts of contract and equity of earlier periods have given way in modern times to a more just appreciation of fairness, and that the fusion of law and equity within a single jurisdiction has produced a new form of equity, particularly evident in England, which aligns with contemporary ideas of human needs and values. The Court referred to Lord Denning’s discussions in his work “The Changing Law,” where Denning illustrated how this new equity is evolving, remaining flexible and fluid in its aim to deliver genuine justice between individuals and between individuals and the State, rather than persisting with archaic, overly technical doctrines derived from a different era with divergent notions of human dignity and rights. In pages 54 and 55 of that book, Lord Denning summarized this modern orientation, stating that courts apply a doctrine of equity which prevents a person from enforcing strict legal rights when doing so would be inequitable, thereby prohibiting a party from reneging on a promise that was intended to be binding, was acted upon, and has consequently been fulfilled.

In the judgment the Court observed that a promise which was intended to be binding, intended to be acted on, and has in fact been acted on, must be respected. The Court clarified that it was not advocating a sudden or radical departure from settled doctrines and precedents, but it contended that the highest Court, as the final arbiter giving shape to the laws of the country, should apply those laws with a vision that reflects contemporary needs, much as the courts in England do. While the underlying principles of justice remain unchanged, the Court noted that the complexity of modern life demands a fresh outlook and a timely, vigorous adaptation of old principles to suit new conditions, ideas, and ideals. The Court acknowledged that courts do not legislate, yet it emphasized that through interpretation they inevitably mould and shape the law. This perspective framed the Court’s view of the position that should be taken when the facts are examined broadly and fairly, as a just jurist of common sense would do.

The factual matrix involved a government employee who had served for many years with an unblemished record and reputation. The employee faced the loss of his post, and the Government, recognizing the hardship, sought a means to rectify the situation, not because any legal fault existed, but out of sympathy for an individual forced to suffer through no fault of his own. The Government identified an alternative posting for him and actually transferred him to that new position. It further determined that the employee’s former post carried certain protections, which it intended to preserve in the new role. Relying on Rule 3 of the Temporary Service Rules, the Government declared the employee to be “quasi‑permanent” in the new post, a status for which he was fully eligible, having completed more than three years of continuous Government service. The appointing authority was satisfied with his qualifications, work, and character for employment in a quasi‑permanent capacity. Correspondence from the Government to the Union Public Service Commission, together with the orders dated 13 September 1952 and 14 December 1953, corroborated this assessment and would not have been issued had the Government not regarded him as a fit and proper person. Consequently, it could not be reasonably argued that the Government did not intend to confer a quasi‑permanent position on him merely because it expressed a desire for him to retain the same protections as before. The Court emphasized that the significance lies not in the literal wording but in the intended meaning, and while it did not at this stage examine whether the Government was correct in believing it could confer such status, the focus was on the clear intention of the Government to grant the employee the same status, pay, service conditions, and protections he previously enjoyed.

The Court observed that the Government had expressly declared that Shri Srinivasan “will carry with him the quasipermanent status of his former post of Public Relations Officer while holding the post of Assistant Station Director.” The Court noted that this language, when read together with the Government’s earlier conduct that showed a strong desire to treat the officer fairly, could be understood only to mean that the protection he enjoyed in his former post was intended to continue in the new post. The Court stated that it would be overly technical and erroneous to treat the declaration as conditional upon the Government possessing any specific power. What mattered, the Court said, was not whether the Government had the legal authority but what the Government intended to do, and the Court expressed absolute confidence that the intention was to give the officer the same status, pay, service conditions and protections he had previously enjoyed. The Court further rejected later Government interpretations of the order as irrelevant, emphasizing that the Government itself had viewed its action in the same light as the Court. In the Government’s reply to the Public Service Commission dated 22 June 1954, the Government admitted that the Commission had not been consulted at the time of shifting Shri Srinivasan’s quasipermanent status from the grade of Public Relations Officer to that of Assistant Station Director. The Court found this admission to confirm that the Government’s purpose was not merely to move the officer from one post to another but also to transfer the quasipermanent status to the new post, thereby intending that the officer retain that status in the Assistant Station Director position.

The Court then turned to the question of the Government’s power to make such a declaration. It agreed that, if the Government lacked the requisite power, its intention would be ineffective, regardless of how well‑meaning it might be. The Court pointed out that Rule 4(a) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, expressly confers on the Government the authority to issue a declaration specifying the particular post to which the quasipermanent status applies. The rule requires only a simple declaration and does not prescribe any special form of language or “magic incantation.” The Court identified the declaration in the order dated 14 December 1953 as satisfying this requirement. The remaining issue, the Court said, was whether Rule 4(b) rendered the declaration invalid because the Federal Public Service Commission had not been consulted. Rule 4(b) provides that no declaration shall be issued “except after consultation with the Commission” where recruitment to a specified post is required to be made in consultation with the Commission. The Court focused on the phrase “is required to be made” and indicated that the true meaning of those words was the point that needed clarification. The Court concluded that there was no doubt in its mind that the words must be given their ordinary meaning, and it signalled that its analysis of this phrase would continue in the following discussion.

In the ordinary sense, those words would be interpreted to convey precisely the meaning they express, just as the language of Article 320(3) of the Constitution appears equally emphatic and imperative. Nevertheless, this Court, while examining State of U P v Manbodhan Lal Srivastava (1), concluded after a careful review of the entire context that the words do not carry the literal effect they seem to possess and are to be regarded as merely directive rather than mandatory. The same view is not confined to this Court; the Federal Court adopted a similar approach in interpreting a comparable provision in Section 256 of the Government of India Act, 1935, in Biswanath Khemka v The King Emperor (2). The Privy Council likewise applied this reasoning in a Canadian case, Street Railway Company v Normandin (1) reported in [1958] S.C.R. 533 and [1945] F.C.R. 99, where the Lordships observed at page 175 that a statutory formality relating to the performance of a public duty should be treated as directory only when treating it as mandatory would cause serious general inconvenience or injustice. The Court now asks whether applying the principle would produce injustice in the present situation and whether it is appropriate to adopt a narrower interpretation of a simple set of rules than the broader approach taken by this Court, the Federal Court and the Privy Council in relation to constitutional provisions, legislative acts and even the statutes of a supreme Parliament. It questions why rules and regulations should be accorded greater sanctity and binding force than the Constitution itself, and why the Court should hesitate to dispense justice with firmness and vigor. Applying the same principle to Rule 4(b) would diminish the sting of the words “required to be made,” thereby opening the way for the Court to deliver the justice for which it exists. The Court observes that the Government appears to be tempering justice with mercy while the judiciary is likened to a demanding creditor seeking a pound of flesh, a reference to the “writ in the bond.” The Court declines to accept this approach. It perceives that an individual has been wronged and sees a straightforward remedy that it would pursue. The Court does not dispute the interpretation placed on these rules by the Public Service Commission; it acknowledges that the rules ought to be observed and are intended to be observed, and it is aware that constitutional sanctions exist for contravention of those rules. However, the Court notes that such sanctions are political rather than judicial, and an act performed in violation of them cannot be challenged in a court of law, rendering the act legally valid. Moreover, the Court holds that the fact the Government might not have acted had it recognised a constitutional directive to consult the Union Public Service Commission does not alter the nature of the act or its legal consequences; having possessed the authority and having exercised it, the Government’s action became binding despite any mistake.

The Court observed that a mistake had been made in the proceedings and that this error required correction in order to achieve a proper result. In explaining its approach, the Court stated that this was the manner in which it would interpret the applicable legal provisions and thereby administer justice in the case. To support its reasoning, the Court referred to an earlier authority that appeared in the 1917 All India Cases, reported at page 170, which dealt with a similar point of law. The Court further expressed that, considering the factual matrix before it, it would ordinarily have allowed both the appeal and the petition and would have directed that costs be awarded to the successful party. However, after completing its analysis of the submissions and the applicable law, the Court ultimately concluded that the appropriate disposition was to dismiss both the appeal and the petition. In addition, the Court determined that no order regarding the payment of costs would be made, meaning that each party would bear its own expenses. Accordingly, the final judgment recorded that the appeal and the petition were dismissed, without any further direction on the question of costs. The dismissal of the appeal and petition thus left the matters before the lower tribunal undisturbed and maintained the status quo.