K.S. Srinivasan vs Union Of India

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 18 February 1958

Coram: S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar

The judgment concerned the appeal of Shri K.S. Srinivasan, who had been appointed on May 1 1946 to the post of Liaison Officer with All India Radio at a salary of Rs 350 per month, the salary falling within the scale Rs 350-20-450-25/2-550. The appointment had been made on the recommendation of the Federal Public Service Commission, and the advertisement—referred to as a memorandum of information—issued by the Commission sought applications for nine vacancies for Listeners’ Research Officers and nine vacancies for Liaison Officers, All India Radio. The memorandum expressly described the positions as permanent and pensionable, but indicated that they would initially be filled on a temporary basis; it further explained that any person who was retained in service and confirmed in the post would become eligible for pension benefits and could also contribute to the General Provident Fund. At the outset, all appointments were made on a probationary period of six months, subject to termination under the conditions laid down in paragraph 4 of the memorandum, which need not be repeated here. Paragraph 5 of the memorandum set out the duties of a Liaison Officer, the principal duty being to organise and conduct publicity for the programmes and other activities of the radio station. Subsequent to the initial appointment, the designation of Liaison Officer was altered to Public Relations Officer, and together with the positions of Listener Research Officer and Assistant Station Director, the posts of Public Relations Officer were upgraded to the salary scale Rs 450-25-500-30-800, effective from 1 January 1947. On 23 May 1952, the Director General of All India Radio issued order No 2(1)A/50, stating that because the appellant had completed more than three years of continuous government service and a declaration had been issued to him in accordance with rules 3 and 4 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, and because an appointment to the post of Public Relations Officer required consultation with the Union Public Service Commission whose concurrence had been obtained, the appellant was appointed to the grade of Public Relations Officer in a quasi-permanent capacity, effective from 1 May 1949. However, on 3 September 1952 the appellant received another order from the Director-General indicating that his services would no longer be required after 6 October 1952. The appellant, taken by surprise by this notice, filed a representation on 8 September 1952 asserting that, as a quasi-permanent Public Relations Officer, he had a right to be placed in an alternative post of the same grade, provided that such a post was held by a government servant who was not in permanent or quasi-permanent service.

It was noted that the post in question was traditionally held by a Government servant who was neither a permanent nor a quasi-permanent employee. On 13 September 1952, the appellant received an order appointing him to officiate as Assistant Station Director, Madras; at that time he was serving as the Public Relations Officer of All India Radio, Madras, and the appointment was made in a purely temporary capacity pending any further orders. Subsequently, on 19 September 1952, the appellant was informed that his representation dated 8 September 1952 was under consideration and that, in the interim, he was advised to apply for any of the Assistant Station Director vacancies that had been advertised by the Union Public Service Commission. In response to this suggestion, the appellant filed a further representation on 4 October 1952, asserting that, under the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, he was entitled to remain in service occupying a post of the same grade and under the same appointing authority, and consequently it was unnecessary for him to be re-selected by the Union Public Service Commission for the Assistant Station Director position. In the concluding paragraph of that representation, the appellant expressed his willingness to follow the Director-General’s suggestion of 19 September 1952; he therefore enclosed an application to the Union Public Service Commission for the Assistant Station Director post and requested that, should the Director-General decide that he should formally apply, his application be transmitted to the Commission for consideration.

While the Government was examining the appellant’s representations, the Union Public Service Commission proceeded to interview candidates for the Assistant Station Director vacancies in March 1953, and the appellant appeared before the Commission on 26 March 1953. On 18 April 1953, the appellant was notified that the Commission had not selected him and that, as a result, it was not possible to continue his service in the present capacity. Reacting to this notice, the appellant made fresh representations arguing that the order terminating his service on the ground of non-selection by the Commission was illegal, because his quasi-permanent status entitled him to occupy a post in the Assistant Station Director grade so long as a person who was not a permanent or quasi-permanent servant continued to hold such a post. The Government’s reply to these representations indicated that the post of Public Relations Officer held by the appellant had been kept in abeyance, rendering it impossible to retain him in that position; consequently, the appellant was given an opportunity to show cause why his service should not be terminated at the expiry of the notice period effective 18 July 1953, and he was required to submit a reply within fifteen days. In his reply, the appellant reiterated that, by virtue of his quasi-permanent status, he was entitled to remain in service under the rules governing Government servants who enjoy such a status.

The appellant maintained that, according to the rule governing Government servants who enjoy quasi-permanent status, he was entitled to remain in service and that any termination of his employment would breach Article 311 of the Constitution. He received a memorandum on 3 July 1953 which was dated 9 June 1953. The memorandum recorded that the Government had examined his representation and concluded that the posts of Public Relations Officer formed a distinct cadre and did not belong to the cadre of Assistant Station Directors. Accordingly, the memorandum stated that the appellant could not rely on his quasi-permanent status as a Public Relations Officer to claim protection in the post of Assistant Station Director and that he should be informed of this conclusion. Subsequently, on 10 July 1953 the appellant filed another representation, this time addressed to the Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs. In that representation he reiterated the objections raised earlier and contended that the proposed termination of his service was irregular, unjust and illegal. He argued that the order terminating his service contravened Article 311 of the Constitution and further submitted that, although the two posts were not placed in the same cadre, there could be no dispute that they were in the same grade. On 17 August 1953 the appellant received a further memorandum informing him that the notice of termination dated 18 April 1953, together with the amendments issued on 12 May 1953 and 3 July 1953, had been withdrawn. The same memorandum also indicated that the show-cause notice dated 26 May 1953, which had required the appellant to explain why his service should not be terminated, was cancelled. These developments were followed by an order dated 14 December 1953, an order that the appellant argued had significant relevance to the matters before the Court and which needed to be reproduced in full.

The order of 14 December 1953 was issued by the Director-General of All India Radio and began with the reference “S. No. 41(R) Government of India, Director General, All India Radio, No. 1(113)-SI/52, New Delhi, the 14th December, 1953”. It stated that, in Directorate Order No. 2(1)-A/50 dated 23 May 1952, Shri K.S. Srinivasan, who was then officiating as Public Relations Officer, All India Radio, had been appointed to that post in a quasi-permanent capacity effective from 1 May 1949. The order went on to note that in August 1952 all posts of Public Relations Officers, except the one in the External Services Division, were placed in abeyance. Because the post of Public Relations Officer was in the same grade as that of Assistant Station Director and carried identical pay scales, the order recorded that Shri Srinivasan was appointed Assistant Station Director in the External Services Division with effect from 22 September 1952. Further, the order incorporated the provision of Ministry of Home Affairs Office Memorandum No. 54/136/51-NGS dated 24 April 1952, which provided that Shri Srinivasan would retain the quasi-permanent status of his former post as Public Relations Officer while serving as Assistant Station Director. The order was signed by M. Lal, Director-General. A copy of this order was also forwarded to the Secretary of the Union Public Service Commission. Despite the issuance of this order, the appellant soon discovered that his difficulties did not cease with the order dated 14 December 1953.

On 31 August 1955 the appellant was notified by the Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting that the Union Public Service Commission had protested his appointment as Assistant Station Director, holding that the appointment violated the applicable regulations; the notification further directed him either to vacate the Assistant Station Director post and accept a temporary posting as Assistant Information Officer in the Press Information Bureau, or, alternatively, to leave the service. The temporary post that was offered to the appellant carried a salary scale of Rs 350-25-500-30-620, which was lower than the scale applicable to an Assistant Station Director. Because this offer stripped the appellant of the quasi-permanent status he previously enjoyed and also represented a demotion in rank, he promptly filed fresh representations with the Home Ministry, the Director-General, and the Minister for Information and Broadcasting. Subsequently, on 7 September 1955 the appellant received the final order of the Government, which formed the basis of the present appeal. The order declared that Shri Srinivasan had been declared quasi-permanent in the grade of Public Relations Officer, All India Radio, with a salary scale of Rs 450-25-500-EB-30-800, effective from 1 May 1949. It further explained that in 1952 all Public Relations Officer posts, except the one in the External Services Division, had been placed in abeyance as an economy measure, and that the sole surviving post had been assigned to the permanent incumbent. The order observed that Shri Srinivasan would have had to be retrenched in 1952 because quasi-permanency does not protect an employee from retrenchment, and that there was no other officer in the Public Relations Officer grade who was non-quasi-permanent and could have been discharged in his place. He had been irregularly transferred to the position of Assistant Station Director in an officiating capacity and had applied for a regular Assistant Station Director position when the Union Public Service Commission advertised the post in 1953, but his application had been rejected. Nevertheless, he was permitted to retain, irregularly, his quasi-permanent status in the Public Relations Officer grade while continuing to serve as Assistant Station Director, pursuant to Directorate General, All India Radio’s order No 1(113)SI/52 dated 14 December 1953. The Union Public Service Commission, however, had not accepted this transfer, finding it to be contrary to the Union Public Service Commission (Consultation) Regulations. In view of the rejection of his application for the Assistant Station Director post in an open selection and the non-acceptance of his transfer by the Commission, the Government of India expressed regret that it could not allow him to remain in the Assistant Station Director post and required him to relinquish that charge immediately. To spare him the hardship of retrenchment, the Government considered offering alternative employment, but indicated that there was no intention to revive the Public Relations Officer posts that had been placed in abeyance in 1952; for the publicity and public relations work of All India Radio, a few

The Government had sanctioned several posts of Assistant Information Officer in the Pay scale numbered Rs. 350-25-500-EB-30-620 within the strength of the Press Information Bureau and it was proposed that the appellant be temporarily absorbed into one of those posts. This temporary absorption was to be made subject to the approval of the Union Public Service Commission, to which a reference had been sent. During the period in which the appellant was required to vacate the post of Assistant Station Director, he was instructed to relinquish charge of that post and to report for duty to the Principal Information Officer of the Press Information Bureau located in New Delhi. The fixation of his salary in the grade of Assistant Information Officer, with the purpose of protecting his present salary, was to be considered only after he had joined the new post. The appellant persisted in making further representations, but those representations were rejected. Consequently, on 11 October 1955 an order was issued transferring him to the Press Information Bureau as an officiating Assistant Information Officer, effective immediately. The same order directed him to hand over charge of the Assistant Station Director position at once and to assume his duties in the Press Information Bureau without delay. The validity of this October order was challenged in the present appeal, and the Court noted that its validity depended upon the earlier order dated 7 September 1955. The appellant refused to accept the lower post of Assistant Information Officer and, on 19 October 1955, handed over charge of his previous post under protest. On 25 November 1955 he filed Writ Petition 209-D of 1955 in the Punjab High Court, seeking a writ of certiorari or any appropriate writ to set aside the orders of 7 September 1955 and 11 October 1955, and requesting his reinstatement as Assistant Station Director in the External Services Division of All India Radio, the position he held when the impugned orders were made. The Punjab High Court dismissed the petition summarily on the same day. The appellant then applied to that Court for a certification of leave to appeal to this Court, but the application was dismissed on 16 March 1956. Subsequently, the appellant sought special leave to appeal to this Court and was granted such leave on 23 April 1956. While moving the special leave application, counsel for the appellant stated that, without prejudice to the parties’ contentions, the appellant would occupy the post of Assistant Information Officer in the Press Information Bureau pending resolution of the appeal. On 22 April 1956 the appellant also filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the order of 7 September 1955 on the ground that it violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Court clarified that the present judgment would govern both the appeal by special leave and the petition under Article 32, and that it would be convenient to consider the appeal first.

In the appeal, the Court first examined whether the orders that were challenged violated the constitutional guarantee set out in Article 311, which protects a person who holds a civil post under the Union. The Court noted that the precise meaning and effect of Article 311 had been examined in detail in a recent decision of this Court, Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India [1958] S.C.R. 828, pronounced on 1 November 1957. The Court reproduced the relevant observations of the majority, stating: “Shortly put, the principle is that when a servant has a right to a post or to a rank either under the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, or under the rules governing the conditions of his service, the termination of the service of such a servant or his reduction to a lower post is by itself and prima facie a punishment, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right to hold that post or that rank and to get the emoluments and other benefits attached thereto. But if the servant has no right to the post, as where he is appointed to a post, permanent or temporary, either on probation or on an officiating basis and whose temporary service has not ripened into a quasi-permanent service as defined in the Temporary Service Rules, his termination of employment does not deprive him of any right and cannot, therefore, be a punishment. One test for determining whether the termination of the service of a government servant is by way of punishment is to ascertain whether the servant, but for such termination, had the right to hold the post. If he had a right to the post as in the three cases hereinbefore mentioned, the termination of his service will by itself be a punishment and he will be entitled to the protection of Article 311. In other words and broadly speaking, Article 311(2) will apply to those cases where the government servant, had he been employed by a private employer, would be entitled to maintain an action for wrongful dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. To put it in another way, if the government has, by contract, express or implied, or, under the rules, the right to terminate the employment at any time, then such termination in the manner provided by the contract or the rules is, prima facie and per se, not a punishment and does not attract the provisions of Article 311.”

The Court then identified the decisive issue as whether the appellant possessed a legally enforceable right to the position of Assistant Station Director that he held at the time the contested orders were issued. The Court observed that, if the appellant did have such a right, the orders would inevitably be invalid because they removed him from that post and demoted him to a lower position, thereby depriving him of a right that the Constitution safeguards. Conversely, if the appellant lacked a right to the post and the rules governing his service allowed his termination, the protection of Article 311 would not apply. The Court therefore framed the question in terms of the appellant’s entitlement to the post under the applicable service rules and the consequent effect of the orders on that entitlement.

It was observed that no disciplinary proceeding had been instituted against the appellant and that he had not been afforded any opportunity to show cause against any such action. The appellant argued that, according to the Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, he possessed a quasi-permanent status in the post of Public Relations Officer, the position to which he had originally been appointed, and that this status had been carried over to the later appointment as Assistant Station Director. Consequently, the appellant contended that he enjoyed a right to remain in his post that could not be taken away except in accordance with the provisions of those rules, and that the orders under challenge violated those provisions. In addition, the appellant submitted that the Union Public Service Commission had failed to grasp the correct legal position and that its opinion, whether officious or otherwise, was neither decisive nor binding upon the Government or upon the appellant himself.

The Union of India, appearing as the respondent, conceded that the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 governed the conditions of the appellant’s service. However, the respondent maintained that the impugned orders were consistent with the said rules. It was argued that, because the appellant was in quasi-permanent service as a Public Relations Officer, his service could be terminated under rule 6(1)(ii) for two reasons: first, there had been a reduction in the number of Public Relations Officer posts available to Government servants who were not in permanent service; and second, the post of Assistant Station Director to which the appellant had been appointed was a purely temporary posting and did not belong to the same grade as the specified post that would allow him to invoke the proviso to rule 6(1)(ii). The respondent further asserted that the order dated 14 December 1953 had been issued on a mistaken understanding, and that after the Union Public Service Commission correctly clarified the position, the Government issued the order of 7 September 1955. To mitigate the appellant’s hardship and avoid immediate unemployment, the Government offered him the post of Assistant Information Officer, a newly created post intended to perform duties similar to those of the former Public Relations Officer. At this stage, the Court noted that it must examine the relevant provisions of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949—hereinafter referred to as the Temporary Service Rules. It pointed out that Rule 2 defines several terms employed in those rules, and that the terms “quasi-permanent service” and “specified post” are particularly material to the issues before the Court.

In the present case the Court examined the definitions contained in the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, which are referred to as the Temporary Service Rules. Rule 2 provides the meanings of two important expressions. The expression “quasi-permanent service” is defined as the period beginning on the date on which a declaration made under Rule 3 becomes effective and continues through periods of duty and ordinary leave, but it excludes any extraordinary leave taken after that date. The expression “specified post” is defined as the particular post, or the particular grade of posts within a cadre, for which a Government servant is declared to be in quasi-permanent service under Rule 3. The Court then turned to Rule 3, which it read in its entirety. Rule 3 states that a Government servant shall be deemed to be in quasi-permanent service if (i) the servant has been in continuous Government service for more than three years, and (ii) the appointing authority, being satisfied with the servant’s suitability as to age, qualifications, work and character for employment in a quasi-permanent capacity, has issued a declaration to that effect in accordance with such instructions as the Governor-General may from time to time issue. The Court also reproduced Rules 4 and 6(1) in full because they are material to the matter before it. Rule 4(a) requires that a declaration issued under Rule 3 must specify the particular post or the particular grade of posts within a cadre to which it relates and must state the date from which the declaration takes effect. Rule 4(b) adds that where recruitment to a specified post must be made in consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission, no declaration shall be issued except after such consultation. Rule 6(1) provides that the service of a Government servant in quasi-permanent service shall be liable to termination (i) in the same circumstances and in the same manner as a Government servant in permanent service, or (ii) when the appointing authority certifies that a reduction has occurred in the number of posts available for Government servants not in permanent service. However, the rule further provides that termination under clause (ii) shall not apply so long as any post of the same grade and under the same appointing authority as the specified post held by the servant continues to be held by a Government servant who is not in permanent or quasi-permanent service. The rule also adds that, among Government servants in quasi-permanent service whose specified posts are of the same grade and under the same appointing authority, termination due to reduction of posts shall ordinarily be effected in order of junior-seniority as set out in Rule 7. Since Rule 6(1) refers to Rule 7, the Court also reproduced Rule 7(1). Rule 7(1) states that, subject to the provisions of that rule, a Government servant for whom a declaration has been made under Rule 3 shall be eligible for a permanent appointment when a vacancy arises in the specified posts that may be reserved for filling from among persons in quasi-permanent service, in accordance with such instructions as the Governor-General may from time to time issue. Finally, the Court noted the explanatory statement that no such declaration confers upon any person a right to claim a permanent appointment to any post.

The Court explained that every appointing authority was required, from time to time, to consult the appropriate Departmental Promotions Committee and to prepare a precedence-ordered list of persons who were serving in quasi-permanent posts and who were therefore eligible for a permanent appointment. While preparing such a list, the appointing authority had to take into account both the seniority of the government servants concerned and their merit. The Court further noted that all permanent appointments that were reserved under sub-rule (1) and fell within the jurisdiction of any such appointing authority had to be made according to the order set out in that list, although the Government retained the power to issue an order directing that permanent appointments to any grade or post could be made solely on the basis of seniority. The Court then turned to the factual background of the present case. It observed that it was undisputed and even admitted that the appellant occupied a quasi-permanent position in the grade of posts referred to as Public Relations Officers. The order dated 23 May 1952 expressly declared that (i) a declaration had been issued with respect to the appellant under rules 3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules, (ii) the Union Public Service Commission had given its concurrence, and (iii) the grade of posts for which the appellant held quasi-permanent status was the Public Relations Officers’ grade. Under rule 4, a declaration made under rule 3 was required to specify the particular post or the particular grades of posts within a cadre to which it applied and to state the date from which it became effective. The Court clarified that a “cadre”, as defined by Fundamental Rule 9(4), meant the strength of a service or a part of a service that had been sanctioned as a separate unit. To illuminate the meaning of “grade”, the Court referred to article 29 of the Civil Service Regulations, which explained that appointments were said to be in the same “class” when they were in the same department, bore the same designation, or had been declared by the Government of India to be in the same class; within a class, appointments might be further divided into “grades” according to pay, but such classifications existed only if they had been constituted or recognised by proper authority, and there were no classes or grades for ministerial officers. From this, the Court concluded that the posts identified as Public Relations Officers in All India Radio formed a distinct grade, and that the appellant held a quasi-permanent status within that grade. The Court then examined Rule 6(1) of the Temporary Service Rules, which set out the manner in which the service of a government servant in quasi-permanent service could be terminated. The specific clause under consideration was clause (ii), which provided that such service could be terminated when the appointing authority concerned certified that a reduction had occurred in the number of posts available for government servants who were not in permanent service. The appellant’s counsel strongly argued that no such reduction, as contemplated by the clause, had taken place in the present circumstances, and that no certification of reduction had been made.

Learned counsel for the appellant contended that, in the facts of the present case, no reduction as contemplated by clause (ii) had occurred, and that consequently there was no certification of any such reduction. Learned counsel for the respondent, with equal force, argued that a reduction within the meaning of the clause did in fact take place and that the appointing authority had duly certified that reduction. Before examining the precise scope and effect of clause (ii), the Court found it necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Temporary Service Rules and the explanatory memorandum that accompanied those rules when they were issued. The memorandum explained that the term “quasi-permanent” service was introduced to attach certain benefits to employees serving in that capacity. Regarding Rule 4(a), the memorandum stated that a government servant must be declared quasi-permanent with respect to a particular post, which could be a single isolated post or a post within a larger cadre comprising several posts. If a cadre is divided into several grades, the post may belong to any one of those grades. A servant declared quasi-permanent may be shifted from one post to another within the same cadre or grade when a reduction in posts or other causes arise, and such shifting does not prejudice his rights. Concerning Rule 6(1), the memorandum clarified that this rule deals with the security of tenure of a quasi-permanent government servant. It emphasized that, except where there is a reduction in the number of posts in the relevant cadre or grade, termination of a quasi-permanent servant’s service must follow the same procedure applicable to a permanent servant, including the necessity of formal proceedings for causes such as indiscipline or inefficiency. The memorandum further noted that a quasi-permanent servant enjoys a superior right of retention in service over purely temporary employees within the grade in which he is declared quasi-permanent.

The matter that required resolution was whether the order dated 7 September 1955 complied with the requirements of Rule 6(1), a question that involved two distinct inquiries: first, the true scope and effect of clause (ii) of Rule 6(1), and second, the impact of the proviso attached to that clause. The Court first examined clause (ii) to determine whether a reduction, as defined by that provision, had occurred in the present circumstances. The Court concluded affirmatively that a reduction did exist. The order dated 14 December 1953, which had been issued in favour of the appellant, expressly recorded that in August 1952 all the posts of Public Relations Officers, except the one in the External Services Division, were placed in abeyance. The impugned order of 7 September 1955 reiterated that in 1952 all the posts of Public Relations Officers, other than the sole post in the External Services Division, were held in abeyance as a measure of economy. This factual finding demonstrated that the number of available posts for government servants who were not in permanent service had been reduced, thereby satisfying the condition stipulated in clause (ii) and supporting the respondent’s claim that the appointing authority had certified such a reduction.

In the order dated September 7 1955, the sole post that survived the economy drive was allotted to a permanent incumbent. The appellant, in a representation submitted on July 10 1953, acknowledged that, pursuant to a memorandum issued by the Director-General of All India Radio on May 21 1953, he had been informed that “it was decided to keep the post in abeyance.” Counsel for the appellant attempted to draw a distinction between the expression “keeping a post in abeyance” and the term “reducing a post.” The counsel suggested that “reducing a post” implied an abolition, either permanent or temporary, whereas “keeping a post in abeyance” merely denoted the decision not to fill the post for the time being. The Court observed that words and phrases acquire their meaning from the context in which they appear. In clause (ii) the expression employed is “reduction… in the number of posts available for Government servants not in permanent service.” Counsel for the respondent correctly emphasized that the entire clause must be read to understand the meaning of “reduction,” and that within that context the term is not limited to abolition, permanent or otherwise. To illustrate the point, the respondent’s counsel proposed a scenario: when a permanent holder of a post goes on deputation, the post becomes available for temporary or quasi-permanent officers; upon the permanent officer’s return, a reduction occurs in the number of posts available to those temporary or quasi-permanent officers. The Court agreed with this interpretation, holding that the word “reduction” in clause (ii) is not confined to abolition and that keeping certain posts in abeyance falls within the scope of the expression. Moreover, the September 7 1955 order explicitly stated that the Government had no intention of reviving the Public Relations Officer posts that had been kept in abeyance since 1952; consequently, for all practical purposes those posts had been abolished. The Court found no special significance in the word “certifies” that appears in clause (ii). It was clear that the appellant had been informed, as early as May 1953, by a memorandum from the appointing authority that the post he occupied would be kept in abeyance. Nothing in the clause prevents the appointing authority from effecting such certification through a memorandum rather than a formal order. The discussion then turned to the more important question concerning the effect of the proviso to clause (ii). The pivotal issue was whether the post of Assistant Station Director, to which the appellant had been appointed on a purely temporary basis on September 13 1952, lay within the same grade or cadre as the Public Relations Officer posts. If it were in the same grade or cadre, the appellant would retain his quasi-permanent status and the shift, as described in the explanatory memorandum quoted earlier, would not affect his rights. This point gave the Court considerable anxiety, and after a very careful

In reaching a decision on the question of whether the post of Assistant Station Director belonged to the same grade or cadre as the posts of Public Relations Officers, the Court carefully examined the historical reorganisation of All India Radio. The reorganisation, set out in a letter numbered K-404/2397 and dated 15/28 December 1944 and issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, was divided into three parts: (i) a revision of the pay scales of certain existing posts; (ii) the creation of some additional posts; and (iii) the creation of new categories of posts. Under the third category the posts of Liaison Officer and Listeners’ Research Officer were created, nine posts being established under each heading, whereas the posts of Assistant Station Director were placed within the first two categories. Subsequently, on 20 March 1950, the Government issued a declaration concerning the cadres on the programme side of All India Radio, recorded in letter No. 17(83)/49-BI. That declaration enumerated the cadre of Assistant Station Directors, which comprised the following posts: Assistant Station Directors; Instructor (Programmes); Assistant Director of Programmes; Listener Research Officer; Officer on Special Duty (Kashmir); and Officer on Special Duty (Hyderabad), the last two being temporary appointments. Notably, the post of Public Relations Officer was not included in this cadre. The same arrangement is reflected in paragraph 129 of Chapter IV, Section 1 of the All India Radio Manual, Volume I, which limits the cadre of Assistant Station Directors to four specific categories of posts and expressly excludes Public Relations Officers. The Court then referred to Fundamental Rule 9(31)(c), which defines a “post on the same time-scale as another post” as one where the two time-scales are identical and the posts fall within the same cadre or class in a cadre that was created to accommodate posts of approximately the same character or degree of responsibility. Accordingly, two conditions must be satisfied: the time-scales must be identical and the posts must belong to the same cadre or class. Paragraph 129 makes clear that only the four categories mentioned earlier fall within the Assistant Station Directors cadre, and Public Relations Officers are not among them. Counsel for the appellant highlighted Appendix 1 of the All India Radio Manual, Volume II, which lists the scales of pay and classification of posts, showing that Assistant Station Directors (post no. 77), Listener Research Officer (post no. 78) and Public Relations Officer (post no. 79) all appear under Central Services, Class II, share the same pay scale and are situated on the programme side. While the Court acknowledged that these posts indeed share the same scale of pay, it reiterated that the equality of pay alone does not satisfy the dual requirements of Fundamental Rule 9(31)(c). Consequently, the Court concluded that the post of Assistant Station Director is not in the same grade or cadre as the posts of Public Relations Officers.

The Court observed that the mere fact that the posts mentioned all fall within Class II and share the same pay scale does not, by itself, decide whether they belong to the same grade or cadre. Reference was made to the 1950 constitution of the cadre of Assistant Station Directors, which plainly shows that Public Relations Officers are not part of that cadre. The Court warned that relying solely on pay scale or service classification would produce many anomalous outcomes. For example, the appendix cited by counsel for the appellant indicates that the post of Assistant Director of Monitoring Services also carries the same pay scale and belongs to Class II, yet there is no suggestion that this post shares any cadre or grade relationship with the Assistant Station Directors. Similarly, a chemist (post 106) and an Assistant Engineer (post 105) both draw the same pay and are classified in Class II, but they do not belong to the same grade or cadre; otherwise a chemist holding a quasi-permanent status could be appointed as an Engineer simply because the chemist’s post was reduced, which would be illogical. The appellant further argued that an order dated 14 December 1953 clearly admitted that the post of Public Relations Officer belonged to the same grade as that of Assistant Station Director, and that the order was issued after an informal consultation with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The appellant contended that this admission should be taken as a factual admission binding on the respondent, especially because the respondent had not produced any order establishing a separate cadre for Public Relations Officers to challenge the admission’s correctness. The Court rejected this line of argument. While an admission may, in certain circumstances, give rise to estoppel, it is not conclusive proof of the matter admitted, and the Court saw no basis to raise an estoppel issue in the present case. At most, the Court noted that once the respondent had admitted that the Public Relations Officer post belonged to the same grade, the burden shifted to the respondent to prove that the statement made on 14 December 1953 was not factual. The Court expressed regret that the High Court had dismissed the case summarily without calling the respondent to make an affidavit or produce the necessary documents at that stage. The Court now possessed a copy of a letter dated 15 December 1944 (also dated 28 December 1944) creating nine new Liaison Officer posts, later redesignated as Public Relations Officer posts, and a letter dated 20 March 1950 declaring the cadre of Assistant Station Directors. These letters had already been referenced by the Court.

In this case, the Court observed that the documentary material presented left little doubt that the posts of Public Relations Officer and Assistant Station Director were not part of the same grade or cadre. The Court noted that the respondent itself acknowledged this distinction in the memorandum dated 9 June 1953, although a contrary statement was later made on 14 December 1953. The Court further recorded that, even in the contested order dated 7 September 1955, the respondent did not admit any error; rather, it merely described the appellant’s transfer to the post of Assistant Station Director as irregular and said that the appellant was allowed to retain a quasi-permanent status in the new post. Upon reading the September 1955 order as a whole, the Court concluded that it disclosed that the Government had initially erred in assuming that the Public Relations Officer posts were in the same grade as the Assistant Station Director posts, and that this mistake was corrected after the Union Public Service Commission highlighted it.

The Court then turned to the question of whether the order of 24 December 1953 could be regarded as an independent declaration in favour of the appellant with respect to the Assistant Station Director post under rules 3 and 4(a) of the Temporary Service Rules. The Court examined this issue from four perspectives. First, the Court asked whether the language of the order itself supported a reading as an independent declaration under the relevant rules. Second, it considered whether the authority that issued the order intended such a declaration and whether the parties understood it that way. Third, the Court evaluated whether, if the order were an independent declaration, consultation with the Public Service Commission was required under rule 4(b). Fourth, the Court contemplated whether any estoppel could arise from the order.

Analyzing the order, the Court found it to be clear and distinguishable from the earlier order of 23 May 1952, which had expressly declared a position in favour of the appellant under rules 3 and 4 concerning a Public Relations Officer post. The Court held that the December 1953 order was not a declaration under those rules. The order stated, first, that the appellant had been appointed in a quasi-permanent capacity to the post of Public Relations Officer; second, that all Public Relations Officer posts were held in abeyance except one; third, that because the Public Relations Officer post was said to belong to the same grade as the Assistant Station Director post with identical pay scales, the appellant was appointed as Assistant Station Director in September 1952; and fourth, that, pursuant to instructions in a specific office memorandum issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the appellant was entitled to retain the quasi-permanent status of his former post while serving as Assistant Station Director. The Court concluded that the order, when read in its entirety and without straining its language, operated solely to give effect to the Home Office memorandum and did not constitute a separate declaration under rules 3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules.

According to the order issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the appellant was permitted to retain the quasi-permanent status of his former post of Public Relations Officer while he occupied the position of Assistant Station Director. The Court observed that the order must be given effect according to the plain meaning of its terms and that, when read as a whole, it did not constitute a declaration under rules three and four of the Temporary Service Rules. Instead, the order simply implemented the instructions contained in the Home Office memorandum that had been referred to in the order and it expressly stated that the appellant would carry his quasi-permanent status from his former post into his new appointment as Assistant Station Director.

The Court further explained that it was impossible for a quasi-permanent status to be declared simultaneously for two posts that belonged to different grades or different cadres. The order dated 14 December 1953 therefore made it clear that the appellant retained his quasi-permanent status in the former post of Public Relations Officer and, based on the mistaken belief that the post of Public Relations Officer was in the same grade as that of Assistant Station Director, he was allowed to enjoy the same status while holding the latter post. This conclusion was supported by a reference to Home Office memorandum number 54/136/51 N.G.S., dated 24 April 1952, a copy of which had been placed before the Court. That memorandum addressed the question of whether a quasi-permanent government servant transferred from one office to another should be permitted to retain a lien on the post to which he had been appointed in a quasi-permanent capacity. The memorandum directed attention to sub-paragraph (c) of the Explanatory Memorandum of Rule 2 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, which provides that a government servant declared quasi-permanent in respect of a particular post may be shifted within the same cadre or grade without his rights being affected. In other words, if a quasi-permanent employee is transferred within the same grade, he carries his quasi-permanent status with him.

The Court noted that the order of 14 December 1953 was intended to give effect to the decision embodied in the aforementioned memorandum and was not an independent declaration pursuant to rules three and four of the Temporary Service Rules. Had the order been an independent declaration concerning a different and new post, the reference to the Home Office memorandum would have been unnecessary, as would have been the recitation that the appellant possessed a quasi-permanent status in his former post and that the former post belonged to the same grade as the new post, thereby allowing him to carry his status to the latter. Moreover, the order itself made no mention of rules three and four, which distinguished it sharply from the earlier order dated 23 May 1952, an order that was in fact a declaration made under those rules.

In this case the Court observed that to hold the order dated 14 December 1953 to be an independent declaration under rules 3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules would contradict the overall tenor of the document. The Court noted that rule 4(a) required a declaration issued under rule 3 to specify the particular post or the particular grade of posts within a cadre to which it applied, and also to state the date from which it would take effect. The order of 14 December 1953 did not declare that the appellant was to hold a quasi-permanent status with respect to the post of Assistant Station Director; rather, it said that he would carry with him the quasi-permanent status he enjoyed in his former post. The Court explained that if the order had been an independent declaration concerning the Assistant Station Director position, it would necessarily have identified that post and the effective date of the declaration. Consequently, the Court was satisfied that, on its terms, the order of 14 December 1953 could not be treated as a declaration under rules 3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules.

The Court further noted that counsel for the appellant had not argued that the order of 14 December 1953 was an independent declaration under rules 3 and 4, nor had the appellant himself understood the order in that sense. The record showed that the order was never intended to function as a declaration under those rules. The appellant’s case was premised on the contention that the post of Assistant Station Director lay in the same grade as the post of Public Relations Officer, and that his quasi-permanent status from the latter post therefore continued in the former. The appellant had initially been appointed to act as Assistant Station Director on a purely temporary basis on 13 September 1952, pending further orders. Even before that date, he had been instructed to apply for the Assistant Station Director position through the Public Service Commission. On 9 June 1953, well after his temporary appointment, he was informed that he could not invoke any protection in the Assistant Station Director post on the basis of his quasi-permanent status as Public Relations Officer. Moreover, a letter dated 22 June 1954 from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to the Public Service Commission stated that the Commission had not been consulted at the time of shifting the appellant’s quasi-permanent status from the grade of Public Relations Officer to that of Assistant Station Director, relying on sub-paragraph (c) of the Explanatory Memorandum of Rule 2 of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, which permits shifting of quasi-permanent status within the same grade without affecting the servant’s rights. This correspondence made it abundantly clear that the appropriate authority never intended the 14 December 1953 order to be a declaration under rules 3 and 4.

The letter explained that a person holding a quasi-permanent status in a particular post may be moved to another post within the same cadre or grade when the number of posts is reduced or for other reasons, and that such a shift does not affect the person’s rights. Because the posts of Assistant Station Director and Public Relations Officer were both in the same pay grade, the letter said that it was not necessary to consult the Public Service Commission in this case. The correspondence therefore made clear that the authority issuing the order dated 14 December 1953 never intended that order to be a declaration under rules three and four of the Temporary Service Rules.

The appellant himself did not regard the order in that way. In all of his submissions he argued that he held a quasi-permanent status as Public Relations Officer, that this post was in the same grade as the post of Assistant Station Director, and that therefore his quasi-permanent status should simply have been carried over to the new post. He never claimed that the order of 14 December 1953 was an independent declaration establishing his status in the post of Assistant Station Director. The Court referred first to paragraph 17 of the appellant’s writ petition before the Punjab High Court, where the appellant wrote that after four months of careful consideration and discussion among the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, the Home Ministry and the Union Public Service Commission, the Government issued an order dated 14-12-‘53 declaring that he would carry quasi-permanent status in his new post of Assistant Station Director in accordance with the rules governing the transfer of quasi-permanent officers. In paragraph 30 the appellant again asserted that the two posts were constituted and recognised as being in the same grade and that, under rule 2(c) of the Temporary Service Rules, a shift from one post to another in the same grade does not affect his status. In other words, the appellant understood the December 14 1953 order not as an independent declaration of his quasi-permanent status in the post of Assistant Station Director, but merely as an application of rule 2(c) because the two posts were in the same grade—a premise that later proved to be incorrect. Even in his statement of case the appellant emphasized that the Government’s order of 14-12-‘53 reiterated his quasi-permanent status in the post of Assistant Station Director, not on the basis of his own representation, but on the authority of the Home Ministry’s order No. 54/136/51-NGS dated 24-4-‘52 relating to the lien of quasi-permanent employees. This reference to the Home Ministry memorandum demonstrates how the appellant interpreted the December 14 1953 order. Finally, the Court noted Rule 4(b) of the Temporary Service Rules, which provides that when recruitment to a specified post must be made in consultation with the Public Service Commission, no declaration under rules 3 and 4(a) shall be issued except after such consultation.

The Court observed that, regarding the order dated 14 December 1953, it was unnecessary to decide whether rule 4(b) of the Temporary Service Rules was merely directory or mandatory. The Court found that the Public Service Commission had not been consulted before the order was issued by the Government. Furthermore, the appointing authority did not intend the order to function as a declaration under rules 3 and 4(a) in this case. In State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava [[1958] S.C.R. 533] it was held that the provisions of Article 320(3)(c) of the Constitution, concerning consultation of the Public Service Commission on disciplinary matters, are not mandatory. The Court noted that this conclusion persisted even though the constitutional text employed the term ‘shall’ in the provision. The Court explained that the first ground was the proviso to Article 320, which itself indicates that in certain cases the Commission need not be consulted. The second ground was that the requirement of consulting the Commission does not make its advice binding on the Government concerning disciplinary matters. The third ground was that, on a proper construction, the article does not confer any right or privilege on an individual public servant. The Court observed that none of these three grounds applied to rule 4(b) of the Temporary Service Rules in the present context. The Court noted that Article 320 may not be mandatory against the President in certain situations as interpreted by jurisprudence. However, a subordinate appointing authority required to make a declaration under the rules must not ignore or abrogate those very rules. The Court explained that quasi-permanent status is created by the rules themselves under the applicable framework and therefore must be respected. Rule 4(b) required that no declaration under rule 3 be issued unless the Public Service Commission had been consulted where recruitment to the specified post required such consultation. Consequently, an officer could not invoke the benefit of rule 3 while simultaneously ignoring the condition imposed by rule 4(b); he could not accept part of the rules and reject another part.

Regarding the principle of estoppel, the Court held that the appellant had not been misled about his quasi-permanent status, which he indeed possessed while serving as Public Relations Officer. The error lay in the appellant’s belief that the post of Assistant Station Director was in the same grade as the post of Public Relations Officer, leading him to rely on the Home Office memorandum. The Court therefore concluded that no question of estoppel arose from the facts of the case in the circumstances presented. In addition, the Court noted that the appellant’s counsel had not based the argument on estoppel, and it must be stated that estoppel was not the foundation of the appellant’s case. Accordingly, the Court found no basis to apply estoppel to prevent the appellant from challenging the order in the present proceedings. The Court emphasized that the appellant’s mistake concerned the classification of the two posts, not the existence of his quasi-permanent entitlement. Because the appellant was aware of his quasi-permanent status, the requirement of reliance for estoppel was not satisfied. Consequently, the Court found no merit in raising estoppel as a defence or as a ground for relief.

The appellant contested the opinion expressed by the Union Public Service Commission and argued that the Commission had rendered an unnecessary opinion, because the Union Public Service Commission (Consultation) Regulations purportedly did not require the Commission to be consulted in the matter. Attention was directed to Regulation 3, which provides that it shall not be necessary to consult the Commission in respect of the selection for appointment to a Central Service, Class I, of any officer who is already a member of the Armed Forces of the Union, an All India Service, a Central Service, Class I, or a Railway Service, Class I; and likewise for appointments to a Central Service, Class II, of any officer drawn from another Central Service, Class I or Class II, or from the Armed Forces of the Union or a Railway Service, Class II. A note to the regulation clarified that the term “officer” does not include a person in “temporary employment.” The correspondence placed before the Court showed that the Commission held that Regulation 3 did not apply to a person employed in “temporary employment” as understood at the time the regulations were framed, and that a “quasi-permanent servant,” as defined in the Temporary Service Rules, was nevertheless regarded as being in temporary service, albeit with certain leave benefits and safeguards concerning termination. The Court was not called upon to adjudicate the correctness of the Commission’s view. It was sufficient to determine that the post of Assistant Station Director was not a post in the same grade or cadre as the post of Public Relations Officer. Consequently, the appellant did not enjoy quasi-permanent status in the post of Assistant Station Director, and his service was subject to termination when the number of Public Relations Officer posts was reduced under clause (ii); moreover, he was not entitled to the benefit of the proviso to clause (ii) with respect to the Assistant Station Director position.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court held that there was no breach of the constitutional guarantee under Article 311(2) in the appellant’s case, and accordingly dismissed the appeal. Regarding the petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, the Court found no evidence of discrimination against the appellant as contemplated by Articles 14 and 16. Although other individuals who did not possess a quasi-permanent status were later appointed as Assistant Station Director through selection by the Commission, the Court expressed that the appellant’s failure to be selected was regrettable but did not amount to a violation of any fundamental right.

In concluding the matter, the Court observed that, setting aside any mere question of legal right, the case presented a particularly difficult situation. The appellant had rendered service for approximately nine years without any blemish, yet his employment was terminated when certain posts were reduced. He had been incorrectly informed that he possessed a quasi-permanent status in the position of Assistant Station Director. The appellant contended that the Union Public Service Commission did not consider him suitable for the post of Assistant Station Director because he asserted this quasi-permanent status. Correspondence with the Commission indicated that his case was not examined under the promotion quota of twenty percent, on the ground that he occupied a position that the Commission described as not “in the field for promotions.” If the appellant’s allegation that he was excluded from direct recruitment on the basis of his claim to quasi-permanent status is correct, the Court recognized an apparent injustice, as he was denied consideration both under the promotion and the direct recruitment quotas. The Court therefore called the attention of the concerned authorities to this aspect, expressing hope that they would review the appellant’s situation with sympathy and grant appropriate relief. The appeal and the petition were dismissed, and, given the circumstances, no order for costs was made.

Justice Bose, however, expressed a respectful disagreement with the majority view. He noted that the appellant’s service as Public Relations Officer, All India Radio, ended because the post was eliminated and that no other post of equal grade existed, leaving the appellant without a right to continued employment. The appellant had been appointed to act as Assistant Station Director on a purely temporary basis “until further orders” on 13 September 1952 (Order No. 1(101)-51/52). On 14 December 1953, the same authority issued further orders (Order No. (113)-51/52) confirming the earlier appointment and stating that, pursuant to Ministry of Home Affairs Office Memorandum No. 54/136/51-NGS dated 24 April 1952, the appellant would carry the quasi-permanent status of his former post of Public Relations Officer while holding the post of Assistant Station Director. Justice Bose held that this subsequent order clearly conferred a quasi-permanent character on the new post. Although the designation resulted from a mistake later discovered, the Court maintained that the Government’s unilateral error could not be borne by the appellant. Citing the principle from the earlier decision of The Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, the judge affirmed that public orders must be interpreted objectively based on their language, without regard to subsequent explanations or discoveries of mistake. He emphasized that the appellant was fault-less, having faithfully served since 1 May 1946, and that his termination on 3 September 1952, effective 6 October 1952, was due solely to the reduction of posts, not any wrongdoing on his part.

The Court explained that a public order cannot be interpreted by referring to explanations that the issuing officer later provides about what he meant, what was in his mind, what he intended to do, or even what he subsequently discovered. Instead, such orders must be read objectively, based solely on the language used in the order itself, because public orders are intended to have a public effect and to influence the conduct of those to whom they are addressed. The principle articulated in earlier cases therefore applies with the same force in the present matter. The Court then turned to the facts concerning the appellant. He had served faithfully in various capacities beginning on 1 May 1946. His service was formally terminated on 3 September 1952, with the termination taking effect on 6 October 1952. The termination was not caused by any fault of his own or by any fault of the Government; it resulted merely from the reduction of the post, a circumstance that the Court described as the “fortunes of war.” Before the termination could take effect, the appellant was placed in another post on 13 September 1952, designated as a temporary appointment “until further orders.” Consequently, there was no break in his service, and he remained in employment when, on 14 December 1953, he was informed that he was quasi-permanent in the position of Assistant Station Director. He accepted this appointment, acted upon it, and continued to serve in that role for nearly two years. The Court observed that this continued service naturally reduced his chances of obtaining other employment, especially as a person grows older and it becomes increasingly difficult to secure new work. The Court did not attribute this difficulty to any fault of the Government, noting that nobody can be blamed for being confused by the complex and technical language of rules and regulations, and that the Government had made efforts to alleviate the hardships of the situation. Equally, the appellant himself was not at fault, and the Court held that, in equity, the party who is least at fault should not be made to suffer. Finally, the Court remarked that the old rigid concepts of contract and equity have given way in modern times to a more humane appreciation of justice. The fusion of law and equity, as seen in England, has produced a new form of equity that reflects contemporary ideas of human needs and values. The Court cited the work of Lord Denning, who, in “The Changing Law,” demonstrates how this evolving equity remains flexible and fluid, aimed at delivering real justice between individuals and between individuals and the State, rather than persisting with antiquated technicalities that were fashioned in a different era with a different conscience and divergent notions of human dignity and rights.

Lord Denning summed up this new orientation in legal thinking by stating that courts apply a doctrine of equity which prevents enforcement of strict legal rights where equity would be offended. He explained that the doctrine also means a court will not allow a person to retract a promise that was meant to be binding, was acted upon, and has actually been performed. The author clarified that he is not advocating a sudden and wild departure from settled doctrines and precedents. He argued that the highest court in the country should administer the law with a broad vision and an understanding of contemporary needs, similar to the courts in England. He observed that while the fundamental principles of justice remain unchanged, the ever-changing pattern of life requires a fresh outlook and a vigorous adaptation of old principles to new conditions, ideas, and ideals. He acknowledged that courts do not create legislation, but emphasized that they inevitably shape the law through interpretation.

The author then examined the factual situation, asking what a fair and commonsense jurist would conclude about a government employee who had served many years without blemish. The employee faced imminent loss of his job, and the government, recognizing the hardship, sought a way to remedy a situation that was not legally wrongful but morally distressing. The government believed it could transfer the employee to another post, and it indeed effected such a transfer. In the former post the employee enjoyed certain protections, and the government intended that those protections continue after the transfer. Relying on rule three of the Temporary Service Rules, the government issued a declaration that the employee would hold a quasi-permanent status in his new position. The employee satisfied all eligibility criteria, having served continuously for more than three years and possessing the required qualifications, work record, and character for a quasi-permanent appointment. Correspondence from the government to the Union Public Service Commission, as well as orders dated September 13, 1952, and December 14, 1953, demonstrated that the government considered him fit and proper for the new role. The author questioned how anyone could argue that the government did not intend to give him a quasi-permanent position in his new post, given the clear intention expressed in the declaration.

In this case the Court noted that the crucial point was not the literal form of the words used by the Government but the meaning that those words were intended to convey. The Court was not, at this stage, concerned with whether the Government had been mistaken in believing that it could confer the quasi-permanent status on the employee; rather the focus was on what the Government intended to do as a fact and what it actually accomplished. The Government had stated that the employee “will carry with him the quasi-permanent status of his former post of Public Relations Officer while holding the post of Assistant Station Director.” The Court considered that this expression left no room for any other interpretation, especially when read together with the Government’s earlier conduct, which demonstrated an anxiety to do the just and right thing for the unfortunate man by ensuring that, because he had been protected in his former post, he would continue to enjoy the same protection in the new post. The Court regarded it as ultra-technical and incorrect to view this statement as being conditional upon the Government having the power to do so. At this juncture the issue was not whether the Government possessed the requisite authority, but what it had intended; on that point the Court expressed no doubt. The Government had wanted, intended, and was straining every nerve to do the right and just thing for the employee, giving him the same status as before in terms of pay, service conditions, and the protections he enjoyed in his earlier appointment. The Court further observed that later interpretations placed by the Government on its own order were irrelevant for construing the intention, and that it was apparent that the Government itself viewed its action in the same light as the Court does now. In the reply to the Public Service Commission dated 22 June 1954, the Government had said, “The Commission were not consulted at the time of shifting of quasi-permanent status of Shri Srinivasan from the grade of Public Relation Officer to that of Assistant Station Director....” The Court found this statement to confirm that the Government intended not merely to move the employee from one post to another, but also to transfer the quasi-permanent status, which could mean nothing less than the intention that he should enjoy that status in the new post.

The Court then turned to the question of the Government’s powers. It accepted that if the Government lacked the power, its action would be ineffective regardless of how well-meaning it might have been. However, the Court pointed to rule 4(a) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, which authorises the Government to make such a declaration. The rule provides that “A declaration issued under rule 3 shall specify the particular post…in respect of which it is issued.” The rule does not require the declaration to be expressed in any special form of words or to follow a “magic incantation.” The only requirement is a simple declaration, and such a declaration was found in the order dated 14 December 1953. Consequently, the sole question to be addressed was whether the declaration was rendered null and void by rule 4(b) because the Public Service Commission had not been consulted.

The issue before the Court was whether rule 4 (b) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, made the declaration ineffective because the Federal Public Service Commission had not been consulted. The rule provides that “Where recruitment to a specified post is required to be made in consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission, no such declaration shall be issued except after consultation with the Commission.” The Court examined the phrase “required to be made” that appears in the prohibition and asked what meaning should be attached to those words.

The Court observed that, on its face, the ordinary construction of those words would be literal – they would be understood exactly as they are written. However, the Court recalled the earlier pronouncement in the State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, [1958] S.C.R. 533, where after a careful analysis of the entire context, the Court held that the words, though emphatic, were not mandatory but merely directive. The Court noted that this view was not confined to Indian jurisprudence.

The Court referred to the decision of the Federal Court in Biswanath Khemka v. The King Emperor, [1925] F.C.R. 99, which had interpreted a similar provision in section 256 of the Government of India Act, 1935 in the same manner. It also cited the Privy Council decision in Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin, [1917] A.C. 170, where the Lords, at page 175, held that when a statute prescribes a formality for the performance of a public duty, that formality is to be regarded as merely directory if treating it as mandatory would cause serious inconvenience or injustice. The Court asked why, in the present case, a narrower interpretation of a set of rules should be adopted when the higher courts had taken a more liberal approach to constitutional and statutory provisions.

The Court questioned the logic of giving greater sanctity to rules and regulations than to the Constitution itself, and it warned against hesitating to dispense justice with firmness and vigor. Applying the same principles, the Court concluded that the words “required to be made” in rule 4 (b) lost their coercive effect, thereby opening the way for the Court to render the justice for which it existed.

The Court described the Government’s attempt to balance justice with mercy as a “Shylocking Shylock in demanding a pound of flesh, and why? because ‘t’ is writ in the bond,” and expressed that it would not accept such an approach. The Court saw a plainly wronged individual and a straightforward remedy, which it was prepared to grant.

Finally, the Court clarified that it was not contesting the interpretation advanced by the Public Service Commission, acknowledging that the Commission’s reading of the rules should be observed. It also affirmed that constitutional sanctions existed and could be invoked if necessary, without disputing the Commission’s perspective.

In the judgment, it was observed that when the statutory rules are ignored, the prescribed sanction operates as a political measure rather than a judicial one, and consequently an act performed in violation of those rules cannot be brought before a court for review. Such an act, although contrary to the rules, retains its legal validity. The Court further noted that the mere possibility that the Government might have acted differently had it been aware of a constitutional obligation to consult the Union Public Service Commission before taking the action does not modify the nature of the act nor does it affect the legal consequences that flow from it. Because the Government possessed the authority to act and indeed exercised that authority, the act assumed a binding character despite any mistake that may have been involved. This reasoning was presented as the manner in which the law should be interpreted and justice should be administered. On this basis, the judge initially expressed an intention to allow the appeal and the petition, ordering that costs be awarded. However, the final order of the Court reversed that position, holding that both the appeal and the petition were to be dismissed. The Court further specified that no order as to costs would be made, and reiterated that the appeal and the petition were dismissed.