Govinda Reddy and Anr vs State Of Mysore

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Appeal (crl.) 7 of 1958

Decision Date: 19 August 1958

Coram: S.R. Das, N.H. Bhagwati, S.K. Das, J.L. Kapur, K. Subbarao

In the matter titled Govinda Reddy & Anr versus State of Mysore, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 19 August 1958. The appeal was identified as Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 1958 and was decided by a bench consisting of Chief Justice S.R. Das together with Justices N.H. Bhagwati, S.K. Das, J.L. Kapur, and K. Subbarao. The judgment is reported in AIR 1960 SC 29 and was delivered by Justice Subba Rao. The four appealed cases originated from two sources: the first two appeals were issued by a certificate of the High Court of Mysore under Article 132(1) of the Constitution, while the remaining two appeals were entertained by the Supreme Court under the special leave provision of Article 136 of the Constitution. All four appeals arose from the same factual incident, namely a sensational and gruesome murder that took place in Bangalore, a city within the then Mysore State, and involved the killing of a prominent lawyer and several members of his family.

The prosecution’s case was confined to a narrow factual matrix that described the life and death of Belur Srinivasa Iyengar, a seventy‑four‑year‑old lawyer who owned considerable wealth. According to the charge sheet, his first wife had died in 1936, leaving behind a son described as insane and two daughters. In February 1937, he married a second wife named Vengadamma, and through that marriage he fathered three daughters and three sons. Prior to 5 June 1956, Mr Iyengar suffered a fractured leg which required him to remain in bed. On the night of 5 June 1956 the members of his household retired to sleep in the usual manner. The deceased was sleeping on a cot in his own bedroom. His wife Vengadamma, their daughter Rangalakshmi, their two sons Lava and Kusha, and his mother‑in‑law Singamma occupied three cots in a room adjoining Mr Iyengar’s bedroom. Two other daughters, Ratna and Prasanna, slept in a separate room, while the household servant Ramalingam rested in the veranda. A watch‑dog was also present in the premises. The residence contained cash, jewels, silverware and other valuable articles that were stored in iron safes, almirahs, trunks and suitcases. On the morning of 6 June 1956 the household was discovered to have been broken into. The bodies of Belur Srinivasa Iyengar, his wife, his mother‑in‑law, his two sons Lava and Kusha, and the servant Ramalingam were found lying dead with serious injuries. The watch‑dog was found in a dying, drugged condition. Valuable items from the safes, almirahs and other containers had been removed. A daughter, Rangalakshmi, was found leaning against a wall, suffering bleeding injuries to her head and was unconscious at the time of discovery.

The version presented by the prosecution asserted that the appellants were related to one another, or at the very least were closely associated with each other, and that they had concocted a plan to commit murder and robbery after becoming aware of the valuable cash and jewels kept in Mr Iyengar’s house. The prosecution alleged that the appellants broke into the house on the night of 5 June 1956 armed with deadly weapons, drugged the watch‑dog, killed the servant, murdered Mr Iyengar, his wife, his mother‑in‑law and his two sons, inflicted grievous injuries on the surviving daughter Rangalakshmi, seized the property stored in the house and subsequently divided the proceeds among themselves.

In the prosecution’s narrative, the accused, having become aware that Belur Srinivasa Iyengar kept cash and valuable jewellery in his house, allegedly conspired to commit murder and robbery. According to that version, the accused broke into the house on the night of 5 June 1956, armed with deadly weapons, and first rendered the house‑dog unconscious by administering a sedative. They then killed the servant, proceeded to murder Belur Srinivasa Iyengar, his wife, his mother‑in‑law and his two sons Lava and Kusha, and caused serious injuries to his daughter Rangalakshmi. After the killings, they removed the cash, jewels and other valuables that had been stored in safes, trunks and suitcases, and subsequently divided the loot among themselves. The appellants were charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for murder, Section 307 read with Section 34 for attempt to murder, Section 457 read with Section 34 for criminal misappropriation of property, Section 380 read with Section 34 for attempted robbery, Section 392 read with Section 34 for robbery, Section 394 for dacoity, Section 397 read with Section 34 for kidnapping for ransom, and Section 460 for theft. The prosecution examined a total of 116 witnesses. No witnesses were examined on behalf of appellant No. 2 or appellant No. 3, while three witnesses were examined in support of the first appellant. The prosecution highlighted the absence of any eye‑witnesses because every individual who could have observed the incident was either killed or severely incapacitated. The only surviving member present in the same bedroom, Rangalakshmi, sustained serious head injuries, remained unconscious for several days after the incident, and was consequently unable to give testimony. The two other daughters, Ratna and Prasanna, who were sleeping in a different room, escaped the attack and learned of the horrific events only on the early morning of 6 June. Consequently, the prosecution’s case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The Court referred to the established test for assessing circumstantial evidence as set out in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952 AIR (SC) 343). The test requires that the circumstances from which guilt is inferred must first be fully established, and every fact so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the accused’s guilt. The circumstances must be of a conclusive nature, such that they exclude every hypothesis other than the one the prosecution proposes to prove. In other words, the evidence must form a chain that is so complete that it leaves no reasonable ground for a conclusion compatible with the accused’s innocence, and it must show that, on the balance of probability, the accused committed the act. Applying this principle, the learned Sessions Judge, and subsequently the High Court on appeal, affirmed that the circumstantial facts established by the prosecution satisfied this test and therefore supported the conviction of the accused.

The trial court determined that the circumstances relating to each accused showed that they had jointly participated in the murder and the other offences charged. Based on that finding, the Sessions Judge convicted the accused on every count for which they were indicted. For the first count the court imposed the capital punishment, while for the remaining counts it imposed a variety of imprisonment terms. The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences to the High Court. The High Court affirmed both the convictions and the sentences, except for the fourth count, holding that theft being an element of robbery meant a double conviction for the same act was impermissible. Consequently the appellants filed separate appeals challenging the death sentence and the other imprisonment orders. The counsel for the appellants argued that a crucial link in the circumstantial chain was the fingerprints taken by police during the investigation and compared with prints found on objects in the victim’s house. They maintained that the admission of those fingerprints violated Article 20 clause 3 of the Constitution, and that exclusion of the prints would break the evidential chain and preclude proof of joint participation. The Court noted that the raised issue framed an important question about whether taking thumb impressions for investigation and using them at trial conflicted with the constitutional protection against self‑incrimination. The Court stated that it was not required to answer that question because, even if the fingerprint comparisons were excluded, the remaining evidence was overwhelmingly sufficient to support the convictions.

The Court then recounted the factual circumstances established by the lower courts that implicated the accused. It recorded that the accused were either related to one another or, at a minimum, maintained a close association. About two weeks before the incident, the second and third accused, together with the witness identified as P.W. 44 Channa, attempted to burglarise the residence of Belur Srinivasa Iyengar with the intention of committing theft, but the attempt failed. On 5 June 1956, the first accused, Krishna, and the fourth accused, Muniswamy, purchased crow‑bars, marked as exhibit numbers one and four, from the shops of P.W. 60 Dhanalakshmi and P.W. 61 Ibrahim respectively. Those crow‑bars were later discovered in the bedroom of Vengadamma at the premises known as “Renga Vilas” on the morning of 6 June 1956, and the items bore blood stains. The presence of the crow‑bars in the victim’s bedroom established a direct link between the accused and the scene of the crime, suggesting they had been in the house shortly before the murder. The fact that the crow‑bars were blood‑stained further implied that they had been used during the violent episode that resulted in death. The court observed that the close association of the accused, combined with the prior unsuccessful burglary attempt, indicated a common plan and motive to commit theft and related offences. Accordingly, the Court concluded that these circumstances, taken together with other evidence, formed a strong basis for finding that the accused acted jointly in the commission of the murder and the other offences.

The Court noted that on the morning of 6 June 1956 the items bought on 5 June, namely crow‑bars, were found in the bedroom of Vengadamma and were stained with blood. It further observed that the appellants were seen moving together on 5 June 1956, indicating their joint presence at the scene. The Court stated that fingerprints belonging to the appellants were recovered from the silver vessels marked M Os 86, 87 and 89, which lay scattered in “Renga Vilas” on the morning of 6 June 1956, and that those fingerprints matched the prints of the accused. The Court also recorded that jewellery owned by members of the Belur Srinivasa Iyengar family, which had been in their possession immediately before the offence, was later discovered in the possession of the appellants, either on their persons or concealed in their homes. Blood‑stained clothing was recovered from a hedge near the residence of the second appellant, Krishna, based on information supplied by him, and similar stained garments were also found at the house of the first appellant, Govinda Reddy. The Court further reported that the appellant Krishna made several purchases on 6 June and again on 8 June 1956; he converted some of the seized jewellery into gold ingots and disposed of them, and the two bills for buying a cot and an almirah were found on his person when he was arrested on 9 June 1956. The cot and the almirah, still unopened, were later discovered in Krishna’s dwelling, where he lived with his concubine Jayamma, at the address No. 21/6‑86 Ramakrishna Mutt Road, Ulsoor. The Court additionally stated that a knife, identified as M O 3, was recovered from a well behind Krishna’s house on the information provided by him; the knife contained mammalian blood, was positively identified by several witnesses as belonging to Krishna, and was used in the household for ordinary domestic purposes. The Court further observed that two half‑ticket portions for a cinema were found at the scene of the incident, and that Govinda Reddy told the witness Basavaraj that he and Krishna intended to go to the cinema together. Finally, the Court recorded that Krishna suddenly became wealthy and made a series of purchases immediately after the date of the incident. The learned counsel for the appellants, while not denying that the circumstantial evidence pointed to the participation of the three accused in murder and other offences, argued that exclusion of the fingerprint evidence would leave insufficient proof to sustain a conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, relying on the decision in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay (1955) 1 SCR 1177. The Court rejected this contention, holding that for appellants 2 and 3 the facts were plainly inconsistent with any claim of innocence, and that, when considered together with all other findings, the discovery of the incriminating items firmly established their guilt.

In this case, the Court observed that the two crow‑bars, which had been shown to have been bought by appellants No 2 and No 3, Krishna and Muniswamy, were discovered in the bedroom of Vengadamma on 6 June 1956, and that both bars bore blood‑stains. The presence of these blood‑stained instruments, together with the proof of their purchase by the two appellants, was held to establish beyond any reasonable doubt that both Krishna and Muniswamy had been present in the deceased’s house on the night of the incident and that they had taken part in the crime.

The learned counsel for the appellants argued that, although the crow‑bars were purchased by appellants No 2 and No 3, it might be possible that the bars had subsequently been handed over to the actual murderers and that the appellants could have been merely recipients of stolen property. The Court explained that the principle requiring an inculpatory fact to be inconsistent with the accused’s innocence does not mean that any far‑fetched hypothesis will satisfy the test; the alternative explanation must be reasonable. While the Court conceded that the fact of the crow‑bars alone might not be decisive of the two appellants’ complicity, it held that, when considered together with the other material facts, the crow‑bars reinforced the inference of guilt. The Court rejected the defence’s suggested hypothesis as an extravagant speculation and concluded that a prudent person, after weighing all the circumstances, could only arrive at the reasonable conclusion that appellants No 2 and No 3 had committed the offences.

Turning to the special pleading raised on behalf of appellant No 1, Govinda Reddy, the counsel contended that, if the fingerprint evidence were excluded, the remaining proof would be insufficient to hold the first appellant liable for participation, and consequently he could not be jointly charged with the other two. The Court therefore set out, with greater specificity, the facts found against Govinda Reddy. First, the appellant was closely associated with appellants No 2 and No 3. Second, PW 38 heard the third accused speak of money and jewels in the house of Belur Srinivasa Iyengar, suggesting that they should kill the occupants and seize the property. Third, on the day after the failed attempt, Govinda Reddy visited the house of appellant No 2 and was told that the attempt had been foiled because the dogs were barking. Fourth, fifteen days after the first incident, PW 38 heard Govinda Reddy and appellant No 3 urging appellant No 2 to make another attempt on the Iyengar house, at which point a woman intervened, advising Govinda Reddy, an elderly man, not to incite such illegal acts and to counsel the younger men properly. Fifth, the appellant possessed special knowledge that Belur Srinivasa Iyengar was a wealthy individual who kept significant cash and jewellery in his residence. Sixth, on 5 June 1956, the appellant was …

The Court recorded that on the morning of the incident, at eleven o’clock appellant No 1 was waiting for appellant No 2 at the Ramanatha Café. At the request of PW 74, appellant No 1 left the café and proceeded to the place known as the “Water Office.” While appellant No 1 was absent, appellant No 2 arrived at the café, found PW 74, and asked her to convey to appellant No 1 that the meeting could be postponed until three o’clock in the afternoon.

Later, at approximately eight o’clock in the evening, both appellants 1 and 2 went to the fuel shop owned by PW 75, Basavaraj. There appellant No 2 parked his motorcycle at the shop, and appellant No 1 informed Basavaraj that they were proceeding to the Himalaya Talkies. During the early hours of the following day, the sixth of June 1956, investigators discovered two half‑portions of cinema tickets, identified as Exhibits P‑74 and P‑74(a). These tickets were verified as the corresponding halves of tickets issued at the Himalaya Talkies and were found in the residence of Belur Srinivasa Iyengar, positioned close to the window from which a bar had been forcibly removed.

Further physical evidence linked appellant No 1, Govinda Reddy, to the crime scene. Finger impressions belonging to him were detected on a silver cup marked M.O. 89, which was recovered from the deceased’s house. On the morning of the tenth of June 1956, PW 114 conducted a search of appellant No 1’s own house and seized a panche bearing the identification M.O. 101. The panche was proven to belong to appellant No 1 and bore stains of human blood. In addition, items labelled M.O. 183 to M.O. 185 were taken from appellant No 1 at the time of his arrest; these jewels were established to have originated from the belongings of the occupants of Belur Srinivasa Iyengar’s house. Appellant No 1 offered no explanation for how he came into possession of these jewels.

The Court chose to exclude from consideration the evidence derived from the comparison of fingerprints found on the silver vessels with those taken by the police from the appellants. It was contended that, if this fingerprint evidence were disregarded, the remaining facts would fail to prove appellant No 1’s participation in the offences of murder and robbery and would only support a conclusion that he had received stolen property. The Court rejected this contention. The cumulative effect of the circumstantial material, particularly the implausible explanation offered by appellant No 1 for the presence of blood stains on his panche and his silence regarding the stolen jewels discovered shortly after the incident, left no doubt in the Court’s mind. The hypothesis that appellants 2 and 3 might have committed the murder and subsequently handed a portion of the loot to appellant No 1 was deemed more fanciful than realistic. Accordingly, the Court found that the facts could not be reconciled with any theory other than appellant No 1’s active participation in both the murder and the robbery, and it concurred with the conclusion reached by the High Court.

In the present matter, the Supreme Court examined the judgment rendered by the High Court and concluded that the conclusions reached by that tribunal were correct. The Court therefore affirmed that the appellants had been properly convicted on each of the charges that had been framed against them, and that the sentences imposed by the trial court were appropriate in view of the facts established during the trial. After a careful review of the record, the Court found no error in the findings of fact or in the application of law by the High Court. Accordingly, the Court held that the conviction and sentencing of the appellants under every count were justified and required no alteration. On that basis, the Court dismissed the appeals filed by the accused, ordering that the judgments of the lower courts remain in force and that the convictions and punishments imposed continue to stand without modification.