Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd.... vs The Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 19 March, 1958

Coram: B.P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, Bhagwati

In the matter titled Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. and others versus the Union of India and others, the Supreme Court heard petitions filed on 19 March 1958. The bench comprised Justice B.P. Sinha and Justice J.L. Kapur, and the judgment was authored by Justice Bhagwati. The petitions were filed under article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the constitutional validity of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, also known as Act 45 of 1955. The petitions also contested the decision issued by the Wage Board created under that Act. Because the petitions raised identical questions of law and fact, the Court decided to resolve them in a single judgment. To understand the opposing arguments presented by the parties, the Court found it necessary to recount the sequence of events that led to the enactment of the impugned legislation. The newspaper sector in India originally did not emerge as a commercial industry; rather, it began with individual newspapers founded by leaders active in national, political, social, and economic movements. Over the preceding fifty years, the sector acquired traits of a profit‑making industry, attracting investment from large industrialists and giving rise to conglomerates that owned multiple newspapers across the country. Apart from a sizeable concentration of journalists in major metropolitan areas, the remainder were dispersed throughout the nation. For more than a decade they had urged the creation of a mechanism that would allow all newspaper workers to have their wages, dearness allowances, benefits, retirement provisions and leave rules examined by an authority. The authority would also be empowered to prescribe fair and reasonable terms for the profession as a whole.

Isolated attempts to address the problem were made by the governments of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. On 18 June 1947, the Government of Uttar Pradesh appointed a committee to inquire into the working conditions of newspaper employees within the state. Later, on 27 March 1948, the Government of the Central Provinces and Berar constituted an inquiry committee to examine and report on various questions concerning the general functioning of the newspaper industry in that province. The committee's mandate included issues such as emoluments, dearness allowance, leave, provident fund, pension benefits and other conditions of service for editorial and other staff. The Uttar Pradesh committee submitted its report on 31 March 1949, while the Central Provinces and Berar committee reported on 27 March 1948, each containing specific recommendations. Despite these regional efforts, the problem that affected the entire nation remained unresolved. During the parliamentary debate on the Constitution (First Amendment) Bill of 1951, the Prime Minister expressed willingness to establish a committee or commission that would include representatives of the press. The purpose of the proposed body was to examine the state of the press and its content. The Prime Minister further elaborated on this proposal on 1 June 1951. The elaboration reflected an increasing governmental interest in a comprehensive national inquiry into the conditions of the press.

The Prime Minister indicated that an enquiry covering the larger issues of the press, similar to the royal Commission carried out in the United Kingdom, might be productive for the press and for the development of this very important aspect of public affairs. The idea was subsequently taken up in the parliamentary debate on the Press (Incitement to Crimes) Bill, which was later renamed the Press (Objectionable Matter) Act, 1952. During the session of April 1952 held in Calcutta, the Indian Federation of Working Journalists passed a resolution calling for the appointment of a Commission to investigate the conditions of the press in India, with the purpose of improving its position, status and functioning within the newly established democratic framework. Following that resolution, the Government of India, through the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, issued a Communiqué on 23 September 1952 announcing the formation of the Press Commission under the chairmanship of Shri Justice G. S. Rajadhyaksha.

The terms of reference of the Commission, inter alia, stated: “2. The Press Commission shall enquire into the state of the Press in India, its present and future lines of development and shall in particular examine: … (iv) the method of recruitment, training, scales of remuneration, benefits and other conditions of employment of working journalists, settlement of disputes affecting them and factors which influence the establishment and maintenance of high professional standards…”. The Commission completed its investigation and submitted its report on 14 July 1954. Among its findings, the report noted that information was available for 137 newspaper concerns; of these, only 59 were returning profits while 68 were experiencing losses. Taken together, the industry as a whole had earned a profit of approximately six lakh rupees on a capital investment of about seven crore rupees, equating to a return of less than one percent per annum.

The Commission also examined the status of proof‑readers. It concluded that proof‑readers as a class could not be automatically classified as working journalists because many performed purely mechanical job work within the press. However, the Commission held that when a person was employed as a proof‑reader solely for the purpose of preparing him to become a more efficient sub‑editor, that individual should be regarded as a working journalist even while performing proof‑reading duties. In all other circumstances, proof‑readers were to be treated as members of press staff subject to the provisions of the Factories Act rather than as journalists.

The question of the emoluments payable to working journalists was addressed in paragraphs 538 and 539 of the report. Paragraph 538 stated: “SCALES TO BE SETTLED BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING OR ADJUDICATION – It has not been possible for us to examine in detail the adequacy of the scales of pay and the emoluments received by the working journalist having regard to the cost of living in the various centres where these papers are published and to the capacity of the paper to make adequate payment… In this connection it may be stated that the Federation of Working Journalists also …”. The Commission therefore expressed that detailed determination of appropriate pay scales and benefits required collective bargaining or, where that failed, adjudication, acknowledging the limitations of its own inquiry in this area.

The Commission, when questioned, acknowledged that beyond recommending a minimum wage, it could not standardize job titles, pay scales, or other service conditions for the many employee categories across various newspapers and regions. It explained that such detailed matters must be resolved through collective bargaining, and if the parties fail to reach agreement, the dispute may be referred to an industrial court or an adjudicator, possibly with assistance from a Wage Board. The All India Newspaper Editors' Conference and the Indian Language Newspapers' Association also submitted that creating uniform designations was impracticable, and that achieving identical salary structures among different newspapers was impossible. They emphasized that newspapers possess differing financial resources and therefore maintain distinct conditions of service for their staff. The Commission expressed agreement in principle that, wherever feasible, the conditions of service for working journalists operating within the same locality should be as uniform as possible. However, it stressed that such uniformity could be attained only through a settlement or adjudication in which both employers and employees participated collectively. The Commission further pointed out that any attempt to impose a single national pay scale would disregard regional cost variations and could create undue hardship for publishing houses with limited financial strength. It therefore recommended that any uniformity be pursued through sector‑wide negotiations rather than through unilateral statutory mandates.

Regarding dearness allowance, the Commission observed that determining an appropriate rate would require an exhaustive examination of cost‑of‑living index movements in each locality where newspapers are printed. It noted that it was unaware of any instance in which a single uniform dearness‑allowance rate had been prescribed for the entire country, irrespective of the disparate economic conditions and fiscal capacities of individual publishing units. Consequently, the Commission concluded that the level of dearness allowance must be adjusted mutually between employers and employees, and that a mechanism should exist to resolve disagreements when consensus cannot be reached. The Commission suggested that a specialized wage board could be constituted to collect data on regional price levels and to advise both parties on a fair allowance rate. It also indicated that periodic revisions of the allowance would be necessary to reflect ongoing changes in inflation and living standards across different newspaper markets. In the absence of an agreed formula, the Commission warned that unresolved disputes could disrupt newspaper operations and harm the public’s access to information. Therefore, the Commission emphasized that an effective dispute‑resolution mechanism was essential to maintain industrial harmony within the newspaper sector.

The Commission described a journalist as occupying a position of considerable responsibility, possessing the ability to influence public opinion for either beneficial or detrimental purposes. It stated that a journalist must have a substantial intellectual foundation and must have attained an educational standard sufficient to perform duties efficiently. Accordingly, the Commission argued that the wage and service conditions of journalists should be attractive enough to draw talented individuals into the profession. It further observed that a journalist must continuously update his knowledge across a wide range of human activities, including technically demanding fields such as law and medicine. This ongoing learning requires regular study, interaction with prominent personalities, and a broad awareness of global issues. Based on these considerations, the Commission recommended that a minimum wage be established for journalists. The Commission also recognized that fixing such a minimum wage might threaten the survival of smaller newspapers, yet it expressed the view that a newspaper unable to afford the wage could not justifiably continue operating. The Commission concluded that while the introduction of a minimum wage might present financial challenges, it was a necessary step to ensure dignified livelihoods for journalists and to preserve the quality of news reporting.

The Commission observed that if a newspaper could not afford to pay the minimum wage that would enable a journalist to live decently and with dignity, then such a newspaper had no justification for continuing its existence. Accordingly, the Commission recommended that the country be divided into localities so that the differential cost of living in each part of India could be taken into account when determining a reasonable minimum wage for each area. It endorsed the concept of a minimum wage that had already been adopted by the Bank Award and quoted the award’s reasoning: although the ideal is a living wage, even in advanced countries the target must be moderated by other considerations, especially the general level of wages in other industries and the capacity of those industries to pay. The award further noted that in India the present level of national income is so low that it is widely accepted that the country cannot afford to prescribe a minimum wage corresponding to a full living wage. Nevertheless, the award emphasized that a minimum wage in India must still provide more than mere subsistence; it must also promote the efficiency of the worker and should cover some provision for education, medical needs and other amenities. On the basis of this reasoning, the Commission suggested that the basic minimum wage for a working journalist throughout India should be Rs 125, with an additional dearness allowance of Rs 25, bringing the total to Rs 150. The Commission also recommended that a further dearness allowance and a city allowance be provided in accordance with the location where the journalist was employed. The author of the report compared this recommendation with those made by the Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh Committees and concluded that the Commission’s figures were broadly consistent with those earlier recommendations, especially when the rise in the cost of living since the earlier reports was taken into account. The Commission then examined whether the Industrial Disputes Act applied to working journalists. After referring to the award of the Industrial Tribunal at Bombay in the dispute between “Jam‑e‑Jamshed” and its workmen, and after reviewing the Patna High Court decision in V N N Sinha v. Bihar Journals Limited ([1953] I.L.R. 32 Pat. 688), the Commission concluded that, at that time, working journalists did not fall within the definition of “workman” under the Industrial Disputes Act, and that no question concerning them could be raised by persons who were themselves governed by that Act. The Commission subsequently considered several employment matters affecting journalists, including the length of appointments, the minimum notice period required for termination, hours of work, leave provisions, retirement benefits and gratuity. It made specific recommendations and suggested that legislation be enacted to regulate the newspaper industry, incorporating provisions on notice periods, bonuses, minimum wages, Sunday rest, leave, and both provident fund and gratuity. Almost immediately after the Press Commission’s report was issued, Parliament enacted the Working Journalists (Industrial Disputes) Act, 1955.

The Working Journalists (Industrial Disputes) Act, 1955 received the President’s assent on 12 March 1955. The statute was enacted expressly to bring the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 within the ambit of working journalists. Section 2(b) of the Act supplied a detailed definition of “working journalist”. It stated that a working journalist was a person whose principal avocation was journalism and who was employed as such, either directly in or in relation to any establishment engaged in the production or publication of a newspaper, or in relation to any news‑agency or syndicate that supplied material for publication in a newspaper. The definition expressly listed categories of persons who were to be treated as working journalists, namely editors, leader‑writers, news‑editors, sub‑editors, feature writers, copy‑tasters, reporters, correspondents, cartoonists, news‑photographers and proof‑readers. However, the definition excluded from its sweep those persons who were employed chiefly in a managerial or administrative capacity, and also excluded those who, although in a supervisory position, exercised functions that were mainly managerial in nature by virtue of the duties attached to the office or the powers vested in them. Section 3 of the Act thereafter provided that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would apply to working journalists in the same manner as they applied to workmen as defined under that earlier legislation.

Despite the extension of the Industrial Disputes Act to working journalists, the Parliament did not consider this measure sufficient to address the broader concerns raised by the Press Commission. Significant agitation arose within the House for the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations concerning notice periods, bonuses, Sunday rest, leave, provident fund and gratuity. Consequently, on 30 November 1955 the Union Government introduced in the Rajya Sabha Bill No. 13 of 1955, a Bill intended to regulate the conditions of service of working journalists and other employees of newspaper establishments. The Bill incorporated the Press Commission’s recommendations on the minimum period of notice, bonus, Sunday rest, leave, and provident fund and gratuity, while leaving the determination of minimum wage rates to a wage board that the Central Government would constitute for that purpose. The Bill also sought to apply the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and the Employees’ Provident Funds Act, 1952 to newspaper establishments of a size recommended by the Commission. During debates in the Rajya Sabha, the Minister for Labour proposed that the word “minimum” be omitted wherever it appeared in the Bill, arguing that a proper wage board should examine the wage question comprehensively and that such an amendment would resolve wage issues for working journalists permanently, based on his experience with industrial wage disputes. The Bill, after this amendment, was passed and enacted as the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955.

The Court noted that the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (45 of 1955) had received the President’s assent on 20 December 1955. The Act was enacted to regulate certain conditions of service of working journalists and other persons employed in newspaper establishments. Under section 2(d) the term “newspaper establishment” was defined as an establishment, whether incorporated or not, that was under the control of any person or body of persons and that produced or published one or more newspapers or conducted any news agency or syndicate. The definition of “working journalist” was essentially the same as that found in the Working Journalists (Industrial Disputes) Act, 1955, and it expressly included a proof‑reader. All words and expressions that were used in the Act but not defined therein were deemed, under section 2(g), to have the meanings assigned to them by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 3 applied the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as they then stood, to working journalists in the same way as they applied to workmen within the meaning of that Act, subject to a modification. Specifically, the Court explained that section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as it related to the period of notice required for retrenchment, was to be construed as prescribing a six‑month notice period for the retrenchment of an editor and a three‑month notice period for any other working journalist. The period between the publication of the report and the enactment of the Working Journalists (Industrial Disputes) Act, 1955 – namely from 14 July 1954 to 12 March 1955 – was bridged by section 4, which enacted special provisions for certain cases of retrenchment occurring during that interval. Section 5 provided for the payment of gratuity, inter alia, to a working journalist who had rendered continuous service of at least three years in any newspaper establishment, whether that service began before or after the commencement of the Act, even if the journalist voluntarily resigned. Section 6 laid down a limit that no working journalist could be required or permitted to work for more than one hundred and forty‑four hours in any period of four consecutive weeks, exclusive of meal times. Under section 7 every working journalist was entitled to earned leave and leave on medical certificate on the terms specified therein, without prejudice to any holidays, casual leave or other kinds of leave that might be prescribed. After addressing retrenchment compensation, gratuity, hours of work and leave, sections 8 to 11 dealt with the fixation of rates of wages for working journalists. Section 8 authorised the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to constitute a Wage Board for fixing the rates of wages applicable to working journalists.

In accordance with the provisions of the Act, the Wage Board was required to be formed with an equal number of members nominated by the Central Government to represent the interests of newspaper employers and the interests of working journalists, and the Central Government was also to appoint an independent person to serve as the Chairman of the Board. Section 9 of the Act specified the factors that the Board must consider when fixing wage rates. These factors included the prevailing cost of living, the existing rates of wages for comparable occupations, the conditions affecting the newspaper industry in the various regions of the country, and any other circumstances that the Board deemed relevant. Once the Board had made a decision on wage rates, the decision had to be communicated to the Central Government as soon as practicable. Under Section 10, the Central Government was then obliged to publish the Board’s decision in any manner it considered appropriate within one month of receiving it. The published decision would become effective on the date specified in the publication; if no date was specified, the decision would take effect on the date of its publication. Section 11 laid down the powers and procedure of the Board, stating that, subject to any procedural rules that might be prescribed, the Board could, for the purpose of fixing wage rates, exercise the same powers and follow the same procedures as an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, when adjudicating an industrial dispute referred to it. According to Section 12, the Board’s decision was binding on all newspaper employers, and every working journalist was entitled to receive wages at a rate that could not be lower than the rate fixed by the Board. Sections 14 and 15 extended the application of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, as then in force, and the Employees’ Provident Funds Act, 1952, as then in force, to every newspaper establishment that employed twenty or more persons. Section 17 provided a mechanism for the recovery of money due from an employer. It allowed a newspaper employee, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, to make an application to the State Government for the recovery of money owed under any provision of the Act, whether in the form of compensation, gratuity, or wages. If the State Government, or an authority designated by it, was satisfied that such money was indeed due, it would issue a certificate for that amount to the collector, and the collector would then proceed to recover the amount in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.

Section 20 authorized the Central Government, by a notification in the Official Gazette, to make rules necessary to give effect to the purposes of the Act. Such rules were to include, without limiting the generality of the power, procedural directions for the Board to fix rates of wages for working journalists. All rules made under Section 20 were required, as soon as practicable after their making, to be laid before both Houses of Parliament for their consideration. The Working Journalists (Industrial Disputes) Act, 1955, was subsequently repealed by Section 21 of the present Act as provided in the legislation. Pursuant to the authority granted by Section 20, the Central Government issued a notification in the Gazette of India, Part II, Section 3, dated 30 July 1956, titled “The Working Journalists Wage Board Rules, 1956.” Rule 8 of those Rules stipulated that any question considered at a Board meeting had to be decided by a majority of the votes cast by members present and voting. In the event of an equality of votes, the Chairman was authorised to exercise a casting vote to break the deadlock. Rule 13 dealt with the resignation of the Chairman or any member, stating that the seat would be deemed vacant from the date the resignation was accepted by the Central Government. Whenever such a vacancy occurred in the Chairman’s office or among the Board members, the Central Government was directed to fill it immediately in accordance with the Act, and the Board could continue its proceedings from the point at which the vacancy had been filled. By a further notification dated 2 May 1956, the Central Government constituted a Wage Board under Section 8 of the Act for fixing rates of wages for working journalists, ensuring equal representation of employers and journalists on the Board. The Government appointed Shri H. V. Divatia, a retired Judge of the Bombay High Court, as the Chairman of the newly formed Board. Three members were nominated to represent the employers’ side, namely Shri G. Narasimhan, Manager of The Hindu, Madras and President of the Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society; Shri A. R. Bhat, M.L.C., former Press Commission member, President of the Indian Language Newspapers Association, and Chairman of the Minimum Wages Inquiry Committee for the Printing Industry in Bombay; and Shri K. P. Kesava Menon, Editor of Mathrubhumi, Calicut. The remaining three members were nominated to represent working journalists and comprised Shri G. Venkataraman, Member of Parliament; Shri C. Raghavan, Secretary‑General of the Indian Federation of Working Journalists; and Shri G. N. Acharya, Assistant Editor of the Bombay Chronicle. The paragraph concludes with a reference to Shri H. V. Divatia, the Chairman, whose details were set to follow in the subsequent part of the judgment.

The Chairman of the Board was noted to have possessed considerable experience, having previously chaired the Textile Labour Enquiry Committee in Bombay, having acted as President of the first Industrial Court that was established in India in 1938, and having served on an Industrial Tribunal that adjudicated a number of disputes involving various banks and their employees as well as several insurance companies and their employees. The inaugural meeting of the Board took place on 26 May 1956 at the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan in Bombay. At this meeting, Shri Kesava Menon and Shri G. Narasimhan were absent. The gathering was described as a preliminary session during which the Board constituted a sub‑committee composed of Shri A. R. Bhat and Shri G. N. Acharya. The sub‑committee was charged with drafting a questionnaire that would be sent to the various newspapers, news agencies, employer organisations, journalist organisations and any interested individuals in order to obtain factual data and other relevant information needed for fixing the wages of working journalists. While preparing the questionnaire, the sub‑committee was instructed to keep in mind three principal requirements: first, to obtain detailed accounts of newspaper establishments; second, to properly evaluate the nature of work and the different categories of working journalists; and third, to classify the country into distinct areas based on criteria such as population and cost of living. The draft questionnaire prepared by the sub‑committee was to be reviewed and finalised by the Chairman and then circulated to all concerned parties by the end of June 1956. Accordingly, the questionnaire was drawn up and dispatched to universities, government bodies, other organisations, individual participants in the Board’s inquiry and to each newspaper individually. The questionnaire was organised into three sections. Part “A” was intended for responses from newspapers, news agencies, employer organisations, journalist organisations and any individuals wishing to answer. Part “B” was directed specifically to all newspapers, and Part “C” was meant for all news agencies. The Board clarified at the outset that, unless a question indicated a different time frame, the reporting period for the sections “B” and “C” of the questionnaire would be the financial years 1 April to 31 March for 1952‑53, 1953‑54 and 1954‑55, or, where an establishment followed a different accounting year, a period of three years as close as possible to those dates. The Board further pointed out that, under section 11 of the Act, it possessed the powers of an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. In Part “A”, under the heading “Cost of Living”, the questionnaire requested the cost‑of‑living index for the respective centres and posed a specific question as to whether the basic minimum wage, dearness allowance and metropolitan allowance set out in paragraph 546 of the Press Commission table were acceptable to the respondent, and, if not, what variations the respondent would suggest and the reasons for those suggestions. The questionnaire also asked respondents to indicate comparable employment categories, which were listed as follows: (a) higher secondary school teachers; (b) college and university teachers; and (c) journalists employed as publicity and public‑relations officers in the information departments of the Central and State Governments.

The questionnaire listed several categories of newspaper staff for comparative purposes, including those employed as publicity and public‑relations officers in the information departments of both Central and State Governments, journalists working for the news‑service division of All India Radio, and research personnel serving in the economic and social research sections of Central Government ministries such as Finance, Labour and Commerce. Under the heading “Special Circumstances” the only item asked was Question No 7, which inquired whether any particular conditions existed in the respondent’s region that might influence the determination of wage rates for working journalists, and, if such conditions existed, required the respondent to describe the conditions and explain their effect on wage setting. Regarding the principles for fixing wages, the questionnaire instructed the respondent to classify the various newspaper establishments and to examine, among other matters, the amount of invested capital, the gross revenue generated, the revenue obtained from advertisements, the circulation figures, the frequency of publication, the presence of chains, multiple units or combines, and the geographical location of the establishment.

Part B of the questionnaire, which was to be completed by newspapers, was headed “Accounts” and required the submission of (1) balance‑sheet statements and (2) trading as well as profit‑and‑loss accounts for the reporting period, using the specimen forms attached to the questionnaire. Additional queries sought details of revenue streams derived from sources such as the press, a process studio, external work, foundry operations and subscriptions, together with expenses incurred for postage, distribution or sale, commissions, rebates to advertisers and other items. The Wage Board intended to obtain through the questionnaire all information it considered necessary for fixing journalists’ wage rates. It was recorded that Shri K. P. Kesava Menon tendered his resignation around 21 June 1956; the Central Government accepted the resignation by a notification dated 14 July 1956 and appointed Shri K. M. Cherian—who was then a member of the executive committee of the Indian and Eastern Newspapers Association, a director of the Press Trust of India and Chief Editor of Malayala Manorama, Kottayam—as his replacement on the Board. The questionnaire had been dispatched to 5,465 newspapers, journals and related publications, but only 381 responses were received; of the 502 daily newspapers contacted, merely 138 replied. The Board subsequently prepared an analysis of the respondents and their answers to each questionnaire item, and compiled statements summarising data on gross revenue, centre populations, paper circulations, cost‑of‑living indexes, dearness‑allowance scales in various states, comparable employment figures, pay scales for key journalist categories, total income, the breakdown of expenses relative to total income, net profits and losses, and the relationship between net results and circulation for the newspapers that had submitted responses.

Further meetings of the Board took place in Bombay on 17 August and again on 20 August 1956. At those meetings the Chairman informed the members that the replies received from the journals, organisations and other entities to which the questionnaire had been sent were unsatisfactory. Consequently the Board resolved to issue a Press Note asking the newspapers and journals to forward their responses, especially to Part “B” of the questionnaire, without delay. The Press Note was to remind the respondents that the Board possessed the powers of an Industrial Tribunal under the Act and that, should the newspapers fail to reply, the Board would be forced to consider additional measures. For the purpose of taking oral evidence the Board decided to divide the country into five zones – Trivandrum, Madras, Delhi, Calcutta and Bombay – and instructed the Secretary to summon witnesses to the nearest convenient centre in each zone. It was also decided that generally one hour should be allotted to each newspaper, three hours to regional units and two hours to smaller units for oral testimony. The Board discussed how many persons might ordinarily be called to give oral evidence from each newspaper or organisation and concluded that the circulation of each newspaper would be an important factor in its findings. Accordingly the Board directed that circulation figures be obtained promptly from the Audit Bureau of Circulation Ltd. In addition, the Board resolved that witnesses, if required, should be asked to produce books of accounts, income‑tax assessment orders or any other documents that the Board deemed essential for its investigation.

The Board subsequently held meetings in several cities: at Trivandrum from 7 September to 10 September 1956; at Madras from 15 September to 20 September 1956; at New Delhi from 19 October to 26 October 1956; at Calcutta from 25 November to 4 December 1956; and at Bombay during three periods – from 4 January to 10 January 1957, from 20 January to 6 February 1957, from 25 March to 31 March 1957, and finally from 22 April to 24 April 1957. During these sessions evidence was recorded from numerous journalists and other persons connected with the newspaper industry at the respective locations. At the Bombay meeting that concluded on 31 March 1957, the Board commenced its final deliberations. The Chairman emphasized the importance of reaching unanimous decisions on matters such as the fixation of wages and expressed his willingness to assist the representatives of the newspaper industry and of working journalists in achieving mutual agreement through direct discussion. The members welcomed this proposal and agreed to continue discussions on the various issues later that afternoon and on the following days. After extensive discussions on 25 and 26 March 1957, during which representatives of both the newspapers and the working journalists met jointly, the Board achieved unanimous agreement on the classification of newspapers, the classification of centres and the classification of employees, except for one point concerning the classification of groups, multiple units and chains based on total gross revenue.

In the course of its deliberations, the Board addressed the classification of newspapers, the classification of centres and the classification of employees. The Board reached agreement on all three matters except for one issue, namely the classification of groups, multiple units and chains on the basis of their total gross revenue. This particular point was decided by a majority vote. The chairman and the representatives of the working journalists voted in favour of the classification, whereas the representatives of the employers voted against it. Concerning the scales of pay, the chairman proposed at the meeting held on 27 March 1957 that, pending a final settlement of the question, the parties should each submit figures for the scales based on two alternative assumptions: one set calculated on the basis of consolidated wages and another set based on basic scales with a separate dearness allowance. Both sides accepted the proposal and agreed to furnish concrete suggestions on the following day. At the Board’s meeting of 28 March 1957, the representatives of the employers asserted that the term “rates of pay” did not encompass scales of pay; consequently, they contended that the Board lacked competence to fix the scales of working journalists. To support this contention they submitted a written statement, signed by all of them, to the chairman. The representatives of the working journalists counter‑argued that the Board was competent to fix the scales of pay. The chairman then adjourned the Board’s sitting in order to study the matter further. A copy of the employers’ written statement was subsequently handed to the working journalists’ representatives, who that same afternoon filed a written reply maintaining that the Board possessed the authority to fix the scales of pay for the various categories of working journalists. At the meeting convened on 29 March 1957, the Board examined its own competency to fix the scales of pay. The chairman expressed his opinion in writing, holding that the Board was indeed competent to fix the scales. A vote was then taken in accordance with rule 8 of the Working Journalists Wage Board Rules, 1956; the chairman and the representatives of the working journalists voted in favour of the Board’s competence, while the representatives of the employers voted against it. Afterward, several suggestions were put forward on the question, but because no agreement appeared possible, the chairman proposed that each member submit his specific scale proposals to him for study, a suggestion that the members accepted. It was also resolved that the chairman would conduct separate discussions with the representatives of the working journalists in the morning and with the representatives of the employers in the afternoon on 30 March 1957. The Board further agreed to reconvene on 31 March 1957 for additional discussions. However, at the meeting held on that date no final decision was reached on the scales of pay, allowances, the date of operation of the decision or related matters. The Board then resolved to meet again on 22 April 1957 to take final decisions. Accordingly, a meeting of the Board was held from 22 to 24 April 1957 in the office of the Wage Board at Bombay, and at that meeting it was unanimously agreed that the word “decision” should be used wherever the word “report” had previously occurred.

In the discussion that followed, the members resolved that the term “decision” should replace the word “report” wherever the latter appeared in the draft. The Board then turned to the question of what form the decisions to be submitted to the Government should take. It was mutually agreed that it would not be necessary to provide reasons for each individual decision; a simple record of the decisions would be sufficient. After this agreement, the members asked the chairman to examine the proposals concerning scales of pay and related allowances that had been submitted by both parties, and to formulate his own proposals so that a final determination could be reached. In response, the chairman distributed to all members his suggested figures for pay scales, dearness allowance, location allowance and retainer allowance. The Board subsequently arrived at a series of decisions on the various matters under consideration. These decisions were unanimous except where a different vote was explicitly noted, and they are set out here because they are relevant to the present inquiry. First, the Board held that for the purpose of fixing wages of working journalists, newspaper establishments should be grouped into different classes. Second, except for weeklies and other periodicals that would be specifically mentioned later, newspaper establishments should be classified on the basis of their gross revenue. Third, in determining gross revenue for classification, the revenue from all sources of a newspaper establishment should be taken into account. Fourth, the Board outlined the classification of daily newspaper establishments into five classes: Class A for establishments with gross revenue exceeding twenty‑five lakh rupees; Class B for those with revenue over twelve and a half lakh but not more than twenty‑five lakh; Class C for revenue over five lakh but not more than twelve and a half lakh; Class D for revenue over two and a half lakh but not more than five lakh; and Class E for revenue of two and a half lakh rupees or less. Fifth, the classification should be based on the average gross revenue calculated over the three‑year period of 1952, 1953 and 1954. Sixth, the parties were permitted to seek re‑classification of newspaper establishments on the basis of the average gross revenue for every subsequent three‑year period beginning with 1955. Eleventh, the Board decided that groups, multiple units and chains should be classified according to the total gross revenue of all constituent units; this was a majority decision with the chairman and the representatives of the working journalists voting in favour and the representatives of the employers dissenting. Twelfth, a newspaper establishment would be classified as a group if it published more than one newspaper from a single centre; as a multiple unit if it published the same newspaper from more than one centre; and as a chain if it published more than one newspaper from more than one centre. Finally, the Board specified that working journalists employed in newspaper establishments should be grouped as follows: full‑time employees would be placed in Group I as Editors; Group II would include Assistant Editors, Leader Writers, News Editors, Commercial Editors, Sports Editors, Film or Art Editors, Feature Editors, Literary Editors, Special Correspondents, Chief Reporters, Chief Sub‑Editors and Cartoonists; Group III would consist of Sub‑Editors, various types of Reporters, full‑time correspondents not covered in Group II, news photographers and other journalists not included in the preceding groups.

In this case the Board defined the categories of employees in newspaper establishments. The full‑time employees were divided into four groups. Group IV consisted of proof‑readers. Part‑time employees were defined as correspondents who worked part‑time for a newspaper and whose principal occupation was journalism. An employee was to be treated as a full‑time employee if, under the conditions of service, that employee was prohibited from working for any other newspaper establishment. The wage scales and grades that the chairman had recommended were adopted by a majority decision. The chairman and the representatives of the working journalists voted in favour, while the representatives of the employers voted against. Shri Bhat proposed that wage scales should be conditional upon a newspaper establishment earning a profit in a particular year and that a grace period should be allowed for the establishment to implement the scales. The majority did not accept these suggestions.

The majority‑approved wages, scales and grades were set out as follows. For daily newspapers, the basic monthly wages for each group of employees depended on the class of the newspaper. In class E, a Group IV employee started at a scale of ninety rupees; a Group III employee at one hundred rupees; a Group II employee at one hundred and fifty rupees; and a Group I employee at one hundred rupees. The progression for the Group IV scale was “100‑5‑165 (13 years)”, for Group III it was “115‑7 ½‑205 (12 years)”, for Group II it was “200‑20‑400 (10 years)”, and for Group I it was “100‑5‑165 (13 years)”. In class D, the starting scales were: Group IV at one hundred rupees, Group III at one hundred and twenty‑five rupees, Group II at two hundred rupees, and Group I at three hundred and fifty rupees, with the respective progression patterns “115‑7 ½‑205 (12 years)”, “125‑10‑245 (12 years)”, “350‑20‑510 (8 years)”, and “500‑30‑740 (8 years)”. In class C, the scales were: Group IV at one hundred rupees, Group III at one hundred and fifty rupees, Group II at three hundred and fifty rupees, and Group I at five hundred rupees, progressing as “115‑7 ½‑205 (12 years)”, “150‑12 ½‑300 (12 years)”, “350‑20‑510 (8 years)”, and “500‑30‑740 (8 years)”. In class B, the scales were: Group IV at one hundred and twenty‑five rupees, Group III at one hundred and seventy‑five rupees, Group II at five hundred rupees, and Group I at one thousand rupees, with progressions “125‑7 ½‑215 (12 years)”, “175‑20‑415 (12 years)”, “500‑40‑820 (8 years)”, and “1000‑50‑1300 (6 years)”. In class A, the scales were: Group IV at one hundred rupees, Group III at one hundred and fifty rupees, Group II at three hundred and fifty rupees, and Group I at five hundred rupees, with the same progression patterns as those described for class B. The majority also approved the inclusion of dearness allowance, location allowance and remuneration for part‑time employees, again with the chairman and the working‑journalist representatives voting for and the employer representatives voting against. Regarding other allowances, the Board, noting insufficient evidence, left the determination of conveyance and other allowances to collective bargaining between the journalists and the concerned newspaper establishments. For fitting existing employees into the new scales, only the service rendered in a particular grade, category and newspaper establishment was to be considered. The Board stipulated that in no case should the present emoluments of any employee be reduced as a result of the decision. When a newspaper establishment was re‑classified pursuant to paragraph 6, the existing pay of its staff was to be protected, although future increments and scales would correspond to the class of paper into which the establishment was placed. The date of operation of these decisions was left to be specified in a later paragraph.

The Board resolved that its decision would become effective from the date on which the Board was constituted, namely the second day of May 1956, for newspaper establishments classified as “A”, “B” and “C”. For establishments falling under classes “D” and “E”, the decision would take effect six months after the Board’s appointment, that is on the first day of November 1956. This resolution was reached by a majority vote; the chairman together with the representatives of the working journalists voted in favour, while the representatives of the employers voted against the proposal.

The Court noted that the judgment required the Government of India to constitute a Wage Board under the relevant Act for the purpose of reviewing the impact of the Board’s decisions on both newspaper establishments and the working journalists. This review was to be undertaken after the expiry of three years but no later than five years from the date the decisions of the Board were published.

The records showed that the Board’s decisions were formally documented on the thirtieth day of April 1957. On that same day, the representatives of the employers appended a minute of dissent, and the chairman entered a note explaining the reasons for the decisions as recorded. The Court emphasized that these documents were of vital importance for determining the issues before it.

In the minute of dissent, the employers’ representatives began by expressing regret that the prevailing conditions in the newspaper industry prevented them from accepting the majority view. They articulated that the fixation of wage rates should be governed by four criteria: the normal needs of a worker; the capacity of the industry to pay; the nature of the industry; and the effect of wage fixation on the development of the industry and on employment. The dissenting representatives then advanced several observations. First, they described the newspaper industry as a distinct class whose product’s selling price was ordinarily below its cost of production, and they highlighted that the cost of production, particularly the price of newsprint, fluctuated frequently, making long‑term financial planning difficult. Second, they pointed out that the industry’s income derived principally from two sources – sales of copies and advertising revenue – with sales depending on public acceptance and advertising income depending on circulation, prestige and the purchasing power of readers. These factors, they argued, rendered newspaper publishing a hazardous undertaking, obliging the fixation of wages at a minimum level, leaving any share of prosperity to be distributed to employees through bonuses. Third, they noted that newspapers could not readily raise their selling price; experience with established newspapers showed that price increases tended to reduce circulation, which in turn adversely affected advertising revenue. Consequently, the income from sales or advertising was not responsive to a progressive increase in expenditure. Finally, they began a statement with the words “In any”, indicating that further considerations would follow.

In its analysis, the Court observed that fixing the wages of any one group of employees could not be done without considering the effect on the other groups within the newspaper establishment. Editorial staff formed one distinct group, and any rise in their remuneration would inevitably affect the wage structure of the remaining sections. The Court noted that the salaries paid to working journalists represented roughly one‑fifth of the total wage bill of a newspaper. It further pointed out that the factory personnel possessed considerable bargaining power; consequently, any increase in the salaries of editorial staff and the introduction of wage scales in that department would have to be matched by a corresponding rise in the wages of factory workers and the establishment of time‑based scales for them as well. The Court then turned to the source of a newspaper’s ability to pay, stating that advertisement revenue was the primary determinant of financial capacity. It emphasized that it was insufficient to look merely at a newspaper’s gross revenue; the proportion of that revenue derived from advertisements had to be taken into account. Because of this, the Court reasoned that a uniform, All‑India minimum wage and scale system would necessarily have to be set low if newspapers operating in regions with low purchasing power—such as Kerala and Orissa—were not to be placed at a disadvantage. The Court concluded that a region‑wise approach to wage fixation would be fair both to the newspaper industry as a whole and to the employees who depended on it.

The Court further examined the proposals put forward by the majority, noting that those proposals seemed to adopt the view that the overriding principle for setting wages was the worker’s need as conceived by the majority, without giving sufficient weight to the impact on the industry. The Court observed that the Board had not before it enough data to properly assess the industry's capacity to pay. It cited the profit and loss statements of daily newspaper establishments for the financial year 1954‑55, which showed that out of the total surveyed, forty‑three papers reported profits while forty papers recorded losses. From this evidence, the Court inferred that the overall condition of the newspaper industry in the country could not be described as satisfactory. Accordingly, the Court held that the wage levels proposed by the majority were excessively high. It warned that such high wage demands would immediately impose a heavy burden on many newspapers, a burden that would continue to increase over the ensuing years and would be magnified when it affected the wages of employees in other sections. The Court explained that this escalating burden would also raise the obligations of the establishments under the provident fund, gratuity and related liabilities. When the full impact of the increased wage structure materialised, the Court foresaw that the economies of most newspapers would be disrupted. It further cautioned that although immediate closures might not occur, many newspapers would soon find themselves unable to meet obligations such as retrenchment compensation and gratuity. In an attempt to fulfil these obligations, newspapers might resort to borrowing; once their credit lines were exhausted, they would be forced to shut down. Regarding the establishment of new newspapers, the Court predicted that promotions would become scarce, leading, after a few years, to a decline in the number of daily newspapers—a development that would be detrimental both to employment and to the freedom of expression in the country.

The Court observed that the total number of newspapers in the country had not shown any increase but had actually declined. It was held that such a decline was contrary to the national interest, both because it would diminish employment opportunities and because it would impair the freedom of expression. (g) Regarding newspaper chains and groups, the Court criticised the classification criterion adopted by the majority as being both unfair and unnatural. It pointed out that calculating the capacity to pay by adding together the total gross revenue of every unit in a chain or group produced an unrealistic picture of the group’s true financial ability. (h) The Court further noted that applying a retrospective effect to the wage orders would only exacerbate the difficulties already facing the newspaper industry. It observed that the industry had already been compelled to devise various methods for meeting the burden of retrospective gratuity, and that a retrospective imposition would add to that strain. (i) On the question of prevailing wage rates for comparable employment, the Court held that the work performed by journalists in newspaper establishments could not be meaningfully compared with other occupations or professions. Accordingly, the Court stated that the remuneration of working journalists should be fixed only after taking into account the overall financial condition of the newspaper industry. Nevertheless, the Court allowed that limited comparisons could be drawn with alternative occupations available to persons possessing similar educational qualifications in specific regions or localities. From that perspective, the Court said that salaries paid to secondary‑school teachers, college and university teachers, as well as employees of commercial firms and banks, should be considered, although the majority had rejected this suggestion.

Paragraph 39 of the judgment explained that the chairman’s note was intended to clarify the reasons behind the decisions, some of which had received unanimous support while others had been approved by a subset of members, thereby forming the majority view. At the beginning of the note, the chairman described that most of the recommendations of the Press Commission aimed at improving the economic condition of small and medium‑sized newspapers. He listed specific measures such as the establishment of a price‑page schedule, the introduction of telescopic rates for government advertisements, and the equitable distribution of such advertisements among newspapers. He also mentioned statutory restrictions on malpractices designed to eliminate cut‑throat competition and the fixation of news‑agency tariffs, which at that time had still not been implemented. The chairman further pointed out that there had been no stability in the price of newsprint, a commodity that constituted a considerable portion of a newspaper’s total expenditure. These circumstances, he argued, had made it necessary to fix a minimum wage that was lower than the level recommended by the Press Commission. In paragraph 40, the chairman observed that in fixing wage rates, the authorities had based their calculations on the condition of the newspaper industry as a whole rather than on the effect that the rates would have on any particular newspaper. He explained that the methodology relied on the average gross income of newspapers belonging to the same class, instead of using the lowest‑earning unit within that class. The chairman warned that using the lowest unit as a benchmark would result in no improvement for any newspaper within the class and would merely preserve the status‑quo. He added that because English‑language and Indian‑language newspapers operate under extremely divergent conditions, it was impossible to avoid some adverse impact on small or medium‑sized newspapers. He concluded the excerpt by beginning a statement about the tone and condition, indicating that further discussion would follow.

The chairman explained that elevating the standard of journalism in India inevitably imposes a certain burden on many newspapers. He recognised that in situations where wages are extremely low, dearness allowance is either minimal or completely absent, and no wage scales exist, proprietors are likely to react to the proposed wage schedule with resentment. He acknowledged that some irregularities could be identified, but emphasized that the commission lacked comprehensive data on all newspapers, and the data that were available were often unsatisfactory. Consequently, it was impossible to satisfy every newspaper and every journalist. Nevertheless, the chairman stated that the commission had attempted to act on widely accepted principles while keeping the Press Commission’s recommendations in mind, rather than basing decisions on each newspaper’s editorial expenditure. He expressed the view that rational management offers considerable potential for increasing newspaper revenues, and he pointed to evidence indicating a bright future for Indian‑language newspapers, given the rising literacy rates and growing political consciousness among readers. He observed that wide disparities preclude any adjustment that could please all interested parties. The chairman hoped that no newspaper would be compelled to shut down because of the decision, and he appealed to the Government and the public to support any good newspaper that deserved to continue operating.

The chairman further remarked that the commission did not regard it as a regretful outcome if its decisions discourage individuals lacking the necessary resources from entering the newspaper industry. While the commission is eager to promote and encourage the growth of small newspapers, it firmly believes that such growth must not come at the expense of working journalists. He extended the same viewpoint to newspapers established for political, religious, or any other propagandistic purposes, asserting that the welfare of journalists should remain paramount regardless of the newspaper’s underlying motives.

Regarding the methodology for classifying all constituent units of a newspaper chain, the chairman explained that one of the most challenging tasks was to determine appropriate wages for journalists employed by newly established newspapers. He noted that the accounts of all constituent units within the same group or chain are combined, resulting in the stronger, higher‑income units subsidising the losses of weaker units. This practice creates considerable wage disparity among journalists performing identical work in different locations. The chairman recalled that the Press Commission had strongly criticised such chain and group arrangements for their adverse impact on employees. Consequently, the commission decided to place all constituent units of the same group or chain into a single class based on the total gross income of the entire establishment, thereby addressing the identified disparities and aligning with the Press Commission’s recommendations.

In fixing the classification of the constituent units that form a newspaper chain, the Board resolved that all such units should be placed together in a single class determined by the total gross income of the entire establishment. The Board recognised that this approach could lead to a situation where journalists employed in the weaker units of the same chain might receive wage rates that are higher than those earned by journalists working in the units that generate the highest income for the chain. However, the Board asserted that, provided the underlying principle is sound and based on a scientific methodology, the ultimate effect of applying this principle must be judged from the standpoint of Indian journalism as a whole, rather than being measured by the particular burden it may place on any individual establishment. The Board further explained that it regarded this principle as one of the principal steps necessary to give effect to the observations and recommendations expressed by the Press Commission. The chairman then turned to the concerns raised by representatives of newspaper employers regarding the possible burden that could arise from the Board’s decisions. He expressed sympathy with their viewpoint and observed that, given the circumstances—especially the fact that this was the first attempt to fix wage rates for journalists—it was probable that certain anomalies might emerge as a result of implementing the decisions. Accordingly, the chairman stated that the Board was reluctant to impose a permanent wage schedule covering all classes of newspapers. He emphasized that it was important for the wage rates fixed by the Board to remain open to review and revision after a period of three to five years, based on the experience gained during that time. The need for such a provision, he explained, stemmed from the fact that the data available to the Board were not as complete as would have been desirable, and because, at this early stage, it was difficult to determine with precision the economic and other effects of the decisions on the newspaper industry as a whole. To mitigate the difficulties and to facilitate future review, the chairman proposed the immediate creation by the Government of India of a standing administrative machinery. He suggested that this machinery should combine the functions of implementing and administering the Board’s decisions with the task of preparing the ground for the review and revision envisaged after three to five years. The proposed body would be responsible for collecting, on a systematic basis, detailed information and data from all newspaper establishments across the country. The types of information envisaged included employment figures, wage rates, earnings, the financial condition of the papers, circulation numbers and other relevant statistics that might be required to assess the impact of the Board’s decisions at the time of review. The Board’s decision was formally published by the Central Government in the Gazette of India Extraordinary dated 11 May 1957. Following this publication, the Commissioner of Labour for Madras issued a circular on 30 May 1957, directing the management of every newspaper establishment in the State to submit to him the report of gross revenue for the three years 1952, 1953 and 1954. The circular stipulated that these reports were to be sent within one month of the publication of the Board’s decision, i.e., no later than 10 June 1957.

According to the notice issued by the Commissioner of Labour, the newspaper establishments were required to submit their gross revenue reports for the years 1952, 1953 and 1954 not later than ten days after the Gazette publication of the Wage Board’s decision, which meant on or before 10 June 1957. In compliance with that deadline, a writ petition identified as Writ Petition No. 91 of 1957 was filed on 13 June 1957 by Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. against the Union of India and other respondents. After this first filing, additional writ petitions were entered on the same ground. On 9 August 1957, three further petitions were filed simultaneously by the Press Trust of India Ltd., the Indian National Press (Bombay) Private Ltd., and the Saurashtra Trust; these were recorded as Petitions Nos. 99, 100 and 101 of 1957 respectively. Subsequently, Hindustan Times Ltd., a publishing house based in New Delhi, lodged a comparable petition on 23 August 1957, which was designated as Petition No. 103 of 1957. Finally, on 18 September 1957, three more writ petitions were submitted: Petition No. 116 of 1957 by Loksatta Karyalaya of Baroda, Petition No. 117 of 1957 by Sandesh Ltd. of Ahmedabad, and Petition No. 118 of 1957 by Jan Satta Karyalaya of Ahmedabad. All of these petitions sought judicial relief concerning the application of the Wage Board’s decision to the newspaper industry.

The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 91 of 1957 were the company Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd., commonly referred to as the “Express Group.” The Express Group was described as the largest chain of newspapers in India. The group published a wide range of periodicals, including the Indian Express, an English daily printed in Madras, Bombay, Delhi and Madurai; the Sunday Standard, an English weekly issued from Madras, Bombay and Delhi; Dinmani, a Tamil daily produced in Madras and Madurai; Dinmani Kadir, a Tamil weekly from Madras; Loksatta, a Marathi daily, and its sister publication Sunday Loksatta, a Marathi weekly, both printed in Bombay; Screen, an English weekly printed in Bombay; and Andhra Prabha, a Telugu daily and weekly. At the time of the petition, the Express Group employed a total of 331 working journalists, of whom 123 were designated as proof‑readers, and an additional 1,570 staff members who were not classified as working journalists. The current annual remuneration paid to the working journalists amounted to Rs 9,77,892. If the Wage Board’s decision were implemented, the total annual remuneration for these journalists would rise to Rs 15,21,282.12, creating an incremental wage bill of Rs 5,43,390.12 each year. The group would also be required to pay part‑time correspondents on a retainer basis and for news items charged per column, which the petitioners estimated would add roughly Rs 1,00,000 annually. In addition, because the Wage Board’s order was to operate retrospectively from 2 May 1956, the Express Group would face an additional payment of Rs 5,16,337.20 for arrears. The petition further noted that this estimate did not include liabilities for past gratuity, recurring gratuity under the relevant Act, or the extra costs associated with reduced working hours, increased leave and other benefits mandated by the Board’s decision. Moreover, if the non‑journalist staff who were excluded from the definition of “working journalist” also demanded comparable wage increases and improved service conditions, the Express Group projected an additional financial burden of approximately Rs 9,92,443.68.

In the matter concerning the organization of newspaper proprietors, the Court recorded that the enterprise employed a total of eight hundred twenty persons, of whom one hundred seventy were classified as working journalists and the remaining six hundred fifty were not included within that definition. The overall annual wage outlay of the concern was approximately twenty‑one lakh rupees, with the salaries of the working journalists accounting for nine lakh rupees of that amount. The Court noted that, according to the Wage Board’s decision, the salary uplift for the working journalists would raise the wage bill by four lakh five thousand six hundred rupees. In addition, because the decision was to operate retrospectively, the employer would be required to pay an equal sum of four lakh five thousand six hundred rupees as arrears to those journalists. The Court further observed that the employer would face an ongoing additional financial burden of sixty thousand rupees each year resulting from the recurring monthly salary increments applicable to the working journalists. If the benefits granted by the Wage Board were extended to the remaining staff members who are not designated as working journalists but who have also demanded comparable improvements, the Court estimated that an extra annual liability of three lakh ninety thousand rupees would be incurred. The Court then examined a hypothetical scenario in which the petitioners might be forced to cease operations at a loss. In that situation, the amount payable to the working journalists under the Act and the Wage Board decision would rise to twenty‑three lakh sixty‑eight thousand five hundred rupees, compared with the earlier liability of eleven lakh sixty‑two thousand five hundred rupees. The Court further calculated that the non‑journalist staff would be entitled to an additional fifteen lakh fifty thousand rupees, bringing the total prospective liability to thirty‑nine lakh eighteen thousand rupees, as opposed to the previous total liability of twenty‑seven lakh twelve thousand five hundred rupees.

The Court then turned to the case of Indian National Press (Bombay) Private Ltd., also known as the Free Press Group, which were petitioners in Petition No. 100 of 1957. The Court listed the publications of the group as the Free Press Journal (a morning English daily), the Free Press Bulletin (an evening English daily), Bharat Jyoti (an English weekly), Janashakti (a morning Gujarati daily) and Navashakthi (a Marathi daily), all issued from Bombay. The group employed four hundred forty‑two individuals, including part‑time correspondents; among them sixty‑five were working journalists, twenty‑one served as proof‑readers, and the remainder comprised other staff not falling within the working‑journalist category. The Court observed that, under the Wage Board’s decision, the group would be required to make an immediate payment of one lakh seventy‑three thousand eight hundred eleven rupees as a result of the decision’s retrospective effect. In addition, the wage bill would increase each year by the same amount of one lakh seventy‑three thousand eight hundred eleven rupees. The Court further noted an annual recurring increase of twenty‑two thousand four hundred seventy rupees to be added to the monthly salaries of the working journalists, together with a corresponding rise in the contributions to the provident fund arising from the higher salaries. Finally, the Court pointed out that, pursuant to the provisions of the Act concerning reduced working hours and increased leave, the group would also incur further financial obligations, the magnitude of which would be determined by the applicable statutory calculations.

In the case of the petitioners that were classified as a chain of newspapers and consequently treated as an “A” class newspaper establishment on the basis of the total gross revenue of all their units, the Court recorded that the liability to pay the working journalists would consist of Rs 90,669 and Rs 29,806 respectively. In addition, there would be a liability for past gratuity amounting to Rs 1,08,534 and a recurring annual liability for gratuity of Rs 17,995. The Court further observed that if the same benefits were extended to the remaining members of the staff who do not fall within the definition of working journalists, the annual burden on the petitioners would rise by an additional Rs 1,80,000. This increased burden arose because the petitioners had been classified and treated as a single chain of newspapers and placed in “A” class on the basis of the aggregate gross revenue of all their publications. The Court noted that, had the component units been classified individually on the basis of their own gross revenue, the classification would have been different: the Free Press Journal, the Free Press Bulletin and the Bharat Jyoti would still fall within “A” class, but Navashakthi would be placed in “C” class and Janashakti in “D” class. Such a differentiated classification would have considerably reduced the financial impact of the Wage Board decision on the petitioners.

The Court then turned to the second petitioner, the Saurashtra Trust, which also operated a chain of newspapers. The Trust publishes Janmabhoomi, a Gujarati daily from Bombay; Janmabhoomi and Pravasi, Gujarati weeklies from Bombay; Lokmanya, a Marathi daily from Bombay; Vyapar, a Gujarati weekly commercial paper from Bombay; Fulchhab, a Gujarati daily from Rajkot; Pratap, a Gujarati daily from Surat; Cutchcha Mitra, a Gujarati daily from Bhuj (Cutch); and Nav Bharat, a Gujarati daily from Baroda. The Trust employs a total of 445 persons, of whom 60 are working journalists and 12 are proof‑readers, the remainder being other staff members. The Court recorded that the effect of the Wage Board decision on the Trust would be to impose a retrospective liability of Rs 1,59,528 and an annual increase in the wage bill of the same amount for the first year, together with a recurring annual increase of Rs 22,000 thereafter. The operation of sections 6 and 7 of the Act, relating respectively to reduced hours of work and additional leave, would impose an extra burden of Rs 42,000 per year. The liability for past gratuity would amount to Rs 93,376, and the recurring annual increase in gratuity would be Rs 11,000. The Court further noted that extending the same benefits to the other staff members who are not working journalists would raise the annual burden by Rs 5,18,964, because the Trust had also been classified as an “A” class newspaper establishment on a chain basis, causing all component units to be treated as “A” class. The Court pointed out that, if each unit were classified on the basis of its own gross revenue, Vyapar would fall within “B” class, Janmabhoomi and Lokmanya within “C” class, and Cutchcha Mitra, Fulchhab and Pratap within “E” class. The Court described this classification method as inequitable.

In the case, the petitioners highlighted an additional element of unfairness by pointing out that certain newspapers were placed in lower classification categories despite having larger gross revenues than other papers placed in higher categories. They noted that the Janmabhoomi newspaper from Bombay was classified as “A” while the Bombay Samachar, a Gujarati‑language morning daily from the same city with a higher gross revenue when considered as a single unit, was placed in Class B. In a similar manner, the Pratap newspaper from Surat was placed in Class A, whereas the Gujarat Mitra, also from Surat and having a greater gross revenue than the Pratap, was placed in Class B because it was treated as a separate unit. Likewise, the Fulchhab newspaper from Rajkot was classified as Class A, while the Jaihind newspaper from the same city, which generated a larger gross revenue than the Fulchhab, was placed in Class C for the same reason of unit treatment. The petitioners then calculated the financial impact of closing down the concern under the new basis prescribed by the Act and the Wage Board decision. They estimated that the liability for the working journalists would rise to a total of Rs 6,13,921, compared with the earlier amount of Rs 1,00,890. For the remaining staff members who were not working journalists, the estimated liability amounted to Rs 3,08,112, making the overall cost of shutting down the concern under the new basis Rs 9,22,033, as opposed to the previous total of Rs 4,09,002. The petitioners further identified Hindustan Times Ltd., New Delhi, the respondents in petition No. 103 of 1957, commonly referred to as the Hindustan Times Group. This group published five titles: the Hindustan Times (an English morning daily), Hindustan Times (Evening News) (an English evening daily), Overseas Hindustan Times (an English weekly), Hindustan (a Hindi daily) and Saptahik Hindustan (a Hindi weekly), all from Delhi. The company employed a total of 695 persons, of whom 79 were working journalists, 14 were proof‑readers and the remaining 602 were other staff members. The wages paid to the working journalists constituted roughly one‑third of the total wage bill, while the wages for the other 602 employees accounted for the remaining two‑thirds. If the Wage Board’s decision were implemented, the petitioners would face additional liabilities solely for the working journalists. These liabilities would include an approximate increase of Rs 2,16,000 in the annual wage bill, arrears amounting to Rs 1,89,000 for the period from 2 May 1956 to 30 April 1957, a past gratuity liability of Rs 2,65,000 as of 31 March 1957, and a recurring annual gratuity liability of Rs 28,000. The aggregate liability would therefore total Rs 6,98,000. The petitioners emphasized that these figures did not yet incorporate the additional burden arising from their contributions to the provident fund, leave rules and payments to part‑time correspondents, and that further recurring increases would occur because of the wage‑scale increments that the Wage Board prescribed for the various categories of working journalists.

The Court observed that if the increase in emoluments were also extended to those members of the staff who are not designated as “working journalists,” the petitioners would face an additional financial burden calculated as follows: an increase of approximately Rs 5,02,000 in the annual wage bill; arrears of payments amounting to roughly Rs 4,51,000 for the period from 2 May 1956 to 30 April 1957; a past liability for gratuity on 31 March 1957 estimated at about Rs 5,50,000; and a recurring annual gratuity liability of approximately Rs 60,000. Summing these components, the total additional liability would be Rs 15,63,000.

Regarding petition No. 116 of 1957, the petitioners were identified as Loksatta Karyalaya, Baroda, the publisher of the Gujarati daily “Loksatta.” The establishment employed fifteen working journalists. The Court noted that, as a result of the Wage Board’s decision, the annual wage bill for these journalists would need to be raised by Rs 10,800, and a retrospective liability of Rs 9,600 would also arise. In addition to these amounts, the Court recorded a recurring annual burden of Rs 6,340, which would cover expenses related to notice pay, gratuity, retrenchment compensation, and the extra cost of reduced working hours together with increased leave entitlements.

The Court then turned to petition No. 117 of 1957, filed by Sandesh Ltd., also described as the Sandesh Group of Ahmedabad. This group publishes several Gujarati periodicals, including the morning daily “Sandesh,” the evening daily “Sevak,” the weekly “Bal Sandesh,” and the monthlies “Aram” and “Sat Sandesh.” The total staff comprised 205 employees, of whom eleven were working journalists, seven were proof‑readers, and the remaining 187 were classified as other staff members. The Court held that, under the Act, the wage‑bill for the working journalists would increase by Rs 24,807 per year, with an equal amount of Rs 24,807 arising as a retrospective liability. Further, the decision would generate an additional expenditure of Rs 30,900 due to reduced working hours and increased leave and holidays, a past gratuity liability of Rs 31,597, a recurring annual gratuity of Rs 24,807, and a recurring wage increase of Rs 1,530 for the working journalists. Proof‑readers, who fall within the definition of working journalists under the Act, would incur a yearly financial burden of Rs 5,724. If the same benefits were extended to the non‑journalist staff, the annual increase in burden would be Rs 1,89,816. The Court calculated that the total cost of shutting down the operation, should that contingency arise, would be Rs 1,08,997 for the working journalists alone, compared with a liability of Rs 22,755 under the earlier regime. For the other staff members, the cost would be Rs 1,46,351, resulting in a total closure cost of Rs 2,55,349 under the new arrangement, versus Rs 1,69,106 under the old system.

In Ahmedabad, the petitioners identified in Petition No. 118 of 1957 are the publishers of two Gujarati periodicals: the daily newspaper Jansatta and the monthly magazine Chandni. Their combined workforce consists of fifteen employees who are classified as working journalists, six individuals employed as proof‑readers, and eighty‑seven other staff members, bringing the total number of employees to one hundred eight. According to the calculations presented, the increase in the wage bill that would be required for the working journalists amounts to twenty‑nine thousand eight hundred eight rupees. In addition, the employers would incur a liability of six thousand six hundred twenty‑four rupees for past gratuity, a recurring annual gratuity obligation of two thousand three hundred three rupees, and a yearly recurring wage increase of two thousand two hundred eighty rupees for those journalists.

The petitioners further explained that, based on the Wage Board’s decision, the financial burden attributable to the six proof‑readers would be six thousand four hundred eighty rupees per year. If the same benefits were extended to the remaining non‑journalist staff, the annual additional cost would rise by forty‑eight thousand seven hundred twenty rupees. Consequently, should a situation arise that required the closure of the publications, the total cost of such a closure, calculated under the provisions of the Act and the Wage Board’s decision, would be one lakh ninety‑eight rupees. This figure contrasts with the earlier estimate of forty‑five thousand two hundred six rupees that applied under the old basis.

The Court observed that all of the petitions filed by the various petitioners shared a common structure. After briefly summarising the historical background that led to the enactment of the contested Act and the Wage Board’s decision, the petitioners challenged both the constitutional validity of the Act and the legitimacy of the Wage Board’s determination. Their challenge to the Act was grounded on the claim that its provisions violated fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, specifically Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and 14. During the hearing, the petitioners also contended that Article 32 was infringed by the Act.

Regarding the Wage Board’s decision, the petitioners raised several objections that were essentially identical to those previously raised by employer representatives in their dissenting minutes before the Board. They further argued that implementing the Board’s decision would be beyond the petitioners’ financial capacity and would inevitably lead to their complete collapse.

In response, the respondents asserted that none of the fundamental rights protected by Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 14 or 32 were violated by the impugned Act. They maintained that the functions of the Wage Board were neither judicial nor quasi‑judicial, and that fixing wage rates constituted a legislative, not a judicial, act. The respondents also pointed out that the Board’s decision had been made after considering all criteria for wage fixation under section 9(i) of the Act, along with the material and evidence presented before it. They noted that a substantial portion of the Board’s determinations were unanimous, that the Board possessed the authority to set wage scales and to give its decisions retrospective effect, and that the petitioners’ financial situation was not such that compliance with the Act would cause their collapse.

The respondents had argued that the financial condition of the petitioners was not so precarious as to cause their collapse as a consequence of the operation of the impugned Act and the decision of the Wage Board. The petitioners had filed several petitions for special leave to appeal, namely Petitions Nos. 91 of 1957, 99 of 1957, 100 of 1957, 101 of 1957 and 103 of 1957, each of which sought leave to challenge the respective decisions of the Wage Board recorded as Petitions Nos. 323, 346, 347, 348 and 359 of 1957. The Court granted special leave in each of those petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution, while reserving the question of maintainability of the appeals for consideration at the hearing. The civil appeals that arose from the special‑leave petitions were directed to be heard together with the writ petitions, and consequently Civil Appeals Nos. 699 of 1957, 700 of 1957, 701 of 1957, 702 of 1957 and 703 of 1957 were placed on the same list for final disposal. before proceeding to the merits of the writ petitions, the Court elected to hear the writ proceedings first because they presented a broader and more comprehensive set of issues than the civil appeals filed by the parties. Counsel for the parties were then heard at length on the questions that required determination in the writ petitions.

Before addressing the constitutionality of the impugned Act and the validity of the Wage Board’s decision, the Court found it appropriate to set out the general principles governing wage fixation and the institutional mechanisms employed for that purpose in various jurisdictions. In broad terms, wages have been grouped into three distinct categories: the living wage, the fair wage and the minimum wage. The Court explained that the notion of a living wage has long influenced wage‑setting practices, whether by statute or by other means, in all economically advanced nations. Although the concept is old, most modern definitions have emerged only recently. The most expressive definition, according to the Court, was given by Justice Higgins of the Australian Commonwealth Court of Conciliation in the landmark Harvester case. Justice Higgins described a living wage as one suitable for “the normal needs of the average employee, regarded as a human being living in a civilized community.” He further clarified that such a wage must not only cover the basic necessities of food, shelter and clothing, but must also afford “a condition of frugal comfort estimated by current human standards.” In his own words, a living wage should be “sufficient to insure the workman’s food, shelter, clothing, frugal comfort, provision for evil days, etc., as well as regard for the special skill of an artisan if he is one.” In a later judgment, Justice Higgins noted that a wage failing to enable a worker to support a marital household of about five persons would not qualify as a living wage. This exposition set the foundation for the Court’s forthcoming analysis of the wage‑fixation scheme challenged in the present proceedings.

The Court observed that the phrase “living wage” had been defined in various statutes and reports. The South Australian Act of 1912 described a living wage as “a sum sufficient for the normal and reasonable needs of the average employee living in a locality where work under consideration is done or is to be done.” Similarly, the Queensland Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act stipulated that the basic wage payable to an adult male employee must not be less than an amount that is “sufficient to maintain a well‑conducted employee of average health, strength and competence and his wife and a family of three children in a fair and average standard of comfort, having regard to the conditions of living prevailing among employees in the calling in respect of which such basic wage is fixed, and provided that in fixing such basic wage the earnings of the children or wife of such employee shall not be taken into account.” In a Tentative Budget Inquiry carried out in the United States of America in 1919, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labour Statistics examined budgets using three concepts: (i) the pauper and poverty level, (ii) the minimum of subsistence level, and (iii) the minimum of health and comfort level, ultimately selecting the last concept as the basis for determining a living wage. The Royal Commission on the Basic Wage for the Commonwealth of Australia adopted this approach and, after conducting norms and budget enquiries, sought to define the minimum of health and comfort level. The Commission endorsed the following description of that level: “This represents a slightly higher level than that of subsistence, providing not only for the material needs of food, shelter, and body covering, but also for certain comforts, such as clothing sufficient for bodily comfort, and to maintain the wearer's instinct of self‑respect and decency, some insurance against the more important misfortunes—death, disability and fire—good education for the children, some amusement, and some expenditure for self‑development.” In the same vein, the United Provinces Labour Enquiry Committee classified living standards into four categories: (i) the poverty level, (ii) the minimum subsistence level, (iii) the subsistence‑plus level, and (iv) the comfort level, and it selected the subsistence‑plus level as the foundation for what it termed the “minimum living wage.” The Bombay Textile Labour Inquiry Committee of 1937 examined the living‑wage standard in detail and, while accepting the concept described above, remarked that “what we have to attempt is not an exact measurement of a well‑defined concept. Any definition of a standard of living is necessarily descriptive rather than logical. Any minimum, after all, is arbitrary and relative. No completely objective and absolute meaning can be attached to a term like the ‘living wage standard’ and it has necessarily to be judged in the light of the circumstances of the particular time and country.” The Committee then proceeded through the

The Court observed that the appropriate method for fixing a basic wage was to use norms and standard budgets so that the wage would approximate the living‑wage standard, taking into account the circumstances of the particular time and country. It then quoted the Minimum Wage‑Fixing Machinery of the International Labour Office, which noted that different countries had produced various estimates of a living wage and that those estimates depended on the point of view of the investigator. The ILO further explained that such estimates could be placed in at least three categories: (i) the amount required for mere subsistence; (ii) the amount required for health and decency; and (iii) the amount required to provide a standard of comfort. From this summary, the Court pointed out that there was a broad consensus that a living wage should enable a male earner to provide for himself and his family not only the bare essentials of food, clothing and shelter but also a modest level of comfort. That modest comfort included education for the children, protection against ill‑health, fulfillment of essential social needs and some insurance against major misfortunes such as old age, as reflected in the Report of the Committee on Fair Wages (1947‑1949). The Court further noted that Article 43 of the Constitution, as a Directive Principle of State Policy, directed the State to endeavour, by suitable legislation or any other means, to secure to all workers a living wage, working conditions that ensured a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure, social and cultural opportunities. This provision represented the ideal that the social‑welfare State should strive to achieve in order to improve workers’ living conditions. Regarding the concept of a minimum wage, the Court referred to the International Convention of 1928, which required the establishment of minimum‑wage‑fixing machinery in industries where no effective collective‑agreement mechanism existed and wages were exceptionally low. The Court explained that, although the living‑wage concept served as the target, even advanced countries tempered it with other considerations, such as the general wage level in other industries and the capacity of industry to pay. The Bombay Textile Labour Inquiry Committee had accepted this view, stating that the living‑wage basis provided an absolute external standard for determining a minimum wage, but that any award based on it was always moderated by practical considerations. Finally, the Court observed that, because India’s national income was very low at the time, it was generally accepted that the country could not afford, by law, a minimum wage that corresponded fully to the living‑wage concept described earlier.

In addressing the question of what level of minimum wage could be sustained by the present stage of the country’s economy, the Court noted that most employers and some provincial governments regarded the minimum wage as being limited to a bare subsistence wage. An important All‑India organization of employees had defined a minimum wage as “the wage which is sufficient to cover the bare physical needs of a worker and his family.” However, the Court observed that many other commentators considered that a minimum wage should also meet additional essential requirements such as a minimum standard of education, medical facilities and other amenities. The Committee on Fair Wages, in its report (pages 7‑9, paragraphs 8‑10), held that a minimum wage must not merely assure the bare sustenance of life but must also preserve the efficiency of the worker. Accordingly, it asserted that the minimum wage must provide for some measure of education, medical requirements and amenities. This formulation was described as the concept of “minimum wage” adopted by the Committee on Fair Wages. The Court further pointed out that variations of this concept existed. For example, in Australian industrial terminology a distinction was drawn between the basic wage and the minimum wage. The basic wage was explained as approximating “a bare minimum subsistence wage and no normal adult male covered by an award is permitted to work a full standard‑hours week at less than the assessed basic wage rate.” The basic wage was expressed as the minimum at which normal adult male unskilled workers could legally be employed, differing from legal minima fixed for skilled, semi‑skilled, piece‑rate and casual workers. By contrast, the minimum wage was defined as “the lowest rate at which members of a specified grade of workers may legally be employed” (O.D.R. Feenander, Industrial Regulation in Australia, 1947, Chapter XVII, page 155).

The Court then distinguished between a bare subsistence or minimum wage and a statutory minimum wage. It explained that the former represented a wage sufficient to meet the bare physical needs of a worker and his family, a rate that had to be paid irrespective of the capacity of the industry to pay. The Court asserted that if an industry could not pay its workmen at least a bare minimum wage, it had no right to exist. This principle was illustrated by a passage from Crown Aluminium Works v. Their Workmen ([1958] S.C.R. 651), which observed: “It is quite likely that in under‑developed countries, where unemployment prevails on a very large scale, unorganised labour may be available on starvation wages, but the employment of labour on starvation wages cannot be encouraged or favoured in a modern democratic welfare state. If an employer cannot maintain his enterprise without cutting down the wages of his employees below even a bare subsistence or minimum wage, he would have no right to conduct his enterprise on such terms.” The Court concluded that while a statutory minimum wage is the minimum prescribed by law and may be higher than the bare subsistence level, the latter remains a fundamental benchmark for assessing the legitimacy of wage arrangements.

The judgment noted that the statutory minimum wage was the amount prescribed by legislation and that it could exceed the bare subsistence wage, thereby providing for education, medical needs and other amenities as previously contemplated. It referred to the expression “minimum rate of wages” appearing in section 4 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (XI of 1948) for further clarification of the concept.

Regarding the notion of a fair wage, the Court recited the observation that payment of fair wages to labour constituted a cardinal recommendation of the Industrial Truce Resolution. It explained that Marshall would deem the prevailing wage in an occupation to be “fair” when it stood at a level comparable with the average remuneration for tasks in other trades of equal difficulty, disagreeableness, rarity of natural ability and expense of training. The Court also cited Professor Pigou’s classification of fairness into two degrees. According to Pigou, a wage was “fair in the narrower sense” when it equaled the current rate for similar workmen in the same trade and locality, and it was “fair in the wider sense” when it matched the predominant rate for comparable work across the nation and the broader spectrum of trades.

The Court then presented the viewpoint of the Indian National Trade Union Congress, which held that wages fixed by collective agreements, arbitrators or adjudicators could serve only as a starting point, akin to a minimum wage. It added that whenever an industry’s capacity to pay a higher wage was established, that higher amount should be regarded as the fair wage. The Congress maintained that the minimum wage should disregard industry capacity and be based solely on the needs of the worker and his family, describing a “fair wage” as a step toward the progressive realization of a living wage. The Court observed that several employers, while initially linking fair wages closely to current wages, were prepared to accept that prevailing rates could be enhanced in line with an industry’s ability to pay, and that over time the fair wage would increasingly approach a living wage.

Finally, the Court recorded the opinion of the Government of Bombay, which possessed considerable experience in wage regulation. That opinion asserted that nothing short of a living wage could be considered a fair wage when competitive conditions demonstrated an industry’s capacity to pay a full living wage. The Government described minimum‑wage standards as establishing an irreducible floor below which no worker should be paid, and explained that a fair wage was set above this floor and moved progressively toward a living wage. The Court concluded that while the lower limit of a fair wage was clearly the minimum wage, the upper limit was determined by the capacity of industry to pay, a factor that would depend on both present economic conditions and future prospects.

In the discussion the Court observed that the upper limit of a fair wage is determined by what may be described in general terms as the capacity of industry to pay. That capacity is said to depend not merely on the industry’s present economic condition but also on its future prospects. Consequently, between the minimum wage at the lower end and the fair‑wage ceiling, the actual wage to be fixed must take into account a number of relevant considerations. The Court listed these considerations as follows: the productivity of labour; the prevailing rates of wages for the same or similar occupations in the same or neighbouring localities; the overall level of national income together with its pattern of distribution; and finally the position of the particular industry within the economy of the country, as recorded in the Report of the Committee on Fair Wages (pages 4, 9‑11, paragraphs II‑15). The judgment then noted that the concept of a “fair wage” functions as a midpoint between a living wage and a minimum wage, and that even the minimum wage referred to earlier is intended to be more than a mere subsistence wage. The minimum wage, according to the Court, must be sufficient to meet the basic physical needs of the worker and his family, must preserve the worker’s efficiency, and must also allow for a modest degree of education, medical care and other amenities. The Court further explained that this idea of a minimum wage is consistent with contemporary thinking in all civilized nations and approximates the statutory minimum wage that the State is obliged to pursue in accordance with the Directive Principle of State Policy previously mentioned. The enactment of the Minimum Wages Act of 1948 was cited as an illustration of an attempt to give effect to a statutory minimum wage. That Act authorised the appropriate Government to fix different minimum rates of wages for different scheduled employments, for different classes of work within the same scheduled employment, for adults, adolescents, children and apprentices, for different localities, and also permitted the rates to be fixed for any period of time such as by the hour, by the day or by any longer period as may be prescribed. The Court observed next that the meanings of the terms “minimum wage”, “fair wage” and “living wage” are not fixed or static; they vary over time. As the national economy grows and standards of living improve, the conception of each category of wage is likely to become more expansive and progressive. Nevertheless, the Court cautioned that while a bare subsistence wage must be fixed regardless of an industry’s ability to pay, the minimum wage contemplated by statute assumes that the industry possesses the capacity to meet that level, and any wage fixation that disregards this essential factor could not be justified. Finally, the judgment raised the question of whether the fixing of rates of wages also entails the fixing of scales of wages, and indicated that this issue required further consideration.

The Court explained that the terms “rates of wages” and “scales of wages” conveyed distinct meanings. It observed that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defined “wages” as “all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a workman in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment.” The Minimum Wages Act, 1948 employed a similar definition, thereby encompassing every payment made periodically to a workman during the course of his employment, not merely the initial amount at the start of the job. The Court further noted that the Concise Oxford Dictionary defined “wages” in the same way: “Amount paid periodically, especially by the day or week or month, for time during which workman or servant is at employer’s disposal.” Regarding the word “rate” in the phrase “rates of wages,” the Court clarified that the term did not limit the expression’s scope. The Concise Oxford Dictionary described “rate” as “a statement of numeral proportion prevailing or to prevail between two sets of things either or both of which may be unspecified, amount, etc., mentioned in one case for application to all similar ones, standard or way of reckoning (measure of) value, etc.” The Twentieth Century Dictionary added that “rate” meant “estimated amount or value” and also “amount determined according to a rule or basis; a standard; a class or rank; manner or mode.” Consequently, the Court held that “rates of wages” referred to the manner, mode, or standard by which remuneration for work was paid, whether at the commencement of employment or at later stages. Thus, rates of wages included scales of wages, and there was no contradiction between the two expressions; the term applied both to the initial and subsequent wage amounts. The Court acknowledged that some Industrial Tribunal decisions specifically mentioned fixing scales of pay, such as in disputes involving certain banking companies and their workers, but it rejected the view that this specific reference excluded scales of wages from the broader concept of rates of wages. The Court affirmed that even without an explicit mention of scales, a tribunal could fix them when addressing the fixation of rates of wages. It also recalled that Industrial Tribunals had consistently required that any increase in wages or scales be fixed only after considering the industry's capacity to pay. In Britannia Building & Iron Co. Ltd. ([1954] 1 L.L.J. 651, 654), the Court noted that as scales rise, the wage bill grows each year and is reflected in production costs; therefore, such scales should not be imposed unless the employer’s present capacity and future financial stability are established. This principle, reiterated in Union Drug Co. Ltd. ([1954] 1 L.L.J. 766, 767), emphasized that incremental scales must be sustainable by the employer over a considerable period. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the requirement to assess the industry’s capacity to pay did not change its earlier construction that rates of wages encompassed scales of wages, and accordingly, fixing rates of wages necessarily involved fixing scales of wages as well.

The Court explained that a wage increment or a scale of remuneration could not be imposed on an employer of industrial labour unless it was shown that the employer possessed the present capacity to pay and that its financial capacity could be relied upon in the future; consequently both financial ability and stability were required conditions. The Court cited the decision in Britannia Building & Iron Co. Ltd., where it was held that scales of wages should not be forced upon an employer unless the employer’s present capacity to pay and its future financial reliability were established, emphasizing that financial ability and stability were essential prerequisites. In a similar vein, the Court referred to the judgment in Union Drug Co. Ltd., which observed that before incremental scales could be imposed by adjudication, it was necessary to determine whether the employer could bear the burden, and that the company’s financial condition must indicate that it would be able to meet the increments year after year for a substantial period, because settled wage scales were intended to be long‑term schemes. The Court noted that this consideration of the industry’s capacity to pay did not conflict with the earlier construction that the term “rates of wages” includes “scales of wages,” and therefore the fixation of rates of wages necessarily encompassed the fixation of scales of wages. The Court further pointed out that statutory minimum‑wage provisions in Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania actually prescribe scales of wages that are graduated according to age and experience. Recognising that the capacity of the industry to pay is a fundamental ingredient in wage fixation, the Court turned to the various methods of measuring such capacity. It identified three possible meanings of the capacity of industry to pay: (i) the capacity of a particular unit—whether marginal, representative or average—to pay; (ii) the capacity of a particular industry as a whole to pay; and (iii) the capacity of all industries in the country to pay. The Court observed that ideas on this subject have differed from country to country. In New Zealand and Australia, the capacity to pay is calculated with reference to all industries in the country, without special concessions for depressed industries. The Australian Arbitration Court, faced with the absence of a clear means of measuring the general wage‑paying capacity of total industry, held that the actual wage sustaining a well‑situated labourer’s average family unit could justifiably be taken as the criterion of what industry could probably pay to all labourers, describing this as a secondary definition of capacity that merely shows that certain industries or units could afford to pay as much as others. The Court then quoted the Bombay Textile Labour Inquiry Committee, which concluded that the term “capacity to pay” could not be defined precisely and remarked that the capacity to pay a wage could not be determined merely by the value of production. The Committee stressed that it was necessary to determine the charges that must be deducted before arriving at the amount that could be paid in wages, noting the theoretical and practical difficulties in identifying a large number of such charges, including interest, remuneration to salaried staff and managing agents, sales commissions and profits, all of which could not be predetermined in a fixed manner for a large organised industry.

The Committee observed that calculating the amount that can be paid as wages requires first identifying the various charges that must be deducted from total earnings. It noted that this task is fraught with both theoretical and practical difficulties because items such as interest charges, remuneration to salaried staff and managing agents, sales commissions and profits cannot be fixed in advance for any large organised industry. Moreover, the Committee said it could not be assumed that representatives of labour would accept the existing levels of expenditure on these items without challenge, especially when the overall management of the industry might be called into question. While acknowledging these complexities, the Committee expressed the view that the capacity to pay should not be measured by looking at a single establishment. Instead, it held that the principal yardstick ought to be the profit‑making capacity of the industry as a whole within the entire province.

In further elaboration, the Committee cautioned against using the capacity of an isolated unit or the capacity of all industries nationwide as the basis for wage determination. It argued that the appropriate benchmark is the capacity of a specific industry operating in a defined region, and that, wherever practicable, the same wages should be prescribed for every unit of that industry within that region. Recognising that a wage‑fixing board cannot feasibly assess the capacity of each individual unit, the Committee recommended adopting a fair cross‑section of the industry as the only practical method. Consequently, it concluded that the industry’s capacity to pay should be gauged on an industry‑and‑region basis after selecting a representative sample. In certain cases, the Committee allowed that it might be permissible to subdivide the industry into suitable classes and evaluate the capacity to pay on a class‑by‑class basis. Regarding the measurement of capacity, the Committee identified two opposing perspectives. The first perspective advises that the wage‑fixing machinery, when assessing capacity, should consider (i) a reasonable return on capital and appropriate remuneration for management, and (ii) a fair allocation for reserves and depreciation to keep the industry healthy. The second perspective insists that a fair wage must be paid at any cost, provided that the wage does not impinge on the capital needed for the industry’s operation. The Committee emphasized that the aim is not merely to determine an abstractly fair wage but also to ensure that employment at existing levels is preserved and, where possible, increased. From this standpoint, the wage level must enable the industry to sustain production efficiently. Accordingly, the capacity of the industry to pay must be assessed with this critical consideration in mind, and the wages board should be tasked with ensuring that the fair wages it fixes for any particular industry are not set excessively high.

In observing the need to avoid excessive wage differentials that could prompt workers to move from one industry to another, the Court emphasized that such disparities would inevitably cause labour migration and could trigger industrial unrest not only within the affected industry but also across other sectors, as noted in the Report of the Committee on Fair Wages (page 14, paragraph 24). Consequently, the primary consideration that must guide wage fixation is that the industry should be able to sustain production efficiently, and the determination of wage rates should prevent labour movement caused by wide wage gaps while also ensuring that existing employment levels are preserved and, where feasible, expanded. Several methods have been suggested for assessing an industry’s capacity to pay, including the selling price of its product, the volume of output, the profit and loss statements of the business, the wage rates accepted by a substantial majority of employers, and the extent of unemployment that might be caused or intensified by an increase in wages. However, these tests are not entirely satisfactory. As E.M. Burns explained in Wages & the State (page 387), a proper inquiry must examine, among other factors, the elasticity of demand for the product because this determines how much of the additional wage cost an employer can shift onto consumers. It must also consider whether a higher wage would compel employers to streamline their organization so that they can absorb the increased cost without difficulty. Frequently, higher wages improve the efficiency of the lowest‑paid workers; the resulting boost in production should be weighed together with the product’s demand elasticity before judging an industry’s ability to pay. Moreover, unless one assumes that an industry’s capacity to pay excludes any reduction in the existing rate of profit, there is no justification for refusing to explore how far employers can be made to bear a higher wage without being driven out of business. This investigation would require analyzing the elasticity of capital supply and organizational capacity in that trade, the profit rates prevailing in other industries, the ease with which capital and organization might be transferred, the possibility of extending similar wage regulation to other trades, and the likelihood of capital and organizational talent migrating elsewhere. From this discussion, the Court distilled that the capacity of an industry to pay is an essential circumstance that must be considered when fixing wage rates, including the establishment of wage scales.

The Court observed that the rule requiring an employer to pay the same wage did not apply when the wage in question was only intended to provide bare subsistence or when it was a statutory minimum wage; in those situations the employer was obliged to pay the prescribed amount regardless of the industry’s capacity to pay. The Court then explained that, in all other cases, the capacity of an industry to meet wage demands had to be examined on a combined industry‑and‑region basis after obtaining a fair cross‑section of the enterprises operating in that field. Furthermore, the Court stated that the appropriate way to assess the industry’s ability to pay should include several factors: the elasticity of demand for the product, the possibility of tightening organisational arrangements so that higher wages could be afforded without difficulty, and the chance that improving the efficiency of the lowest‑paid workers would raise overall production, the latter being considered together with the product’s demand elasticity. All of these considerations were to be balanced against the overarching principle that the additional wage burden should not be so great as to force the employer out of business. The Court noted that these observations formed the guiding principles for fixing rates of wages and then turned to the question of what machinery should be employed to implement such fixation. It explained that the machinery for fixing wages could, in some instances, involve referring the matter to industrial tribunals or other bodies established under labour relations legislation; however, those bodies were primarily created to prevent and settle industrial disputes, whether actual or anticipated, and wage disputes were only one category of such matters. The Court emphasized that ensuring an adequate wage was a distinct objective that required the establishment of a specialised wage‑fixing board, whether a trade board or a general board. It observed that legislative enactments rarely fixed wage rates directly, although a few statutes did so, and that this form of wage regulation had become obsolete because of its inherent inflexibility. Finally, the Court described the constitution of wage‑fixing boards, noting that they naturally fell into two broad categories. The first category comprised boards that did not represent a single trade but rather represented all trades, with both workers and employers in general having representation. Examples cited included the Industrial Welfare Commission of Texas, the Minimum Wage Board of Manitoba, and the South Australian Board of Industry, each of which featured a mix of government officials, employer representatives, worker representatives and, in some cases, an independent member. The second category consisted of boards that represented a single trade, a part of a trade, or a group of allied trades; these boards were intended to be composed of specialists, and their membership was structured to include an equal number of employer representatives alongside the other members.

In the examples cited, the composition of wages boards included an equal number of employer and worker representatives, an impartial chairman, and, in some instances, additional members drawn from the public. Such structures were found in the British Trade Boards as well as in the South Australian, Victorian and Tasmanian Wages Boards, and in the advisory or wages boards established by many central commissioners in the United States and Canada, as noted in “Wages & The State” by E.M. Burns (p. 187). In the United Kingdom, where trade boards rather than general boards were created, the Minister of Labour appointed a board whenever he was convinced that a particular trade or industry lacked an adequate mechanism for effective wage regulation and that such a mechanism was necessary. The trade board was a relatively large body that comprised an equal number of employer and worker representatives together with a few independent members, including the chairman. Although the Minister made the formal appointments, the employer and worker representatives were selected on the recommendation of the relevant trade associations. The board first issued a public notice announcing its tentative proposals for fixing or revising a wage rate and invited objections or comments. After a two‑month notice period, the board took a final decision and submitted a report to the Minister, who was required to confirm the rate unless, for special reasons, he returned the recommendations to the board for further consideration.

The Wage Council Act of 1945 (8 & 9 Geo. VI, ch. 17) provided for the establishment of Wage Councils. Under this Act the Minister of Labour and National Service could issue a wages‑council order after reviewing any objections lodged against a draft order by persons who appeared to be affected. The Wage Council was authorised to conduct any investigations it deemed necessary and to publish a notice of its wage‑regulation proposals. Persons affected by the proposals could submit written representations, which the Council would consider. The Council could also make further inquiries and then forward its proposals to the Minister, either with amendments or without. The Minister would examine these proposals and issue an order that gave effect to them from a date specified in the order. The remuneration fixed by such wage‑regulation orders was termed statutory minimum remuneration.

Similar provisions existed under the Agricultural Wage Regulation Act of 1924 (14 & 15 Geo. V, ch. 37), which dealt with the regulation of wages by Agricultural Wages Committees and the Agricultural Wages Board. In Canada and Syria, a typical board consisted of five members, whereas in China the size of the board varied from nine to fifteen members. In all of these jurisdictions the boards were designed so that employers and workers received equal representation. In Canada the

Boards were required to inquire into the conditions of work and into the rates of wages. In certain provinces the boards possessed the authority to issue orders or decrees directly, whereas in other provinces the boards could only make recommendations that had to be submitted to the Lieutenant Governor, who then issued the appropriate orders. In the United States of America some state statutes stipulated that the representatives of employers and workers should be elected, but in the majority of the states the administrative authorities were empowered to make direct appointments to the boards. Once constituted, those boards were authorized to conduct inquiries, to call for records, to summon witnesses, and to make recommendations concerning minimum wages. Several American statutes imposed a time‑limit within which proposals had to be submitted. The administrative authority could either accept a report or reject it and return it for reconsideration, or it could establish a new board to examine the matter anew. Certain statutes further provided that if a report was not accepted, the issue had to be referred again either to the same wages board or to a newly formed wages board. (Report of the Committee on Fair Wages, p. 26, para. 50).

The entire procedure for determining wages in the United States was outlined in two Supreme Court decisions: Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & M.R. ([1912] 227 U.S. 88; 57 L.Ed. 431) and Opp. Cotton Mills Inc. v. Administration. ([1940] 312 U.S. 126; 85 L.Ed. 624). Under the Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938, the Administrator was required to convene industry committees for each sector; these committees periodically recommended the minimum rate or rates of wages that employers should pay. The committee was to advise the Administrator on the highest minimum wage rates for the industry that, after taking into account economic and competitive conditions, would not substantially reduce employment. Following such recommendation, wage orders could be issued by the Administrator after giving due notice to all interested persons and providing them an opportunity to be heard. In Australia, each state had provisions for appointing wage boards, though the details of those provisions were not discussed. The discussion focused on the wage board system in Victoria, which was created in 1896 as a mechanism for directly regulating wages and working conditions in “sweating” industries, without intending to manage industrial relations generally. Under the Factories and Shops Act, 1924, wage boards were established for various industries, and a Court of Industrial Appeals was designated to hear appeals from wage board determinations. Where no special wage board existed, the General Wages Board governed the industry; it comprised two employer representatives nominated by the Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers, two employee representatives nominated by the Melbourne Trade Hall Council, and a chairman who was either agreed upon by the four members or appointed by the Minister for Labour. (Kenneth F. Walker, “Industrial Relations in Australia”).

The Court noted that, in the majority of cases, wage boards are constituted with an equal number of representatives of employers and representatives of employees, and they also include one or more independent persons, of whom one is appointed as the chairman. Regarding the situation in India, the Court reproduced a summary that described the history of wage‑fixation in the country as a very recent development. The summary stated that there was practically no effective machinery for the settlement of industrial disputes or for fixing wages until the last war. It mentioned that the first important legislation for dispute settlement was the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act of 1938, which created an Industrial Court, although the Act had limited application and the Court was not entrusted with the power to fix or regulate wages. During the war, state intervention became necessary, and numerous adjudicators were appointed to decide trade disputes under the Defence of India Rules. The Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 was identified as the first all‑India measure for the settlement of industrial disputes, and under that Act various tribunals have issued awards regulating wages in several important industries. The summary further explained that the first legislation specifically aimed at regulating wages was the Minimum Wages Act of 1948, which applied only to the so‑called sweated industries where labour was largely unorganised and working conditions were considerably worse than in organised industry. Under that Act the appropriate Government either appoints a Committee to hold enquiries and advise on fixing minimum rates of wages, or, if it already possesses sufficient material, publishes its proposals for wage fixation in the official gazette and invites objections. The Government then fixes the minimum rates of wages after receiving the Committee’s recommendations or public objections. The summary pointed out that the Act provides no provision for any appeal, but establishes an advisory board in each province to coordinate the work of the various committees, and also a Central Advisory Board to coordinate the work of the provincial boards. It added that complaints of non‑payment of the minimum rates of wages fixed by the Government may be presented to claims authorities, and that breaches of the Act are punishable by criminal courts. The Court observed that it is noteworthy that the committees, sub‑committees, advisory board and central advisory board mentioned in the Act are to be composed of persons nominated by the Central Government, representing employers and employees in the scheduled employments in equal numbers, together with independent persons who may not exceed one‑third of the total membership; one of those independent persons is to be appointed as the chairman by the appropriate Government. Finally, the Court quoted a recent amendment to the Bombay Industrial Relations Act of 1946, which allows wage boards to be established in the Province of Bombay either separately for each industry or for a group of industries, and requires that each wage board consist of an equal number of employer and employee representatives.

The committee explained that each wage board was composed of representatives of employers, representatives of workers, and a number of independent persons, including a Chairman, all of whom were nominated by the Government. The board was empowered to decide disputes that concerned reduction in the number of persons employed, rationalisation or other efficiency measures, wages, the period and mode of payment, hours of work and leave with or without pay. The committee further observed that once a matter had been referred to a wage board, no proceedings could be started or continued before a conciliator, a conciliation board, a labour court or an industrial court. The wage boards were authorised to constitute committees for local areas for the purpose of making enquiries. The Government was required to declare the decisions of the wage boards binding; however, if the Government considered it inexpedient on public grounds to give effect to the whole decision or any part of it, the matter had to be placed before the Provincial Legislature, and the Legislature’s decision would then be binding. The committee noted that a provision existed for filing appeals from the decisions of the wage boards to the Industrial Court. (Report of the Committee on Fair Wages, p. 27, para. 52). 122. The committee also recorded that the wage boards were placed under the superintendence of the Industrial Court.

The committee then turned to Recommendation 30, which concerned the application of minimum‑wage‑fixing machinery as suggested by the International Labour Office in 1949. The recommendation stated that whatever form the minimum‑wage‑fixing machinery might take – for example, a trade board for individual trades or a tribunal – it should operate by investigating the relevant conditions in the trade or part of the trade concerned and by consulting the interests primarily affected, namely the employers and the workers in that trade. The recommendation further required that the views of both employers and workers on all matters relating to fixing the minimum rate of wages should be solicited and given full and equal consideration. It added that, to give greater authority to the rates fixed, the general policy should be that employers and workers, represented in equal numbers or with equal voting strength, should jointly take a direct part in the deliberations and decisions of the wage‑fixing body. Where representation was given to one side, the other side should be represented on the same footing, and the wage‑fixing body should also include one or more independent persons whose votes could break a tie between employer and worker representatives. The recommendation further suggested that these independent persons should, as far as possible, be selected in agreement with or after consultation with the employer and worker representatives on the wage‑fixing body. 123.

The Court observed that where organisations representing employers and workers exist, those organisations must be invited to submit the names of individuals they recommend for appointment to the wage‑fixing body. It further held that the independent persons referred to in paragraph (a) should be chosen from men or women who are recognised as possessing the qualifications required for the duties of the body and who are free from any interest in the trade that could call their impartiality into question.

In discussing the system of establishing trade boards, the Court referred to the appraisal made by the Committee on Fair Wages. The Committee noted that a trade board benefits from expert knowledge of the special problems of the trade for which it is created and is therefore in a good position to devise a wage scheme suited to the conditions prevailing in that trade. However, the Committee also pointed out a limitation of the system: because there is no single authority to coordinate the activities of the various boards, wide disparities may arise between the scales sanctioned for similar industries. By contrast, a general board can ensure coordination but lacks the competence of a trade board to appreciate the special problems of each trade. The Committee cited the Bombay Textile Labour Inquiry Committee, which reported that the trade‑board system is best suited to Indian conditions, particularly because trade boards function mainly through discussion and conciliation, and only in exceptional cases must the deciding votes of the Chairman and the independent members be exercised (Report of Committee on Fair Wages, p. 27, para. 53). From this discussion the Court concluded that a wage board dealing with a particular trade or industry, composed of an equal number of employer and employee representatives together with one or more independent members, one of whom serves as Chairman, is the most appropriate mechanism for arriving at a proper fixation of wages in that industry.

The Court then turned to the principles that should guide such a wage board once it is appointed. It stated that the appointing authority must lay down clear principles for wage fixation. To illustrate the international perspective, the Court cited a passage from “Minimum Wage – An International Survey – I.L.O. Geneva, 1939,” which summarises the position in various countries. The passage explains that the fundamental principle of the Australian system, both at the Commonwealth and State levels, is the concept of a living wage. Even where legislation does not expressly mention this principle, its importance remains great in practice. As a criterion for wage regulation, the principle of the living wage is described as a vague and general indication of the purpose of the legislation, leaving the widest possible discretion to the wage‑fixing tribunals. In the Commonwealth context, the legislation indeed leaves the Court completely free to determine the principles on which the basic or living wage is to be assessed.

In this discussion, the Court observed that it was completely free to decide the principles on which the basic or living wage should be assessed. Certain State statutes, however, supplied specific but limited directions that were intended to guide that determination in a more defined manner. For example, legislation in Queensland defined the family unit and required that the basic wage be calculated on the basis of the needs of that unit. In some situations the general focus on the workers’ needs was supplemented by instructions to set wage rates that were described as “fair and reasonable”. Those instructions also required consideration of the average standard of comfort enjoyed by workers in the same locality or in similar occupations. Such references, it may be noted, implicitly alluded to general economic conditions and the capacity of industry to pay, because current standards of comfort were closely linked to those factors. In at least one Queensland case, the Court was expressly directed to examine the probable effects of its decisions on industry and on the community at large. Section 128 introduced the United States Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938, which set out principles to guide industry committees convened by the Administrator under that Act. The Act required the committee to recommend to the Administrator the highest minimum wage rates for the industry that, taking due regard to economic and competitive conditions, would not substantially curtail employment in that industry. The Act further provided that no classification or minimum wage rate should be fixed solely on a regional basis, and that the industry committee and the Administrator must consider several relevant factors.

The first factor considered competitive conditions, which were affected by transportation costs, living expenses, and production costs. The second factor involved wages established for comparable work by collective labour agreements negotiated between employers and employees of their own choosing. The third factor required looking at wages paid for comparable work by employers who voluntarily maintained minimum wage standards in the industry. Additionally, the Act expressly prohibited making any classification or fixing any minimum wage rate on the basis of age or sex. Section 129 noted that the normal rule was to leave a wide discretion to the tribunals responsible for fixing wages. The reason was that these tribunals were composed of equal numbers of employer and employee representatives, enabling them to best appreciate the whole situation and reach correct results. Section 130 introduced the heading “Procedure to be followed” and indicated that the procedure for wage boards was equally flexible. Section 131 explained that the wage councils and central coordinating committees appointed under the United Kingdom Wages Council Act of 1945 were each subject to any regulations that the Minister might make concerning their meetings and procedures. The same applied to the agricultural wages committees and agricultural boards created under the Agricultural Wages Regulation Act of 1924.

The Court observed that bodies such as wage boards possessed the authority to design their own procedural rules, including matters of quorum, as they deemed appropriate. In Australia, the wage boards were convened informally by the chairman whenever either the employer or the employee side requested a meeting. No statutory formalities or prescribed procedures were required for such gatherings. These meetings were normally held in the offices of the Department of Labour, where an officer of the department performed the duties of secretary. Consequently, the boards that were thus formed retained complete discretion to determine the manner in which they would conduct inquiries, and there was no obligation to enact any specific regulation governing their procedural conduct. Nevertheless, the Court noted that a series of safeguards existed to protect the interests of the parties involved. In the United Kingdom, for example, the wages councils created by the Minister of Labour and National Services were established only after the minister had taken into account objections raised by persons who might be affected by the council’s decisions. The councils then issued wage‑regulation proposals that were published in accordance with the prescribed method, after having considered written representations concerning those proposals. The minister examined the councils’ recommendations and would promulgate wage‑regulation orders only when satisfied that the recommendations were appropriate. The minister also retained the power to return a proposal to the council for reconsideration; if the council resubmitted its proposals, the same procedural steps were repeated as in the original submission. In the United States, the industry committees convened by the administrator were subject to the administrator’s scrutiny. The administrator gave notice to all interested persons and provided them an opportunity to be heard before approving any recommendations contained in the committees’ reports. When the administrator was fully convinced that the recommendations were proper, he approved them and gave them effect. If the administrator disapproved, he referred the matter back to the committees for further consideration and new recommendations. The administrator’s orders could thereafter be reviewed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals and, if necessary, could be further revised by the United States Supreme Court upon issuance of a certiorari or certification.

The Court further explained that, in certain Australian states, determinations made by special boards could be appealed to a Court of Industrial Appeals and were also subject to challenge before the High Court. Similar protective mechanisms were incorporated in India’s Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Under that Act, the work of the various committees, sub‑committees and advisory committees was coordinated by advisory boards, and the activities of those advisory boards were in turn coordinated by a Central Advisory Board. The Central Advisory Board was entrusted with the responsibility of advising the Central Government on the fixation of minimum wage rates and on other matters covered by the Act, thereby ensuring that the minimum‑wage fixing process was guided by a multilayered system of review and consultation.

After the Central Advisory Board has furnished its advice, the appropriate Government proceeds to act on the fixation or revision of minimum rates of wages. If the Government wishes to fix the minimum rates without consulting the various committees or sub‑committees, it must publish its proposal by a notification in the Official Gazette so that persons likely to be affected are informed; subsequently the Government may fix the rates only after it has considered any representations made by the interested parties. The wage boards created under the amended Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, are placed under both the appellate and supervisory jurisdiction of the State’s industrial courts, and any party dissatisfied with a wage board’s decision may prefer an appeal before those courts. Even though safeguards exist against the wage boards’ determinations, the specific procedural steps they follow during proceedings are of little consequence, provided they collect adequate data and material to reach a proper conclusion on the matters referred to them. However, should a wage board at any time disregard the prescribed procedural regulations, or in the absence of such regulations adopt a method that runs contrary to the principles of natural justice, its decision would be deemed vitiated and could be set aside by the appropriate authority. Considerable disagreement exists regarding the character of the functions performed by these wage boards, giving rise to a controversy over whether their actions are administrative, judicial, quasi‑judicial, or legislative. This question is significant for two reasons: first, whether the wage boards’ decisions are amenable to judicial review; and second, whether the principle of audi alteram partem applies to their proceedings. If the wage boards’ functions are characterised as administrative or legislative, their decisions would not be subject to judicial review, would not be susceptible to writs of certiorari or prohibition under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, and would likewise fall outside the scope of special leave jurisdiction under Article 136. Moreover, their decisions would not be vulnerable on the ground that the audi alteram partem principle—no person shall be condemned unheard—was ignored, nor would the procedures adopted be judged contrary to natural‑justice principles. It is well settled that writs of certiorari and prohibition may lie only against judicial or quasi‑judicial acts, and consequently such remedies are available only to bodies and persons other than courts that exercise a judicial function.

In the strict sense, any body of persons that possesses legal authority to decide questions that affect the rights of individuals, and that bears a duty to act in a judicial manner, must submit to the controlling jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice. This jurisdiction is exercised through orders such as certiorari and prohibition, as explained in Halsbury’s Laws of England, third edition, volume II, page 55, paragraph 114. The statement emphasizes that the High Court’s supervisory powers extend to any entity whose functions are judicial or quasi‑judicial in nature.

The principle of audi alteram partem, which guarantees that no one shall be condemned unheard, is limited to judicial or quasi‑judicial proceedings. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council observed this limitation in the case of Patterson v. District Commissioner of Accra ([1948] A.C. 341, 350). In that decision, counsel argued that the provisions of section 9 amounted to a “mass punishment” of the inhabitants of the proclaimed district and relied upon the well‑known passage from Banaker v. Evans (16 Q.B. 162, 171), which states that “no proposition can be more clearly established than that a man cannot incur the loss of liberty or property for an offence by a judicial proceeding until he has had a fair opportunity of answering the charge against him, unless indeed the legislature has expressly or impliedly given an authority to act, without that necessary preliminary.” The Privy Council noted that this principle has been reiterated in numerous cases, culminating in Capel v. Child ([1832] 2 C. & J. 558), where Bayley B. observed that he knew of no case in which a man could be deprived of any part of his property without first being given an opportunity to be heard. The Lords further indicated that, in their view, the contested section did not contemplate any judicial proceeding, and therefore a decision adverse to the appellant did not violate the principles articulated in Banaker v. Evans (16 Q.B. 162, 171).

The distinction between legislative and judicial functions is further articulated in Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, eighth edition, volume I, chapter V, page 185. Cooley explains that, as a general rule, inquiries, deliberations, orders, and decrees peculiar to the legislative department must be judicial acts in nature, and they cannot simultaneously be both judicial and legislative. He underscores a marked difference between the employment of judicial tribunals, which decide the legality of claims and conduct, and legislative tribunals, which create the rules upon which such decisions must be based. According to Cooley, it is the province of judges to determine what the law is on existing cases, applying law to the facts, while it is the province of legislators to make new rules for regulating new controversies. In his description, the application of law by judges is a judicial act, whereas the enactment of new rules is a legislative act, highlighting the essential separation of powers between the two functions.

The Court explained that a rule which interferes with past or present circumstances and does not look wholly to the future fails to meet the definition of a law as “a rule of civil conduct,” because a rule of conduct cannot consistently apply to events that occurred before the rule was enacted. It further observed that judicial power is concerned with deciding private disputes between or regarding persons, whereas legislative power is meant to regulate public concerns and to make laws for the benefit and welfare of the State. The Court added that the enactment of private statutes, when lawful, occurs on petition or by the consent of all interested parties, and such statutes refrain from interfering with past transactions and vested rights. 145 The Court then cited a classic passage from the opinion of Justice Holmes in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. Ltd. (1908) 211 U.S. 210, 226‑227, 53 L.Ed. 150, 158‑159, stating: “A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule, to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power. The establishment of a rate is the making of a rule for the future, and therefore, is an act legislative not judicial in kind…” 146 The Court clarified that the relevant question does not depend on the character of the body that makes the decision, but on the character of the proceedings themselves. 147 It further held that the nature of the final act determines the nature of the preceding enquiry. 148 The Court referred to earlier authorities such as Mitchell Coal and Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1913) 230 U.S. 247, 57 L.Ed. 1472, 1482 and Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Green Garrett (1913) 231 U.S. 198, 58 L.Ed. 229, 239 for support. 149 However, the Court acknowledged a practical difficulty in categorising functions strictly as legislative or judicial because administrative agencies often perform functions that do not fit neatly into separate compartments. Citing the treatises of Stason and Cooper on administrative tribunals, the Court noted that “One of the great difficulties of properly classifying a particular function of an administrative agency is that frequently – and, indeed; typically – a single function has three aspects. It is partly legislative, partly judicial and partly administrative.” The Court illustrated this with the example of rate‑making, which has been described at times as legislative and at other times as judicial. In some respects the function involves purely executive or administrative powers; for instance, when the Interstate Commerce Commission fixes a tariff for a railroad, the function is viewed as legislative. Conversely, when the issue is whether a shipment containing a mixture of coffee and chicory should be charged the rate applicable to coffee or the lower rate applicable to chicory, the question is more nearly judicial. On the other hand, when the problem is merely the calculation of the total freight charges due for a particular shipment, the determination can fairly be described as an administrative act.

The Court observed that the difficulty of classifying the function of an administrative agency could be resolved by examining, in each appropriate case, whether the agency performed a function that was primarily legislative, judicial, or administrative, and then characterizing the agency accordingly. The Court referred to the decisions in Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., ([1908] 191 New York 123) and People ex rel. Central Park, North & East River R. Co. v. Willcox. ([1909] 194 New York 383) as authority for this approach.

In discussing the nature of wage‑setting bodies in the United Kingdom, the Court noted that several textbook authors had described the function of the wage board as legislative in character. It cited Robson’s Justice and Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., at page 608 (footnote), which identified a Wage Council as “a subordinate legislative authority” rather than an administrative tribunal. The Court also reproduced a passage from Griffith’s Principles of Administrative Law, page 39, which explained that the Wages Councils Act, 1945 authorized the Minister of Labour and National Service to create Wages Councils by order, and that such councils could submit detailed “wages regulations proposals” to the Minister, who then issued orders giving effect to those proposals. The passage recorded that in 1947, fifty‑five such orders were made covering thirty‑one different trades.

The Court further cited Barbare Wootton’s work “Social Foundations of Wage Policy; Modern Methods of Wage Determination,” page 88, where the author contrasted arbitration tribunals with statutory wage councils. Wootton explained that wage councils were composed of equal numbers of employer and worker representatives together with an independent chairman and, in some cases, additional independent members. By contrast, arbitration tribunals included representatives drawn from outside the industry whose disputes they resolved, with technical expertise supplied by assessors who did not partake in the final award. According to Wootton, this structural difference signified a legislative function for wage boards, which drafted industry‑specific regulations, and a judicial function for arbitration courts, which rendered judgments on matters submitted to them. The Court noted that the selection of industrial arbitrators who were not connected with the industries they adjudicated was intended to assure impartiality, similar to the guarantee of bias‑free decision‑making expected of judges.

Finally, the Court mentioned that the High Court of the Commonwealth of Australia had adopted a comparable view in Australian Boot Trade Employees Federation v. Whybrow & Co. ([1910] 10 C.L.R. 266, 318), where the court examined an award made by a wages board empowered by state legislation to fix minimum wages. The Court highlighted that Justice Issacs, at page 318, articulated a test for determining the character of such a function: if the dispute concerned the relative rights of parties based on past or present circumstances, the award resembled a judgment of an ordinary judicial tribunal; if the dispute concerned future rights and obligations, the determination created new rights and obligations and thus bore the character of a legislative act.

In the decision of Whybrow & Co. ([1910] 10 C.L.R. 266, 318), the Court examined an award made by a wages board that had been authorised by a State statute to determine minimum wage rates. The test for classifying the nature of the board’s function was articulated by Justice Issacs, and the Court quoted his passage at page 318 in the following terms: “If the dispute concerns the relative rights of the parties as they exist on the basis of past or present circumstances, the award is essentially a judgment, comparable to a decree that might be rendered by an ordinary judicial tribunal exercising ordinary judicial power, and the law applicable to the case must be observed. However, if the dispute relates to what the parties’ mutual rights and responsibilities shall be in the future – that is, if no present rights are being claimed or denied but a future rule of conduct is to be prescribed, thereby creating new rights and obligations with sanctions for non‑compliance – then the determination, whether termed an award, an arbitration, a decision, or otherwise, is fundamentally of a legislative character and is limited only by the law that authorises it. Conversely, where neither present rights are asserted nor a future rule of conduct is prescribed, but merely a fact is established that is necessary for the practical implementation of already admitted rights, the proceeding, although described as arbitration, is more accurately an appraisal or a ministerial act.”

Against this line of reasoning, it has been submitted that the decisions of the Wage Councils in Great Britain, presented as wage‑regulation proposals under the Wage Councils Act, obtain their legal force only through orders issued by the Minister to give effect to those proposals; absent such ministerial orders, the wage‑council determinations would remain merely recommendations without any legislative character. Regarding wage boards in the Commonwealth of Australia, it is noted that the Factories and Shops Act 1905 of Victoria provides that “Every determination of any Special Board shall unless and until so quashed… have the like force, validity and effect as if such determination had been enacted in this Act,” thereby conferring on the boards’ determinations the hallmarks of a legislative act. The discussion also references the United States Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938, under which wage orders finally approved by the Administrator are subject to judicial review by the Circuit Courts of Appeals, the District Courts of Appeals, and may be further reviewed by the United States Supreme Court upon certification. Finally, the Indian Minimum Wages Act of 1948 establishes committees, sub‑committees, advisory sub‑committees, advisory boards, and a central advisory board for fixing minimum wages, thereby creating a statutory framework for the determination of wage standards.

In this matter, the Court observed that the committees and advisory bodies that are created under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 prepare recommendations for the rates of wages applicable to each scheduled employment. These recommendations are then transmitted to the responsible Government, which, by publishing a notification in the official Gazette, fixes the minimum rates of wages. The Gazette notification serves as a formal sign that the Government has accepted the committees’ recommendations and gives them the force of law. The Court further noted that a recent amendment to the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 authorises the State Government, by means of a Gazette notification, to constitute one or more wage boards for any industry within the State. The amendment stipulates that such wage boards must follow the same procedural rules as the Industrial Court when conducting arbitration proceedings, and that any appeals from the decisions of the wage boards are to be lodged before the Industrial Courts. The Industrial Courts, possessing supervisory and control powers over the wage boards, ensure that the boards do not exercise any legislative functions. The Court recognised that the arguments presented before it fell into two opposing camps. On one side, it was argued that because the wage board determinations bind both present and future employers and employees once they are accepted and notified, the boards are performing a legislative function, echoing the reasoning of Justice Holmes. On the other side, it was contended that the statutory framework governing the boards may limit them to a more administrative or adjudicatory role. The Court concluded that it would be inaccurate to declare categorically that the wage boards’ functions are inherently legislative.

The Court explained that the true character of the wage boards’ functions must be discerned by examining the specific provisions of the statutes that create them. If a careful reading of those provisions shows that the boards are constituted solely to determine the future relationship between employers and employees with respect to wages, then there would be grounds to regard their activities as legislative. Conversely, if the statutes outline that the boards operate with powers and procedures similar to those of Industrial Tribunals, and that their decisions are subject to review by higher tribunals exercising judicial or quasi‑judicial authority, then the boards cannot be said to be exercising legislative powers. Accordingly, the Court held that the determination of whether a particular wage board performs legislative functions depends entirely on the relevant statutory language, and that no universal test exists to resolve the issue in every case. Moreover, the Court noted that even when the statutory construction indicates that the board’s functions are not legislative, a further inquiry is required to decide whether those functions are administrative in nature or possess a judicial or quasi‑judicial character. This subsequent classification is crucial because only if the functions are judicial or quasi‑judicial would the board’s decisions be subject to writ jurisdiction or the special leave jurisdiction highlighted earlier.

In this part of the discussion the Court examined whether the wage boards performed functions that could be described as quasi‑judicial rather than purely administrative, because only in the latter situation would their decisions be open to challenge under writ jurisdiction or the special leave jurisdiction previously mentioned. The Court noted that there was no doubt that these wage boards were not exercising purely judicial functions. They were not courts in the strict sense of the term, and the functions they performed could, at best, be characterised as quasi‑judicial. The fact that the wage boards were administrative agencies created for the purpose of fixing wages did not automatically give their functions an administrative character, and despite being administrative bodies they could nevertheless be exercising quasi‑judicial functions if certain conditions were satisfied. The Court then referred to the position summarised in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 11, pages 55‑56. That source explained that orders of certiorari and prohibition could lie against bodies and persons other than courts stricto sensu. Any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having a duty to act judicially was subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice, exercised by means of those orders. It was not necessary that the body be a court; an administrative body engaged in ascertaining facts or law could be under a duty to act judicially even though its proceedings lacked the formalities and practices of a court of law. The duty was said to arise when, after hearing evidence, the body had to decide on that evidence between a proposal and an opposition. Moreover, a body could be under a duty to act judicially, and therefore subject to control by such orders, even if there was no formal lis inter partes before it, provided it had to determine a question solely on the facts of the particular case and on the evidence before it, apart from any policy or extraneous considerations. The passage further explained that an administrative body whose decision was in whole or in part driven by policy questions might still be under a duty to act judicially during the decision‑making process. If, in order to reach its decision, the body had to consider proposals, objections and evidence, and at some stage there existed something resembling a lis before it, then at that stage the body would be under a duty to act judicially. Conversely, if an administrative body, throughout the process of reaching its decision, never faced any form of lis and considered the question only from the perspective of policy and expediency, it could not be said to be under a duty at any time to act judicially. The Court also referred to the decision of the Court in Nagendra Nath Bora.

In the case of Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, reported in the 1958 Supreme Court Reporter at page 1240, the Court explained that to determine whether an administrative body is exercising a quasi‑judicial function, two inquiries must be made. First, it must be ascertained whether the body is required to resolve evidence presented between a proposal and an opposition. Second, it must be examined whether the body is bound by a duty to act judicially when arriving at its decision. The Court observed that the duty to act judicially may arise in a wide variety of circumstances and that it is impossible to define the duty exhaustively. Accordingly, the presence or absence of such a duty must be decided in each case by looking at the specific facts, the construction of the relevant statute, and the general principles previously set out, as noted in paragraph one hundred fifteen of the same report. The decision in R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee ex parte R. A. Brand & Co. Ltd., reported in the 1952 Queen’s Bench at pages 413, 428, 429 and 430, further clarified when an administrative body can be said to have a duty to act judicially. That judgment held that the duty may arise under many different circumstances and that it would be both impossible and unwise to attempt a comprehensive definition. When a decision is that of a court, the duty to act judicially is clear unless the court is acting in a purely ministerial capacity, such as when justices grant excise licences. Conversely, when an administrative body’s decision is influenced wholly or partially by policy considerations, the duty may arise during the process of reaching the decision. If, in order to reach the decision, the body must consider proposals, objections and evidence, then a duty to act judicially attaches to that inquiry, a principle that underlies the decision in Errington v. Minister of Health, reported in 1935 at page 249 of the King’s Bench. The Court also referred to Rex v. The London Country Council, ex parte Entertainments Protection Association Ltd., reported in 1931 at pages 215 and 233‑4, noting that an administrative body tasked with ascertaining facts or law may be under a judicial duty even though its proceedings lack the formalities of a court. Likewise, the Board of Education v. Rice case, reported in 1911 at page 182 of the Appeal Cases, was cited for the same proposition. More recently, the Court has repeatedly held that certiorari lies to set aside decisions of rent‑control tribunals, despite the fact that such tribunals may decide on their own knowledge without requiring formal evidence or a hearing, as illustrated in Rex v. Brighton and Area Rent Tribunal, reported in 1950 at page 410 of the King’s Bench. The Court then contrasted this view by stating that if an administrative body, throughout its decision‑making process, never faces any lis and must consider matters solely from a policy or expediency standpoint, it cannot be said to be under a duty at any stage to act judicially, a principle that will be examined further in the subsequent discussion.

The Court observed that when an administrative body reaches a decision without any adversarial dispute before it and must evaluate the matter solely in terms of policy and expediency, the body cannot be said to be under a duty at any stage to act judicially; this position was compared with the authority in Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning ([1948] A.C. 87, 102). Counsel for the petitioners then vigorously argued that the functions performed by wage boards in fixing wage rates should be examined in the light of those principles. According to the petitioners, a genuine contest existed between employers on one side and employees on the other. The employees, they said, demanded that a statutory minimum wage be fixed and that wage scales be determined in a particular manner. The employers, by contrast, contended that the existing situation should be maintained or that a wage level considerably lower than the statutory minimum sought by the employees should be fixed, and that the wage scales should be set on a gradation much lower than, or at least different from, the employees’ proposal. Each side, the petitioners maintained, would advance certain factors that they regarded as material to the determination of wages; the employees would stress factors affecting them, while the employers would try to minimize the importance of those factors and would emphasise other considerations that they claimed to be determinative. This clash of positions, the petitioners argued, created a genuine proposition and opposition, giving rise to a lis between the parties. Consequently, the wage boards would have to decide these disputed points after collecting appropriate data and materials and after hearing evidence. The boards could accomplish this only by issuing questionnaires to all interested parties, gathering the responses, and conducting hearings. Thus, the petitioners concluded, the wage boards would necessarily be bound by a duty to act judicially, and the functions they performed would be of a quasi‑judicial character.

Respondents, however, put forward the opposite view. Their counsel asserted that the very composition of the wage boards violated the fundamental jurisprudential principle that no person should act as a judge in his own cause. This principle, the respondents cited, had been laid down by the House of Lords in the decision of Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning ([1948] A.C. 87, 102). According to the respondents, the presence of representatives of employers and employees on the board, together with an independent chairman and other members, meant that the board members would inevitably have a bias in favour of the side they represented. As a result, the respondents argued, the wage board could not be regarded as a legitimate judicial or quasi‑judicial body because its members were not independent of the interests they were called upon to adjudicate.

In the passage cited from page 103, a learned Lord expressed a desire that the term “bias” be used only within its correct context. He explained that, in his view, bias signifies a departure from the requirement of impartial justice that the law imposes on persons who hold judicial positions or who are commonly regarded as exercising quasi‑judicial functions, such as arbitrators. The rationale for this understanding, he said, is that a decision‑maker who must resolve a dispute between two or more parties must approach the matter with an independent mind and must not be inclined in favour of either side. The counsel for the respondents then argued that the wage board, being composed of representatives of employers together with representatives of employees, an independent chairman and other members, would inevitably be biased toward the interests of those they represent. Consequently, they contended that such members would lack the competence required of judges and that a wage board formed in this manner could scarcely be described as a judicial body. The Court recognised that these submissions possessed considerable merit; however, it noted that it was not required to render a final opinion on the issue of bias because the matter would ultimately be decided by reference to the earlier conclusion that the decision of the Wage Board itself was ultra vires. Nonetheless, the Court observed that regardless of whether the functions of wage boards are characterised as legislative or quasi‑judicial, the application of proper safeguards—such as those previously discussed, including the provision for judicial review or the adoption of procedures comparable to the recommendations of wage councils in the United Kingdom or the reports of advisory committees considered by the administrator under the Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938 in the United States—would eliminate any objection to the determinations made by the boards. In other words, when appropriate safeguards are in place, the determinations of wage boards cannot be challenged on the ground that the principles of natural justice have been violated. Having addressed the question of bias, the Court then turned to examine the extent to which the impugned legislation infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioners. The first right considered was that guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which confers on every citizen the freedom of speech and expression. The Court stressed that this guarantee must be read in conjunction with Article 19(2), which enumerates constitutionally permissible restrictions on the exercise of the right. Article 19(2), as amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 and applied retrospectively, provides that nothing in sub‑clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, nor prevent the State from making any law, insofar as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. The Court therefore indicated that any restriction on the freedom of speech and expression must fall within the four corners of Article 19(2); otherwise, such a restriction could not be upheld.

The Court observed that any restriction on the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a) must fall within the scope of Article 19 (2); otherwise such a restriction cannot be sustained. The Court further noted that the freedom of speech and expression necessarily embraces the freedom of the press. In order to illustrate the breadth of that freedom, the Court referred to passages from the report titled “Freedom of the Press – A Framework of Principles,” which was prepared by the Commission on Freedom of the Press in the United States of America. The report defines the general meaning of freedom as the ability of a person to use one’s powers of action (i) without external restraint or control and (ii) with whatever means or equipment are required for the action. It explains that the primary suggestion of the term “freedom” is a negative one, meaning the absence of external interference that might suppress or constrain an individual. To be free, therefore, is essentially to be free from arbitrary impediments, dominating powers, or authority. The report adds that, provided the unhindered person possesses all that is needed to act, the negative meaning remains the chief element of the concept. However, because freedom is intended for action and action is directed toward an end, the report states that a positive element of freedom lies in the ability to achieve that end. In this sense, freedom means having the command of the means necessary to accomplish a purpose; without the requisite equipment, freedom becomes a mockery. Consequently, the report formulates a conception of freedom of the press that incorporates both “freedom from” and “freedom for.” It declares that a free press must be free from compulsions of any kind—whether governmental, social, external, or internal—but acknowledges that persistent and distorting pressures, such as financial, clerical, popular, or institutional pressures, can become tantamount to compulsion and thereby erode effective freedom. The report further asserts that a free press must be free for the expression of opinion in all its phases and must be equipped with full command of technical resources, financial strength, reasonable access to sources of information both domestic and foreign, and the necessary facilities to bring information to the national market, so that it can grow to the measure of that market. The Court then remarked that Indian jurisprudence contains very few authorities that elaborate the nature, scope, and extent of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression as enshrined in Article 19 (1) (a).

In this matter the Court examined the scope of the guarantee of freedom of speech and expression contained in article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. The first decision that the Court considered was the case of Ramesh Thaper versus the State of Madras, reported in the 1950 Supreme Court Reports at page 594 and again at page 597. The case concerned a prohibition imposed on the entry into the State of Madras and on the circulation of the appellant’s journal under section 9 (1‑A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. Patanjali Sastri J, who then presided over the bench, observed at page 597 that there could be no doubt that the freedom of speech and expression embraces the freedom to propagate ideas, and that this freedom is secured by the freedom of circulation. He stressed that liberty of circulation is as indispensable to that freedom as liberty of publication, because without the ability to circulate a publication its value would be greatly diminished. He supported this view by referring to the United States decision Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877), and also to Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1937). The Court then turned to the subsequent decision of Brij Bhushan & Anr. versus the State of Delhi, reported in the 1950 Supreme Court Reports at page 605 and at page 608. That case dealt with the constitutionality of section 7 (i)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, which authorised the imposition of pre‑censorship on a journal. Patanjali Sastri J again delivered the majority opinion, stating at page 608 that the imposition of pre‑censorship on a journal clearly restricts the liberty of the press, which is an essential component of the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by article 19 (1) (a). He quoted Blackstone’s Commentaries, noting that the liberty of the press consists in the absence of any prior restraint on publication, and that freedom from criminal censure after publication is a separate matter. The Court concluded that these two judgments constitute the only decisions of this Court that directly interpret article 19 (1) (a). Both decisions affirm that freedom of speech and expression includes the freedom to disseminate ideas, that such freedom is assured by the right to circulate material, and that the liberty of the press is an indispensable part of the constitutional guarantee, characterised by the prohibition of any prior restraint on publication. The Court also observed that a substantial body of jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of the United States addresses the same concept of freedom of speech and expression. It cited the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that “Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.” Finally, the Court noted that the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression safeguarded by article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution is founded upon the principles expressed in the United States’ First Amendment, and that reference to the American decisions is appropriate for understanding the true nature, scope and extent of the right, notwithstanding earlier warnings against uncritical reliance on foreign authorities.

In discussing the breadth of the guarantee of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a), the Court observed that the provisions of Amendment I of the United States Constitution are relevant and that it is therefore permissible and appropriate to look to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court to gain a proper appreciation of the true nature, scope and extent of this constitutional right. This approach was recommended even though the Court had previously warned against reliance on American and other foreign authorities, as indicated in the earlier judgments of State of Travancore‑Cochin & Ors. v. Bombay Co. Ltd. (1952 S.C.R. 1112, 1120) and State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala (1957 S.C.R. 874, 918).

The Court then referred to the American case of Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1935 U.S. 297, 233, 249; 80 L.Ed. 660, 668), in which a statute imposed a licence tax on the business of publishing advertisements. The decision quoted at page 668 stressed that the purpose of the statute was not merely to censor the press, but to enable the government to prevent the free and general discussion of public matters, which is essential for preparing citizens to exercise their rights intelligently. The Court noted that, upon examination of the statute’s history and its contemporary application, it was struck down as unconstitutional because it was deemed a deliberate and calculated device, disguised as a tax, intended to restrict the circulation of information to which the public is entitled under constitutional guarantees.

The judgment also cited a dissenting opinion in The Associated Press v. The National Labour Relations Board (1936 U.S. 301, 103, 136; 81 L.Ed. 953, 963). The dissent argued that if press freedom does not include the right to adopt and pursue a policy without governmental restriction, then the term “freedom” is a misnomer. It further asserted that denying the press the ability to adopt a policy and to employ or discharge its agents freely amounts to denying the liberty to exercise uncensored judgment in hiring and firing decisions. The same opinion, at page 965, emphasized that constitutional guarantee requires that the publisher or the publisher’s agency be free from any restraint regarding employment in the editorial staff.

Finally, the Court mentioned Schneider v. Irvington (1939 U.S. 308, 147; 84 L.Ed. 155, 164), a case dealing with municipal regulations against littering of streets. The United States Supreme Court, at page 164, described freedom of speech and freedom of the press as fundamental personal rights and liberties. The Court clarified that these expressions are not empty phrases; rather, they reflect the framers’ belief that the exercise of these rights forms the foundation of a free government supported by a free press.

The Court observed that, consistent with many of its previous opinions, it is essential to avoid any restriction on the enjoyment of the liberties of speech and press. It cited the case of Thomas v. Collins, reported in 1944 at 323 U.S. 516, 545, and in the Lawyer’s Edition at 89 L.Ed. 430, 448, where the Court emphasized that the State must not interfere with this right. The judgment in Thomas v. Collins contains the following passage at page 448: “But it cannot be the duty, because it is not the right, of the State to protect the public against false doctrine. The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, speech, and religion. In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any Government to separate the true from the false for us.” The Court further referred to a compilation of United States Supreme Court decisions that appears in the 93rd volume of the Lawyer’s Edition at page 1151, which presents a summary under the heading “The Supreme Court and the right of Free Speech and Press.” At page 1153 of the same volume, the compilation includes the following excerpt under the sub‑heading “Right in General: Freedom from Censorship and Punishment”: “The freedom of speech and of press are fundamental personal rights & liberties, the exercise of which lies at the foundation of free Government by free men...... The very purpose of the first Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, speech, and religion; it rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.” The Court also noted the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Beauharnais v. Illinois, reported in 1951 at 343 U.S. 250, 285, and in the Lawyer’s Edition at 96 L.Ed. 919, 943, which contains at page 943 the following remarks: “There is room for regulation of the ways and means of invading privacy. No such leeway is granted the invasion of the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Until recent years that had been the course and direction of constitutional law. Yet recently the Court in this and other cases has engrafted the right of regulation onto the First Amendment by placing in the hands of the legislative branch the right to regulate ‘within reasonable limits’ the right of free speech. This to me is an ominous and alarming trend. The free trade in ideas which the framers of the Constitution visualised disappears. In its place there is substituted a new orthodoxy – an orthodoxy that changes with the whims of the age or the day, an orthodoxy which the majority by solemn judgment proclaims to be essential to the safety, welfare, security, morality, or health of Society. Free speech in the constitutional sense disappears. Limits are drawn – limits dictated by expediency, political opinion, prejudices or some other desideratum of legislative action.” From these authorities, the Court concluded that, in the United States of America, the freedom of speech includes the freedom of the press and that both freedoms are regarded as fundamental personal rights.

In the United States, the Court explained that both freedom of speech and freedom of the press were regarded as fundamental personal rights belonging to every citizen. The Court further observed that the press enjoyed protection on the premise that the broadest possible dissemination of information, drawn from a variety of sources that might even oppose one another, was essential for the public’s welfare. This extensive liberty, the Court said, formed the very foundation of a free government administered by a free people. The purpose of guaranteeing such liberty, the Court noted, was to keep public authorities from assuming the role of guardians over the public mind. In addition, the Court clarified that freedom of the press also encompassed the right to obtain or retain employment that was necessary for exercising the press function, meaning that journalists and editorial staff could not be subjected to restrictions that limited their employment or caused their unemployment. The Court reiterated that this conception of free speech and expression, as it existed in the United States, implied that no legislation could be enacted that would create prior censorship, limit the circulation of newspapers, or restrict the ability of editorial personnel to be hired or retained. Any such measure, the Court held, would infringe the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and therefore would be vulnerable to being struck down as unconstitutional. The Court, however, recognized that the press was not exempt from ordinary taxation required to support the government, nor from the ordinary statutes that governed industrial relations. In the case of Grosjean v. American Press Co., the Court observed that while newspaper owners were not immune from standard forms of taxation, a particular tax that had been used historically to suppress the press was not an ordinary tax. The Court explained that the primary aim of the immunity claimed in that case was to preserve an untrammeled press that could serve as a vocal source of public information. The Court noted that newspapers, magazines and other journals had historically illuminated public and business affairs more effectively than any other medium, and that an informed public opinion acted as a strong restraint on misgovernment. Accordingly, any suppression or reduction of the publicity afforded by a free press could not be viewed without serious concern. The Court further stated that the tax in question was objectionable not merely because it extracted money, but because, given its historical background and present context, it functioned as a deliberate and calculated device disguised as a tax, intended to limit the circulation of information to which the public was entitled under constitutional guarantees. The Court concluded that a free press acted as a principal interpreter between the government and the people, and that allowing it to be fettered would ultimately fetter the people themselves.

In the case of Labour Relations Board, reported at [1936] 301 U.S. 103, 136; 81 L.Ed. 953, 963, the Court held that the freedom of the press protected by the First Amendment was not infringed by applying to an editor employed by the Associated Press the provisions of the National Labour Relations Act that prohibited an employer from dismissing an employee because of union activities. The Court further noted on page 960 that the argument asserting any regulation safeguarding union activities or collective bargaining rights was automatically an unlawful intrusion upon press freedom “has no relevance to the circumstances of the instant case and is an unsound generalization.” In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, reported at [1942] 319 U.S. 105, 136; 87 L.Ed. 1292, 1311, the matter concerned a license fee imposed for the sale of religious books. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting on page 1311, observed that a tax on newspaper publishing was not unconstitutional merely because it affected the exercise of a constitutional right; such a tax would be invalid only if it singled out newspaper publishing for special burden or was imposed in a manner that encroached upon the essential scope of a free press. He added that, had the Court found the tax measures vulnerable on that ground, he would have agreed, but the Court had not reached that conclusion. The decisions in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, reported at [1945] 327 U.S. 186, 194; 90 L.Ed. 614, 621, and Mabee v. White Planis Publishing Co., reported at 1945 327 U.S. 178; 90 L.Ed. 607, applied the Federal Fair Labour Standards Act to the press. The Court, quoting page 621, explained that there was no discriminatory treatment of the press; the Act’s purpose was to place newspaper publishers on the same footing as other businesses, and the exemption for small newspapers served the same objective. Moreover, the Court stated that nothing in the Grosjean case, reported at [1935] 297 U.S. 233, 249; 89 L.Ed. 660, 668, barred Congress from exempting certain publishers based on size from a tax or regulation that would be valid if uniformly applied. Finally, the Legislative Reference Service’s analysis of the United States Constitution, on page 792, summarized that the Supreme Court, recalling that the American Revolution began when the English government imposed stamp duties on colonial newspapers, had remained vigilant to the potential use of taxation as a means of suppressing undesirable publications.

In this matter, the Court observed that persons who disseminate ideas are, of course, liable to ordinary taxes in the same way as any other individuals. However, when it comes to licence or privilege taxes, the situation differs. The privilege of publishing is granted by the Constitution and therefore neither a State nor the Federal Government could withhold it. The Court then noted, at paragraph 205, that the application of anti‑trust legislation, the National Labour Relations Act, or the Fair Labour Standards Act to newspapers does not diminish the freedom of the press. Continuing at paragraph 206, the Court stated that statutes governing the payment of wages have likewise been held not to infringe the freedom of speech and expression. In the same publication, the Court reproduced observations concerning minimum‑wage statutes, explaining that the theory that a law setting minimum wages for women and children violated due‑process by impairing freedom of contract had been rejected in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). The Court further cited Justice Douglas, who for the majority explained that the judiciary does not act as a “super‑legislature” to judge the wisdom of legislation or to decide whether its policy offends public welfare. Rather, state legislatures possess constitutional authority to experiment with new techniques, are entitled to their own standards of public welfare, and may, within very broad limits, regulate business‑labour relations provided that specific constitutional prohibitions are not violated and that there is no conflict with valid federal law, as affirmed in Day‑Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).

The Court clarified at paragraph 207 that, although the press cannot claim blanket immunity from general laws, it is impermissible to subject the press to statutes that would curtail freedom of speech and expression, restrict circulation, limit the means by which information is disseminated, or force the press to rely on government assistance. Laws that single out the press by imposing excessive and prohibitive burdens, thereby narrowing circulation, penalising the choice of instruments for exercising the right, preventing the establishment of new newspapers, or ultimately compelling the press to seek state aid, would be pronounced unconstitutional. Such statutes could not be justified under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The Court referred, at paragraph 208, to its earlier consideration of the scope of Article 19(2) in Brij Bhushan & Anr. v. State of Delhi ([1950] S.C.R. 605, 608), where Justice Fazl Ali, in a dissenting opinion, emphasised at page 619 that freedom of speech and expression is among the most valuable rights guaranteed to a citizen and must be zealously protected by the judiciary.

The Court stated that the right of free speech and expression was guaranteed to every citizen by the Constitution and therefore had to be protected with great vigilance by the judiciary. It further observed that open political debate was indispensable for the effective operation of a democratic system, and noted a contemporary tendency among scholars to disapprove of any form of censorship, while at the same time agreeing that “liberty of the press” should not be mistaken for “licentiousness”. The Court emphasized, however, that the Constitution itself prescribed certain permissible limitations, and that the judicial function was confined to determining whether a particular statute fell within those expressly enumerated limits. 209. Consequently, the Court held that any law passed by the legislature which did not squarely fall within the ambit of Article 19(2) could not claim the protection of the constitutional saving clause and would therefore be invalidated for infringing the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).

In the matter presently before it, the Court found that the sole rationale offered for the enactment of the challenged Act was that it sought to impose reasonable restrictions for the benefit of a specific segment of the public, namely working journalists and other employees of newspaper establishments. The Court observed that the Act did not correspond to any of the categories listed in Article 19(2), such as security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence. 210. Accordingly, with Article 19(2) ruled out, the only issue remaining for determination was whether any provision of the impugned Act in any manner diminished or restricted the petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. 211. The Court noted that counsel for the Union had argued that only legislation which directly dealt with the right mentioned in Article 19(1)(a) could be subject to the protection of that article, and that if a statute was not directly concerned with that subject, Article 19(1)(a) would not apply, the relevant test being the subject‑matter of the legislation rather than its effects. 212. Supporting this position, counsel cited the observations of Chief Justice Kania in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, wherein it was held that merely because a preventive detention order resulted in imprisonment, it did not automatically invoke the provisions of Article 19(1) relating to speech, assembly, and other freedoms, and that such reasoning could not be extended to punitive detention without proper justification. The Court concluded that the argument advanced by the Union could not succeed and that, in the absence of a valid saving clause under Article 19(2), the impugned Act was liable to be struck down for violating the petitioners’ constitutional freedom of speech and expression. 213.

In the discussion, the Court observed that permitting a broad narrowing of the freedoms listed in article 19(1) would render punitive detention imposed under various sections of the Penal Code—such as those dealing with theft, cheating, forgery or ordinary assault—unlawful. The Court stressed that such a sweeping conclusion does not automatically follow from the constitutional provision and that it must be avoided. According to the judgment, the Constitution does not intend to produce that result. The article, the Court held, must be interpreted without any preconceived ideas. The proper reading, the Court explained, requires that the legislation under scrutiny be directly related to one of the rights enumerated in the sub‑clauses of article 19. Where a statute expressly seeks to control a citizen’s freedom of speech or expression, or his right to assemble peaceably and without arms, the question then arises whether the statute is saved by the appropriate saving clause contained in article 19. Conversely, if the law is not directly concerned with any of those subjects, but only indirectly affects the rights because of the operation of another law—such as a law providing for punitive or preventive detention—then the issue of article 19’s applicability does not arise. The Court emphasized that the correct approach is to examine the directness of the legislation rather than the consequences of a detention that is otherwise lawful for the detainee’s conduct. On that limited basis, the Court concluded that the argument that article 19(1) is generally infringed in such cases must fail, and any alternative construction of the article would be unreasonable.

The opinion articulated above was expressed solely by Kania C.J.; the other judges of the Bench did not comment on the matter. Nevertheless, the passage was later cited with approval by a later Bench of this Court in Ram Singh & Ors. v. The State of Delhi ([1951] S.C.R. 451, 455). In that decision, the Full Court held that although personal liberty is a broad concept that encompasses the freedoms listed in article 19(1), and the deprivation of liberty would extinguish those freedoms, the Constitution treats those liberties as distinct fundamental rights and provides separate articles 19, 21 and 22 to prescribe the specific limitations and conditions under which each right may be curtailed or abridged. Accordingly, a law that restricts freedom of speech and expression for reasons other than the security of the State or its overthrow—such as a law enacted in the interests of public order—may not fall within the ambit of clause (2) of article 19 and therefore could be void. However, the Court also observed that an order of preventive detention cannot be declared invalid merely because the detention is intended to prevent the making of speeches that are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The case involved a detention under the Preventive Detention Act, where the order sought to stop the detainee from making such speeches.

In this case the Court observed that the prevention of speeches that were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order could not be justified under the limitation clause of Article 19(2) as it then existed, because public order was not listed among the categories of permissible restrictions. Consequently, any limitation placed on the freedom of speech and expression on the ground of public order could not be sustained; the only ground available at that time was the undermining of the security of the State or its overthrow. The Court therefore held that a restriction intended to preserve public order would not fall within the ambit of Article 19(2), and that even if the Court had found that the right to freedom of speech and expression had been infringed, the order could not be saved by invoking Article 19(2). Nevertheless, the Court adopted a different approach, concluding that the principal purpose of the order was preventive detention, not the curtailment of the freedom of speech and expression, which was merely a consequential effect of detaining the individual. On that basis the Court upheld the validity of the order. The Attorney‑General then argued that the object of the impugned Act was solely to regulate certain conditions of service of working journalists and other employees in newspaper establishments, and not to deprive the petitioners of their freedom of speech and expression. Accordingly, he submitted that the Act could not be said to fall within the prohibition contained in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 13(2) of the Constitution. On the other side, counsel for the petitioners contended that the Court must examine the true nature and character of the legislation, assessing its substance rather than its form, and consider its effect and operation. They submitted that, when viewed as a whole, the impugned Act was designed to regulate the employment of the essential organs of newspaper publications, thereby relating to the freedom of the press and consequently attracting the constitutional prohibition. To support this proposition, they relied on a passage from Minnesota Ex Rel. Olson (1930) 283 U.S. 697, 708, which states that when dealing with constitutional questions the Court looks at substance, not mere form, and that a statute must be tested by its operation and effect. Further reliance was placed on observations of Mahajan J., then a judge, in Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd. (1954) 674 S.C.R. at page 683, wherein he emphasized that the substance of legislation must be examined with rigor to determine the real action of the legislature, and that the Court should not be swayed by the superficial appearance of a law. He also noted that a legislature cannot evade constitutional prohibitions merely by adopting an indirect method to achieve the same result, and that the Court must look beyond names, forms and appearances to discover the true character and nature of the legislation.

In its observations, the Court emphasized that a legislature could not evade constitutional restraints by employing an indirect method that produced the same result; therefore the Court was required to look beyond the mere names, forms and appearances of the legislation to discover its true character and nature. The Act that was challenged, as its long title disclosed, was enacted to regulate certain conditions of service of working journalists and other persons employed in newspaper establishments. At the very forefront of the Act, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was made applicable to working journalists, subject to certain modifications relating to the operation of section 25F of that Act. The remaining provisions contained in Chapter II dealt with matters such as the payment of gratuity, the regulation of hours of work and leave, and the fixation of wages for the working journalists. Consequently, the primary purpose of the impugned legislation was the regulation of conditions of service for journalists. Chapter III of the Act extended the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and the Employees’ Provident Funds Act, 1952, to all employees of newspaper establishments where twenty or more employees were engaged, thereby covering both working journalists and other staff of the establishments. The miscellaneous provisions set out in Chapter IV were intended merely to give effect to, or to implement, the substantive provisions of the main part of the Act and did not alter its overall effect or operation. If this description accurately reflected the true nature of the statute, it was impossible to contend that the Act had been designed to affect the freedom of speech and expression enjoyed by the petitioners, nor that such an effect was its necessary outcome. It was conceded during the arguments that, had a general law relating to industrial or labour relations been applied uniformly to the press industry as a whole, no exception could have been taken to it. Likewise, if the question rested solely upon the application of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, or the Employees’ Provident Funds Act, 1952, to the working journalists, no exemption could have been permitted. Nonetheless, the counsel argued that, in addition to the application of these general statutes, the impugned Act contained specific provisions concerning the payment of gratuity, hours of work, leave and the fixation of wage rates that were uniquely tailored to the press industry as it applied to working journalists. Those provisions, they contended, created a class of privileged workers within the press, conferring benefits and rights not granted to other employees, thereby imposing a direct and preferential burden on the newspaper industry and tending to curtail circulation and narrow the scope of dissemination of information.

In this case, the Court observed that the provisions under challenge could restrict the flow of information, limit the petitioners’ freedom to select the manner in which they exercise their constitutional right, and could potentially weaken press independence by compelling reliance on governmental assistance. The Court noted that the primary purpose of the legislation was to improve the working conditions of employees in the newspaper industry, and that it would be impractical for the State to address all industries simultaneously; therefore, a phased approach targeting individual sectors was considered reasonable policy. It further explained that, even with respect to the workers themselves, it was sensible to identify a distinct class of employees who merited separate treatment in order to provide the benefits contemplated by the statute. Consequently, the Court held that such a classification did not, by itself, demonstrate an unlawful preference or prejudice against the press, since the overarching aim was the betterment of those workers’ conditions. The Court rejected any suggestion of a hidden motive behind the enactment, emphasizing that employers might have to shoulder a larger financial burden and that the industry’s operations could become somewhat more difficult, but these were merely incidental disadvantages that could arise in the future. The Court clarified that these adverse effects were not the legislature’s intention when it sought to improve workers’ welfare. While acknowledging that well‑off employers might absorb the added costs without difficulty, the Court recognized that marginal employers could face strain and, in extreme scenarios, might be forced to close their establishments; however, such outcomes were deemed extraneous and beyond the legislature’s contemplation. Therefore, the Court concluded that it could not be argued that the possible impact of the measures, even if they materialized in certain cases, would invalidate the legislation. The petitioners had projected several consequences, including a reduction in newspaper circulation, a narrowing of information dissemination, constraints on the petitioners’ freedom to choose their means of expression, and a risk that press independence would be compromised by the need to obtain government aid. The Court found these projected effects to be remote, contingent upon numerous variables, and not inevitable results of the statute. Unless such outcomes were direct and unavoidable consequences of the law, the Court held that the legislation could not be struck down on that basis. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the mere possibility of such an eventuality did not necessarily reflect the legislature’s intended purpose when enacting a measure intended to benefit the affected workers.

In discussing the purpose of the impugned Act, the Court observed that although the legislation was enacted to benefit working journalists employed in newspaper establishments, those journalists also functioned as the vocal organs and essential agencies for exercising the constitutional right of free speech and expression. Consequently, any statute that sought to improve the conditions of service for such journalists would inevitably affect newspaper establishments and, by extension, have repercussions on the freedom of the press. The Court therefore held that the Act could legitimately be characterized as a measure that impacted the press, and that if the intention, or the proximate effect and operation, of the Act were such as to bring it within the mischief that Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution aims to prevent, the legislation could be struck down. However, the Court noted a real difficulty for the petitioners: the measures enacted for the benefit of working journalists neither intended nor actually operated to take away or abridge the petitioners’ right to freedom of speech and expression.

The principal grievance of the petitioners concerning the impugned Act centered on the appointment of a Wage Board to fix rates of wages for working journalists. The petitioners contended that this provision created a class of privileged workers who would enjoy benefits and rights not afforded to other employees of industrial establishments. Moreover, they argued that the Act left the fixation of wage rates to an agency vested with arbitrary and unchanneled powers, thereby allowing the Board to impose an indeterminate burden on the wage structure of the press, to determine employer‑employee relations at its discretion, and to impose such burdens and relations for any period it deemed appropriate. The Court indicated that this contention would be more appropriately examined while considering an alleged infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g). It further remarked that, as regards Article 19(1)(a), the petitioners’ argument had only a remote bearing and therefore would not be discussed at length. The Court then turned to Article 19(1)(g), which enshrines the petitioners’ fundamental right to carry on any occupation, trade or business. This freedom, however, is subject to the limitations embodied in Article 19(6), which provides that nothing in sub‑clause (g) shall affect the operation of any existing law that imposes, or prevents the State from making, reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public. On this basis, the petitioners articulated their contention that the impugned Act imposed unreasonable restrictions on the freedom to carry on business. Specifically, they argued that the Act (a) empowered the fixation of rates of wages on criteria relevant only for the determination of minimum wages, and (b) empowered the fixation of wages in a manner that further restricted their business, points that the Court would consider in its subsequent analysis.

The Court noted that the legislation permits the grant of gratuity and compensation without obligating the Board to take into account the most important consideration, namely the capacity of the industry to make such payments. It further observed that the Act authorises the Board to consider factors that are not directly relevant to the determination of wages, but rather whatever the Board deems appropriate for its purpose. Moreover, the statute provides a procedure that does not require the Board to follow the rules laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, thereby allowing the Board to adopt any procedure, even an arbitrary one, that breaches the principle of audi alteram partem. The Court held that the restrictions enumerated above, insofar as they lead to the destruction of the petitioners’ business, go beyond the limits of permissible legislation under Article 19(1)(g). In addition, the Court emphasized the unreasonable nature of the restriction by pointing out that Section 12 of the impugned Act declares the Board’s decision binding on all employers, while the working journalists are not bound by the same decision. Consequently, if the journalists are dissatisfied, they may seek further revision by raising industrial disputes against their employers and having those disputes adjudicated under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The Court then turned to the test for reasonable restrictions that may be placed on the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g). It recalled its earlier pronouncements in two landmark decisions. In Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court, through Mahajan J., explained that the term “reasonable restriction” means that any limitation on the exercise of the right must not be arbitrary or excessive, and must be no more than what is required in the public interest. The word “reasonable” entails intelligent care and deliberation, signifying a choice of course dictated by reason. Legislation that arbitrarily or excessively infringes the right lacks the quality of reasonableness and, unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) and the social control permitted by clause (6) of the same article, it must be deemed wanting. This formulation was affirmed in Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., and again in Ch. Tika Ramji v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. The Court further cited State of Madras v. V. G. Rao, where Patanjali Sastri C.J. observed that the judiciary, in Dr. Khare’s case, had defined the scope of judicial review under clause (5) of Article 19, noting that both substantive and procedural aspects of imposing a reasonable restriction must be examined. This case law establishes the benchmark for assessing whether a statutory restriction on a fundamental right is constitutionally valid.

The Court explained that the law being challenged had to be analysed for reasonableness. In other words, the Court said it must look not only at how long the restriction lasted and how wide its reach was, but also at the circumstances and the manner in which the restriction was authorised. The Court stressed that the reasonableness test, wherever it was prescribed, had to be applied to each specific statute that was questioned, and that no single abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness could be imposed on every case. The Court listed the factors that must enter the judicial assessment: the nature of the right that was alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction, the extent and urgency of the evil that the restriction sought to remedy, the disproportionality of the measure, and the prevailing conditions at the relevant time.

This approach had been approved in State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Others ([1954] S.C.R. 587, 626), where the then Chief Justice observed that the fact that a statute was given retrospective operation could also be taken into account when determining whether the restriction was reasonable in the interest of the general public. The Court also referred to a more recent decision, Virendra v. State of Punjab ([1958] S.C.R. 308), for further support of this principle.

The Court then turned to the specific issue of wage fixation. It noted that the appointment of a wage board for fixing rates of wages could not be challenged in itself, because the constitution of such boards had long been regarded as an appropriate method for determining wage rates. The Court explained that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 applied only when an industrial dispute actually arose or was reasonably expected to arise between employers and employees in a particular establishment. Although the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (Act 36 of 1956) provided for the appointment of a National Tribunal by the Central Government to adjudicate disputes of national importance or those affecting establishments in more than one State, the prerequisite for that mechanism remained the existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute, as set out in section 7‑B.

The Court further clarified that if wages for employees of a specific industry needed to be fixed without any industrial dispute having arisen or being anticipated, the proper method was the appointment of wage boards. Such boards substituted for Industrial Tribunals or National Industrial Tribunals and were generally composed of an equal number of representatives of employers and employees in the industry, together with a quota of independent members, one of whom was appointed as the chairman of the board.

The Court observed that the principal grievance of the petitioners, however, was that …

In this matter, the petitioners argued that Section 9 of the Act failed to prescribe the necessary criteria for fixing rates of wages. They noted that Section 8 authorises the Central Government to set up a wage board to determine rates of wages for working journalists in accordance with the Act. Section 9 further directs that, in fixing such rates, the Board must take into account the cost of living, the prevailing rates of wages for comparable employments, the conditions prevailing in the newspaper industry across different regions of the country, and any other circumstances that the Board deems relevant. The petitioners contended that these listed criteria were applicable only to the fixation of minimum rates of wages. They observed that the term “minimum” had been used in Bill No 13 of 1955 when it was introduced in the Rajya Sabha, but that the word was omitted when the Bill was enacted as the Act. Moreover, they submitted that the capacity of the industry to pay – an essential factor for wage fixation – was not included among the matters the Board must consider. They further argued that the provision allowing the Board to consider “any other circumstances which to the Board may seem relevant” effectively placed such considerations at the Board’s subjective discretion, thereby preventing any court or other authority from reviewing the Board’s decisions in an objective manner.

The Court clarified that it would not engage in an extensive discussion on whether, for the purpose of interpreting the phrase “fixing rates of wages,” it would be appropriate to examine the Statement of Objects and Reasons that accompanied Bill No 13 of 1955 in the Rajya Sabha, or to investigate the rationale for deleting the word “minimum” from the Bill’s provisions concerning rates of wages and the Wage Board when the Act was finally passed. The Court observed that there is a prevailing view that such extrinsic materials are not proper aids for construing statutory language, which must instead be given its plain and grammatical meaning. The Court cited the authority in Ashvini Kumar Ghosh & Anr. v. Arabinda Bose & Anr. (1953 SCR 1) and the decision in Provat Kumar Kar and others v. William Trevelyan Curtiez Parkar, noting that reliance on extrinsic aids is justified only where the statutory terms are ambiguous or vague. The Court held that, in the present case, reference to those external materials was unnecessary, even though the expression “fixing rates of wages” could be regarded as ambiguous to the extent that it does not specify whether the “wages” intended are “living wages,” “fair wages,” or “minimum wages.”

In this case the Court observed that the Act had been enacted with the purpose of giving effect to the recommendations contained in the Press Commission’s Report. The Court pointed out that the Press Commission had adopted a concept of minimum wage that went beyond a mere subsistence level. According to the Commission, a minimum wage should not only secure the basic survival of a worker but also promote the worker’s efficiency by providing for a modest standard of education, medical care and other amenities. Consequently, the minimum wage that the Legislature intended to implement was necessarily higher than a bare subsistence wage. The Court further noted that, even though the Press Commission itself had not insisted that the capacity of the newspaper industry to pay such a wage be examined, it had expressed the view that a newspaper could not claim a right to exist if it could not afford to pay its employees a wage that would enable them to live decently and with dignity. The Court therefore concluded that the concept of minimum wage sought to be implemented by the legislation required the Wage Board to consider the industry’s ability to pay as an essential factor. The removal of the word “minimum” from the provision, if any deletion occurred, broadened the range of matters that the Wage Board could examine. Had the word “minimum” remained, the Board’s inquiry would have been confined strictly to determining a minimum wage. By deleting the term, however, the Board was empowered to fix wage rates without being limited to a minimum threshold, allowing it to set rates in a manner it deemed appropriate according to the circumstances of each case. The Court explained that the Board could thus fix rates that might constitute a statutory minimum wage or approximate a standard wage, although, given the present economic conditions of the country, the Board could not claim the authority to prescribe living wages for journalists. The Court also referred to section 9(1) of the Act, which enumerated criteria that included the prevailing rates of wages for comparable employments. The Court clarified that this criterion was unrelated to the notion of a minimum wage. To illustrate this point, the Court cited the decision of the Industrial Court in Nellimarla Jute Mills ([1953] 1 L.L.J. 666), where it was held that comparison with wages in other concerns could be used to determine a fair or upper‑limit wage, but not to establish the floor or minimum wage, which must be based on the basic needs of a worker’s family consisting of three persons.

The Court observed that the criterion of prevalent wages for comparable employment had indeed been considered by the members of the Committee on Fair Wages and by the Press Commission. Although the Press Commission treated this factor as an essential component of the minimum wage, the Court was not persuaded to give it such decisive weight. Consequently, the Court concluded that Section 9(1) of the Act was intended solely to define a minimum wage and not any higher wage concept. If a true construction of Section 9(1) allows the prevailing‑wage criterion to support rates that exceed bare subsistence, whether statutory minimum, fair or even living wages, it cannot be said that the provision limits itself to minimum‑wage fixation alone. The Court therefore held that the capacity of the newspaper industry to pay was an essential circumstance that the Wage Board must consider when fixing either the rates of wages or the wage scales, both of which fall within the expression ‘rates of wages’. This factor was not a trivial element; the Court likened its importance to that of the cost of living and the prevailing wages for comparable jobs, and suggested that it ought to have been expressly listed in Section 9(1). The Legislature, however, may have omitted such explicit mention either because it accepted the view of the Press Commission or because it believed that the third criterion—circumstances relating to the newspaper industry in different regions—sufficiently encompassed the industry’s paying capacity. Nevertheless, the Court found this construction difficult to reconcile, noting that the capacity to pay can be assessed only on an industry‑and‑region basis and therefore fits within the regional circumstance criterion. Even if that inclusion were possible, the Court observed that the statute assigned only a minor role to this factor alongside considerations such as literacy, newspaper popularity, language preferences and other regional characteristics. Given that the Press Commission had placed no importance on the industry's paying capacity, the Court concluded that it was unlikely the Legislature intended the Wage Board to be obligated to treat this circumstance as a major factor. Accordingly, the petitioners’ criticism that the Act failed to make consideration of the industry's capacity to pay an essential requirement for fixing wage rates appeared to be justified.

In this matter, the Court observed that it was well‑recognised that courts normally preferred to uphold the constitutionality of a statutory provision wherever possible. The Court therefore held that if the circumstance of the capacity of the newspaper industry to pay could be understood as falling within the broader category of “circumstances relating to the newspaper industry in different regions of the country,” the provision should not be declared unreasonable or in violation of the petitioners’ fundamental right. Accordingly, the Court expressed the view that section 9(1) of the Act did not exclude consideration of the essential circumstance of the industry’s capacity to pay. Moreover, the Court stated that it was not merely permissible but indeed incumbent upon the Wage Board to take that circumstance into account when fixing the rates of wages for working journalists.

The Court then turned to the last criterion enumerated in section 9(1), which read “any other circumstance which to the Board may seem relevant.” It was submitted that this wording left the matter to the Board’s subjective judgment and that the Board could consider such circumstances in its absolute discretion without any higher‑authority control, thereby creating the possibility of arbitrary exercise of power. The Court noted that if the matters were to be determined objectively, they would be examined and the existence of such circumstances would be scrutinised in appropriate proceedings. However, because the criterion was framed as a matter of the Board’s subjective satisfaction, it was argued that this could enable arbitrary action and that such a scheme was unreasonable. The petitioners cited the case of Thakur Reghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer & Ors., wherein a provision was struck down for vesting an arbitrary, subjective power in a court that could assume superintendence of property without oversight. The Court rejected this line of argument, explaining that the “any other circumstance” provision stood on an equal footing with, and was to be read ejusdem generis with, the other specifically listed criteria in the section. The Court emphasized that the legislature could not possibly enumerate every conceivable circumstance that might be relevant to the Board’s wage‑fixing function. It was therefore appropriate for the Board, during its inquiry, to encounter and consider additional relevant circumstances that were not expressly listed, and the legislature could not be expected to anticipate all such factors.

It was therefore, and rightly in the Court’s opinion, left to the Board to determine the relevance of those circumstances and to take them into consideration while fixing the rates of wages. The Court observed that, provided the principles that should guide the Board in fixing the rates of wages were laid down with sufficient clarity and particularity, and that the criteria of major importance were specifically enumerated, there was nothing improper in leaving other relevant considerations that might arise during the enquiry to the subjective satisfaction of the Board. The Board, the Court noted, was constituted of equal numbers of representatives of employers and of employees, and therefore it was best positioned to take account of all relevant circumstances, whether or not those circumstances had been expressly listed in the statutory section.

The Court then addressed the contention that the procedure to be followed by the Board for fixing the rates of wages had not been laid down and that, consequently, the Board could adopt any arbitrary procedure, thereby violating the principle of audi alteram partem and rendering the scheme unreasonable. Section 20(2)(d) of the impugned Act empowered the Central Government to make rules, inter alia, regarding the procedure to be followed by the Board in fixing rates of wages. Section 11 provided that, subject to any rules that might be prescribed, the Board could, for the purpose of fixing rates of wages, exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, exercised or followed for adjudicating an industrial dispute referred to it. The Court explained that this provision was merely enabling; it vested in the Board the discretion to decide whether to exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as an Industrial Tribunal. Accordingly, the Board was at liberty to adopt its own procedure, even if such a procedure were arbitrary or violative of the principle of audi alteram partem.

In support of its reasoning, the Court referred to the practice in the United Kingdom, where the Wage Councils and the Central Co‑ordinating Committees under the Wages Councils Act, 1945, and the Agricultural Wages Board under the Agricultural Wages Regulations Act, 1924, were also empowered to regulate their proceedings in such manner as they thought fit. Similarly, the Court noted that Wage Boards in Australia had no formal procedure prescribed for them, although the Wage Boards established under the amended Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, were required to follow the same procedure as an industrial court with respect to industrial proceedings before them. From these comparative examples, the Court concluded that it would not be legitimate to hold that the procedure to be followed by a wage board for fixing rates of wages must necessarily be prescribed by the statute that constituted the board. While each of the statutes contemplated that rules of procedure might be prescribed, the Court emphasized that even where such rules were prescribed, the discretion to regulate the procedure in a manner deemed appropriate by the wage boards remained with them.

The wage boards may adopt procedures that they consider appropriate, but such procedures must remain within the limits of any procedural rules that have been prescribed by the statute. Accordingly, the legislation confers a wide discretion on the boards to formulate their own rules of procedure; however, this discretion does not permit them to enforce arbitrary or capricious procedures. The boards are entrusted with the task of gathering data and material that are relevant for determining the issues that arise before them. Although they are not judicial tribunals but administrative agencies, they are required to elicit all relevant information, invite answers to questionnaires or representations from the parties concerned, hear evidence, and arrive at a determination after observing the principles of natural justice. Even when the boards perform functions that are quasi‑judicial in nature, the exercise of arbitrary powers by them would not be countenanced by any court or higher authority.

In the matter presently before the Court, the statute that is being challenged contains a provision dealing with the application of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to working journalists. While the Act expressly provides for certain matters such as the payment of gratuity, hours of work and leave, it also establishes a wage board for the specific purpose of fixing rates of wages. The statute lays down the principles to be followed by the wage board in fixing those rates, and it requires that the board’s decision be published in the same manner as awards of industrial courts under the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 11 of the Act further provides that, subject to any rules of procedure that may be prescribed by the Central Government, the wage board is empowered to exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as an industrial tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. When this provision is given effect, it is abundantly clear that the legislature intended to assimilate the wage board as closely as possible to an industrial tribunal established under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and it contemplated that the board, for the purpose of fixing rates of wages, may exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure. The decision of the board was binding on all employers, although the working journalists retained the right to agitate the question further under the Industrial Disputes Act if they were dissatisfied with the board’s determination and sought a further increase in their rates of wages. All these circumstances lead to the conclusion that, even though the board was not strictly bound to exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as an industrial tribunal, the board was nevertheless not entitled to adopt any arbitrary procedure that violated the principles of natural justice. 240. If on the construction of the relevant sections of the statute the functions which the Wage Board was performing

In this case, the Court observed that if the actions of the Wage Board were equivalent to establishing a law or a rule of conduct that would bind not only the employers and employees currently engaged in the industry but also those who might join the industry in the future, then the well‑known observation of Justice Holmes would become applicable. Under those circumstances, the functions carried out by the Wage Board could be described as having a legislative character. However, the Court noted that the situation before it was different because the establishment of the Wage Board was examined in the context of applying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act to the working journalists and in relation to the powers and procedures that an industrial tribunal constituted under that Act would exercise. In that setting, it was arguable that the Wage Board was not performing a legislative function; rather, it was performing functions that were quasi‑judicial in nature, meaning that its role was more akin to that of a tribunal deciding specific matters than to that of a body making general legislative rules.

The Court further pointed out that the Legislature itself, when it enacted the impugned Act, did not treat the functions of the Wage Board as legislative. It referred to the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha (1957), specifically Rule 70, which required that any Bill proposing a delegation of legislative power must be accompanied by a memorandum explaining the proposal, indicating its scope, and stating whether the delegation was of a normal or exceptional character. The Court also mentioned Rule 317, which established a committee on subordinate legislation tasked with examining whether powers to make regulations, rules, sub‑rules, or by‑laws conferred by the Constitution or delegated by Parliament were being properly exercised within the delegated limits. In the memorandum related to delegated legislation that was attached to Draft Bill No. 13 of 1955, introduced in the Rajya Sabha on 28 September 1955, the Constitution of the Wages Board for fixing rates of wages was not described as a piece of delegated legislation. The only reference made in that memorandum was to Clause 19 of the Bill, which empowered the Central Government to formulate rules concerning specific matters enumerated in the clause. The memorandum described those matters as purely procedural and routine, such as prescribing hours of work, payment of gratuity, holidays, earned leave or other kinds of leave, and the procedure to be followed by the Minimum Wages Board in fixing minimum wages and the manner in which its decisions might be published. Clause 19(3) of the Bill further provided that any rules made under the section would, as soon as practicable after their creation, be laid before both Houses of Parliament. These provisions were eventually enacted as Section 20 of the impugned Act, and they represented the only piece of delegated legislation contemplated by the Legislature, being covered by the memorandum on delegated legislation that was appended to the Bill. The decision of

The Court observed that the Wage Board’s decisions were not required to be laid before both Houses of Parliament, a step that would have been mandatory only if the fixation of wage rates were classified as delegated legislation. Instead, the statutory scheme provided that the Central Government would publish the Board’s determinations after receiving them in a manner that the Government deemed appropriate. This mode of publication was likened to the manner in which the awards of industrial tribunals are published by the appropriate Government pursuant to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Court noted that this arrangement was cited as evidence that Parliament intended the Wage Board not to function as a sub‑legislative authority. While the Court recognised the persuasiveness of these arguments, it held that it was not necessary, for the purpose of the present adjudication, to resolve the precise nature and character of the functions performed by the Wage Board. It was sufficient to state that the Board was not empowered or authorised to adopt arbitrary procedures nor to disregard the principles of natural justice.

The petitioners further contended that the restrictions imposed on newspaper establishments by the impugned Act were unreasonable because they would effectively destroy the petitioners’ businesses, thereby exceeding the permissible scope of legislation under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. They argued that the power to impose reasonable restrictions on the right to carry on a business does not extend to a power to destroy that business altogether. To support this proposition, they relied on the decision in Stone v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. ([1885] 116 U.S. 307, 331; 29 L.Ed. 636, 644), quoting the Court’s observation: “From what has thus been said it is not to be inferred that this power of limitation or regulation is itself without limit. This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation.” Similar observations were cited from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo ([1896] A.C. 88, 93 (J.C.)) and Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for the Dominion ([1896] A.C. 348, 363), with particular emphasis on the former case’s dictum: “But their Lordships think there is a marked distinction to be drawn between the prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation or governance of it and indeed the power to regulate and govern seems to imply the continued existence of that which is sought to be regulated or governed.” These authorities were considered by the Court in the earlier decision of Saghir Ahmed v. State of U.P. & Ors. After examining the authorities cited by both sides, the Court observed: “Be that as it may, although in our opinion the normal use of the word ‘restriction’ seems to be in the sense of ‘limitation’ and not ‘extinction’, we would on this occasion prefer not to express any final opinion.”

In its discussion, the Court observed that the question of whether the restrictions imposed by the impugned Act were reasonable depended largely on the specific nature of the newspaper trade and the prevailing conditions within that trade. The Court further explained that even if the provisions of the Act did not outright destroy the petitioners’ business, they would cripple it to such an extent that the newspapers could continue only under excessively burdensome conditions. Such circumstances, the Court held, would likely reduce circulation, compel the newspapers to seek financial assistance from the government, and therefore place an unreasonable burden on their constitutional right to carry on business, bringing the restrictions within the prohibition of Article 19(1)(g) read with Article 13(2) of the Constitution. The Court then turned to several specific provisions of the Act. Section 2(f) defined “working journalist” to include proof‑readers, despite the Press Commission Report’s recommendation that certain classes of proof‑readers be excluded from that definition; the Court noted that the legislature’s decision to include all proof‑readers imposed an undue burden on newspaper establishments beyond what was expected. The Act also extended the notice period for retrenchment of a working journalist beyond the limits set by Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, prescribing six months’ notice for an editor and three months for any other journalist. Moreover, the retrenchment provision was applied retrospectively to all retrenchments that occurred between 14 July 1954 and 12 March 1955. The Act further required payment of gratuity not only in the usual cases but also when a journalist who had served continuously for at least three years resigned voluntarily. The prescribed hours of work were fixed at a total of 144 hours over any four‑week period, a figure considerably lower than the hours recommended by the Press Commission Report. Wage determination was vested in a Wage Board that could set any wage it deemed appropriate, irrespective of the industry’s capacity to pay, potentially imposing wages beyond what the newspaper sector could bear. While each of these provisions taken singly might not destroy or severely cripple the petitioners’ enterprises, the Court emphasized that, when read together with Sections 14 and 15 of the Act—which applied the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and the Employees’ Provident Funds Act, 1952 to newspaper establishments—the cumulative effect would be to impose an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners’ right to conduct their business.

The Court said that it would consider each of the submissions separately. It observed that, although the Press Commission had not recommended that all proof‑readers be placed within the definition of “working journalists,” it was necessary to remember that proof‑readers hold a very significant position in the editorial staff of a newspaper. In the work “Journalism as a Career” (1955), B. Sen Gupta describes the function of the proof‑reader in the following way: “The proof‑reader is another important link in the production of a newspaper. On him depends, not to a small extent, the reputation of a paper. He has to be very careful in correcting mistakes and pointing out any error of fact or grammar that has crept into any news item or article through oversight or hurry on the part of the sub‑editor. He has not only to correct mistakes but also to see that corrections are carried out.” The Court also quoted the Kemsley Manual of Journalism, page 337, which explains that proof‑reading is “primarily the art and practice of finding mistakes in printed matter before publication and of indicating the needed corrections. It includes the detection of variations between the type and the copy from which it was set, mis‑statements of facts, figures or dates, errors in grammar, inaccuracies in quotations, and other defects.” The manual adds that a proof‑reader must query any doubtful passage, may identify possible libel, and must return the material to the editorial authority for a decision. From these descriptions, the Court inferred that proof‑readers must be individuals of exceptional knowledge and sound judgment, familiar with current affairs and the correct spelling of public figures’ names, and often specialized in particular fields such as sports, theatre, cinema or music, thereby saving considerable time in consulting reference books.

The Court noted that the Wage Board, in the schedule to its decision, defined “proof‑reader” as “a person who checks up printed matter or ‘Proof’ with edited copy to ensure strict conformity of the former with the latter. Factual discrepancies, slips of spelling, grammar and syntax may also be discovered by him and either corrected or get them corrected.” Considering the vital function performed by proof‑readers, the Court found it understandable that the Legislature, despite the Press Commission’s recommendations, chose to include proof‑readers within the definition of “working journalist.” While acknowledging that proof‑readers would be eligible for higher wages because the Wage Board fixed rates of wages, the Court held that this fact alone did not constitute an unreasonable burden on newspaper establishments.

In this matter the Court observed that including proof‑readers within the definition of “working journalist” could impose an unreasonable burden on newspaper establishments. The Court then turned to the provisions concerning notice of termination and held that those provisions could not be said to be inherently unreasonable. Referring to the recommendations of the Press Commission and to the authority found in Halsbury’s Laws of England, volume twenty‑two, second edition, page one‑50, paragraph two‑four‑nine, footnote (e), the Court noted that the reference work sets out the periods of reasonable notice that have historically been granted to persons in various newspaper‑related occupations. For example, a newspaper editor has been found entitled to a notice period ranging from six months, as indicated in Fox‑Bourne v. Vernon & Co. Ltd. (1894) ten T.L.R. 647, up to twelve months, as held in Grundy v. Sun Printing and Publishing Association (1916) thirty‑three T.L.R. 77, Court of Appeal. A sub‑editor of a newspaper was identified as being entitled to six months’ notice in Chamberlain v. Bennett (1892) eight T.L.R. 234. Likewise, a foreign correspondent for The Times was found to have a six‑month notice entitlement in Lowe v. Walter (1892) eight T.L.R. 358. The Press Commission further recommended that the notice period for termination of service should be calibrated according to the length of service rendered and the nature of the particular appointment, noting that no rigid rule could be prescribed because notice practices differ across jurisdictions and are shaped by statutory law or collective bargaining arrangements. The Court explained that, in England, judicial decisions have established that an editor is generally entitled to a one‑year notice period while an assistant editor is entitled to six months’ notice. After reviewing the English practice, the Commission also examined an Indian decision, Suit No. 735 of 1951 filed in the City Civil Court at Bombay, where the judge held that an assistant editor was entitled to a four‑month notice in the specific circumstances of that case, but observed that, under normal conditions, the English rule of six months’ notice should be applied in India. The judge further suggested that editors should receive a longer notice period because it is comparatively more difficult for senior journalists to obtain a new assignment. On the basis of this analysis, the Court concluded that the six‑month notice period prescribed for an editor and the three‑month period prescribed for other working journalists under section 3(2) of the impugned Act did not invite serious objection. The Court also addressed the retrospective application of the provision covering the interval from 14 July 1954 to 12 March 1955, noting that it was intended to protect a limited number of editorial staff who had been retrenched by management in anticipation of implementing the Press Commission’s recommendations, and that there was nothing improper in that retrospective operation. Finally, the Court turned to the provision relating to the payment of gratuity to working journalists who voluntarily resigned from newspaper establishments, and held that this provision was not reasonable. The Court emphasized that a gratuity constitutes a retirement benefit scheme, and that the conditions for granting such a benefit must be consistent with established labour‑court principles concerning retirement remuneration.

The Court observed that the criteria for granting gratuity have been established through decisions of the Labour Courts in this country. In the judgment of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, reported in [1955] L.A.C. 55 at pages 55 and 58, the Court remarked on page 158 that the essential principle behind gratuity is that it constitutes a retirement benefit for long service, providing for old‑age security, and that recent authorities, as reflected in various awards and Tribunal decisions, favour the provision of a double benefit. The Court further explained that while the Provident Fund supplies a measure of relief consisting partly of the employee’s wages, it is insufficient on its own, and where the finances of the employer allow, two separate retirement benefits should be permitted. A related observation appears in Nundydroog Mines Ltd., cited in [1956] L.A.C. 265 at page 267. Those authorities, however, dealt with gratuity granted on the occasion of retirement.

Labour Court decisions have also granted gratuity when an employee resigns. In the case of Cipla Ltd., reported in [1955] 2 L.L.J. 355 at pages 355‑358, the Court considered the employer’s capacity and other relevant factors and ordered gratuity on a full scale, explicitly covering voluntary retirement or resignation after fifteen years of continuous service. A similar approach was adopted by the Court in Indian Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Ltd., reported in [1956] 1 L.L.J. 435, where it was held that where the employer possesses sufficient financial capacity, workers are entitled to gratuity in addition to Provident Fund benefits. The Court explained that the assessment of financial capacity must examine the overall financial stability of the concern, including its profit‑earning ability, historical profits, reserves, prospects for replenishing reserves, capital requirements, and the risks involved. The Court also noted that the award of gratuity under ground 2 required the employee to have completed at least fifteen years of continuous service and to be entitled to a payment equivalent to fifteen months’ salary or wages.

From these authorities, the Court inferred that even where gratuity has been awarded upon an employee’s resignation, it has been conditioned on a minimum of fifteen years of uninterrupted service, not merely on a three‑year tenure as alleged in the present matter. Since gratuity is intended as a reward for good, efficient and faithful service rendered over a considerable period—an understanding reflected in the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Vol. I, page 614, Chapter XV, paragraph 1503—there is no justification for granting gratuity on a substantially shorter period of service. Consequently, the Court found no basis to order gratuity in the present case where the employee had only three years of service before voluntarily resigning.

In this case, the Court observed that the principle of granting gratuity does not extend to a situation where an employee voluntarily resigns and thereby terminates his service, except in exceptional circumstances. One such recognised exception is the so‑called “conscience clause.” The Court then quoted a passage from Fernand Terrou and Lucion Solal’s work Legislation for Press, Film and Radio in the World today, a UNESCO series published in 1951, specifically the section dealing with “Journalists’ Working Conditions and their Moral Rights” on page 404. The quoted passage explained that among the benefits that the professional journalist status may confer—whether stemming from statutory law or from an agreement—there is one of particular importance because it goes to the very core of the profession. This benefit concerns freedom of information and is intended to safeguard the journalist’s independence, his freedom of thought and his moral rights. The passage described this benefit as what in France is termed the “conscience clause.” The essence of the clause, according to the passage, is that when a journalist’s integrity is seriously threatened, he may break the contract that binds him to the newspaper concern and, at the same time, receive all the indemnities that are normally payable only if the employer breaks the contract. The passage further noted that under the French law of 1935, the indemnity for dismissal, which may be quite substantial, is payable even when the contract is broken by a professional journalist, provided that his action is inspired by a marked change in the character or policy of the newspaper or periodical, if such change creates a situation prejudicial to his honour, his reputation, or, in a general way, his moral interests. The passage compared this moral right of a journalist to the moral right of an author or artist, a right first recognised by the 1935 law and subsequently acknowledged in a number of countries. The passage also reproduced the wording of the collective contract of 31 January 1938 in Poland, which listed as good and sufficient reasons for a journalist to cancel his contract without notice: (a) the exertion of pressure by an employer upon a journalist to induce him to perform an immoral action; and (b) a fundamental change in the political outlook of the journal, proclaimed by public declaration or otherwise made manifest, if the journalist’s employment would thereafter be contrary to his political opinions or the dictates of his conscience. The Court further noted that a similar clause is found in Switzerland in the collective agreement dated 1 April 1948 between the Geneva Press Association and the Geneva Union of Newspaper Publishers. That agreement provides that if a marked change takes place in the character or fundamental policy of the newspaper, if the concern no longer has the same moral, political or religious character that it possessed when an editorial employee was engaged, and if this change prejudices his honour, his reputation or, in a general way, his moral interests, the employee may demand his instant release. In such circumstances the employee shall be entitled to an indemnity payable in the same manner as the salary.

In the judgment, the Court observed that an employee who resigns after three years of service is not entitled to any gratuity, and that a statutory provision such as that found in section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the Act, which would grant a gratuity in such circumstances, was manifestly unreasonable. The Court therefore concluded that the provision placed an undue restriction on the petitioners’ constitutional right to conduct business and should be declared unconstitutional. By contrast, the Court held that the clause governing the maximum number of hours of work for journalists could not be regarded as unreasonable, given the specific nature and quality of journalistic work. Turning to the matter of wage fixation, the Court noted that the Wage Board was composed of an equal number of representatives from newspaper establishments and from the working journalists, and that it was chaired by an independent person. The Act prescribed principles for the Board’s guidance, directing it to consider, among other factors, the industry’s capacity to pay. On this basis, the Court found no basis to label the statutory provisions relating to the composition and function of the Wage Board as unreasonable. The Court acknowledged, however, that a particular decision of the Wage Board might be invalid if the Board ignored the criteria set out in section 9(1) of the Act or if its procedure violated the principles of natural justice; such a defect would affect the decision itself, not the constitution of the Board. The Court then examined section 17 of the Act, which empowers the State Government or an authorized authority to issue a certificate for money due from an employer, enabling the amount to be recovered by the collector in the same manner as arrears of land revenue. The petitioners challenged this provision, alleging it imposed a financial burden on employers. The Court clarified that the provision concerns only the mode of recovery and does not itself create a new fiscal burden. While the Court indicated it would later consider the provision in relation to a possible violation of Article 14, it rejected the argument that the provision infringed the petitioners’ right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g). Finally, the Court concluded that the petitioners’ challenge to the Act on the ground that it violated Article 19(1)(g) failed, except insofar as it related to the specific subsection previously identified.

The Court observed that the provision identified as section 5 (1) (a) (iii) of the impugned Act was clearly severable from the remaining sections of the legislation. Consequently, the Court held that this particular clause could be declared unconstitutional while leaving the rest of the Act operative and without rendering the entire statute invalid.

Turning to the challenge under Article 14, the Court restated the issue presented by the petitioners. They contended that the Act accorded a special statutory guarantee of gratuity, prescribed hours of work and leave, and fixed salaries for working journalists, while denying comparable benefits to other persons engaged in similar or comparable employment. The petitioners further argued that the Act established a Pay Commission to determine journalists’ wages, thereby bypassing the normal procedure prescribed by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The petitioners advanced several specific contentions. First, they claimed that by selecting press‑industry employers for special treatment, the Act subjected them to discriminatory treatment compared with all other industrial employers governed by the ordinary industrial‑relations law. Second, they asserted that the discrimination manifested in multiple ways: (a) isolating newspaper employees for differential treatment; (b) imposing a new burden on a segment of their workers regarding gratuities, compensation, working hours and wages; (c) creating a Pay Commission to fix journalists’ wages; (d) failing to prescribe the essential criterion of the employer’s capacity to pay; (e) allowing the Board to adopt any arbitrary procedure, even in violation of the audi alteram partem principle; (f) permitting the Board to apply the procedure of the Industrial Disputes Act to some newspapers while using an arbitrary procedure for others; (g) making the Board’s decisions binding only on employers and not on employees; and (h) providing for the recovery of monies due from employers in the same manner as arrears of land revenue. Third, the petitioners maintained that the classification created by the Act was arbitrary and unreasonable because it removed newspaper employers and working journalists from the general operation of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and Act I of 1955.

The Court then referred to the principle underlying Article 14 as articulated in earlier decisions. It quoted the summary given by Justice Das in Budhan Choudhry & Others v. State of Bihar, noting that Article 14 has been examined in numerous cases, including Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India ([1950] S.C.R. 869), State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara ([1951] S.C.R. 682), State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar ([1952] S.C.R. 284), Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra ([1952] S.C.R. 435), Lachmandas Kewalaram Ahuja v. State of Bombay ([1952] S.C.R. 710), Quasim Razvi v. State of Hyderabad ([1953] S.C.R. 581), and Habeeb Mohamad v. State of Hyderabad ([1953] S.C.R. 661). The Court indicated that, given the extensive jurisprudence, it was unnecessary to engage in a lengthy discussion of the meaning, scope and effect of Article 14.

In discussing the meaning, scope and effect of the constitutional provision, the Court noted that the jurisprudence on article 14 is now settled. Article 14 prohibits class legislation, but it does not bar reasonable classification that is necessary for legislation. For a classification to be permissible, the Court explained, two essential requirements must be satisfied. First, the classification must be based on an intelligible differentia that clearly distinguishes the persons or objects that are placed within the group from those that are excluded. Second, the identified differentia must have a rational nexus to the purpose that the statute seeks to achieve. The Court further observed that the basis for classification may vary; it may be geographical, or may relate to objects, occupations or similar criteria. What remains indispensable, according to the Court, is that there be a logical connection between the chosen basis of classification and the object of the legislation that is being examined. Moreover, the Court reiterated well‑established decisions holding that article 14 condemns discrimination not only in substantive law but also in procedural law.

Having set out these principles, the Court then turned to the question of whether the statute challenged by the petitioners infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution. The Court indicated that it would now examine the impugned Act in the light of the foregoing observations. The Court recalled that it had already referred to the findings of the Press Commission concerning the status of working journalists in the country. In addition, the Court quoted a further passage from the Commission’s report to illustrate the special nature of the journalistic profession. The report emphasized that journalism requires a high level of general education and some specialized training. Newspapers serve as a vital instrument for educating the masses, protecting the rights of the people, reflecting and guiding public opinion, and criticizing wrongdoing by any individual or organization, regardless of stature. Consequently, the press constitutes an essential adjunct to democracy. The report further asserted that the profession must be staffed by individuals of high intellectual and moral standards. Journalists are described as creative artists, and the public, rightly or wrongly, expects them to possess a broad knowledge and the ability to voice opinions on any conceivable topic. The report also highlighted that, beyond the nature of their work, the conditions under which journalists operate are unique to the profession.

In this passage, the Court observed that the output of journalists could not be assessed by the quantity of material produced, as is common in other industries, because the quality of their work is an essential factor in evaluating their capacity. The Court further noted that insecurity of tenure was a distinctive characteristic of the journalistic profession. It clarified that although insecurity may exist in other occupations, certain situations particular to journalism can lead to unemployment that would not necessarily arise in other fields. The security of journalists, the Court said, depended to some extent on the whims and caprices of the newspaper proprietors. The Court cited instances where a change in ownership of a newspaper or a shift in its editorial policy had produced a substantial alteration in the editorial staff. Unlike most other industries, where a change in proprietorship does not normally entail a change in personnel, the Court explained that the primary purpose of a newspaper is not merely to report news but also to educate and guide public opinion; consequently, a change in ownership or editorial direction may, and in some cases has, resulted in a wholesale replacement of editorial staff. The Court emphasized that these particular circumstances of journalism must be kept in mind when formulating any scheme intended to improve the conditions of working journalists (para. 512). The Court then indicated that these considerations had weighed with the Press Commission when it recommended that working journalists receive special treatment compared with other employees of newspaper establishments for the purpose of ameliorating their conditions of service (278). The Court further referred to a passage from the UNESCO‑published study “Legislation for Press, Film and Radio in the World Today” (1951), page 403, which states that under certain systems special advantages more extensive than those enjoyed by ordinary employees are conferred upon journalists, sometimes by law itself. The passage cited examples from Latin America where legislation for journalists is detailed and far‑reaching, providing special benefits such as protection against sickness, disability, dismissal or retirement, and in Brazil granting professional journalists, who must be Brazilian nationals, considerable tax exemptions. The passage also described French law of 29 March 1935, which gave journalists substantial advantages ahead of general social legislation, including a paid annual holiday: one month’s holiday after at least one year of service, five weeks after ten years, and entitlement, upon termination of an indefinite‑duration contract, to one or two months’ notice together with an indemnity for dismissal not less than one month’s salary (279).

The Court observed that the indemnity payable for a journalist who has rendered service for a full year or a portion of a year is calculated on the basis of the most recent rate of pay. It further noted that when a journalist’s period of service exceeds fifteen years, the amount of the indemnity is not determined by the usual formula but is instead fixed by an arbitral committee, as previously explained in paragraph 280. The Court then considered the status of working journalists as a distinct class separate from other employees of newspaper establishments. It held that the legislature may enact special legislation aimed at improving the conditions of service for this distinct group without committing any discrimination. Such a classification, the Court said, permits the journalists to be singled out for preferential treatment in comparison with other newspaper employees and does not fall within the prohibition of Article 14 of the Constitution. The only prohibition under Article 14, according to the Court, is that persons belonging to a particular group should not be treated differently among themselves; no allegation of intra‑group discrimination could be made against the legislation in question.

The Court continued that treating the group of working journalists specially does not invite any objection that a special law has been enacted solely for their benefit, nor does it create a problem that a separate mechanism is established for fixing their wages, different from the mechanism used for other workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Court explained that legislation may also regulate the payment of retrenchment compensation and gratuities, the fixing of working hours, and the determination of wage rates for journalists in comparison with other workmen in newspaper establishments, without any disability. It further said that a wage board could be constituted as the machinery for fixing journalists’ rates of wages, and such a board could be created in the same manner as other wage‑fixing bodies.

The Court observed that there was no industrial dispute, either actual or anticipated, between employers and working journalists as a whole, although a dispute could potentially arise between an individual newspaper employer and its own journalists. The provisions of the impugned Act, the Court explained, were intended to provide a general fixation of wage rates for working journalists to improve their service conditions, and the establishment of a wage board for this purpose was an established method of achieving that objective. Consequently, the Court held that creating such a mechanism for journalists’ benefit was not objectionable and did not amount to discrimination against other newspaper employees.

Finally, the Court noted that the wage board must consider the industry’s capacity to pay when fixing wages, as previously discussed. It emphasized that the board’s procedure should be similar to that of an industrial tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or at the very least should not violate the principles of audi alteram partem or natural justice. The Court concluded that there was no circumstance in which the wage board, if it chose to exercise the same powers and follow the same procedures as an industrial tribunal, would be required to discriminate between one set of newspaper establishments and another.

The Court observed that the Wage Board could not adopt the same procedural framework as an Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, if such adoption would lead to discrimination between one group of newspaper establishments and another. If the Wage Board were to assume the powers of an Industrial Tribunal, it would consequently be obligated to follow the procedure expressly prescribed in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; adherence to that procedure would preclude any possibility of discrimination in the manner alleged. The Court noted that the Wage Board’s decision was binding solely upon the employers, while the working journalists retained the freedom to press for higher wages by filing an industrial dispute under the relevant statutory scheme. Once the Board fixed wage rates, those rates would ordinarily regulate the contractual relationship between the employers and the journalists. However, the Court held that reserving to the journalists the right to seek further wage increases under the Industrial Disputes Act did not constitute any improper feature of the provision, nor did it undermine the purpose of improving the journalists’ service conditions as a collective class. The Court further emphasized that no discrimination could be said to exist between the employers on one side and the working journalists on the other, because they were opposite parties in a dispute. The fact that the weaker party received different treatment aimed at ameliorating its conditions of service did not automatically invalidate the Board’s decision. The Court explained that the weaker side could legitimately be regarded as a distinct class, and the conferment of special benefits to that class for the purpose of improving its service conditions was not discriminatory. Turning to section 17 of the Act, the Court found that the provision allowing recovery of monies owed by employers in the same manner as arrears of land revenue was also non‑discriminatory. The Court observed that, in employer‑employee conflicts, employers often failed to implement measures intended for employee benefit, leaving employees unable to realize or receive those benefits. The Court pointed out that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, contained a parallel provision in section 33C, as amended by Act 36 of 1956, which itself reproduced the earlier section 25‑I introduced by Act 43 of 1953. The Court recalled that if the general provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, had been made applicable to the working journalists, no conflict would arise, reinforcing the view that section 17 of the impugned Act was consistent with established legal principles.

The Court stated that the provision in question was intended to give the working journalists – a distinct group among the employees of newspaper establishments – a means to recover monies owed to them in the same way that workmen could do so under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Court observed that there was nothing discriminatory about providing a mechanism for employers to pay the amounts due to these journalists. It further noted that the same reasoning applied to the alleged discrimination between employers in the press industry and employers in other industrial sectors. The Court explained that other industrial employers would continue to be governed by the ordinary law of industrial relations contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In contrast, the employers of working journalists formed a separate class, and a law designed to operate between this class and the journalists could not be characterised as discriminatory. The Court added that any measures aimed at improving the conditions of working journalists employed in newspaper establishments could only be achieved by directing legislation specifically at press‑industry employers as a whole. Even when the Act was viewed as a piece of social‑welfare legislation, the Court held that the State could begin its intervention with a limited sector without having to enact identical statutes for every other industry. Accordingly, no allegation of discrimination could be made against the State for favouring one industry over others. The Court recognised that a classification might be based on geography, occupation, purpose or similar criteria, and that the essential question was whether a clear link existed between the basis of classification and the objective of the Act that was being challenged. In the Court’s opinion, both criteria for a permissible classification were satisfied. The classification rested on an intelligible differentia that set the working journalists apart from other employees of newspaper establishments, and this differentia bore a rational relationship to the purpose of the Act, which was to improve the service conditions of those journalists. Consequently, the Court concluded that the constitutional challenge to the Act on the ground of discrimination failed.

Turning to the claim of violation of Article 32, the Court observed that the sole ground of attack was that the impugned Act did not require the Wage Board to provide reasons for its decisions, thereby allegedly rendering the petitioners’ right to approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of their fundamental right ineffective. It was argued that the right to apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari was itself a fundamental right and that any legislation seeking to restrict or defeat that right amounted to an infringement of Article 32 and was consequently void. The petitioners contended that without a speaking order – an order that set out the grounds of the decision – a writ of certiorari could not be issued, and that a statute allowing an order to be issued without reasons would sterilise the Supreme Court’s power to examine the validity of such orders, thereby violating Article 32. The Court examined these contentions in the context of the constitutional framework and the scope of the right conferred by Article 32.

In the submissions concerning the scope of a writ of certiorari, counsel for the petitioners contended that such a writ could be properly issued only against a “speaking order”, meaning an order that contains an explanation of the reasons on which the decision is based. They argued that if a statute authorised the issuance of an order without any reasons, the effect would be to neutralise the Court’s ability to scrutinise the legality of that order, thereby contravening the guarantee of Article 32 of the Constitution. The petitioners relied heavily on an English precedent, Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shaw ([1951] 1 K.B. 711, 718). In that case Lord Goddard C.J. observed at page 718 that a lower‑court order could be examined by a higher court only when it was a speaking order, that is, when it set out the grounds of the decision. He further explained that a bare order imposing a fine or directing a removal could not be examined beyond its face, because such an order did not disclose any reasoning.

The Court of Appeal later affirmed this principle in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shaw ([1952] 1 K.B. 338). In the appellate judgment, Denning L discussed the content of the record at page 352, stating that the record must include at least the initiating document, any pleadings, and the adjudication itself, but it does not have to contain the evidence or the reasons unless the tribunal chooses to incorporate them. He clarified that where the tribunal does state its reasons and those reasons are legally erroneous, a writ of certiorari lies for the purpose of quashing the decision. This authority, however, did not impose an affirmative duty on an inferior tribunal to set out reasons; it merely highlighted that, in the absence of reasons, the High Court would be unable to exercise its prerogative jurisdiction of certiorari because there would be no material on which to base a review.

A more directly applicable Indian precedent was A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras and Anr. ([1950] S.C.R. 88, 100). In that case a statutory provision barred a detainee, under threat of prosecution, from disclosing to the Court the grounds of his detention that had been communicated to him by the detaining authority. The provision was struck down as ultra vires and void. Justice Mahajan explained at page 243 that such a provision would disable the Court from exercising its constitutional functions under Article 32, because the Court would be unable to examine whether the grounds supplied to the detainee were the true basis of the detention or merely vague or irrelevant material. He emphasized that the purpose of furnishing the detainee with the grounds is to enable him to make a representation against them and to prove his innocence, and that any law preventing the detainee from revealing those grounds to the Court would defeat the Court’s ability to protect the fundamental right.

In that case Mahajan J held that the Supreme Court could not perform its functions under article 32 and could not adjudicate whether the grounds supplied satisfied the sub‑clause when the court was denied access to those grounds. He observed that a detained person possessed a guaranteed right to receive the very grounds on which the order of detention was based. The Court therefore was entitled to examine whether the supplied grounds actually formed the basis of detention or whether they contained vague or irrelevant material. He explained that the purpose of providing the detainee with the grounds was to enable him to make a representation against them and to prove his innocence. Consequently, for the Court to protect this fundamental right and to grant relief, it was essential that the detainee not be prohibited, under threat of punishment, from disclosing the grounds to the Court, and that no statutory injunction could prevent the Court from reviewing those grounds. Mahajan J noted that section 14 of the impugned Act created a substantive offence for disclosing the grounds and imposed a duty on the Court not to permit such disclosure. He said that this provision amounted to a suspension of a constitutional guarantee, because it effectively made administration of the law by the Court impossible and simultaneously deprived the detained person of access to justice. In his opinion, therefore, the provision that barred disclosure of the grounds infringed or curtailed the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and was ultra vires the powers of Parliament.

It is true that if the impugned Act contained a provision preventing the Wage Board from giving reasons for its decision, such a provision might be interpreted to mean that the Board’s order was not a speaking order and that no writ of certiorari could be issued to the petitioners. In that hypothetical situation the Supreme Court would be powerless to remedy the petitioners’ grievances by granting a writ of certiorari, and the constitutional right of a citizen to approach the Court under article 32 would become ineffective. However, the Court found that in the present case no such provision existed in the impugned Act. The Act did not state that the Wage Board was prohibited from providing reasons for its decisions. Instead, it left to the discretion of the Wage Board whether to furnish reasons. The Court examined the language of the statute and noted that the provision dealing with the Wage Board’s powers was silent on any requirement to state reasons. It observed that the discretion left to the Board meant that the Board could, if it chose, provide a reasoned order, but it was not compelled to do so. The absence of a mandatory reason‑giving clause meant that the Board’s orders could still be considered speaking orders for the purposes of certiorari, because the parties could be informed of the basis of the decision. Consequently, the petitioners could not claim that their right under article 32 was denied, as the statute did not obstruct the Court’s ability to review the order.

The Court observed that the issue of infringement of the right guaranteed under article 32 of the Constitution had not been raised in any of the petitions filed by the petitioners. That question was introduced only during the oral arguments presented by the learned counsel for the petitioners, and it appeared to be a later addition to their case. Nevertheless, the Court examined the argument because it was forcefully urged by the counsel during the hearing. After considering the submissions, the Court held that the Act could not be attacked on the ground that it violated the fundamental right protected by article 32. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the legislation, taken as a whole, did not infringe any of the rights guaranteed by articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 14 or 32, except for the specific provision contained in section 5(1)(a)(iii). The Court found that this particular provision contravened the freedom of occupation protected by article 19(1)(g), rendering it unconstitutional and requiring its removal from the statute.

Beyond the challenge to the constitutionality of the Act, the petitioners contended that the decision of the Wage Board was illegal and void on several grounds. First, they argued that the re‑constitution of the Board was ultra vires and not authorized by the Act, because the relevant rules had only been published on 30 July 1956. Second, they claimed that the Board’s majority decision lacked statutory support, and that the rules providing for such a decision went beyond the scope of the Act, making the decision ultra vires. Third, they alleged that the procedure followed by the Board breached the principles of natural justice, rendering the decision invalid. Fourth, they maintained that the decision was invalid because no reasons were given and the Board failed to disclose the considerations that led to its conclusion. Fifth, they asserted that classifying establishments on the basis of gross revenue was illegal and not authorized by the Act. Sixth, they argued that grouping establishments into chains or multiple units was unauthorized. Seventh, they said the Board had no power to fix journalists’ salaries on an all‑India basis, being limited only to individual industrial establishments. Eighth, they pointed out that the decision did not take into account the capacity to pay of any particular establishment. Ninth, they claimed the Board lacked authority to issue a decision with retrospective effect. Tenth, they argued the Board could not fix scales of pay for a period of three years, even subject to later government review. Eleventh, they noted that the Board was handicapped by the absence of a Cost of Living Index.

The Court then stated the legal position that a decision could be declared illegal on any of three grounds. The first ground was that the Act under which the decision was made was ultra vires, as illustrated in earlier cases such as Mohammad Yasin v. Town Area Committee, Jalalabad & Anr ([1952] S.C.R. 572, 578) and Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh ([1954] S.C.R. 1122, 1127). The second ground was that the decision itself infringed the petitioners’ fundamental rights, as discussed in Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India & Ors. ([1956] S.C.R. 267). The third ground was that the decision was ultra vires the Act, a principle noted in Pandit Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. ([1956] S.C.R. 664). The Court concluded that the present challenge could not be predicated on the Act being ultra vires or on infringement of fundamental rights; consequently, the challenge must be confined to the third ground, namely that the decision was ultra vires the Act itself.

The Court referred to three authorities to illustrate the different bases on which a decision could be attacked. It cited the judgment in Mohammad Yasin v. Town Area Committee, Jalalabad & Anr ([1952] S.C.R. 572, 578) and Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh ([1954] S.C.R. 1122, 1127) as examples of a challenge premised on the doctrine that the enactment under which a decision is made is ultra vires. It then noted that a decision might be questioned because it infringes the fundamental rights of the petitioners, referring to Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India & Ors. ([1956] S.C.R. 267). Finally, it mentioned that a decision could be attacked for being ultra vires the authorising Act, citing Pandit Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. ([1956] S.C.R. 664). After reviewing these authorities, the Court held that the impugned decision of the Wage Board could not be set aside on the first two grounds – that the parent Act itself was ultra vires or that the decision violated fundamental rights. Consequently, the Court limited the scope of the challenge to the third ground, namely that the decision was beyond the powers conferred by the Act.

The first ground of attack concerned the resignation of Shri K. P. Kesava Menon, who had originally been appointed as a member of the Wage Board. The resignation occurred on or about 21 June 1956 and was accepted by the Central Government through a notification dated 14 July 1956. The same notification appointed Shri K. M. Cherian in Menon’s place, thereby reconstituting the Board. The petitioners argued that the Act contained no provision for the resignation of a Board member or for filling the vacancy created thereby. They pointed out that such a procedural rule was introduced only later, in the Working Journalists Wage Board Rules, 1956, which were published by a Gazette of India notification (Part II, Section 3) on 31 July 1956. On that basis, the petitioners claimed that the re‑constitution of the Board by naming Cherian was unauthorised by the original Act, and therefore the Board that issued the contested decision was not validly constituted.

In response, the Court examined the relevant statutory framework. Section 8 of the Act authorises the Central Government, by way of a notification in the Official Gazette, to constitute a Wage Board. The Court held that this power must be interpreted in light of section 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which provides that when a Central Act or subsequent regulation confers a power, that power may be exercised from time to time as occasions arise unless there is a clear intention to the contrary. Applying this principle, the Court concluded that the Government’s acceptance of Menon’s resignation and the subsequent appointment of Cherian did not breach any statutory restriction. The Board could therefore be regarded as having been duly constituted on 14 July 1956, the date when all five members contemplated under section 8(2) were able to function. The Court further noted that Menon had not attended the preliminary meeting of the Board held on 26 May 1956, and that the substantive work of the Board was carried out after Cherian’s appointment. Accordingly, the objection raised by the petitioners was deemed overly technical and incapable of affecting the validity of the Board’s constitution or its subsequent actions.

May 26 1956 marked the date when Shri K. M. Cherian was appointed to replace Shri K. P. Kesava Menon on the Wage Board. After this appointment, the Board began its substantive work, but it was not until July 14 1956 that the entire Board, as constituted on that day, actually commenced functioning as a complete body. The petitioners raised an objection concerning the technical aspects of this sequence, yet the Court regarded the objection as purely formal and concluded that it did not create any material difference with respect to the validity of the Board’s constitution or its subsequent operations.

The submission identified as ground 2 overlooked the fact that the Working Journalists Wage Board Rules, 1956 were issued by the Central Government on July 31 1956. Those Rules were promulgated under the authority granted to the Government by section 20 of the Act, which empowers the Government to formulate regulations necessary to give effect to the purposes of the Act, especially the procedural steps that the Board must follow when fixing wage rates. Rule 8 of those Regulations stipulated that every question considered at a Board meeting had to be decided by a majority of the votes of the members present and voting, and that in the case of an equal division of votes, the Chairman would be entitled to cast the deciding vote. Consequently, the Rule expressly required that Board decisions be reached by a majority, and the Board adhered to this requirement in all its determinations. Because the Rule was framed by the Central Government under the delegated authority of section 20, it qualified as delegated legislation; if the Rules were laid before both Houses of Parliament in accordance with section 20(3), they would acquire the force of law. After their publication, the Rules became incorporated into the Act itself, and any subsequent decision of the Wage Board reached by the prescribed majority was therefore lawful and could not be set aside in the manner suggested by the petitioners.

The third ground advanced by the petitioners alleged a breach of the principles of natural justice. It was contended that the Board had failed to follow the procedure laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act, asserting that, under section 11 of the Act, the Board possessed discretion to fix wage rates and therefore should have applied the same powers and procedural safeguards as an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 when adjudicating an industrial dispute. The petitioners pointed to two specific instances where the Board apparently claimed the powers of an Industrial Tribunal. First, the Board’s questionnaire indicated that it exercised such powers pursuant to section 11 of the Act. Second, the Board’s subsequent actions—though detailed in the following portion of the judgment—reinforced its claim to tribunal‑like authority. The petitioners argued that, by assuming these powers, the Board was also obligated to observe the procedural requirements that bind an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the 1947 Act.

The Wage Board noted that the newspapers and journals had not submitted their replies to the questionnaire. Consequently, at a meeting convened on 17 August 1956, the Board reiterates its earlier stance and resolves to publish a Press Note. In that note the Board urges the newspaper and journal establishments to send their replies as soon as possible, reminding them that the Board possesses the powers of an Industrial Tribunal under section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Press Note further warns that if the establishments continue to fail in providing their responses, the Board will be compelled to take further steps in the matter. This action clearly demonstrates that the Wage Board intended to exercise the powers conferred by section 11 of the Act. Although the exercise of such powers was discretionary, the Board nevertheless assumed them and equated its position with that of an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the 1947 Act. By assuming those powers, the Board was consequently bound to observe the procedural requirements applicable to an Industrial Tribunal of that kind. It is also submitted that the questionnaire addressed by the Wage Board to the newspaper establishments contained no concrete proposal for their consideration. The only issue raised in Part “A,” Question No. 4, asked the establishments whether the basic minimum wage, dearness allowance and metropolitan allowance suggested by the Press Commission were acceptable, and if not, what variations they would propose and why. The wording of that question did not draw the establishments’ attention to any specific proposal other than the one put forward by the Press Commission, and the establishments had no indication of the wage structure the Board intended to adopt. After collecting the necessary data, receiving answers to the questionnaire, and examining witnesses, the Board concluded that a particular wage structure was appropriate in its opinion. Nevertheless, it was necessary for the Board to communicate its proposed wage structure to the concerned newspaper establishments and invite any representations within a prescribed period. Only after receiving such representations should the Board have finalised its proposals and published its decision. Had the Board followed this procedure, its decision could not have been attacked on the ground of violating the principles of natural justice. It would undoubtedly have been more prudent for the Board to have adopted the procedure described, and the eighth ground raised by the petitioners is, in the Court’s view, sufficiently determinative of the issue.

The Court noted that the issue of whether the Wage Board had acted beyond its statutory authority was raised, but because the Court had already reached a conclusion on that point, it chose not to express any further opinion on the ground of attack advanced by the petitioners. The next ground of challenge, identified as ground 4, asserted that the Wage Board had failed to provide reasons for its decision. The Court observed that at the Board’s meeting held on 22 April 1957, the members had resolved that it was not necessary to furnish reasons for each decision and that merely recording the decision would be sufficient. Consequently, the Board did not accompany its published decision with a statement of reasons. The Court acknowledged that, in the absence of such reasons, it became difficult to ascertain what considerations, if any, guided the Board in reaching its conclusions on the various matters before it. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the Board was under no statutory duty to explain its reasoning, as the governing Act contained no provision requiring the Board to do so, and therefore the Board was fully within its rights to refrain from giving reasons. While the Court suggested that prudence would have encouraged the Board to explain the basis of its determination—so that the Court would not need to infer the Board’s thought process and assess whether particular circumstances had been duly considered—it held that the lack of reasons did not invalidate the decision. Moreover, the Court pointed out that, although a formal judgment with reasons was not produced, the Chairman’s contemporaneous note dated 30 April 1956 provided a clear indication of the majority’s thinking. This note, the Court said, was highly informative and shed considerable light on whether specific factors had been taken into account by the Board before it arrived at its decision.

The Court then turned to ground 5, which questioned the classification of newspaper establishments on the basis of gross revenue. The classification scheme had been challenged as being illegal and unauthorized under the Act. The Court observed that the Act itself made no reference to any classification system and could not be expected to prescribe one. What the Act expressly authorized was the fixing of wage rates for working journalists in accordance with the principles laid down in section 9(1). In exercising this function, the Wage Board, created under the Act, was at liberty to adopt any classification method it deemed appropriate, provided that the classification was not irrational. The Court explained that, given the need to consider newspaper establishments across the entire country when fixing journalists’ wages, some form of classification was inevitable. Such classification needed to reflect the varied size and capacity of the establishments, and the Board was therefore justified in selecting a classification basis—such as gross revenue—so long as the choice was reasonable and served the purpose of fixing equitable wage rates.

The Court observed that the classification of newspaper establishments must take into account both their size and their capacity to operate. It noted that a variety of criteria could be employed for this purpose, including the circulation figures of the newspaper, the revenue derived from advertisements, the total gross revenue, the amount of capital invested in the business, and other relevant factors. Although the proportion of advertisement revenue to gross revenue might be a pertinent consideration when classifying newspapers, the Court was not prepared to conclude that the Wage Board was unjustified in selecting gross revenue as the basis for its classification scheme. The Court held that the Wage Board possessed the authority to adopt any classification method it deemed appropriate, provided that the method was not irrational. Consequently, the Court could not describe the Board’s choice of gross revenue as radically erroneous or as a factor that would invalidate its decision. The Court further affirmed that, given the diversity in the sizes and capacities of newspaper establishments across the country, a practical and workable test was essential for classification. Since the Wage Board opted to use gross revenue as its test, the Court found no justification to deem that decision unwarranted or unacceptable.

In addressing the historical context, the Court recalled that the Newspaper Industry Inquiry Committee in Uttar Pradesh, in its report dated 31 March 1949, had proposed a three‑tier classification system. Under this system, “Class A” would include papers that either had a circulation of ten thousand copies or more, possessed invested capital of three lakh rupees or more, or earned an annual income of three lakh rupees or more. “Class B” would comprise papers with a circulation between five thousand and ten thousand copies, invested capital ranging from one lakh to three lakh rupees, or an annual income between one lakh and three lakh rupees. “Class C” would consist of papers whose circulation fell below five thousand copies, invested capital was less than one lakh rupees, or annual income was below one lakh rupees. The petitioners challenged the reliance on gross revenue, arguing that advertisement revenue typically formed the bulk of a newspaper’s gross revenue while revenue from circulation was often a small component, except possibly for language‑specific newspapers. They contended that without considering the proportion of advertisement revenue, it would be impossible to accurately assess a newspaper’s financial standing for classification purposes. The petitioners further proposed that the profit and loss statements of newspaper establishments should serve as the appropriate test, asserting that such an approach would produce a markedly different classification outcome. They argued that the balance‑sheets and profit‑and‑loss accounts of the various newspapers would need to be examined, and maintained that even if…

The Court observed that even when the gross revenue of a particular newspaper establishment is sufficiently large to merit placement in Class A or Class B on the basis of that revenue, the establishment might nevertheless be operating at a loss, making such a classification inappropriate. Earlier in the judgment the Court had already noted that the profit‑and‑loss test is unsatisfactory. Although the profit‑and‑loss accounts and balance‑sheets of the various limited companies may have been audited by professional auditors and accepted by the income‑tax authorities, they do not provide a reliable basis for classifying newspaper establishments for the reasons previously explained. The Court further recorded that, prior to the present proceedings, the Indian Federation of Working Journalists had attempted to show that the profit‑and‑loss accounts and balance‑sheets of several petitioners were manipulated and therefore unreliable. While the Court was not required to determine definitively whether the profit‑and‑loss test should be accepted, it was sufficient to state that the Wage Board was not at fault in rejecting that test, and that its decision to do so was at least defensible.

Turning to the sixth ground of attack, the Court addressed the issue of grouping newspaper establishments into chains or multiple units and the allegation that such grouping is unauthorised by the Act. The Court answered succinctly that, if grouping is justified by the prevailing conditions of the newspaper industry, there is nothing in the Act that prohibits it. The Wage Board was empowered to fix the wage structure for working journalists employed across newspaper establishments throughout the country. Consequently, where chains or multiple units exist, the individual establishments that constitute those chains fall within the scope of the Board’s inquiry, and the Board’s decision to treat them as a single group cannot, by itself, be challenged. The Act does not expressly require the Wage Board to adopt a different approach; rather, it is left to the Board to assess, on a case‑by‑case basis, whether such grouping is warranted. Unless the Court discovers a specific provision in the Act that forbids the Board’s action, it will not deem the grouping unauthorised. The Court noted, however, that the real difficulty with grouping relates to the industry's capacity to pay, a matter that will be examined later. Regarding the seventh ground, the Court referred to the definition of “newspaper establishment” in Section 2(d) of the Act, which describes it as “an establishment under the control of any person or body of persons, whether incorporated or not, for the production”.

The Court explained that the definition of “newspaper establishment” in Section 2(d) reads, “an establishment under the control of any person or body of persons, whether incorporated or not, for the production or publication of one or more newspapers or for conducting any news agency or syndicate.” The petitioners argued that the word “establishment” must refer only to a single entity and cannot be stretched to cover a group of establishments, even if each individual establishment is capable of producing or publishing more than one newspaper. They contended that, although the definition might technically encompass chains or multiple units, it still requires that the “establishment” be a single, individual operation that produces or publishes a chain of newspapers or multiple units of newspapers. The petitioners further maintained that if several chains or multiple units are owned by the same person or body—whether incorporated or not—but are operated by separate newspaper establishments, the mere fact of common control does not merge those separate establishments into one “establishment” for the purpose of the definition. Consequently, each would remain a distinct newspaper establishment despite being under common control. The petitioners relied on a Calcutta High Court decision in Pravat Kumar v. W. T. C. Parker, where the phrase “employed in an industrial establishment” was interpreted to mean employment at a specific place used for manufacturing or an activity amounting to industry as defined in the Act. A similar interpretation of “industrial establishment” was adopted by the Madras High Court in S.R.V. Service Ltd. v. State of Madras (A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 115, 122). In that case the court observed that the dispute involved workers and management of one industrial establishment, namely the Kumbakonam branch of S.R.V.S. Ltd., and rejected the argument that the branch was not an industrial establishment under the Act. The court referred to Section 3 of the Act to reject the counsel’s contention, holding that S.R.V.S. Ltd. with all its branches should be treated as one industrial establishment. These precedents, according to the Court, support the view that a newspaper establishment—like an industrial establishment—must be situated at a single location, even if it engages in the production or publication of more than one newspaper. If such activities occur in different towns or cities across different states, each newspaper establishment that produces or publishes those newspapers must be regarded as a separate establishment for the purpose of analysing the relationship between the establishment and its employees. There is no justification for aggregating these distinct newspaper establishments into a single chain or multiple‑unit entity and treating them as one establishment. The petitioners, however, pointed out that the Act contains no provision expressly prohibiting such grouping.

The Court observed that the Act contained no provision that barred the grouping of newspaper establishments. It noted that if the Wage Board could lawfully classify establishments on the basis of gross revenue, it could also lawfully group them into chains or multiple units. Consequently, there was nothing in the Act to stop several newspaper establishments, each producing or publishing one or more newspapers in different parts of the country, from being treated as a single newspaper establishment for the purpose of fixing wage rates. The Court further explained that it would not be improper to expect a uniform standard of employment and service conditions across all such establishments when they were under the control of the same person or group, irrespective of whether that person or group was incorporated. At the same time, the Court recognized that it would be inequitable for an employer to pay one group of workers higher wage scales while paying another group lower scales without justification. However, the Court held that it was legitimate to allow differences in wage scales where those differences reflected the quality of work required, the labour conditions prevailing in different regions, the standard of living in those regions, or other related factors.

Paragraph 319 explained that the Wage Board must keep all these considerations in mind when determining the wage structure, although the relative importance of each factor might differ according to the specific conditions of the areas where the newspaper establishments operated. Paragraph 320 simply referred to item 8 of the earlier order. In paragraph 321 the Court turned to what it described as the most significant ground of contention: the Wage Board’s decision had failed to take into account the capacity to pay of any individual newspaper establishment. The Court reiterated that the Wage Board’s fixation of wage rates did not specify whether the rates were to be minimum wages, fair wages, or living wages, leaving that determination to the Board’s discretion. The guiding principles laid down for the Board required it to consider certain circumstances before making a determination, and one of those essential circumstances was the industry’s capacity to pay, which was included under the heading “the circumstances relating to newspaper industry in different regions of the country.” The Court then questioned whether the Board truly understood this category in that sense and whether it had applied its mind to it. It noted that at the preliminary meeting on 26 May 1956, the Board had constituted a Sub‑Committee to draft a questionnaire to be sent to the various journals and organisations concerned, with the aim of obtaining factual data and other relevant information needed for wage fixation. The Sub‑Committee was instructed to keep in view, among other things, the need for a proper classification of the country into different areas based on criteria such as population and cost of living. The Court pointed out that this was the only reference in the record to that requirement.

In addressing the requirement of section 9(1), the Court observed that the questionnaire prepared by the Wage Board did not contain any reference to the capacity of the newspaper industry to pay, a factor the Court had previously held to be included within the scope of that statutory provision. The only item in the final version of the questionnaire that touched upon this criterion was Question No. 7, which appeared in Part “A” under the heading “Special circumstances.” The question read: “Are there in your regions any special conditions in respect of the newspaper industry which affect the fixing of rates of wages of working journalists? If so, specify the conditions and indicate how they affect the question of wages.” Even this question, however, did not make a clear effort to elicit information specifically about the industry’s capacity to pay. The Court noted that while the Wage Board unquestionably sought detailed accounts from newspaper establishments and requested data that would aid in the proper evaluation of the nature and quality of work performed by various categories of working journalists, the essential consideration of paying capacity was not prominently raised as an issue. Information on that point was only indirectly sought from the respondents to the questionnaire. When the Board later summarized the answers to Question No. 7, it found that some newspaper establishments had, in an incidental manner, referred to their capacity to pay. The Court emphasized that such references were made by the establishments themselves, were merely incidental, and did not indicate that the capacity to pay had been a focal point in the minds of the parties when the questionnaire was answered.

The Court further noted that, even before the establishment of the Press Commission, statistical evidence showed a troubling picture of the industry’s financial health. Out of a total of 127 newspapers, 68 were reported to be operating at a loss while 59 were making profits, resulting in an overall profit margin of approximately one percent on a capital investment of seven crore rupees. The profit and loss accounts and balance sheets of the various companies that owned or controlled these newspaper establishments had been submitted to the Wage Board, but they told a very bleak story. For the financial year 1954‑55, the profit and loss statements indicated that 43 newspapers recorded profits whereas 40 recorded losses. Although the Court cautioned that no rigorous scientific conclusion could be drawn from these figures alone, it held that the data unmistakably demonstrated that the condition of the newspaper industry as a whole could not be regarded as satisfactory. In light of this, the Court stressed that it was incumbent upon the Wage Board, even though it considered the profit‑and‑loss statements as not necessarily reflecting the true financial position of the establishments, to examine the question of the industry's capacity to pay with heightened vigilance. The Court also pointed out an additional difficulty facing the Board: the questionnaire had been sent to 5,705 newspapers, yet only between 312 and, at most, 325 of them responded. Consequently, the Wage Board remained largely in the dark about the situation prevailing in the many newspaper establishments from which no response was received.

In its note dated 30 April 1957, the chairman observed that the Wage Board possessed no comprehensive data on all newspaper establishments, and that the limited information it did have was often unsatisfactory. He reiterated that the data available to the Board fell short of what the Board would have preferred, and consequently he recommended the creation of a permanent administrative mechanism. This mechanism would be tasked with regularly gathering detailed information from every newspaper establishment across the country, including data on employment, wage rates, earnings, financial condition, circulation figures and other material necessary for evaluating the impact of the Board’s decisions at the time of any review. The Board, lacking sufficient data and information, was effectively “groping in the dark” and therefore unable to reach a sound conclusion regarding the wage structure it was required to determine. Absent such data, the Board could not ascertain how its proposals would affect the overall capacity of the industry to pay, either on a national basis or regionally. The chairman noted that, at that stage, the Board could not precisely calculate the economic and other consequences of its decisions for the newspaper industry as a whole. Concerning the effect of the proposals on individual establishments, the chairman expressed optimism about the future of Indian‑language newspapers, citing rising literacy and growing political awareness among readers. He suggested that, with rational management, newspaper incomes could be substantially increased, and although no adjustment could satisfy every interested party, he hoped that no newspaper would be forced to shut down as a result of the Board’s decision. He added that a good newspaper deserving of existence would receive assistance from the Government and the public, a statement of optimism that the record does not appear to substantiate.

Although the Wage Board classified newspaper establishments into five categories ranging from “A” to “E” based on gross revenue, it did not take into account the proportion of advertisement revenue relative to gross revenue. Nor did it consider the essential differences between circulation levels and the paying capacity of language‑medium newspapers compared with English‑language newspapers. Had these factors been incorporated, the Board’s reliance on gross revenue as the primary basis for classification would have been altered in several respects. Consequently, the grouping of establishments failed to reflect critical economic distinctions that could have influenced the assessment of wage structures and the overall financial health of the newspaper industry.

The Court observed that classifying newspapers as part of chains or multiple units implied that the weaker establishments within those groups would be treated on an equal footing with the stronger ones, and it was asserted that any loss suffered by the weaker units would be more than offset by the profits earned by the more prosperous units. It noted that the effect of these proposals on newspaper groups was defended merely on principle, without any assessment of the practical consequences for the operation of the weaker establishments. The Chairman further expressed the view that the Board was aware that, as a result of its decision, some journalists employed in the weaker units of a chain might receive substantially higher remuneration than those working in the highest‑income units of the same group. Nevertheless, the Chairman maintained that if the principle underlying the scheme was sound and scientific, the inevitable outcomes of its application should be evaluated from the perspective of Indian journalism as a whole, rather than by measuring the burden imposed on any particular establishment. The Court therefore concluded that the principle favoured by the Wage Board was being implemented without due consideration of the additional strain it would place on the weaker components of a newspaper enterprise. The representatives of the employers objected to the fixing of wage scales by arguing that the determination of wage rates did not automatically include the determination of wage scales. This objection was rejected by the representatives of the employees, by the Chairman, and by the majority of the Wage Board, which affirmed that the Board was empowered to fix both the rates of wages and the accompanying scales of wages. The Court recalled that the Press Commission had merely recommended a basic minimum wage for consideration by the parties, while indicating that the detailed scales of wages should be settled through collective bargaining or adjudication. Although the Wage Board had assumed the responsibility of fixing wage scales within the scope of its reference, the Court held that it was incumbent upon the Board to examine the impact of the scales it fixed on the industry's overall capacity to pay. No material on record demonstrated that, either with respect to wage rates or wage scales, the Board ever considered how its determinations would affect the payment capacity of the industry as a whole or on a regional basis. Moreover, the Court identified an additional difficulty in upholding the Board’s decision, observing that even when fixing the rates of wages for working journalists, the Board appeared not to have taken into account other statutory provisions that granted journalists benefits such as retrenchment compensation, gratuity, regulated hours of work and leave. These ancillary benefits, the Court noted, would inevitably influence the financial obligations of newspaper establishments.

The Court observed that the statutory provisions concerning retrenchment compensation, gratuity, hours of work and leave inevitably affect the financial capacity of newspaper establishments. If the Wage Board had taken these effects into account, it was highly probable that the wage rates and the wage scales finally fixed would have been lower than those reflected in the Board’s decision. The Court further noted that the difficulty of the situation was amplified by the fact that working journalists comprised at most one‑fifth of the total workforce employed in newspaper establishments. The remaining eighty percent of employees could be described as factory‑type workers who, under the Industrial Disputes Act, could seek improvement of their service conditions through the dispute‑resolution machinery provided by that legislation. Consequently, if the Wage Board’s orders improved the conditions of the journalists, the large body of other employees would likely become dissatisfied and, at the earliest opportunity, would raise industrial disputes in order to obtain better terms for themselves. Although the Industrial Courts created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 might not grant these workers relief equal to that granted to the journalists, the Court held that any improvement in their conditions would necessarily be considered by the courts, taking into account the benefits already enjoyed by the journalists. Such improvements would impose an additional financial burden on the newspaper establishments and would substantially diminish their ability to meet wage obligations. The Court emphasized that this consideration should have been part of the Wage Board’s deliberations, yet the record showed no evidence that the Board actually examined this factor.

The Court also pointed out that the retrospective operation of the Wage Board’s decision was calculated to place an extra financial strain on newspaper establishments. While this retrospective element might be a minor consideration compared with the other factors already discussed, the Court stressed that it nonetheless represented a circumstance the Board ought to have weighed when fixing wage rates. In the hearing, the petitioners submitted detailed statements illustrating the magnitude of the financial burden created by the Board’s decision. Those statements demonstrated that the wage bill of the newspaper establishments would increase considerably, that the retrospective effect would erode a substantial portion of their reserves, and that the combined impact of the Act’s provisions on retrenchment compensation, gratuity, hours of work and leave, together with the Wage Board’s determination of wage rates and scales, would generate a grave financial strain on the establishments.

The evidence indicated that the financial resources of the newspaper establishments, while not necessarily being driven to total collapse, were placed under a severe strain that could threaten their continued operation. The statements on record further demonstrated that an additional burden would arise if a newspaper chose to dismiss its working journalists; this burden would become even greater should the establishment, albeit reluctantly, resolve that it was more advantageous to shut down the business rather than to continue operating under the weight of the imposed financial obligations. The Court noted that the numerical data supporting these observations had already been set out in the earlier portion of the judgment, and therefore it was unnecessary to repeat those figures. Nonetheless, the unavoidable conclusion was that the Wage Board’s decision imposed a very heavy financial burden on the newspaper establishments. This burden was intensified by several factors: the classification of establishments on the basis of gross revenue, the fixation of wage scales, the statutory provisions relating to hours of work and leave, the grouping of newspapers into chains or multiple units, and the retrospective operation of the Wage Board’s decision as previously described.

The Court observed that, had the Wage Board circulated the proposals before finalising them, the various newspaper establishments would have had an opportunity to submit their opinions and any representations they wished to make for the Board’s consideration. If, after receiving such input, the Board had then finalised its decision, the criticism that the Board failed to consider the industry’s capacity to pay—either as a whole or on a regional basis—would have lost much of its force. In reality, however, the Board did not take such a step. Instead, proposals were exchanged only between the representatives of the employers and those of the employees. The Chairman’s discussions with each set of representatives yielded no substantive result, and he subsequently, acting in a mediatory capacity, presented his own proposals, apparently taking into account the differing points of view expressed by both sides. The decision on wage scales emerged as a majority decision that was not endorsed by the employers’ representatives. Likewise, the Chairman’s proposals were rejected by the employers but accepted by the employees, thereby becoming the majority decision of the Wage Board. The final decision of the Chairman on these matters did not appear to stem from any genuine assessment of the industry’s capacity to pay, either nationally or regionally; rather, it reflected a compromise that was largely accepted only by the employees’ representatives and not by those of the employers. Consequently, the Court found no evidence in the present case of any genuine consideration by the Board of the overall capacity of the newspaper industry to meet the financial requirements imposed.

The Court noted that the chairman himself had recorded, at the time the decision was published on 30 April 1957, that the Wage Board found it difficult to determine with any precision the economic and other consequences of the decision for the newspaper industry as a whole. This observation formed the basis of the Court’s conclusion that the Board had not conducted a thorough assessment of the industry’s capacity to pay, either on a national or regional basis.

The respondents, during the hearing before the Court, attempted to demonstrate that the conversion of the currency into naye pyse and the consequent increase in the price charged to the public had led to a considerable rise in the income of several newspapers. The petitioners disputed these figures and argued that any revenue increase resulting from the price conversion was more than offset by a decline in circulation, the continuously rising cost of newsprint, and higher commissions payable to commission agents. While the Court did not reproduce the detailed calculations, it was satisfied that the conversion to naye pyse had not produced the effect claimed by the respondents and had not enhanced the newspapers’ capacity to pay the wages imposed by the Board.

The Court further observed that the Wage Board had expressed a hopeful expectation that, should a newspaper be of good quality and deserving of existence, the Government and the public would assist it in continuing operations. The Board also advised against a hasty judgment and recommended that the effects of its decision be observed with patience for a period of three to five years, indicating that the Board regarded its decision as experimental and was uncertain of its own position. The chairman appealed to the Government of India to establish immediately a standing administrative mechanism capable of implementing and administering the decision, as well as preparing for a review and revision after the stipulated period. This appeal represented another optimistic hope of the Board, yet the Court emphasized that the Government was under no obligation to fulfil this expectation and that there was no certainty that a review or revision would occur after the three‑to‑five‑year interval. In its careful examination of all Wage Board proceedings, tables and statements, the Court found no satisfactory evidence that the Board had examined the industry’s capacity to pay when fixing the wage structure. As previously noted, the Board was at liberty not to assign undue importance to such considerations.

In the present matter the Board chose to ignore the profit‑and‑loss statements that had been filed by a number of newspaper establishments. Because those statements plainly indicated that the trade was not generating profit, it became even more crucial for the Board to verify that each class of newspaper establishments could sustain the financial burden created by the wage structure that the Board intended to impose. Industrial adjudication routinely employs a methodology for ascertaining an employer’s capacity to bear such a burden. When an industry comprises distinct classes, it is not always required to examine the payment capacity of every single unit; however, it is essential to assess the ability of each class as a whole to manage the imposed burden. Accordingly, a representative cross‑section of the various classes should be examined carefully, and every relevant factor must be taken into account in determining the total load that the class, considered collectively, can endure. Where feasible, the adjudicating authority often projects the effect of the proposed wage structure over the next two or three years to see how it would influence the employer’s financial position. The complete record before the Board, including the Chairman’s note, contains no indication that the Board attempted any such assessment of the industry’s capacity to pay. Instead, the proceedings reveal that the demands presented by employee representatives and the concessions offered by employer representatives were treated merely as opposing contentions, and the Chairman endeavoured to reach a final decision on the conventional basis of give‑and‑take.

By following this approach, the members of the Board appear to have lost sight of the fundamental prerequisite for fixing a wage structure—that is, a proper consideration of the industry’s capacity to pay. In the Court’s view, this omission creates a fatal flaw in the Board’s decision. Had the Court been convinced that the Board had duly examined this aspect, it would have been reluctant to entertain any challenge to the decision on the ground that the capacity‑to‑pay factor had been ignored. Ordinarily, in cases where special Boards are constituted to devise wage structures, the Court refrains from acting as an appellate forum for factual disputes. Nevertheless, in the present case an indispensable condition for determining the wage structure was entirely disregarded, leading to the inevitable conclusion that the Board violated the mandatory requirement of section 9 and that, consequently, its decision is ultra vires the Act. The submission that the Board lacked authority to issue a decision having retrospective effect is likewise untenable.

In this case the Court observed that the Wage Board possessed both jurisdiction and authority to issue a decision that could take effect retrospectively from the date of its appointment, and that there was no legal defect in the Board’s stipulation that its decision operate retrospectively in the manner it specified. The Court noted that while such retrospectivity might affect the industry’s capacity to pay, the matter had already been addressed earlier and required no further discussion. Regarding the tenth ground raised, the Court explained that this ground alleged that the Board had the power to fix wage scales for a three‑year period subject to governmental review by appointing another Board thereafter. The Court stated that it did not need to examine such a temporal fixation because the Board had never exercised that authority; its sole power was to determine wage rates and present its findings to the Government. Consequently, any expectation that the decision would be open to review or revision after three or five years was not contained in the Board’s actual decision, and the Court therefore did not consider the effect of a hypothetical period fixation.

Turning to the eleventh ground, the petitioners claimed that the Board was disadvantaged because it lacked a Cost of Living Index. The Court rejected this contention, observing that the Board’s own decision, in Clause 24, referred to the All‑India Cost of Living Index published by the Labour Bureau of the Government of India, with base year 1944 set at 100, and that the dearness allowance was fixed in relation to that index. Because these statistics were available to the Board, it could not be said that the Board was handicapped in this respect.

After reviewing all the grounds of attack presented against the validity and the binding nature of the Wage Board’s decision, the Court concluded that the decision could not be upheld and therefore must be set aside. Accordingly, the petitions were allowed, and the petitioners were entitled to a declaration that section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, was ultra vires the Constitution of India, and that the Wage Board’s decision dated 30 April 1957 was illegal and void. Concerning costs, the Court observed that the petitioners had failed on most of their constitutional arguments, and therefore each party was ordered to bear its own costs of the petitions. The Court also noted the civil appeals numbered 699 to 703 of 1957, which were directed against the same Wage Board decision.

The appeals questioned the decision of the Wage Board, contending that overturning that decision would prevent the destruction of the newspaper establishments involved and would safeguard their fundamental rights. The Court granted special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution for each appeal, while expressly leaving open the issue that the maintainability of the appeals could still be urged by any party. The Court further observed that these appeals are covered by the judgment recently delivered in Petition No. 91 of 1957 and others, and therefore each appellant is entitled to a declaration that the Wage Board’s decision is ultra vires the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, and consequently void and inoperative. In view of that conclusion, the Court found it unnecessary to examine whether the appeals would be maintainable under Article 136, because the appellants had already achieved substantive success in their petitions under Article 32; the question of maintainability had become purely academic and required no further consideration. Accordingly, the Court ordered that no further orders would be made except that each party should bear and pay its own costs. The petitions were allowed and the appeals were disposed of in accordance with that order.