Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. vs The Union of India and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Petitions Nos. 91, 99, 100, 101, 103

Decision Date: 8 January 1958

Coram: Not extracted

In this matter, Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. and another newspaper establishment filed petitions against the Union of India and other respondents. The judgment was delivered on 8 January 1958 by a Bench of the Supreme Court of India. The petitions challenged the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (Act 45 of 1955), specifically sections 3(2), 4, 5(1)(a)(iii), 9(1), 11, 12, 17 and 20(d)(2). The petitioners raised constitutional questions under Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 14 and 32 of the Constitution of India. The Act had been enacted to give effect to the recommendations of the Press Commission and to regulate the conditions of service of working journalists and other employees of newspaper establishments. Among its provisions, the Act required payment of gratuity to a journalist who had rendered continuous service for at least three years, even if he voluntarily resigned, regulated working hours and leave, and provided for the payment of retrenchment compensation with retrospective effect in certain cases. Section 9(1) of the Act set out the principles that the Wage Board was to follow when fixing rates of wages for working journalists. Those principles required the Board to consider the cost of living, prevailing wage rates for comparable employment, regional conditions of the newspaper industry, and any other relevant circumstances. The petitioners contended that the provisions of the Act infringed their fundamental rights under the cited constitutional articles. They also argued that the Wage Board’s decision fixing wage rates and scales, which was made without any assessment of the newspaper industry’s capacity to meet those rates, imposed an excessive financial burden that could ruin the industry. The petitioners asserted that the Board’s approach was erroneous, that it failed to apply proper criteria, violated the principles of natural justice, and was therefore illegal and void.

The Court held that, with the sole exception of section 5(1)(a)(iii), the Act was constitutionally valid. The Court observed that section 5(1)(a)(iii) infringed Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and, being severable from the remainder of the Act, was the only provision that had to be declared ultra vires. The Court further construed section 9(1) to impose a mandatory duty on the Wage Board to take into account the capacity of the newspaper industry to pay the rates and scales of wages recommended by it. Because the Board’s decision did not demonstrate such consideration, the Court concluded that the decision was void and inoperative. The judgment therefore upheld the validity of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, except for the offending clause, and emphasized the necessity for the Wage Board to evaluate the financial capability of the industry when fixing wage rates.

The Court observed that Section 9(1) of the Act required the Wage Board to consider the capacity of the newspaper industry to pay the rates and scales of wages it recommended. Because there was no evidence that the Board had actually taken that capacity into account, the Court held that the Board’s decision was void and inoperative. The judgment then turned to the interpretation of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Relying on its own earlier rulings, the Court affirmed that freedom of the press formed an essential component of the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by that article. Consequently, the press enjoyed the right to publish and circulate news without any prior restraint. The Court referred to the decisions in Ramesh Thaper v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 594 and Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, [1950] S.C.R. 605 to support this understanding. It also considered it appropriate to examine decisions of the United States Supreme Court because Article 19(1)(a) was modeled on the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The American rulings made clear that while the press is free from restrictions on its editorial staffing, it is not exempt from ordinary taxation, from general industrial-relations legislation, or from statutes governing the payment of wages.

The Court explained that a law would violate Article 19(1)(a) only if it singled out the press and imposed burdens that restricted circulation, penalised the press’s choice of personnel, prevented the establishment of newspapers, or forced the press to depend on government aid. Such a law would fall outside the protective ambit of Article 19(2). The Court found that the impugned Act was not a law of that character; rather, it was a benevolent piece of legislation aimed at regulating the service conditions of working journalists. The Court held that the Act, although it directly affected the press and lay beyond the categories of protection mentioned in Article 19(2), did not take away or abridge the petitioners’ freedom of speech and expression, and therefore did not infringe Article 19(1)(a). The Court also considered the cases of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88; Ram Singh v. State of Delhi, [1951] S.C.R. 451; Minnesota Ex Rel. Olson, (1930) 283 U.S. 697; and Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd., [1954] S.C.R. 674. Finally, the Court concluded that the Act could not be held to violate Article 19(1)(g) because it satisfied the reasonableness test laid down by this Court, as illustrated in Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1950] S.C.R. 759; State of Madras v. V.G. Rao, [1952] S.C.R. 597; State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, [1954] S.C.R. 587; and Virendra v. State of Punjab, [1958] S.C.R. 308.

It was held that section 9(i) of the Act indeed prescribed the relevant criteria for fixing wage rates. A proper construction of that provision required that the criterion of prevailing wages for comparable employment could be satisfied only where the wages exceeded the bare subsistence level or the minimum wages. Because the definition of wage rates also embraced wage scales, the Wage Board was obliged to consider the newspaper industry’s capacity to pay before fixing any rates. Although the Act did not expressly state this, the Court was able to read the third criterion—namely, the circumstances relating to the newspaper industry in different regions of the country—as encompassing such a consideration. Consequently, the provisions of section 9(i) were not unreasonable nor violative of article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Moreover, section 9(1) did not confer unchecked authority on the Wage Board. The final criterion, which permitted the Board to take into account any other circumstances it deemed relevant, had to be interpreted ejusdem generis with the preceding criteria, which already provided clear and particular principles to guide the Board. In view of this, the Legislature was justified in leaving additional considerations to the Board’s subjective satisfaction, especially since the Board consisted of an equal number of representatives of employers and employees, as supported by the precedent in Thakur Raghbir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer.

The Court further rejected the claim that sections 11 and 20(2)(d) of the Act left the Board without any procedural guidelines or allowed it to follow an arbitrary procedure contrary to the principles of natural justice. The petitioners’ contention that the Act’s provisions concerning proofreaders—who were classified as working journalists—regarding notice periods under section 3(2), retrospective operation specified in section 4, and prescribed hours of work imposed unreasonable restrictions on their fundamental right to carry on business was found to have no substance. Regarding gratuity, the Court observed that it was intended as a reward for long, efficient, and faithful service; therefore, awarding gratuity to an employee who voluntarily resigned after only three years, as contemplated by section 5(1)(a)(iii), was unreasonable and wholly unjustified. Finally, the Court concluded that the Act was not discriminatory and did not breach article 14 of the Constitution, because working journalists constituted a distinct class that could be reasonably differentiated from other newspaper employees.

The Court observed that newspaper employees could be distinguished from other newspaper workers on a clear and intelligible basis that was rationally related to the purpose of the Act. Consequently, the provisions contained in section twelve and section seventeen of the Act could not be characterised as discriminatory. The authority in Budhan Choudhary v. The State of Bihar, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045, was therefore applicable to this conclusion. The Court further noted that the impugned legislation did not contain any prohibition preventing the Wage Board from furnishing reasons for its decisions, nor did it bar the Board from issuing a speaking order whenever it chose to do so. As a result, the Act could not be said to have infringed the fundamental right of a citizen to seek a writ of certiorari under article thirty-two of the Constitution. The cases of Rex v. Northumberland County Appeal Tribunal, Ex Parte Shaw, [1951] 1 K.B. 711 and Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex Parte Shaw, [1952] 1 K.B. 338, were held to be inapplicable to the present controversy. The Court relied upon A.K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, to explain that the nature of a body’s functions—legislative, administrative, judicial, or quasi-judicial—must be determined by reference to the statute that created it. An administrative body may nevertheless perform quasi-judicial functions if it is required to evaluate evidence and reach a judicial determination. Applying this test, the Court found no doubt that the Wage Board, created under the impugned Act, was operating in a quasi-judicial capacity. The precedent in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, [1958] S.C.R. 1240, was cited in support of this view.

The Court recognised that, although it ordinarily refrains from adverting to questions of fact, the present case warranted scrutiny because the Wage Board had entirely disregarded a vital condition essential to the performance of its statutory function and had imposed an excessive financial burden on the newspaper industry. While the classification of the newspaper industry on the basis of gross revenue, the fixation of wage scales, the provisions relating to hours of work, leave, retrospective operation in specified cases, and the grouping of newspapers into chains or multiple units could not be described as improper or unjustified, these classifications nevertheless intensified the financial burden on the industry. The Board had conducted no enquiry into the industry's capacity to meet the imposed obligations, either on a national or regional basis, and it failed to invite or consider any representations from the industry before finalising its decision. Accordingly, the Court held that the Board’s decision was ultra vires the Act and contravened the principles of natural justice.

For the record, the original jurisdiction of this matter comprised petitions numbered ninety-one, ninety-nine, one-hundred, one-hundred-one and one-hundred-three, filed under article thirty-two of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The same matters were also the subject of civil appeals numbered six-hundred-ninety-nine to seven-hundred-three of 1957, which were entertained by special leave against the decision of the Wage Board for Working Journalists published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary (Part II, Section 3) dated eleven May 1957. The subsequent procedural history of the case included hearing dates in December 1957 (the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth days) and in January 1958 (the eighth, ninth, tenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, twenty-first, twenty-second, twenty-third, twenty-fourth and twenty-eighth days).

Counsel for the petitioners in Petition No. 91 of 1957 argued that the Working Journalists Act, 1955 was beyond the power of the legislature because it violated the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Articles 19 (1)(a), 19 (1)(g), 14 and 32 of the Constitution. The counsel explained that Article 19 (1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression and that this freedom includes the right to use whatever means are necessary to exercise that freedom, which necessarily embraces the freedom of the press. The counsel emphasized that an abstract guarantee of free expression would be meaningless unless it covered the practical tools required for its exercise, citing the United States Commission on Freedom of the Press (1947), the Royal Commission for the Press in the United Kingdom (1949), and several judicial decisions such as Ramesh Thapar v. State of Madras, Brij Bhusan v. State of Delhi, Ex parte Jackson, Lovell v. City of Griffin, Orosjean v. American Press Co., and Schneider v. Irvington, together with the United States Constitution commentary. The counsel contended that, when read as a whole, the impugned Act authorised a fixation of journalists’ salaries at a level that would cripple the operation of the press, thereby obstructing, controlling and prohibiting the free employment of the means of expression that form the press’s vocal chord. Consequently, the Act infringed the freedom protected by Article 19 (1)(a) and could not be saved by the reasonable-restriction provision of Article 19 (2). To test the validity of the legislation, the counsel argued that its operation and effect must be examined, referring to Dwarkadas Srinivas of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. and Minnesota Ex Rel. Olson. The counsel further maintained that the Act violated the right guaranteed by Article 19 (1)(g) because it imposed an unreasonable restraint on the petitioners’ freedom to carry on business, relying on cases such as Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Ch. Tika Ramjidas v. State of U.P., State of Madras v. V. G. Row, State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, and Virendra v. State of Punjab. Finally, the counsel asserted that any law restricting fundamental rights must be reasonable not only in substance but also in procedure, citing Dr. N. B. Khare v. State of Delhi and Ourbachan v. State of Punjab.

The Court observed that section 9(1) of the Act did not specify any criteria for fixing wages. The only wage-fixation criteria contained in the Act related to the determination of minimum rates of wages, although the term “minimum” that appeared in Bill 13 of 1955 when introduced in the Rajya Sabha was later removed before the Bill became law. Consequently, the Act failed to impose on the Wage Board the duty to regard an industry’s capacity to pay as an essential or even a major factor when fixing wages. Moreover, the phrase “any other circumstances which to the Board may seem relevant” in section 9(1) was left to the Board’s subjective judgment, without any supervisory authority capable of reviewing that discretion. The Court held that this situation granted the Board the power to act arbitrarily, which by itself rendered the provision unreasonable, citing the earlier decisions in Thakur Raghbir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer, [1953] S. C. R. 1049 and R. M. Seshadri v. District Magistrate, Tanjore, [1955] 1 S. C. R. 686. The Court further noted that the Act did not prescribe any procedure for the Wage Board to follow, unlike the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 as amended. In the absence of a mandatory procedure, the Board could adopt any method, even one that ignored the principle of audi alteram partem, and therefore the Act was unreasonable. The Court clarified that the Board’s functions were not legislative but were quasi-judicial in nature, and the legislature had intended to align the Board as closely as possible with an Industrial Tribunal established under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. If section 11 of the Act were regarded merely as an enabling provision that allowed the Board to exercise its powers and adopt any procedure it chose, such a construction would be unreasonable.

The Court further examined the substantive provisions of the Act, namely sections 2(f), 3, 4, 5, 8 to 11, 12, 14, 15 and 17, and found that they imposed restraints on newspaper establishments that could effectively destroy the petitioners’ businesses. The Court emphasized that the power conferred by article 19(6) of the Constitution to impose restrictions on the right to carry on business does not extend to a power that destroys the business itself, referring to the authorities in Stone v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 29 L. Ed. 636; Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo, 1896 A. C. 88; and A. G. for Ontario v. A. G. for the Dominion, [1896] A. C. 348. The Court held that the Act was discriminatory and violative of article 14 of the Constitution because it accorded more favourable treatment to working journalists than to other employees. The Act gave journalists statutory benefits—including retrenchment compensation, gratuity, regulated hours of work and leave—that were not available to workers in comparable employments, thereby creating an unjustified classification. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Act’s selective advantages and the burdens imposed on newspaper employers were constitutionally infirm.

The provision applies only to a selected section of newspaper employees. It grants these employees the benefit of wage fixation by creating a mechanism in the form of a Pay Commission even when no industrial dispute exists, and without requiring that the principal criterion of the employer’s capacity to pay be taken into account; see Britannia Bldg. and Iron Co. Ltd., (1954) 1 L. L. J. 651, 654; Union Drug Co. Ltd., (1954) 1 L. L. J. 766, 767; Report of the Committee on Fair Wages, pp. 13-15, paras. 21, 23 and 24. Alternatively, the provision authorises the use of the procedure prescribed by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, even though this procedure is applied in disregard of the principles of audi alteram partem. The Act subjects the employers of newspaper establishments to discriminatory treatment in several respects. First, the employers are singled out from all other industrial employers who fall under the ordinary law regulating industrial relations under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Second, the employers have been burdened with new obligations concerning a specific class of their workers in relation to gratuity, compensation, hours of work and wages. Third, section 12 of the Act makes the decision of the Wage Board binding only on the employers and not on the employees. Fourth, section 17 provides for the recovery of money from employers only and not from employees in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. The classification introduced by the impugned Act is therefore arbitrary and unreasonable because it removes newspaper employers, with respect to the working journalists, from the general operation of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The right to approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of a fundamental right under article 32 is itself a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, as held in Ramesh Thapar v. The State of Madras, [1950] S. C. R. 594, 597. The right to obtain a writ of certiorari against a decision depends on the impugned decision being, on its face, a “speaking order,” as discussed in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shaw, [1951] 1 K. B. 711, affirmed by the Court of Appeal in [1952] 1 K. B. 338; and A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, [1950] S. C. R. 88, 243. The Act violates article 32 because it fails to require the Wage Board to give any reasons for its decisions. The decisions of the Wage Board are illegal and void for three reasons: (1) the Act under which they are made is ultra vires, as indicated in Mohd Yasin v. Town Area Committee of Jalalabad, [1952] S. C. R. 572; Himatalal Harilal Mehta v. State of U. P., [1954] S. C. R. 1122; (2) the decisions themselves infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioners, as held in Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India, [1956] S. C. R. 267; and (3) the decisions are ultra vires the Act, as affirmed in Pandit Ram Narain v. State of U. P., [1956] S. C. R. 664. The reconstitution of the Board on the retirement of one of its members was likewise ultra vires and unauthorised by the Act as it stood at that time.

In this case the Court observed that the reconstitution of the Wage Board members was ultra vires and unauthorised by the Act as it existed at the relevant time, because the Rules governing such reconstitution had been published on 10 July 1956. The Court further stated that the procedure for reaching a decision by majority was not provided for by the Act, and that the Rule which permitted such a majority decision therefore exceeded the authority of the Act. Because the procedure adopted by the Board violated the principles of natural justice, the Court held the procedure to be invalid. The Board had also failed to follow the procedure laid down for an Industrial Tribunal, even though on two separate occasions—once when a questionnaire was issued and again when several newspapers did not respond to that questionnaire—the Board claimed to be exercising the powers of an Industrial Tribunal. The Court noted that neither the questionnaire nor any later communication contained any concrete proposals from the Board to the newspaper establishments. Moreover, the Board’s final decision was found to be invalid because it did not set out any reasons and did not explain the considerations on which the Board relied.

The Court further examined the method of classifying newspapers on the basis of gross revenue and concluded that such classification contravened the provisions of the Act. It explained that a newspaper’s gross revenue is largely composed of advertising revenue, and that without taking into account the proportion of advertising revenue to total revenue it is impossible to obtain an accurate picture of the financial condition of a newspaper establishment for classification purposes. The Court suggested that profit and loss should be the appropriate test, and that using this test would produce a markedly different classification. Historically, when wages for an industry were fixed, the prevailing consideration was the industry’s capacity to pay, and wages fixed after a general inquiry applicable to the whole industry were always minimum wages. Therefore, assessing a wage level solely on the basis of gross revenue was erroneous. The Court identified another serious defect in the Board’s decision: the calculation of gross revenue was made not for each newspaper individually but collectively for the entire organisation, which might operate several papers. This collective calculation could place an organisation that publishes many papers in the top class because of its aggregate gross revenue, even though each individual paper might be operating at a loss. The Court held that treating multiple units or a chain of newspapers as a single establishment adversely affected the petitioners and was not authorised by the Act. Finally, the Court observed that the Wage Board was not empowered by the Act to fix wages for working journalists across the whole industry; it could only set wages for individual establishments, as indicated by the definition of “newspaper establishment” in section 2(d) of the Act. The term “establishment” refers to a single establishment and not to a group of establishments, even if a single establishment publishes more than one newspaper. The Court cited the decision in Pravat Kumar v. W.T. to support this interpretation.

The Court noted the relevance of earlier authorities such as C. Parker, A. 1. R. 1950 Cal. 116, 118, and S. R. V. Service Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras, A. 1. R. 1956 Mad. 115, 121-122, and then held that the decision of the Wage Board was illegal because it failed to show that the capacity to pay of the individual newspaper establishment had ever been considered. No record existed to demonstrate that, either with respect to the rates of wages or the scales of pay, the Board had examined the impact of its determinations on the ability of the industry, taken as a whole or regionally, to meet those obligations. Moreover, in fixing wages, the Board apparently disregarded other provisions of the Act that granted working journalists additional benefits, benefits that would also affect the paying capacity of newspaper establishments.

The Court further observed that journalists constitute only one-fifth of the total workforce employed by newspaper establishments. If the Board were to improve the conditions of service of the working journalists, the remaining eight-fifths of employees would likely become dissatisfied and could raise industrial disputes in pursuit of better conditions. Such disputes would impose an additional financial burden on the establishments and would substantially affect their capacity to pay. The retrospective operation of the Board’s decision was also calculated to impose a further financial burden on the establishments. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Board had exceeded its statutory authority by giving retrospective effect to its decision.

The Court also held that the Board acted without legal authority when it fixed scales of pay for a period of three years, a power not conferred on it by the Act. In addition, the Board was handicapped by the absence of a Cost of Living Index, which further undermined the legality of its determinations. Counsel for the petitioners, namely K. M. Munshi, L. K. Jha, S. S. Shukla, Balbhadra Prasad Sinha and R. J. Joshi, had emphasized that the freedom of the press is a fundamental personal right of the petitioners. The Court reiterated that this freedom rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to public welfare, forming the foundation of a free government and enjoying a preferential position among constitutional guarantees. It characterized this liberty as a “preferred right”.

In discussing the purpose of the constitutional guarantee of free speech, the Court cited authorities such as Thomas v. Collins, 89 L. Ed. 430; The Supreme Court and the Right of Free Speech and Press-Annotation in 93 L. Ed. 1151; and Beauharnais v. Illinois, 96 L. Ed. 919, 943 (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas). While acknowledging that the press is not immune from general laws relating to industrial relations, the Court warned that any Act or provision would violate the right of free speech and expression if it directly and preferentially burdens the freedom of the press, tends to curtail circulation, or otherwise restricts the ability of the press to disseminate information.

In this case, the Court observed that the provisions of the Act would narrow the scope of disseminating information, restrict the petitioners’ freedom to select the means by which they exercised their right of expression, and potentially undermine the Press’s independence by forcing it to rely on Government assistance. The Court noted that the Act singled out the Press for a direct burden that was excessive and so restrictive that it became prohibitive. By creating a distinct class of workers whose benefits and rights were enforceable in a manner comparable to a public debt, the Act, according to the Court, violated constitutional guarantees. Specifically, section 9 of the impugned Act, the Court held, allowed an agency to fix wages in contravention of the Constitution, granting that agency arbitrary and unchecked power to impose an indeterminate burden on the wage structure of the Press. The Court emphasized that the Act, together with the decision of the Wage Board which became enforceable under the Act, imposed a burden that was both excessive and prohibitive. Such a burden, the Court said, would likely curtail revenue and restrict circulation, thereby impeding the means of imparting information and of giving free expression to speech. Moreover, the Court found that the Act penalised the petitioners’ right to choose the instruments for exercising their expression or to seek alternative media, and it would compel the Press to seek Government aid merely to survive, discouraging the establishment of new newspapers. The Court described the situation created by the Act as practically impossible, stating that the petitioner could only respond, “I cannot live, I cannot die and I cannot commit suicide.” Even if the petitioners were to close their business and liquidate all assets, the Court observed, they would still be unable to meet all liabilities. The Court reiterated that the Constitution does not permit any abridgement of the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression unless it falls within the categories of restriction enumerated in Article 19(2). When those permissible restrictions were drafted, the framers deliberately ensured that freedom of speech would be protected and not left at the mercy of a legislature that might impose excessive burdens on the Press. For this reason, the Court explained, the “public interest” restriction found in Article 19(6) is not part of Article 19(2). Finally, the Court drew a distinction between the United States and India, noting that the United States Constitution contains a “due process of law” clause, which has allowed its Supreme Court to read into the Constitution doctrines restricting fundamental rights, such as the earlier ruling that a statutory minimum wage in the newspaper industry violated free speech, a position later revised. In contrast, the Indian Constitution omits any due-process clause, and therefore any direct restriction imposed by the Government on the Press would contravene Article 19(1)(a) and be unconstitutional.

The Court noted that, in the United States, the judiciary exercised the discretion granted by the due-process clause, recognised changed circumstances in labour relations, and held that imposing a minimum wage on the press did not infringe the constitutional guarantee of free speech, as documented in the Constitution of the United States of America, Revised and Annotated (1952), U. S. Govt. Printing Office, pp. 792, 988. In contrast, the Indian Constitution permits restriction of freedom of speech only under the limitation set out in Article 19(2). Consequently, any restriction that might be regarded as valid for other industries would still be ultra vires when applied to the press because the press enjoys a special privilege under Article 19(1)(a). A direct governmental restriction on the press would therefore contravene Article 19(1)(a), and even a legislative attempt to impose a minimum wage on the press would be unconstitutional. However, the Court observed that this illegality would not extend to an adjudicatory mechanism envisaged by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, where the government provides a forum for the settlement of disputes and claims between citizens. In such a setting there is no violation of the fundamental rights protected against governmental encroachment. The Court further held that several provisions of the Act effectively place restrictions on the press that inevitably curtail freedom of speech and expression, thereby breaching Article 19(1)(a). The Act, according to the Court, creates a privileged class of working journalists that stands above other workers, above contractual arrangements, and even above the general law of the land. The Wage Board, the Court said, has exceeded its statutory authority by reaching conclusions that restrict the petitioners’ fundamental rights. While the Act empowers the Central Government to constitute a Wage Board for fixing rates of wages, it does not authorize the Board to determine entire wage scales. “Fixing” is understood to refer to a determination made at a specific point in time; the legislature did not intend that a single wage figure would fix wage scales perpetually. The Court explained that the entire framework of the Act was built around the concept of a minimum wage, and the abrupt removal of the word “minimum” has caused the present difficulties. The statutory language consistently refers to “rates of wages” rather than “scales of wages,” and the term “rates of wages” applies only to a particular point in time. Section 9(2) of the Act expressly provides that the Board may fix rates of wages for time work and piece work, and it cannot refer to scales. The Court emphasized that the same words used in the statute must be given the same meaning throughout, as they are likewise employed in the Minimum Wages Act, the Payment of Wages Act, and other legislation to denote a wage fixed in time and amount.

In this case, the Court observed that the expression “rates of wages” was intended to denote a wage fixed for a particular point in time and a specific amount. The Court held that the Wage Board had gone beyond the authority granted to it by fixing entire scales of wages and increments, thereby placing a restriction on the press that the Act had not contemplated. It further noted that both the Act and the Wage Board had ignored various considerations that, according to precedent and legal principles, were essential for proper wage fixation, and that they had done so without imposing any limits on fundamental rights. The Court pointed out that even the Minimum Wages Act required periodic reviews and mandated that proposals for minimum wages be published for public comment. According to the Court, the decision of the Wage Board was taken in breach of the procedure laid down in section eleven of the impugned Act and also violated the principles of natural justice, rendering the decision illegal. The Court criticized the Board for relying on total revenue from all sources rather than on the revenue generated by the labour of working journalists. It explained that classifying newspapers based on the gross revenue of all publications owned by an organisation and fixing wages on that basis produced outcomes that were absurd, discriminatory, and contrary to the principle articulated in the Act itself. To illustrate this point, the Court cited a newspaper with a small circulation in Kutch that was placed in a higher wage category than a larger newspaper in Bombay merely because the former belonged to a larger organisational group.

The Court further observed that the Wage Board failed to remain within the limits of the impugned Act, which required wages to be determined taking regional considerations into account. The Board’s decision, the Court said, was made without proper regard to the financial capacity of individual newspapers to meet the wage requirements, and the Board did not exercise adequate care in formulating its decision. Such lack of care, the Court held, rendered the decision unreasonable and consequently restrictive of fundamental rights. The Court also found that the Board had exceeded its authority by giving its wage structure retrospective effect, a move that the Court declared invalid and ultra vires the Act. Regarding section twelve of the Act, the Court noted that it created a one-sided obligation by binding only the employers to the Board’s decision. While such a unilateral obligation might be appropriate when a minimum subsistence wage is fixed, it was unsuitable for wages at higher, “luxury” levels. The Court explained that this unilateral binding left journalists free to seek wage increases before an industrial tribunal, but prevented employers from seeking any alteration of the wage structure under any circumstances. Moreover, the Act provided no mechanism for reviewing or revising the wage structure even when conditions changed. The Court concluded that the Act and the Board’s decision imposed restrictions on the fundamental right to conduct business by substantially increasing operating costs and by fettering the terms of service contracts between employers and employees. By ignoring regional disparities, the Board’s approach discriminated among newspapers, among employers, and among employees.

P. Sinha, Gurbachan Singh, Harbans Singh and R. Patnaik appeared as counsel for the petitioners in Petition No. 103 of 1957. S. S. Shukla acted as counsel for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 116 to 118 of 1957. M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, together with B. Sen and R. H. Dhebar, represented respondent No. I (the Union of India) in all of the petitions. Before addressing the merits of the dispute, the Court considered it necessary to set out the background and the perspective that guided the enactment of the Act, the meticulous inquiries that preceded its passage, and the specific conditions that the legislation was intended to address. The relevant material included the Report of the Press Commission dated 14 July 1954, the Report of the Inquiry Committee constituted in 1947, and the Report of the Central Provinces and Berar Press Inquiry Committee constituted on 27 March 1948. The Court observed that the Act did not infringe any of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 14 and 32 of the Constitution. It further held that the functions of the Wage Board created under section 8 of the Act were neither judicial nor quasi-judicial in nature; the determination of wage rates by the Wage Board constituted a legislative exercise rather than a judicial one. The Board had reached its decisions after considering all the criteria prescribed in section 9(1) of the Act, together with the material and evidence placed before it, and many of the Board’s determinations were unanimous. Under the Act, the Wage Board possessed the authority to fix wage scales and to give retrospective effect to its decisions. The Court noted that the petitioners’ financial situation was not such that the enactment of the Act’s provisions or the Board’s decisions would cause their collapse. Regarding the alleged breach of Article 19(1)(a), the Court stated that the legislation must first be examined to see whether it dealt directly with the fundamental right in question. The principle articulated in several Supreme Court decisions is that when a law is challenged on the ground of violating a fundamental right, the Court must first determine whether the law directly concerns that right; if it does not, no further inquiry is required. References were made to A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88 (per Kania, C.J.), and Ram Singh v. State of Delhi, [1951] S.C.R. 451 at 455. The Court also invoked the doctrine of “pith and substance,” observing that a law aimed primarily at regulating gambling, even if it incidentally restricted business, was not held to be violative of the fundamental right to carry on business, as illustrated in State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala, [1957] S.C.R. 874. Finally, the Court emphasized that the provisions of the Act were expressly designed to regulate the conditions of service of journalists and not to affect the freedom of expression or speech, thereby eliminating any question of infringement of the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a).

In this case the Court observed that the provisions of the Act were directed at regulating the conditions of service of journalists and were not intended to affect the freedom of expression or speech. Consequently, no breach of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19 (1) (a) could be found. The petitioners’ reliance on decisions of United States courts, such as Minnesota Ex Rel Olson, was rejected. The Court gave two reasons for this rejection. First, the Constitution of the United States is materially different from the Indian Constitution. Second, the American courts have, in the cases cited, adopted the same approach as the Indian Supreme Court in A K Gopalan v State of Madras and related authorities. Those American authorities included The Associated Press v National Labour Relations Board, Mabee v White Plains Publishing Co., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co v Walling and Murdock v Pennsylvania, where the application of the U S Fair Labour Standards Act to newspaper enterprises was held not to infringe freedom of speech.

The Court further held that the restrictions imposed under article 19 (6) on the freedom to carry on a business, which is protected by article 19 (1) (g), remain reasonable even if, in certain circumstances, they lead to a prohibition on carrying on that business. Such restrictions are permissible when they are imposed in the public interest. In considering the Report of the Committee on Fair Wages appointed by the Government of India and the prevailing practice in other jurisdictions, the Court found that the Act did not introduce any unusual procedure in constituting a Wage Board for fixing the rates of wages payable to working journalists. The Act, for the most part, follows the recommendations of the Press Commission. The only notable departure is that while the Press Commission had recommended the fixation of a minimum wage, the Act provides for the fixation of all wages.

Under the directive principles of State policy, article 43 of the Constitution, the aim is not merely to secure a minimum wage but to achieve a fair and living wage. The Court quoted Justice Gajendragadkar, noting that while the goal must be pursued, it is necessary to consider the capacity to pay. The Court explained that capacity to pay may be assessed on a regional or national basis, but not on a unit-by-unit basis for each newspaper. The Court emphasized that it must ascertain the legislature’s intention. The term “minimum wage” has been understood in two senses: an “industrial minimum wage,” which is a subsistence level wage that any unit must pay to remain viable, and a “statutory minimum wage,” which is a wage level above subsistence that the legislature may deem appropriate. A statutory minimum need not be confined to a single fixed amount; it may legitimately include a scale of wages. The Court noted that the definition of “wages” in the relevant section of the Act is comprehensive.

Section 2(rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, together with the provisions contained in the Third and Fourth Schedules to that Act, state that the term “wages” includes both the period of payment and the mode of payment. The learned judge asked whether this reference also embraces wage scales. The Court explained that the concept of wages does indeed cover wage scales. It was on this understanding that various Industrial Tribunals have, in the past, fixed wage scales for workers. The Supreme Court has also taken this view in its earlier decisions. The learned judge further inquired whether the question of the inclusion of scales within the definition of wages had ever been formally raised and decided, or whether it had merely been assumed. According to the Court, to the best of its knowledge, the issue has not been specifically raised before a judicial body and decided; rather, it has been treated as an assumed principle. The Court noted that the word “wages” used in sections 8 and 9 of the Act is employed in a comprehensive manner. The proper method, the Court observed, is first to ascertain the meaning of the term “wages” and then to determine whether the word “rates” limits that meaning. In construing the relevant provision, the Court held that it would not be appropriate to look at what the Legislature did at the time of enactment, what was said in the Bill, or how the word “minimum” was omitted.

One of the criteria set out in section 9(1) of the Act is the prevailing rates of wages for comparable employments. The Court emphasized that this criterion does not refer to a minimum wage, citing the decision in Nellimarla Jute Mills (1953) 1 L.L.J. 666. The reference shows that section 9(1) contemplates fixing wage rates that are higher than the bare subsistence level or the industrial minimum wage. The phrase “the circumstances relating to newspaper industry in different regions of the country” found in section 9(1) is interpreted to mean the capacity to pay on a regional basis. The discretion given to the Wage Board to consider “any other circumstances which to the Board may seem relevant” is acknowledged as being subjective, but the Court stressed that it is the Board itself that must decide which circumstances are relevant and which are not. Such discretionary power, the Court held, is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. The general policy concerning the Wage Board, according to the Court, was to grant it the widest possible discretion, and there was no suggestion that this discretion was constrained. Even if the Legislature had left the fixation of wages entirely to the Board without prescribing any specific criteria, the Court said, such an arrangement would still be a competent legislative act because of the nature of the Board’s functions. In fact, three criteria have already been laid down in section 9(1) of the Act. Considering the variety and complexity of the matters involved, the Court observed, it was not feasible for the Legislature to anticipate or enumerate every possible circumstance that might be relevant. Consequently, there is nothing unusual or arbitrary in vesting the Wage Board with a broad discretion over its own procedures. The Court referred to practices in other jurisdictions, noting that in the United Kingdom the Central Co-ordinating Committee under the Wage Councils Act, 1945, and the Agricultural Wages Board under the Agricultural Wages Regulation Act, 1924, are authorized to regulate their own proceedings, and that no formal procedure has been prescribed for Wage Boards in Australia. Finally, the Court stated that including proofreaders within the definition of “Working Journalist” in section 2(1) of the Act is not unreasonable, because proofreaders occupy an important position in the editorial staff of a newspaper.

The Court observed that proofreaders occupy a very important position in the editorial staff of a newspaper, as recorded in Kemsley Manual of Journalism page 337 and in Sen Gupta’s Journalism as a Career (1955 edition). It held that the notice period for retrenchment prescribed in section 3(2) of the Act is not unreasonable, citing Halsbury’s Laws of England volume 22 paragraph 249 footnote e. The Court explained that the retrospective operation of compensation provided by section 4 of the Act is intended to address the few cases where management anticipates retrenchment after the Press Commission’s recommendations, and therefore cannot be described as unreasonable. It stated that there is nothing unusual in section 5 of the Act, which provides for a gratuity, because gratuity is recognised by industrial tribunals, for example in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation case (1955) and the Nundydroog Mines Ltd. case (1956). The Court noted that under the laws of several countries, indemnity is paid to employees who resign voluntarily, as shown in the UNESCO publication “Legislation for Press, Film and Radio in the World Today” (1957) and the Geneva Press Association collective agreement of 1 April 1948. The Court added that Indian labour courts have also awarded gratuity on voluntary resignation, referring to the Cipla Ltd. case (1955) and the Indian Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Ltd. case (1956). It found that the hours of work prescribed in section 6 of the Act are reasonable given the nature of a journalist’s work, noting that these hours correspond to those fixed by section 54 of the Factories Act, 1948, and are comparable to provisions in the Mines Act, 1952 and various State Shops and Establishments Acts. The Court described sections 8 to 11 as dealing with the constitution of the Wage Board and the fixation of wage rates. It explained that the Board must consist of an equal number of employer and employee representatives and an independent chairman, and that this composition is not unreasonable. The Court pointed out that the Act lays down principles to guide the Wage Board in fixing wages, and therefore the provisions cannot be said to be unreasonable. It held that section 17 of the Act merely deals with the mode of recovery of money from an employer and imposes no financial burden, so it does not infringe article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The Court observed that article 14 of the Constitution does not forbid reasonable classification for legislative purposes, citing Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar (1955). It emphasized that journalism is a specialised profession requiring a high degree of general education and specific training, as noted in the Press Commission Report paragraph 512 and the UNESCO publication “Legislation for Press, Film and Radio in the World Today” (1951). Finally, the Court concluded that working journalists constitute a distinct class separate from other newspaper employees and from employees in other industries.

In the Court’s view, journalists formed a distinct class of workers who could be singled out for the purpose of improving their conditions of service. The Court stated that there was no discrimination in enacting special legislation for the benefit of this class, nor in creating a special machinery for fixing their wages that differed from the machinery used for other workmen. Even if the Act was regarded as a social-welfare measure, the Court observed that the State could begin its intervention at any point and that such a measure need not be all-encompassing. The Court found nothing unreasonable in section 12 of the Act, which made the decision of the Wage Board binding only upon the employers. It held that a provision whose purpose was to protect employees could not be said to be repugnant to Article 14 on the ground that it discriminated against employers, citing South Bank Ltd. v. Pichuthayappan, A.I.R. 1954 Madras 377. Section 17, the Court explained, was intended for the benefit of working journalists and enabled them to recover money due from an employer under the Act; a similar provision existed in section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act. Accordingly, there was no discrimination in extending a provision that governed employees in other industries to working journalists. The object of the Act, the Court said, was to improve the conditions of service of working journalists, and the classification rested on intelligible differentia that distinguished them from other employees of newspaper establishments and from workers in other industries. These differentiae, the Court held, were based on a rational nexus and satisfied the requirements of permissible classification. The Court dismissed the claim that the Act infringed Article 32, noting that the Act did not forbid the Wage Board from giving reasons for its decisions, and therefore no violation of the petitioners’ fundamental right under Article 32 arose.

The Court further explained that, even if any provision of the Act were held void, the issue of severability would arise. If the void provision were severable, only that section would be struck down while the remainder of the Act would survive. Similarly, the Court indicated that if it found the Act itself to be constitutional but a particular decision of the Wage Board to be ultra vires or unconstitutional, it would set aside that decision without affecting the validity of the Act as a whole, relying on precedents such as State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, [1951] S.C.R. 682; State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd., [1953] S.C.R. 1069; and R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. The Union of India, [1957] S.C.R. 930. Regarding the Wage Board’s decisions, the Court said it had to first determine whether those decisions were intra vires the Act, because an authority delegated to make subordinate legislation could not act contrary to the statute. Second, the Court had to examine whether the decisions, as part of the Act, in any way contravened the Constitution. The Court concluded that these were the only questions that needed to be addressed concerning the Wage Board’s decisions, and that no other issue, such as a violation of procedural fairness or the principle of audi alteram partem, arose in this context.

The Court observed that the procedure followed by the Wage Board was not required to conform to the principles of natural justice, specifically the audi alteram partem rule, and noted that this maxim had been cited frequently but did not apply to delegated legislation. It rejected the argument that, on the basis of section eleven, the Legislature had not intended the Wage Board to act as a delegated authority because the Board was given a choice among the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act to follow. The Court held that even a subordinate legislative authority must follow certain procedures to reach conclusions, yet it found no necessity for a hearing of every person who might be affected by the Board’s decisions. Rather, the Board was described as a subordinate legislative body that could gather any information it deemed appropriate and was obliged to consider all relevant circumstances. The Court clarified that remedies such as certiorari and prohibition were available only against judicial or quasi-judicial acts, citing Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd Edn., vol. 11, p. 55, para. 114). It further stated that the audi alteram partem principle applied solely to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, referring to Patterson v. District Commissioner of Accrator ([1948] A. C. 341). For guidance on distinguishing judicial from legislative functions, the Court referred to Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (8th Edn., vol. 1, p. 185) and several United States cases, including Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Co. Ltd., Mitchell Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, and Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Green Garrett. The Court noted that writers on United Kingdom law had characterised the functions of the Wage Board as legislative in nature, citing Robson’s Justice and Administrative Law (3rd Edn., p. 608), Griffith’s Principles of Administrative Law (p. 39), and Barbara Wootton’s Social Foundations of Wage Policy (p. 88). It added that the same view prevailed in Australia, referencing the Federated Saw Mills case (8 C. L. R. 465) and Australian Boot Trade Employees Federation v. Whybrow and Co. (10 C. L. R. 266, 289, 317, per Isaacs, J.). The Court pointed out that the Labour and Industry Act, 1953, of Victoria (Australia) in section 39(2) gave statutory recognition to such determinations, treating them as having the force, validity and effect of an enactment. It emphasized that the very constitution of the Wage Board under the impugned Act—comprising an equal number of employer and employee representatives and an independent chairman—precluded the Board from being judicial or quasi-judicial, invoking the principle that no one should be a judge in his own cause as expressed in Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning ([1948] A. C. 87, 103). Finally, the Court rejected the inference that the establishment of the Wage Board under section 8 exhausted the Government’s powers under the Act, stating that the power to constitute the Board remained available under section 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and could be exercised as circumstances required.

In this case, the Court observed that the Board could, pursuant to section fourteen of the General Clauses Act of 1897, be reconstituted whenever circumstances required. Accordingly, there was no impropriety in the Central Government’s decision to reconstitute the Board after the resignation of Shri K. P. Keshava Menon. The Court further noted that the majority decision under consideration was made in accordance with the Rules that had been framed by the Central Government under section twenty of the Act; these Rules had become an integral part of the Act itself. Consequently, a decision reached by a majority in conformity with those Rules could not be set aside. In reviewing the determinations made by the Wage Board, the Court stated that they would be given the same consideration and weight as those made by a legislature, referring to the authority of Pacific States Box and Basketing Co. v. White, 80 L. Ed. 138; 296 U. S. 170. The Court explained that under section two of the Act, the Wage Board “may” exercise the powers and follow the procedure laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, and that the language “may” indicated discretion rather than an obligatory command. Because the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act were primarily intended for the adjudication of disputes between two parties, they did not automatically apply to the Wage Board. This was the reason the Act permitted the Board either to exercise certain powers conferred by the Industrial Disputes Act or to follow the procedures prescribed therein at its own discretion. Moreover, the Court held that the Act did not require the Board to furnish reasons for its decisions, and that the Board was within its rights to decline to provide such explanations. Turning to the methodology for assessing the reasonableness of the wage structure for the entire industry, the Court cautioned against focusing on the impact on any single newspaper or individual unit. It observed that multiple units or chains could be classified based on the total gross revenues of all constituent units, since economies of scale in group operations could lower production costs. The Court found no provision in the Act that prohibited the Board from grouping establishments into chains or multiple units, nor any provision that barred the treatment of several newspaper establishments, even if they published one or more newspapers in different parts of the country, as a single establishment for the purpose of fixing wage rates. Classification was inevitable when the Board had to consider newspaper establishments nationwide for wage fixation. If the Board adopted gross revenue as a practical basis for classification, the Court found that there was nothing improper in that choice, and such a basis could not invalidate the Board’s decision. The Court further noted that the profit figures of newspaper establishments were often vague and difficult to determine because many items were intermingled in profit calculations. Relying on the profit and loss of individual concerns to gauge their capacity to pay would be hazardous. The Court pointed out that even the Bank Award had used “turnover” or aggregate resources as the classification criterion, and thus the use of gross revenue was the only proper and convenient method for ascertaining the actual status of a newspaper establishment when fixing a wage structure.

The Court observed that the appropriate basis for determining the wage structure for a newspaper establishment was its actual status, and that the wage structure recommended by the Board, when compared with the existing scales and salaries in many newspaper establishments, was neither exorbitant nor unreasonable. It stated that the industry should be considered on a regional basis rather than on the basis of individual units. The Court noted that although some individual units might experience hardship or even cease to exist, such consequences were not relevant to the assessment. Quoting Justice Gajendragadkar, the Court explained that to challenge the decisions under Article 19(1)(g) the petitioners must demonstrate that a particular class of newspaper, or the class as a whole, would be unable to bear the imposed burden or would cease to exist. The Court further held that the financial figures presented in the petitioners’ individual statements did not constitute evidence of unreasonableness in the wage fixation. It clarified that the Board’s decision was given retrospective effect from the date of its constitution, and that Section 13 of the Act already contemplated interim relief, yet the Board chose to apply retrospective effect rather than grant interim relief. Counsel for respondent No. 3 submitted balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of the petitioner company for several years, and argued that with prudent management the earnings of the Indian Express group of newspapers were sufficient to pay working journalists according to the scale fixed by the Wage Board. The Court accepted that analysis and concluded that the Board’s decision was legally valid and just, taking into account all relevant factors for fixing a fair wage. Counsel for the Indian Federation of Working Journalists and for the Delhi Union of Journalists contended that Parliament may delegate to the Wage Board the power to legislate on certain subjects. The Court agreed that the so-called decision of the Wage Board represented a valid exercise of such delegated power by a subordinate legislative body operating under parliamentary mandate and within the constitutional limits. Even assuming the Board to be a quasi-judicial entity, the Court observed that it had observed the principle of audi alteram partem, and therefore no prerogative writ should be issued to disturb its findings. Counsel for the petitioner, in reply, argued that the Board was not intended to exercise legislative powers but rather powers of a judicial nature. The Court referred to Section 10 of the Working Journalist Act, which requires the Board to make a “decision,” a term used in several statutes to denote a determination by a judicial tribunal. Finally, the Court noted that under Section 8 the Board’s decision must be made in accordance with the provisions of the Act and

It was recorded that the Board's role was limited to applying existing law rather than creating new law. Under section 11, the Wage Board was required to follow the procedural rules that applied to an Industrial Tribunal. The judgment noted that the Board's decision was binding only upon certain persons and not upon the entire public, and that such decision could be executed in the same way as an award of an Industrial Tribunal. The character of the Board's award was described as identical to that of an industrial tribunal award, and reference was made to a Supreme Court ruling that a tribunal does not perform legislative functions. The analysis concluded that Parliament had not intended to give the Board any powers of subordinate legislation. This conclusion was supported by reference to the Rules of Business of the Lok Sabha together with the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill. In the memorandum concerning delegated legislation that was appended to the Bill, the constitution of the Wage Board for fixing wages was not listed as delegated legislation (The Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha (1957)-Rule 70). Moreover, the decision of the Wage Board was not required to be laid before both Houses of Parliament, a step that would have been necessary had the Board's wage-fixing power constituted delegated legislation (Rule 317). Consequently, the Board was held not to have been constituted as a sub-legislative authority. The issue, therefore, was not what the legislature could have enacted but whether, by virtue of the powers conferred on the Board under the enacted Act, the Board functioned as a legislative body or as a tribunal exercising adjudicatory functions. It was affirmed that the Board possessed no delegated-legislative powers and that it had been provided with all the features needed to characterise it as a judicial body. In interpreting the Act, the Court was said to be entitled to consider the surrounding circumstances, the object of the legislation, and whether a particular term used in the statute had been contemplated by the legislature at the time of enactment. The Court indicated that the entire background and the effect of omitting the word “minimum” from the enactment must be examined. The Press Commission had focused solely on fixing a minimum wage, and section 9 of the Act followed that pattern, seeking to implement the Commission’s recommendations. The Commission, while considering minimum wage, had ignored the capacity to pay, and the Act, being based on the Commission’s report, similarly made no provision for assessing capacity to pay. This omission, acceptable in the context of minimum wages, rendered any wage fixation at a higher level unreasonable and therefore void. It was further observed that merely renaming “minimum wage” as a “statutory” minimum did not alter its substance. Section 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, could apply unless the enactment expressly excluded it by necessary implication. Finally, the overall scheme of the impugned Act was said to contemplate only a single Wage Board and a single decision, and it was not open to the Government to reconstitute the Board at will.

In response to a submission that the Government might reconstitute the Wage Board whenever it wished, the Court observed that the doctrine of “pith and substance” is relevant only for determining whether the legislature possessed the authority to enact a particular law. The Court explained that, irrespective of whether the Act imposes a direct burden, it must first examine whether the legislation is a special law that singles out a specific industry for the imposition of that burden. If the Act indeed targets a particular industry, as it does in the present case, the Court held that it creates a direct burden. By contrast, a law that is general in its application would not be characterised as imposing a direct burden. The Court further noted that the Act stands alone in being arbitrary and excessive, and that no other country has a comparable statute. The Court identified three distinctive features of the Act: (1) it provides for gratuity even when an employee resigns voluntarily; (2) it authorises the Wage Board to fix wages that are indeterminate but are treated as having the status of minimum wages; and (3) it empowers the Board to fix wages without (i) laying down essential standards, (ii) imposing a duty to follow a reasonable procedure, (iii) subjecting its decisions to review by an appellate tribunal or a court, and (iv) giving the parties concerned an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the proposal. The Court observed that, in other jurisdictions, various safeguards exist to prevent arbitrary wage decisions, citing the United Kingdom Wage Councils Act of 1945, the United States Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938, and the Factories and Shops Act of 1905 together with the 1928 Act of Victoria, Australia. The Court quoted a previous judgment stating that “All these criticisms would be out of place if it is held that the work of the Wage Board was legislative and not judicial.” It rejected that view, affirming that if the mechanism of the Act unreasonably restricts the freedom to trade, the Act must be declared void under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

The Court continued that, even assuming there is no excessive delegation of legislative power, the Court must still examine whether the restrictions imposed by the Act encroach upon the constitutional safeguards guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g). The Court warned that fixing wage scales solely on the basis of gross revenue, without taking into account the liability of newspapers, is a devastating doctrine for industrial relations. The Court clarified that the Wage Board is not a sub-legislative body; however, even if it were, it must act in a judicial manner and remains subject to writs of certiorari. The Court held that, if the Board’s decisions become incorporated into the Act, the Board must be regarded as a quasi-judicial body because it is expected to conduct a preliminary investigation before recording its findings. The Court emphasised that the functions of the Wage Board cannot be described as exclusively legislative or exclusively judicial. It observed that the functions performed by administrative agencies do not fit into rigid compartments; they may be partly legislative, partly judicial, and partly administrative, as explained in the treatise “Stason and Cooper, Cases and other Materials on Administrative Tribunals.” Consequently, the Court must determine whether the administrative agency performs a predominantly legislative or a predominantly judicial function and characterise it accordingly, relying on precedent such as Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas Electric Light and Power Co., (1908) 191 New.

The Court referenced the decision in People ex rel. Central Park North and East River Co. v. Willcox, reported in (1909) 194 New York 383, to illustrate how wage-regulating bodies have been treated in other jurisdictions. It observed that in the United Kingdom the determinations made by Wage Councils acquire a legislative character when the Minister issues an order giving effect to the proposed wage regulations. In Australia, the Factories and Shops Act of 1905 and the Labour and Industry Act of 1953, particularly Section 39(2) of the Victorian legislation, expressly confer upon the Special Board the characteristics of a legislative authority. Under the United States Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938, wage orders that are ultimately approved by the Administrator remain subject to judicial review. In India, the Minimum Wages Act of 1948 requires that the recommendations of the Committees be forwarded to the appropriate Government, which then issues a notification in the official Gazette to fix minimum wages for each scheduled employment. The Court noted that the recent amendment to the Bombay Industrial Relations Act of 1946 requires Wage Boards created under that Act to follow the procedure of the Industrial Court in arbitration matters, and therefore they cannot be said to perform a legislative function. Nonetheless, the Court held that the Wage Board established under the impugned Act, although an administrative or sub-legislative body, may nevertheless exercise quasi-judicial functions if certain conditions are satisfied, citing authorities such as Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd Edn., vol. 11, pp. 55-56), Rex v Manchester Legal Aid Committee (ex-parte R A Brand and Co Ltd.) [1952] 2 Q B 413, 428, Rex v London County Council (ex-parte the Entertainments Protection Association Ltd.) [1931] 2 K B 215, 233-234, Board of Education v Rice [1911] A C 179, 182, and Allen C K Law and Order (1956 Edn., pp. 102, 256, 257).

The Court further observed that the Wage Board had failed to give any attention to the paramount consideration of an employer’s capacity to pay, a factor that it should have examined in reasoned fashion. No enquiry had been made into the wage burden that the Board’s scales would impose on the industry as a whole or on any particular unit. The specific burden that the Board proposed to impose had never been articulated, even indirectly. Moreover, the Board had not considered what potential burden might arise if non-journalists employed in newspaper establishments made comparable wage demands. The Court noted that no analysis had been offered regarding the effect of the retrospective operation of the wage scales on the industry or on any individual unit. Counsel for the Federation of Press Trust of India Employees’ Union, Bombay Union of Journalists and Gujarat Working Journalists Union, counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal No 699 of 1957, counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos 700 to 702 of 1957, and counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal No 703 of 1957, were identified as appearing on behalf of the respective parties.

The matter was listed as Appeal No. 703 of 1957. Counsel for respondent No. I in all the appeals were B. Sen and R. H. Dhebar. The Indian Federation of Working Journalists was represented in all the appeals, as well as respondent No. 2 in Civil Appeal No. 700 of 1957, by N. C. Chatterjee, J. B. Dadachanji and S. N. Andley. Respondent No. 3 in Civil Appeals No. 699 of 1957 was represented by B. R. L. Iyengar, J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath. The judgment was delivered on 19 March 1958 by Justice Bhagwati, who authored the opinion of the Court.

The petitions were filed under Article 32 of the Constitution and sought to examine the constitutional validity of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (Act 45 of 1955), hereinafter referred to as “the Act”, together with the decision of the Wage Board constituted under that legislation. Because all the petitions raised identical questions of law and fact, the Court chose to consider them together in one comprehensive judgment. To understand the opposing arguments of the parties, the Court found it necessary to recount the sequence of events that culminated in the enactment of the impugned statute.

The Court observed that the newspaper sector in India did not originate as a conventional industry; rather, it began with isolated newspapers founded by leaders active in national, political, social and economic movements. Over the preceding half-century the sector acquired the hallmarks of a profit-oriented industry, as wealthy industrialists invested capital and conglomerates came to own and control multiple newspapers throughout the country. While a sizeable concentration of working journalists resided in the major metropolitan centres, the remainder were dispersed across the nation. For more than a decade these journalists had been pressing for a mechanism that would allow an impartial agency or authority to examine and determine their wages, salaries, dearness allowances, other allowances, retirement benefits, leave rules and overall conditions of service, thereby ensuring that fair and reasonable terms applied uniformly to all working journalists. Isolated efforts to address these concerns were undertaken by the governments of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. On 18 June 1947 the Government of Uttar Pradesh constituted a committee to investigate the working conditions of newspaper employees within the state. Subsequently, on 27 March 1948 the Government of the Central Provinces and Berar appointed an Inquiry Committee to study and report on various aspects of newspaper operations in that province, including the remuneration, dearness allowance, leave entitlements, provident fund contributions, pension benefits and related matters affecting editorial and other staff. The Uttar Pradesh committee submitted its report on 31 March 1949, while the Central Provinces and Berar committee reported on 27 March 1948, each offering a set of recommendations. Despite these state-level inquiries, the broader All-India issue remained unresolved. During the parliamentary debate on the Constitution (First Amendment) Bill of 1951, the Prime Minister indicated his readiness to address the matter at the national level.

In this matter, the Prime Minister expressed willingness to set up a committee or a commission that would include representatives of the press and that would examine both the condition of the press and its editorial content. He expanded on this proposal on 1 June 1951, suggesting that an inquiry comparable to the Royal Commission inquiry conducted in the United Kingdom could prove beneficial for the press and for the development of this important public-affairs institution. The concept was subsequently debated in Parliament during discussions on the Press (Incitement to Crimes) Bill, which later became the Press (Objectionable Matter) Act, 1952. During the parliamentary session held in Calcutta in April 1952, the Indian Federation of Working Journalists passed a resolution calling for the appointment of a commission to investigate the conditions of the press in India with the aim of improving its position, status and functioning within the newly established democratic framework. Following this resolution, the Government of India, through the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, issued a communique on 23 September 1952 announcing the creation of the Press Commission under the chairmanship of Shri Justice G. S. Rajadhyaksha. The terms of reference assigned to the commission, inter alia, required it to “enquire into the state of the Press in India, its present and future lines of development and shall in particular examine … (iv) the method of recruitment, training, scales of remuneration, benefits and other conditions of employment of working journalists, settlement of disputes affecting them and factors which influence the establishment and maintenance of high professional standards.” The commission completed its investigation and submitted its report on 14 July 1954. Among its findings, the commission reported that out of 137 newspaper concerns for which information was available, only fifty-nine were generating profits while sixty-eight were incurring losses. Overall, the newspaper industry as a whole earned a profit of approximately six lakh rupees on a capital investment of about seven crore rupees, translating to a return of less than one per cent per annum. The commission also examined the status of proof-readers and concluded that, as a class, proof-readers could not be regarded as working journalists because many performed purely mechanical tasks. However, it held that where a person was employed as a proof-reader solely to develop his skills as a sub-editor, that individual should be treated as a working journalist during that period; in all other circumstances the individual would fall within the definition of press staff subject to the Factories Act. The commission addressed the question of remuneration for working journalists in paragraphs 538 and 539 of its report. Paragraph 538 stated: “Scales to be settled by collective bargaining or adjudication – It has not been possible for us to examine in detail the adequacy of the scales of pay and the emoluments received by the working journalist having regard to the cost of living in the various centers where these papers are published and …” thereby indicating that the determination of pay scales and related benefits should be left to collective bargaining mechanisms or, where necessary, adjudicative processes.

In considering the ability of a newspaper to make adequate payment............ the Commission noted that the Federation of Working Journalists, when consulted, agreed that apart from proposing a minimum wage, it would be impossible for the Commission to standardise job titles, set pay scales or determine other service conditions for the various categories of employees employed by different newspapers in different regions. The Federation expressed that such details should be resolved through collective bargaining, and where a bargaining agreement could not be reached, the dispute should be referred to an industrial court or an adjudicator, with the possible assistance of a Wage Board if required. The All India Newspaper Editors’ Conference and the Indian Language Newspapers’ Association also submitted that standardising designations was not feasible and that achieving uniform salary structures across newspapers would be impossible, because the financial resources and service conditions of each newspaper vary considerably. The Commission agreed in principle that, insofar as practicable, uniformity should exist in the conditions of service for working journalists operating within the same geographical area or locality. However, the Commission stressed that such uniformity could be attained only through a settlement or an adjudication process in which both employers and employees participated jointly.

The Commission further observed that determining a dearness allowance would require a very detailed examination of the rise in cost-of-living index numbers for the numerous locations where newspapers are published. It noted that no known case had prescribed a uniform dearness-allowance rate applicable nationwide, irrespective of the differing economic conditions and the varying payment capacities of individual newspaper units. Consequently, the Commission held that the allowance must be mutually adjusted by the employers and employees, and if they could not agree, an appropriate mechanism should be established to resolve their disputes. The Commission then characterised the position of a journalist, stating: “A journalist occupies a responsible position in life and has powers which he can wield for good or evil. It is he who reflects and moulds public opinion. He has to possess a certain amount of intellectual equipment and should have attained a certain educational standard without which it would be impossible for him to perform his duties efficiently. His wage and his conditions of service should therefore be such as to attract talent. He has to keep himself abreast of the development in different fields of human activity—even in such technical subjects as law, and medicine. This must involve constant study, contact with personalities and a general acquaintance with world’s problems.” The Commission concluded that a minimum wage should be fixed for journalists, and it considered that imposing such a wage might render it impossible for small newspapers to continue operating, yet it also expressed the view that a newspaper unable to pay a wage that enables an employee to live decently and with dignity should not be expected to survive.

The commission observed that if a newspaper could not afford to pay a minimum wage that would enable its journalist to live decently and with dignity, then such a newspaper had no justification to continue operating. It therefore recommended that the country be divided into localities reflecting the differing cost of living in various regions, and that a reasonable minimum wage be determined for each area. The commission endorsed the concept of a minimum wage that had been adopted by the Bank Award, noting that while the ideal is a living wage, even in advanced countries the wage must be balanced against other considerations, especially the prevailing wage levels in other industries and the ability of the industry to pay. In the Indian context, the commission acknowledged that the national income level was currently too low to permit a minimum wage equivalent to a living wage, but it insisted that the minimum wage must still go beyond mere subsistence to ensure worker efficiency, including provision for some education, medical needs and other amenities. Accordingly, the commission suggested that the basic minimum wage for a journalist throughout India should be Rs 125, with a dearness allowance of Rs 25, making a total of Rs 150. It also recommended additional dearness and city allowances depending on the location where the journalist worked. The commission compared its recommendation with those of the Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh committees and found that its figures were broadly consistent, especially in view of the rise in the cost of living since those earlier reports. Regarding the applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act to journalists, the commission referred to the award of the Industrial Tribunal at Bombay in the dispute between “Jam-e-Jamshed” and its workmen, and to the decision of the Patna High Court in V. N. N. Sinha v. Bihar Journals Limited (1) (1953) 1 L.R. 32 Pat 688. On the basis of these authorities, the commission concluded that journalists did not fall within the definition of “workman” as it stood in the Industrial Disputes Act, and that questions concerning journalists could not be raised by parties who were themselves governed by that Act. The commission then examined issues such as the tenure of appointment, the minimum notice period for termination, hours of work, leave provisions, retirement benefits and gratuity. It made specific recommendations and suggested that legislation regulating the newspaper industry should incorporate provisions on notice period, bonus, minimum wages, Sunday rest, leave and a provident fund.

Following the submission of the Press Commission Report, Parliament enacted the Working Journalists (Industrial Disputes) Act, 1955 (Act I of 1955). The President gave assent on 12 March 1955. This statute was intended to bring the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 within the scope of working journalists. Section 2(b) of the Act defined a “working journalist” as a person whose principal avocation is journalism and who is employed in, or in relation to, any establishment that produces or publishes a newspaper, or in any news agency or syndicate that supplies material for newspaper publication. The definition expressly listed occupations such as editor, letter-writer, news-editor, sub-editor, feature writer, copy-taster, reporter, correspondent, cartoonist, news-photographer and proof-reader. The definition excluded individuals who were chiefly employed in a managerial or administrative capacity, or who, although employed in a supervisory role, performed functions that were essentially managerial by the nature of their duties or the powers vested in them. Section 3 of the Act stipulated that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would apply to working journalists in the same manner as they applied to workmen within that legislation. However, the Court observed that merely extending the 1947 Act to journalists was not sufficient to address the broader concerns raised by the Press Commission’s recommendations.

Recognising the continued parliamentary agitation to implement the Press Commission’s recommendations, the Union Government introduced Bill No 13 of 1955 in the Rajya Sabha on 30 November 1955. The Bill sought to regulate the conditions of service of working journalists and other staff employed in newspaper establishments. It incorporated the Commission’s recommendations concerning the minimum period of notice, bonus, Sunday rest, leave, provident fund and gratuity. The determination of minimum wage rates, however, was to be left to a Minimum Wage Board that the Central Government would constitute for that purpose. The Bill also aimed to extend the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and the Employees’ Provident Funds Act, 1952 to newspaper establishments that exceeded the size thresholds recommended by the Commission. During the Rajya Sabha debate, the Minister for Labour moved an amendment that removed the word “minimum” wherever it appeared in the Bill. He explained that the word should be omitted so that a proper wage board could consider the wage issue comprehensively, citing his experience with industrial wage disputes and expressing confidence that such a board would resolve the wage question for working journalists permanently.

The Court noted that the legislation finally enacted bore the title “The Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (45 of 1955)” and that it obtained the President’s assent on 20 December 1955. The Act was described as one designed to regulate certain conditions of service of working journalists as well as other persons employed in newspaper establishments. For the purpose of the Act, a “newspaper establishment” was defined in section 2(d) as “an establishment under the control of any person or body of persons, whether incorporated or not, for the production or publication of one or more newspapers or for conducting any news agency or syndicate”. The term “working journalist” was defined in terms almost identical to those used in the Working Journalists (Industrial Disputes) Act, 1955, and the definition expressly included proof-readers. The Act further provided, under section 2(g), that any word or expression used in the Act but not defined therein, but defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, would be given the meaning assigned to it in that earlier Act. Section 3 then applied the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as they existed at the relevant time, to working journalists in the same manner as they applied to workmen within the meaning of that Act, subject to a specific modification: the notice period under section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, when applied to working journalists for the purpose of retrenchment, was to be construed as six months in the case of an editor and three months for any other working journalist.

The Court further explained that the interval between the publication of the report and the commencement of the Working Journalists (Industrial Disputes) Act, 1955—namely the period from 14 July 1954 to 12 March 1955—was to be covered by section 4, which introduced special provisions to address certain cases of retrenchment that occurred during that gap. Section 5 provided that a working journalist who had rendered continuous service of at least three years in any newspaper establishment, whether that service began before or after the Act’s commencement, was entitled to receive gratuity, even if the journalist voluntarily resigned from the establishment. Section 6 imposed a limitation on working hours, stipulating that no working journalist could be required or permitted to work more than one hundred and forty-four hours in any period of four consecutive weeks, exclusive of meal times. Under section 7, every working journalist was granted earned leave and leave on medical certificate on the terms specified therein, without prejudice to any holidays, casual leave, or other categories of leave that might be prescribed. After establishing the regime for retrenchment compensation, gratuity, work-hour limits, and leave, sections 8 to 11 of the Act dealt with the fixation of rates of wages payable to working journalists.

Section 8 of the Act authorised the Central Government, by means of a notification in the Official Gazette, to constitute a Wage Board for fixing the rates of wages payable to working journalists. The Board was required to consist of an equal number of persons nominated by the Central Government to represent newspaper employers and an equal number of persons to represent working journalists, and it was to be chaired by an independent individual appointed by the Central Government.

Section 9 enumerated the factors that the Wage Board had to consider when fixing wage rates. These factors included the prevailing cost of living, the existing rates of wages for comparable occupations, the specific conditions of the newspaper industry in the various regions of the country, and any other circumstance that the Board deemed relevant to the determination of appropriate wages.

Under Section 10, the decision of the Wage Board fixing the wage rates was to be communicated to the Central Government as soon as practicable. The Central Government was then required to publish the Board’s decision, in any manner it thought fit, within one month of receiving it. The published decision would become effective on the date named in the publication; if no date was specified, the decision would take effect on the date of its publication.

Section 11 prescribed the powers and procedure of the Wage Board. Subject to any procedural rules that might be made, the Board was empowered, for the purpose of fixing wage rates, to exercise the same powers and follow the same procedures as an Industrial Tribunal established under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, when adjudicating an industrial dispute referred to it.

According to Section 12, the decision of the Wage Board was declared binding on all newspaper employers. Consequently, every working journalist was entitled to receive wages at a rate that could not be lower than the rate fixed by the Board.

Sections 14 and 15 applied, respectively, the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, as then in force, and the provisions of the Employees’ Provident Funds Act, 1952, as then in force, to every newspaper establishment that employed twenty or more persons.

Section 17 dealt with the recovery of money due from an employer. It provided that whenever any amount was owed to a newspaper employee under any provision of the Act—whether as compensation, gratuity, or wages—the employee could, without prejudice to any other method of recovery, apply to the State Government for assistance in recovering the amount. If the State Government, or any authority it designated for that purpose, was satisfied that the money was indeed due, it would issue a certificate for the sum to the collector, and the collector would proceed to recover the amount in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.

The provision stated that if any sum was confirmed to be due, the authority would issue a certificate specifying that amount to the collector, and the collector would then recover the amount using the same procedures applied to arrears of land revenue. Section twenty granted the Central Government the power, by publishing a notification in the Official Gazette, to make rules intended to give effect to the purposes of the Act; in particular, and without limiting that general authority, the rules were required to include, among other matters, the procedure that the Board was to follow when fixing rates of wages. Every rule made under this section had to be laid before both Houses of Parliament as soon as practically possible after its creation. The Working Journalists (Industrial Disputes) Act, 1955, was expressly repealed by section twenty-one of the Act. Exercising the power conferred by section twenty, the Central Government issued a notification in the Gazette of India, Part II, Section 3, dated 30 July 1956, titled “The Working Journalists Wage Board Rules, 1956.” Rule eight of those rules prescribed that each question considered at a Board meeting was to be decided by a majority of the votes of the members who were present and voting; if the votes were equal, the Chairman was given a casting vote. Rule thirteen dealt with the resignation of the Chairman or any member from office or membership, as the case might be, and provided that the seat would be deemed vacant from the date the resignation was accepted by the Central Government. When such a vacancy occurred either in the Chairman’s office or among the members of the Board, the Central Government was required to take immediate steps to fill the vacancy in accordance with the Act, and the Board’s proceedings could continue, with the reconstituted Board, from the point at which the vacancy had been filled. By a notification dated 2 May 1956, the Central Government constituted a Wage Board under section eight of the Act for the purpose of fixing rates of wages for working journalists, ensuring that the Board comprised equal representation of employers of newspaper establishments and of working journalists. The Government appointed Shri H. V. Divatia, a retired judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, as the Chairman of the Board. The three members nominated to represent the employers were: Shri G. Narasimhan, Manager of The Hindu, Madras, and President of the Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society; Shri A. R. Bhat, Member of the Legislative Council, former member of the Press Commission, President of the Indian Language Newspapers Association, and Chairman of the Minimum Wages Inquiry Committee for the Printing Industry in Bombay; and Shri K. P. Kesava Menon, Editor of Mathrubhumi, Calicut. The three members nominated to represent the working journalists were: Shri G. Venkataraman, Member of Parliament.

In this case, the Board consisted of the Chairman, Shri H. V. Divatia, together with representatives of employers and of working journalists. The journalist-representatives were Shri C. Raghavan, Secretary-General of the Indian Federation of Working Journalists, and Shri G. N. Acharya, Assistant Editor of the Bombay Chronicle. The Chairman, Shri Divatia, brought extensive experience to the role, having served as Chairman of the Textile Labour Enquiry Committee in Bombay, as President of the first Industrial Court established in India in 1938, and as a member of an Industrial Tribunal that had adjudicated numerous disputes between banks and their employees as well as between insurance companies and their employees. The Board’s inaugural meeting took place on 26 May 1956 at the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan in Bombay; Shri K. P. Kesava Menon and Shri G. Narasimhan were absent from that session. During this preliminary meeting, the Board constituted a sub-committee composed of Shri A. R. Bhat and Shri G. N. Acharya to prepare a questionnaire to be sent to journals, news agencies, employers’ organisations, journalists’ organisations and any interested individuals. The sub-committee was instructed to keep in mind three objectives while drafting the questionnaire: first, to obtain detailed accounts of newspaper establishments; second, to evaluate properly the nature of and work performed by the various categories of working journalists; and third, to classify the country into different zones based on criteria such as population and cost of living. The Chairman was to finalise the draft and dispatch it to all concerned parties by the end of June 1956. Consequently, the questionnaire was prepared and circulated to universities, government bodies, other organisations, interested individuals and each newspaper individually. It was organised into three parts. Part A was directed to newspapers, news agencies, employers’ and journalists’ organisations and any individuals wishing to respond. Part B was intended for all newspapers, and Part C for all news agencies. The Board specified that, unless a question indicated a different time frame, the reporting period for parts B and C would be the financial years April 1 to March 31 for 1952-53, 1953-54 and 1954-55, or, where a different accounting year applied, a three-year period as close as possible. The Board also noted that, under section 11 of the Act, it possessed the powers of an Industrial Tribunal established under the Industrial Disputes Act. In Part A, under the heading “Cost of Living,” the questionnaire sought the cost-of-living index for each centre and included a special query asking whether the basic minimum wage, dearness allowance and metropolitan allowance set out in the table annexed to paragraph 546 of the Press Commission were acceptable to the respondent, and if not, what variations the respondent would propose.

In the questionnaire that the Wage Board sent to newspaper establishments, the Board asked the party being questioned whether the basic minimum wage, dearness allowance and metropolitan allowance listed in paragraph 546 of the Press Commission were acceptable. If the party indicated that they were not acceptable, the Board required the party to suggest what variations should be made and to explain the reasons for those suggestions. The Board also asked the party to indicate comparable employment categories that could be used as benchmarks for wage fixation. The comparable employments that were suggested included higher secondary school teachers; college and university teachers; journalists who worked as publicity and public relations officers in the information departments of the Central and State Governments; journalistic employees of the news-service division of All India Radio; and research personnel employed in the economic and social research departments of Central Government ministries such as finance, labour and commerce. Under the heading “Special Circumstances” the questionnaire contained only one question, numbered 7, which asked whether there were any special conditions in the respondent’s region that affected the fixing of wage rates for working journalists. The Board required respondents who answered affirmatively to specify those conditions and to explain how each condition influenced the wage question. Regarding the principles of wage fixation, the Board instructed the party to categorise the various newspaper establishments and to consider, among other factors, the invested capital, gross revenue, advertisement revenue, circulation, periodicity of publication, the existence of chains, multiple units or combines, and the location of the establishment. In Part B, which was to be answered solely by newspapers, the Board required information under the heading “Accounts”. Respondents were to furnish balance-sheet details as well as trading and profit-and-loss accounts for the reporting period, using the specimen forms supplied with the questionnaire. Additional questions sought details of revenue derived from sources such as the press, a process studio, outside work, foundry operations and subscriptions, together with expenditures on postage, distribution or sale, commissions and rebates to advertisers, and any other relevant items. The Board intended to elicit all information it deemed necessary for fixing wage rates through this questionnaire.

The record shows that Shri K. P. Kesava Mellon tendered his resignation on or about 21 June 1956. By a Government notification dated 14 July 1956, the Central Government accepted his resignation and appointed Shri K. M. Cherian in his place. Shri Cherian, who was a member of the executive committee of the Indian and Eastern Newspapers Association, a director of the Press Trust of India and the chief editor of Malayala Manorama, Kottayam, was therefore named a member of the Wage Board. Out of the 5,465 newspapers, journals and similar publications to which the questionnaire was dispatched, only 381 returned a response. Of the 502 daily newspapers that received the questionnaire, merely 138 replied. The Board commissioned an analysis of the respondents and of the answers given to each question in the questionnaire. It also obtained statements prepared on the basis of various data points, including the gross revenue of each newspaper, the population of the centres in which they operated, their circulation figures, the cost-of-living index, the scales of dearness allowance applicable in certain States, figures relating to comparable employments, the pay scales for important categories of journalists, the total income, the breakdown of expenditure in relation to total income and total expenses, and other financial particulars disclosed by the respondents.

In preparation for its final report, the Board examined the relationship between income and net profits, as well as the relationship between net losses, net profits and the circulation figures of the various newspapers that had returned the questionnaire. Subsequent meetings of the Board were convened on 17 August and on 26 August 1956 in Bombay. At those meetings the Chairman informed the members that the replies received from journals, organisations and other entities to which the questionnaire had been sent were unsatisfactory. Consequently the Board resolved to issue a Press Note requesting that the newspapers and journals submit their responses, with particular emphasis on Part B of the questionnaire, as soon as possible. The Press Note would also remind the respondents that the Board possessed the powers of an Industrial Tribunal under the governing Act and that, should the newspapers fail to furnish the required replies, the Board would be forced to take further action.

The Board then decided that, for the purpose of taking oral evidence, the country should be divided into five zones: Trivandrum, Madras, Delhi, Calcutta and Bombay. The Secretary was instructed to summon witnesses to the centre that was nearest and most convenient for each zone. It was further agreed that, as a general rule, one hour of oral evidence would be allotted to each newspaper, three hours to regional units and two hours to smaller units. The Board also deliberated on how many persons might ordinarily be called to give oral evidence from each newspaper or organisation. It concluded that a key factor influencing the Board’s findings would be the circulation of each newspaper; therefore it decided to obtain the latest circulation figures from the Audit Bureau of Circulation Ltd. without delay. In addition, the Board resolved to require witnesses, if necessary, to produce books of accounts, income-tax assessment orders or any other documents that the Board deemed essential for its inquiry.

Following these resolutions, the Board held a series of meetings at various locations: in Trivandrum from 7 September to 10 September 1956; in Madras from 15 September to 20 September 1956; in New Delhi from 19 October to 26 October 1956; in Calcutta from 25 November to 4 December 1956; and in Bombay during several periods— from 4 January to 10 January 1957, from 20 January to 6 February 1957, from 25 March to 31 March 1957, and finally from 22 April to 24 April 1957. At each of these sessions evidence was recorded from numerous journalists and other persons connected with the newspaper industry. When the Board reconvened in Bombay from 25 March to 31 March 1957, it entered upon its final deliberations. At that meeting the Chairman stressed the importance of reaching unanimous decisions regarding the fixation of wages and related matters. He expressed a strong desire that representatives of the newspaper industry and of working journalists be able to achieve mutual agreement through direct discussions, and he assured them of his fullest cooperation and assistance on any points where agreement could not be obtained. The members received this suggestion positively and resolved to discuss the various issues among themselves in the afternoon and on the subsequent days. After considerable discussion on 25 March, the Board continued its deliberations.

On 25 March 1957 and again on 26 March 1957 the representatives of newspaper owners and of working journalists met jointly. During those two sittings the Board achieved unanimous agreements on three matters: the classification of newspapers, the classification of centres, and the classification of employees. The only issue that did not receive unanimous support was the classification of groups, multiple units and chains based on their total gross revenue. That particular point was settled by a majority decision. In that vote the chairman and the representatives of the working journalists voted in favour of the proposal, whereas the representatives of the employers voted against it. Following these classifications, the chairman addressed the question of pay scales at the meeting held on 27 March 1957. He proposed that, while the final settlement of the wage issue was pending, each side should furnish figures for pay scales calculated on two alternative bases: one based on consolidated wages and another based on basic scales together with a separate dearness allowance. Both parties accepted the request and agreed to present concrete suggestions on the next day.

At the Board’s meeting on 28 March 1957 the representatives of the employers put forward the contention that the term “CC rates of pay” did not encompass pay scales, and therefore the Board lacked the authority to fix the scales for working journalists. To support this position they submitted a written statement signed by all the employer representatives to the chairman. The representatives of the working journalists countered this claim by arguing that the Board did have competence to determine pay scales. The chairman then adjourned the sitting to examine the matter further. Later that afternoon the written statement of the employers was circulated to the journalists’ representatives, who filed a written reply asserting that the Board was indeed competent to fix the scales for the various categories of working journalists. The Board reconvened on 29 March 1957 to discuss its own jurisdiction to set the scales. In a written opinion the chairman affirmed that the Board possessed such competence. A vote was taken in accordance with rule 8 of the Working Journalists Wage Board Rules, 1956. The chairman and the journalists’ representatives voted in favour of the Board’s competence, while the employers’ representatives voted against it. Since agreement on this point could not be reached, the chairman invited each member to submit the specific scales they proposed for his study, and the members accepted this arrangement. It was also resolved that the chairman would hold separate discussions with the journalists’ representatives on the morning of 30 March 1957 and with the employers’ representatives on the afternoon of the same day. The Board agreed to meet again on 31 March 1957 for further deliberations. However, at the 31 March meeting no final decision was made on the scales of pay, allowances, or the date on which any decision would take effect. Consequently, the Board scheduled another meeting for 22 April 1957 to take the final decisions.

On the basis of the earlier plan, the Board convened a session at its Bombay office from the twenty-second to the twenty-fourth of April, 1957. During that meeting the members unanimously resolved that the term “decision” should replace the word “report” wherever it appeared in their documents. They then turned to the question of what kind of decisions were to be submitted to the Government. The Board agreed that it would not be necessary to provide reasons for each decision; it would be sufficient simply to record the decisions themselves. After this, the members asked the chairman to examine the proposals concerning pay scales, allowances and other matters that had been submitted by both parties, and to prepare his own proposals so that the Board could reach a final decision. In response, the chairman distributed to all members his suggested arrangements for pay scales, dearness allowance, location allowance and retainer allowance. The Board subsequently adopted a series of decisions on the various issues under consideration. These decisions were unanimous except where a separate note indicates a different voting outcome, and they are set out below because they are relevant to the inquiry before the Union of India.

The Board first decided that, for the purpose of fixing wages of working journalists, newspaper establishments should be grouped into different classes. Except for weeklies and other periodicals specifically mentioned later, the classification of newspaper establishments would be based on their gross revenue, and all sources of revenue for a newspaper would be taken into account in computing that gross revenue. The Board established five revenue classes for daily newspaper establishments: Class A for establishments with gross revenue exceeding Rs 25 lakhs; Class B for revenue over Rs 12.5 lakhs but not exceeding Rs 25 lakhs; Class C for revenue over Rs 5 lakhs but not exceeding Rs 12.5 lakhs; Class D for revenue over Rs 2.5 lakhs but not exceeding Rs 5 lakhs; and Class E for revenue of Rs 2.5 lakhs and below. The classification would be based on the average gross revenue over the three-year period covering 1952, 1953 and 1954. The Board further allowed that parties could request re-classification on the basis of the average revenue for any three-year period beginning with 1955. Regarding groups, multiple units and chains, the Board held that they should be classified according to the total gross revenue of all their constituent units; this particular decision was adopted by a majority, with the chairman and the representatives of the working journalists voting in favour and the representatives of the employers voting against. The Board defined a “group” as a newspaper establishment publishing more than one newspaper from a single centre; a “multiple unit” as one publishing the same newspaper from more than one centre; and a “chain” as one publishing more than one newspaper from more than one centre. Finally, the Board prescribed the grouping of working journalists employed in newspaper establishments. Full-time employees would be placed in Group I if they are editors, and in Group II if they hold positions such as assistant editor, leader writer, news editor, commercial editor, sports editor, film or art editor, feature editor, literary editor, special correspondent, chief reporter, chief sub-editor or cartoonist. Additional groups for sub-editors, reporters, full-time correspondents, news photographers and other journalists were to be defined in the subsequent schedule.

The Court recorded that the classification of working journalists placed Sub-Editors and all kinds of Reporters, together with full-time correspondents who did not fall within Group II, and also news photographers along with other journalists not covered by the earlier groups, into Group III. Group IV was defined to consist of Proof Readers. The Court further explained that part-time employees were to be understood as those correspondents who were employed on a part-time basis by a newspaper establishment and whose main occupation was journalism. An employee would be deemed a full-time employee if, under the conditions of service, that person was prohibited from working for any other newspaper establishment. The Court noted that the wage scales and grades recommended by the chairman had been approved by a majority decision, with the chairman and the representatives of the working journalists voting in favour and the representatives of the employers voting against. It was observed that Shri That had suggested that wage scales should be made conditional upon a newspaper establishment earning a profit in a particular year and that time should be allowed for the establishments to implement the scales; however, the majority did not accept these suggestions. Consequently, the wage scales and grades, as agreed to by the majority, were set out as follows: working journalists belonging to different groups and employed in different classes of newspaper establishments were to receive the basic wages per mensem specified in the schedule. For daily newspapers, the schedule listed Class E with Group I receiving a starting scale of 90 with no further scale, Group II receiving a starting scale of 150 with no further scale, and Group III receiving a starting scale of 100 with a scale of 100-5-165 applicable after thirteen years and an EB-7-200 scale after five years; Class D with Group I receiving a starting scale of 115 and a scale of 115-7-½-205 after twelve years and an EB-15-295 after six years, Group II receiving a starting scale of 200 and a scale of 200-20-400 after ten years; Class C with Group I receiving a starting scale of 100 with a scale of 100-5-165 after thirteen years and an EB-7-200 after five years, Group III receiving a starting scale of 125 with a scale of 125-10-245 after twelve years and an EB-12J-320 after six years, Group II receiving a starting scale of 225 with a scale of 225-20-385 after eight years and an EB-30-445 after two years, and Group I receiving a starting scale of 350 with a scale of 350-25-550 after eight years and a further scale of 40-630 after two years. For Class B, Group I was assigned a starting scale of 100 with a scale of 100-5-165 after thirteen years and an EB-7-200 after five years, Group III a starting scale of 150 with a scale of 150-12J-300 after twelve years and an EB-20-420 after six years, Group II a starting scale of 350 with a scale of 350-20-510 after eight years and an EB-30-570 after two years, and Group I a starting scale of 500 with a scale of 500-30-740 after eight years and a further scale of 40-820 after two years. For Class A, Group IV received a starting scale of 125 with a scale of 125-7-½-215 after twelve years and an EB-10-275 after six years, Group III a starting scale of 175 with a scale of 175-20-415 after twelve years and an EB-25-515 after four years, Group II a starting scale of 500 with a scale of 500-40-820 after eight years and an EB-50-920 after two years, and Group I a starting scale of 1000 with a scale of 1000-50-1300 after six years and a further scale of 75-1600 after four years. The Court also reported that dearness allowance, location allowance and the remuneration of part-time employees had been decided by the majority, again with the chairman and the representatives of the working journalists voting for and the representatives of the employers voting against. Regarding other allowances, the Court observed that because of a lack of sufficient evidence, the Board had resolved that the determination of conveyance and other allowances should be left to collective bargaining between the working journalists and the concerned newspaper establishments. On the matter of fitting existing employees into the new scales, the Court stated that only the service rendered in a particular grade and category within the specific newspaper establishment should be taken into account. The Court further emphasized that in no case should the present emoluments of any employee be reduced as a result of this decision. When a newspaper establishment was re-classified according to paragraph 6 above, the existing pay of the staff was to be protected, although any future increments and scales would correspond to the class of paper to which the establishment now belonged. Finally, the Court noted that the Board’s decision was to become operative from the date of the Board’s constitution.

The Board, whose date of constitution was 2 May 1956, was directed to apply its decisions to newspaper establishments classified as “A”, “B” and “C” from that date. For establishments falling in classes “D” and “E”, the Board’s decisions were to become effective six months after its appointment, that is, from 1 November 1956. The resolution concerning the latter classes was also passed by a majority vote; the chairman together with the representatives of the working journalists supported the resolution, whereas the representatives of the employers opposed it.

The judgment further required that the Government of India, under the relevant Act, establish a Wage Board to examine the impact of the Board’s decisions on both newspaper establishments and the working journalists. This review was to be undertaken after three years from the date of publication of the Board’s decisions, but no later than five years thereafter. The decisions of the Board were formally recorded on 30 April 1957. However, on the same day the employer representatives appended a minute of dissent, and the chairman entered a note explaining the reasons for the recorded decisions. Both the minute of dissent and the chairman’s note were deemed crucial for resolving the matters before the Court. In the dissenting minute, the employer representatives began by expressing regret that the prevailing conditions in the newspaper industry prevented them from accepting the majority view. They argued that wage fixation should be guided by four criteria: the normal needs of a worker, the industry’s capacity to pay, the nature of the industry, and the effect on industry development and employment. The employers further elaborated that the newspaper sector constituted a distinct class whose product’s selling price was generally below the cost of production. They noted that the cost of newsprint fluctuated frequently, making long-term financial commitments difficult. They observed that newspaper income derived mainly from sales and advertising; sales depended on public acceptance while advertising revenue depended on circulation, prestige and the purchasing power of readers. Consequently, they contended that publishing was inherently hazardous, and wages should therefore be set at a minimum level, leaving any surplus to be shared with employees through bonuses. The employers also pointed out that raising the selling price of newspapers was typically ineffective, as past experience showed that such increases tended to reduce circulation, which in turn harmed advertising revenue. They emphasized that neither sales nor advertising revenue responded proportionally to higher expenditures. Finally, the employers warned that any wage fixation for a particular group of employees would inevitably affect other sections within the newspaper establishment. They highlighted that editorial staff represented roughly one-fifth of the total wage bill, while factory workers possessed significant bargaining power; therefore, any increase in editorial wages would likely compel corresponding increases for factory staff and the introduction of new time scales.

It was held that any determination of wages for one category of employees must take into account the consequences for other categories within the same newspaper establishment. Editorial staff constituted one such category, and any rise in their remuneration would inevitably affect the wage structure of the remaining staff. The salaries of working journalists represented roughly one-fifth of the total wage expenditure, while the factory workers possessed considerable bargaining strength; consequently, an increase in editorial salaries or the introduction of salary scales for editors would have to be accompanied by a corresponding rise in factory wages and the establishment of time-based scales for those workers as well. The Court noted that advertisement revenue was the primary factor that determined a newspaper’s ability to pay its employees. Therefore, it was insufficient to consider only the overall revenue of a newspaper; the proportion of that revenue derived from advertising also had to be examined. This implied that if minimum wages and salary scales were fixed on an All-India basis, they would necessarily have to be set low in order not to disadvantage newspapers published in languages of regions with lower purchasing power, such as Kerala and Orissa. The Court concluded that it would be equitable for both the industry and its workers if wages were fixed on a regional basis. The Court further observed that the proposals put forward by the majority appeared to be guided primarily by the principle of satisfying the worker’s need as they understood it, without sufficient regard for the impact on the newspaper industry as a whole. The Board, it was said, had not been presented with adequate data to properly assess the industry’s capacity to pay. The profit and loss statements of daily newspaper establishments for the year 19.54-55, as submitted to the Board, showed that while forty-three newspapers reported profits, forty newspapers incurred losses, indicating that the overall condition of the newspaper sector in the country was far from satisfactory. Accordingly, the majority’s proposals were described as unduly high and likely to impose an immediate and growing financial burden on many newspapers, a burden that would be amplified over subsequent years and would also affect the wages of employees in other sections. This additional strain would extend to obligations such as the provident fund and gratuity, and when the full effect of the increased wage burden materialised, the economic viability of most newspapers would be severely undermined. The Court warned that although many newspapers might not close immediately, they could be unable to meet liabilities for retrenchment compensation, gratuity and similar obligations arising from such wage increases. In an attempt to meet these liabilities, newspapers might resort to borrowing until their credit was exhausted, after which they would be forced to shut down. Regarding the establishment of new newspapers, the Court projected that such ventures would become rare, and after a few years the nation would find that the total number of daily newspapers had not increased but had actually declined.

In this case, the Court observed that a reduction in the number of newspapers would be contrary to the nation’s interests, both because it would harm employment and because it would impair freedom of expression. The Court then turned to the issue of classification of newspaper chains and groups. It held that the criterion adopted by the majority, which relied on the total gross revenue of all units in a chain or group, was unfair and unnatural because such an aggregate figure presented an unrealistic picture of the group’s ability to meet its wage obligations. The Court further noted that applying any rule retrospectively would only worsen the difficulties already faced by the newspaper industry, which had already been required to devise methods for meeting the burden of retrospective gratuity payments.

Regarding the prevailing wage rates for comparable employment, the Court explained that the work performed by journalists in newspaper establishments could not be directly compared with other occupations or professions. Accordingly, the wages of working journalists should be determined only in light of the overall financial condition of the newspaper industry. Nevertheless, the Court allowed that limited comparisons could be made with alternative occupations available to persons possessing similar educational qualifications in specific regions or localities. From that standpoint, the salaries of secondary-school teachers, college and university teachers, and employees in commercial firms and banks could be taken into account, although the majority had rejected this approach.

The note prepared by the chairman was intended to elucidate the reasons behind the decisions that he said he had at least considered. Some of those reasons had been accepted unanimously, while others had gained the support of a majority of members and thereby become the basis of the majority decisions. At the outset, the chairman explained that most of the recommendations of the Press Commission were aimed at improving the economic condition of small and medium-sized newspapers. Those recommendations included a price-page schedule, telescopic rates for government advertisements with a fair distribution among newspapers, statutory restrictions on malpractices to eliminate cut-throat competition, and the fixation of news-agency tariffs. The chairman pointed out that these measures had still not been implemented and that there had been no stability in the price of newsprint, which constituted a considerable proportion of a newspaper’s expenditure. Because of these circumstances, the chairman said, it had become necessary to fix a minimum wage lower than the level recommended by the Press Commission.

Concerning the fixation of wage rates, the chairman observed: “In fixing the rates of wages, we have based them on the condition of the newspaper industry as a whole and not on the effect which they will produce on a particular newspaper. We can only proceed on the average gross income of a newspaper falling under the same class and not on the lowest unit in that class. Otherwise, there will be no improvement in any unit of the same class, and the status quo might remain.” He added that, given the extremely divergent conditions prevailing in both English-language and Indian-language newspapers, it was impossible to avoid some adverse impact on small or medium-sized newspapers. He concluded that when the tone and condition of journalism in India had to be raised to a higher level, the measures adopted needed to reflect the realities of the entire industry.

In explaining the consequences of the wage fixation, the chairman observed that it was inevitable that a varying degree of burden would fall on a number of newspapers. He acknowledged that in situations where wages were already very low, dearness allowance was either minimal or entirely absent, and no wage scales existed, proprietors were likely to react to the newly proposed wage schedule with resentment. The chairman noted that certain anomalies could be identified, but reminded that comprehensive data on every newspaper were not available to the commission, and the information that was available was often unsatisfactory. Consequently, he stated that it was impossible to satisfy the demands of every newspaper as well as those of all journalists under the prevailing circumstances. Nevertheless, the commission endeavoured to proceed on the basis of accepted principles, while also taking into account the recommendations of the Press Commission, and deliberately did not base its calculations on the editorial expenditures of individual newspapers. He expressed the view that rational management offered considerable potential for increasing newspaper income and pointed to evidence before the commission indicating that the future of Indian-language newspapers appeared bright, given rising literacy rates and growing political consciousness among readers. The chairman further explained that when wide disparities existed, no adjustment could be fashioned that would satisfy every interested party. He expressed hope that no newspaper would be forced to shut down as a result of the decision, and added that if a newspaper was of good quality and merited continued existence, it was his expectation that both the Government and the public would assist in its continuation.

The chairman then made an additional observation, stating that the commission did not regard it as regrettable if its decisions discouraged individuals lacking the necessary resources from entering the newspaper industry, where the payment of a reasonable minimum wage was required. While expressing a desire to promote and encourage the growth of small newspapers, he stressed that such promotion should not come at the expense of working journalists. He applied the same principle to newspapers that were established for political, religious or any other propagandist purpose, indicating that those too should not compromise journalists’ wages.

Regarding the methodology for classifying all constituent units of a newspaper group or chain, the chairman explained that the decision to place every unit in the same class was based on the total gross income of the entire establishment. He described the task of fixing wages for journalists employed by newly emerging newspapers as particularly difficult. He noted that the accounts of all constituent units within the same group or chain were merged, resulting in the losses of weaker units being absorbed by the higher incomes of prosperous units. This practice created considerable disparity in the wages of journalists performing identical work across different constituent units located in various centres. The chairman referenced strong criticism by the Press Commission of such chain and group arrangements and their adverse impact on employees. Consequently, the commission resolved to group all constituent units of the same group or chain together in a single class, determined on the basis of the total gross income of the entire establishment.

The Board explained that it would place all constituent units of a newspaper group or chain in the same classification based on the total gross income of the entire establishment. It acknowledged that this approach might result in some journalists working for the weaker units of a chain receiving wages that exceed those earned by journalists employed by the chain’s highest-income units. Nevertheless, the Board asserted that if its principle were sound and scientific, its ultimate effect should be assessed from the viewpoint of Indian journalism as a whole rather than from the specific burden imposed on any individual establishment. The Board further expressed that the principle it had adopted represented a major step toward implementing the recommendations advanced by the Press Commission.

Subsequently, the Chairman turned to the concerns raised by representatives of newspaper employers regarding the possible burden that might arise from the Board’s decisions. He conveyed sympathy for their viewpoint and observed that, given the circumstances—particularly the fact that this was the first attempt to fix wage rates for journalists—some anomalies were likely to emerge during implementation. Accordingly, the Chairman stated that the Board was reluctant to impose a permanent wage schedule covering all classes of newspapers. He emphasized that the wage rates fixed by the Board should remain subject to review and revision after a period of three to five years, based on the experience gained during that interval. This need for periodic reassessment was underscored by the Board’s admission that the data it possessed were not as complete as desired and that, at this stage, it was difficult to determine with precision the economic and other impacts of its decisions on the newspaper industry overall.

To mitigate these challenges, the Chairman proposed the immediate creation of a standing administrative machinery by the Government of India. He suggested that this body should combine the functions of implementing and administering the Board’s decisions with the task of preparing for the envisaged review and revision after three to five years. The proposed machinery would be responsible for systematically collecting detailed information and data from all newspaper establishments across the country. Such data would include employment figures, wage rates, earnings, the financial condition of the papers, circulation numbers, and other relevant statistics required to assess the effects of the Board’s decisions at the time of review.

The Board’s decision was published by the Central Government in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary) dated 11 May 1957. Following that publication, the Commissioner of Labour for Madras issued a circular on 30 May 1957. The circular directed the management of every newspaper establishment in the State to submit a report of gross revenue for the three years 1952, 1953 and 1954. The submissions were required to be sent within one month of the Board’s decision, that is, no later than 10 June 1957.

The Court observed that a writ petition numbered 91 of 1957 had been filed on 13 June 1957 by Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. against the Union of India and other respondents. Subsequently, similar petitions were filed on 9 August 1957 by the Press Trust of India Ltd., Indian National Press (Bombay) Private Ltd., and the Saurashtra Trust, which were recorded as petitions numbers 99, 100 and 101 of 1957 respectively. On 23 August 1957, Hindustan Times Ltd., New Delhi, filed a comparable petition that was designated as petition number 103 of 1957. Later, on 18 September 1957, three additional petitions were lodged: petition numbers 116, 117 and 118 of 1957 were filed by Loksatta Karyalaya, Baroda, Sandesh Ltd., Ahmedabad, and Jan Satta Karyalaya, Ahmedabad respectively. The petitioners in petition number 91 of 1957, referred to as the “Express Group,” were identified as the largest newspaper chain in India at the time.

The Court noted that the Express Group published a variety of periodicals, namely the Indian Express, an English daily issued from Madras, Bombay, Delhi and Madurai; the Sunday Standard, an English weekly printed in Madras, Bombay and Delhi; Dinmani, a Tamil daily from Madras and Madurai; Dinmani Kadir, a Tamil weekly from Madras; Lokasatta, a Marathi daily, together with its Sunday weekly, both printed in Bombay; Screen, an English weekly from Bombay; and Andhra Prabha, a Telugu daily and weekly. According to the petition, the group employed a total of 331 journalists who performed the duties of working journalists, of whom 123 served as proof-readers, while the remaining 1,570 employees constituted the rest of the staff. The Court recorded that the current annual remuneration paid to the working journalists amounted to Rs 9,77,892. If the decision of the Wage Board were implemented, the Court estimated that the total remuneration for those journalists would rise to Rs 15,21,282-12, thereby increasing the annual wage bill by Rs 5,43,390-12. In addition, the petitioners indicated that they would be required to remunerate part-time correspondents through retainers and per-column payments, which would impose an extra financial burden of approximately Rs 1,00,000 per year. The Court further noted that the retrospective effect of the Wage Board decision, dated from 2 May 1956, would compel the Express Group to pay an additional sum of Rs 5,16,337-20 as arrears. This calculation excluded any liability for past gratuity, recurring gratuity as provided under the relevant Act, or additional costs arising from reduced working hours, increased leave, and other provisions contained in the decision. Moreover, the Court recorded that if the remaining staff members, who were not classified as working journalists, made comparable demands for higher wages and improved service conditions, the Express Group would face an estimated further burden of Rs 9,92,443-68.

The Court also recorded that the petitioners in petition number 99 of 1957, the Press Trust of India Ltd., were a non-profit cooperative organization of newspaper proprietors. According to the petition, the Trust employed a total of 820 persons, of whom 170 were classified as working journalists and the remaining 650 employees did not fall within that definition. The Court noted these figures as part of the factual background presented to the Court.

The Court observed that a large number of employees of the petitioners did not fall within the definition of “working journalists.” The petitioners’ total annual wage bill was approximately Rs 21,00,000, of which the salaries of the working journalists amounted to Rs 9,00,000. An increase in the wage bill resulting from the Wage Board’s decision to raise the salaries of the working journalists was calculated at Rs 4,05,600, and because the decision was to operate retrospectively the petitioners would also have to pay arrears of an additional Rs 4,05,600 to those journalists. Moreover, the petitioners would incur a further recurring financial burden of Rs 60,000 each year due to the monthly salary increments applicable to the working journalists. The Court noted that if the benefits of the Wage Board decision were extended to the other staff members who were not classified as working journalists but who had made similar demands, the petitioners would face an extra annual liability estimated at Rs 3,90,000. In a worst-case scenario where the petitioners could not continue their business without operating at a loss and were forced to shut down, the amount payable to the working journalists under the Act and the Wage Board decision would rise to Rs 23,68,500, compared with the liability on the old pay scale of Rs 11,62,500. In addition, the non-journalist staff would require a further payment of Rs 15,50,000. Consequently, the total liability in such a circumstance would amount to Rs 39,18,000, whereas the earlier liability stood at Rs 27,12,500. The Court then turned to the situation of Indian National Press (Bombay) Private Ltd., also known as the Free Press Group, petitioners in Petition No 100 of 1957. This publishing house produces the Free Press Journal (a morning English daily), the Free Press Bulletin (an evening English daily), Bharat Jyoti (an English weekly), Janashakti (a morning Gujarati daily) and Navashakthi (a Marathi daily) from Bombay. It employs a total of 442 persons, including part-time correspondents; of these, 65 are working journalists, 21 are proof-readers, and the remaining employees are staff members not classified as working journalists. The Court held that the Wage Board decision would require the Free Press Group to make an immediate payment of Rs 1,73,811 as arrears, and to incur an equal annual increase of Rs 1,73,811 in its wage bill. In addition, there would be a yearly recurring increase of Rs 22,470 and a corresponding rise in the provident-fund contribution due to the higher salaries. Under the provisions of the Act relating to reduced working hours and increased leave, the liability would further increase by Rs 90,669 and Rs 29,806 respectively for the working journalists, in addition to the other liabilities mentioned.

The Court observed that the retrospective effect of the Wage Board decision would obligate the petitioners to pay past gratuity amounting to Rs. 1,08,534 and to incur a recurring annual gratuity liability of Rs. 17,995. If the same benefits were extended to staff members who are not classified as working journalists, the Court noted that the annual financial burden would increase by Rs. 1,80,000. This additional liability arose because the petitioners had been treated as a single newspaper chain and placed in the “A” class based on the combined gross revenue of all their units. Had each component newspaper been classified individually according to its own gross revenue, the Court held that the Free Press Journal, the Free Press Bulletin and the Bharat Jyoti would each fall within class “A”, while Navashakti would be placed in class “C” and Janashakti in class “D”. Such a classification would have substantially reduced the financial impact of the Wage Board decision on the petitioners. The Court therefore emphasized that the method of classification directly influences the magnitude of the wage bill increase, the liability for reduced working hours, and the additional leave entitlement. In the present arrangement, the wage bill would rise by Rs. 1,73,811 immediately, with a corresponding annual increase of the same amount, and an additional recurring yearly increase of Rs. 22,470. Further, the provisions of the Act concerning reduced hours of work and increased leave would impose extra liabilities of Rs. 90,669 and Rs. 29,806 respectively on the working journalists.

The Court then turned to the situation of the Saurashtra Trust, identified as petitioners in Petition No. 101 of 1957, which operates a separate chain of newspapers. The Trust publishes Janmabhoomi, a Gujarati daily from Bombay, Janmabhoomi and Pravasi, a Gujarati weekly from Bombay, Lokmanya, a Marathi daily from Bombay, and Vyapar, a Gujarati weekly commercial paper also from Bombay. In addition, the Trust publishes Fulchhab, a Gujarati daily from Rajkot; Pratap, a Gujarati daily from Surat; Cuttccha Mitra, a Gujarati daily from Bhuj in Cutch; and Nav Bharat, a Gujarati daily from Baroda. The total workforce of the Trust consists of 445 employees, of whom 60 are classified as working journalists, 12 serve as proof-readers, and the remaining staff belong to other categories. According to the Court, the retrospective operation of the Wage Board decision would impose a burden of Rs. 1,59,528 on the Trust and would raise the wage bill by the same amount for first year. In addition, a recurring annual increase of Rs. 22,000 would be added to the wage bill from the second year onward. The Court further noted that sections 6 and 7 of the Act, which provide for reduced working hours and additional leave, would create an extra yearly liability of Rs. 42,000. The liability for past gratuity was calculated at Rs. 93,376, and the recurring annual increase in gratuity would amount to Rs. 11,000. If the same gratuity and other benefits were extended to the non-journalist staff, the Court indicated that the annual financial burden would rise by Rs. 5,18,964 because the entire chain would continue to be classified as an “A” class newspaper establishment. Had each component newspaper been classified individually on its gross revenue, the Court explained that Vyapar would fall into class “B”, Janmabhoomi and Lokmanya into class “C”, and Cuttccha Mitra, Fulchhab and Pratap into class “E”. The Court therefore concluded that the method of classification produced a manifest inequity, because the same chain of newspapers received a much heavier financial obligation than it would have if each title were assessed separately.

In this case the judgment observed that the newspaper Janmabhoomi, which is published from Bombay, had been placed in Class A, while Bombay Samachar – a Gujarati-language morning daily from the same city that actually generated a larger gross revenue than Janmabhoomi when considered as a single unit – had been placed in Class B. In a similar manner the newspaper Pratap from Surat was classified as belonging to Class A, whereas Gujarat Mitra, also published from Surat and having a higher gross revenue than Pratap, was placed in Class B because it was treated as a separate unit. Likewise the newspaper Fulchhab of Rajkot was placed in Class A, while Jaihind, another newspaper from Rajkot that enjoys a larger gross revenue than Fulchhab, was placed in Class C for the same reason of being dealt with as an individual unit.

The judgment then set out the monetary consequences of the new classification scheme. It calculated that, if the petitioners were compelled to shut down their concern because they could no longer run the business without incurring a loss, the cost of closing down for the working journalists would be Rs 6,13,921 under the new basis, compared with a cost of Rs 1,00,890 under the old basis. For the remaining staff members who are not working journalists the amount computed under the new basis was Rs 3,08,112. Adding the two figures, the total cost of closing down the concern on the new basis, as required by the provisions of the Act and the decision of the Wage Board, would be Rs 9,22,033, whereas the total cost that would have arisen otherwise was Rs 4,09,002.

The judgment further described the situation of Hindustan Times Ltd., New Delhi, the petitioners in Petition No. 103 of 1957, also referred to as “the Hindustan Times Group”. The group publishes five titles from Delhi: (i) Hindustan Times, an English-language morning daily; (ii) Hindustan Times (Evening News), an English-language evening daily; (iii) Overseas Hindustan Times, an English-language weekly; (iv) Hindustan, a Hindi-language daily; and (v) Saptahik Hindustan, a Hindi-language weekly. The total workforce consists of 695 employees, of whom 79 are working journalists, 14 are proof-readers and the remaining 602 are other staff members. The wages paid to the working journalists account for roughly one-third of the overall wage bill, while the wages of the other 602 staff members make up the remaining two-thirds.

Applying the Wage Board’s decision, the judgment stated that the petitioners would face additional liabilities concerning the working journalists alone. These liabilities would include an approximate increase of Rs 2,16,000 in the annual wage bill, arrears of about Rs 1,89,000 for the period from 2 May 1956 to 30 April 1957, a past gratuity liability of Rs 2,65,000 as of 31 March 1957, and a recurring annual gratuity liability of Rs 28,000. The aggregate of these amounts totals Rs 6,98,000. The judgment noted that these figures do not yet incorporate the increased liabilities that would arise from the petitioners’ contributions to the provident fund, the application of leave rules, or payments to part-time correspondents. Moreover, the judgment pointed out that there would be a further recurring increase in the wage bill because the various categories of working journalists would be entitled to increments in accordance with the wage scales prescribed by the Wage Board.

In this matter, the Court recorded that extending the provisions of the Wage Board to all categories of employees would impose an additional financial burden on the petitioners that could be broken down as follows: an increase in the annual wage bill of approximately Rs 5,02,000; arrears of payments for the period from 2 May 1956 to 30 April 1957 amounting to roughly Rs 4,51,000; a past liability for gratuity as on 31 March 1957 estimated at about Rs 5,50,000; and a recurring annual gratuity liability of approximately Rs 60,000. The aggregate of these components summed to an estimated total of Rs 15,63,000.

The petitioners identified in Petition No 116 of 1957 were the Loksatta Karyalaya, Baroda, publisher of the Gujarati daily Loksatta. They employed fifteen working journalists. According to the Court’s calculations, the decision of the Wage Board would require an increase of Rs 10,800 in the annual wage bill for those journalists, with a retrospective liability of about Rs 9,600. In addition, the Court noted a recurring annual burden of Rs 6,340, which covered the costs associated with notice pay, gratuity, retrenchment compensation, and the extra expenses arising from reduced working hours and increased leave entitlements.

The petitioners in Petition No 117 of 1957 were Sandesh Ltd., also referred to as the Sandesh Group, Ahmedabad, which published the morning Gujarati daily Sandesh, the evening Gujarati daily Sevak, the Gujarati weekly Bal Sandesh, and the Gujarati monthlies Aram and Sat Sandesh. The enterprise employed a total of 205 staff members, comprising eleven working journalists, seven proof-readers, and 187 other employees. The Court observed that the Wage Board’s provisions would raise the wage bill for the eleven journalists by Rs 24,807 per year, and a similar amount would arise from retrospective application of the decision. An additional increase of Rs 30,900 was projected due to the reduction in working hours and the accompanying rise in leave and holidays. The Court calculated a past gratuity liability of Rs 31,597, a recurring annual gratuity liability of Rs 24,807, and a recurring annual wage increase for the journalists of Rs 1,530. The financial burden for proof-readers, who fall within the definition of working journalists under the Act, was estimated at Rs 5,724 per year. Should the benefits be extended to the remaining staff who are not classified as working journalists, the annual increase would amount to Rs 1,89,816. Consequently, the total cost of shutting down the business, if such a scenario were contemplated, would be Rs 1,08,997 for the working journalists alone, compared with a liability of Rs 22,755 under the previous arrangement. The other staff members would require payments of Rs 1,46,351, making the overall cost of closure Rs 2,55,349 under the new regime, versus Rs 1,69,106 under the old basis.

The petitioners in Petition No 118 of 1957 were the Jansatta Karyalaya, Ahmedabad, which published the Gujarati daily Jansatta and the Gujarati monthly Chandni. The Court’s findings with respect to this petition were recorded in the subsequent portion of the judgment.

In this case, the Court observed that the petitioners employed a total of one hundred and eight persons, comprising fifteen working journalists, six proof-readers and eighty-seven other staff members. The Court noted that, according to the Wage Board decision, the increase in the wage-bill for the working journalists would amount to twenty-nine thousand eight hundred eight rupees. In addition, the Court recorded that liability for past gratuity for these journalists would be six thousand six hundred twenty-four rupees, the recurring annual gratuity would be two thousand three hundred three rupees, and the annual recurring increase in wages would be two thousand two hundred eighty rupees. Regarding the proof-readers, the Court stated that the financial burden would be six thousand four hundred eighty rupees per year as fixed by the Wage Board. The Court further explained that, if the same benefits were extended to the remaining staff members who were not classified as working journalists, the annual financial burden would rise by forty-eight thousand seven hundred twenty rupees. Consequently, the Court calculated that the total cost of a possible closure of the undertaking, should such a contingency occur, would be one lakh eighty hundred rupees under the provisions of the Act and the Wage Board decision, compared with forty-five thousand two hundred six rupees on the earlier basis.

The Court then described the pattern of the petitions, noting that each petitioner, after briefly summarising the historical background that led to the enactment of the contested Act and to the Wage Board’s decision, challenged the constitutional validity of both the Act and the Decision. The Court recorded that the petitioners attacked the Act on the ground that its provisions infringed the fundamental rights secured by article nineteen sub-paragraph one of clause a, article nineteen sub-paragraph one of clause g, and article fourteen of the Constitution; during the hearing, the petitioners also alleged a violation of article thirty-two. Regarding the Wage Board’s decision, the Court noted that the petitioners raised objections that were essentially the same as those presented by the employers in their dissenting minutes before the Board. The petitioners further contended that implementing the decision would be beyond their financial capacity and would inevitably lead to the collapse of their enterprises.

The Court set out the respondents’ replies. According to the respondents, none of the fundamental rights guaranteed by article nineteen (a), article nineteen (g), article fourteen or article thirty-two were infringed by the impugned Act. The respondents argued that the functions of the Wage Board were neither judicial nor quasi-judicial, that fixing wage rates was a legislative, not a judicial, activity, and that the Board had considered all criteria prescribed under section nine sub-paragraph one of the Act, together with the material and evidence before it, before arriving at its decision. The respondents further pointed out that many of the Board’s decisions were unanimous, that the Board possessed authority to determine wage scales and to give its decisions retrospective effect, and that the petitioners’ financial positions were not such that the provisions of the Act would cause their collapse.

The Court noted that the petitioners had filed five separate petitions—Petition Nos. 91 of 1957, 99 of 1957, 100 of 1957, 101 of 1957 and 103 of 1957—seeking special leave to appeal the decisions of the Wage Board. These appeals corresponded respectively to the Wage Board decisions recorded as Petitions Nos. 323, 346, 347, 348 and 359 of 1957. The Court granted special leave in each of those petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution, while expressly reserving the question of whether the appeals were maintainable for determination during the hearing. Consequently, the civil appeals that arose from the special-leave petitions were directed to be heard together with the writ petitions previously mentioned, and to be disposed of finally in the same proceedings. The civil appeal numbers that thus came before the Court were Appeals Nos. 699 of 1957, 700 of 1957, 701 of 1957, 702 of 1957 and 703 of 1957. All of these civil appeals were taken up for hearing and final disposal alongside the writ petitions that were filed under Article 32 of the Constitution.

The Court explained that it elected to hear the writ petitions first because they presented a broader and more comprehensive set of questions than the civil appeals filed by the parties. Substantial arguments were then heard from counsel on the various issues that required the Court’s determination. Before turning to the substantive test of the constitutional validity of the impugned Act and the correctness of the Wage Board’s decision, the Court deemed it necessary to lay a foundation by examining the general principles that govern wage fixation and the mechanisms used for this purpose in different jurisdictions.

In this regard, the Court observed that wages are generally classified into three distinct categories: the living wage, the fair wage and the minimum wage. Regarding the living wage, the Court cited the well-known statement that the concept of a living wage has long influenced wage-setting practices, whether by statute or otherwise, in all economically advanced countries. Although the idea is historic, most contemporary definitions have been formulated only in recent times. The Court highlighted the most expressive definition, which was articulated by Justice Higgins of the Australian Commonwealth Court of Conciliation in the celebrated Harvester case. Justice Higgins described the living wage as the amount appropriate for “the normal needs of the average employee, regarded as a human being living in a civilized community.”

Justice Higgins further clarified that the living wage must not only cover the basic necessities of food, shelter and clothing, but must also provide “a condition of frugal comfort estimated by current human standards.” He explained that a living wage must be sufficient to secure for the workman food, shelter, clothing, frugal comfort, provision for ill-days and other necessities, while also taking into account any special skill possessed by an artisan. In a later judgment, Justice Higgins remarked that, because marriage is the usual condition of adult men, a wage that does not enable a worker to support a matrimonial household and about five persons in a home cannot be regarded as a living wage. The Court also referred to the South Australian Act of 1912, which defines the living wage in similar terms, thereby illustrating the international consensus on the essential elements of a living wage.

The South Australian legislation defined a living wage as “a sum sufficient for the normal and reasonable needs of the average employee living in a locality where work under consideration is done or is to be done.” In a similar vein, the Queensland Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act stipulated that the basic wage payable to an adult male employee could not be less than an amount “sufficient to maintain a well-conducted employee of average health, strength and competence and his wife and a family of three children in a fair and average standard of comfort, having regard to the conditions of living prevailing among employees in the calling in respect of which such basic wage is fixed, and provided that in fixing such basic wage the earnings of the children or wife of such employee shall not be taken into account.” In the United States, a Tentative Budget Inquiry conducted in 1919 by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labour Statistics examined budgets according to three concepts: (i) the pauper and poverty level, (ii) the minimum of subsistence level, and (iii) the minimum of health and comfort level. The Commissioner adopted the third concept – the minimum of health and comfort level – as the basis for determining a living wage. The Royal Commission on the Basic Wage for the Commonwealth of Australia endorsed this approach, and through the use of norms and budget inquiries it sought to determine what the minimum of health and comfort level should be. The Commission quoted the description of this level as follows: “This represents a slightly higher level than that of subsistence, providing not only for the material needs of food, shelter, and body covering but also for certain comforts, such as clothing sufficient for bodily comfort, and to maintain the wearer’s instinct of self-respect and decency, some insurance against the more important misfortunes—death, disability and fire—good education for the children, some amusement, and some expenditure for self-development.”

The United Provinces Labour Enquiry Committee classified living-standard levels into four categories: (i) the poverty level, (ii) the minimum subsistence level, (iii) the subsistence-plus level, and (iv) the comfort level. It selected the subsistence-plus level as the foundation for what it termed the “minimum living wage.” The Bombay Textile Labour Inquiry Committee, in its 1937 report, examined the living-wage concept at length. While accepting the definition described above, the Committee observed that “what we have to attempt is not an exact measurement of a well-defined concept. Any definition of a standard of living is necessarily descriptive rather than logical. Any minimum, after all, is arbitrary and relative. No completely objective and absolute meaning can be attached to a term like the living wage standard,” and that the standard must be judged in the light of the circumstances of the particular time and country. The Committee then proceeded, using norms and standard budgets, to prescribe the basic wage that would approximate the living-wage standard according to the conditions prevailing at that time.

In its discussion, the Court referred to the observation that the living-wage standard must be interpreted in light of the circumstances of the particular time and country. The Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery, as published by the Labour Office, summarized this viewpoint by noting that various countries have made estimates of a living wage, but those estimates differ according to the investigator’s perspective. The Machinery further classified such estimates into at least three categories: (i) the amount required merely for subsistence, (ii) the amount necessary to ensure health and decency, and (iii) the amount needed to provide a standard of comfort.

From this summary of worldwide concepts of a living wage, the Court observed that there is a generally accepted argument that a living wage should enable a worker to provide for himself and his family not only with the bare essentials of food, clothing and shelter, but also with a modest degree of comfort. This includes provision for children’s education, protection against illness, fulfillment of essential social needs, and a modest insurance against major misfortunes such as old age.

The Court then cited Article 43 of the Constitution, which declares a Directive Principle of State Policy whereby the State shall endeavour, by suitable legislation, economic organization or any other means, to secure for all workers—whether agricultural, industrial or otherwise—a living wage, working conditions that ensure a decent standard of life, and full enjoyment of leisure as well as social and cultural opportunities. The Court described this constitutional mandate as the ideal toward which the Indian social-welfare State must strive in order to improve the living conditions of workers.

Turning to the concept of a minimum wage, the Court noted that the International Convention of 1928 requires the establishment of minimum-wage-fixing machinery in industries where no effective wage regulation exists through collective agreement or other means and where wages are exceptionally low. While the living wage is the ultimate target, the Court explained that even in advanced economies it must be moderated by other considerations, notably the overall wage levels prevailing in other sectors and the capacity of industry to pay such wages. This approach has been endorsed by the Bombay Textile Labour Inquiry Committee, which observed that the living-wage basis supplies an absolute external standard for determining the minimum wage, but that any award or wage fixation using a living-wage criterion is invariably tempered by practical considerations.

Finally, the Court recognised that in India the national income level is presently so low that it is widely accepted that the country cannot legally prescribe a minimum wage corresponding fully to the living-wage concept described above. Consequently, the Court posed the question of what level of minimum wage can be sustained by the present stage of the Indian economy, noting that most employers and some respondents have contributed to the discussion, as reflected in the Report of the Committee on Fair Wages (1947-1949).

The Committee on Fair Wages, in its report covering the years 1947 to 1949 (pages 5-7, paragraphs 6 and 7), recorded that the provincial governments of the time regarded the minimum wage as something that could at present be limited only to a bare subsistence level. The Committee noted that even a prominent all-India organization of employees defined a minimum wage as “the wage which is sufficient to cover the bare physical needs of a worker and his family.” While some commentators accepted this narrow definition, other voices argued that a minimum wage should also meet additional essential requirements, such as a minimum level of education, access to medical facilities and other basic amenities. The Committee itself accepted that a minimum wage must do more than merely sustain life; it must also preserve the efficiency of the worker. Consequently, the Committee held that the minimum wage should include provision for at least a modest measure of education, medical care and other necessary amenities. This broader understanding of “minimum wage” was adopted by the Committee on Fair Wages as its guiding concept.

The Committee further observed that variation exists in the way the concept of minimum wage is applied in different jurisdictions. In Australian industrial terminology, for example, a distinction is drawn between the “basic wage” and the “minimum wage.” The basic wage in Australia is described as approximating a bare subsistence wage and is set so that no normal adult male worker covered by an award may be required to work a full standard-hours week for less than the assessed basic wage rate. The basic wage therefore represents the minimum legal rate for unskilled adult male workers, while different legal minima are prescribed for skilled and semi-skilled workers, piece-rate workers and casual labour. The Committee explained that the minimum wage, in contrast, is simply the lowest rate at which persons of a specified grade may be legally employed. It also distinguished between a bare subsistence or minimum wage – a rate that must be paid irrespective of an industry's ability to pay and which, if an industry cannot meet, calls into question the right of that industry to exist – and a statutory minimum wage, which is the rate prescribed by legislation and may be set higher than the bare subsistence level. The Committee cited judicial observations, noting that in under-developed countries where large-scale unemployment exists, labour may be offered on starvation wages, but such wages cannot be encouraged in a modern democratic welfare state. An employer who cannot sustain his enterprise without reducing wages below even a bare subsistence level would have no right to continue the enterprise on those terms. The statutory minimum wage, therefore, serves as a legally mandated floor that may exceed the basic subsistence requirement.

In this passage the Court discussed the scope of a fair wage, noting that a fair wage must permit at least a modest provision for education, medical needs and other amenities, as was previously described. The Court referred to the expression “minimum rate of wages” as defined in section 4 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (XI of 1948). The concept of a fair wage, the Court explained, was originally set out in the Industrial Truce Resolution, which declared that payment of fair wages to labour was one of its fundamental recommendations. According to Marshall, a wage rate may be described as “fair” when it is roughly on a level with the average remuneration for tasks in other trades that involve the same degree of difficulty and unpleasantness, require equally rare natural abilities and equally costly training. Professor Pigou, the Court noted, distinguished two senses of fairness in wage assessment. He described a wage as “fair in the narrower sense” when it matches the prevailing rate for similar work performed by workers in the same trade and locality, and as “fair in the wider sense” when it corresponds to the predominant rate for comparable work throughout the country across all trades. The Indian National Trade Union Congress, cited in [1958] S.C.R. 651, held that agreements, arbitrators and adjudicators could only serve as a starting point, similar to the minimum wage, and that wherever an industry’s capacity to pay a higher wage could be proven, such a higher wage should be regarded as the fair wage. The Congress further asserted that a minimum wage must not be linked to the industry’s ability to pay; rather, it should be determined solely by the needs of the worker and his family. In its view, a “fair wage” represented a step toward the progressive achievement of a living wage. While some employers initially regarded a fair wage as closely aligned with existing wages, they expressed willingness to raise the prevailing rates in line with the industry’s capacity to pay, anticipating that the fair wage would gradually move toward a living wage. The Court also quoted the Government of Bombay, which, drawing on extensive experience in wage regulation, declared that nothing short of a living wage could be called a fair wage if a competitive industry could be shown to afford a full living wage. The Government described the minimum-wage standards as establishing an irreducible floor, the lowest limit below which no worker should be paid, whereas a fair wage is set above that minimum and moves upward toward a living wage. Accordingly, the Court observed that the lower bound of a fair wage is necessarily the statutory minimum wage, while the upper bound is determined by what may broadly be described as the capacity of industry to pay.

In determining the amount that an industry could be required to pay, the Court observed that the amount would depend not only on the industry's current economic condition but also on its future prospects. Between the lower limit of a minimum wage and the upper limit of a living wage, the actual fair wage would be set after considering several factors. These factors were identified as (i) the productivity of labour, (ii) the prevailing rates of wages for the same or similar occupations in the same or neighbouring localities, (iii) the level of national income and its distribution, and (iv) the position of the industry within the national economy. The Court noted that the concept of a “fair wage” therefore represented a midpoint between a living wage and a minimum wage. Moreover, the minimum wage referred to in the discussion was understood to be more than a bare subsistence wage; it was to be sufficient to meet the basic physical needs of the worker and his family, to preserve the worker’s efficiency, and to allow for some education, medical care, and other amenities. This understanding of a minimum wage was said to align with the advanced thinking of all civilised nations and to approximate the statutory minimum wage that the State should strive to achieve in accordance with the Directive Principles of State Policy. The Court cited the enactment of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 as an illustration of an attempt to provide such a statutory minimum wage. That Act was intended to fix minimum rates of wages in certain employments and empowered the appropriate Government to prescribe different minimum rates for (i) different scheduled employments, (ii) different classes of work within the same scheduled employment, (iii) adult workers, adolescents, children and apprentices, (iv) different localities, and (v) for periods that could be fixed by the hour, by the day or by any larger period as may be prescribed. The Court further observed that the meanings of the expressions “minimum wage,” “fair wage,” and “living wage” were not fixed or static; they were expected to vary over time as the national economy grew, living standards improved, and societal notions of wage categories became more progressive. It was also emphasized that while a bare subsistence wage might be fixed regardless of an industry's capacity to pay, the minimum wage contemplated under the Act presupposed that the industry possessed the capacity to meet that wage. Consequently, any fixation of wages that ignored the essential factor of an industry's capacity to pay could not be supported. Finally, the Court raised the question of whether fixing rates of wages also implied fixing scales of wages, noting that “rates of wages” and “scales of wages” are distinct expressions with different connotations, and that the term “wages” had been defined elsewhere in legislation.

The Court observed that the term “wages,” as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, signifies “all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money which, if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, would be payable to a workman in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment.” A similar definition appears in the Minimum Wages Act of 1948. Consequently, “wages” encompass every payment made to a workman from time to time during the course of his employment, and not merely the initial sum of money paid at the commencement of the employment relationship. The Court further noted that the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word, as given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, is “amount paid periodically, especially by the day or week or month, for time during which a workman or servant is at the employer’s disposal.” The presence of the word “rate” in the phrase “rates of wages” does not restrict the scope of the expression. “Rate,” according to the same Concise Oxford Dictionary, denotes “a statement of numerical proportion prevailing or to prevail between two sets of things, either or both of which may be unspecified, mentioned in one case for application to all similar ones, a standard or way of reckoning (measure of) value, etc.” Chambers’ Twentieth-Century Dictionary adds that “rate” can mean an estimated amount or value, and also “amount determined according to a rule or basis; a standard; a class or rank; manner or mode.” On this basis, the Court held that “rates of wages” refer to the manner, mode, or standard by which remuneration is paid for work performed, whether at the start of employment or at any subsequent stage. Accordingly, “rates of wages” include the scales of wages, and there is no logical opposition between the two expressions; the phrase applies both to initial wages and to later amounts. While it is true that certain industrial tribunal decisions have specifically mentioned the fixing of scales of pay—for example, in an industrial dispute involving certain banking companies—such references do not exclude “scales of wages” from falling within the broader meaning of “rates of wages.” The larger expression is capable of embracing scales of wages as part of its ambit. Moreover, even in the absence of an express reference to scales, a tribunal may still fix the scales while conducting an inquiry into the fixation of rates of wages. The Court also cited authority that industrial tribunals have consistently held that any increments in wages or scales of remuneration must be fixed only after giving due regard to the capacity of the industry to pay. In the case of Britannia Building & Iron Co. Ltd., the Court noted that as time-scales increase, the wage bill rises year after year and is reflected in the cost of production; therefore, such scales should not be imposed on the employer unless it is shown that the employer presently possesses the capacity to pay and that its financial stability can be relied upon in the future.

It was held that a wage increment could be ordered only when it could be shown that the employer presently possessed the ability to pay the increased wages and that this financial capacity could be relied upon in future periods. In other words, both the present financial ability of the employer and the stability of that ability were considered essential conditions for fixing higher wages. Similar observations were expressed in the judgment of the Union Drug Co. Ltd., where the Court noted that before any incremental wage scales could be imposed by adjudication, it was necessary to determine whether the employer would be able to shoulder the additional burden. The Court emphasized that the company’s financial condition must be such as to lead to the conclusion that it could meet the incremental payments year after year for a considerable number of years, especially when the wage scales that were being settled were intended to operate as long-term schemes. The cited authorities for this principle included the decisions reported at (1954) 1 L.L.J. 651, 654 and (1954) 1 L.L.J. 766, 767.

This requirement of assessing the employer’s capacity to pay, however, did not undermine the earlier construction that the expression “rates of wages” subsumed “scales of wages” within its ambit. Consequently, the fixation of rates of wages was understood to include the fixation of wage scales as well. The Court pointed out that statutory minimum-wage provisions in several Australian jurisdictions—namely Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania—prescribe wage scales that vary according to the worker’s age and experience, illustrating that scales are an integral part of wage determinations. Recognising that the capacity of an industry to pay is a fundamental ingredient in setting wages, the Court examined the various ways in which such capacity might be measured. It identified three possible conceptions of the industry’s capacity to pay: (i) the capacity of a specific unit, whether marginal, representative or average, (ii) the capacity of an entire industry taken as a whole, and (iii) the capacity of all industries across the nation. The Court noted that different countries adopt differing approaches. In New Zealand and Australia, the capacity to pay is calculated with reference to all industries in the country, without granting special concessions to depressed sectors. An Australian Arbitration Court had observed that, owing to the lack of a clear method for measuring the general wage-paying capacity of the total industry, the actual wage that well-situated labourers were maintaining for an average family could be taken as a reasonable benchmark for what the industry could likely pay to all workers. The Court regarded this as a secondary definition, useful only for comparing the ability of certain industries or units to match the payments of others. Finally, the Bombay Textile Labour Inquiry Committee concluded that a precise definition of “capacity to pay” was elusive. The Committee observed that the capacity to pay a wage could not be determined merely by the value of production; it was necessary first to identify the various charges that must be deducted before arriving at the amount available for wages. The determination of

The Committee observed that each of a large number of charges involved significant substantial theoretical and practical difficulties. Interest charges, remuneration to salaried staff and managing agents, sales commissions, and profits could not be predetermined in a fixed manner for any large organised industry. It could not be expected that labour representatives would accept the current levels of expenditure on these items without challenge, especially when the industry's management quality was in question. Nevertheless, the Committee held that capacity should not be measured on the basis of an individual establishment alone. It stated that the principal criterion ought to be the profit-making capacity of the industry throughout the entire province. The Committee warned that taking the capacity of a single unit or of all industries nationwide would be erroneous. Accordingly, the relevant standard should be the capacity of the particular industry within a specified region at the time of assessment. Where practicable, the same wages ought to be prescribed for all units of that industry situated in that region. The wage-fixing board could not feasibly measure the capacity of each individual unit, so it was directed to select a fair cross-section of the industry.(1) Consequently, the Committee concluded that the industry’s capacity to pay should be gauged on an industry-and-region basis after taking such a representative sample.(1) In particular cases, the Committee allowed that the industry might be divided into appropriate classes, and the capacity to pay could then be examined classwise.

The Committee identified two opposing views on how the capacity of an industry to pay should be measured. The first view required that the wage-fixing machinery consider a fair return on capital, adequate remuneration to management, and a reasonable allocation to reserves and depreciation to keep the industry healthy. The second view insisted that a fair wage must be paid at any cost, provided that the payment did not encroach upon capital. The Committee emphasized that the objective was not merely to determine abstractly fair wages, but to ensure that existing employment levels were maintained or, if possible, increased. From this perspective, the wage level should enable the industry to sustain production efficiently under prevailing market conditions. Accordingly, the capacity of an industry to pay should be assessed with this essential consideration in mind as a guiding principle. The wages board was also charged with ensuring that the fair wages fixed for any particular industry were not substantially out of line with wages in other industries within the same region. In addition, the board should periodically review wage determinations to reflect changes in industrial profitability and regional social and economic conditions, thereby maintaining equitable wage standards across sectors. Such ongoing assessment would support the maintenance of stable industrial relations by ensuring that wage adjustments remain consistent with the evolving capacity of each industry.

The Court observed that wide disparities in wage rates would inevitably cause labour to move and would provoke industrial unrest not only in the industry directly affected but also in other industries. It emphasized that the principal consideration to be kept in mind was that an industry must be capable of maintaining production efficiently, and that the fixation of wage rates should be such that workers would not be induced to shift from one industry to another because of large differences, while existing employment should at least be preserved and, where possible, expanded. Various tests had been suggested for measuring an industry's capacity to pay, namely: (1) the selling price of the product; (2) the volume of output; (3) the profit and loss statements of the business; (4) the rates that had been accepted by a large majority of employers; and (5) the degree of unemployment that might be created or increased by imposing a higher wage, as noted in the Report of the Committee on Fair Wages, p. 14, para. 24. The Court found these indicators to be unsatisfactory on their own. It then referred to the definition offered in the work titled “Wage-, & the State” by E. M. Burns, page 387, which stated that a proper inquiry must include, inter alia, the elasticity of demand for the product, because this determines how much of the increased wage burden employers can shift onto consumers. The inquiry must also examine how far the compulsory payment of a higher wage would cause employers to tighten organisational arrangements so that they could meet the higher cost without difficulty. The Court further noted that higher wages often raise the efficiency of the lowest-paid workers, and that the resulting increase in output must be considered together with the product’s demand elasticity before judging a trade’s ability to pay. Moreover, unless it is held that the trade’s capacity to bear a higher wage necessarily implies that the existing rate of profit must not be reduced, there is no reason why efforts should not be made to determine how far employers can be required to bear the wage increase without being driven out of business. Such an assessment would require investigation of the elasticity of capital supply and organisational capacity in the particular trade, as well as comparison with profit rates in other industries, the ease with which capital transfers could occur, the possibility of extending similar wage regulation to other trades, and the likelihood of capital and organisational talent moving abroad. From this discussion the Court extracted the principle that, except in cases of bare subsistence or statutory minimum wage where the employer is obligated to pay the prescribed rate, the capacity of an industry to pay must be regarded as an essential circumstance when fixing wage rates and wage-scale structures.

The Court explained that three fundamental principles must guide the determination of wage rates. First, the capacity of an industry to pay should be examined without regard to the special cases of bare subsistence or minimum-wage provisions, meaning that even where a minimal wage is mandated the employer must still meet that obligation. Second, the assessment of an industry’s capacity to pay must be carried out on a combined industry-and-region basis after selecting a representative cross-section of firms within that industry. Third, the appropriate measure for evaluating the industry’s ability to afford higher wages must incorporate several factors: the elasticity of demand for the product, the possibility of reorganising the industry so that it can sustain higher wage costs without difficulty, and the potential for increasing the efficiency of the lowest-paid workers, which would raise output when considered together with product-demand elasticity. All of these considerations must be balanced against the overarching requirement that the added wage burden must not be so great as to drive the employer out of business.

The Court then turned to the question of what institutional machinery should be employed to fix wages. It observed that wage fixation may be referred to industrial tribunals or similar bodies established under labour-relations legislation. However, such tribunals are primarily designed to prevent and resolve industrial disputes that have already arisen or are anticipated, with wage disputes being only one category of such conflicts. Ensuring an adequate wage, the Court noted, is a distinct objective that calls for a dedicated wage-fixing board, whether a trade board or a general board. The Court remarked that legislative enactments rarely prescribe wage rates directly, although a few statutes do so. Moreover, the Court considered the traditional method of wage regulation through direct legislative fixation to be largely obsolete because of its inflexible nature.

Finally, the Court described the constitutional classification of wage-fixing boards. It said that boards fall naturally into two principal groups. The first group consists of boards that are not limited to a single trade but represent all trades, workers in general, and employers in general. Examples cited included the Industrial Welfare Commission of Texas, which comprises the Commissioner of Labour, a representative of employers on the Industrial Accidents Board, and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction; the Minimum Wage Board of Manitoba, composed of two employer representatives, two worker representatives (one of each required to be a woman), and one impartial member; and the South Australian Board of Industry, which includes a President and four Commissioners, two nominated by the South Australian Employers’ Federation and two by the United Trades and Labour Council of the State. The second group consists of boards representing a single trade, a segment of a trade, or a collection of allied trades. These boards are intended to be staffed by specialists, containing an equal number of employer and worker representatives, an impartial chairman, and, in some instances, members of the public.

In the discussion of wage-regulating bodies the judgment listed several examples, including the British Trade Boards, the South Australian, Victorian and Tasmanian Wages Boards, and the advisory or wages boards established by many of the central commissioners in the United States and Canada. (1) The Court then provided a concise overview of how wages boards operate in the United Kingdom. It explained that, in the United Kingdom, where separate trade boards rather than general boards have been created, the Minister of Labour may appoint a board when it is determined that no satisfactory mechanism exists in a particular trade or industry to regulate wages effectively and that such a mechanism is therefore required. The trade board is described as a relatively large entity composed of an equal number of employer representatives and worker representatives together with a few independent members, including the chairman. Although the Minister makes the appointments, the employer and worker representatives are selected on the recommendation of the relevant associations. (1) The board is required to publish a notice stating its tentative proposals for fixing or revising a wage rate and to invite objections or comments. After a period of two months it issues a final decision and forwards a report to the Minister, who must confirm the rate unless, for special reasons, he returns the recommendations to the board for further consideration. (1) The judgment next referred to the Wage-Council Act, 1945 (8 & 9 Geo. VI, ch. 17), which provides for the creation of Wage Councils. Under this Act the Minister of Labour and National Service may make a wages-council order after examining any objections to a draft order raised by persons who appear to be affected. The Wage Council may conduct investigations as it deems appropriate, publish notices of its wage-regulation proposals, and allow affected parties to submit written representations, which the Council will consider. The Council may also make further inquiries it finds necessary and then submit its proposals to the Minister, either unchanged or amended as it sees fit. The Minister reviews these proposals and issues an order giving effect to them from a date specified in the order; the remuneration fixed by such orders is termed statutory minimum remuneration. Similar provisions exist under the Agricultural Wage Regulation Act, 1924 (14 & 15 Geo. V, ch. 37) concerning Agricultural Wages Committees and the Agricultural Wages Board. The Court also noted that in Canada and Syria a typical board consists of about five members, while in China board size varies from nine to fifteen members. In all these jurisdictions employers and workers enjoy equal representation. In Canada the boards are mandated to inquire into conditions of work and wages, and in some provinces they are authorized to issue orders or decrees, whereas in other provinces their powers differ. (1) The Report of

The Court observed that, according to the report of the Committee on Fair Wages, pages twenty-five to twenty-six, paragraph thirty, the recommendations of a wage board must be forwarded to the Lieutenant Governor, who then issues the appropriate orders. In the United States of America, some state statutes require that the representatives of employers and workers be elected, whereas in most states the administrative authorities are empowered to make direct appointments. The boards created under those statutes are authorised to conduct inquiries, request documents, summon witnesses and make recommendations concerning minimum wages. Certain American statutes also prescribe a time-limit for submitting proposals. Under those statutes the administrative authority may either accept a report, reject it and send it back for reconsideration, or constitute a new board to examine the matter anew. Some statutes further stipulate that if a report is rejected, the issue must be referred again either to the same wages board or to a newly constituted wages board. The Court noted that the entire procedure for wage determination in the United States has been explained in two decisions of the United States Supreme Court: Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & M. R., cited as reference (2), and Opp. Cotton Mills Inc. v. Administration, cited as reference (3). The Court also referred to the Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938, which provides that the Administrator may convene industry committees for each industry; those committees periodically recommend the minimum wage rates that should be paid by employers. The committee is required to recommend to the Administrator the highest minimum wage rates for the industry that, taking into account economic and competitive conditions, will not substantially reduce employment in that industry. After giving due notice to all interested parties and affording them an opportunity to be heard, the Administrator may then issue wage orders. The Court further mentioned that Australia, like other jurisdictions, has provisions in various states for appointing wage boards, though the details of those provisions were not elaborated. It was sufficient to refer to the wage-board system in the state of Victoria, which was established in 1896 as a mechanism for directly regulating wages and working conditions in “sweating” industries, without intending to control industrial relations per se. Under the Factories and Shops Act, 1924, wage boards were created for different industries, with a Court of Industrial Appeals designated to hear appeals from wage-board determinations. Where no specific wage board existed, the General Wages Board governed the industry; this board comprised two employer representatives nominated by the Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers, two employee representatives nominated by the Melbourne Trade Hall Council, and a chairman who was either agreed upon by those four members or appointed by the Minister for Labour. The Court noted that, in the majority of instances, such wage boards were constituted with an equal number of employer and employee representatives.

The Court noted that a wage board is required to include representatives of employees and representatives of employers together with one or more independent persons, and that one of the independent persons must be appointed as chairman. It then turned to the situation in India, summarising the development of wage-fixation mechanisms. According to the summary, the history of wage-fixation in India is comparatively recent. Until the end of the Second World War there was virtually no effective institutional framework for either settling industrial disputes or fixing wages. The first significant legislation dealing with industrial disputes was the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act of 1938, which established an Industrial Court. However, that Act applied only in limited circumstances and the Court created under it was not empowered to fix or regulate wages. During the war, the Government found it necessary to intervene in industrial disputes, and a large number of adjudicators were appointed under the Defence of India Rules to resolve trade disagreements. The Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 became the first nationwide legislation capable of settling industrial disputes across the country, and under that Act various tribunals have issued awards that regulate wages in several important sectors.

The Court pointed out that the first statute expressly intended to regulate wages throughout India was the Minimum Wages Act of 1948. That Act, as explained in the cited commentary, applies only to so-called “sweated” industries where labour is largely unorganised and working conditions are considerably poorer than in organised sectors. Under the Minimum Wages Act the appropriate Government may either constitute a Committee to conduct enquiries and advise on the fixation of minimum wage rates, or, if the Government believes it already possesses sufficient material, publish proposed wage rates in the official gazette and invite objections from the public. After considering the Committee’s recommendations or any public objections, the Government fixes the minimum rates of wages. The Act contains no provision for an appeal against the fixation. It provides for an advisory board in each province to coordinate the work of the various committees, and a Central Advisory Board to coordinate the activities of the provincial boards. Complaints concerning non-payment of the minimum rates fixed by the Government may be presented to the designated claims authorities, and violations of the Act are punishable by criminal courts.

The Court further observed that the composition of the committees, sub-committees, advisory boards and the Central Advisory Board is prescribed by law. All members are to be nominated by the Central Government and must represent both employers and employees in the scheduled employments in equal numbers. Independent persons may constitute no more than one-third of the total membership, and one of those independent members must be appointed as chairman by the appropriate Government. Finally, the Court referred to a recent amendment to the Bombay Industrial Relations Act of 1946, which permits the establishment of wage boards in the Province of Bombay either for each individual industry or for groups of industries. Each wage board must consist of an equal number of employer and employee representatives together with a number of independent persons, including a chairman, all of whom are nominated by the Government. The wage board is empowered to decide disputes relating to

The Court noted that wages boards were empowered to deal with issues such as reduction in the number of persons employed, rationalisation or other efficiency measures, systems of work, wages and the period and mode of payment, as well as hours of work and leave with or without pay. It was observed that once a matter was referred to a wages board, no proceedings could be commenced or continued before a conciliator, a conciliation board, a labour court or an industrial court. The wages boards were authorised to form committees for local areas for the purpose of making enquiries. The Court explained that it was obligatory on the Government to declare the decisions of the wages boards binding, but that where the Government felt it would be inexpedient on public grounds to give effect to the whole or any part of a decision, the matter had to be placed before the Provincial Legislature, whose decision would then be binding. The Court also pointed out that there was a provision for filing appeals from the decisions of the wages boards to the Industrial Court. These wage boards were, moreover, placed under the superintendence of the Industrial Court. The Court referred to Recommendation 30, the recommendation concerning the application of minimum-wage-fixing machinery made by the International Labour Office in 1949, and quoted the report of the Committee on Fair Wages (pp. 26-27, paras 51-52). The recommendation stated that the minimum-wage-fixing machinery, whatever form it might take – for example a trade board for individual trades or a tribunal – should operate by investigating the relevant conditions in the trade or part of trade concerned and by consulting the interests primarily and principally affected, namely the employers and the workers in that trade, whose views on all matters relating to fixing the minimum rate of wages should be solicited and given full and equal consideration. The Court further explained that, to secure greater authority for the rates that might be fixed, the general policy should be that employers and workers, through representatives equal in number or having equal voting strength, should jointly take a direct part in the deliberations and decisions of the wage-fixing body; wherever representation was accorded to one side, the other side should be represented on the same footing. The wage-fixing body should also include one or more independent persons whose votes could ensure effective decisions in the event that the votes of the employers’ and workers’ representatives were equally divided. Such independent persons should, as far as possible, be selected in agreement with or after consultation with the employers’ and workers’ representatives on the wage-fixing body. Finally, the Court stressed that, in order to ensure that the representatives of employers and workers enjoyed the confidence of those whose interests they represented, the employers and workers concerned should be given a voice, as far as practicable, in the selection of their representatives, and that any existing organisations of employers and workers should, in any case, be invited to submit names of persons recommended by them for appointment to the wage-fixing body.

The Court observed that where organisations representing employers and workers are present, those organisations must be invited to propose the names of individuals they recommend for appointment to the wage-fixing body. It further held that the independent person or persons referred to in paragraph (a) must be chosen from among men or women who are recognised as having the qualifications required for the duties of the body and who are free from any interest in the trade or part of the trade that could call their impartiality into question.

The Court then examined the assessment made by the Committee on Fair Wages regarding the system of establishing trade boards. It quoted the Committee’s observation that a trade board benefits from the expert knowledge of the particular trade for which it is created, and therefore it is well placed to devise a wage scheme that matches the conditions prevailing in that trade. However, the Court noted that the system suffers from the drawback that there is no single authority to coordinate the activities of the various boards, which can lead to wide disparities between the wage scales approved for similar industries. By contrast, a general board provides coordination but lacks the specialised competence of a trade board to understand the special problems of each trade. The Court also cited the report of the Bombay Textile Labour Inquiry Committee, which concluded that the trade-board system is best suited to Indian conditions because trade boards normally reach wage determinations through discussion and conciliation, and only in exceptional cases must the chairman’s vote or the vote of the independent members be decisive.

From this discussion, the Court inferred that a wage board formed for a particular trade or industry, composed of an equal number of employer and employee representatives and including one or more independent members, with one of the independent members serving as chairman, is the most appropriate mechanism for fixing proper wages in that industry. The Court stressed that when such a wage board is appointed, the appointing authority must also lay down the principles that will guide the board in fixing wages. To illustrate the kind of principles that may be appropriate, the Court referred to a passage from “Minimum Wage – An International Survey – I.L.O. Geneva, 1939,” which summarises the position in various countries. The passage explains that the fundamental principle of the Australian system, at both the Commonwealth and State levels, is the concept of a living wage. Even when legislation does not explicitly mention this principle, it remains highly influential in practice. The living-wage principle, however, is described as a broad and general guideline that gives wage-fixing tribunals considerable discretion in determining the basic or living wage, and the Court noted that under Commonwealth law the tribunal is entirely free to decide the principles on which the living wage is to be assessed, while certain State laws provide more specific, though limited, directions.

The judgment explained that while State legislation generally provided only limited and specific instructions, certain jurisdictions gave more detailed guidance. In Queensland, for example, the statute defined the family unit whose needs were to be considered when calculating the basic wage. In some instances, the general focus on the workers’ needs was supplemented by instructions to set wage rates that were described as “fair and reasonable.” Those instructions required the authorities to consider the average standard of comfort enjoyed by workers in the same locality or in comparable occupations, as noted in the Report of the Committee on Fair Wages, page 27, paragraph 53. The Court observed that such references implicitly referred to broader economic conditions and to the ability of industry to make payments, because the prevailing standards of comfort were closely linked to those factors. Moreover, the Court pointed out that, at least in one Queensland case, the tribunal was expressly directed to assess the likely impact of its decisions on industry and on the community at large.

Turning to the United States, the Court cited the Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938, which set out principles to guide industry committees convened by the Administrator under the Act. The Act required the committee to recommend to the Administrator the highest minimum wage rates for an industry that, after taking due account of economic and competitive conditions, would not substantially reduce employment in that industry. The Act further stipulated that, when deciding whether to create classifications and when fixing minimum-wage rates for those classifications, no classification or wage rate could be fixed solely on a regional basis. Instead, the industry committee and the Administrator were to consider, among other relevant factors, (1) competitive conditions affected by transportation, living, and production costs; (2) wages established for work of similar character by collective labour agreements negotiated between employers and employees through their own representatives; and (3) wages paid for comparable work by employers who voluntarily maintained minimum-wage standards in the industry. The Act expressly prohibited making any classification on the basis of age or sex.

The Court noted that, notwithstanding these detailed provisions, the usual practice was to grant a wide discretion to the tribunals that fixed wages. Because such tribunals were composed of equal numbers of employer and employee representatives, they were considered best placed to understand the whole situation and to reach appropriate conclusions. Regarding procedure, the Court observed that the process to be followed by wage boards was described as “fluid.” It explained that wage councils and central coordinating committees appointed under the Wages Council Act of 1945, as well as agricultural wages committees and agricultural boards created under the Agricultural Wages Regulation Act of 1924 in the United Kingdom, were each subject to any regulations that the Minister might issue concerning meetings, quorum, and other procedural matters. Nonetheless, each of these bodies retained the authority to regulate its own procedure as it deemed appropriate.

The Court observed that wage boards in Australia may be convened informally by the chairman whenever either party requests a meeting, and that no specific legal formalities or procedural rules are required to be followed. Such meetings are normally held in the offices of the Department of Labour, with an officer of that department acting as secretary. Once constituted, these Australian wage boards are authorised to regulate their own procedures in any manner they consider appropriate, and there is no obligation to enact any separate regulation governing the conduct of inquiries before them. Nevertheless, the Court noted that a number of safeguards have been incorporated to protect the interests of the parties involved. In the United Kingdom, wage councils are created by the Minister of Labour and National Services after the minister has considered objections raised by persons who appear likely to be affected. The councils then draft wage-regulation orders after reviewing written representations on their proposals, and these proposals are published in the prescribed manner. The minister subsequently examines the councils’ recommendations and, only when satisfied, promulgates the wage-regulation orders. The minister also retains the power, in appropriate cases, to return the proposals to the wage councils for reconsideration. When the councils resubmit their proposals, the same procedural steps are followed as with the original submissions. The Court cited Kenneth F. Walker’s work, “Industrial Relations in Australia,” page 24, in support of these observations.

The Court further explained that in the United States, reports prepared by industry committees convened by the administrator are subject to the administrator’s scrutiny. The administrator must give notice to all interested persons and provide them an opportunity to be heard about the contents of the reports. Only after this hearing does the administrator either approve the recommendations and put them into effect, or, if dissatisfied, refer the matter back to the committees for further consideration and new recommendations. The administrator’s orders are reviewable by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals and may be further revised by the United States Supreme Court upon the granting of certiorari or certification. Regarding special boards in certain states of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Court noted that appeals against their determinations lie to the Court of Industrial Appeals and may also be challenged before the High Court. The Court pointed out that similar safeguards exist under India’s Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Under that Act, the work of committees, sub-committees and advisory committees is coordinated by advisory boards, whose work is further coordinated by a central advisory board. This central advisory board advises the Central Government on fixing minimum rates of wages and other matters under the Act, and the Government takes action only after receiving such advice.

The Court observed that after the Central Advisory Board makes a recommendation, the appropriate Government must act on that recommendation in order to fix or revise the minimum rates of wages. In the event that the Government chooses to fix the minimum rates of wages without referring to the various committees or sub-committees, it is required to publish its proposals by means of a notification in the Official Gazette so that persons who are likely to be affected are informed. The Government may then fix the minimum rates of wages only after it has considered any representations that are submitted by interested parties. The wage boards that are created under the amended Bombay Industrial-Relations Act, 1946, are placed under the appellate jurisdiction as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the industrial courts of the State, and any party whose rights are affected by the decisions of those wage boards is entitled to file an appeal before the industrial courts. Because such safeguards are built into the system, the Court held that the particular procedure adopted by the wage boards during the pendency of their proceedings is immaterial, provided that the safeguards remain in place. Nevertheless, the wage boards are normally expected to follow all necessary procedures to gather sufficient data and collect adequate material so that they can reach a proper conclusion on the matters that are referred to them. If at any time they were to disregard the regulations that prescribe the procedure to be followed, or if, in the absence of such regulations, they adopted a procedure that contravened the principles of natural justice, then their decision would be vitiated and could be set aside by the appropriate authority. The Court noted that there is considerable divergence of opinion concerning the character of the functions performed by these wage boards, and a controversy has arisen as to whether their functions are administrative, judicial, quasi-judicial, or legislative in nature. This question assumes importance on two grounds: first, whether the decisions of the wage boards are open to judicial review, and second, whether the principle of audi alteram partem – that no man shall be condemned unheard – applies to the proceedings before the wage boards. The Court explained that if the functions performed by the boards were deemed to be administrative or legislative, then they would not be subject to judicial review; they would not be amenable to writs of certiorari or prohibition under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, nor would they fall within the special leave jurisdiction under Article 136. Their decisions would also not be vulnerable on the ground that the principle of audi alteram partem was not observed, nor that the procedure adopted was contrary to natural justice. The Court reiterated that it is well settled that writs of certiorari and prohibition will lie only in respect of judicial or quasi-judicial acts, quoting the principle that “the orders of certiorari and prohibition will lie to bodies and persons other than courts stricto sensu. Any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions” is therefore subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the High Court exercised by means of these orders.

The Court observed that any body which affects the rights of individuals and is required to act in a judicial manner falls within the controlling jurisdiction of the High Court. Such jurisdiction is exercised through the issuance of writs of certiorari and prohibition. The principle of audi alteram partem, which requires that a person be heard before a decision affecting his rights is made, applies only to proceedings that are judicial or quasi-judicial in nature. In this regard, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in Patterson v. District Commissioner of Accra, noted that counsel had argued that the provisions of section 9 amounted to a “mass punishment” of the inhabitants of the proclaimed district and relied on a well-known passage from the judgment in Bonaker v. Evans. That passage declares that no person may lose liberty or property as a result of a judicial proceeding unless he has been given a fair opportunity to answer the charge, unless the legislature has expressly or impliedly authorized a proceeding without that prerequisite. The Committee cited numerous authorities and concluded with reference to Capel v. Child, where Bayley B. observed that he was unaware of any case in which a judicial proceeding deprived a person of any part of his property without first providing an opportunity to be heard. The Lordships further indicated that, in their view, the section under consideration does not contemplate a judicial proceeding, and therefore a decision against the appellant does not violate the principles articulated in Bonaker v. Evans. The Court also referred to Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd edition, vol. 11, paragraph 114) for support. Moreover, the distinction between legislative and judicial functions was illustrated from Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (8th edition, vol. 1, chapter V, p. 185). Cooley explained that the inquiries, deliberations, orders and decrees characteristic of the legislative department are inherently judicial acts, and that a body cannot perform both legislative and judicial roles simultaneously because a clear difference exists between the employment of judicial and legislative tribunals. Judges determine the legality of claims and conduct, applying existing law to the facts, whereas legislators create the rules upon which such judicial decisions are based. In sum, the application of law is the province of judges, while the making of law is the province of legislators; the former compares parties’ claims with established law, while the latter enacts new rules to regulate future controversies.

The Court explained that a rule of law cannot consistently apply to actions that occurred before the rule was promulgated, because such retroactive operation would contradict the definition of law as “a rule of civil conduct.” It further noted that judicial power is concerned with adjudicating private disputes between individuals, whereas legislative power is responsible for regulating public matters and enacting statutes for the benefit and welfare of the State. The Court added that private statutes, when valid, are enacted either on petition or with the consent of all affected parties, and that such statutes must refrain from interfering with past transactions and vested rights. In support of this observation, the Court quoted a classic passage from Justice Holmes in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. Ltd.: “A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule, to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power. The establishment of a rate is the making of a rule for the future, and therefore, is an act legislative not judicial in kind.” The Court emphasized that the determination of whether a proceeding is legislative or judicial depends not on the character of the body that conducts it, but on the nature of the proceedings themselves; the character of the final act defines the character of the preceding inquiry. The Court also referred to the decisions in Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. and Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Green Garrett for further guidance. Recognizing a practical difficulty, the Court observed that functions performed by administrative agencies cannot be neatly divided into separate legislative or judicial compartments. Citing the treatises of Stason and Cooper on administrative tribunals, the Court explained that a single function of an administrative agency often possesses three aspects: legislative, judicial, and administrative. For illustration, the Court discussed rate-making, which has at times been described as legislative and at other times as judicial. In some instances, the activity merely involves executive or administrative powers. For example, when the Interstate Commerce Commission sets a tariff for a railroad, that function is viewed as legislative. Conversely, when the issue is whether a mixed shipment of coffee and chicory should be charged the coffee rate or the lower chicory rate, the determination resembles a judicial function. Finally, when the problem is simply the calculation of total freight charges for a specific shipment, the act can be fairly described as administrative. This nuanced difficulty underscores the need to assess each function on its own merits rather than imposing rigid classifications.

The Court explained that the difficulty of classifying a particular function of an administrative agency can be resolved by examining, in each case, whether the agency mainly performs a legislative, judicial, or administrative function and then characterising the function accordingly. The Court referred to earlier decisions such as Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Electric Light & Power Co. and People ex rel. Central Park, North as well as East River R. Co. v. Willcox to illustrate this approach. The Court then discussed how the wage board in the United Kingdom had been described by several textbook authors as having a legislative character. In Robson’s Justice and Administrative Law, third edition, a footnote at page 608 states that a Wage Council is “not an administrative tribunal but a subordinate legislative authority.” Griffith’s Principles of Administrative Law, at page 39, observes that subordinate legislation concerning Wages Councils occupies a large portion of the subject and explains that the Wages Councils Act 1945 empowered the Minister of Labour and National Service to establish Wages Councils by order, which would then operate in various industries and trades. The passage notes that six such orders were made in 1947 and that the Councils could submit detailed “wages regulations proposals” to the Minister, who would then issue orders embodying those proposals; in 1947, fifty-five orders covered thirty-one trades. Barbare Wootton, in Social Foundations of Wage Policy; Modern Methods of Wage Determination, at page 88, compares arbitration tribunals and courts of inquiry with statutory wage councils, pointing out that wage councils consist of equal numbers of employer and worker representatives together with an independent chairman and, occasionally, additional independent members. Wootton stresses that the representative members of wage councils are drawn from within the relevant industry, unlike the members of arbitration tribunals who come from outside the industry and may rely on assessors for technical expertise. This structural difference, according to Wootton, demonstrates a clear distinction between the legislative function of wage councils, which draft regulations for their own industry, and the judicial function of arbitration courts, which render judgments on matters presented to them. The Court further noted that the High Court of the Commonwealth of Australia adopted a similar view in Australian Boot Trade Employees Federation v. Whybrow & Co., examining an award made by a wages board created under a State statute.

The Court observed that the purpose of wage boards was to fix minimum rates of wages. It explained that the test for determining whether a function was legislative or judicial could be found in the words of Issacs J., quoted at page 318. According to that passage, if a dispute concerned the relative rights of parties based on past or present circumstances, the award functioned as a judgment that could have been the decree of an ordinary judicial tribunal exercising ordinary judicial power, and the law applicable to the case had to be observed. Conversely, if a dispute concerned what the parties’ mutual rights and responsibilities would be in the future – that is, if no present rights were asserted or denied but a future rule of conduct was to be prescribed, thereby creating new rights and obligations with sanctions for non-conformity – then the determination, whether called an award, an arbitration, a determination, or a decision, was essentially of a legislative character and was limited only by the law that authorized it. The Court further noted that if there were neither present rights asserted nor a future rule of conduct prescribed, but merely a fact ascertained that was necessary for the practical effectuation of admitted rights, the proceeding, although termed an arbitration, was in reality an appraisal or a ministerial act.

The Court then turned to the contrary view that had been urged. It recorded that the decisions of the Wage Councils in Great Britain, made in the form of wage-regulation proposals submitted to the Minister under the Wage Councils Act, derived their legal force only from the orders made by the Minister that gave effect to those proposals; without such ministerial orders, the determinations would remain merely the decisions of the Wage Councils and would not acquire any legislative character. In the Commonwealth of Australia, the Court highlighted that under the Factories and Shops Act, 1905, of Victoria, every determination of any Special Board, unless and until it was quashed, had the same force, validity and effect as if such determination had been enacted in that Act, thereby investing the boards’ determinations with legislative characteristics. The Court also referred to the Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938 in the United States, where wage orders ultimately approved by the Administrator were subject to judicial review by the Circuit Courts of Appeals, the United States Courts of Appeals of the particular district, and, on certification, further review by the Supreme Court of the United States. Finally, the Court noted that the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, in India provided for committees, sub-committees, advisory sub-committees, advisory boards and a central advisory board for fixing minimum rates of wages, and that the recommendations of these bodies were forwarded to the appropriate Government, which, by notification in the official Gazette, approved the recommendations and gave them legal sanction.

The Court explained that the official Gazette authorises the fixation of minimum rates of wages for each scheduled employment. The notification issued in the Gazette signifies the approval of the appropriate Government of the recommendations made by the various committees, and it confers a legal sanction on those recommendations. The Court noted that the recent amendment to the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 empowers the State Government, by means of a Gazette notification, to constitute one or more wage boards for any industry within the State. The amendment further directs these wage boards to follow the same procedures as the Industrial Court with respect to arbitration proceedings before them, and it provides that appeals from the decisions of the wage boards lie to the Industrial Courts, which possess supervisory and control powers over the wage boards. Consequently, the Court held that, on the facts, it could not be urged that the wage boards perform any legislative functions.

The Court observed that two opposite points of view had been presented before it. One view contended that the functions performed by wage boards were necessarily legislative, while the opposite view denied such a character. The Court found it impossible to declare categorically that the functions of the wage boards were always legislative. It accepted as true that the determinations of the wage boards bind both employers and employees presently, and, once accepted by the appropriate Government or authority and notified in accordance with law, those determinations also bind future employers and employees in the industry. The Court added that if this were the sole consideration, the dictum of Justice Holmes cited earlier would render the wage boards’ functions legislative. However, the Court emphasized that the statutory provisions creating the wage boards must also be taken into account.

The Court explained that a careful scrutiny of the statutory provisions may lead to the conclusion that wage boards are appointed solely to determine the future relationship between employers and employees with regard to wages payable. In such a circumstance, there would be justification for holding that the wage boards are exercising legislative functions. Conversely, the Court observed that if, upon examination of all relevant statutory provisions establishing the wage boards, their powers and procedures appear to be assimilated to those of Industrial Tribunals, or if their adjudications are subject to judicial review by higher tribunals exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, then it cannot be said that the wage boards are performing legislative functions.

Accordingly, the Court held that whether the wage boards exercise legislative functions must be determined by the specific provisions of the statutes that incorporate them, and that no universal rule could be laid down to resolve this question in all cases. Moreover, even if, after construing the relevant statutory provisions, the Court were to conclude that a particular wage board does not perform legislative functions, the Court recognised that the remaining issue would be to ascertain whether the board’s functions are administrative, judicial, or quasi-judicial in nature. Only if the functions are judicial or quasi-judicial would the board’s decisions be open to challenge through writ jurisdiction or the special remedies mentioned earlier.

In this case, the Court noted that there was no doubt that the wage boards did not exercise purely judicial functions. The Court explained that the boards were not courts in the strict sense of the term and that the functions they performed could at most be described as quasi-judicial. Although the boards were administrative agencies created for the purpose of fixing wages, the Court held that this fact alone did not automatically give their functions an administrative character. The Court further observed that, despite being administrative bodies, the boards could still be exercising quasi-judicial functions if certain conditions were satisfied. To clarify the legal position, the Court referred to the statement found in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd edition, volume 11, pages 55-56, which reads: “The orders of certiorari and prohibition will lie to bodies and persons other than courts stricto sensu. Any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, is subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice, exercised by means of these orders. It is not necessary that it should be a court; an administrative body in ascertaining facts or law may be under a duty to act judicially notwithstanding that its proceedings have none of the formalities of, and are not in accordance with the practice of, a court of law. It is enough if it is exercising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition. A body may be under a duty, however, to act judicially (and subject to control by means of these orders) although there is no form of lis inter partes before it; it is enough that it should have to determine a question solely on the facts of the particular case, solely on the evidence before it, apart from questions of policy or any other extraneous considerations.” The Court added that an administrative body whose decision is influenced, wholly or partly, by policy questions may also be under a duty to act judicially while reaching its decision. Accordingly, the Court explained that if, in order to arrive at a decision, the body had to consider proposals, objections, and evidence, and at some stage there existed a dispute of fact before it, then at that stage the body would be under a duty to act judicially. Conversely, the Court stated that if an administrative body reached its decision without ever facing a factual dispute and considered the matter solely from the standpoint of policy and expediency, it could not be said to be under any duty to act judicially. The Court referred to the decision in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, to illustrate this point and concluded that, in order to determine whether an administrative body is exercising a quasi-judicial function, it must first be examined whether the body decides on evidence between a proposal and an opposition, and secondly whether it is under a duty to act judicially in arriving at its decision.

The Court observed that the initial step in the analysis must be to determine whether the body is required to resolve factual evidence that lies between a proposal and an opposition. After that, the Court stressed that it must be examined whether the body is bound by a duty to act judicially while arriving at its decision. The Court explained that such a duty to act judicially may arise in a wide variety of situations and that it is impossible, and indeed unwise, to attempt an exhaustive definition of all possible circumstances. Consequently, the question of whether a duty to act judicially exists must be decided in each case by looking at the specific facts of that case, by interpreting the particular statute that governs the body, and by applying the general principles that have already been set out. The Court referred to the authority cited in paragraph 115 of the earlier decision and noted the relevant citation as [1958] S.C.R. 1240.

In discussing when an administrative body can be said to have a duty to act judicially, the Court quoted the decision in R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee ex parte R. A. Brand and Co. Ltd. The quoted passage explained that the duty to act judicially “may arise in widely different circumstances which it would be impossible, and indeed inadvisable, to attempt to define exhaustively.” The Court clarified that where the decision is that of a court, the duty is clear unless the court is performing a purely ministerial function, such as granting excise licences. Conversely, when the decision is made by an administrative body and is driven in whole or in part by policy considerations, the duty to act judicially may arise during the process of reaching that decision. The Court further explained that if, in order to reach its decision, the body must consider proposals, objections, and evidence, then a duty to act judicially attaches to that inquiry. This principle, the Court noted, forms the foundation of the decision in Errington v. Minister of Health, cited as [1935] 1 K.B. 249. The Court also referenced Rex v. The London Country Council ex parte Entertainments Protection Association Ltd. (see [1931] 2 K.B. 215, 233-4) and observed that an administrative body, even when it is ascertaining facts or law without the formalities of a court, may still be under a duty to act judicially, as held in Board of Education v. Rice ([1910] A.C. 179, 182). More recently, the Court has repeatedly held that a writ of certiorari lies to set aside the decisions of rent-control tribunals, even though such tribunals are entitled to act on their own knowledge and information, may proceed without evidence unless it is submitted, and need not hold a hearing unless a party gives notice, as indicated in Rex v. Brighton and Area Rent Tribunal (see [1952] 2 Q.B. 413, 428-30). The Court concluded that, if an administrative body reaches its decision without ever having a lis before it and considers the matter solely from a policy and expediency perspective, no duty to act judicially can be said to exist at any stage.

From the standpoint of policy and expediency, the Court observed that it could not be said that an administrative body is under a duty to act judicially at any stage, and it referred to the authority in Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning for support. Counsel for the petitioners strongly argued that when the wage boards carry out the function of fixing wage rates, the situation must be viewed in light of the principles previously cited. According to the petitioners, a clear conflict exists between the employers on one side and the employees on the other. The employees press for the fixation of a specific statutory minimum wage and for wage scales to be determined in a particular way, whereas the employers contend that the existing situation should be maintained or, at the very least, that a wage level far below the statutory minimum demanded by the employees should be fixed. The employers further maintain that the wage scales should be set on a graduated basis that is considerably lower than, or otherwise different from, the scale proposed by the employees. The employees, in turn, assert that certain material factors influencing wage fixation, which affect them directly, must be treated as determinative of the wage rates, while the employers seek to downplay the importance of those factors and instead introduce other considerations that they claim should determine the rates. Consequently, each side attempts to minimise the weight of the other’s factors, creating a proposition and opposition on both sides and giving rise to a genuine lis between the parties.

The petitioners explained that the resolution of these disputed points would have to be undertaken by the wage boards, and that the boards could reach a decision only after gathering appropriate data and materials and after hearing evidence relevant to the matter. They further argued that if the wage board’s role consists of determining the issues that arise from the proposition and opposition, based on the data and material collected through questionnaires issued to all interested parties and the evidence presented before it, then the board’s proceedings necessarily import a duty to act judicially. In that circumstance, the functions performed by the wage board acquire a quasi-judicial character. The respondents, however, contended that the very constitution of the wage boards contravenes the fundamental jurisprudential principle that no person should act as a judge in his own cause. They cited the House of Lords decision in Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning, referencing page 103, where the judgment states: “My Lords, I could wish that the use of the word bias should be confined to its proper sphere. Its proper significance, in my opinion, is to denote a departure from the standard of even-handed justice which the law requires from those who occupy judicial office, or those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi-judicial office, such as an arbitrator.” The respondents argued that because the wage board includes representatives of employers and employees along with an independent chairman and other members, the board members would inevitably have a bias in favour of the parties they represent, rendering them unqualified to act as judges and calling into question the board’s character as a judicial body. The Court noted the considerable force of these contentions but indicated that it was not yet prepared to give a final opinion on the issue, pending further consideration of the matter.

The Court explained that the term “bias” should be understood in its proper context. In the Court’s view, bias signifies a departure from the even-handed justice that the law requires of those who occupy judicial positions or who are commonly regarded as holding quasi-judicial offices, such as arbitrators. The reason for this meaning, the Court observed, is that when a person is required to adjudicate a dispute between two or more parties, he must approach the adjudication with an independent mind, free of any inclination or prejudice toward either side in the controversy. The Court then turned to the argument raised on behalf of the respondents that the members of the wage board – namely the representatives of the employers, the representatives of the employees, an independent chairman and several other members – would inevitably be biased in favour of the interests they represent and therefore would be incompetent to act as judges. Consequently, the wage board so constituted could scarcely be described as a judicial body. While the Court acknowledged that these contentions possess considerable force, it declined to give a final opinion on the issue because the ultimate conclusion concerning the ultra vires nature of the wage board’s decision would later render the question academic. Nevertheless, the Court observed that regardless of whether the functions performed by wage boards are characterised as legislative or quasi-judicial, the adoption of proper safeguards – for example, provision for judicial review or procedures akin to those governing the recommendations of wage councils in the United Kingdom or the reports of advisory committees considered under the Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938 in the United States – would eliminate any objection based on a violation of natural-justice principles. Having addressed that point, the Court proceeded to examine the extent to which the impugned statute infringed the petitioners’ fundamental rights. Regarding Article 19(1)(a), which guarantees every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression, the Court noted that this right must be read together with Article 19(2), which enumerates constitutionally permissible restrictions. Article 19(2), as amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, with retrospective effect, provides that nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law that imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. The Court warned that any limitation on the exercise of the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) that does not fall within the four corners of Article 19(2) cannot be sustained.

In this matter the Court observed that Article 19 (2) could not be sustained, because the right to freedom of speech and expression necessarily embraces the freedom of the press. The Court found it appropriate to quote from the report titled “Freedom of the Press-A Framework of Principles”, which was prepared by the Commission on Freedom of Press in the United States of America. The report explained the general meaning of freedom as follows: to be free means to have the ability to use one’s powers of action without any external restraint or control, and to possess whatever means or equipment are required for that action. It further stated that the primary suggestion of the word “freedom” is a negative one, signifying the absence of external interference, whether such interference seeks to suppress or to constrain. To be free, therefore, is essentially to be free from some arbitrary impediment to action, or from any dominating power or authority. The report added that, provided the unhindered individual already possesses everything needed to act – a situation that is usually assumed – the negative meaning remains the dominant element of the concept of freedom.

Nevertheless, the report continued that because freedom is intended for action, and action is directed toward an end, a positive component of freedom also exists. This positive kernel consists in the ability to achieve the intended end, which implies that the individual must have command of the means required to accomplish that end. The report warned that, unless the necessary equipment for effective action is available, mere lack of restraint may become a mockery of freedom, and that unrestrained action without equipment does not constitute liberty for any purpose that demands such equipment (pages 54-55). From this analysis the report derived a conception of freedom of the press, summarising it as freedom both from and for. A free press, the report said, must be free from compulsions arising from any source – governmental, social, external or internal – as distinct from pressures, which cannot be eliminated except in a moribund society devoid of competing forces and beliefs. Persistent and distorting pressures, such as financial, clerical, popular or institutional pressures, may approach compulsion, thereby diminishing effective freedom; the press and its audience must therefore work together to restore that freedom.

The report further explained that a free press must be free for the expression of opinion in all its phases and for the achievement of press-service goals that reflect both the press’s own ideals and the community’s requirements, goals that existing techniques make possible. To fulfil these ends, the press must possess full command of technical resources, financial strength, reasonable access to sources of information both domestically and internationally, and the necessary facilities for delivering information to the national market. The press, the report concluded, must grow in proportion to the size of that market (page 228). The Court noted that Indian jurisprudence contains very few authorities that define the nature, scope and extent of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution. The Court pointed out that the first case in which this right was examined by this Court was Ramesh Thaper v. The State of Madras.

In this case, the Court noted that the matter involved a prohibition on the entry and circulation of the appellant’s journal in the State of Madras, imposed under section 9 (1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. The Court then referred to the observation made by Patanjali Sastri J., then a Judge of this Court, at page 597 of the reported judgment, where he stated that there can be no doubt that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas, and that this freedom is secured by freedom of circulation. He further explained that liberty of circulation is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publication, adding that without circulation a publication would be of little value. The Court cited the United States case Ex parte Jackson and also referenced Lovell v. City of Griffin to illustrate similar principles. The Court also discussed the subsequent case Brij Bhushan & Anr. v. The State of Delhi, which concerned the constitutionality of section 7 (i) (e) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, a provision that imposed pre-censorship on a journal. The majority judgment, again authored by Patanjali Sastri J., was recorded at page 608 of the reported judgment. In that judgment he observed that the imposition of pre-censorship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the press, which constitutes an essential component of the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution. He quoted Blackstone’s Commentaries, volume four, pages 151-152, stating that “the liberty of the Press consists in laying no previous restraint upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.” He emphasized that every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public, and that forbidding this would destroy the freedom of the press. The Court then observed that these two decisions are the only judgments of this Court that directly interpret Article 19 (1)(a). Both decisions establish that freedom of speech and expression includes the freedom to propagate ideas, that this freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation, and that the liberty of the press is an essential part of that constitutional right, with liberty of the press meaning the absence of prior restraint on publication. The Court noted, however, that a considerable body of authority exists in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the concept of freedom of speech and expression. It recalled that Amendment I of the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. The Court concluded that it is evident that the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression enshrined in Article 19 (1)(a) of our Constitution is based upon the provisions of Amendment I of the United States Constitution.

In this opinion the Court stated that it was legitimate and appropriate to look at decisions of the United States Supreme Court in order to understand the true nature, scope and extent of the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a), even though this Court has previously warned against reliance on American and other foreign cases, as indicated in State of Travancore-Cochin & Ors. v. Bombay Co. Ltd. (1) and State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (2). The Court then referred to the case Grosjean v. American Press Co. (3), in which a statute had imposed a licence tax on the business of publishing advertisements. At page 668 of the reported judgment, the Court observed that “the evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the Government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.” (See Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 8th Edition, Vol. 11, p. 886). The statute in Grosjean was subsequently declared unconstitutional because, when viewed in light of its historical background and its contemporary context, it was regarded as a deliberate and calculated device disguised as a tax, intended to restrict the circulation of information that the public was entitled to receive under constitutional guarantees. The Court further cited a passage from the dissenting opinion in The Associated Press v. The National Labour Relations Board (4) as illustrative. The dissent argued that “if the freedom of the press does not include the right to adopt and pursue a policy without governmental restriction, it is a misnomer to call it freedom. And we may as well deny at once the right to the press freely to adopt a policy and pursue it, as to concede that right and deny the liberty to exercise an uncensored judgment in respect of the employment and discharge of the agents through whom the policy is to be effectuated.” The same opinion, at page 965, also stressed that “due regard for the constitutional guarantee requires that the publisher or agency of the publisher of news shall be free from restraint in respect of employment in the editorial force.” The Court then mentioned Schneider v. Irvington (5), a case dealing with municipal regulations against littering of streets. In that decision, the Court, at page 164, observed: “This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as fundamental personal rights and liberties. The phrase is not an empty one and was not lightly used. It reflects the belief of the framers of the Constitution that exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free government by free press. It stresses, as …” Footnote citations follow: (1) [1952] S.C.R. II 12, 1120. (2) [1957] S.C.R. 87, 918. (3) (1935) 297 U.S. 233, 249; G.L. Ed. 660, 668. (4) (1936) 301 U.S. 103, 136; 81 L.Ed. 953, 963. (5) (1939) 308 U.S. 147; 84 L.Ed. 155, 164.

Many opinions of this Court have stressed the importance of preventing any restriction on the enjoyment of fundamental liberties. The principle of non-interference by the State with the right of free expression was highlighted in Thomas v. Collins (1) at page 448, where the Court observed: “But it cannot be the duty, because it is not the right, of the State to protect the public against false doctrine. The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, speech, and religion. In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any Government to separate the true from the false for us.” A summary of United States Supreme Court decisions on this subject is given in 93 L. Ed. at page 1151. The same source, at page 1153, contains a passage under the heading “Right in General: Freedom from Censorship and Punishment” that reads: “The freedom of speech and of press are fundamental personal rights & liberties, the exercise of which lies at the foundation of free Government by free men. The very purpose of the first Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, speech, and religion; it rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.”

The dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Beauharnais v. Illinois (2) at page 943 states that while there may be room for regulation of the methods by which privacy is invaded, no such leeway is granted to the invasion of the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Until recent years, this view had directed constitutional law. Recently, however, the Court in this case and others has placed on the legislative branch the authority to regulate “within reasonable limits” the right of free speech, a development that the dissent calls “an ominous and alarming trend.” The dissent warns that the free trade in ideas envisioned by the framers would disappear, to be replaced by a new orthodoxy that changes with the whims of the age or day, an orthodoxy that the majority proclaims essential to safety, welfare, security, morality, or health of society. Consequently, free speech in the constitutional sense would vanish, replaced by limits dictated by expediency, political opinion, prejudice, or other legislative desiderata. From these observations it is clear that in the United States of America: (a) the freedom of speech includes the freedom of the press; (b) the freedom of the press rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to public welfare; (c) such freedom forms the foundation of a free government of a free people; (d) the purpose of the guarantee is to prevent public authorities from assuming guardianship of the public mind; and (e) freedom of the press entails freedom of employment, meaning that no measure may impose pre-censorship, curtail circulation, or restrict employment choices within the editorial force without infringing the constitutionally protected freedom of speech and expression.

Speech and press were held to be fundamental personal rights of every citizen. The liberty of the press was understood to rest on the premise that the broadest possible dissemination of information, drawn from a variety of competing and antagonistic sources, was essential for the welfare of the public. This liberty formed the cornerstone of a free government administered by a free people. The purpose of guaranteeing such freedom was to prevent public authorities from assuming the role of guardian over the public mind. Moreover, freedom of the press was interpreted to include the freedom to obtain or to decline the necessary means of exercising that right, meaning that individuals could not be restricted in their employment or non-employment within the editorial workforce. This conception of freedom of speech and expression, as it exists in the United States, consequently requires that no legislation be enacted which would effectively impose prior censorship, curtail the circulation of newspapers, or limit the choice of employment or unemployment among editorial staff. Any such measure would undoubtedly infringe upon the freedom of speech and expression and, therefore, would be liable to be struck down as unconstitutional.

The press, however, was not exempt from the ordinary forms of taxation that support the Government, nor from the general laws governing industrial relations. In Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1) the Court observed, “It is not intended by anything we have said to suggest that the owners of newspapers are immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for support of the Government; but this is not an ordinary form of tax but one single in kind with a long history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the press.” The principal aim of the immunity that was invoked in that case was to preserve an untrammeled press capable of acting as a vocal source of public information. Newspapers, magazines and other journals in the country have historically illuminated public and business affairs more thoroughly than any other medium of publicity, and an informed public opinion serves as a potent restraint on misgovernment. Consequently, the suppression or abridgment of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be taken lightly. The tax that was challenged was deemed unacceptable not merely because it extracted money from the respondents, but because, given its historical background and present context, it functioned as a deliberate and calculated device—disguised as a tax—to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled under constitutional guarantees. A free press is one of the great interpreters between Government and the people; to fetter it is, in effect, to fetter the people themselves. In The Associated Press v. National Labour Relations Board (1), the Court reiterated that the freedom of the press safeguarded by the First Amendment was not compromised by the application of labour-relation statutes to an editor’s duties, underscoring the principle that reasonable regulation does not automatically constitute an invalid invasion of press freedom.

In the decision of the Labour Relations Board, the Court held that the freedom of the press protected by the First Amendment was not curtailed by applying the provisions of the National Labour Relations Act to an editor employed by the Associated Press. The editor’s role, which involved assessing the news value of items received and rewriting them for distribution to members of the association throughout the United States, required him to work without bias or prejudice. The Act, which forbids an employer from terminating an employee because of union activities, was therefore applicable without infringing press freedom. The Court further noted at page 960 that the argument that any regulation safeguarding union activities or collective bargaining rights automatically constitutes an invalid intrusion on press freedom “has no relevance to the circumstances of the instant case and is an unsound generalization.” The Court also referred to Murdock v. Pennsylvania (2), a case concerning a license fee for the sale of religious books, and quoted Justice Frankfurter’s dissent at page 1311. In that dissent, Justice Frankfurter observed that a tax on newspaper publishing is not invalid merely because it touches upon the exercise of a constitutional right. He clarified that a tax would be invalid only if it singled out newspaper publishing for special burden or imposed it in a way that encroached on the essential scope of a free press. He added that, had the Court found such vulnerability, he would have agreed, but the Court had not reached that conclusion.

The Court further examined the applicability of the Federal Fair Labour Standards Act to the press in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling (1) and Mabee v. White Planis Publishing Co. (4). In the Walling case, at page 621, the Court observed that the press was not singled out for treatment different from that given to other businesses in general. The purpose of the Act was to place newspaper publishers on the same plane as other businesses, and the exemption for small newspapers served the same objective. The Court noted that nothing in the Grosjean case (1) prohibited Congress from exempting some publishers because of their size from a tax or regulation that would otherwise be valid if applied universally. The Legislative Reference Service’s analysis of the Constitution of the United States of America, on page 792, summarized the Supreme Court’s position by recalling that the American Revolution began when the British government imposed stamp duties on colonial newspapers, alerting the Court to the potential use of taxation as a means of suppressing objectionable publications. The analysis concluded that while persons who disseminate ideas are subject to ordinary taxation like others, license or privilege taxes occupy a distinct category because the privilege of publishing is granted by the Constitution and cannot be withheld by either State or Federal governments.

The Court explained that individuals who disseminate ideas are, like all other persons, liable to ordinary taxes that are imposed on the general public. However, regarding taxes that are based on a licence or a privilege, the Court held that the situation is different because the privilege of publishing is conferred by the Constitution and therefore neither a State nor the Federal Government may withhold it. The Court further observed that the application of the Anti-Trust Laws, the National Labour Relations Act, or the Fair Labour Standards Act to newspapers does not constitute an infringement of the freedom of the press. In a similar vein, the Court noted that statutes governing the payment of wages have been determined not to curtail the freedom of speech and expression. The publication cited by the Court made a specific reference to the minimum-wage statutes, stating that the earlier doctrine which claimed that a law fixing minimum wages for women and children violated due-process by impairing the freedom of contract was finally rejected in 1937 by the decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379. The Court quoted Justice Douglas, indicating that the recent judgments make clear that the judiciary does not act as a “super-legislature” to assess the wisdom of legislation or to decide whether the policy expressed by a law offends the public welfare. The Court further referred to the authority of State legislatures to experiment with new techniques, to set their own standards of public welfare, and to regulate business-labour relations within broad limits, provided that no specific constitutional prohibition is breached and there is no conflict with valid federal law, as illustrated in Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 423 (1952). Consequently, the Court concluded that while the press cannot claim blanket immunity from general laws, it also cannot be subjected to statutes that would diminish or abridge the freedom of speech and expression, restrict circulation, impede the choice of means for exercising the right, or force the press to depend on Government assistance. Such statutes, especially those that single out the press for onerous and prohibitive burdens, would be struck down as unconstitutional and would not be saved by Article 19(2) of the Constitution.

The Court further noted that it had examined the scope of Article 19(2) in the earlier case Brij Bhushan & Anr. v. The State of Delhi, where Justice Fazl Ali, in a dissenting judgment, observed on page 619 that “It must be recognized that freedom of speech.” The Court indicated that this observation underscores the principle that any legislative enactment must fall squarely within the permissible restrictions enumerated in Article 19(2); otherwise, it would be invalidated for violating the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). The Court’s discussion thus emphasized that the press enjoys protection against legislative measures that would unduly hamper its ability to disseminate information or compel it to seek state support for survival.

In this case, the Court observed that freedom of speech and expression constitutes one of the most valuable rights guaranteed to a citizen by the Constitution and therefore must be zealously guarded by the judiciary. The Court further recognised that free political discussion is essential for the proper functioning of a democratic government, and contemporary jurists generally disapprove of censorship, although they concur that “liberty of the press” should not be confused with its “licentiousness” (1) [1950] S.C.R. 605, 608. The Constitution, however, expressly prescribes certain limitations, and the Court’s task is limited to determining whether a particular statute falls within those constitutional limits. Consequently, unless a law enacted by the Legislature squarely fits within the provisions of Article 19(2), it cannot be saved and must be struck down as unconstitutional for violating the petitioners’ fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a).

The Court noted that the only justification offered for the enactment of the impugned Act was that it imposes reasonable restrictions in the interests of a specific segment of the public, namely working journalists and other persons employed in newspaper establishments. The Court found that the Act does not fall within any of the categories enumerated in Article 19(2), namely: the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or matters relating to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. Because Article 19(2) is therefore inapplicable, the sole issue for determination was whether any provision of the impugned Act in any manner takes away or abridges the petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression.

The learned Attorney-General contended that only legislation that directly deals with the right mentioned in Article 19(1)(a) falls within the protection of that article. According to that view, if legislation does not directly address the subject matter, Article 19(1)(a) would not apply; the test, the Attorney-General argued, is the subject-matter of the legislation rather than its effect or result. To support this position, he referred to observations of Kania C.J. in A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras (1), where it was stated that a preventive detention order results in the detention of the applicant in a cell, and it was argued that the rights specified in Article 19(1) clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g) have been infringed because the detainee cannot freely exercise speech. The same argument was urged with respect to the other clauses. The Court noted that although this argument originated in a case concerning preventive detention, if it were correct it would also apply to punitive detention and to anyone sentenced to a term of imprisonment under the relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code. The Court therefore rejected the proposition that the mere subject-matter test would exempt the impugned Act from scrutiny under Article 19(1)(a).

In this case the Court examined whether punitive detention imposed under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, such as those dealing with theft, cheating, forgery or even simple assault, could be justified on the basis of the saving provisions of article 19(2) to (5). The Court held that the argument must be rejected. Even though the saving clauses permit abridgement of the rights enumerated in article 19, the Constitution does not allow punitive detention under those penal provisions to be sustained merely because article 19 contains such clauses. The Court emphasized that such a construction does not follow from the article and must be avoided. In the Court’s view, the result would be inconsistent with the constitutional scheme. The Court then explained how article 19 must be interpreted without any preconceived notions. The provision requires that the legislation under scrutiny must deal directly with one of the rights specified in the sub-clauses of article 19. If a law directly attempts to control a citizen’s freedom of speech or expression, or his right to assemble peaceably and without arms, the question arises whether that law is saved by the relevant saving clause of article 19. However, when the legislation does not directly address any of those subjects, but only operates indirectly – for example, by providing for punitive or preventive detention that consequently curtails those rights – the article does not apply. The proper test is the directness of the legislation, not the eventual effect of a valid detention on the detainee’s life. On this limited ground, the Court concluded that the contention that the rights listed in article 19(1) are infringed in such cases must fail. Any other interpretation, according to the Court, would be unreasonable. The opinion expressing this reasoning was authored by Kania C. J., while the other judges on the bench did not comment on the issue. The passage was later quoted with approval by a Bench of this Court in Ram Singh & Ors. v. State of Delhi. In that case the Full Court held that personal liberty, though broad enough to encompass the freedoms in article 19(1), is treated as a distinct fundamental right with separate provisions in articles 19, 21 and 22, each subject to its own limitations. Consequently, a law that restricts freedom of speech and expression, even if motivated by public order rather than by security of the State or its overthrow, may fall outside the reservation of article 19(2) and be void. Nevertheless, an order of preventive detention cannot be declared invalid solely because the detention aims to prevent speeches prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

The Court observed that the matter concerned a detention made under the Preventive Detention Act, where the order of detention was issued specifically to prevent the detainee from delivering speeches that were deemed prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The Court noted that, at the time the Constitution stood, the term “public order” did not appear among the categories listed in article 19(2). Consequently, any restriction on the freedom of speech and expression could not be justified on the ground of public order, because the only permissible ground for such a restriction under article 19(2) was the undermining of the security of the State or its overthrow. The Court therefore concluded that a restriction imposed for the purpose of maintaining public order would not fall within the ambit of article 19(2). The Court further explained that, had it found an infringement of the right of freedom of speech and expression, the order could not have been saved by invoking article 19(2). Nevertheless, the Court held that the immediate purpose of the impugned order was preventive detention, not the curtailment of speech, and that the limitation on speech was merely a consequential effect of the detention. On that basis, the Court upheld the validity of the order.

The Attorney-General argued that the object of the challenged Act was merely to regulate certain conditions of service for working journalists and other persons employed in newspaper establishments, and that it did not intend to take away or abridge the right of freedom of speech and expression enjoyed by the petitioners; therefore, the Act could not fall within the prohibition of article 19(1)(a) read with article 13(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners, on the other hand, contended that the Court must examine the true nature and character of the legislation and assess its substance rather than its form, that is, its effect and operation. They pointed out that, when viewed as a whole, the Act served to regulate the employment of the essential organs of newspaper publications and therefore related to the freedom of the press, bringing it within the constitutional prohibition. Reliance was placed on a passage from Minnesota Ex Rel. Olson, which stated that in constitutional questions the Court looks to substance rather than mere form and that a statute must be tested by its operation and effect. The petitioners also cited observations of Mahajan J. in Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd., emphasizing that the Court must examine the substance of legislation to determine what the legislature has truly done, and that the Court should not be overly persuaded by the mere appearance of the legislation.

In considering the constitutional limits that bind a legislature, the Court observed that a legislature may not evade those limits simply by employing an indirect method that achieves the same result as a prohibited action. Consequently, the Court emphasized that it must look beyond the formal names, shapes, and appearances of statutes to uncover their true character and nature. The impugned Act, as indicated by its long title, is an enactment intended to regulate certain conditions of service for working journalists and other persons employed in newspaper establishments. At the very beginning of the Act, the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 is made applicable to working journalists, subject to certain modifications concerning the application of section 25F of that Act. The remaining provisions of Chapter II deal with matters such as the payment of gratuity, hours of work, leave, and the fixation of wages for the working journalists. Thus, the principal objective of the impugned legislation is the regulation of service conditions for these workers. Chapter III of the Act extends the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act of 1946 and the Employees’ Provident Funds Act of 1952 to all employees of newspaper establishments that employ twenty or more persons, and this extension covers both working journalists and other employees of such establishments. The miscellaneous provisions found in Chapter IV are intended solely to implement or give effect to the main provisions of the Act, and they do not alter the overall impact or operation of the legislation. If this description accurately reflects the true nature of the Act, it becomes impossible to assert that the Act was designed to affect the freedom of speech and expression enjoyed by the petitioners, nor that such an effect was its necessary consequence. During the arguments, it was conceded that if a general law governing industrial or labour relations were to be applied uniformly to the press industry, no exception could be taken to it. Likewise, if the matter rested on the application of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 to working journalists, or on the application of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act of 1946 or the Employees’ Provident Funds Act of 1952 to them, no exemption could be permitted. However, the respondents argued that beyond the application of these general statutes, the impugned Act contains provisions dealing with the payment of gratuity, hours of work, leave, and wage fixation that are uniquely tailored to the press industry with respect to working journalists. They contended that these provisions create a distinct class of privileged workers in the press, granting them benefits and rights that are not extended to other employees, thereby singling out the press industry.

The Court observed that the provisions of the impugned Act, when applied to other employees, imposed a direct and preferential burden on the press. The Court noted that the provisions appeared to have a tendency to reduce newspaper circulation and therefore to narrow the dissemination of information, to restrict the petitioners’ freedom to select the manner in which they exercised their right, and to endanger press independence by compelling the press to seek government assistance. Nevertheless, the Court held that the purpose of the legislation was clearly to improve the conditions of workmen employed in the newspaper industry. The Court explained that it would be impracticable for the State to address all industries at once, and that, as a matter of policy, it was reasonable to deal with industries individually. In the same vein, the Court said that it was equally reasonable to identify a distinct class of employees who occupied a separate category and to confer benefits on them in the manner contemplated by the statute. This circumstance, the Court concluded, did not demonstrate any undue preference or prejudicial treatment directed at the press; the primary objective remained the amelioration of workmen’s conditions. The Court further rejected the contention that the legislation was motivated by any ulterior purpose, such as increasing the financial burden on employers or making the operation of the industry more difficult. The Court described such outcomes as incidental disadvantages that might arise in the future, but affirmed that the legislature did not intend them when it enacted the measure. The Court acknowledged that well-off employers might not feel the strain, whereas marginal employers could find the burden harder to bear and, in some conceivable cases, might be forced to close their establishments; however, the Court characterised this as an extraneous consequence beyond the legislature’s contemplation. Accordingly, the Court held that it could not be said that the possible impact of the measures—namely, the alleged curtailment of circulation, restriction of freedom to choose a medium, or erosion of press independence—vitiated the legislation, because those effects were remote, contingent upon various factors, and not direct or inevitable results of the statutory provisions.

The Court observed that a consequence of the type described by the petitioners need not be the one that the legislature contemplated when it enacted a measure intended to benefit the workmen concerned. Although the impugned Act provides for measures that are directed to the welfare of working journalists employed in newspaper establishments, those journalists constitute the vocal organs and essential agents through which the right of free speech and expression is exercised. Consequently, any legislation that seeks to improve the conditions of service of these journalists must inevitably affect the newspaper establishments themselves and thereby have ramifications for the freedom of the press. For this reason, the Court said that the impugned Act could properly be characterized as a measure that impacts the press, and if either the purpose of the Act or its immediate effect were such as to bring it within the mischief of Article 19(1)(a), the provision would be liable to be struck down. However, the Court noted that the petitioners faced a real difficulty because, notwithstanding the measures enacted for the benefit of working journalists, neither the intention nor the operation of the impugned Act was aimed at taking away or abridging the right of free speech and expression that the petitioners enjoy. The essential complaint of the petitioners concerned the appointment of a Wage Board to fix rates of wages for working journalists. They argued that, apart from creating a privileged class of workers with benefits and rights not extended to other employees of industrial establishments, the Act left the determination of wage rates to an agency endowed with arbitrary and unchanneled powers. This, they claimed, would enable the Board to impose an indeterminate burden on the wage structure of the press, to shape employer-employee relations according to its own discretion, and to maintain such burdens and relations for any duration it deemed appropriate.

While the Court said that this grievance would be more appropriately examined in the context of the alleged infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g), it added that the argument also had a remote connection to Article 19(1)(a) and therefore did not require extensive discussion at this stage. Turning to Article 19(1)(g), the Court explained that the petitioners’ fundamental right is to carry on any occupation, trade or business. This freedom is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed under Article 19(6), which provides that “nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right, conferred by the said sub-clause.” The petitioners contended that the impugned Act imposes unreasonable restrictions on the freedom to carry on business in several ways. First, it empowers the fixation of wage rates on criteria that pertain only to the determination of minimum wages. Second, it authorises the fixation of wages, gratuity and compensation without obliging the Board to consider the essential factor of the industry’s capacity to pay. Third, it allows the Board to base its determinations on considerations it deems relevant rather than on matters strictly pertinent to wage fixation. Fourth, it provides a procedure that does not compel the Board to conform to the rules under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, thereby permitting the Board to follow any arbitrary procedure that may violate the principle of audi alteram partem. The petitioners argued that these restrictions, taken together, exceed the permissible limits of legislation under Article 19(1)(g) and that the unreasonableness of the restrictions is further highlighted by Section 12 of the impugned Act, which declares the Board’s decision to be binding on all employers.

The petitioners contended that the impugned Act imposes unreasonable restrictions on the constitutional freedom to carry on a business. They argued that the Act does so in several ways. First, it authorises the determination of wage rates on criteria that are relevant only to the fixing of a minimum wage, thereby exceeding the scope of wage regulation. Second, the Act permits the fixation of wages, the grant of gratuity and compensation without requiring the Board to take into account the essential factor of the industry’s capacity to pay such amounts. Third, the Act allows the Board to consider matters that are not directly relevant to wage fixation, but rather matters that the Board itself deems appropriate for its purposes. Fourth, the Act establishes a procedure that does not oblige the Board to follow the rules laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, consequently permitting the Board to adopt an arbitrary procedure that contravenes the principle of audi alteram partem. The petitioners further maintained that these restrictions, insofar as they lead to the destruction of their business, go beyond the limits of permissible legislation under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In addition, they pointed out that Section 12 of the Act declares the Board’s decision to be binding on all employers, yet working journalists are not bound by that decision and may, if dissatisfied, seek further revision by raising industrial disputes with their employers and having those disputes adjudicated under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petitioners relied on the Court’s earlier pronouncements on the test of reasonable restriction. In Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Mahajan J. observed that “the phrase ‘reasonable restriction’ connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public. The word ‘reasonable’ implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course which reason dictates. Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in article 19(1)(g), and the social control permitted by clause (6) of article 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality.”[1] That observation was later affirmed in Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. and in Ch. Tika Ramji v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. The Court also considered the same phrase in State of Madras v. V. G. Rao, where C. J. Patanjali Sastri remarked that the Court had earlier defined the scope of judicial review under clause (5) of Article 19 in Doctor Khare’s case, emphasizing that “the phrase ‘imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right’ also occurs...”[2][3][4]

The Court observed that the judge who expressed the view—while another judge left the question open—said that both the substantive and procedural dimensions of the impugned restrictive law must be assessed through the lens of reasonableness. In other words, the Court should examine not only the duration and the breadth of the restrictions but also the particular circumstances and the method by which the restrictions were authorized. The Court emphasized that the test of reasonableness, wherever it is provided, must be applied to each statute that is challenged, and that no single abstract standard or universal pattern of reasonableness may be imposed on every case. Accordingly, the analysis must take into account the nature of the right claimed to be infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions, the seriousness and urgency of the evil that the restriction seeks to remedy, the degree of disproportionality in the restriction, and the prevailing conditions at the time of enactment. All of these factors, the Court held, should shape the judicial verdict on the validity of the law.

This approach to reasonableness was affirmed in State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Others (1), where the then Chief Justice further noted that the retrospective operation of a statute may also be properly considered when evaluating whether a restriction is reasonable in the public interest, a view reinforced by a later decision of the Court in Virendra v. State of Punjab (2). The Court also observed that the appointment of a wage board for fixing rates of wages could not be challenged as such, because the constitution of such boards has been recognised as an appropriate mechanism for wage fixation. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, applies only when an industrial dispute actually arises or is reasonably expected to arise between employers and employees in a particular establishment. Although the amendment by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (36 of 1956) provides for the Central Government to appoint a National Tribunal under section 7-B for disputes of national importance or those affecting establishments in more than one State, the prerequisite for invoking such a tribunal remains the existence or anticipation of an industrial dispute. Where no dispute exists or is anticipated, the proper avenue for fixing wages is the creation of wage boards. These boards substitute for Industrial Tribunals or National Industrial Tribunals and are generally composed of an equal number of representatives of employers and employees.

The Board for that particular industry was to be composed of members representing employers and employees together with a quota of independent members, and one of the independent members was to be appointed as the chairman of the Board. The petitioners primarily complained that the criteria required for fixing rates of wages were not specified in section 9(1) of the Act. Section 8 gave the Central Government the power to constitute a wage board to fix rates of wages for working journalists in accordance with the Act. Section 9(1) further required the Board, when fixing such rates, to take into account the cost of living, the prevailing rates of wages for comparable employments, the circumstances relating to the newspaper industry in the various regions of the country, and any other circumstances that the Board considered relevant. The petitioners argued that these criteria were intended only for fixing minimum rates of wages, noting that the word “minimum” had appeared in Bill No. 13 of 1955 when it was introduced in the Rajya Sabha but had been omitted from the final Act. They also contended that the capacity of the industry to pay, which they said was an essential circumstance for wage fixation, was not listed among the factors that the Board must consider. Moreover, the petitioners submitted that the provision in section 9(1) allowing the Board to consider “any other circumstances which to the Board may seem relevant” effectively placed the determination of those circumstances in the Board’s subjective discretion, thereby preventing any court or other authority from examining the Board’s decision objectively. The Court stated that it would not engage in an extensive discussion about whether it would be appropriate to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons that accompanied Bill No. 13 of 1955, or to the circumstances that led to the deletion of the word “minimum” from the provisions dealing with rates of wages and the Wage Board, when the Act was finally enacted. It noted that there is a general consensus that such materials are not considered aids for interpreting the language of a statute, which must be given its plain and grammatical meaning, as observed in the decisions of Ashvini Kumar Ghosh & Anr. v. Arabinda Bose & Anr. and Provat Kumar Kar and Others v. William Trevelyan Curtiez Parkar. The Court further explained that only when the statutory terms are ambiguous or vague should extrinsic materials be consulted to discover the legislature’s true intention. In the present case, the Court found that such reference was unnecessary.

The case before this Court required examination of whether the phrase “fixing rates of wages” was ambiguous because it did not indicate whether the wages to be fixed were to be living wages, fair wages or minimum wages. Earlier in the judgment it was observed that the Act had been enacted to give effect to the recommendations contained in the Press Commission’s Report. The Report’s notion of a minimum wage was not limited to a bare subsistence level; rather, it was described as a wage that would ensure not only the basic sustenance of the worker but also his efficiency, permitting provision for certain amounts of education, medical care and other amenities. Accordingly, if the Legislature intended to implement this concept of a minimum wage, the floor wage it envisioned would be appreciably higher than a mere subsistence wage. Moreover, the implementation of such a wage required the Wages Board to consider the capacity of the newspaper industry to pay, even though the Press Commission itself did not deem that consideration essential. The Commission had expressed the view that a newspaper industry which could not afford to pay its employees a wage sufficient to enable them to live decently and with dignity had no right to continue its existence. Thus, the concept of minimum wage that the legislature sought to give effect to necessarily involved an assessment of the industry’s ability to meet that wage.

The deletion of the word “minimum” from the statutory language, as noted by the Court, broadened the scope of inquiry before the Wage Board. Had the term “minimum” been retained in relation to the rates of wages, the Board’s deliberations would have been confined strictly to determining whether a wage met that minimum threshold. By removing the word, the Board was vested with the authority to fix rates of wages without being limited to a minimum-wage analysis, allowing it to set wages in a manner appropriate to the circumstances of each case. Consequently, the Board could determine whether the resulting wages constituted a statutory minimum wage or approximated a standard wage, taking into account the prevailing economic conditions of the country. Nonetheless, the Board could not, within its powers, fix living wages for working journalists. Section 9(1) of the Act specified that the criteria for fixation also included the prevailing rates of wages for comparable employments. The Court emphasized that this criterion bore no relationship to the concept of minimum wages. In support of this observation, reference was made to a decision of the Industrial Court in the case of Nellimarla Jute Mills, which addressed the relevance of comparable wages in determining fair wages but not in setting a minimum floor wage.

In the decision of Nellimarla Jute Mills (1), the Court held that it was permissible to compare wage rates in other enterprises for the purpose of determining a fair wage and the upper limit of wages, but such a comparison could not be used to set the minimum or floor level of wages, which must be based on the basic needs of a worker’s family consisting of three consumption units. The Court observed that this criterion was undoubtedly taken into account by the members of the Committee on Fair Wages as well as by the Press Commission. Even though the Press Commission regarded this factor as an essential component of the minimum wage it envisioned, the Court was not inclined to place excessive emphasis on that circumstance and concluded that section 9(1) was intended to address only a minimum wage and nothing beyond it.

If, therefore, the criterion of prevailing wage rates for comparable employments, when read in accordance with the true construction of section 9(1), is understood to be compatible solely with the determination of wage rates that are higher than the bare subsistence level—whether those rates are labelled statutory minimum wage, fair wage or even living wage, as noted in citation (1) [1053] 1 L.L.J. 666—then it could not be argued that the criteria enumerated in section 9(1) of the Act are relevant only to the fixation of minimum wages. The Court pointed out that the capacity of the industry to pay is an essential circumstance that the Wage Board must consider, whether the Board is fixing rates of wages or scales of wages, both of which are included within the expression “rates of wages.” This circumstance was characterised as far from insignificant; the Court held that it is as important as the cost of living and the prevailing rates of wages for comparable employments, and therefore it ought to have been expressly mentioned in section 9(1).

The Court noted that the Legislature may have omitted a specific reference to the industry’s capacity to pay either because it was influenced by the view expressed by the Press Commission or because it believed that the third criterion listed in section 9(1)—namely, the circumstances relating to the newspaper industry in different regions of the country—could implicitly encompass that factor. However, the Court found considerable difficulty in reconciling this interpretation. It explained that the capacity of the industry to pay can be assessed only on an industry-cum-region basis, and from that perspective it might be subsumed under the mentioned regional circumstances. Yet, even if such inclusion were possible, the Court argued that assigning only a minor role to this factor, alongside considerations such as literacy rates, newspaper popularity, linguistic preferences and other similar regional characteristics, makes it hard to imagine that the capacity of the industry to pay was intended to be treated merely as a subsidiary element.

In examining the statutory scheme, the Court observed that the Legislature, recalling that the Press Commission gave no significance to the capacity of the newspaper industry to pay, chose not to make that factor mandatory for the Wage Board when fixing wage rates. From this perspective, the petitioners’ criticism that the Act failed to require the Board to consider the industry’s ability to meet wage obligations appeared justified. Nevertheless, the Court noted that courts generally incline to preserve the constitutionality of a enactment, and if the capacity to pay can be interpreted as falling within the category of “circumstances relating to the newspaper industry in different regions of the country,” the provision should not be struck down as unreasonable or as infringing the petitioners’ fundamental rights. Accordingly, the Court held that section 9(1) did not exclude the consideration of this essential circumstance; rather, it remained open and indeed incumbent upon the Wage Board to take the industry’s paying capacity into account when determining the rates of wages for working journalists.

The final criterion enumerated in section 9(1) permits the Board to consider “any other circumstance which to the Board may seem relevant.” Counsel for the petitioners argued that this language leaves the determination entirely to the Board’s subjective satisfaction, granting it unfettered discretion that cannot be controlled by any higher authority. The Court responded that if such matters were left to objective determination, the existence of the circumstance would be examined and properly scrutinised in appropriate proceedings. By leaving the criterion to the Board’s subjective satisfaction, the statute appears to enable the Board to exercise arbitrary power, which the Court found unreasonable. The petitioners relied on the case of Thakur Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer & Ors., where a provision granting the Court of Wards discretionary authority to assume superintendence of a landowner’s property was struck down because the discretion could not be reviewed by higher authorities. The Court explained that this analogy does not aid the petitioners, because the “any other circumstance” clause is read together with, and by ejusdem generis, the other specifically enumerated criteria in the same section. Since the major criteria have been expressly listed, it would be impossible for the Legislature to exhaustively enumerate every possible relevant circumstance, and the provision does not grant unfettered discretion beyond the scope of the enumerated factors.

The Board was expected to consider all factors that could influence the fixation of wage rates. During its inquiry the Board could encounter additional circumstances that were relevant to determining appropriate wage rates, and such circumstances could not be exhaustively anticipated or listed by the Legislature. Consequently, the Court held that it was proper for the Board to assess the relevance of those circumstances and to include them in its wage-rate calculations. If the guiding principles for the Board’s wage-rate fixation were articulated with sufficient clarity and specificity, and the major criteria were expressly enumerated, there was no defect in permitting the Board to rely on other considerations that emerged during the inquiry, subject to its own judgment. The Board’s composition—equal numbers of employer representatives and employee representatives—made it well suited to evaluate all pertinent circumstances, including those not expressly listed in the statute. It was, however, submitted that the Act did not prescribe a specific procedure for the Board to follow in fixing wage rates, thereby allowing the Board to adopt any arbitrary procedure that might breach the audi alteram partem principle, which the petitioner claimed was unreasonable. Section 20(2)(d) of the impugned Act authorized the Central Government to make rules, inter alia, concerning the procedure to be observed by the Board in setting wage rates, and Section 11 provided that, subject to any such rules, the Board could, for the purpose of fixing wage rates, exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, when adjudicating an industrial dispute referred to it. The Court observed that this was an enabling provision that gave the Board discretion to decide whether to adopt the tribunal-like procedure. Accordingly, the Board retained the liberty to devise its own procedure, even if that procedure were arbitrary or violated the audi alteram partem principle. Nevertheless, the Court noted that comparable bodies in other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom’s Wage Councils and Central Coordinating Committees under the Wages Councils Act, 1945, and the Agricultural Wages Board under the Agricultural Wages Regulations Act, 1924, were likewise empowered to regulate their proceedings as they deemed appropriate. Similarly, Australian Wage Boards operated without a formally prescribed procedure, although Wage Boards established under the amended Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, were required to follow the same procedure as an industrial court for industrial proceedings before them. Therefore, it could not be held that the Board must have a statutory-prescribed procedure for fixing wage rates.

In this case the Court observed that the statute creating a wage board did not require the board to follow a procedure fixed by law for fixing wage rates. Each of the statutes concerned allowed that procedural rules could be made, but even where such rules were prescribed, the statutes left it to the discretion of the wage boards to regulate their own procedures as they thought appropriate, provided they respected any prescribed rules. Accordingly, the wage boards were given a broad discretion to set their own procedural regulations, yet this discretion did not permit them to adopt arbitrary procedures. The Court emphasized that wage boards were responsible bodies tasked with gathering data and material necessary to decide the matters before them. Although they were not judicial tribunals, they functioned as administrative agencies and were expected to obtain all relevant information, invite answers to questionnaires or representations from the parties, hear evidence, and reach determinations in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The Court noted that even when wage boards performed quasi-judicial functions, any exercise of arbitrary power by them would not be tolerated by a court or any higher authority. Turning to the facts of the present dispute, the Court noted that the impugned Act placed the application of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before working journalists. While the Act specifically addressed matters such as gratuity, hours of work and leave, it provided that a wage board would be constituted to fix rates of wages. The Act also stipulated the principles that the wage board must follow in fixing wages and required that the board’s decision be published in the same manner as awards of industrial courts under the Industrial Disputes Act. Section eleven of the Act dealt with the powers and procedure of the board and stated that, subject to any procedural rules that might be prescribed by the Central Government, the board was empowered to exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as an industrial tribunal established under the Industrial Disputes Act. By giving effect to this provision, the Court found that the Legislature intended to bring the wage board as close as possible to an industrial tribunal under the 1947 Act, allowing the board to use the same powers and procedures for fixing wage rates. The board’s decision was to be binding on all employers, although the journalists retained the right to challenge the board’s award under the Industrial Disputes Act if they were dissatisfied and sought a further increase in wages. All these circumstances led the Court to conclude that, although the board was not strictly bound to act exactly like an industrial tribunal, it was nonetheless prohibited from adopting any arbitrary procedure that violated natural-justice principles.

The Court observed that, although the Wage Board was not bound to exercise the identical powers or to follow the identical procedure as an industrial tribunal created under the Industrial Disputes Act, the Board was nevertheless prohibited from adopting any arbitrary procedure that violated the principles of natural justice. The Court explained that if, upon construing the relevant statutory sections, the functions performed by the Wage Board were found to amount to laying down a law or a rule of conduct that would bind not only the employers and employees presently engaged in the industry but also those who might join the industry in the future, then the well-known dictum of Justice Holmes would apply and those functions could be described as legislative in character. However, the Court noted that in the present case the establishment of the Wage Board must be examined against the backdrop of the application of the Industrial Disputes Act to working journalists and the statutory provision that the Board should exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as an industrial tribunal under that Act. In that context, it was possible to contend that the Board was not performing legislative functions but was instead carrying out quasi-judicial functions. The Court further pointed out that the Legislature, when it enacted the impugned Act, did not treat those functions as legislative at all. The Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha (1957) require, under Rule No 70, that any Bill proposing the delegation of legislative power be accompanied by a memorandum explaining the proposal, indicating its scope, and stating whether it is of a normal or exceptional character. Additionally, Rule 317 establishes a committee on subordinate legislation to scrutinise and report to the House on whether powers to make regulations, rules, sub-rules, by-laws and similar instruments conferred by the Constitution or delegated by Parliament are being exercised properly within the delegated authority. The Court observed that the Legislature’s creation of the Wage Board for fixing rates of wages was not regarded as a piece of delegated legislation in the memorandum on delegated legislation that was attached to draft Bill No 13 of 1955, introduced in the Rajya Sabha on 28 September 1955. The only reference in that memorandum was to Clause 19 of the Bill, which empowered the Central Government to make rules on certain matters specified therein, and it described those matters as purely procedural and routine, relating, inter alia, to prescribing hours of work, payment of gratuity, holidays, earned leave or other kinds of leave, and the procedure to be followed by the Minimum Wager, Board in fixing minimum wages and the manner in which its decisions might be published. Clause 19(3) of the Bill further provided that all rules made under this clause would be...

Section 20 of the impugned Act required that, as soon as practicable after they were made, the rules be laid before both Houses of Parliament. Those clauses were ultimately incorporated as section 20 and represented the sole piece of delegated legislation that the Legislature had contemplated. The memorandum attached to the Bill expressly covered this sole piece of delegated legislation. Consequently, the decision of the Wage Board was not required to be laid before both Houses of Parliament, a step that would have been necessary had the fixation of wage rates been regarded as delegated legislation. Instead, the decision was to be published by the Central Government after it had been communicated to the Government by the Wage Board in a manner that the Central Government deemed appropriate. This mode of publication was analogous to the manner in which awards of Industrial Tribunals are published by the appropriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The circumstance was highlighted as evidence that the Legislature did not intend to create the Wage Board as a sub-legislative authority. While the Court recognized the force of these arguments, it observed that it was unnecessary, for the purposes of this decision, to determine the precise nature and character of the functions performed by the Wage Board. It was sufficient to state that the Wage Board was not empowered or authorised to adopt any arbitrary procedure or to contravene the principles of natural justice.

The petitioners further contended that the restrictions imposed on newspaper establishments by the impugned Act were unreasonable because they would effectively destroy the petitioners’ businesses and thus exceed the permissible limits of legislation under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. They argued that although the legislature may impose reasonable restrictions on the right to carry on a business, such power does not extend to destroying the business itself. To support this proposition, they relied on the decision in Stone v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., where it was observed that “From what has thus been said it is not to be inferred that this power of limitation or regulation is itself without limit. This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation.” Similar observations were drawn from decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo and Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for the Dominion, the former emphasizing that “there is a marked distinction to be drawn between the prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation or governance of it and indeed a power to regulate and govern seem to imply the continued existence of that which is sought to be regulated or governed.” The petitioners indicated that these authorities were also considered by this Court in Saghir Ahmed v. State of U.P. & Ors., underscoring that the reasonableness of restrictions depends substantially on the nature of the trade and the conditions prevailing therein.

The Court observed that, although in its view the ordinary meaning of the word “restriction” was that of limitation rather than confiscation, it preferred not to give a definitive opinion on the matter at that stage; nevertheless, the Court indicated that the assessment of whether a restriction was reasonable would largely depend on the particular trade involved and the conditions prevailing in that trade. The Court then examined the provisions of the impugned Act and noted that, even if those provisions did not automatically extinguish the petitioners’ business, they could nonetheless cripple the business and render it impossible for the petitioners to continue operating except under extremely burdensome conditions. Such effects, the Court held, would effectively curtail the circulation of the newspapers, compel the petitioners to seek government assistance, and impose an unreasonable burden on their constitutional right to carry on a business, thereby falling foul of Article 19(1)(g) read with Article 13(2) of the Constitution. Several specific sections of the Act were discussed. Section 2(f) defined “working journalist” to include the “proof-reader,” a classification that the Court noted went beyond the recommendation of the Press Commission, which had suggested that certain classes of proof-readers be excluded from that definition. By including all proof-readers, the legislature, according to the Court, placed an excessive burden on newspaper establishments. The provision concerning notice for the retrenchment of a working journalist was also extended beyond the limits set by Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; the Act required a six-month notice period for an editor and a three-month notice period for any other working journalist. Moreover, the retrenchment rules were applied retrospectively to all cases of retrenchment that had occurred between 14 July 1954 and 12 March 1955. The Act also expanded the obligation to pay gratuity, not only in the situations normally covered by law but also when a working journalist who had completed at least three years of continuous service voluntarily resigned from a newspaper establishment. The prescribed hours of work were limited to 144 hours in any period of four consecutive weeks, a figure markedly lower than the hours recommended by the Press Commission Report. Finally, the determination of wage rates was vested in a Wage Board, which was empowered to fix any wage it deemed appropriate regardless of the newspaper industry’s capacity to pay, potentially resulting in wages that the industry could not bear. The Court observed that each of these provisions, taken individually, might not destroy the petitioners’ business, but the cumulative effect could be severely detrimental.

The Court noted that when the provisions of sections fourteen and fifteen of the impugned Act are read together with the application of the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946 and the Employees’ Provident Funds Act, 1952 to newspaper establishments, the combined effect could conceivably cripple the petitioners’ business and therefore constitute an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners’ right to carry on their trade. The Court stated that each of these contentions would be examined individually. It was recognised that proof-readers had not been uniformly recommended by the Press Commission for inclusion in the definition of working journalists, yet the Court emphasised that proof-readers occupy a very important position in the editorial staff of a newspaper. Referring to B. Sen Gupta’s book “Journalism as a Career” (1955), the Court quoted the author’s description of the proof-reader: “The proof-reader is another important link in the production of a newspaper. On him depends, not to a small extent, the reputation of a paper. He has to be very careful in correcting mistakes and pointing out any error of fact or grammar that has crept into any news item or article through oversight or hurry on the part of the sub-editor. He has not only to correct mistakes but also to see that corrections are carried out.” The Court further cited the Kemsley Manual of Journalism, page three-three-seven, which explains that proof-reading is primarily the art and practice of finding mistakes in printed matter before publication and indicating the necessary corrections. The manual adds that proof-reading includes detecting variations between the type and the copy, misstatements of facts, figures or dates, grammatical errors, inaccurate quotations and other defects. It also notes that when a proof-reader is uncertain about a possible mistake, he must query the proof so that the editorial staff can decide, and that any suspected libel must be referred back to editorial authority. From these observations, the Court concluded that proof-readers must be persons of exceptional knowledge and sound judgment, well-versed in current affairs, familiar with the names of public figures and confident in their spelling. Some proof-readers specialise in sport, theatre, cinema, music and other branches, which helps to save time that would otherwise be spent consulting reference books. As a matter of fact, the Wage Board, in the schedule to its decision, defines a “proof-reader” as “a person who checks up printed matter or ‘Proof’ with edited copy to ensure strict conformity of the former with the latter. Factual discrepancies, slips of spelling, grammar and”

In discussing the function of proofreaders, the Court observed that they may detect syntactical errors and either correct those errors themselves or arrange for their correction. Recognising the importance of this role, the legislature, notwithstanding the Press Commission’s recommendations, incorporated proofreaders within the definition of a working journalist. The Court noted that proofreaders were likely to be entitled to higher wages because the Wage Board fixed wage rates for them; however, the Court held that this wage entitlement alone did not constitute an unreasonable burden on newspaper establishments. Accordingly, the provisions relating to notice periods could not be described as inherently unreasonable. The Court further referred to the Press Commission’s recommendations and to the authority of Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 22, 2nd edition, p. 150, para. 249, footnote (e), which sets out the periods of reasonable notice deemed appropriate for various newspaper occupations. For example, a newspaper editor was said to be entitled to a notice period ranging from six months (as in Fox-Bourne v. Vernon & Co. Ltd., (1894) 10 T.L.R. 647) to twelve months (as in Grundy v. Sun Printing and Publishing Association, (1916) 33 T.L.R. 77, C.A.). A sub-editor of a newspaper was allotted six months’ notice (see Chamberlain v. Bennett, (1892) 8 T.L.R. 234), and a foreign correspondent to The Times was also granted six months (see Lowe v. Walter, (1892) 8 T.L.R. 358).

The Court further explained that the Press Commission had recommended that notice periods for termination of service should reflect both the length of service rendered and the nature of the appointment, acknowledging that no rigid rule could be imposed. It observed that the practice of notice periods varied across jurisdictions, being influenced by statutory law or collective bargaining agreements. In England, judicial decisions had established that an editor was generally entitled to one year’s notice, while an assistant editor received six months’ notice. After reviewing English practice, the Court noted a Bombay judgment (Suit No. 735 of 1951, City Civil Court) in which the judge held that an assistant editor was entitled to four months’ notice in the specific circumstances of that case. The judge, however, expressed that, ordinarily, the English rule of six months’ notice should be applied in India, and that a longer notice period might be appropriate for senior editors because securing a comparable position for such journalists was comparatively more difficult. Consequently, the Court concluded that the six-month notice period prescribed for editors and the three-month period prescribed for other working journalists under section 3(2) of the impugned Act did not invite serious objection. Finally, the Court observed that the retrospective operation of the provision, covering the interval from July 14, 1954, to March 12, 1955, was intended to address the few cases involving employees of newspaper editorial staffs who had been retrenched during that period.

In the judgment, it was observed that certain newspaper establishments had been retrenched by their managements in anticipation of the implementation of the Press Commission’s recommendations. The provision that dealt with the payment of gratuity to working journalists who voluntarily resigned from such establishments was held to be unreasonable. The court explained that gratuity is essentially a retirement benefit designed for long-service employees, and the conditions for granting it had been set out in various Labour Court decisions in the country. In the case of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, the court noted at page 158 that the fundamental principle behind gratuity is that it serves as a benefit for old age after prolonged service, and that recent authority, as reflected in awards and tribunal decisions, favoured granting a double benefit. The court further expressed the view that while a Provident Fund offers some relief in the form of a portion of the employee’s wages to the employee or his family, it is insufficient by today’s standards, and that, where the finances of the concern permit, two retirement benefits ought to be provided.

The judgment then turned to other authorities that dealt with gratuity on retirement and, in some instances, on resignation. It cited Nundydroog Mines Ltd. as an example of cases where gratuity was awarded upon retirement. The court also referred to decisions of the Labour Court that have allowed gratuity to employees who resigned voluntarily, provided certain conditions were satisfied. In the case of Cipla Ltd., the court considered the financial capacity of the concern and other relevant factors, and directed that gratuity be granted on a full scale to an employee who resigned voluntarily after fifteen years of continuous service. Similar considerations were highlighted in the case of Indian Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Ltd., where it was observed that a series of Appellate Tribunal decisions had established that an employer with sufficient financial capacity must provide gratuity in addition to Provident Fund benefits. The court enumerated the aspects that must be examined when assessing the financial capacity of a concern, including overall financial stability, profit-earning ability, historical profits, reserves, the ability to replenish those reserves, and the risk associated with capital investment. It further noted that gratuity was awarded under the ground of retirement or resignation after fifteen years of continuous service and with a minimum of fifteen months’ salary or wages. The judgment emphasized that, even in those cases where gratuity was granted on resignation, it was conditioned upon the completion of at least fifteen years of continuous service, rather than the three-year minimum that was being contested in the present matter.

In the cases where gratuity had been awarded upon an employee’s resignation, the courts had granted it only after the employee had completed fifteen years of continuous service and not merely after a minimum of three years of service as argued in the present matter. The court explained that gratuity was a reward for good, efficient and faithful service rendered over a considerable period, as stated in the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Vol. 1 at page 614, Chapter XV, paragraph 1503. Consequently, there was no justification for awarding gratuity where an employee voluntarily resigned and terminated his service, except in exceptional circumstances. One such exception was the operation of the so-called “conscience clause.” The court referred to the work of Fernand Terrou and Lucion Solal, Legislation for Press, Film and Radio in the World to-day, a series of studies published by UNESCO in 1951, which at page 404 discussed “Journalists’ Working Conditions and their Moral Rights.” The passage, also reported in [1956] 1 L.L.J-435, noted that among the benefits which the status of a professional journalist might confer, whether derived from law or from an agreement, was a benefit of particular importance because it went to the very core of the profession. This benefit concerned freedom of information and was intended to safeguard the journalist’s independence, freedom of thought and moral rights. It was described as the “conscience clause” in France. The court explained that the essence of this clause was that when a journalist’s integrity was seriously threatened, the journalist could break the contract binding him to the newspaper concern and, at the same time, receive all the indemnities normally payable only when the employer broke the contract. The court observed that, in France, under the law of 1935, the indemnity for dismissal – which could be quite substantial – was payable even when the contract was broken by a professional journalist, where his action was inspired by “a marked change in the character or policy of the newspaper or periodical, if such change created for the person employed a situation prejudicial to his honour, his reputation, or in a general way his moral interests.” The court further noted that this moral right of a journalist was comparable to the moral right of an author or artist, a right first recognised by the French law of 1935 and later acknowledged in several other countries. The court also cited the collective contract of 31 January 1938 in Poland, which stated that a journalist could cancel his contract without warning for good and sufficient reasons, namely (a) pressure by an employer to induce the journalist to perform an immoral act, and (b) a fundamental change in the political outlook of the journal, publicly declared or otherwise manifested, that would make the journalist’s continued employment contrary to his political opinions or to the dictates of his conscience. Finally, the court mentioned that a similar clause existed in Switzerland, in the collective agreement signed on 1 April 1948 between the Geneva Press Association and the Geneva Union of Newspaper Publishers.

In the clause drawn from the Geneva Union of Newspaper Publishers, the Court observed that when a newspaper undergoes a marked change in its character or fundamental policy, and when the concern no longer possesses the same moral, political or religious character that it had at the time an editorial employee was engaged, and when such a change prejudices the employee’s honour, reputation or, in a general sense, his moral interests, the employee may demand immediate release and is entitled to an indemnity that is payable in the same manner as his salary. The Court further noted that the Act provides an additional exception for an employee who has been in continuous service of the employer for more than fifteen years. Conversely, the Court held that if an employee voluntarily resigns after only three years of service, there is no justification for awarding him a gratuity, and any provision of that kind contained in section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the Act would be unreasonable. Consequently, the Court concluded that the provision imposes an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners’ right to carry on business and must be struck down as unconstitutional. Regarding the provision that regulates the hours of work for journalists, the Court found that it could not be regarded as unreasonable, having regard to the nature and quality of the work performed by working journalists. Turning to the matter of fixation of rates of wages, the Court recalled that the Wage Board is constituted of equal numbers of representatives of newspaper establishments and of working journalists, with an independent chairman at its head, and that the Board is guided by principles which require it to consider, among other circumstances, the capacity of the industry to pay. The Court stated that it is impossible to say that the provisions governing the Wage Board are unreasonable. While the Court recognised that a decision of the Wage Board might be reached without observing the essential criteria laid down in section 9(1) of the Act, or that the procedure followed might be contrary to the principles of natural justice, the Court clarified that such defects would affect only the validity of the particular decision and not the constitution of the Wage Board itself, which therefore could not be challenged on this ground. Finally, the Court examined the provision contained in section 17 of the Act concerning the recovery of money due from an employer, which empowers the State Government or any authority appointed for that purpose to issue a certificate for the amount to the collector in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. The petitioners had impeached this provision, but the Court observed that it relates solely to the mode of recovery and does not impose any financial burden on the employer, and that the Court would consider this provision at a later stage.

In addressing the alleged infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 14, the Court observed that the provision under scrutiny did not violate the petitioners’ right to conduct business under Article 19 (1) (g). The petitioners had challenged the constitutionality of the impugned Act on the ground that it infringed their Article 19 (1) (g) freedom to carry on business. The Court rejected this contention, holding that the challenge failed in its entirety except with respect to section 5 (1) (a) (iii). That particular clause was deemed plainly severable from the remainder of the statute, and therefore capable of being struck down as unconstitutional without rendering the rest of the Act invalid. The Court then turned to the question raised under Article 14, noting that the dispute centered on whether the Act had singled out working journalists for special treatment by granting them statutory guarantees of gratuity, prescribed hours of work and leave—benefits that were not extended to other persons engaged in similar or comparable employment. Moreover, the Act fixed the salaries of these journalists without adhering to the standard procedure prescribed by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In this regard, the Court framed the issue as one of whether the selective provisions of the impugned legislation amounted to unreasonable discrimination prohibited by Article 14.

To elaborate on the alleged discrimination, the Court listed several propositions advanced by the petitioners. First, it was argued that by selecting employers in the press industry from among all industrial employers governed by the ordinary industrial-relations law—namely the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Act I of 1955—the impugned Act subjected press-industry employers to disparate treatment. Second, the petitioners identified multiple facets of this alleged discrimination: (a) the singling out of newspaper employees for differential treatment; (b) imposing a new burden on a segment of their workforce concerning gratuities, compensation, hours of work and wages; (c) creating a Pay Commission as a machinery for fixing journalists’ wages; (d) failing to prescribe the essential criterion of “capacity to pay” in wage determination; (e) permitting the Board to adopt any arbitrary procedure in fixing wages, even if such a procedure violated the audi alteram partem principle; (f) allowing the Board discretion to apply the Industrial Disputes Act procedure to some newspapers while using an arbitrary process for others; (g) making the Board’s decision binding only on employers and not on employees; and (h) authorising the recovery of money due from employers in the same manner as arrears of land revenue. Third, the Court noted that the classification effected by the Act was described as arbitrary and unreasonable because it removed newspaper employers and their working journalists from the ordinary operation of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Act I of 1955. Finally, the Court referred to the principle underlying Article 14 as articulated in several precedents, summarising the view expressed by Justice Das in Budhan Choudhry & Others v. State of Bihar, which explained that Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification, provided the classification is based on an intelligible differentia and bears a rational relationship to the statutory purpose.

The Court listed a series of authorities that had examined the scope of article fourteen of the Constitution, including the decisions reported in the Second Report of the Supreme Court Reporter in 1950 at page 869, the 1951 reporter at page 682, the case of Sarkar, the judgment of Kathi Raning Rawat versus the State of Saurashtra, the case of Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja versus the State of Bombay, the judgments of Quasim Razvi and Habeeb Mohamad each against the State of Hyderabad. The Court then observed that it was unnecessary to embark upon an extended discussion about the precise meaning, scope and effect of the provision of article fourteen that was under consideration. The Court stated that it is now well settled that while article fourteen prohibits class legislation, it does not preclude a legislature from making reasonable classifications for the purpose of lawmaking. However, to satisfy the test of a permissible classification, two conditions must be satisfied. First, the classification must be based on an intelligible differentia that clearly distinguishes the persons or objects placed within the group from those who are excluded from the group. Second, that differentia must bear a rational connection to the purpose that the statute seeks to achieve. The Court explained that a classification may rest on various bases such as geography, the objects sought to be achieved, the occupation of the persons concerned or similar criteria. What is essential, the Court held, is that there be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the enactment that is being examined. The Court further noted that, as established by its own decisions, article fourteen condemns discrimination not only in substantive law but also in procedural law. Having set out these principles, the Court indicated that it would now turn to the question of whether the impugned Act infringed the petitioners’ fundamental right guaranteed by article fourteen. The Court recalled that it had already recorded the observations of the Press Commission concerning the status of working journalists in the country. The Court then quoted a further passage from the Press Commission’s Report, stating that the work of a journalist requires a high level of general education and specialised training. Newspapers were described as a vital instrument for educating the masses, and it was noted that their business is to protect the rights of the people, to reflect and guide public opinion, and to criticize wrongs committed by any individual or organisation, however powerful. The Report further asserted that journalists form an essential adjunct to democracy and that the profession must be staffed by individuals of high intellectual and moral quality. Journalists were portrayed as creative artists whose work is expected by the public to display a broad omniscience and the ability to comment on any subject that may arise. The Court also highlighted that, apart from the nature of their work, the conditions under which journalists perform their duties are unique to the profession. It was noted that journalists operate under very high pressure, often needing to work late into the night because most newspapers are published in the morning, and that they must meet strict deadlines to ensure that the edition goes to press on time.

The Court observed that journalists work against the clock because an edition must reach the press at a fixed time, and any news that breaks before that deadline must be incorporated into that edition. Consequently, journalism is a highly specialised occupation that requires a person to be well-read, capable of quickly assessing a situation and reaching a correct conclusion, and able to endure the stress and strain of the work. Unlike many other industries, the output of a journalist cannot be measured merely by the quantity produced; the quality of the work is an essential element in assessing a journalist’s capacity. The Court also noted that insecurity of tenure is a distinctive feature of the journalism profession. Although other professions may experience some insecurity, the circumstances unique to journalism can lead to unemployment that would not necessarily arise in other fields. A journalist’s job security often depends on the whims and caprices of the newspaper owners. The Court cited instances where a change in ownership or a shift in editorial policy resulted in a substantial turnover of editorial staff, a situation that is uncommon in other industries where a change of proprietorship does not normally entail a change of staff. Because a newspaper’s essential purpose is not only to report news but also to educate and guide public opinion, a change in ownership or editorial direction may, and in some cases has, led to a wholesale replacement of editorial personnel. These peculiar circumstances must be kept in mind when formulating any scheme aimed at improving the conditions of working journalists.

The Court further explained that these considerations influenced the Press Commission’s recommendation that working journalists receive special treatment compared with other employees of newspaper establishments with respect to the amelioration of their service conditions. The Court referenced a UNESCO study on legislation for the press, film and radio published in 1951, which noted that in certain jurisdictions journalists enjoy special advantages that exceed those granted to ordinary employees, sometimes enshrined in law. For example, some Latin American countries have enacted detailed legislation providing journalists with extensive benefits, including protection against sickness, disability, dismissal and retirement. In Brazil, professional journalists who are Brazilian by birth and nationality receive considerable tax exemptions. In France, the law of 29 March 1935 granted journalists substantial advantages that were, at the time, far ahead of general social legislation, such as the right to an annual paid holiday. The Court emphasized that because working journalists constitute a distinct group within newspaper establishments, legislative measures aimed at improving their conditions of service do not constitute discrimination; rather, they constitute a permissible classification that allows for preferential treatment of journalists relative to other newspaper employees.

The Court explained that French legislation provided journalists with a statutory right to paid annual leave. Under that law a journalist who had been employed by a newspaper or periodical for at least one year was entitled to one month of holiday, and a journalist whose contract had continued for ten years or more was entitled to five weeks of holiday. When a contract of indefinite duration was terminated, the journalist was required to receive either one month or two months’ notice, depending on the circumstances, and was also entitled to a dismissal indemnity. The indemnity could not be less than one month’s salary for each completed year, or part of a year, of service, calculated at the most recent rate of pay. If the journalist’s service exceeded fifteen years, the amount of the indemnity was to be fixed by an arbitral committee. The Court observed that, because working journalists formed a distinct class within newspaper establishments, the legislature could lawfully enact special measures to improve their conditions of service without violating the prohibition of discrimination contained in Article 14. The only prohibition in that article is against unequal treatment among persons belonging to the same class, and the Court found no basis for such a charge against the legislation under discussion.

The Court further held that the existence of a special law for journalists and the creation of a separate mechanism for fixing their wages did not constitute an impermissible distinction. The payment of retrenchment compensation and gratuities, the regulation of working hours, and the determination of wage rates for journalists could all be enacted without breaching the principle of equality. The mechanism proposed involved constituting a wage board to set the rates of wages for journalists, which was a recognized method of achieving the objective of ameliorating their service conditions. The Court noted that no industrial dispute, in the general sense, had arisen or was anticipated between employers and journalists as a class, although a dispute might arise between an individual newspaper establishment and its own journalists. Consequently, the wage board’s role in fixing wages for journalists was not discriminatory when compared with the treatment of other newspaper employees, and it was permissible for the board to consider the industry’s capacity to pay while observing procedural fairness and natural-justice principles.

The Court observed that the Wage Board was required to take into account the capacity of the newspaper industry to pay, as had been noted earlier. It held that the procedure to be followed by the Board was to be the same as that employed by an industrial tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or at any rate a procedure that would not violate the principle of “audi alteram partem” or any other rule of natural justice. The Court further explained that, even if the Wage Board chose to exercise powers and follow procedures identical to those of an Industrial Tribunal, there was no justification for it to discriminate between one newspaper establishment and another. Should the Board assume the powers of an Industrial Tribunal, it would be bound by the procedural requirements set out in the Industrial Disputes Act, and adherence to those requirements would preclude any discrimination of the sort suggested. The Court also noted that the Wage Board’s decision was binding only on the employers; the working journalists retained the freedom to pursue a wage increase by raising an industrial dispute under the relevant legislation. Once the Board fixed the rates of wages, those rates ordinarily governed the relationship between the employers and the journalists, but the journalists’ reserved right to seek further increases under the Industrial Disputes Act was not improper and did not defeat the purpose of improving the journalists’ conditions of service as a group.

The Court further concluded that no discrimination could be said to exist between the employers on the one side and the working journalists on the other, because they were opposing parties in a dispute. The fact that the weaker party—here, the journalists—received different treatment aimed at ameliorating its service conditions did not, in the Court’s view, invalidate the Wage Board’s decision. The Court affirmed that a weaker party could be treated as a distinct class and that granting special benefits to that class for the purpose of improving conditions of service was not discriminatory. The provisions of section 17 of the Act, which allowed for the recovery of monies due from employers in the same manner as arrears of land revenue, were also held not to be discriminatory. The Court pointed out that, in industrial relations, employers frequently failed to implement measures enacted for employees’ benefit, leaving employees unable to realise those benefits. It observed that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, contained a comparable provision in section 33C, as amended by Act 36 of 1956, serving the same remedial purpose.

The provision under discussion was a copy of the former section 25-1 that had been inserted by Act 43 of 1953. The Court noted that if the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—being a general legislation—had been extended to cover working journalists, there would have been no conflict. Likewise, the Court found no conflict in introducing section 17 into the statute that was being challenged, because the purpose of that provision was to give working journalists—who form a distinct class among employees of newspaper establishments—a means to recover monies owed to them in the same way that workmen could recover arrears under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Court saw nothing discriminatory in providing such a recovery mechanism for amounts due by employers to these working journalists. The Court further observed that the alleged discrimination between press-industry employers on the one side and other industrial employers on the other side was misplaced. The latter group would continue to be governed by the ordinary law of industrial relations contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Employers of working journalists would likewise constitute a separate class, and a law enacted to operate between that class and the employers, as contemplated by the statute, could not be described as discriminatory. The Court explained that if measures are to be devised for improving the conditions of working journalists employed in newspaper establishments, the only effective way is to direct legislation specifically at press-industry employers in general. Even when the Act is regarded as a piece of social-welfare legislation, the State may begin its intervention in one sector without simultaneously enacting similar measures for all other industries; consequently, the State cannot be charged with discriminating against a single industry. Classification may be based on geography, objects, occupations or similar criteria, and the decisive question is whether there is a nexus between the basis of classification and the purpose of the Act that is being challenged. In the present case, both conditions of permissible classification were satisfied.

The Court held that the classification rested on an intelligible differentia that set working journalists apart from other employees of newspaper establishments, and that this differentia bore a rational relation to the object of the legislation, namely the amelioration of the conditions of service of working journalists. Accordingly, the attack on the constitutionality of the Act failed. Regarding Article 32, the Court observed that the sole ground of attack was that the impugned Act did not require the Wage Board to give reasons for its decisions, thereby allegedly depriving the petitioners of the right to approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of their fundamental right.

The petitioners argued that the right to approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of a fundamental right becomes meaningless if the statutory scheme prevents such an application. They contended that, in order to seek a writ of certiorari, there must first be an order that infringes a fundamental right, and that the entitlement to petition the Supreme Court for such a writ is itself a fundamental right. Accordingly, any legislation that seeks to limit or defeat this entitlement would contravene article 32 of the Constitution and would, therefore, be void. The petitioners further maintained that a writ of certiorari could only be issued against a “speaking order,” that is, an order that discloses the reasons on which it is based. They asserted that if a statute permits the issuance of an order without requiring the authority to state reasons, the statute effectively sterilises the Supreme Court’s power to examine the validity of that order, and thus such a provision would be violative of article 32.

To support this position, counsel for the petitioners relied upon the English decision in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shaw, where Lord Goddard C.J. observed at page 718 that “similarly anything that is stated in the order which an inferior court has made and which has been brought up into this court can be examined by the court, if it be a speaking order, that is to say, an order which sets out the grounds of the decision. If the order is merely a statement of conviction that there shall be a fine of 40s., or an order of removal or quashing a poor rate, there is an end of it, this court cannot examine further. If the inferior court tells this court why it had done what it has and makes it part of its order, this court can examine it.” The Court of Appeal affirmed this principle in a subsequent report of the same case, and Denning L.J., then a Lord Justice, explained at page 352 what constitutes the record, stating: “What, then, is the record?...... Following these cases I think the record must contain at least the document which initiates the proceedings; the pleadings if any; and the adjudication; but not the evidence, nor the reasons, unless the tribunal chooses to incorporate them. If the tribunal does state its reasons, and these reasons are wrong in law, certiorari lies to quash the decision.” The cited decisions, recorded in [1951] 1 K. B. 711, 718 and [1952] 1 K. B. 338, clarified that certiorari lies only when the inferior tribunal’s order is a speaking order. They did not impose a duty on the tribunal to set out reasons, but they highlighted that the absence of reasons would render it impossible for the High Court to exercise its prerogative jurisdiction of certiorari. The petitioners also referred to a more recent decision of this Court in A. K. Gopala v. The State of Madras and Anr., which further addressed the issue.

In the earlier matter referred to as Anr. (1), the Court examined a statutory provision that, among other things, prohibited a detained individual from disclosing to the Court the reasons for his detention that had been communicated to him by the detaining authority, subjecting any such disclosure to criminal prosecution. The Court held that this provision was beyond the authority of Parliament and consequently struck it down as ultra vires and void. Justice Mahajan, who then sat as a Judge, set out his reasoning at page 243. He explained that if the Court were barred from examining the grounds of detention, it would be unable to exercise the functions conferred on it by article 32 of the Constitution, nor could it determine whether the grounds supplied satisfied the statutory sub-clause. He stressed that a person who is detained has a guaranteed constitutional right to know the very grounds on which the order of detention is based. The Court must be enabled to scrutinise those grounds to ascertain whether they are the specific reasons for detention or merely vague or irrelevant material. The purpose of providing the detained person with the grounds is to allow him to make a representation that rebuts those grounds and to enable him to prove his innocence. Justice Mahajan further observed that for the Court to protect this fundamental right and to grant appropriate relief, it is essential that the detainee is not punished for revealing the grounds to the Court, and that no legal injunction may prevent the Court from reviewing those grounds. He noted that Section 14 of the impugned statute created a substantive offence for disclosing the grounds and imposed a duty on the Court not to permit such disclosure. In his view, this provision effectively suspended a constitutional guarantee, because by imposing a stringent restriction it made it impossible for the Court to administer justice, thereby depriving a detained person of access to the Court’s protection. Consequently, he concluded that the provision, by prohibiting disclosure of the grounds, infringed the rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution and was ultra vires of parliamentary power. The Court observed that, were a similar provision to exist in the present impugned Act, it could be interpreted to mean that the Wage Board’s order would not be a “speaking order” and that no writ of certiorari would be available to the petitioners on that basis. In such a circumstance, the Court would be powerless to remedy the petitioners’ grievances through a writ of certiorari, and the fundamental right of a citizen to approach the Court under article 32 of the Constitution would be rendered ineffective. However, the Court noted that the present case does not contain any provision that bars the Wage Board from providing reasons for its decision, a point later discussed in the subsequent portion of the judgment.

The Court observed that the impugned Act contains no clause that forbids the Wage Board from providing reasons for its decisions. The Act is silent on any mandatory requirement that the Board must disclose its reasoning, and consequently the Board is left free to decide, at its own discretion, whether to furnish such explanations. Because the statute does not impose any prohibition, the Court found it impossible to conclude that the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 32 of the Constitution is being infringed in any manner. The Court further noted that this issue was never raised in the written petitions filed by the petitioners; it was introduced only during oral arguments by the counsel representing them. The Court regarded this argument as an after-thought but nevertheless addressed it, as it was pressed with some vigor during the proceedings. After considering the matter, the Court stated its opinion that the Act cannot be challenged on the ground that it violates the fundamental right protected by Article 32.

Turning to the broader question of the Act’s constitutionality, the Court held that, except for one specific provision, none of the sections of the Act contravene any of the fundamental rights enumerated in Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1), 14 or 32 of the Constitution. The only provision found to be inconsistent with a constitutional guarantee is section 5(1)(a)(iii), which the Court determined to be in violation of the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g). Accordingly, that particular clause is declared unconstitutional and must be struck down, while the remainder of the Act stands as valid and enforceable.

In addition to contesting the validity of the Act, the petitioners asserted that the decision rendered by the Wage Board is illegal and void for a number of reasons. First, they claimed that the reconstitution of the Board was ultra vires and not authorized by the Act as it existed at the relevant time, noting that the governing rules were only published on 30 July 1956. Second, the petitioners argued that the majority decision of the Board lacked statutory support, because the Act itself contains no provision empowering such a decision and the Rules that purported to provide for it exceeded the authority of the Act, rendering the action ultra vires. Third, they contended that the procedure adopted by the Board violated the principles of natural justice, thereby rendering the decision invalid. Fourth, they maintained that the decision was invalid because the Board failed to give any reasons for its ruling and did not disclose the considerations that guided its determination. Fifth, they asserted that classifying matters on the basis of gross revenue was illegal and not authorized by the Act. Sixth, they argued that grouping entities into chains or multiple units was likewise unauthorized. Seventh, the petitioners claimed that the Board lacked authority under the Act to fix salaries of journalists on an all-India basis; the Act permits salary fixation only for a particular industrial establishment, not for all newspapers collectively. Eighth, the decision was said to be defective because it did not show that the capacity to pay of any specific establishment had been taken into account. Ninth, the petitioners alleged that the Board had no power to issue a decision with retrospective effect. Finally, they argued that the Board was not empowered to set pay scales for a period of three years, even though such scales were subject to review by the Government after that period.

The Government, by appointing another Wage Board at the expiry of the three-year period, and by allowing the Board to operate without a Cost of Living Index, created a situation in which the law regarded the decision as illegal on any of three possible grounds. The first ground was that the Act under which the decision was made was ultra vires, a position supported by the authorities in Mohammad Yasin v. Town Area Committee, Jalalabad & anr. (1) and Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2). The second ground was that the decision itself infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioners, an argument drawn from Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India & ors. (3). The third ground was that the decision was ultra vires the Act, a view endorsed by Pandit Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. (4). The Court held that the decision of the Wage Board could not be attacked on the basis that the impugned Act was ultra vires or that the decision infringed fundamental rights, because those two grounds were not applicable in the present circumstances. Accordingly, the challenge was required to be confined strictly to the third ground, namely that the decision was ultra vires the Act itself. The first ground of attack, concerning the resignation of Shri K. P. Kesava Menon, arose when he resigned on or about 21 June 1956 and the Central Government accepted his resignation by a notification dated 14 July 1956. The same notification appointed Shri K. M. Cherian in his place, thereby reconstituting the Board. The Act contained no provision for the resignation of a Board member or for filling the vacancy that resulted. Such a provision was introduced only later in the Working Journalists Wage Board Rules, 1956, which were published by a Gazette notification (Part 11, Section 3) on 31 July 1956. Consequently, it was contended that the reconstitution of the Board by appointing Shri K. M. Cherian was unauthorized by the Act as it then stood, and that the Board which issued the decision was not properly constituted. The authorities cited for this contention were [1952] S.C.R. 572, 578; [1954] S.C.R. 1122, 1127; [1956] S.C.R. 267; and [1956] S.C.R. 664. The Court noted that Section 8 of the Act empowered the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to constitute a Wage Board, and that this power must be read in harmony with Section 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which provides that when a Central Act or Regulation confers a power after the commencement of the Act, that power may be exercised from time to time as the occasion arises unless a different intention appears.

If this interpretation of Section 8 is accepted, then there was nothing objectionable in the Central Government’s action of reconstituting the Board upon acceptance of Shri K. P. Kesava Menon’s resignation. The power to constitute the Board, as conferred by the statute, could be exercised whenever a vacancy occurred, provided the statutory scheme allowed for such exercise. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the reconstitution of the Board on 14 July 1956 did not violate any statutory limitation and was therefore valid. This reasoning led the Court to reject the argument that the Board was improperly constituted and to focus the inquiry solely on whether the decision itself was ultra vires the Act.

In the case at hand, the Court observed that the resignation of Shri K. P. Kesava Menon was formally accepted, and consequently the Board was reconstituted. The Court held that, for all practical purposes, the Wage Board could be considered to have been constituted on 14 July 1956, the date on which all five members contemplated under section 8(2) of the Act were available to perform their functions. It was noted that Shri K. P. Kesava Menon had not taken part in the preliminary meeting of the Board held on 26 May 1956, and that the substantive work of the Board was carried out only after Shri K. M. Cherian was appointed in his place. Accordingly, the Board as a whole began to function effectively only after 14 July 1956. The petitioners’ objection to this sequence of events was described by the Court as overly technical and incapable of making any material difference to the validity of the Board’s constitution or its subsequent operations. The Court further rejected the contention that the Board’s composition was irregular, emphasizing that the procedural steps taken conformed to the statutory requirements and that the Board was duly empowered to act from the aforesaid date.

Turning to the second ground raised by the petitioners, the Court pointed out that the Working Journalists Wage Board Rules, 1956, which were published on 31 July 1956, were promulgated by the Central Government in exercise of the authority conferred by section 20 of the Act. Section 20 empowered the Government to make regulations necessary to implement the purposes of the Act, including the procedure to be followed by the Board in fixing wage rates. Under Rule 8 of those regulations, every question considered at a Board meeting was to be decided by a majority of the votes of the members present and voting, with the Chairman possessing a casting vote in case of a tie. The Court noted that this rule expressly allowed decisions to be reached by a majority, and that the Board adhered to this procedure when arriving at its determinations. The rule was characterized as delegated legislation, validly framed under the authority of section 20 and, once laid before both Houses of Parliament in accordance with section 20(3), acquiring the force of law. Consequently, after the rules were published they became part of the Act, and any subsequent decision of the Wage Board made by a majority in accordance with Rule 8 was lawful and could not be invalidated on the basis suggested by the petitioners. Regarding the third ground, the Court observed that the petitioners alleged a breach of natural justice, claiming that the Board had not followed the procedure laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act but had instead applied the powers granted under section 11 of the Act, which purportedly required the Board to act like an Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, when adjudicating an industrial dispute referred to it.

In the matter before the Court, it was observed that the Wage Board on two separate occasions expressly asserted that it possessed the powers of an Industrial Tribunal established under the Industrial Disputes Act. The first instance occurred when the Board issued a questionnaire and, within that questionnaire, it stated that it exercised such powers pursuant to section eleven of the Act. The second instance arose after several newspapers and journals that had received the questionnaire failed to return their replies. At a meeting of the Board held on the seventeenth day of August, 1956, the Board reiterated its position, deciding to issue a Press Note that urged the newspapers and journals to submit their replies promptly. The Press Note explicitly reminded the parties that the Board held the powers of an Industrial Tribunal under the Act and warned that, should the newspapers continue to withhold their responses, the Board would be forced to adopt further measures. These actions clearly indicated that the Board intended to invoke the authority conferred by section eleven. Although the exercise of that authority was discretionary, the Board nonetheless assumed the role and powers of an Industrial Tribunal and, by implication, bound itself to observe the procedural requirements that applied to such tribunals.

The petitioners further argued that the questionnaire sent by the Board to the newspaper establishments contained no specific proposal for their consideration. The only matter presented to the establishments was Question Number Four in Part A, which inquired whether the basic minimum wage, dearness allowance and metropolitan allowance recommended by the Press Commission were acceptable, and, if not, what variations the establishments would propose and the reasons for those variations. This single question did not draw the establishments’ attention to any concrete wage structure that the Board might adopt, leaving them without any indication of the wage framework under consideration. After receiving the questionnaire responses, gathering the necessary data and examining witnesses, the Board formed the opinion that a particular wage structure was appropriate. Nevertheless, it was required to communicate that proposed structure to the interested newspaper establishments and to invite them to submit any representations within a prescribed time limit. Only after receiving such representations could the Board finalize its proposals and publish its decision.

The Court observed that the Wage Board ought to have completed its proposals and then published its final decision. Had the Board adhered to that procedure, the decision could not have been attacked on the ground that it violated the principles of natural justice. The Court considered it undoubtedly more prudent for the Board to have followed the outlined steps. Regarding ground number eight, the Court found that it was sufficiently decisive to determine the question of whether the Wage Board’s decision was ultra vires. Consequently, having reached a conclusion on that issue, the Court refrained from expressing any further opinion on the petitioners’ alternative challenge. Concerning ground four, the petitioners argued that the Board failed to give reasons for its decision. The Court noted that at the Board’s meeting on 22 April 1957, it was agreed that reasons need not be provided for each decision and that merely recording the decision was sufficient; accordingly, no reasons were attached to the published decision. The absence of reasons made it difficult to discern what considerations, if any, had guided the Board in reaching its conclusions on the various points. The Court held that the Board was under no statutory obligation to furnish reasons, as the Act contained no provision to that effect, and the Board was therefore within its rights to omit them. Nevertheless, the Court remarked that prudence would have suggested that the Board provide reasons, which would have spared the Court the necessity of probing the Board’s mind to ascertain whether particular circumstances had been duly considered. The Court further stated that, although formal reasons were not given, sufficient insight into the Chairman’s thinking was available in a contemporaneous note dated 30 April 1956, which explained the majority’s reasoning and illuminated whether specific factors were taken into account. Regarding ground five, the petitioners challenged the classification of newspaper establishments on the basis of gross revenue as illegal and unauthorised by the Act. The Court noted that the Act is silent on any classification scheme and could not be expected to prescribe one. The Act authorized the Board, under section 9(1), to fix wage rates for working journalists, and in doing so the Board was free to adopt any classification it deemed appropriate, provided such classification was not irrational.

In this case, the Court observed that the Wage Board possessed full authority to classify newspaper establishments in any manner it deemed appropriate, provided that such classification was not irrational. Because the task of fixing journalists’ wage rates required consideration of all newspaper establishments across the country, the Court held that some form of classification based on size and capacity was inevitable. The Court listed several possible criteria for such classification, including newspaper circulation, advertising revenue, gross revenue, and capital invested in the business. Although the proportion of advertising revenue to gross revenue could be a relevant factor, the Court declined to say that the Wage Board was unjustified in using gross revenue as the basis for classification. The Court affirmed that the Wage Board acted within its competence, and that adopting gross revenue as the classification criterion did not render its decision radically wrong or vitiate it. Accepting the necessity of classification due to the varying sizes and capacities of newspapers nationwide, the Court found it essential to employ a practical test, and saw no reason to deem the use of gross revenue unwarranted. The Court recalled that the Newspaper Industry Inquiry Committee in Uttar Pradesh, in its report dated 31 March 1949, had suggested a classification scheme based on circulation, invested capital, and annual income, with three distinct classes. Class A was defined as papers with a circulation of ten thousand copies or more, or invested capital of three lakh rupees or more, or annual income of one lakh rupees and above. Class B comprised papers with circulation between five thousand and ten thousand copies, or invested capital between one lakh and three lakh rupees, or annual income between one lakh and three lakh rupees. Class C included papers with circulation below five thousand copies, or invested capital below one lakh rupees, or annual income below one lakh rupees. The petitioners had challenged the use of gross revenue, arguing that advertising revenue typically constituted the bulk of that figure, while revenue from circulation represented only a small portion, especially for language newspapers where the situation might differ. They contended that without considering the proportion of advertising revenue within gross revenue, an accurate assessment of a newspaper establishment’s financial condition for classification purposes could not be made.

The Court observed that the petitioners had proposed that the classification of newspaper establishments should be based on the profit and loss statement of each establishment, arguing that such an approach would produce a markedly different picture from that obtained by using gross revenue. They contended that the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of the various newspaper enterprises ought to be examined, and that even if a particular newspaper generated gross revenue large enough to place it in Class “A” or Class “B”, it might nevertheless be operating at a loss, rendering that classification inappropriate. The Court noted that earlier in the judgment it had already described the profit and loss test as unsatisfactory. Although the profit and loss accounts and balance sheets of the limited companies might have been audited by professional auditors and accepted by the income-tax authorities, the Court held that these documents did not provide a reliable basis for classifying the newspaper establishments for the reasons previously explained. The Court further mentioned that, before the present hearing, the respondent – the Indian Federation of Working Journalists – had attempted to demonstrate that the profit and loss accounts and balance sheets of several petitioners were manipulated and therefore unreliable. The Court clarified that it was not required to determine whether the profit and loss test should be adopted, but it was sufficient to state that, since the Wage Board had not accepted that test, the Board was not erroneous in refusing to rely upon it.

Regarding the second ground of attack, which questioned the grouping of newspapers into chains or multiple units on the basis that such grouping was unauthorised by the Act, the Court gave a concise answer. It explained that if the grouping of newspapers into chains or multiple units was justified by the conditions prevailing in the newspaper industry, there was nothing in the Act that prohibited such a grouping. The Court pointed out that the Wage Board was empowered to fix the wage structure for working journalists employed in newspaper establishments throughout the country. Consequently, if chains or multiple units existed, the individual establishments forming those chains fell within the scope of the Board’s inquiry, and the Board’s decision to treat them as a single group could not, in itself, be challenged. The Court further noted that the Act could not be said to have expressly authorised the Board to adopt such a grouping, but it also did not contain any provision that barred the Board from doing so. The responsibility rested on the Board to determine, on the facts of each case, whether grouping was appropriate, and unless the Court found a specific prohibition in the Act, it would not deem the Board’s grouping to be unauthorised.

The Court indicated that the difficulty concerning the industry’s capacity to pay would be examined later when the specific ground was considered. In regard to ground seven, the Court focused on the definition of “newspaper establishment” provided in Section 2(d) of the Act, which described such an establishment as “an establishment under the control of any person or body of persons, whether incorporated or not, for the production or publication of one or more newspapers or for conducting any news agency or syndicate.” The petitioners argued that the word “establishment” should be understood narrowly to refer only to a single physical entity and not to a collection of entities, even though a single entity might produce or publish several newspapers. While the definition could be read to encompass chains or multiple units, the argument asserted that each chain or unit must still be a single establishment that produces or publishes a group of newspapers. If several newspaper establishments, each owned or controlled by the same person or body, produced or published the newspapers separately, the fact of common control would not transform those distinct establishments into one “newspaper establishment” for the purposes of the definition; they would remain separate establishments despite shared ownership.

The petitioners relied on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Pravat Kumar v. W. T. C. Parker (A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 116, 118, para 20), where the Court interpreted the expression “employed in an industrial establishment” to mean employment at a particular place that is used for manufacture or an activity amounting to industry as defined in the Act. A similar interpretation was adopted by the Madras High Court in S. R. V. Service Ltd. v. State of Madras (A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 115, 122), which observed that a dispute between workers and management of the Kumbakonam branch of S. R. V. S. Ltd. involved one industrial establishment, and that it was difficult to accept the counsel’s contention that the branch was not an industrial establishment under the various sections of the Act. The Madras Court further noted that reference to Section 3 was sufficient to reject the contention that all branches of S. R. V. S. Ltd. should be treated as a single industrial establishment. These authorities support the view that a newspaper establishment, like an industrial establishment, must be located at a single place, even if it is engaged in the production or publication of more than one newspaper. When such activities are carried out in different towns or cities of different

In this case, the Court observed that newspaper establishments that produce or publish newspapers in different locations cannot be treated as a single industrial establishment for the purpose of determining the relationship between the employer and the employees. Each establishment must be regarded as a separate newspaper establishment, and there is no justification for aggregating these distinct units into a single chain or multiple-unit entity and treating them as one newspaper establishment. The Court referred to the earlier authorities A. I. R. 1950 Cal. 116, 118, para. 20 and A. I. R. 1956 Mad. 115, 122 in support of this view. The petitioners pointed out that the Act contains no provision expressly forbidding such a grouping. The Court noted, however, that if the Wage Board were authorized to classify establishments on the basis of gross revenue, it could equally justify grouping them into chains or multiple units. Nothing in the Act prevents the Board from treating several newspaper establishments that publish one or more newspapers in different parts of the country as a single establishment for the purpose of fixing wage rates. The Court further held that it would be reasonable to expect the same standard of employment and conditions of service across all newspaper establishments that are under the control of the same person or group, whether incorporated or not. To employ one set of workers at higher wages and another set at lower wages without a legitimate reason would be unfair. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that differences in wage scales may be legitimate when they reflect the quality of work required, the labour conditions prevailing in different regions, the standard of living in those regions, and other related factors. All these considerations must be borne in mind by the Wage Board when it determines the wage structure, although the relative importance assigned to each factor may vary according to the specific circumstances of each area where the newspaper establishments operate. The Court then turned to the most significant ground raised by the petitioners: the Wage Board’s decision had failed to consider the capacity to pay of any particular newspaper establishment. The Court reiterated that the Board’s wage fixations did not specify whether the wages were to be minimum, fair, or living wages, leaving that determination to the Board’s discretion. The guiding principles laid down required the Board to take into account certain circumstances before making its determination, and one essential consideration was the capacity of the industry to pay, which was included in the category “the circumstances relating to newspaper industry in different regions of the country.” The Court concluded that it remained necessary to examine whether the Wage Board truly understood this category and had applied its mind to it.

In the course of its deliberations, the Board demonstrated that it had truly considered the matter before it. At the initial meeting of the Board, which was held on May 26 1956, the members resolved to establish a Sub-Committee whose task was to prepare a questionnaire to be sent to the various newspapers and journal organisations that might be affected. The purpose of the questionnaire was to obtain factual data and any other information that would be necessary for fixing the rates of wages. The Sub-Committee was instructed to keep in mind, among other considerations, the need for a “proper classification of the country into different areas” based on criteria such as population and the cost of living. This instruction was the sole reference in the Board’s work to the requirement of section 9(1). No separate reference was made to the capacity of the newspaper industry to pay wages, a factor which the Court had previously held to be included within the considerations of that provision. When the questionnaire was finally drafted, the only item that touched on the capacity of the industry was Question 7 in Part A, headed “Special Circumstances”. That question asked: “Are there in your regions any special conditions in respect of the newspaper industry which affect the fixing of rates of wages of working journalists? If so, specify the conditions and indicate how they affect the question of wages.” Even this question did not clearly demand an answer about the industry’s ability to pay. The Board did request detailed accounts of newspaper establishments and sought information that would assist it in evaluating the nature and quality of work performed by various categories of journalists. Nevertheless, the essential consideration of the industry’s capacity to pay was never prominently raised, and the questionnaire did not solicit that information from the newspaper establishments to which it was addressed. The Board’s summary of the responses to Question 7 occasionally mentioned the capacity of the industry to pay, but such references arose only because the respondents themselves introduced the matter in an incidental way, not because the Board had directed it. It is noteworthy that, even before the Press Commission’s investigation, data had shown that out of 127 newspapers, 68 were operating at a loss while 59 were making a profit, resulting in an overall profit margin of roughly one percent on a capital base of seven crores. The profit-and-loss accounts and balance sheets of the various companies that owned or controlled newspaper establishments had also been submitted to the Board, and these documents painted a bleak picture. For the financial year 1954-55, the statements indicated that 43 newspapers reported profits whereas 40 reported losses. Although no precise scientific conclusion could be drawn from these figures, they indisputably demonstrated that the overall condition of the newspaper industry could not be described as satisfactory.

In view of the circumstances, the Court observed that the Wage Board bore an even greater responsibility to examine the capacity of the newspaper industry to meet its wage obligations, even though the Board had treated the profit and loss statements of the newspaper establishments as unreliable indicators of their true financial condition. A further obstacle confronted the Board because, of the 5,705 newspapers to which a questionnaire had been sent, only three hundred twelve, or at most three hundred twenty-five, actually replied. Consequently, the Board remained uninformed about the situation of the remaining newspapers. The Chairman himself highlighted this deficiency in a note dated 30 April 1957, stating that the Board possessed no comprehensive data on all newspapers and that the data it did have was, in many instances, unsatisfactory. He reiterated in the same note that the information available to the Board fell short of what the Board would have wished to have, and he consequently recommended the creation of a permanent administrative mechanism. This mechanism would be tasked with collecting, on a systematic basis, detailed information and data from every newspaper establishment in the country, including figures on employment, wage rates and earnings, financial condition, circulation, and other matters that might be required for assessing the effects of the Board’s decisions at the time of any future review. The Court noted that, in the absence of sufficient data and information, the Wage Board was effectively groping in the dark and was unable to reach a proper conclusion regarding the wage structure it was required to determine. Because of this lack of material, the Board could not calculate the impact of its proposals on the industry’s overall capacity to pay, neither on a national scale nor on a regional basis. The Chairman admitted that, at that stage, it was difficult for the Board to work out, with any degree of precision, the economic and other consequences of its decision for the newspaper industry as a whole. Regarding the effect of the proposals on individual newspaper establishments, the Chairman expressed optimism, stating that the future of Indian-language newspapers appeared bright in view of rising literacy and growing political awareness among readers. He added that, through rational management, there was considerable scope for increasing newspaper income, and although no adjustment could satisfy every interested party, it was hoped that no newspaper would be compelled to shut down as a result of the Board’s decision. He further asserted that, if a newspaper was a good one and deserved to continue, the Government and the public would assist in ensuring its survival. The Court noted that this note of optimism was not supported by any evidence on the record.

The Board had divided newspaper establishments into five categories, labeled A through E, using gross revenue as the sole criterion. In doing so, it failed to take into account the share of advertising revenue within the total revenue, nor did it consider the fundamental distinction between circulation figures and the paying capacity of language-medium newspapers as compared with English-language newspapers. Had these factors been examined, the Board would likely have altered its reliance on gross revenue as the basis for classification in several respects. Moreover, the Board’s decision to treat newspapers that belonged to chains or multiple-unit groups as a single entity meant that weaker units within those groups were placed on an equal footing with stronger ones, with the expectation that losses incurred by the weaker units would be offset by profits earned by the more prosperous units. The justification for this approach was presented merely on a principle-based ground, without any assessment of the concrete consequences for the weaker units. The Chairman acknowledged that, as a result of the Board’s decision, journalists employed by the weaker units of a chain might receive considerably higher remuneration than those working in the highest-earning units. Nevertheless, he maintained that if the principle was sound and scientific, its eventual outcomes should be evaluated from the perspective of Indian journalism as a whole, rather than focusing on the particular burden imposed on any single establishment. Consequently, the principle that the Board favoured was applied without appreciating the specific strain it would place on the weaker segments of individual newspaper establishments. Representatives of the employers contested the fixation of wage scales, arguing that fixing rates of wages did not automatically entail fixing scales. This objection was rejected both by the representatives of the employees and by the Chairman, and the Board, by a majority decision, accepted that it could determine scales concurrently with rates. The Press Commission had merely proposed a basic minimum wage for consideration by the parties and had suggested that scales of wages should be settled through collective bargaining or adjudication. Although the Board assumed the responsibility of fixing scales within its reference terms, it was obliged to examine how the determined scales would affect the industry’s capacity to pay. The record contains no indication that, with respect to either the rates or the scales of wages it set, the Board ever contemplated the impact of its determinations on the overall paying capacity of the newspaper industry.

The Board had not examined how its decision would affect the industry’s overall ability to pay wages, either on a national basis or in particular regions. Moreover, the Board failed to take into account the other statutory provisions that grant working journalists entitlement to retrenchment compensation, gratuity, regulated hours of work and leave, all of which would inevitably influence the financial capacity of newspaper enterprises. Had the Board considered these obligations, it is probable that the rates of wages and the accompanying wage scales it finally fixed would have been set at a lower level than those reflected in its award. This difficulty is intensified by the fact that journalists constitute at most one-fifth of the total workforce employed by newspaper establishments, while the remaining eighty percent consist of employees who may be described as factory workers and who are able to seek improvements in their conditions of service through the machinery provided by the Industrial Disputes Act. If the Board were to raise the conditions of service for journalists, the other employees would likely become discontented and, at the earliest opportunity, would raise industrial disputes seeking better terms for themselves. Even though the Industrial Courts created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, might not grant these workers relief equal to that afforded to journalists, such courts would nevertheless be compelled to improve their conditions of service while taking into account the benefits already enjoyed by journalists; this would impose an additional financial burden on newspaper establishments and would substantially affect their capacity to meet wage obligations. The Board does not appear to have reflected on this consideration, as no evidence on the record shows that it was taken into account when arriving at the final decision. In addition, the retrospective operation of the Board’s award was calculated to impose a further financial strain on newspaper establishments, a circumstance that, although less significant than the other factors mentioned, still ought to have been examined by the Board before fixing the rates of wages. The magnitude of the financial burden imposed by the Board’s decision was vividly illustrated by the statements presented on behalf of the petitioners during the hearing, which demonstrated the considerable impact on the wage bill and the reserves of the newspaper enterprises.

According to the statements presented, the wage expenses of the newspaper establishments were expected to rise sharply, and the retrospective effect of the Wage Board’s decision would draw a substantial amount from their reserves. The combined effect of the Act’s provisions on retrenchment compensation, gratuity payment, working hours and leave, together with the Wage Board’s determination of wage rates and scales, was projected to strain the financial resources of the newspaper establishments to the point of potentially crippling them, and in extreme cases, could even result in their complete closure. The statements further illustrated that an additional burden would arise if the establishments chose to discharge their working journalists, a burden that became even more acute when the establishments, albeit reluctantly, concluded that shutting down their operations was more economical than continuing under the imposed financial obligations. The judgment earlier in this case had already set out the relevant figures, and those figures need not be repeated here. Nevertheless, the inevitable conclusion was that the Wage Board’s decision imposed a very heavy financial burden on the newspaper establishments, a burden that was intensified by the classification of establishments on the basis of gross revenue, the fixation of wage scales, the provisions concerning hours of work and leave, the grouping of newspapers into chains or multiple units, and the retrospective operation of the decision as previously mentioned.

If the Wage Board had first circulated these proposals to the various newspaper establishments before finalising them, the establishments would have had the opportunity to submit their views and any representations they wished to make for the Board’s consideration. Had the Board then taken those opinions and representations into account before issuing its final decision, the criticism that the Board had failed to consider the industry’s capacity to pay—either as a whole or on a regional basis—would have lost much of its strength. In reality, the Board undertook none of these steps. Instead, proposals were exchanged between the representatives of employers and those of employees, but the chairman’s discussions with each set of representatives yielded no productive outcome. Acting in a mediatory capacity, the chairman presented his own proposals, apparently reflecting the various points of view expressed by both parties. The decision on the wage scales emerged as a majority decision that was not endorsed by the employers’ representatives. While the employers rejected the chairman’s proposals, the employees’ representatives accepted them, and consequently those proposals became the majority decision of the Wage Board.

In this case, the Court observed that the final decision of the Wage Board emerged as a majority ruling that was accepted by the employee representatives but not by the employer representatives. The Court noted that the chairman’s ultimate determination on the wage issues did not appear to be based on any genuine assessment of the newspaper industry’s overall capacity to pay, either in aggregate or on a regional basis. Instead, the decision reflected a compromise that the chairman fashioned among the differing viewpoints, a compromise that found acceptance chiefly among the employees’ side. The Court found no evidence in the record that the capacity of the industry to meet the wage demands had been meaningfully examined. This conclusion was reinforced by the chairman’s own remark, made in a note issued concurrently with the publication of the decision on 30 April 1957, in which he acknowledged the difficulty the Wage Board faced in precisely gauging the economic and other impacts of the decision on the newspaper trade as a whole. During the hearing, the respondents attempted to demonstrate that the conversion of prices into naye paisa, which led newspapers to charge the public higher rates, had resulted in a substantial rise in the revenue of several newspapers. The petitioners contested these figures, pointing out that any increase in income attributed to the price conversion was more than offset by a decline in circulation, the continuously rising cost of newsprint, and the higher commissions payable to commission agents. The Court indicated that it was not necessary to reproduce the detailed calculations, but it was satisfied that the conversion to naye paisa had not produced the effect claimed by the respondents and had not enhanced the paying capacity of the newspaper establishments. Moreover, the Court highlighted that the Wage Board itself expressed a hopeful stance, stating that if a newspaper was of good quality and deserved to exist, the Government and the public would support its continuation, and that the Board intended to observe the practical consequences of its decision patiently over a period of three to five years rather than pass immediate judgment. The chairman further urged the Government of India to establish an immediate standing administrative mechanism capable of both implementing the decision and preparing the ground for a review after the prescribed period. The Court characterized this appeal as another expression of hopeful expectation by the Wage Board, noting that the Government was under no obligation to fulfill this hope and that it was uncertain whether any review or revision would actually occur after the stipulated timeframe.

The Court observed that there was no certainty that the Government would ever undertake a review or revision of the Wage Board’s decision after the prescribed period elapsed. It stated that it had examined in detail every proceeding of the Wage Board together with all the tables and statements that the Board had prepared. In doing so, the Court found that neither the proceedings nor any of the tables contained satisfactory evidence showing that the Board had examined the industry’s capacity to pay when it fixed the wage structure. The Court noted that, as it had previously pointed out, the Board was entitled to give limited weight to the profit-and-loss statements submitted by the various newspaper establishments; however, because those statements on their face indicated that the trade was not generating profit, the Board ought to have been even more careful to ensure that the different classes of newspaper establishments could bear the burden created by the wage structure it had decided upon. The Court explained that industrial adjudication commonly employs a method for ascertaining an employer’s capacity to meet the financial burden that is sought to be imposed. When an industry consists of several classes, it may not be necessary to assess the capacity of each individual unit, but it is essential to evaluate the capacity of each class as a whole to bear the imposed burden. The Court further described that a cross-section of the relevant classes should be examined carefully, taking into account all material factors, in order to determine what burden the class, considered collectively, can sustain. Where possible, the Court said, an effort is often made to project the impact of the wage structure over the next two or three years so as to gauge its effect on the employer’s financial position. The Court reported that the entire record before the Board, including the Chairman’s note, gave no indication that the Board had attempted such an analysis of the industry’s capacity to pay. Instead, the proceedings revealed that the demands presented by the employees’ representatives and the concessions offered by the employers’ representatives were treated as opposing positions, and that the Chairman endeavoured to reach a final decision on a conventional give-and-take basis. In following this approach, the Court observed, all members of the Board appeared to have lost sight of the fundamental prerequisite for fixing a wage structure, namely, the consideration of the industry’s capacity to pay. The Court held that this oversight created a fatal flaw in the Board’s decision. It added that, had the Court been satisfied that the Board had duly considered the capacity-to-pay issue, it would have been reluctant to entertain a challenge to the validity of the decision on that ground. The Court concluded by remarking that, in situations where special Boards are constituted to devise wage structures, this essential consideration cannot be ignored.

In the matter before it, the Court observed that it would ordinarily decline to act as an appellate body on issues that hinge upon factual determination. Nevertheless, the Court found that a fundamental prerequisite for establishing a wage structure had been wholly disregarded in the present case. Because this essential condition was omitted, the Court concluded that the Wage Board had breached the mandatory requirement prescribed in section 9 of the governing Act, rendering the Board’s decision beyond the powers conferred by the statute. The Court then turned to the ninth ground raised by the petitioners, which contended that the Board lacked authority to issue a decision having retrospective effect. The Court rejected this contention, holding that the Wage Board possessed both jurisdiction and authority to render a decision that could operate retrospectively from the date of its appointment. The Court further stated that there was no legal defect in the Board’s choice to impose retrospectivity in the manner it specified. Although the retrospective nature of the decision might influence the industry’s capacity to meet wage obligations, the Court noted that this issue had already been examined earlier and required no further elaboration.

The tenth ground advanced by the petitioners concerned the Board’s power to fix wage scales for a period of three years, subject to a subsequent governmental review through the appointment of another Wage Board at the end of that period. The Court found this ground irrelevant, because the Board had not, in its terms, fixed any such temporal period. The Board’s sole authority lay in determining the rates of wages and forwarding its findings to the Government. Any expectation that the decision would be subject to review or revision after three or five years was not incorporated into the Board’s decision, and therefore the Court did not consider any effect that such a fixation of period might have. The eleventh ground alleged that the Wage Board was disadvantaged by the lack of a Cost of Living Index. The Court dismissed this argument, noting that Clause 24 of the Board’s decision expressly referred to the All-India Cost of Living Index published by the Labour Bureau of the Government of India, with a base year of 1944 set at 100, and that the dearness allowance was fixed in accordance with that index. Since the relevant statistics were available to the Board, it could not be said to have been handicapped in this respect. After evaluating all the grounds of attack on the validity and binding nature of the Wage Board’s decision, the Court concluded that the decision could not be sustained and must be set aside. Accordingly, the petitions were allowed, and the petitioners were entitled to an order declaring that section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act was ultra vires the Constitution of India and that the Wage Board’s decision dated 30 April 1957 was illegal and void.

The Court held that section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, was beyond the powers of the legislature because it violated the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the Court declared that the decision of the Wage Board dated 30 April 1957 was illegal and void. Regarding costs, the Court observed that the petitioners had failed on most of their arguments concerning the constitutionality of the Act, and therefore the fairest order was that each party should bear and pay its own costs in these petitions. The matter also involved Civil Appeals numbered 699-703 of 1957, which were filed against the same Wage Board decision. Those appeals sought to set aside the decision on the ground that it threatened the very existence of the newspaper establishments concerned and infringed their fundamental rights. Special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution had been granted by this Court for each of those appeals, although the question of whether the appeals were maintainable was left open for argument. The Court noted that these appeals fell within the scope of the judgment it had just delivered in Petition No. 91 of 1957 and others, and that the appellants would be entitled, in each appeal, to a declaration that the Wage Board’s decision was ultra vires the Working Journalists Act of 1955 and therefore void and inoperative.

Having reached that conclusion, the Court felt it unnecessary to examine further whether the appeals were maintainable under Article 136, because the appellants had already achieved substantial success in their petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court regarded the remaining issue as purely academic and refrained from spending additional time on it. The final order therefore contained no substantive relief other than directing that each party to the proceedings should bear and pay its own costs. Accordingly, the petitions were allowed and the civil appeals were disposed of as directed.