D. S. Garewal vs The State of Punjab and Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 426 of 1958

Decision Date: 11 December 1958

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah

In the matter of D. S. Garewal versus the State of Punjab and another, decided on 11 December 1958, the Supreme Court of India considered an appeal challenging the constitutional validity of the All‑India Services Act (LXI of 1951) and the legality of disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner. The judgment was authored by Justice K. N. Wanchoo, and the bench was comprised of Justices K. N. Wanchoo, S. K. Das, P. B. Gajendragadkar and M. Hidayatullah. The case was reported in 1959 AIR 512 and in the 1959 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports at page 792, and it has been cited in subsequent reports including RF 1967 SC 212, R 1968 SC 754, RF 1970 SC 150, RF 1973 SC 1461, RF 1975 SC 446, R 1982 SC 1126, R 1983 SC 937, and F 1985 SC 421. The central issue for determination was whether the All‑India Services Act, enacted by the provisional Parliament, was a constitutionally valid enactment. At the time of its passage there was only one legislative chamber, and under the powers conferred by article 392 of the Constitution the President issued the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No. II on 26 January 1950, which among other things effected an adaptation of article 312(1) by removing the clause that required a resolution of the Council of States, supported by not less than two‑thirds of the members present and voting, declaring that it was necessary or expedient in the national interest. The petitioner had been appointed to the Indian Police Service in 1949 and was serving as Superintendent of Police in Punjab in 1957 when he was demoted to Assistant Superintendent of Police. He was informed that disciplinary action would be taken against him under rule 5 of the All‑India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, which had been framed under section 3 of the All‑India Services Act. Consequently, he was placed under suspension and an officer was directed to conduct a departmental enquiry. Upon receipt of the notice of enquiry, the petitioner filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court, challenging both the constitutional validity of the Act and the legality of the enquiry. The High Court dismissed the petition, leading to the present appeal. The petitioner’s contentions were threefold: first, that the President had exceeded the powers granted by article 392 in amending article 312 in the manner adopted; second, that the provisional Parliament lacked competence to enact the impugned Act because the condition precedent required by article 312 had not been complied with; and third, that the Rules were repugnant to article 312 because they were made at a time when the adaptation was no longer in force. The Court proceeded to examine these contentions in light of the constitutional provisions and the legislative history, ultimately holding that the contentions lacked substance and were to be rejected.

The Court observed that every contention put forward by the appellant lacked any substance and therefore had to be rejected. The Court explained that the authority granted to the President by Article 392 of the Constitution was sufficiently broad to permit him to make any adaptation, whether by modification, addition or omission, that he deemed necessary or expedient with respect to a particular constitutional article. Consequently, the Court held that the President could omit a condition precedent in Article 312 without exceeding his power, and that such omission was a valid adaptation. Because the adaptation was valid, the Court reasoned that no question of compliance with the omitted condition could arise, and the provisional Parliament was fully competent to enact the impugned Act. The Court noted that the decision in Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar, [1952] S.C.R. 89, was not applicable to the present situation. The Court further stated that the later re‑appearance of the omitted part of Article 312 before the Central Government framed the Rules under the Act could not affect the validity of those Rules, since the Act itself was a permanent measure and the Rules derived their force from that Act. The Court reaffirmed the well‑settled principle that the legislature may delegate to other authorities the power to frame rules necessary to give effect to the purposes of the law it has enacted, and that such delegation may extend to an executive authority within the bounds prescribed by law. In support of this principle, the Court referred to the decisions in Re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, [1951] S.C.R. 747 and Rajnarain Singh v. The Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 290. The Court rejected the argument that expressions such as “Parliament may by law provide” or “Parliament may by law confer” in the Constitution necessarily excluded the possibility of delegation. It observed that each case required a determination of whether the intention was to have the entire provision enacted as statutory law without recourse to any rules framed under delegated authority. Given the numerous and varied provisions contemplated by Article 312, the Court found it impossible to conclude that all of them were intended to be enacted solely as statute law, with nothing left for delegation to the executive. The Court therefore dismissed the suggestion that Article 312 prohibited Parliament from delegating to the Central Government the authority to frame rules relating to recruitment and conditions of the All‑India Services. The contention that Section 3 of the Act was vitiated by excessive delegation was likewise found to be without merit, as the Act did not prescribe any policy. The Court observed that Section 4 of the Act, when read with Section 3(2), demonstrated that there was no delegation of power to the Central Government under Section 3(1) beyond what was justified by the special circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the Court concluded that there was no basis for the argument that only the Central Government, and not the Punjab Government, could institute the enquiry. The Court noted that Rule 5 of the Rules required that the enquiry be initiated by the Government under which the concerned officer served, although the ultimate punishment might have to be imposed by the Central Government in accordance with Rule 4(1).

The Court observed that the provisions of the Act were not applied beyond what the special circumstances of the case justified. It held that there was no basis for the argument that only the Central Government, and not the Punjab Government, could commence the enquiry. Rule 5 of the Rules made clear that the enquiry had to be started by the government under which the officer concerned served, although the ultimate punishment, as prescribed by Rule 4(1), might have to be imposed by the Central Government. The appeal, identified as Civil Appeal No 426 of 1958, was taken by special leave from the judgment and order dated 30 July 1958 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ Application No 732 of 1958. Counsel for the appellant consisted of three members, while the State of Punjab was represented by the Advocate‑General and an Additional Advocate‑General, and counsel for respondent No 1 was also involved. Counsel for the Intervener appeared on behalf of an interested party. The judgment was delivered on 11 December 1958 by Justice Wanchoo. The appeal raised the constitutional validity of the All‑India Services Act, 1951 (hereinafter “the Act”). The appellant had been appointed to the Indian Police Service on 1 October 1949 and posted in Punjab, serving as Superintendent of Police in several districts before being reverted to Assistant Superintendent of Police in August 1957 and subsequently posted to Dharamsala in March 1958. In that month he received notice that disciplinary action might be taken against him under rule 5 of the All‑India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, framed under section 3 of the Act. He was then placed under suspension pursuant to rule 7 of the Rules pending disciplinary proceedings, and Shri K. L. Bhuridaja S. was appointed as the enquiry officer to conduct the departmental enquiry. The enquiry officer issued a notice to the appellant in July 1958. The appellant promptly filed an application under article 226 of the Constitution before the Punjab High Court challenging both the constitutionality of the Act and the legality of the enquiry. The High Court dismissed the application on 30 July 1958, and the appellant’s request for a certificate to appeal to this Court was denied the following day. He thereafter applied for and was granted special leave to appeal. Counsel for the appellant presented six points in support of the appeal: (1) that the amendment made by the President in article 312 of the Constitution, executed under article 392 by the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No II of 26 January 1950, exceeded the President’s power under article 392; (2) that the provisional Parliament lacked competence to enact the Act in 1951 because the condition precedent for such an Act under article 312 had not been satisfied; (3) that the Rules, promulgated in 1955, were repugnant to article 312 since the President’s amendment by the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No 11 had ceased to have effect and article 312 stood as originally enacted; (4) that article 312 mandated Parliament to make a law regulating recruitment and conditions of service for all‑India services and barred delegation of that function to the Central Government, rendering section 3 of the Act invalid; (5) that, in any event, the delegation made by section 3 of the Act was excessive and therefore should be struck down; and (6) that the Punjab Government possessed no authority to institute proceedings under the Rules. The Court noted that points 1, 2 and 3 could be considered together for analysis.

In the appeal, the petitioner contended that the rules issued in 1955 were invalid because they conflicted with article 312 of the Constitution. The petitioner argued that the presidential amendment made through Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No 11 had lost its effect, so that in 1955 article 312 stood exactly as it was originally enacted. The petitioner further asserted that article 312 imposed a duty on Parliament to enact legislation governing the recruitment and service conditions of all‑India services created under that article, and that this duty could not be delegated to the Central Government; consequently, section 3 of the Act was claimed to be unconstitutional. Additionally, the petitioner maintained that even if any delegation were permissible, the delegation granted by section 3 of the Act was excessive and therefore that provision should be struck down. Finally, the petitioner argued that the Punjab Government lacked the authority to commence the proceedings under the said rules. The first three submissions were treated together by the Court. The Court then explained the scope of article 392, which allows the President, for the purpose of removing difficulties—especially those arising from the transition from the Government of India Act, 1935 to the present Constitution—to issue an order directing that the Constitution shall, for a specified period, operate subject to adaptations such as modifications, additions or omissions that the President deems necessary or expedient, provided that no such order may be issued after the first meeting of a duly constituted Parliament under Chapter 11 of Part V. The Court noted that the object of this provision is clear from its language. The Court also referred to article 379, which stipulates that until both Houses of Parliament have been duly constituted and summoned for their first session under the Constitution, the body that functioned as the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India immediately before the Constitution’s commencement shall act as the provisional Parliament and shall exercise all powers and perform all duties conferred on Parliament by the Constitution. Because only a single House existed during the transitional period, the Court observed that difficulties were inevitable in applying a Constitution that envisaged a bicameral legislature. To address these difficulties, the President issued Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No II on 26 January 1950, which among other changes also amended article 312. The order directed that clause (1) of article 312 should omit the words “if the Council of States has declared by resolution supported by not less than two‑thirds of the members present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in the national interest so to do.” This order took effect immediately and was to remain in force until both Houses of Parliament were duly constituted and summoned for their first session. After the deletion, article 312 read, in clause (1): “Notwithstanding anything in Part XI, Parliament may by law provide for the creation of one or more all‑India services common to …”

The provision of Article 312(1) allowed the Union and the States, subject to the other provisions of the Chapter, to regulate the recruitment and the conditions of service of persons appointed to any all‑India service. Article 312(2) declared that the services known at the commencement of the Constitution as the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service would be deemed to be services created by Parliament under that article. The petitioners argued that, although the President unquestionably possessed the authority to make adaptations under Article 392, he had exceeded that authority by completely omitting the words that had been removed from Article 312. They suggested that a proper adaptation would have been achieved if, in the original text of Article 312, the phrase “Council of States” had been substituted with the phrase “provisional Parliament”. Such a substitution would have required a resolution of the provisional Parliament, rather than a resolution of the Council of States, for the creation and regulation of recruitment and conditions of service of an all‑India service common to the Union and the States. To support this submission, reliance was placed on the decision in Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar (1), where the Court, while considering an adaptation made to Article 368 by the same order, observed that “the adaptation leaves the requirement of a special majority untouched”. The petitioners contended that, had the President made the adaptation in the manner proposed by counsel—namely, by replacing the words rather than deleting them—the requirement of a resolution supported by the requisite majority would have remained intact and the action would have fallen within the President’s constitutional power. Because the entire portion was omitted, they argued, the President had exceeded his authority. The petitioners further noted that the Sankari Prasad Singh case (1) did not hold that an adaptation of Article 368 made in any other manner would be invalid or unconstitutional. The reference to the special‑majority requirement was made solely to stress that there was no substantive ground for grievance, and not to imply that the adaptation would have been improper if that provision had not been retained. The Court, in that case, had pointed out that Article 392 was expressed in very wide terms, permitting an order to be issued for the removal of any difficulties. Likewise, the nature of an adaptation under Article 392 was also expressed broadly and could take the form of a modification, addition, or omission. In the instance of Article 368, the President considered it necessary or expedient to adopt a modification, whereas for Article 312 he deemed an omission of certain words to be necessary or expedient. Consequently, the power conferred on the President by Article 392 was extremely wide, and it could not be said that the President was permitted to make an adaptation in one form but barred from doing so in another.

In this case, the Court observed that the Constitution granted the President the discretion to decide whether an adaptation of a constitutional provision should be effected by modification, addition, or omission. Accordingly, the Court held that when the President considered it necessary or expedient to omit certain words from a particular article, such a decision did not exceed the authority conferred by Article 392. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Act could not be struck down on the basis that the President had acted beyond his power under Article 392, and that, had the President not exercised this power, a resolution of the provisional Parliament bearing the required majority would have been needed before any legislation could be introduced to regulate recruitment and conditions of service of an all‑India service.

The Court further noted that once it was established that the President’s omission in Article 312 fell within his constitutional authority, there remained little substance to the other two arguments presented by counsel for the petitioner. The first of those arguments claimed that the provisional Parliament lacked competence to pass the 1951 Act because the condition precedent stipulated by Article 312—namely, the passage of a resolution with the requisite majority—had not been satisfied. The Court explained that the removal of the words creating that condition, effected by the President’s order under Article 392, meant that the provisional Parliament could validly pass the Act without any prior resolution. Regarding the second argument, which contended that the Rules issued in 1955 were inconsistent with Article 312 because the previously omitted words had re‑appeared, the Court dismissed this claim as entirely without merit. The Court clarified that the re‑appearance of those words in Article 312 after the expiration of the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No. II in 1952 had no bearing on the validity of the Rules. The Rules were framed under the power given to the Central Government by the Act, and provided the Act itself was valid when enacted, the Central Government possessed the authority to make permanent rules under it. Therefore, the 1955 Rules could not be challenged on the ground that the omitted words had re‑entered Article 312.

Having found no force in any of the three points raised, the Court rejected them all. Turning to the fourth contention, the Court addressed the argument that Article 312 imposed a mandatory duty on Parliament to enact the law governing recruitment and conditions of service of all‑India services, and thus Parliament could not delegate any portion of that work to the Central Government by way of Rules. The Court proceeded to examine this submission in the context of established principles on legislative delegation, as set out in the preceding portion of the judgment.

The Court observed that it is well settled that the legislature may validly delegate to other authorities the power to frame rules necessary to give effect to the purposes of legislation it has enacted, a principle that was affirmed by the majority of the Judges in Re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (1). The decision in the Delhi Laws case was subsequently examined in Rajnarain Singh v. The Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna (2), where the Court held that such delegation may extend to authorising an executive authority to modify the law that has been made, provided that the essential features of the law are not altered. The Court further noted that the notion of what constitutes an essential feature cannot be expressed in broad, general terms. Consequently, the Court concluded that delegation of legislative functions to executive authorities is permissible, but only within prescribed limits. In the present matter, Section 3 of the Act provides that the Central Government, after consulting the Governments of the States concerned, may make rules for the regulation of recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to an all‑India service. The section also mandates that every rule made under it must be laid before Parliament for a period of not less than fourteen days as soon as possible after its formulation, and that such rules are subject to modification, either by repeal or amendment, on a motion moved in the session of Parliament in which they are laid. Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Chatterjee, contended that Article 312 of the Constitution permits no delegation at all and that the Constitution requires Parliament itself to frame the entire law relating to the regulation of recruitment and conditions of service of all‑India services. Accordingly, the Court needed to examine whether any expression in Article 312 removes the usual power of delegation that ordinarily resides with the legislature. Emphasis was placed on the phrase “Parliament may by law provide” appearing in Article 312. It was submitted that this wording should be interpreted to mean that no delegation is permissible in a law made under Article 312. The Court’s attention was directed to the language of Article 245, which states “Parliament may make laws,” and it was argued that the wording in Article 312 is of a special form, requiring Parliament to provide, by law, for the regulation of recruitment and conditions of service and thereby precluding any delegation to other authorities. Reference was also made to the expressions used in Article 138(1) (“Parliament may by law confer”), Article 138(2) (“Parliament may by law provide”), Article 139 (“Parliament may by law confer”), and Article 148(3) (“as may be determined by Parliament by law”). In contrast, the Court noted that Article 173(c) provides for action “by or under any law made by Parliament” and Article 293(2) uses similar language, suggesting that the Constitution does not categorically prohibit delegation where the phrase “may by law” appears.

The Court observed that when the Constitution employs the phrases “may by law confer” or “may by law provide,” it does not categorically prohibit the delegation of authority. The Court held that each constitutional provision must be examined to determine whether the framers intended the entire matter to be settled solely by legislation without any rule‑making power being delegated. Accordingly, the Court examined article 312 to ascertain whether the Constitution required that the regulation of recruitment and conditions of service for an all‑India service be effected only by statute, leaving no scope for delegating rule‑making powers. The Court noted that regulating recruitment and conditions of service inevitably involves a large number of detailed rules, which may need to be altered frequently in response to the changing needs of public administration. The framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of this practical requirement, and it would be unreasonable to conclude that they intended Parliament itself to draft every such rule and to amend them through the lengthy legislative process each time an adjustment was necessary. Consequently, the Court concluded that article 312 was not intended to demand that all the myriad provisions required for regulating recruitment and service conditions be enacted as primary legislation, with no delegation to the executive. In the context of article 312, the words used do not exclude the delegation of rule‑making authority for the regulation of recruitment and conditions of service of all‑India services. The Court therefore could not read article 312 as prohibiting Parliament from delegating to the Central Government the power to frame rules on these matters, and it rejected the contention that such a prohibition existed. Turning to the argument that, even if delegation were permissible, the present legislation involved excessive delegation and should be struck down, the Court examined the structure of the Act. The Act consists of four short sections: the first provides the short title, the second defines the term “all‑India service,” the third confers on the Central Government the authority to formulate rules for recruitment and service conditions after consulting the concerned State Governments, and stipulates that all such rules must be presented to Parliament and may be altered by Parliament. Section 4, which is pivotal, states that all rules that were in force immediately before the Act’s commencement and applicable to an all‑India service shall continue to operate and shall be deemed to have been made under the Act. The Court therefore found that the Act does not abandon legislative policy or standards, but rather provides a framework within which the Central Government may make detailed rules, subject to parliamentary oversight.

The provision in Section 4 states that “rules in force immediately before the commencement of this Act and applicable to an all‑India service shall continue to be in force and shall be deemed to be rules made under this Act.” It was argued that the Act therefore contains no legislative policy or standard and that all authority is left to the Central Government. In support of this contention reference was made to the observations of Mukherjea, in Re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 at page 982, where he explained that “the essential legislative function consists in the determination or choosing of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct. It is open to the legislature to formulate the policy as broadly and with as little or as much detail as it thinks proper and it may delegate the rest of the legislative work to a subordinate authority who will work out the details within the framework of that policy. So long as a policy is laid down and a standard established by statute no constitutional delegation of legislative power is involved in leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the legislation is to apply.” The argument therefore asserted that, in this case, Parliament had not performed the essential legislative function because it had not determined or chosen a legislative policy nor formally enacted that policy into a binding rule of conduct. At first glance, the language of the Act appears to give some weight to this contention.

However, a careful examination of Section 4, together with its scope and purpose, demonstrates that Parliament did in fact lay down a legislative policy and formally enact it. The section adopts the rules that were already in force at the time the Act commenced and states that those rules shall continue to be in force and shall be deemed to be made under the Act. This adoption means that the legislature expressly incorporated the pre‑existing rules governing the two all‑India services into the statutory framework, thereby establishing a clear standard for recruitment and conditions of service. Although Section 4 is concise, it functions as a statutory provision that embraces all the rules operative at the commencement of the Act. By deeming those rules to be made under the Act, Parliament provided the necessary foundation for the Central Government, under Section 3, to add to, alter, vary, or amend those rules in the future. Consequently, Section 4 undeniably set the legislative policy and created a binding rule of conduct for the two all‑India services with respect to recruitment and service conditions.

In this case the Court observed that section 4 of the Act embodied the legislative policy and established a uniform standard that the Central Government was required to follow. By enacting section 4 the Parliament effectively turned that policy into a mandatory rule of conduct. Section 3 then conferred on the Central Government the authority to make future rules that could add to, modify, vary or amend the rules that had been incorporated under section 4, and that such future rules would be binding. Because the rules covered the all‑India services that are common to both the Central and State Governments, section 3 additionally required that any new rule be framed only after consultation with the State Governments. The Court further noted that Parliament ensured that every rule made under the Act had to be laid before Parliament for a period of fourteen days before it could come into force, and that each such rule remained subject to repeal or amendment through a motion moved by Parliament in the same session in which the rule was laid. This procedure, the Court held, demonstrates that Parliament did not surrender its authority; rather, it retained continual supervision and control over the delegated power. Consequently, when section 4 is read together with section 3(2), the Court found that, even in the special circumstances of the present matter, there was no excess in the delegation of power to the Central Government under section 3(1). Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Act could not be invalidated on the ground of excessive delegation.

The Court then turned to the final contention raised by the respondents, namely that the Government of Punjab lacked the authority to initiate the proceedings under the Rules. To address this point the Court examined the relevant provisions of the Rules. Rule 3 enumerates seven categories of penalty that may be imposed. Rule 4 identifies the authorities empowered to impose each penalty, specifying that three of the penalties—dismissal, removal and compulsory retirement—are exclusive to the Central Government, while the remaining four penalties may be imposed by a State Government. Rule 5 lays down the procedure to be followed when a penalty is to be imposed. The argument advanced by the respondents was that, because the charge against the appellant was serious and could potentially result in dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, the enquiry should have been instituted by the Central Government. The Court rejected this submission. Firstly, the Court observed that at the commencement of an enquiry it is not possible to predict whether any penalty will be imposed, let alone which specific penalty among the seven listed in Rule 3 might be applied. Hence, even assuming that the authority imposing the penalty must also commence the enquiry, it could not be said at this early stage that the Punjab Government, which is capable of imposing four of the seven penalties, was an improper body to institute the enquiry. Secondly, the Court noted that a careful reading of Rule 5 reveals the intention that the enquiry be instituted by the Government under which the officer is serving, even in cases where the ultimate penalty might be one that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central Government. Accordingly, the Court held that the Punjab Government possessed the requisite authority to commence the enquiry under the Rules.

The Court explained that Rule 4(2) mandates that for the four penalties which a State Government may impose, the enquiry must be instituted by the Government under which the officer was serving at the time of the act or omission that rendered him liable to punishment. It pointed out that Rule 2(b) defines “Government”, and its third clause provides that when a member of service is serving in connection with the affairs of a State, the Government means that State’s Government. Because the appellant was serving in connection with the affairs of the State of Punjab, the Court held that, for the purposes of Rule 5, the Government referred to is the Punjab Government, and consequently the Punjab Government alone could take the steps prescribed in Rule 5. The Court observed that Rules 5(1) to 5(8) lay down the procedure for such enquiries, and that the word “government” used in these sub‑rules therefore denotes the Punjab Government in the present case. Rule 5(9) deals with the post‑enquiry stage; it provides that after the enquiry is completed and the punishing authority reaches a provisional conclusion on the penalty, if the proposed penalty is dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or reduction in rank, the charged member must be given a copy of the enquiry report and a further opportunity to show cause why the proposed penalty should not be imposed. The Court noted that the use of the term “punishing authority” rather than “government” indicates that the question of punishment arises only after the enquiry, and that the appropriate Government would then consider that question. If the punishment falls within the three categories listed in Rule 4(1), the enquiry report must be forwarded to the Central Government so that it may determine the provisional punishment and communicate it to the officer, in compliance with Article 311(2). The Court concluded that the institution of the enquiry is contemplated by Rule 5 to be carried out by the Government of the State whose affairs the officer is serving, which in this case is the Punjab Government, while the Central Government would become involved only after the enquiry if one of the three penalties in Rule 4(1) is to be imposed. Accordingly, the Court rejected the contention that the Central Government should have instituted the enquiry and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The Court concluded that the appeal could not be sustained and therefore ordered that it be dismissed. In addition, the Court directed that the financial costs incurred in the proceedings be awarded to the State of Punjab. Accordingly, the State of Punjab was entitled to receive the costs, and the appellant was required to bear the expense of the litigation. By entering this order, the Court formally closed the matter, indicating that the appeal was dismissed and that the State of Punjab would recover the costs associated with the case. The dismissal of the appeal, together with the award of costs to the State of Punjab, constituted the final disposition of the proceedings.