Attar Singh and Others vs The State Of U.P

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Writ Petition No. 119 of 1957

Decision Date: 17 December 1958

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha

In the matter titled Attar Singh and Others v. The State of U P, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 17 December 1958. The opinion was authored by Justice K N Wanchoo and the bench comprised Justices K N Wanchoo, Natwarlal H Bhagwati and Bhuvneshwar P Sinha. The petitioners, identified as Attar Singh and several others, challenged the constitutional validity of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, originally enacted as Uttar Pradesh V of 1954 and subsequently amended by Act No XVI of 1957. The specific provisions under scrutiny included sections 8, 9, 10, 14 to 17, 19 to 22 and 49 of the amended statute. Their challenge invoked Articles 14 and 31(2) of the Constitution of India. The petitioners argued that the Act, which was designed to promote agricultural development by reallocating compact land parcels to tenure‑holders in place of scattered holdings, discriminated against them in several respects. First, they claimed that sections 8, 9 and 10, read with section 49, prescribed a procedure for correcting and revising revenue records in 929 villages subject to consolidation that differed materially from the procedure applicable under the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act of 1901, thereby creating an unjust classification. Second, they contended that sections 14 to 17 as well as sections 19 to 22, when read together with section 49, conferred arbitrary powers on the consolidation authorities over the petitioners’ lands and stripped them of the judicial protection ordinarily available to other tenure‑holders. Third, they argued that section 29B, which dealt with compensation, provided an inadequate amount of compensation and thus violated Article 31(2). The factual background revealed that a notification issued under section 4 of the impugned Act declared the State Government’s decision to formulate a consolidation scheme for the area where the petitioners held land, and this was followed by a statement of proposals under section 19. The petitioners objected to these proposals and appealed to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) without success. After careful consideration, the Court held that the petitioners’ contentions must fail. While acknowledging that the procedure laid down by the Act differed in some respects from that prescribed by the 1901 Revenue Act, the Court found the procedure to be neither arbitrary nor devoid of natural justice. It observed that the differences were justified by the substantial advantages that consolidation offered to tenure‑holders and therefore constituted a permissible classification based on an intelligible differentia reasonably connected with the object of the legislation. Consequently, the expeditious procedure for effecting consolidation contained in Chapter II of the Act, read with the applicable Rules, could not be said to violate Article 14. For similar reasons, the provisions of Chapter III were also held not to infringe Article 14. The Court further ruled that section 22(2), which made the arbitrator’s decision final and ousted the jurisdiction of ordinary courts even where a party had obtained a decree that might be appealed, was necessary in the interest of expedition. Considering the special conditions prevailing in such cases and the benefits a consolidation scheme provided to the entire body of tenure‑holders, the Court concluded that the cash compensation provided by section 29B was not inadequate, even assuming the applicability of Article 31(2). The judgment was rendered in the original jurisdiction of Writ Petition No 119 of 1957, filed under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the petitioners included Achhru Ram, J P Goyal and K L Mehta, while the State was represented by H N Sanyal, the Additional Solicitor‑General of India, assisted by K L.

The Court observed that the rules prescribed under the Act could not be said to infringe the equality provision of Article 14 of the Constitution. For the same reason, the provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act were also held not to be violative of Article 14. The Court explained that Section 22(2) of the Act, which makes the arbitrator’s decision final by excluding the ordinary courts’ jurisdiction even when a decree subject to appeal has been obtained, was justified by the need for speedy resolution of consolidation matters. Considering the special circumstances that arise in consolidation cases and the benefit that a consolidation scheme offers to all tenure‑holders, the Court concluded that the cash compensation prescribed for tenure‑holders under Section 29B of the impugned Act could not be regarded as inadequate, even if Article 31(2) of the Constitution were applicable.

The judgment originated as an original jurisdiction writ petition numbered 119 of 1957, filed under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The petition was presented on behalf of four brothers who owned land in the village of Banat, tahsil Kairana, District Muzaffarnagar. A notification issued under Section 4 of the Act declared that the State Government intended to implement a consolidation scheme covering 223 villages in the same tahsil. Subsequent actions under various sections of the Act led to the preparation of a statement of proposals under Section 19. The petitioners and other interested parties lodged objections to these proposals, and those objections were decided in April 1956. The petitioners appealed the decision to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), whose order was rendered in August 1957. Following that order, the petitioners filed the present writ petition in this Court.

The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the Act on several grounds, specifically raising five principal objections. First, they argued that Section 6 read with Section 4 gave the State Government arbitrary power to treat tenure‑holders differently by selecting certain villages for consolidation while excluding others, thereby violating Article 14. Second, they contended that Sections 8, 9 and 10, read with Section 49, established a procedure for correcting and revising revenue records in consolidated villages that was fundamentally different from the procedure applicable to villages not under consolidation, constituting discrimination in breach of Article 14. Third, they raised concerns regarding Sections 14 to 17, which were also alleged to create discriminatory effects. The Court proceeded to examine these submissions in detail.

In the petition, the parties argued that when sections 14 to 17 are read together with section 49 of the Act, they grant consolidation authorities arbitrary power to dispossess a tenure‑holder of his land or any rights therein. The petitioners contended that such a tenure‑holder was denied the judicial protection that other tenure‑holders in villages not placed under consolidation enjoyed, thereby creating discrimination that violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The petition further asserted that sections 19 to 22, also read with section 49, produced the same kind of discrimination on the basis articulated in sections 14 to 17 and were therefore also struck down as violative of Article 14. In addition, the petition claimed that section 29‑B, which deals with compensation, provided inadequate remuneration and consequently infringed Article 31(2) of the Constitution. Before addressing each of these contentions individually, the Court considered the historical background of the legislation. The Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act No. VIII was originally enacted in 1939, but it proved ineffective because it could be invoked only when more than one‑third of the village’s cultivators applied for a consolidation order. Consequently, the legislature recognized that a compulsory element was required to achieve the desired consolidation of holdings. The purpose of consolidating holdings was understood to be the improvement of agricultural productivity, and after the 1944 Final Report of the Famine Inquiry Commission recommended compulsory consolidation schemes, several states adopted such measures. The State of Bombay was the first to enact the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act (Bombay Act LXII of 1947), which was subsequently followed by the Uttar Pradesh Act that is the subject of the present challenge. The stated objective of the Uttar Pradesh Act was to allocate compact parcels of land in place of scattered plots to tenure‑holders, thereby facilitating large‑scale cultivation and providing a range of ancillary benefits. These benefits included the reduction of boundary lines, leading to land savings and fewer boundary disputes; a decrease in the time required to manage fields because farmers would no longer need to travel between widely separated strips of land; the ease of erecting proper barriers such as fences, hedges, and ditches around a single compact area to prevent trespass and theft; improved control of irrigation and drainage, which would lessen water‑related disputes; and more effective management of pests, insects, and plant diseases on contiguous holdings. All of these advantages were intended to promote agricultural development and increase food‑grain production, which was considered a pressing need of the period. With these objectives in mind, the Uttar Pradesh Legislature passed the Act in 1953, obtained the President’s assent on March 4, 1954, and caused its publication in the Gazette on March 8, 1954, after which declarations under section 4 were issued for the principal areas of the State, including the petitioners’ village.

The portion of the State of Uttar Pradesh that includes the petitioners’ village was declared under the Act in July 1954. The statute provides a four‑stage process for village consolidation. In the first stage, the revenue records are corrected, a matter dealt with by sections 7 to 12. The second stage involves preparation of statements of principles, governed by sections 14 to 18; objections to those principles are entertained, decided, and the principles are thereafter confirmed under section 18. The third stage, covered by sections 19 to 23, concerns the preparation of a statement of proposals; objections to the proposals are likewise invited and disposed of, and the proposals are confirmed under section 23. Once the proposals have been confirmed, the final stage commences, in which the confirmed proposals are enforced pursuant to section 24 and the following provisions. From the objects of the Act and the benefits that flow from its implementation, it is clear that the legislation is intended to be a boon to tenure‑holders in a village and to promote agricultural development and increased food production. It is in this context that the challenge to the constitutionality of the Act must be examined. Section 6 of the Act empowers the State Government, at any time, to cancel the declaration made under section 4 with respect to the whole or any part of the area specified therein. When such a cancellation occurs, the area ceases to be under consolidation operations and the effect of the declaration, as provided by section 5, also ceases. The contention raised is that section 4 confers an arbitrary power on the State Government to cancel the declaration, even partially, thereby creating discrimination between villages that are under consolidation and those that are not. The learned Additional Solicitor General responded on two fronts: first, that section 6 merely restates a power already available to the State Government under the General Clauses Act; second, that the high status of the authority—namely the State Government—and the Rules made under the Act, which prescribe a standard for the Government to follow, remove any suggestion of arbitrariness that the wording of the section might convey. The Court found it unnecessary to express an opinion on this contention because, even if accepted, the only result would be the striking down of section 6, leaving the petitioners in the same position whether section 6 is retained or removed. It may be that a citizen whose order of consolidation was made in his favour and later cancelled could approach the Court with a grievance that the beneficial order was revoked.

The Court observed that even if a power were exercised under a provision that might later be declared void, the question of whether that power could be challenged would arise only in a case where the petitioners’ rights were directly affected. It further noted that the petitioners’ grievance would not be harmed by severing section 6 from the remainder of the Act, because the authority to cancel an order of consolidation is not so inseparably intertwined with the authority to issue such an order that one cannot function without the other. The Court held that the legislature could have bestowed on the Government the power to order consolidation without simultaneously granting it the power to rescind that order, and therefore the two powers are clearly capable of being separated. Since the petitioners’ claim does not depend on the validity of section 6, the Court declined to decide the issue now and left it open for determination in a suitable future case.

Regarding the first stage of revising and correcting maps and records before a consolidation scheme becomes effective, the Court explained the procedure prescribed in the Act. Section 7 directs the Assistant Consolidation Officer to examine the revenue records and to test the accuracy of the village map, the khasra and the current annual registers by making a partal in accordance with a rule that will be issued. After completing the partal, the Officer must prepare a statement indicating the errors discovered in the map, the khasra and the khatauni, together with the number and nature of any land‑record disputes arising under the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1901. Under section 8 the Assistant Consolidation Officer submits this report to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) along with an opinion on whether any revision of the maps and records is required. Upon receipt of the report, the Settlement Officer may either direct the Assistant Consolidation Officer to proceed with correcting the maps and records, which is likely when the mistakes are few, or may recommend to the State Government that a full revision be undertaken in accordance with Chapter IV of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1901, which is expected when many errors are found. If the Assistant Consolidation Officer is instructed to make corrections, he will conduct a further partal if necessary and amend the map or the entries in the annual register according to the procedure laid down in rule 22. That rule requires the Officer to issue a notice to all persons affected by the provisional entries, invite objections, examine and hear the parties, record their evidence and then effect the corrections. The order made by the Assistant Consolidation Officer may be appealed within twenty‑one days under section 8(4) to the Consolidation Officer, whose decision is final. The Court noted that this procedure differs fundamentally from the procedure prescribed under the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act.

The Court observed that the procedure prescribed under the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, coupled with the effect of section 49 of that Act, bars the jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts in any matters arising out of consolidation proceedings. Consequently, persons affected by orders of the Consolidation Officer are deprived of the right to institute a suit that they could otherwise have filed under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, as indicated in sections 40, 41, 51 and 54. The Court acknowledged that a difference undeniably exists between the procedure laid down in the Act and the procedure that tenure‑holders would be entitled to if their village were not subject to consolidation. However, the Court held that where consolidation constitutes a benefit to the tenure‑holders of a village, and where the process must be completed within a reasonable period, it is necessary to adopt a procedure that is shorter than the ordinary procedure provided by the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act or a suit in a civil or revenue court.

The Court further held that the procedure established by the Act cannot be described as arbitrary or as lacking the essential elements of natural justice. Under the scheme, the Assistant Consolidation Officer is required to give notice to all persons affected, to hear any objections raised, and to afford those persons an opportunity to produce evidence. After considering the objections, the Assistant Consolidation Officer makes a decision, and only one appeal lies against his order. In the Court’s opinion, this single level of appeal is sufficient in the special circumstances created by the Act to ensure justice for those who contest the correction of records.

The Court noted that the reduction of the number of appeals to one does not represent a drastic departure from the ordinary procedural framework. Accordingly, the Court declined to strike down the provisions contained in Chapter II of the Act on the ground of discrimination, given the peculiar circumstances of a consolidation scheme that must be effected within a reasonable timeframe. The Court reasoned that any variance from the ordinary procedure may be justified as a permissible classification based on an intelligible differentia that bears a reasonable relationship to the objective sought to be achieved by the legislation.

Moreover, the Court pointed out that section 12 provides that where a dispute arises as to title and such a question has not already been determined by a competent court, the Consolidation Officer must refer the matter to the Civil Judge, who in turn refers it to an arbitrator. The arbitrator then proceeds in accordance with rule 73, giving a hearing to the parties, taking both oral and documentary evidence, and finally rendering an award. Section 37 of the Act incorporates the Arbitration Act to govern the procedural aspects of the arbitrator’s proceedings. Considering the scheme of Chapter II and the necessity for a more expeditious process when consolidation is to be carried out, the Court concluded that there exists a rational basis for the classification embodied in the Act.

The Court observed that the procedure set out in Chapter 11 of the Act, together with the applicable Rules, is justified in villages where a consolidation scheme is intended to be implemented. Accordingly, the challenge raised under Article 14 of the Constitution to the provisions of Chapter II cannot succeed. The objections identified in paragraphs 3 and 4 may be considered together because they both attack the provisions of Chapter III that govern the Statement of Principles and the Statement of Proposals. The process begins with the publication of the Statement of Principles, after which objections are invited from interested parties. Under Section 17, the Assistant Consolidation Officer is required to consider the objections, hear the parties if necessary, and take into account the view expressed by the Consolidation Committee. After completing this assessment, the Assistant Consolidation Officer prepares a report that is submitted to the Consolidation Officer. The Consolidation Officer then conducts a hearing of the objectors, may call for additional evidence, and finally issues an order confirming the Statement of Principles, as prescribed in Rule 43‑B. A similar procedure is followed when the Statement of Proposals is published: objections are invited, and the same steps are applied to resolve those objections. In the case of the proposals, the legislation also provides a mechanism for referring any disputed question of title to the Civil Judge, who in turn refers the matter to an arbitrator. Section 22 of the Act provides that once a question of title has been referred to the arbitrator, all suits, appeals, references or revisions in the court of first instance that involve the same question of title must be stayed. Section 22(3) declares the arbitrator’s decision to be final, and Chapter III contains no provision for an appeal, even though two officials – the Assistant Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Officer – actually hear the matter. The principal criticism focuses on Section 22(2), where it is argued that even if a party has obtained a decree that could be appealed, the ordinary courts lose jurisdiction and the arbitrator’s decision becomes final. The Court acknowledged that this observation is correct, but held that such a provision is essential for the timely execution of consolidation schemes. Without it, consolidation could be indefinitely delayed because numerous disputes would remain pending in the courts, defeating the purpose of the scheme. The reasoning previously applied to the second point also supports the view that there is a rational basis for the classification, which is closely linked to the objective of the Act. Consequently, the challenge under Article 14 to the provisions of Chapter III must likewise fail.

Regarding the fifth point, the Court noted that the contention concerns the alleged inadequacy of the compensation prescribed in Section 29‑B of the Act. It was observed that the original enactment of the Act did not contain any provision dealing with compensation. Subsequently, a series of writ applications were filed, highlighting the absence of a compensation mechanism before Section 29‑B was introduced. The Court therefore recognized that the issue of compensation must be examined in the context of the legislative history and the remedial measures that were later incorporated.

In the Allahabad High Court a decision was rendered that, because certain property had been taken away under Section 14(1)(ee) for public purposes without any compensation, the relevant provision was void under Article 31(2) as it stood before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 (hereinafter “the Fourth Amendment”). Appeals filed by the State Government against that judgment are presently pending before this Court, and they will be considered in a separate proceeding. Subsequent to the High Court judgment the legislature enacted Section 29‑B, which set out the principles for payment of compensation for lands acquired under Section 14(1)(ee) after the High Court decision. Section 29‑B was introduced by Act XVI of 1957 and was given retrospective effect from the date on which the original Act had come into force. It has been contended before us that the compensation prescribed in Section 29‑B is inadequate and, therefore, that the provision should be struck down under Article 31(2) as it existed prior to the Fourth Amendment. Arguments were also advanced concerning whether Section 29‑B would be saved by the Fourth Amendment. The Court, however, finds it unnecessary to pursue those submissions because, upon examination of the facts of the present case, it is concluded that the compensation scheme provided in Section 29‑B is sufficient. Assuming for the sake of argument that the case were still governed by Article 31(2) as it stood before the Fourth Amendment, Section 29‑B mandates cash compensation equal to four times the hereditary rate for a bhumidar and twice that rate for a sirdar. The distinction between the two rates has not been challenged, the Court noting that the rights of a bhumidar, who is the landowner, are substantially greater than those of a sirdar, who is merely a tenant. While it has been alleged that the amount awarded is not the fair market value of the land, the Court proceeds to examine the provisions of Section 14(1)(ee) to assess the actual impact on the petitioners.

Section 14(1)(ee) establishes the framework by which a tenure‑holder contributes land required for public purposes and specifies the extent to which vacant land may be utilized for that purpose. The present examination is limited to the first component, namely the contribution of tenure‑holders toward land needed for public purposes. In the facts before the Court, the petitioners owned land in one chak with a rental value of Rs 20‑6‑0, but they were allotted land having a rental value of Rs 20‑5‑0. In another chak, land that originally possessed a rental value of Rs 148‑10‑0 was replaced by land with a rental value of Rs 147‑13‑0. Consequently, out of land originally valued at Rs 169‑0‑0, the petitioners received land valued at Rs 168‑2‑0, while land valued at Annas 0‑14‑0 was transferred to a common pool. The net reduction represents just over half a percent of the total value, and such a loss rarely exceeds one percent. Thus the parcel of land taken over by the government is a very small portion, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the petitioners’ holdings.

In the present case, the pieces of land that were taken from the tenure‑holders were so small that, if sold separately, they would have fetched almost no value. These tiny parcels were collected from a number of tenure‑holders, brought together in one location, and combined with any vacant land that might have existed so that the land could be used in accordance with section 14 (1) (ee). By doing so, a compact tract of land was created, which was then made available for the use of the tenure‑holders themselves as well as for other villagers. Form CH‑21, prepared under rule 41 (1), set out the specific purposes for which this land would be employed. The form listed the following uses: (1) plantation of trees; (2) pasture land; (3) manure pits; (4) threshing floor; (5) cremation ground; (6) graveyards; (7) a primary or other school; (8) a playground; (9) a panchayat house; and (10) any other objects deemed appropriate. Accordingly, the small parcels acquired from the tenure‑holders were consolidated and applied to these purposes, which directly benefited the tenure‑holders. Although each holder lost a very small piece of land, in return they received advantages that arose from the creation of a much larger, unified area composed of the combined small pieces and any vacant land. The central issue, therefore, was whether, under these circumstances, the tenure‑holders could be said to have received adequate compensation pursuant to section 29‑B for the tiny portions of land taken for public purposes. This situation required distinction from cases where land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, because in the present case the benefit accrued directly to the tenure‑holders, whereas in ordinary public‑purpose acquisitions any benefit to the dispossessed person is typically indirect and remote. The State argued that the compensation owed to the tenure‑holders was not limited to the monetary amount specified in section 29‑B; it also included the advantage obtained from the consolidation of the small parcels into a larger tract of land, which would provide various benefits as indicated in form CH‑21, in addition to the benefit of having their scattered holdings merged into a compact block. The question, then, was whether the cash compensation alone under section 29‑B could be considered inadequate in light of these additional advantages. The Court held that, taking into account the unique circumstances of cases of this nature, and remembering that each individual tenure‑holder lost only a very small portion of land which was then merged with other similar parcels to form a larger area for the collective benefit of all tenure‑holders, it could not be said that the cash compensation, when added to the advantages derived from the newly created compact block, was insufficient. Consequently, assuming that article 31 (2) continued to apply as it had before the Fourth Amendment, the Court concluded that the compensation provided under section 29‑B was not inadequate.

In the matter before the Court, it was held that the compensation which the tenure‑holders are entitled to receive pursuant to section 29‑B could not be described as inadequate when considered in the factual circumstances of the case. The Court examined the statutory provision and the context of the land acquisition, and determined that the monetary award already incorporated the interests of the affected persons and was therefore consistent with the requirements of the statute. Accordingly, the submission that the compensation fell short of what was required was rejected. The assessment of adequacy was undertaken in light of the actual benefit that the tenure‑holders would obtain from the land consolidation scheme, and the Court concluded that the statutory compensation formula adequately addressed those interests. The petitioner's reliance on an alleged insufficiency was therefore unsupported by the record. The Court further observed that the particular ground of attack raised by the petitioner did not succeed. Because the petition did not establish any viable claim, the Court concluded that the petition lacked any substantive force. Having found no merit in the contention, the Court deemed the petition to be devoid of any substantive basis. On that basis, the Court ordered that the petition be dismissed and directed that the costs of the proceedings be borne by the petitioner, reflecting the principle that costs follow the unsuccessful party. The final operative part of the order therefore recorded that the petition was dismissed.