Virendra vs The State Of Punjab And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Petitions Nos. 95 and 96 of 1957

Decision Date: 6 September 1957

Coram: DAS C.J., Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, A.K. Sarkar

In the matter titled Virendra versus The State of Punjab and Another, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 6 September 1957. The bench for this case comprised Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice J. L. Kapur and Justice A. K. Sarkar, with Chief Justice Das, Justice Sudhi Ranjan also listed among the judges. The petitioner, identified as Virendra, brought the suit against the State of Punjab and another respondent, and the case was recorded as a connected petition. The judgment was cited as 1957 AIR 896 and 1958 SCR 308. The substantive issue involved the Press Control provisions of the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956 (No. 38 of 1956), specifically Sections 2 and 3, and their compatibility with the constitutional guarantees of Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 19(2) and 19(6) of the Constitution of India.

The two petitions under consideration challenged the constitutional validity of the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956, which had been enacted by the State Legislature in response to serious communal tension between Hindus and Akali Sikhs over the question of partition of the State on linguistic and communal lines. The petitioners were the editors, printers and publishers of two daily newspapers, “Pratap” and “Vir Arjun,” which were printed and published simultaneously from Jullundur and New Delhi. Both newspapers openly supported the “Save Hindi” agitation. Under Section 2(1)(a) of the impugned Act, the Home Secretary issued two notifications directed at the editor, printer and publisher of the Jullundur-based newspapers, prohibiting them from printing or publishing any matter concerning the “Save Hindi” agitation for a period of two months. In an identical manner, two further notifications issued under Section 3(1) targeted the editor, printer and publisher of the New Delhi-based newspapers, forbidding them from bringing the newspapers printed in New Delhi into the territory of Punjab from the date of the notifications onward.

The Court observed that Section 2(1) of the Act contained a built-in time limit for the operation of an order and also provided for a right of representation by the aggrieved person, whereas Section 3 did not contain any such provision. The petitioners contended that both Sections 2 and 3 were beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature because they infringed the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) and the freedom to carry on any trade, business or profession guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g). They argued that these provisions were not saved by the reasonable-restriction clauses in Articles 19(2) and 19(6). Further, the petitioners maintained that the provisions did not merely impose reasonable restrictions but amounted to a total prohibition of the exercise of the fundamental rights, by banning the publication of all matters related to the “Save Hindi” agitation under Section 2(1)(a) and by imposing a complete bar on the entry of the two newspapers into the whole of Punjab under Section 3(1). The petitioners pressed the view that, even assuming the provisions were merely restrictive, they were unreasonable because they gave the State Government unchecked discretion without any safeguard against abuse, and because the language of the sections was sufficiently wide to cover restrictions both within and beyond the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action.

It was submitted that the provisions did not merely impose restrictions but amounted to a total prohibition, that the restrictions were unreasonable, that the sections granted the State Government and its delegate unfettered and uncontrolled discretion, that the Act contained no safeguard against abuse of that power, and that the wording of the sections was so wide as to encompass restrictions both within and beyond the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action, rendering them ultra-vires the Constitution. It was further argued that the notification issued under section 2(1)(a) of the Act, as framed, would bar even the publication of any material concerning the “Save Hindi agitation” and should have been confined only to matters likely to prejudice public order.

The Court held that the restrictions imposed by section 2(1)(a) of the impugned Act qualified as reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Article 19(2) of the Constitution; consequently, the petition challenging the notifications issued under that provision must fail. However, the Court observed that section 3 of the Act did not specify any time limit for the operation of an order made thereunder nor did it provide for a representation by the aggrieved party to the State Government. Because of this deficiency, the restrictions imposed by section 3 could not be classified as reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) of the Constitution, and the petition challenging the notifications made under that provision must succeed.

The Court further observed that the right to freedom of speech and expression necessarily includes the right to propagate one’s views and that the various freedoms guaranteed by Article 19(1) are exercisable throughout India. Whether any restriction amounts to a total prohibition of the exercise of those rights must be assessed by reference to its scope. In the present case, the restrictions concerned publications on a single topic and limited the circulation of the newspapers to a specific territory; therefore, they did not constitute a total prohibition of the fundamental rights. The expression “in the interest of” in Articles 19(2) and 19(6) gives the protection a very wide ambit, and although the free interchange of views is ordinarily in the public interest, circumstances may arise where public order outweighs that interest, making reasonable restrictions on speech and on the freedom to carry on trade or business imperative.

Considering the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Act, its purpose, the seriousness and urgency of the problem it sought to address, and the enormous power of the press with modern rapid-circulation facilities—power that could be abused with harmful consequences—the Court concluded that the restrictions imposed by the Act were reasonable within the meaning of the relevant constitutional provisions. The decision in The State of Madras v. V. G. Row, (1952) S.C.R. 597, was followed. It was further noted that it was appropriate for the State Legislature to retain the wide preventive powers granted under the sections to the State Government or its delegate, subject to the safeguards articulated by the Court.

The Court observed that the authority granted to the State Government, which was entrusted with maintaining law and order, or to any person to whom that authority was delegated, was to be exercised according to the State’s own subjective satisfaction. The Court explained that if such exercise were made justiciable and subjected to judicial review, it would defeat the purpose for which the enactment was drafted. The Court referred to the decision in Dr. N. B. Khare v. The State of Delhi, (1950) S.C.R. 519, to support this view. However, the Court stressed that this discretion was not without limits. The two statutory sections, according to the Court, imposed the condition that the State Government or its delegate could employ the powers only when they were convinced that such use was necessary for the specific purpose identified in the sections and not for any other reason. If the powers were abused, the Court held that the abuse could be struck down, but the statute itself could not be invalidated. To illustrate this point, the Court cited Dwaraka Prasad Laxmi Nayain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (1954) S.C.R. 803, as inapplicable, and relied on Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 380.

The Court further explained that, in view of the amended provisions of Article 19(2) of the Constitution and the specific wording of the two sections, the exercise of power was limited to the purposes expressly mentioned therein. Consequently, the principles laid down by the Court in Ramesh Thappay’s case and applied in Chintaman Rao’s case could not be extended to the present matter. Accordingly, the Court held Ramesh Thappay v. The State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 594, and Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1950) S.C.R. 759, as inapplicable. The Court pointed out that the two provisos to section 2(1)(a) and clause (b) of section 2(1) clearly demonstrated that the restrictions imposed by section 2 were reasonable restrictions on the rights guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g). These restrictions, the Court said, were therefore protected by Articles 9(2) and 19(6) of the Constitution. The Court found no basis for the grievance that the notification under section 2(1)(a) prevented the publication of matters opposing the “Save Hindi” agitation. The Court observed that if a newspaper changed its policy, the time-limit set for the operation of the notifications and the right to make a representation provided sufficient remedy for the petitioner. Introducing the suggested qualification into the notifications, the Court warned, would make the exercise of the powers dependent on an objective test subject to judicial scrutiny and would defeat the very purpose of the section.

The judgment was filed under civil appellate jurisdiction for Petitions Nos. 95 and 96 of 1957, which were petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the petitioners included N. C. Chatterjee, Charan Das Puri and Naunit Lal, while counsel for the respondents comprised C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Lachman Das Kaushal, Deputy Advocate-General for the State of Punjab, and T. M. Sen. The judgment was delivered on 6 September 1957 by Chief Justice DAS. In those petitions, the petitioners challenged the validity of the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956 (Act No. 38 of 1956), herein referred to as the impugned Act.

In the petitions, the petitioners sought the issuance of a writ or order that would require the respondents to withdraw the notifications that had been issued against the two petitioners in their capacities as editors, printers and publishers of the newspapers Pratap and Vir Arjun. The Daily Pratap had been founded roughly thirty-eight years earlier in Lahore, which was then the capital of the united Punjab, and it was a daily newspaper printed in the Urdu language and script. After the partition of the country, the Daily Pratap had been published simultaneously from Jullundur and from New Delhi. Vir Arjun was a Hindi daily newspaper that likewise was published concurrently from Jullundur and New Delhi. In Petition No. 95 of 1957, the petitioner Virendra was identified as the editor, printer and publisher of the two papers issued from Jullundur, while K. Narendra was identified as the editor, printer and publisher of the two papers issued from New Delhi. The petitioners alleged that following the appointment of the States Reorganisation Commission on 29 December 1953, the Akali party in Punjab launched a campaign demanding the partition of the State on communal and linguistic grounds. According to the petitioners, that agitation soon degenerated into a campaign of hatred that threatened the peace of the State. The petitioners maintained that Hindus in the State, representing a wide range of opinions, together with a segment of the Sikh community and the Congress Party, strongly opposed the partition proposal. In those circumstances, it was reasonable to infer that Hindus would also engage in counter-propaganda through the press and other platforms against the agitation initiated by the Akali party. It was admitted that the editorial policy of the Daily Pratap and Vir Arjun had been to oppose the Akali demand for partition of Punjab. Consequently, a great deal of tension was generated in the State because the two bitterly opposing groups were attempting to propagate their respective ideologies. About a year earlier, the Congress Party, which was then the ruling party, was said to have yielded to the communal pressure exerted by the Akalis and to have accepted what became known as the regional formula. Amidst this ideological conflict and to prevent or counter any activity that might prejudice communal harmony, the Punjab Legislature deemed it necessary to enact the impugned Act, which received the President’s assent on 19 October 1956 and came into force on 25 October the same year. The material provisions of the impugned Act were then set out, beginning with Section 2(1)(a), which provides that the State Government or any authority authorised by it may, if satisfied that such action is necessary to prevent or combat any activity prejudicial to the maintenance of communal harmony affecting or likely to affect public order, issue a written order addressed to a printer, publisher or editor.

Section 2(1)(a) of the impugned Act empowers the State Government or any authority authorised by it, when satisfied that such action is necessary to prevent or combat any activity that may prejudice communal harmony or public order, to issue a written order addressed to a printer, publisher or editor. The order may prohibit the printing or publication of any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects for a specified period, or in a particular issue or issues of a newspaper or periodical. The law expressly limits the duration of any such order to a maximum of two months from the date it is made. In addition, the Act provides that the person against whom the order is made may, within ten days of the issuance of the order, make a representation to the State Government. Upon considering that representation, the Government may modify, confirm or rescind the order. Section 2(1)(b) further authorises the State Government or an authorised authority to require that any matter not exceeding two columns be published in a particular issue or issues of a newspaper or periodical, provided that adequate remuneration is paid, and to specify the period, not exceeding one week, and the manner of such publication. Clause (c) of section 2(1) authorises the State Government or the delegated authority to impose pre-censorship. Sub-section (2) of section 2 grants the State Government or the authority that issued an order the power, in the event of any disobedience of an order made under section 2, to order the seizure of all copies of any publication and of the printing press or any other instrument or apparatus used in the publication. Section 3(1) provides that the State Government or any authority authorised by it, if satisfied that such action is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to communal harmony or public order, may by notification prohibit the bringing into Punjab of any newspaper, periodical, leaflet or other publication. Sub-section (2) of section 3 gives the State Government or the authority issuing the order the power, in case of disobedience of an order made under section 3, to order the seizure of all copies of the newspaper, periodical, leaflet or other publication concerned. Section 4 prescribes the punishment for contravention of any provision of the Act, stipulating that the offender may be punished with imprisonment, which may extend to one year, or with a fine up to one thousand rupees, or with both.

The factual backdrop described in the petition indicates that on or about 30 May 1957 a movement known as the “save Hindi agitation” was launched by an organisation called Hindi Raksha Samiti. The Arya Samaj, a cultural and religious society, joined this campaign with the aim of changing what it regarded as objectionable features of the regional formula and the Sachar formula concerning language. According to the petitioners, who are the editors, printers and publishers of two newspapers published simultaneously from Jullunder and New Delhi, the Hindi Raksha Samiti claims to enjoy the support of practically all sections of the Hindus of the State. The petitioners contend that they have been publishing criticisms and news concerning the agitation that they consider fair and legitimate. They further allege that newspapers such as Prabhat and Ajit, which support the Akali party in the State, have been publishing articles and news expressed in a strong and violent language directed against the “save Hindi agitation” and the Hindu community. The agitation proceeded in the usual manner of political agitations of this kind, with demonstrations, slogans, satyagraha by volunteers and lathi charges by the police. Eventually, on 10 July 1957, the agitation reached a climax when volunteers of the “save Hindi agitation” forcibly entered the Secretariat of the Punjab Government at Chandigarh. It was in these circumstances that the four notifications complained of were issued.

In this matter, the petitioners from Jullundur and New Delhi maintained that the provisions of the language-related formulae were not only unjust and unfair to the effort of promoting the national language, but also served as a device to enable a minority community to dominate the majority politically. The petitioners, who were editors, printers and publishers, admitted that they had been printing criticisms and news reports concerning the “save Hindi agitation,” and asserted that those publications were fair and legitimate. However, they alleged that rival newspapers such as Prabhat and Ajit, which supported the Akali party in the State, had been publishing articles and news items employing strong and violent language against the “save Hindi agitation” and the Hindu community. The agitation proceeded in the usual manner of political movements of this type, with volunteers holding demonstrations, chanting slogans and practising satyagraha, while the police responded with lathi charges. On 10 July 1957 the volunteers of the “save Hindi agitation” forcibly entered the Secretariat of the Punjab Government at Chandigarh. It was in this context that four notifications were issued. On 13 July 1957 a notification made under section 2(1)(a) of the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956, was served on Virendra, who was the editor, printer and publisher of the Daily Pratap published from Jullundur. The notification read: “Whereas Ranbir Singh, Home Secretary, Punjab Government, authorised by the Government under section 2 of the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956, after examining the publications listed in the annexure relating to the ‘save Hindi agitation’, has satisfied himself that action is necessary to combat the calculated and persistent propaganda carried on in the newspaper Pratap published at Jullundur, which disturbs communal harmony in the State of Punjab; and whereas such propaganda, by appealing to communal sentiments, has created a situation likely to affect public order and tranquillity in the State; and therefore, in pursuance of the powers conferred under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of section 2 of the Act, I prohibit Shri Virendra, the printer, publisher and editor of Pratap, from printing or publishing any article, report, news item, letter or any other material of any character whatsoever relating to or connected with the ‘save Hindi agitation’ for a period of two months from this date.” The annexure attached to this notification enumerated the headings of fifteen separate articles that had appeared in the newspaper between 30 May 1957 and 8 July 1957. On the same day an identical notification, with an annexure listing the headings of sixteen articles published during the same period in the newspaper Vir Arjun, was issued against Virendra in his capacity as editor, printer and publisher of Vir Arjun, also published from Jullundur. Subsequently, on 14 July 1957 two further notifications, identical in wording, were issued under section 3 of the same Act against K. Narendra, who was the editor, printer and publisher of Daily Pratap and Vir Arjun published from New Delhi. These notifications were intended to prohibit the bringing into Punjab of the newspapers printed and published at Delhi, on the ground that they were propagating material likely to disturb communal harmony and public order.

In this case, the Punjab Government issued a notification concerning the newspapers Daily Pratap and Vir Arjun, both printed in New Delhi, and published the notice in the Punjab Government Gazette Extraordinary on Sunday, 14 July 1957. The Home Department notification, numbered 8453-C(H)-57/14580, was signed by Ranbir Singh, the Home Secretary to the Government of Punjab, who acted under the authority granted by section 3 of the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956. He declared that, after due consideration, it was necessary to combat and prevent the propaganda relating to the “save Hindi agitation” that was being carried out in the Daily Pratap, because such propaganda was intended to disturb communal harmony in the State of Punjab and thereby affect public order. Accordingly, exercising the power conferred by section 3(1) of the Act, he prohibited the entry into Punjab of the newspaper printed and published at Delhi, effective from the date of publication of the notification. The petitioners challenged sections 2 and 3 of the impugned Act, contending that both provisions were ultra vires the State Legislature because they infringed the fundamental rights guaranteed to them by Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and were not saved by the protective provisions embodied in Article 19(2) or Article 19(6). They argued that the provisions imposed not merely reasonable restrictions but a total prohibition on the exercise of those fundamental rights. Specifically, they pointed out that the notifications issued under section 2 effect a blanket prohibition on the printing and publishing of any article, report, news item, letter or any other material of any character whatsoever that relates to or is connected with the “save Hindi agitation.” Similarly, the notifications made under section 3 impose a complete ban on the entry and circulation of the papers published from New Delhi throughout the entire territory of Punjab. The court recognized that the right to freedom of speech and expression includes the right to propagate and circulate one’s views and opinions, subject to reasonable restrictions, and that the various freedoms guaranteed by Article 19(1) are exercisable by citizens throughout the whole of India. It observed that the notifications under section 2(1)(a) prohibit only the printing and publishing of material relating to the specific “save Hindi agitation” issue, while the notifications under section 3(1) ban the entry and circulation of the newspapers only within Punjab. Consequently, the petitioners remained free to print and publish all other matters and to circulate the newspapers in every other part of the territory of India. The court therefore held that, although the restrictions were comprehensive in their limited scope, the question of whether they amounted to a total prohibition of the fundamental rights must be determined by reference to the full ambit of those rights.

The Court observed that, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, it could not be said that the entire rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) had been completely taken away. Rather, the statutes had imposed only specific restrictions on the exercise of those rights, namely, the prohibition of printing and publishing articles, reports, news items, letters or any other material that dealt with a particular subject and the limitation on the circulation of such newspapers to a defined territory. Consequently, the Court held that it would be inaccurate to describe these provisions as effecting a total prohibition of the fundamental freedoms concerned. Counsel for the petitioner then argued that even if the statutes were viewed merely as imposing restrictions, they would still be void because they were incompatible with the Constitution, the restrictions being unreasonable. Regarding the freedom of speech and expression secured by Article 19(1)(a), the Court noted that this freedom is qualified by Article 19(2), which permits a law to impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order. Similarly, the right to engage in any occupation, trade, or business guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) is qualified by Article 19(6), which allows reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. The Court referred to its earlier decision in Ramji Lal Modi v. The State of U.P. (Petition No. 252 of 1955, decided on 5 April 1957), observing that the phrase “in the interests of” has a broad amplitude and is considerably wider than the expression “for the maintenance of.” The Court explained that a law need not be directly aimed at maintaining public order or protecting the public against a specific evil; it may still be enacted “in the interests of” public order or the general public. Against this backdrop, the Court examined whether the restrictions imposed by sections 2 and 3 could be characterised as reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Articles 19(2) and 19(6). The Court then recalled the test of reasonableness articulated in The State of Madras v. V. G. Row, stating that the test must be applied to each statute under challenge and that no single abstract standard can govern all cases. The Court stressed that the nature of the alleged infringement, the purpose underlying the restriction, the seriousness and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied, the proportionality of the restriction, and the prevailing conditions at the relevant time must all be considered in reaching a judicial determination. This principle has been reiterated and applied by the Court in numerous subsequent decisions, and the surrounding circumstances of the impugned law must therefore be examined in this light.

The Court observed that the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the law, the purpose behind it, and the seriousness and urgency of the evil that the statute sought to address had already been discussed. It emphasized that the press constitutes a powerful institution possessing vast influence, which is expected to be exercised for the protection and welfare of the people. However, the Court warned that such influence can be misused to serve anti-social ends by stirring up passions and prejudices of one segment of the population against another, thereby disturbing public order and tranquillity, or by supporting policies of a subversive nature. Accordingly, the Court held that the considerable sway of newspapers—whether for good or ill—over readers’ minds, their extensive reach, and the modern means that enable rapid circulation to both near and distant territories must be taken into account when the judiciary assesses the reasonableness of any restriction imposed on the press. The citation (1) [1952] S.C.R. 597,607 was noted in this regard, indicating that the press must be evaluated against this background.

The Court further stated that preventing a newspaper from publishing its own views or the views of its correspondents on a matter that may be a burning issue of the day constitutes a serious encroachment on the valuable and cherished right to freedom of speech and expression. While society generally demands free propagation and exchange of ideas, the Court recognised that circumstances may arise where the public-order interest requires a reasonable subordination of the freedom of speech to the need for maintaining public order. The Constitution, the Court explained, acknowledges this necessity and attempts to balance the two competing social interests by permitting reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech and expression in the interest of public order, as well as reasonable restrictions on the freedom to carry on trade or business in the interest of the general public. Consequently, the Court framed the pivotal question: whether the restrictions placed on the exercise of the rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) are reasonable in view of all surrounding circumstances, meaning whether they are reasonably necessary in the interest of public order under Article 19(2) or in the interest of the general public under Article 19(6). The Court accepted that a serious tension had arisen between Hindus and Akalis regarding the proposed partition of the State on linguistic and communal lines. The populace was divided into two hostile groups—one supporting the agitation and the other opposing it—and the agitation and counter-agitation were being aired through the press and public platforms. The Court warned that such agitation could at any moment take a nasty communal turn, flare into communal frenzy and factional fighting, thereby disturbing public order in a State that borders a foreign nation, where preservation of public order and tranquillity is essential for the safety of the State.

The Court explained that the Legislature had enacted the challenged statute with the purpose of preserving the safety of the State and maintaining public order. It noted that the Legislature was required to consider which authority would be best placed to decide, at any given moment, whether the prevailing circumstances justified imposing restrictions on the freedom of speech, expression, or the right to engage in any occupation, trade or business, and to determine the appropriate extent of such restrictions. The Court found the answer to be evident, observing that the State Government, being charged with preserving law and order and possessing all material facts, was the most suitable authority to investigate the situation, assess its urgency, and decide whether any anticipatory action was necessary to prevent a threatened or anticipated breach of peace. The Court further stated that the judiciary was wholly unsuited to gauge the seriousness of the situation because it does not have access to the material facts available only to the executive Government. Consequently, the Court held that the determination of the timing and extent of restrictions on the press must necessarily be left to the judgment and discretion of the State Government, which is precisely what the Legislature intended by passing the statute. The statute, according to the Court, conferred wide powers on the State Government or on any authority to which it might delegate those powers, to be exercised only if the Government was satisfied with the conditions set out in the two relevant sections. The Court observed that the grant of such broad powers, based on the subjective satisfaction of the Government or its delegate regarding the necessity of their exercise for preventing or combating activities prejudicial to communal harmony and likely to affect public order, amounted to permissible reasonable restrictions on the two fundamental rights, given the surrounding circumstances and the tension caused by press agitation. The Court emphasized that swift and effective action was essential to the purpose of these powers, and therefore their exercise must remain within the subjective satisfaction of the Government tasked with maintaining law and order. It warned that making the exercise of these powers justiciable and subject to judicial scrutiny would defeat the very purpose of the enactment. The Court also referred to a dissenting judgment in Dr. N. B. Khare v. The State of Delhi, noting that even in that case certain authorities were permitted to make initial orders based on their own satisfaction rather than on objective material, thereby supporting the view that the statute’s discretion was constitutionally valid.

The Court referred to the observations of Mukherjea, J., in Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (2) and held that those observations did not apply to the facts of the present case. The Court first observed that, unlike the situation in the earlier decision, the discretion under the impugned provisions is vested initially in the State Government itself and not in a low-level officer such as a licensing officer, as was the case in Dwarka Prasad. While it is true that the State Government may delegate its power to any officer or other person, the Court emphasized that the very fact that the power of delegation must be exercised by the State Government provides a safeguard against arbitrary use of the delegated authority. The Court further noted that the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order, 1953, which was the subject of the earlier observations, contained no guiding principles or instructions on how the delegated power should be exercised. That order gave no indication of the purpose or circumstances in which the licensing authority could grant, refuse, renew, suspend, revoke, cancel or modify a licence, and consequently any person chosen by the State Coal Controller could exercise the power without any regulatory framework. No rules or directions had been framed to regulate or guide the licensing officer’s discretion under that order. The Court contrasted this with sections 2 and 3 of the Act that are under challenge, stating that the exercise of power under either section is conditioned on the satisfaction of the State Government or the authority authorised by it that the action is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to communal harmony and likely to affect public order. Referring to the decision in Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court explained that the dictum of Mukherjea, J., is inapplicable to a statute that sets out an underlying policy which must govern any order made under the law, and where the discretion granted to the authority is required to be exercised in a manner that furthers that policy. Accordingly, the Court held that the two sections at issue lay down a clear principle: the State Government or any authority it delegates to may exercise the power only when it is satisfied that such exercise is necessary for the specific purposes enumerated in the sections, and it cannot be used for any other purpose. In this view, neither section can be challenged on the ground that they confer unfettered or uncontrolled discretion upon the State Government or a single executive officer, because the discretion is expressly limited by the statutory condition of satisfaction of a defined public-order objective.

In this passage the Court observed that the provision permits an executive officer to state, even if untruthfully and merely as a formality, that he is satisfied, and the provision contains no safeguard to stop the officer from misusing the authority granted by the sections. The Court then referred to the decision in Khare’s case, emphasizing that the exercise of a discretionary preventive power, which is to be employed in anticipation of a breach of public order, must necessarily be left to the State Government or to officers to whom the State Government may delegate that authority. The Court warned that no presumption should be made that either the State Government or the delegated authority will misuse its power. It further held that rendering the exercise of such power subject to judicial review would defeat the very purpose for which the power was conferred. Moreover, even if an officer were to misuse the power, the appropriate remedy would be to strike down the misuse, not to invalidate the statute itself. The Court cited the principles laid down in Ramesh Thappar v. The, State Of (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380, 386, 387, and applied in Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (2), which state that where the language of an impugned law is sufficiently broad to permit restrictions both within and beyond constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting guaranteed fundamental rights, and where there is a possibility that the law could be applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution, the provision must be declared ultra vires. The Court observed that those principles do not apply to the present case. The Court recalled that Article 19(2), as originally drafted, protected a law dealing with any matter that undermined the security of the State or tended to overthrow it. Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act was enacted “for the purpose of securing public safety and the maintenance of public order”. The Court noted that, absent limiting words in the statute, the Act could not be confined only to severe activities intended to endanger State security, nor was there any assurance that officers would distinguish between persons acting prejudicially to State security and those who were not. The Court concluded that this consideration is not relevant to the case at hand. Finally, the Court observed that Article 19(2) has been amended to protect laws imposing reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order, and that the language of the two sections of the impugned Act expressly limits the exercise of the conferred powers to the purposes specifically mentioned and to no other purpose. Apart from the stated limitations and conditions for the exercise of

The judgment explained that the powers granted by the two sections contain two important provisos attached to section 2(1)(a). The first proviso stipulates that any order made under this provision may remain in force for only two months after it is issued. The second proviso permits the person who is aggrieved by such an order to present a representation to the State Government; upon consideration of that representation, the Government may modify, confirm, or rescind the order. The exercise of this power is conditioned upon the authority’s positive satisfaction that the order is necessary for the specific purposes mentioned in the section, and the effect of the power is limited to a fixed period and may be altered or withdrawn after a representation is made. The Court held that, given the surrounding circumstances, this limitation cannot be described as unreasonable or as falling outside the protection afforded by Article 19(2) or Article 19(6). Furthermore, under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 2, several conditions are imposed on any required publication: the material must not exceed two columns, adequate remuneration must be paid for the publication, and the requirement cannot continue for more than one week. The Court considered these safeguards to be highly relevant in assessing the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by section 2. It emphasized that the prevailing circumstances that led to the enactment of the statute—including the urgency of addressing communal antagonism and hatred, the potential for such evil to be amplified by partisan news in widely circulated daily newspapers, and the specific conditions embedded in the section itself—must all be taken into account when determining whether the restrictions are reasonable. On this basis, the Court concluded that section 2 imposes reasonable restrictions on the rights guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) in the interest of public order and the general public, and that these restrictions are protected by Articles 19(2) and 19(6). Counsel for the petitioner, Virendra, argued that even assuming the validity of section 2(1)(a), the notifications issued under it were overly broad. He contended that the operative part of the notification barred the petitioner from publishing any article, news item, letter, or any other material of any character relating to or connected with the “save Hindi agitation,” including a report or a letter from a correspondent about the agitation, or even a report of a statement made on the floor of the House by the Prime Minister deprecating the “save Hindi agitation.” The Court found this argument to lack substantive merit, observing that the language of the notification, when read in the context of the safeguards and purpose of the statute, did not amount to an unreasonable or unconstitutional restriction.

The Court observed that, assuming the provision of the section to be valid as the counsel for the petitioner was willing to accept, that provision granted the State Government the authority to act when it was satisfied that such action was necessary to achieve the purposes stated in the section. In effect, the power could be exercised only on the basis of the subjective satisfaction of the State Government or a delegate appointed by it. Consequently, if the State Government or its delegate believed that, in order to realise the specified objectives, it was essential to prohibit any publication concerning the “save Hindi agitation,” the Court could not simply override that judgment by holding that the restriction was unnecessary. To do so would amount to replacing the Government’s own satisfaction with that of the Court. The authority that issued the order had carefully considered the situation, having examined the overall trend of the newspapers’ policies and their likely reactions, and had formed a conviction of necessity based on several articles printed in those newspapers between 30 May 1957 and 8 July 1957. In those publications, the petitioner had consistently presented material supporting the agitation and expressed disapproval of any content opposing it. It was conceded that the newspapers’ editorial policy was to support the “save Hindi agitation.” Therefore, the argument that the newspapers were being unjustly prevented from publishing material against the agitation was deemed hollow, unconvincing, and without substance. It was not unreasonable for the Government to hold the view, given the prior conduct and stated policy of the papers, that they would not publish news or opinions contrary to their stance without adding adverse commentary. Moreover, if the newspapers were to alter their policy in the future, they could approach the State Government and request a modification of the Notifications. Considering the entirety of section 2(1)(a) along with its two provisos—the requirement of the authority’s satisfaction regarding the matters specified, the temporal limitation on the effectiveness of the Notifications, and the provision granting the aggrieved party a right to make a representation—the Court found the grievance to be illusory. The petitioner suggested that the Notifications should have been qualified to bar only those publications likely to prejudice public order. The Court noted that, had such a qualification been added, it would raise the question of who would decide whether a particular publication affected public order. If an editor claimed it did not while the State maintained it did, the decision-making authority would become unclear.

The Court observed that, if a dispute arose about whether a particular publication was likely to prejudice public order, the responsibility to decide that question would fall upon the judiciary. In the event that the Government chose to invoke its power of seizure in order to halt the circulation of the offending issue, it would have to do so while anticipating that the Court might require it to demonstrate that stopping the circulation was indispensable for preventing any detrimental impact on public order. That demonstration, the Court explained, would become the principal question before the judge. Similarly, if the Government initiated criminal proceedings under section 4, the same fundamental issue would arise, namely whether the action was necessary to protect public order. The Court noted that such a requirement would effectively nullify the purpose of the provision, assuming, for the sake of argument, that the provision was otherwise valid. The necessity for exercising the power in order to achieve the objectives specified in the statute, the Court held, is left entirely to the subjective satisfaction of the Government, given the nature of the matter and the surrounding circumstances. Accordingly, once the Government is satisfied that the exercise of its power is required for the purposes enumerated in the section, and provided that the Notification issued falls within the scope of the section—meaning it either directs or prohibits an act that the section itself authorises the Government to direct or prohibit—there is no further substantive inquiry for the Court to entertain. The only remaining question, therefore, is whether the Notification has been complied with, and the Court’s role would be limited to determining whether there has been a breach of that Notification. Introducing the suggested qualification into the Notification, the Court warned, would transform the exercise of power—currently left to the Government’s subjective judgment—into an exercise subject to an objective test and judicial scrutiny, thereby defeating the very purpose of the provision. The Court also addressed the final allegation that the impugned Notifications were issued in bad faith solely to suppress legitimate criticism and fair comment on public affairs. After reviewing the articles annexed to the opposition affidavit and referenced in the Notifications, the Court concluded that a reasonable person could indeed perceive the articles as justifying the order for the purposes stated in the statute. Consequently, based on the material before it, the Court could not find the Notifications issued under section 2 to have been mala fide. The Court further observed that the safeguards described in sections 2(1)(a) and (b) do not extend to the provisions of section 3. Although the exercise of powers under section 3(1) is subject to the same condition of satisfaction by the State Government or its delegate as mentioned in section 2(1)(a), the Court pointed out that section 3 lacks a time limit for the operation of an order and provides no mechanism for a person to make a representation to the State Government, a deficiency that renders the provisions of section 3 unreasonable.

The Court observed that the provisions contained in section three of the statute were unreasonable and that the learned Solicitor-General expressed evident difficulty in endorsing the validity of that particular section. It was noted with some surprise that, within the same enactment, two sections were drafted in markedly different language, a circumstance the Court found noteworthy. Consequently, after considering the reasons articulated earlier, the Court held that petition number ninety-five of the year 1957, styled Virendra versus the State of Punjab, which challenged the notifications issued under section two sub-paragraph (a), must be dismissed. By contrast, petition number ninety-six of the year 1957, styled K. Narendra versus the State of Punjab, which questioned the operation of section three, was allowed to proceed. In the circumstances of these two matters, the Court decided that no order as to costs would be made against either party concerning the applications. Accordingly, the dismissal of petition ninety-five of 1957 was confirmed, and the allowance of petition ninety-six of 1957 was affirmed.