The State Of Uttar Pradesh vs M/S. Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 14 and 15 of 1955

Decision Date: 20 November 1957

Coram: Syed Jaffer Imam, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, P.B. Gajendragadkar

The State of Uttar Pradesh filed a petition against M/s Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co., Ltd. and another respondent. The matter was decided by the Supreme Court of India on 20 November 1957. The judgment was authored by Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, with Justices Natwarlal H. Bhagwati and P.B. Gajendragadkar forming the bench. The case is reported in 1958 AIR 187 and 1958 SCR 973. The dispute concerned the Industrial Disputes Act, specifically the validity of awards that were made after the period prescribed by the statute. The operative provisions were Section 6‑A of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U.P. 27 of 1947) and Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance, 1953 (U.P. Ordinance 1 of 1953). The headnote of the judgment set out the factual backdrop. Clause 16 of General Order No. 6,5, issued by the Governor on 15 March 195?, required that the decision of a Tribunal or Adjudicator be pronounced within forty days of the date of reference. Under that provision the Governor, by orders dated 19 August 1952 and 20 January 1953, referred two industrial disputes to adjudication. Neither reference specified a fixed period for the award, but each directed the adjudicator to act in accordance with Order No. 6,5. In the first reference the period for making the award was successively extended up to 10 March 1953; the second reference did not receive any extension.

Before either award was rendered, Clause 16 of Order No. 6,5 was amended on 18 February 1953, changing the prescribed period from forty days to one hundred and eighty days. The award in the first case was finally made on 17 April 1953, which was beyond one hundred and eighty days from the date of reference. The award in the second case was rendered on 26 June 1953, which exceeded the original forty‑day limit but fell within the amended one hundred and eighty‑day period. On 22 May 1953 the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance, 1951, came into force. That Ordinance, with retrospective effect, empowered the State Government to enlarge, from time to time, the period for making an award and also validated certain awards that had not been made within the originally fixed time. The Labour Appellate Tribunal declared both awards invalid because they had not been made within the statutory time limits. The appellant argued that the amendment of Clause 16 meant that the references ought to be interpreted as allowing a one hundred and eighty‑day period, and further asserted that Section 3 of the Ordinance validated the awards. The Supreme Court held that the award in the first case, being rendered after the extended period, was invalid and could not be validated by Section 3 of the Ordinance. Conversely, the award in the second case, although made after the original forty‑day period, was validated by Section 3(2) of the Ordinance, rendering it legally effective.

The Act required that awards be submitted within a specified period. Although the orders of reference did not expressly state a time limit, they indicated that the references were to be decided in accordance with the provisions of Order No 615. Consequently, the orders must be interpreted as imposing a forty‑day deadline for the submission of awards. A later amendment of clause 16 replaced the forty‑day period with a one‑hundred‑eighty‑day period. That amendment could not affect an order of reference that had been made before the amendment, because the amendment was not given retrospective operation. In construing Section 3 of the 1953 Ordinance, clause (1) is to be understood as validating all extensions of time for submission of awards that were made prior to the Ordinance’s commencement. Clause (3) applies to proceedings that were pending at the Ordinance’s commencement and brings Section 6‑A of the Act, introduced by the Ordinance, into force for those proceedings. Clause (2) validates awards against which no judicial proceedings were pending at the commencement of the Ordinance, and it does not limit validation only to awards that had become final. Accordingly, the award in the first case, against which an appeal had been filed before the Ordinance commenced and to which clause (3) of Section 3 applied, was held to be invalid because it was made after the last date permitted by the enlarged time period. By contrast, the award in the second case, against which the appeal was filed after the Ordinance commenced, was validated by clause (2) of Section 3 of the Ordinance.

The Court noted that the matter fell under civil appellate jurisdiction and involved Civil Appeals Nos 14 and 15 of 1955. Both appeals were taken by special leave from a decision dated 30 September 1953 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow, in the matters recorded as Civil Appeals Nos 111‑198 of 1953 and III‑321 of 1953. Counsel for the appellants and the second respondent (the Unions) appeared for both appeals, while counsel for the first respondent appeared in Civil Appeal No 14, and separate counsel appeared for the first respondent in Civil Appeal No 15. The judgment was delivered on 20 November 1957 by Justice Imam. The Court observed that the two appeals were heard together because they arose from a single judgment of the Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 30 September 1953, which had considered seven separate appeals. Since the legal question presented to the Supreme Court was identical in both appeals, the Court’s decision would govern both. Civil Appeals Nos 14 and 15 of 1955 originated from Appeal Nos 111‑198 of 1953 and 111‑321 of 1953 before the Tribunal, respectively. The central issue before the Tribunal had been whether the awards from which the seven appeals were filed were legally valid and within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

The matter before the Court concerned precisely the issue of whether the awards that had been challenged were lawfully made and within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or Adjudicator. Before addressing that issue, the Court set out the relevant factual background. On 15 March 1951 the Governor of Uttar Pradesh issued a General Order that contained a number of clauses and that was issued under the authority granted by clauses (b), (c), (d) and (g) of section 3 and by section 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (referred to as the Act, Act XXVIII of 1947). This General Order replaced the earlier General Order No. 781 (L)/XVIII dated 10 March 1948. The new order of 15 March 1951 was recorded as Order No. 615 (LL)/XVIII‑7 (LL) of 1951, hereinafter called Order No 615. Clause 16 of Order No 615 stipulated that the decision of the Tribunal or Adjudicator had to be pronounced within forty days, excluding holidays but not the annual vacations observed by courts that are subordinate to the High Court, from the date on which the State Government referred an industrial dispute to the adjudicating authority. A proviso to that clause permitted the State Government to extend the period for the submission of the award from time to time. On 18 February 1953 this clause was amended so that the prescribed period of forty days was increased to one hundred eighty days.

On 17 December 1952 the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Strawboard Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers’ Union, reported in 1953 S.C.R. 439. Following that decision the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance 1953 (Ordinance No 1 of 1953), hereinafter the Ordinance, was promulgated by the Governor and came into force on 22 May 1953. Under section 2 of the Ordinance, a new provision, section 6‑A, was inserted into the Act. Section 2 of the Ordinance declared that after section 6 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the following shall be deemed always to have been added as section 6‑A: “Enlargement of time for submission of awards. Where any period is specified in any order made under or in pursuance of this Act referring any industrial dispute for adjudication within which the award shall be made, declared or submitted, it shall be competent for the State Government, from time to time, to enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or enlarged may have expired.” Section 3 of the Ordinance provided for the removal of doubts and validation, stating that any order of enlargement made before the commencement of the Ordinance under the principal Act, or any order that would have been valid if section 6‑A had been in force, shall be deemed to have been validly made. It further declared that no award, whether delivered before or after the Ordinance’s commencement, would be invalid merely because the originally specified period or any enlargement thereof had expired at the time of making, declaring or submitting the award, and that any proceeding pending at the Ordinance’s commencement would be decided as if section 6‑A had been in force at all material dates.

In the orders of the Ordinance the Court set out a table that recorded, for each of the seven appeals before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the date on which the industrial dispute was referred, the day on which the statutory period of forty days expired, any period of enlargement that was granted, the date on which the award was submitted, and the date on which the appeal was filed. The first appeal, numbered 111‑186/53, was referred on 13‑February‑1953, the forty‑day period ran out on 3‑April‑1953, no enlargement was made, the award was submitted on 6‑April‑1953 and the appeal was filed on 5‑May‑1953. The second appeal, 111‑187/53, was referred on 28‑January‑1953, the forty‑day period expired on 18‑March‑1953, there was no enlargement, the award was submitted on 13‑April‑1953 and the appeal was filed on 5‑May‑1953. The third appeal, 111‑321/53, also had a reference date of 28‑January‑1953 and a forty‑day expiry of 18‑March‑1953, without any enlargement; the award was submitted later on 26‑June‑1953 and the appeal was filed on 18‑July‑1953. The fourth appeal, 111‑183/53, followed the same reference date of 28‑January‑1953 and the same expiry of the forty‑day period on 18‑March‑1953, with no enlargement, the award being submitted on 13‑April‑1953 and the appeal filed on 4‑May‑1953. The fifth appeal, 111‑323/53, was referred on 9‑February‑1953, the forty‑day period ended on 29‑March‑1953, no enlargement was recorded, the award was submitted on 22‑June‑1953 and the appeal was filed on 20‑July‑1953. The sixth appeal, 111‑209/53, was referred on 15‑January‑1953; the statutory forty‑day period expired on 5‑March‑1953 and an enlargement was granted on 13‑March‑1953, extending the deadline; the award was submitted on 9‑April‑1953 and the appeal filed on 8‑May‑1953, with the filing occurring before 31‑March‑1953. The seventh appeal, 111‑198/53, concerned a reference dated 19‑August‑1952; the original forty‑day period would have ended on 10‑October‑1952, but several extensions were granted – on 4‑November‑1952, on 11‑November‑1952, on 26‑December‑1952, on 13‑January‑1953 and on 11‑February‑1953 – each pushing the deadline further. The award in this case was finally submitted on 13‑May‑1953 and the appeal was subsequently filed. This detailed table was used by the Tribunal to evaluate whether the awards were made within the time limits prescribed by the Act and the Ordinance.

The Labour Appellate Tribunal concluded that the award in appeal number 111‑198/53 had been made not only after the expiry of the enlarged period but also long after the maximum period of one hundred and eighty days from the date of reference had elapsed. In contrast, for each of the other six appeals the Tribunal found that the awards had been made on the day the original forty‑day period expired and that they were nevertheless within the overall limit of one hundred and eighty days from the respective dates of reference. The Tribunal further noted that appeals numbered 111‑321/53 and 111‑323/53 had been filed after the Ordinance came into force, whereas the remaining appeals had been filed before the Ordinance commenced. The Tribunal then turned to the factual background of two specific industrial disputes. In the matter of Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co., Ltd., the Governor issued an order on 19‑August‑1952 that referred the dispute between the mill and its workmen to the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer in Kanpur for adjudication, invoking Order No. 615. In the matter of Kamlapat Motilal Sugar Mills, the Governor issued an order on 28‑January‑1953 that referred the dispute between that mill and its workmen to the Regional Conciliation Officer in Lucknow, also under Order No. 615. Neither of these orders of reference specified a deadline by which the respective Conciliation Officers were to submit their awards; each order simply required that the officers adjudicate the dispute in accordance with the provisions of Order 615. The Tribunal therefore considered that, absent an express time‑limit in the orders, the statutory forty‑day period prescribed by Order 615 applied, and it examined the effect of the subsequent legislative provisions on the validity of the awards and the legality of the proceedings that followed.

The orders in question expressly required that the dispute be adjudicated pursuant to the provisions of Order No. 615. It is only by referring to clause 16 of that Order that one can infer that the decisions of the Conciliation Officers were required to be pronounced within the time prescribed in the orders of reference, namely forty days from the date on which the reference was made. In the particular matter involving Swadeshi Cotton Mills, the record shows that the original time limit was extended on several occasions, whereas in the matter concerning Kamlapat Motilal Sugar Mills no such extensions were granted, as is evident from the accompanying chart. Under section 3 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the State Government possessed the authority, for the purposes specified in that provision, to issue either a general or a special order that could create Industrial Courts and could refer any industrial dispute to conciliation or adjudication in the manner prescribed by the order. Order No. 615 was a general order issued under those statutory powers. Clause 10 of Order No. 615 empowered the State Government to refer any dispute either to the Industrial Tribunal or, if the Government, after considering the nature of the dispute or the convenience of the parties, deemed it appropriate, to any other person designated for adjudication. Clause 16 of the same Order fixed the period within which the Tribunal or the appointed adjudicator had to deliver its decision, subject to the provision that the State Government could, from time to time, extend that period. Section 6(1) of the Act further stipulated that when an authority to which an industrial dispute had been referred for award or adjudication completed its enquiry, it must submit its award to the State Government within such time as may be specified. Consequently, the Act required that the award be submitted within a prescribed time limit, and in the absence of a special order of reference under section 3, that time limit would be determined by the provisions of a general order such as Order No. 615. An order that refers an industrial dispute for adjudication but fails to specify the time within which the award must be submitted is therefore an invalid order of reference. In the present cases, the orders of reference did not indicate any specific deadline for the submission of the award; they merely directed that the dispute be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Order No. 615. When those orders of reference are read together with clause 16 of Order No. 615, it must be understood that they implicitly set the deadline for award submission at forty days from the date of reference. The proviso attached to clause 16 of Order No. 615, which allowed the State Government to extend the period for award submission from time to time, was held to be an invalid provision in light of section 6(1) of the Act.

The Court explained that, according to the judgment in Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers’ Union (1953) SCR 439, an award submitted after forty days from the date of reference would be invalid because any extensions granted by the State Government could not be considered under section 6(1) of the Act. However, the Court noted that the Act had subsequently been amended by an Ordinance which introduced section 6‑A, and that, by virtue of section 2 of the Ordinance, section 6‑A was to be treated as part of the Act from its inception. Consequently, sections 6(1) and 6‑A must be read together. Section 6(1) required that an award be filed within a specified date once the enquiry was completed, whereas section 6‑A empowered the State Government to enlarge that period from time to time, even if the originally fixed or previously enlarged period had already expired. In the appeals before the Court, the orders of reference had stipulated a forty‑day period for submitting awards. Under section 6‑A, the State Government could theoretically extend that period by issuing further orders for each reference. The Court observed that no such extending order was issued in the matter constituting Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1955, and that although extending orders had been issued in the matter of Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1955, the final extension only placed the deadline on 10 March 1953, while the award was actually filed on 13 May 1953. Thus, in one case the award was filed beyond the original forty‑day deadline, and in the other it was filed after the extended deadline. The State of Uttar Pradesh, appearing as the appellant, contended that clause 16 of Order 615 had been amended to provide a period of one hundred and eighty days instead of forty days, and therefore the orders of reference should be interpreted as requiring award submission within one hundred and eighty days, making the amendment retrospective. The Court clarified that Order 615 is a general order governing the establishment of conciliation boards and industrial tribunals, and that clause 16 merely provides a general direction that tribunal decisions be pronounced within a specified number of days. An order of reference, however, is a special order that may prescribe both the manner of adjudication and the time limit for the decision. Since the orders of reference in the present cases only referred to the provisions of Order 615 without specifying a new time limit, they must be read as fixing a forty‑day period for award submission, and the later amendment of clause 16 cannot retroactively alter the time limit set by those earlier orders of reference.

The order of reference was a special order that could have set out both the procedure for adjudicating the industrial dispute and the period within which the award was to be pronounced. In the present cases the orders of reference merely directed that the disputes be decided in accordance with the provisions of Order No. 615. Consequently, the disputes had to be adjudicated according to the method prescribed in that order, and the orders of reference were to be read as fixing a period of forty days for the submission of the awards. Although clause 16 was later amended to provide one hundred eighty days instead of forty days, that amendment could not alter a previously issued order of reference that required the award to be submitted within forty days. The Court could not accept the appellant’s submission that the amended clause 16 should operate retrospectively and that the earlier orders of reference ought to be deemed to prescribe a period of one hundred eighty days. Section 6(1) of the Act provides that the authority to which an industrial dispute is referred must submit its award within the time specified. When read together with section 6‑A, a proper interpretation shows that the time for submitting the award is the period fixed in the order of reference. Therefore, a mere amendment of clause 16 does not change the period already stipulated in the order of reference. The Court concluded that the amendment to clause 16 did not materially affect the situation, and that the awards in the cases before it had to be submitted within forty days from the date of the order of reference, or within any enlarged period that had been lawfully granted.

Having resolved that issue, the Court turned to the question of the effect of section 3 of the Ordinance, which remained to be considered. That section was intended to remove doubts and to validate extensions of time for the submission of an award, and it also sought to validate certain awards. Clause (1) of the section is clear: it validates all extensions of time that were made before the Ordinance came into force as if section 6‑A of the Act had always been a part of the Act. In other words, extensions granted under the general order, which were promulgated under section 3 of the Act, are to be treated as having been made under section 6‑A. Clause (3) of section 3 likewise presents no difficulty. It provides that every proceeding pending before any court or tribunal at the commencement of the Ordinance concerning an award shall be decided as if section 6‑A of the Act had been in force at all material dates. This construction confirms that the Ordinance operates to give retrospective effect to the provisions of section 6‑A for the purpose of deciding pending proceedings and validating earlier extensions of time.

In this case the Court observed that clauses (1) and (3) of section 3 of the Ordinance merely restated the provisions of section 6‑A of the Act, and that those provisions were sufficiently clear even without the restatement. The Court then turned to clause (2) of the same section, noting that it required a more detailed examination.

The counsel for the appellants argued that clause (2) was broad enough to cover every award, not only those awards that had become final as the Labour Appellate Tribunal had held. According to that argument, the words at the end of the clause – “as if section 6‑A had been in force at all material dates” – were redundant and could be ignored. The counsel further suggested that, because clause (2) already contained the necessary effect, clause (3) was superfluous and need not exist.

The counsel for the appellant contended that clause (2) validated all awards, whether those awards were made before the Ordinance commenced or after it commenced, even where the time limit for submitting the award or any extension of that limit had already expired. The counsel said that, on that basis, an award could not be challenged merely on the ground of lateness, and that the validation extended to any proceeding pending before a court or tribunal at the moment the Ordinance began, even if the proceeding concerned an award.

Mr N. C. Chatterjee, appearing for respondent No. 1, argued that the Labour Appellate Tribunal had correctly decided that clause (2) of section 3 covered cases in which the awards had become final. He developed his argument by stating that the clarification sought by section 3 of the Ordinance must be read in relation to section 6‑A of the Act and not in isolation. He explained that if an award fell outside the scope of section 6‑A, then the entire Ordinance could not be applied to that award.

He further explained that section 3(1) of the Ordinance validated all orders of time‑extension made before the Ordinance commenced, and that those orders should be treated as if they had been made under section 6‑A of the Act. Section 3(2) was, according to him, enacted to prevent the validity of an award from being questioned when the award was submitted after the prescribed period or any extension thereof. The phrase “as if section 6‑A had been in force at all material dates” was said to indicate that an order of extension must have been issued by the Government exercising the powers granted by section 6‑A.

Mr Chatterjee maintained that section 3(2) did not apply to a case where an award was made independently of the Government’s exercise of powers under section 6‑A. He concluded that sections 3(2) and 3(3) were subordinate to section 6‑A of the Act. The Tribunal, he noted, seemed to think that there was a conflict between sub‑sections (2) and (3) of section 3 and therefore tried to limit the scope of sub‑section (2) in order to resolve that apparent repugnance.

In the earlier discussion, the Tribunal had tried to avoid a conflict between the provisions of the Ordinance by imposing a self‑created limitation on the scope of sub‑section 2 of section 3. It had ruled that sub‑section 2 applied only to awards that had already become final, but in doing so it overlooked the language of that sub‑section, which referred to awards that might be made even after the Ordinance had come into force. Consequently, it was difficult to see how finality could be said to attach to such awards on the very date the Ordinance was promulgated. The Tribunal was also persuaded by the argument that, if section 6‑A was applicable to appeals or proceedings against awards that were pending when the Ordinance commenced, there would be no reason for it not to apply to appeals or proceedings that might be taken against awards after the Ordinance had begun. While expressing this view, the Tribunal again failed to notice that sub‑section 3 of section 3 was deliberately confined to proceedings against an award that was pending at the moment the Ordinance commenced and to no other situations. The Court found that the principal purpose of the Ordinance was to validate orders extending the time within which an award had to be submitted and to prevent the validity of an award from being challenged merely because it was submitted after the prescribed time or any extension thereof. Beyond an order of extension of time, the Ordinance addressed at least three scenarios concerning the submission of an award. The first scenario involved an award submitted before the Ordinance began, with no proceeding pending before any Court or Tribunal at the commencement of the Ordinance; the second scenario covered an award submitted after the Ordinance became operative; both of these cases were dealt with by clause (2) of section 3 of the Ordinance. The third scenario concerned an award submitted before the Ordinance began, against which a proceeding was already pending before a Court or Tribunal at the time the Ordinance came into effect. Section 3(3) of the Ordinance was drafted so that it would not interfere with judicial proceedings already pending against an award, but merely directed that such a proceeding be decided as if section 6‑A had been part of the Act from the date of its enactment. Where no judicial proceeding against an award was pending, the Ordinance intended that the award should not be questioned solely on the ground that it was submitted after the specified period or any extension of that period. Although sub‑section 2 of section 3 was not elegantly worded and appeared to result from hurried legislation, the Court concluded that, when the provisions were reasonably construed, their meaning became clear and no real conflict existed between them and the provisions of clause (3) of the same section.

The expression “as if section 6‑A had been in force at all material dates” must be given substance and cannot be treated as redundant as the appellants suggested. In grammatical terms, the expression refers to any action, any proceeding taken, any direction issued, or any jurisdiction exercised in pursuance of or upon an award. Section 6‑A of the Act, however, bears no relation to that wording and therefore the words cannot be applied to the portion of the clause unrelated to Section 6‑A. The same wording also cannot refer to a situation where an award was made after the prescribed period without any order of enlargement of time, because Section 6‑A does not apply to such a case. Consequently, the words can only relate to the segment of the clause that deals with an enlargement of time for submitting the award, which is precisely the purpose of Section 6‑A of the Act. In the Court’s view, when Section 3(2) of the Ordinance is read in this manner, it yields a coherent meaning that aligns with Section 6‑A of the Act and does not clash with Section 3(3) of the Ordinance. The awards mentioned in Section 3(2) are those against which no judicial proceeding was pending at the moment the Ordinance commenced. The Court further holds that the provisions of Sections 3(2) and 3(3) do not conflict with one another. The Court cannot accept the Labour Appellate Tribunal’s view that Section 3(2) pertains only to awards that had become final.

Having interpreted Section 3 of the Ordinance, the Court proceeded to examine the specific appeals before it. Appeal No. III‑198/53 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, which gave rise to Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1955, was filed before the Ordinance came into force. Accordingly, by operation of Section 3(3) of the Ordinance, that appeal had to be decided as if the provisions of Section 6‑A had been in effect on all material dates. For such an appeal, the provisions of Clause (2) of Section 3 could not apply, and therefore the appeal fell within the ambit of Clause (3). In the facts of that case, the award had been submitted on May 13, 1953, whereas the last date of enlargement permitted submission only up to March 10, 1953. Because the award was filed after the permissible deadline, the Court considered it to have been made without jurisdiction and consequently invalid. Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1955 arose from Appeal No. 111‑321 of 1953 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and was filed with the Tribunal after the Ordinance had commenced. In that matter, the award was submitted forty days beyond the prescribed period and there was no order granting an enlargement of time. Hence, the appropriate provision governing that appeal was Section 3(2) of the Ordinance rather than Section 3(3). As a result, the award in that case was validated under Section 3(2) of the Ordinance.

The Court observed that the award in question had been validated by operation of section 3(2) of the Ordinance, and therefore its legal force could not be denied merely because the award had been presented after the deadline prescribed for its submission. By relying on the language of section 3(2), the Court concluded that the mere fact of tardiness did not, in itself, render the award invalid or deprive it of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court turned to the consequences for the pending appeals. In respect of Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1955, the Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant be ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. With regard to Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1955, the Court granted the relief sought, ordered that the appeal be allowed, and also directed that the costs of the appeal be awarded to the successful party. In addition, the Court set aside the decision rendered by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 111‑321/53, thereby overturning that Tribunal’s determination. The final operative directions of the judgment therefore recorded that Appeal No. 14 of 1955 was dismissed, while Appeal No. 15 of 1955 was allowed, each with an order as to costs as specified.