The State Of Mysore vs H.L. Chablani

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 3 December, 1957

Coram: S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar

The case titled The State of Mysore versus H. L. Chablani was decided on 3 December 1957 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice S. K. Das, who sat together with Justice A. K. Sarkar. Justice S. K. Das recorded that the appeal filed by the State of Mysore, which sought review of a certificate that had been issued by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad under Article 132 of the Constitution, could be disposed of on two succinct grounds. Consequently, the Court limited its factual discussion to those matters that were directly relevant to the two grounds of disposal.

The respondent, H. L. Chablani, entered the civil service of the then State of Hyderabad when he was appointed Deputy Jailor at Jalna on 14 December 1948. Subsequently, on 7 April 1950, he received an appointment to act as Assistant Superintendent of Jails in the same State. In February 1951 the Hyderabad Public Service Commission advertised vacancies for four posts of Assistant Superintendent, Central Jails, in the Hyderabad Division. The advertisement required that candidates be not younger than 21 years and not older than 25 years as of 24 February 1951, while also allowing an age concession for temporary government servants, retired officers of the Hyderabad Army, former state service personnel, and surplus staff, to the extent of their prior service. Applicants were instructed to attach their matriculation certificates as proof of age, and government servants were further required to refer to their service book or Civil List. On 19 February 1951 the respondent submitted an application in which he declared his date of birth to be 25 February 1926, a date that corresponded with the entry in his service book. In response, the Public Service Commission, by a letter dated 2 April 1951, authorized the respondent to sit for the competitive examination scheduled for 1 May 1951, but simultaneously requested that he furnish his matriculation and degree certificates. The respondent complied on 19 April 1951 by sending his matriculation certificate. That certificate, however, recorded his birth date as 25 December 1924. When forwarding the certificate, the respondent explained that the incorrect date arose from an error made by the school official who admitted him, an error that had then been perpetuated in the school registers and ultimately reflected in the matriculation document. The Public Service Commission consequently wrote to the Registrar of Bombay University for verification, and after receiving a reply, it prepared a report to the State Government, issued by a letter dated 15 June 1951. In that letter the Commission asserted that “Mr. Chablani deliberately gave an incorrect date of birth.”

In this case the Commission recorded that the respondent had deliberately supplied the Government with an incorrect date of birth and had subsequently tried to mislead the Commission. The Commission noted that the respondent produced his Matriculation Certificate only after being pressured to do so and concluded that, on a preliminary basis, a person who had made such an attempt at deception should not continue in permanent Government service. Accordingly the Commission directed that the respondent be required to show cause why he should not be dismissed for three alleged offences: first, for having given the Government a false age; second, for attempting to deceive the Public Service Commission in the same manner; and third, for falsely stating in his application to the Commission that all entries therein were correct. On the basis of this letter, the State Government on 22 August 1951 issued a show‑cause notice to the respondent, asking him to explain why he should not be dismissed for making false declarations concerning his date of birth to the Government and also in his application for the post of Assistant Superintendent of Jails addressed to the Commission. The respondent replied on 30 August 1951, maintaining that his true date of birth was 25 February 1926 and that the date appearing in the Matriculation Certificate was erroneous. To support his claim he submitted a photocopy of his original horoscope, an affidavit from the family priest, an affidavit from a living elder member of his family, an affidavit from a former class‑mate, an affidavit from a former school principal, and a medical certificate issued by the Civil Surgeon of Nanded. After receiving this explanation the State Government made no further communication, and on 30 September 1951 it issued an order dismissing the respondent from Government service effective from that date. The respondent then appealed to the Chief Minister, and on 4 October 1951 an order was passed staying the operation of the dismissal. On 20 December 1951 the stay order was withdrawn and the dismissal order was confirmed with immediate effect. Two days earlier, on 18 December 1951, the respondent had sent another representation through the Inspector General of Prisons, enclosing a birth registration certificate issued by the Hyderabad (Sind) Municipality. In that representation he asserted that the certificate corroborated his explanation that the date of birth he had given in his application to the Commission was correct and that the age shown in the Matriculation Certificate was mistaken. Upon receipt of this additional representation the State Government again stayed the dismissal pending further orders. Subsequently, on 12 April 1952 the State Government wrote to the Public Service Commission requesting a reconsideration of the respondent’s case in view of the fresh materials he had supplied. The State Government further expressed its opinion that there was no ulterior motive or bad faith on the part of the respondent because he was neither over‑age for the post nor barred from promotion on the ground of age even if the earlier date of 25 December 1924 were accepted, and that he was entitled to the concession applicable to temporary Government servants, making his application to the Commission regular.

In its communication the State Government asserted that, even if the respondent’s actual date of birth were 25 December 1924, he was not over‑age for the post to which he had applied and his age would not bar him from future promotion. The Government further stated that, on that basis, the respondent was entitled to the same age‑related concession that temporary Government servants enjoy, and therefore his application to the Public Service Commission was properly placed.

The Public Service Commission, however, disagreed with the State Government’s assessment. In a letter dated 25 April 1952 the Commission recorded its observations. It said that the respondent had deliberately attempted to mislead the Commission by providing an incorrect date of birth and affirming its correctness. The Commission noted that the respondent failed to support his claim with the Matriculation Certificate, which was required by the rules, and instead produced another certificate only after being pressured, indicating an intent to deceive. The Commission further observed that the respondent’s claim that Bombay University had mistakenly transferred his elder brother’s age to him was unsupported by any authority of the University. It concluded that the respondent’s motivation was to reduce his recorded age by two years, thereby gaining an additional two years of Government service, and that such conduct amounted to misconduct warranting severe punishment. The Commission added that horoscopes are not accepted as proof of age by any Government body or Commission, nor are they admitted by the Hindu Customary Statutory Regulations, and that while a clerical error may be corrected, a horoscope cannot overturn the age stated in a Matriculation Certificate. Apart from mentioning the horoscope submitted by the respondent, the Commission’s letter made no reference to any of the other fresh material supplied.

Subsequently, on 6 June 1952 the State Government issued a final order dismissing the respondent from his position on the ground that he had made a false declaration of age to the Public Service Commission. The respondent appealed this dismissal to the Rajpramukh, but his appeal was rejected. He then filed a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad on 5 June 1953, seeking a writ of certiorari to set aside the dismissal order dated 6 June 1952 and the preceding proceedings, and also requesting a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to reinstate him to the post he held at the time of dismissal. The High Court heard the petition and, by its judgment dated 28 September 1954, held that the dismissal order violated the constitutional protection provided by Article 311(2) of the Constitution, rendering the order void and ineffective. Accordingly, the Court granted the relief sought, ordering that the respondent be reinstated in service without delay.

The High Court, after ordering the respondent’s reinstatement in service, later entertained an application for a certificate under Article 132(1) of the Constitution. By an order dated 18 February 1955 the High Court granted such a certificate and set out the terms on which it was granted. Those terms read in full: “On behalf of the State two points are urged in support of this application for leave to proceed to the Supreme Court. (i) That in the facts of the case our view regarding the contravention of Article 311 was wrong; and, (ii) That the operative part of our order was unauthorised inasmuch as in a mandamus matter, Article 226 of the Constitution only permits this Court to pass a declaratory order and all upon the respondent to act according to law. In our opinion the first point is no longer open to the applicant in view of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in The State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid, and Joseph John v. The State of Travancore Cochin, (S). In respect of the second point, however, there is, in our judgment, sufficient room for argument regarding the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution and in this a question of interpretation of the Constitution is involved. We allow the application and grant leave under Article 132 of the Constitution.” On the basis of that certificate the appellant subsequently filed the present appeal.

The appellant contended that the High Court had erred in holding that there was a violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection, asserting that the terms of the certificate expressly limited the appellant’s right to appeal. According to that objection, the appellant could not press the appeal on the ground that Article 311 had been wrongly interpreted without first obtaining leave under Clause (3) of Article 132, and that the appeal must be confined to the ground on which the certificate was granted – namely, whether under Article 226 the High Court was empowered to issue a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to reinstate the respondent in the post he held before dismissal.

The Court was of the view that, given the facts and circumstances, no substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of Article 311 truly arose. It observed that the High Court, in granting the certificate under Article 132(1), had determined – correctly or incorrectly – that the case presented a substantial question of law relating to the interpretation of Article 226, not to Article 311. Consequently, the effect of the certificate was to enable the appellant to approach this Court on the basis that the High Court’s interpretation of Article 226 was erroneous. The Court further noted that if the appellant wished to rely on any other ground, he would have needed to seek the requisite leave under Clause (3) of Article 132, which permits an appeal on a different ground once the certificate has been issued.

In this case, the Court observed that if the appellant had wished to raise an appeal on any ground other than the constitutional question certified, the appellant could have moved the Supreme Court for the leave prescribed by Clause (3) of Article 132. That clause reads: “(3) Where such a certificate is given, or such leave is granted, any party in the case may appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that any such question as aforesaid has been wrongly decided and, with the leave of the Supreme Court, on any other ground.” The Court further noted that Clause (1) of Article 132 provides, inter alia, that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court when the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. Normally, a party seeks leave under Clause (3) when it wishes to argue a point concerning the merits of the case, that is, a point that does not involve a constitutional interpretation. In the present matter, both the issues relating to Articles 311 and 226 were constitutional in nature; nevertheless, the High Court proceeded on the premise that there was no genuine substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of Article 311, because that interpretation had already been settled by earlier decisions of this Court, and that the only remaining substantial question of law concerned the power of the High Court to order reinstatement. Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Chatterji, argued that, according to the Federal Court decision in Krishnaswami Pillai v. Governor General‑in‑Council AIR 1947 FC 37 (C), the determination of whether a reasonable opportunity of showing cause has been afforded in a particular case is a question of fact. The Court said it was not necessary to pursue the argument to the extent suggested by counsel, nor was it essential to decide whether Clause (3) of Article 132 barred the appellant from raising additional issues. The Court acknowledged that, in certain situations, the question of whether a reasonable opportunity of showing cause has been provided may be so intertwined with the constitutional guarantee contained in Article 311(2) that it becomes a substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of that article. However, the Court explained that the present case rested on a different factual foundation. The respondent had not been invited to show cause beyond the request set out in the Government’s first letter dated 22 August 1951. After the respondent supplied an explanation together with documentary proof of his correct age, the Government issued only the dismissal order and offered no further communication. At one stage the Government appeared inclined to reconsider the matter, and the Public Service Commission, although disagreeing with the Government’s position, did not seem to have examined the complete set of evidence presented by the respondent regarding his age. In light of these facts, the Court concluded that in these circumstances the situation was clear.

The Court observed that there was no substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of Article 311, and noted that, based on the evidence, the High Court had determined that the respondent had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. The Court found no good or compelling reasons to dissent from that conclusion. The discussion then turned to the second ground raised in the appeal, which the Court considered to have become purely academic. It was acknowledged that the respondent had been reinstated in accordance with the order of the High Court. The appellant had submitted that the respondent was only acting in the capacity of Assistant Superintendent of Jails and that the order directing his reinstatement to that position would prejudice the State Government’s right to return the respondent to his substantive post. The respondent, however, contended that he had already been returned to his substantive post. Consequently, the Court held that it was unnecessary to make any further pronouncement on the now‑academic issue of the High Court’s power to direct restoration to office through a writ of mandamus against the Government under Article 226 of the Constitution. Moreover, the Court concluded that examining the various decisions and authorities cited by counsel for the appellant would not serve any useful purpose at this stage and should be deferred to a more appropriate occasion. In the result, for the reasons set out above, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.