The State Of Bihar vs Ram Naresh Pandey

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 31 January, 1957

Coram: Jagannadhadas, J., P. Govinda Menon

In this case the Supreme Court of India, with Justice P Govinda Menon as the author of the judgment and Justice Jagannadhadas sitting as a judge, considered two appeals that arose from an order of discharge issued by the Subordinate Judge‑Magistrate of Dhanbad. The magistrate had acted under section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when he consented to the withdrawal of the public prosecutor from a prosecution that was pending against one of the accused, Mahesh Desai. The original prosecution had been instituted on the basis of a first information report filed by a person named Ram Naresh Pandey. That report named twenty‑eight individuals for alleged participation in the murder of Nand Kumar Chaubey, who was a peon employed at a colliery in Bagdigi. The murder had taken place during a serious riot on 20 February 1954 and was said to have resulted from a dispute between two rival labour unions that had arisen in connection with a strike. Most of the accused were charged under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, including section 302, on the ground that they had taken part in the actual commission of the murder.

In contrast, the charge against Mahesh Desai was limited to section 302 together with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. According to the first information report, Desai had allegedly abetted the murder by making certain speeches and by giving exhortations at meetings or group talks on the day preceding the murder. The public prosecutor filed an application for withdrawal of the case against Desai on 6 December 1954, while the matter was still at the committal stage before the magistrate and before any evidence had been taken. The prosecutor argued that, based on the evidence then available, it would not be just or expedient to continue with the prosecution of Mahesh Desai, and therefore it was necessary to withdraw the case solely against him. During the arguments before the magistrate, it was explained that the prosecutor’s position was that the evidence relating to Desai’s alleged complicity was scant and consisted of only a single, doubtful piece of evidence that was unlikely to establish a prima facie case.

The learned magistrate considered the application in a reasoned order and concluded that there was no basis for refusing the consent sought by the prosecutor. Accordingly, he discharged Mahesh Desai. This order was challenged before the Sessions Court, where a revision petition was filed jointly by the original informant, Ram Naresh Pandey, and the widow of the murdered victim. The Sessions Judge upheld the magistrate’s discharge order. The private parties, dissatisfied with that decision, further appealed to the High Court in revision. The Chief Justice of that High Court examined the matter and expressed the opinion that the consent should not have been granted. He therefore set aside the magistrate’s order, holding that there had been no judicial exercise of discretion in the magistrate’s decision. He directed the magistrate to record the evidence and then to determine whether a prima facie case existed against Mahesh Desai. The Advocate‑General of the State subsequently approached this Court, challenging the High Court Chief Justice’s order. Leave to appeal was granted on the ground that the Chief Justice’s view was based on an erroneous understanding of the legally permissible approach in such matters and that his decision could have wider repercussions for the State. Mahesh Desai also obtained special leave to appeal, and both appeals were disposed of by this judgment.

In matters of this type the High Court ordinarily refrains from intervening, yet the learned Chief Justice felt compelled to set aside the magistrate’s order on the basis that “there was no judicial exercise of discretion in the present case.” Consequently, he instructed that the magistrate should first record the evidence and thereafter determine whether that evidence establishes a prima facie case against the appellant, Mahesh Desai. The Advocate‑General of the State subsequently approached this Court to challenge the order of the learned Chief Justice. Leave to do so was granted on the ground that the Chief Justice’s view was founded on an erroneous understanding of the legally permissible approach in such cases and that his decision could produce ramifications throughout the State beyond the specific matters before him. The aggrieved individual, Mahesh Desai, also obtained special leave to file an appeal, and both of these appeals are now disposed of by the present judgment.

The point of law that emerges from the Chief Justice’s reasoning can be extracted from several passages of his judgment. He observed, “This is not a case where there is no evidence; on the contrary, this is a case where there is evidence which requires judicial consideration.” He further noted that the procedure adopted by the learned Special Magistrate amounted to an assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence before any evidence had actually been heard, thereby surrendering the Court’s function to the Public Prosecutor. The Chief Justice added that he did not believe that section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure justified such a procedure. The legal question therefore arises as to whether, when an application for withdrawal under section 494 is made on the ground of insufficiency or meagreness of reliable evidence, it is improper for the Court to grant consent before the evidence is taken, assuming the Court is reasonably satisfied that, if taken, the evidence would not likely lead to a conviction. Section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Any Public Prosecutor may, with the consent of the Court, in cases tried by jury before the return of the verdict, and in other cases before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried; and upon such withdrawal, – (a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged in respect of such offence or offences; (b) if it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is required, he shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or offences.” The provision is an enabling one that confers upon the Public Prosecutor the discretion to apply to the Court for consent to withdraw from prosecution, and the consent, once granted, carries the consequences prescribed by the section.

In this case, the Court explained that once consent was granted under section 494, the result had to be either the discharge or the acquittal of the accused, depending on the circumstances. The provision did not specify any particular grounds on which the Public Prosecutor could seek such consent, nor did it list the factors that the Court should consider before granting it. Nevertheless, the Court observed that any order of discharge or acquittal issued after consent would be subject to correction by the High Court under sections 435, 436, 439 or 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the Court held that the act of granting consent constituted a judicial function, and that the Court was required to exercise judicial discretion in doing so. However, the Court clarified that this discretion was not limited solely to material obtained by judicial inquiry; to restrict it in that way would unduly narrow the broad language of section 494. The Court emphasized two principal aspects to keep in mind while interpreting the section. First, the initiative lay with the Public Prosecutor, and the Court’s role was merely to give or refuse consent, not to adjudicate the merits of the case. Second, as noted by the Privy Council in Bawa Faqir Singh v. The King Emperor, the section conferred a general executive discretion on the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from prosecution, subject to the Court’s consent, which could be based on a variety of grounds. The Court therefore said that when it exercised its discretion to grant consent, it had to be satisfied that the Public Prosecutor’s executive function was not being misused, and that the consent was not intended to interfere with the normal course of justice for improper reasons. In this regard, the Court recalled that although the Public Prosecutor was an executive officer, he was also, in a broader sense, an officer of the Court and was obligated to aid the Court with a considered opinion, while the Court was entitled to benefit from a fair execution of that function. The Court also noted that in the Indian criminal justice system, the primary responsibility for prosecuting serious, cognizable offences rested with the executive authorities. Once a complaint of such an offence reached the appropriate authorities, the tasks of investigation, evidence collection, and prosecution were functions of the executive. Nevertheless, the Magistrate also performed specific duties at various stages of the process, for example during the investigation.

In the present case, the Court explained that when a person was arrested, the Magistrate was required to bring the arrested individual before him within twenty‑four hours, as mandated by section sixty‑one of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The continued detention of the arrested person for investigative purposes could be authorized by the Magistrate under section one‑sixty‑seven. The Magistrate also possessed the authority to order a search upon issuance of a warrant, pursuant to section ninety‑six, and could record statements of witnesses and confessions in accordance with section one‑sixty‑four. Where appropriate, the Magistrate could direct an investigation or a further investigation under sections one‑fifty‑five two and two‑zero‑two. In each of these matters, the Court observed that the Magistrate exercised discretionary functions; the initiative for these actions originated with the executive, yet the ultimate responsibility rested with the Magistrate. The Court emphasized that such discretion had to be exercised based on the material then available and did not constitute a prima facie judicial determination of any specific issue. The Magistrate’s role was described as supplementary to that of the executive, intended to prevent abuse of power. The Court further noted that section four‑ninety‑four, which required the consent of the Court for a withdrawal by the Public Prosecutor, aligned with this scheme rather than with the provisions governing inquiries and trials. Accordingly, the provision could not be interpreted as imposing upon the Court the responsibility for a prima facie determination of a triable issue. The Court clarified that a discharge resulting from such consent need not always meet the standard of “no prima facie case” under sections two‑zero‑nine one and two‑five‑three one, or the standard of “groundlessness” under sections two‑zero‑nine two and two‑five‑three two. Nevertheless, the Court warned that consent should not be granted lightly on an application by the Public Prosecutor; a careful and proper scrutiny of the grounds for the application was required. The Court then turned to a substantial number of decisions from various High Courts that had been cited before it. After a thorough review, the Court observed that all of those decisions recognized that the Magistrate’s function in granting consent was a judicial one subject to correction. However, in some of those judgments, the respective positions of the Public Prosecutor and the Court in discharging their functions under section four‑ninety‑four were not sufficiently appreciated. The Court remarked that, particularly in later decisions, there was a general concurrence that an application for consent could legitimately be made by the Public Prosecutor for reasons not limited to the judicial prospects of the prosecution, citing authorities such as The King v. Moule Bux and The King v. Parmanand. Consequently, the Court concluded that, for the purpose of exercising its discretion in granting or withholding consent, it was not required to determine a triable issue on the basis of judicial evidence. Finally, counsel for the respondents strongly argued that while this principle might apply when consent was sought on grounds other than evidentiary considerations, the situation would differ if consent were requested on the ground of lack of evidence or lack of adequate or reliable evidence. The respondents contended that in such a scenario, the Court could exercise its judicial function only by referring to judicially recorded evidence, similar to the circumstances contemplated by the Code for judicial inquiry or trial. They suggested that this would effectively require the Court, before granting consent, to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the relevant evidence, akin to the procedure a Magistrate might follow under section two‑zero‑two, or alternatively that consent could not be given at all on such a ground, compelling the Court to proceed with the prosecution and decide discharge or acquittal under the appropriate provisions of the Code.

In response to the argument that a request for consent on the ground that there is no evidence or that the evidence is not adequate or reliable must be dealt with by the Court as a matter of judicial inquiry, counsel for the respondents contended that the Court would have to base its decision on judicially recorded evidence, just as it would in any of the situations foreseen by the Code of Criminal Procedure for a judicial inquiry or a trial. The counsel further suggested that this position could lead to two possible consequences. First, the Court, before granting consent, would be required to conduct a preliminary enquiry into the material evidence, in a manner comparable to a Magistrate acting under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure who may direct an inquiry. Second, the counsel argued that the opposite result might follow, namely that consent could not be granted at all on the basis of an alleged insufficiency of evidence, and that the prosecution would thereby have to proceed, with the eventual discharge or acquittal of the accused being effected under one of the other provisions of the Code that deal with such outcomes. The Court observed that accepting either of these possibilities would amount to grafting an exception or a proviso onto the broad language of section 494, an approach that could not be sanctioned by a permissible construction of that provision. Consequently, the Court was unable, with all due respect, to adopt the view expressed by the learned Chief Justice, whose judgment was under appeal, that where an application for consent is founded on an alleged inadequacy of evidence requiring judicial consideration, it would be manifestly improper for the Court to consent to withdrawal before the relevant evidence had been recorded and examined. At the same time, the Court clarified that this observation should not be taken to mean that evidence already recorded at the time of the application would be ignored; such evidence must indeed be examined to determine whether the proposed withdrawal amounts to an abuse of process or an improper interference with the ordinary course of justice. Subsequently, counsel for the respondents raised a fresh legal point to support the order of the High Court that set aside the magistrate’s discharge of the appellant. The point centred on the proposition that, in a matter triable by a Court of Session, an application by the public prosecutor for withdrawal with the consent of the Court does not arise at the committal stage. Counsel emphasised the wording of section 494, which states that “in cases tried by jury, any public prosecutor may, with the consent of the Court, withdraw from the prosecution of any person before the return of the verdict.” According to counsel, this language clearly indicates that such withdrawal cannot be effected until the case reaches the trial stage in the Sessions Court. Additionally, counsel relied upon the subsequent phrase in the same section, “either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried,” arguing that the use of the word “tried” confirms that the power to withdraw may be exercised only after the case has actually proceeded to trial.

In this case, the Court considered the argument advanced by counsel for the respondents that section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be invoked only after the case reaches the trial stage. The respondent’s counsel relied on the wording of section 494, which states that in cases tried by a jury a public prosecutor may, with the consent of the Court, withdraw from the prosecution before the return of the verdict, and further emphasized the phrase “either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried.” The counsel also cited a passage from Archbold’s Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (32nd edition, pages 108‑109, section 12) which explains that a nolle prosequi to stay proceedings on an indictment or information pending in any Court may be entered, with the leave of the Attorney‑General, at the instance of either the prosecutor or the defendant, at any time after the bill of indictment is signed and before judgment. The counsel argued that this principle underlies the first part of section 494. The Court observed that the analogy with English practice was misleading because the scheme of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code differs substantially from the English system. The provision in the Code that corresponds to the Attorney‑General’s power to enter a nolle prosequi is section 333, which deals with jury trials in the High Court, and the procedure laid down in section 494 does not parallel that provision. The Court further explained that the expression “in other cases before the judgment is pronounced” in section 494, when read in context, clearly applies to all cases that are not tried by a jury. Consequently, for those non‑jury cases, once the Court gives consent for withdrawal, the effect is either a discharge or an acquittal, depending on the stage of the proceeding, as indicated by the two alternatives (a) and (b) provided in section 494. From this analysis the Court concluded that, for every class of cases other than jury trials, the power to withdraw may be exercised at any stage of the entire proceedings, including the stage of preliminary inquiry in a Sessions case that is triable without a jury. The Court rejected the respondent’s contention that the power cannot be exercised at the preliminary inquiry stage and is limited to cases leading to a jury trial, finding no reason in the Code for such a discrimination. The Court could not interpret section 494 as containing any such limitation; the wording is broad and general and applies to all classes of cases that can end in either a discharge or an acquittal according to the stage at which the section is invoked. The Court noted that the respondent’s argument depended on the use of the word “tried” and the distinction between “inquiry” and “trial” within the Code’s scheme. The Court also referred to the definition of “inquiry” in section 4(k) of the Code, which states that “‘Inquiry’ includes every inquiry other than a trial conducted under this code by a Magistrate or Court.” The Court observed that this definition offers little guidance on whether the word “trial” in section 494 is intended to exclude an inquiry.

The provision employs the term “trial” without expressly limiting it to exclude an inquiry, and the Code itself contains no definition of the term. According to Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, “trial” means the conclusion by a competent tribunal of questions in issue in legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal. Wharton’s Law Lexicon defines “trial” as the hearing of a cause, civil or criminal, before a judge possessing jurisdiction over it, in accordance with the laws of the land. These dictionary entries show that the words “tried” and “trial” have no single fixed or universal meaning. It is true that in many sections of the Code the terms have been used to refer to the stage after an inquiry, and that meaning is derived from the surrounding context of those sections. Consequently, there is no reason to assume that when the same words appear in a different context within the Code they must carry that same limited connotation. Each use of “tried” or “trial” must be interpreted in light of the specific context, the overall scheme, and the purpose of the provision in which it occurs. Counsel for the respondents also argued that the word “judgment” in the expression “in other cases before the judgment is pronounced” of section 494 limits the phrase “in other cases” to proceedings that end in a regular judgment. They contended that such a limitation would exclude interim orders like committal in the present case, as argued by counsel. The difficulty with that contention is that “judgment” is not defined in the Code and is a term of general import meaning a judicial determination or decision of a court. Wharton’s Law Lexicon defines “judgment” simply as a judicial determination or decision of a court in general terms. There is no reason to think that, in the context of this section, the term does not apply to a committal order that terminates the proceeding as far as the inquiring court is concerned. It may be that within Chapter XXVI of the Code the word “judgment” carries a narrower meaning. Even if that were so, it does not follow that an application made during a preliminary inquiry— which necessarily occurs before any judgment in the trial— is excluded. The history of section 494 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure confirms the foregoing view. The power for a public prosecutor to withdraw a charge with the consent of the court first appeared in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1872, section 61. That provision read: “The public prosecutor may, with the consent of the Court, withdraw any charge…”

In the 1872 Code of Criminal Procedure, the provision allowed a public prosecutor, with the consent of the court, to withdraw a charge against any person who was in the prosecutor’s charge. The text specified that if such withdrawal occurred while the case was still under inquiry, the accused would be discharged, and if the withdrawal happened while the accused was already under trial, the accused would be acquitted. The next iteration of the law appeared in the 1882 Code (Act X of 1882) as section 494. That version stated that any public prosecutor appointed by the Governor‑General in Council or the Local Government could, with court approval, withdraw from prosecuting any person in cases tried by jury before a verdict was returned, and in all other cases before a judgment was pronounced. It further provided that if the withdrawal was made before a charge had been framed, the accused would be discharged, whereas if the withdrawal was made after a charge had been framed, or when the Code required no charge to be framed, the accused would be acquitted.

It is evident that the 1882 amendment completely redrafted the earlier section, introducing two notable alterations while preserving the basic mechanism. The wording of the section remained essentially unchanged in the 1898 Code (Act V of 1898). A further amendment was effected by Act XVIII of 1923, which inserted the phrase “either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried” into the 1882 provision and omitted the reference to the prosecutor being “appointed by the Governor‑General in Council or Local Government.” The current version of section 494 corresponds to the 1882 text as modified by the 1923 amendment. Taken together, three substantial changes occurred between the original 1872 provision (section 61) and the present law. The first two changes introduced in 1882 were intended to shift the determining factor for discharge or acquittal from the distinction between inquiry and trial to whether a charge had been framed. The second change clarified that a withdrawal application could generally be made up to the moment a judgment was pronounced, but in cases that proceeded to a jury trial the application could be made only before the verdict was returned. The third change made in 1923 clarified that a withdrawal need not cover the entire case against an individual; it could apply to one or more specific offences for which the person was being prosecuted. These modifications were introduced for clearly identifiable purposes. The original 1872 provision was already sufficiently broad to encompass all categories of cases, including jury trials at the stage of preliminary inquiry, and therefore there is no reason to conclude that the successive amendments were intended to exclude preliminary inquiries from the scope of the present section 494.

There was no basis to conclude that the successive legislative amendments were intended to remove a preliminary inquiry from the operation of section 494, as the final interpretation now demonstrates. It is also relevant to note that both the terms “inquiry” and “trial” received definitions in the Code of 1872; however, the definition of “trial” was omitted in the subsequent 1882 Code. Later, in the 1898 Code, the definition of “inquiry” was modified by inserting the words “other than a trial,” which left the term “trial” without a statutory definition. These incremental changes, each affecting either section 494 or the definition of “inquiry,” collectively support the earlier conclusion that section 494 was meant to embrace every form of inquiry as well as every form of trial, and that the reference to “trial” in that provision was never meant to be confined to a narrow meaning. The same principle was adopted in the decisions of Giribala Dasee v. Madar Gazi [1932] I.L.R. 60 Cal. 233 and Viswanadham v. Madan Singh [1949] I.L.R. 64 Mad, and this Court concurs with the reasoning expressed in those cases on this point. Regarding the substantive issues raised in the appeals, the scope of consideration is limited. As already mentioned, the Public Prosecutor filed the application before any evidence had been recorded at the committal stage. Consequently, the only material available to the Prosecutor or to the Court at that time consisted of the contents of the First Information Report and any witness statements that the police might have taken during their investigation. The allegations made against the appellant, Mahesh Desai, can be extracted from the First Information Report as follows: “These persons, namely Mahesh Desai and others, regularly held meetings and advocated for the closure of the Bagdigi cable plant and coke plant and for the assault of the ‘dalals’. On the preceding Friday morning, when some labourers were preparing to resume work in pit 8 at Lodna, the striking labourers caused a disturbance which prevented the other labourers from returning to work. At approximately eleven o’clock in the morning, Mahesh Desai, the leader of the Koyala Mazdoor Panchayat, arrived at Bagdigi and instructed the labourers present there to cease all work, to remain at their posts and to ensure that no one worked. Acting on Mahesh Desai’s instruction, the labourers halted their work. The night before, at around eleven‑thirty p.m., while I was in my quarter at Lodna, Jadubans Tiwary, the overman of Bagdigi Colliery, reported that Sheoji Singh and Ramdhar Singh had informed him that at about six‑thirty p.m. the previous evening, Mahesh Desai had gone to Bagdigi Mahabir Asthan, gathered between one‑hundred and twenty‑five labourers and conducted a meeting, during which Mahesh Desai claimed to have learned that the company and its dalals intended to send some labourers to pit 10 the following morning to resume work, and that those labourers would be reinstated. Accordingly, that morning Phagu Dusadh, Jalo Dusadh, Chamari Dusadh and others were …”

Mahesh Desai addressed the gathered labourers and instructed them to go to their respective workplaces and ensure that work did not resume under any circumstances. He told them to remain ready in every respect and said that the labourers from Lodna would also come to their assistance, adding that the police would be unable to cause them any harm. The meeting broke up at approximately 7:30 a.m. After the meeting, Mahesh Desai travelled in his jeep from Mahabir Asthan to pit No. 10 and again urged the labourers at that location to continue their strike. While near the jeep, Phagu Dusadh, Jalo Dusadh and Haricharan Dusadh of Bagdigi engaged in conversation with him. Jadubans Tewary, the overman of Bagdigi Colliery, later reported hearing Mahesh Desai say that it was necessary to finish the “dalals” in order to achieve victory and that the workers should stay prepared for that purpose. After making this remark, Mahesh Desai entered his jeep and told Phagu, Haricharan and Jalo directly to “finish all” and that “what will happen will be seen.” He then departed in the jeep, after which Phagu, Jalo and Haricharan returned to the spot where they had spoken with him.

The first information report (FIR) continued by describing events that occurred the following day, stating that a riot broke out during which Phagu Dusadh, Jalo Dusadh and Haricharan Dusadh, together with other persons, pursued Nand Kumar Chaubey. According to the FIR, Phagu struck Chaubey with a “pharsa” blow and Haricharan hit him with a lathi, causing Chaubey to fall and die. In the concluding part of the FIR, the informant declared that, having instigated the evening meeting the previous day and having incited Phagu, Jalo and Haricharan near pit No. 10, Mahesh Desai had also caused a crowd of about one thousand people to assemble the next morning under the leadership of Harbans Singh and other union workers, and that this mob led to the murder of Nand Kumar Chaubey at approximately 8:15 a.m., carried out by Phagu, Jalo and Haricharan using lathi and pharsa. From these statements it emerged that Mahesh Desai was alleged to have exhorted the labourers at three different times: once at 11 a.m., again at 6:30 p.m., and finally at 7:30 p.m. The FIR did not make clear whether the informant’s claim about the 11 a.m. exhortation was based on personal observation or on information received from the labourers themselves. In contrast, the details regarding the 6:30 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. exhortations appeared to stem from information provided by Jadubans Tiwary, who in turn seemed to have relied on what Sheoji Singh and Ramdhar Singh had told him. Consequently, the prosecution’s case depended primarily on the testimony of Jadubans Tiwary and, possibly, that of Sheoji Singh and Ramdhar Singh, each of whom could at most testify about the exhortations made by Mahesh Desai at the various occasions. It was presumed that these individuals had been examined by the police during the investigation.

In this matter, the Court observed that the investigation had produced certain material which had been examined by the police during the inquiry. On the basis of that material, the Court found it difficult to understand why the opinion expressed by both the trial court and the Sessions Court should be regarded as improper. That opinion was that the Public Prosecutor considered the evidence to be insufficient for a conviction and therefore consent under section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be withheld. Even the private complainant, who was permitted to take part in all stages of the proceedings, did not claim in his objection or revision petitions that any additional or superior material was available. Nor could the complainant’s counsel, during arguments before the Court, point out any further evidence that might exist. Consequently, the Court concluded that no order to withdraw the case should be issued as a matter of law or propriety. The matter, therefore, ought to be disposed of only after the evidence had been examined judicially. The Court also expressed that, even the learned Chief Justice might not have found it necessary to interfere with the magistrate’s order in exercising his revisional jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court held that the order of the High Court should be set aside and that the appeals were to be allowed. By that decision, the order of the trial court was restored. The Court addressed a question raised about whether private complainants could be permitted to take part at various stages of the proceedings. It clarified that nothing said was intended to confer a locus standi on the private complainant. The Court noted with regret that the prosecution remained at a very early stage even after nearly three years had elapsed since the murder. It expressed hope that the remaining proceedings against the other accused would be expedited. Finally, the Court ordered that the appeals were allowed.