The State of Assam vs A.N. Kidwai, Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 346-363 of 1956

Decision Date: 31 January 1957

Coram: DAS

The judgment recorded the case titled The State of Assam versus A. N. Kidwai, Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, with the decision rendered on the thirty‑first day of January, 1957. The matter was heard before a bench of the Supreme Court of India. The petitioner was the State of Assam and the respondent was A. N. Kidwai, who held the office of Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals. The date of judgment was 31 /01 /1957. The central question involved the Revenue Tribunal and the transfer of powers authorized by an enactment that allowed the Provincial Government to appoint an Appellate Authority. The Court was asked to consider whether the transfer of such powers amounted to an excessive delegation of legislative authority, whether the notification issued by the Government to make the appointment was valid, and whether there was any repugnancy between the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 (Assam IV of 1948), section 3(3), and the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935 (25 & 26 Geo. 5 Ch. 42), section 296, as well as the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act (Eastern Bengal and Assam Act 1 of 1910), section 9(2).

The headnote described that the State of Assam, together with several other parties, filed appeals against a series of judgments issued by the High Court of Assam. Those High Court judgments, made under article 226 of the Constitution, had set aside certain orders made by an Appellate Authority. That authority had been appointed by the Governor of Assam through a notification issued under section 3(3) of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948, and the notification was dated 5 July 1955. The appeals raised the common issue of the constitutional validity of section 3(3) and the legality of the notification that appointed the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals as the Appellate Authority. In 1955, rival claimants had applied for licences and for the settlement of country‑spirit shops for the fiscal year 1956‑57. Those claimants, dissatisfied with the decisions of the Deputy Commissioner and the Excise Commissioner, appealed under section 296 of the Government of India Act to the Appellate Authority. The High Court had subsequently quashed the orders of that Authority. Under the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910, the final appellate body—referred to as the Board—comprised the Provincial Government and its ministers, who were necessarily members of the Legislature. Section 296 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by sub‑section (1), prohibited legislators from acting as members of the Board, and by sub‑section (2) authorised the Governor to constitute a tribunal with the same jurisdiction until the Legislature provided otherwise. The Government of Assam initially created a single‑member tribunal, first called the Board and later the Assam Revenue Tribunal, which continued to operate until the Assam Revenue Tribunal Act, 1946, empowered the Provincial Government to establish a three‑member Assam Revenue Tribunal. In 1948, after the establishment of the High Court of Assam, the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948, was enacted, abolishing the earlier Tribunal and transferring its jurisdiction to the High Court while also permitting the Provincial Government to appoint an authority under section 3(3) of that Act. While disposing of the writ petitions, the High Court held that section 296(2) of the Government of India Act imposed a duty on the Provincial Legislature to constitute the tribunal, a duty which it had failed to fulfil, and consequently found the appointment under section 3(3) to be invalid.

In this case the Court examined the contention that subsection 3(3) of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 created an excessive delegation of the legislative authority granted to the Legislature by the Government of India Act, 1935, and that the accompanying Notification conflicted with section 9 of the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910. The applicants argued that, because of this alleged excess and conflict, subsection 3(3) of the impugned Act and the Notification were void, and that the Appellate Authority, having not been validly constituted, could issue no lawful orders. The Court held, however, that subsection 3(3) of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 and the Notification issued by the Provincial Government under that provision were not void. The Court observed that the purpose of section 296(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 was merely to empower the Governors of certain provinces to constitute an appellate tribunal and to set a time‑limit for its operation; it was not intended to impose a duty on Provincial Legislatures to create such a tribunal, nor to restrict their legislative competence under the Act. Even assuming that section 296(2) imposed such an obligation, the Court found that the Assam Legislature had fully satisfied it by enacting subsection 3(3) of the 1948 Act. The 1948 Act was intended to transfer the powers and jurisdiction previously exercised by the Assam Revenue Tribunal to the High Court and to an authority to be appointed by the Provincial Government, and the relevant provisions clearly show that the Legislature had deliberated and decided to allocate those powers between the two bodies. Although subsection 3(3) was not drafted with perfect precision, it left no doubt that the Legislature itself created the appellate authority mentioned therein, while the Provincial Government’s role was limited to selecting the personnel, following the usual practice of Indian legislatures. Consequently, there was no excessive delegation of legislative power to the Government. The Court further held that the word “appointed” in the provision could refer to appointments to be made in the future, not only to existing appointments. The Act was not in conflict with the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910 as amended by section 296 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and there was no impropriety in the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, who was the same as the Commissioner of a Division, being designated as the Authority to entertain appeals from the Excise Commissioner. Moreover, the possibility of an appeal from the decision of any other Commissioner of a Division arising before him did not affect the validity of the Notification, and it could not be said to be repugnant to section 9(2) of that Act. The judgment therefore affirmed the validity of subsection 3(3), the Notification, and the orders of the Appellate Authority. This judgment concerned civil appellate jurisdiction in Appeals Nos. 346 to 363 of 1956, filed under Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India.

The Court noted that the present judgment would dispose of eighteen separate civil appeals that had been granted certificates of fitness by the High Court of Assam under Article 132 of the Constitution of India. The appeals numbered 346 to 363 were filed against judgments of the Assam High Court issued on May 23, 1956, and on June 12, 1956. The first group of appeals, namely numbers 346, 347, 348, 349 and 359, challenged the High Court’s decisions rendered on May 23, 1956, in Civil Rules Nos. 26, 31, 32 and 33 of 1956, which had arisen from petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. The remaining appeals stemmed from nine other civil rules that were decided in similar writ applications and were disposed of by the High Court’s judgment of June 12, 1956, which simply followed the earlier May 23 decision. All of the appeals raised the constitutional validity of section 3(3) of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 (the “1948 Act”), as well as the legality of Notification No. Rex 184/52/39 issued by the Governor of Assam on July 5, 1955, pursuant to subsection (3) of clause a 3 of the same Act, which appointed the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals as the appellate authority under the 1948 Act. The Court recorded that counsel for the appellant, including the Advocate‑General of Assam and other appointed advocates, appeared for Appeals Nos. 346 to 358, while additional counsel for the appellant represented Appeal No. 359 and Appeals Nos. 360, 361, 362 and 363. Counsel for the respondents, comprising the Solicitor‑General of India and other advocates, represented Respondents 1 and 2 in Appeals Nos. 346 and 359, Respondent 1 in Appeal No. 347, and Respondent 1 in various other appeals listed. Further counsel for Respondent 1 and Respondent 5 appeared in the remaining appeals, with an additional advocate representing Respondent 6 in Appeal No. 356 and Respondent 1 in Appeals Nos. 357 and 363. The judgment was delivered by the Chief Justice, and the Court indicated that all eighteen appeals would be heard together to properly address the question of the vires of the statutory provision and the Governor’s notification.

At this point it was necessary to refer to certain statutory provisions and rules that were relevant to the issues before the Court. The Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act of 1910 (Eastern Bengal and Assam Act 1 of 1910), hereinafter called the “1910 Act,” had been enacted to consolidate and amend the law then applicable in Eastern Bengal and Assam concerning the import, export, transport, manufacture, sale and possession of intoxicating liquor and intoxicating drugs. Sub‑section (2) of section 3, as amended and adapted, defined the term “Board” to mean the Provincial Government of Assam. Chapter II of the Act dealt with establishments and control. Section 8 provided for the appointment of officers and for the conferment, withdrawal and delegation of powers upon those officers. Section 9 of the Act, which was of particular importance, read as follows:

Section 9(1) stipulated that in all proceedings under the Act the Excise Commissioner and the Commissioner of the Division were to be subject to the control of the Board, and that the Collector was to be subject to the control of both the Excise Commissioner and the Board, and additionally, in such cases and matters as the Provincial Government might specify, to the control of the Commissioner of the Division. Section 9(2) provided that orders passed under the Act or under any rule made under the Act were appealable in the manner prescribed by rules that the Provincial Government might make for that purpose. Sub‑paragraph (a) allowed an appeal of any order passed by a Collector other than the District Collector to the District Collector. Sub‑paragraph (b) permitted an appeal of any order passed by the District Collector to the Excise Commissioner, or, where the Provincial Government specified, to the Commissioner of the Division. Sub‑paragraph (c) allowed an appeal of any order passed by the Excise Commissioner or by the Commissioner of a Division to the Board. Section 9(3) stated that in cases not covered by clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub‑section (2), orders passed under the Act or under rules made thereunder would be appealable to such authorities and in such cases as the Provincial Government might declare by rules made for that purpose. Section 9(4) empowered the Board, the Excise Commissioner, the Commissioner of the Division (in such cases and matters as the Provincial Government might specify), or the District Collector to call for the proceedings held by any officer or person subordinate to them or subject to their control and to pass such orders on those proceedings as they thought fit.

Chapter III of the Act dealt with the import, export and transport of intoxicants, while Chapter IV addressed the manufacture, possession and sale of intoxicants. Section 18 of Chapter IV prohibited the sale of intoxicants except under the authority of, and in accordance with the terms and conditions of, a licence granted by the Collector or the Excise Commissioner, and it also set out certain exceptions to that prohibition. Chapter V provided for the imposition of duties and fees, either generally or for any specified local area, on any excisable article that was imported, exported, transported or manufactured under any licence granted.

In the Act, Chapter VI laid down the requirements for the form and the conditions under which licences, permits and passes could be granted. Section 28 of that chapter imposed a duty on the Collector to take such steps as would enable him to determine the opinion of the local public concerning the licensing and location of shops. Section 29 dealt with the cancellation or suspension of licences, permits or passes. Under Section 32, a person who had been granted a licence could not claim any right to the renewal of that licence, nor could he claim any compensation if the licence were determined to be cancelled. Chapter VII contained general provisions, and it included Section 36, which gave the Provincial Government the authority to make rules for giving effect to the provisions of the Act or any other law then in force relating to excise revenue. Sub‑section (2), clauses (g), (h) and (i) of Section 36 specifically empowered the Provincial Government to frame rules that regulated the periods for which licences could be issued, identified the persons who could obtain licences for the sale of any intoxicant, prescribed the procedure to be followed, and listed the matters that had to be ascertained before a licence could be granted. Those rules also prescribed the manner in which duty on any intoxicant would be levied. Chapter VIII dealt with the prevention, detection and investigation of offences, while Chapter IX prescribed the penalties and the procedure for imposing them. Exercising the powers conferred by Section 36, the Provincial Government of Assam issued detailed rules. Part IV of those rules addressed licences, settlements and fees, the duration and the number of licences, the location of shops, the ascertainment of local public opinion, the procedure for settlements, the prohibition on granting retail licences to certain persons, and the grant of licences, among other matters. A review of the Act and the rules showed that no individual possessed an absolute right to sell liquor; the purpose of the legislation and the rules was to control and restrict the consumption of intoxicating liquors, a measure considered necessary for the preservation of public health and morals, and also to generate revenue. Subsequently, the Government of India Act, 1935, came into force on 1 April 1937. Section 296 of that Act, which formed the principal point of controversy in these appeals, originally read as follows: “(1) No member of the Federal or a Provincial Legislature shall be a member of any tribunal in British India having jurisdiction to entertain appeals or revise decisions in revenue cases. (2) If in any Province such jurisdiction had, immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act, been vested in the Local Government, the Governor shall constitute a tribunal, consisting of such person or persons as he, exercising his individual judgment, may think fit to exercise the same jurisdiction until other provision in that behalf is made by an Act of the Provincial Legislature.”

It was stated that the Governor, acting on his own judgment, could deem it appropriate to exercise the same jurisdiction until such time as the Provincial Legislature enacted a different provision for that purpose. The Governor was also authorized to determine the salaries and allowances payable to the members of any tribunal created under the preceding subsection, and those remuneration costs were to be charged to the revenues of the Province. The judgment recalled that Section 9 of the 1910 Act designated the Board—defined by clause 3(2) of that Act as the Provincial Government—as the final appellate authority. Because the Provincial Government was composed of ministers who were necessarily members of the Legislature, those ministers in Assam actually functioned as the Board and exercised the final appellate authority under Section 9 of the 1910 Act. Parliament’s policy was to discontinue that practice, and consequently it introduced a prohibition through subsection (1) of Section 296, which had been quoted earlier. The purpose of Parliament, however, was not to eliminate the right of a final appeal but to preserve it. The prohibition in subsection (1) barred the Board, meaning the Provincial Government, from acting as the final appellate authority under the 1910 Act. Therefore, it became necessary to create another body to exercise that appellate power. In response, Parliament, by means of subsection (2) of Section 296, empowered the Governor of each province where, before the commencement of that Act, the appellate authority had been vested in the Provincial Government, to constitute a tribunal with the same jurisdiction. The tribunal therefore created by the Governor was to continue exercising jurisdiction until the Legislature made an alternative provision. Exercising the powers granted to him by subsection (2) of that section, the Governor of Assam constituted a single‑member tribunal initially called the Board and later renamed the Assam Revenue Tribunal. From time to time the composition of this tribunal was altered by notifications issued for that purpose. The Assam Revenue Tribunal thus created functioned until 1946, when the Assam Revenue Tribunal Act, 1946 (Assam Act II of 1946), hereinafter referred to as “the 1946 Act,” was enacted. Sub‑section (1) of clause 3 of the 1946 Act required the Provincial Government to constitute a tribunal called the Assam Revenue Tribunal, consisting of a President and two members. Sub‑section (2) stipulated that the tenure of the President and the members would be five years. The qualifications of the President and the members were prescribed by sub‑section (3), while sub‑section (4) made provision for filling vacancies. Sub‑section (5) directed that the President and the non‑official members should receive such salaries as might be prescribed, that is, as determined by rules made under the Act. The powers and functions of the tribunal were defined by paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Act. Sub‑section (2) of Section 5 conferred on the tribunal the jurisdiction to entertain appeals and to revise the decisions in

All revenue matters that fell under the enactments listed in the Schedule, where such jurisdiction had previously belonged to the Provincial Government, were placed under the authority of the Assam Revenue Tribunal created by the 1946 Act. The Schedule enumerated nine separate enactments. Section 7 of the Act expressly barred any further appeal or revision against orders issued by the Tribunal. Nevertheless, Section 8 granted the Tribunal the power to review its own orders. Section 9 eliminated the earlier Assam Revenue Tribunal that had been constituted by the Governor and declared that any appeal or application for revision that had been pending before that earlier tribunal would be deemed to have been filed before the new Tribunal established under the 1946 Act, and it ordered that those matters be decided by the new Tribunal as if they had originally been instituted there.

In exercising the powers given by the 1946 Act, the Provincial Government set up a three‑member Tribunal to serve as the final appellate body. Consequently, the appellate hierarchy changed over time. Under the 1910 Act, up to 31 March 1937, appeals proceeded under section 9 from the Deputy Commissioner to the Excise Commissioner and then from the Excise Commissioner to the Board, which was the Provincial Government. From 1 April 1937, when the Government of India Act 1935 came into effect, until the passage of the 1946 Act in June 1946, appeals moved from the Deputy Commissioner to the Excise Commissioner and then to the single‑member Tribunal appointed by the Governor of Assam. After the 1946 Act abolished the Governor’s Tribunal, the appeal route became from the Deputy Commissioner to the Excise Commissioner and thereafter to the three‑member Tribunal created by the 1946 Act. On 5 April 1948, a High Court for Assam was established, and the following day the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 (Assam IV of 1948) received the Governor’s assent. The Act was published in the official gazette on 8 April 1948 and was brought into force the same day by a notification issued under section 1(3). Section 3(1) of the 1948 Act stipulated that, subject to the provisions of subsection 3, the Assam High Court would exercise the jurisdiction to entertain appeals and revise decisions in revenue cases that had been vested in the Provincial Government immediately before 1 April 1937 under any law then in force. Subsection 2 added that, without prejudice to the generality of the preceding provision, the Assam High Court would specifically have jurisdiction over all revenue cases arising under the enactments named in Schedule A, where such jurisdiction had previously belonged to the Provincial Government before 1 April 1937. Subsection 3 further provided, without prejudice to the earlier provisions, that any authority appointed by a general or special order of the Provincial Government would also exercise jurisdiction to entertain appeals and revise decisions in matters arising under the enactments specified in the Schedule.

In this case the Court examined the provisions of the 1948 Act concerning jurisdiction. Section 3 provided that the jurisdiction presently exercised by the Revenue Tribunal had originally been vested in the Provincial Government before 1 April 1937. Sub‑section (4) of that section stated that the Assam High Court and the authority appointed by the Provincial Government would have jurisdiction to entertain appeals and to revise decisions in the fields of jurisdiction that this Act transferred to them, as specified in section 7(2). The Court noted that the drafting of this section was unusual. Although sub‑section (1) began with the words “subject to the provisions of sub‑section (3) of this section”, and sub‑section (2) said “without prejudice to the generality of sub‑section (1)”, sub‑section (3) subsequently used the phrase “without prejudice to the foregoing provisions”, which referred back to both sub‑sections (1) and (2). Section 5 prohibited any appeal or revision against orders made by the Assam High Court or by the authority referred to in section 3(3) when those orders were made in the exercise of the powers granted by the Act. Section 6 gave the Assam High Court or the authority referred to in section 3(3) the power to review its own decision or order under certain conditions. Section 7 dealt with the abolition of the Assam Revenue Tribunal and with pending cases before it. It provided that from the date on which the Act came into force the Assam Revenue Tribunal would be deemed abolished and its President and members would be deemed to have vacated their offices. It further provided that any appeal or application for revision that was pending before the Tribunal on that date would be deemed to have been instituted before the Assam High Court or the authority referred to in section 3(3), according to the field of jurisdiction transferred by the Act to each, and that those matters would be decided as if they had originally been filed before the appropriate forum. The Court found that the use of the word “deemed” in sub‑section (1) of section 7 created ambiguity, and that this ambiguity had led to arguments before the Court, which would be addressed later. Section 8 authorised the Assam High Court to make rules by notification in the official gazette that were consistent with the provisions of the Act for the purpose of implementing the Act, and similarly authorised the Provincial Government to make rules for the guidance of the authority appointed by it as contemplated by section 3(3). The Act also contained two schedules. Schedule A listed five enactments, namely the first four and the ninth enactment referred to in the schedule of the 1946 Act, and Schedule B listed the remaining four enactments of the schedule to the 1946 Act.

The judgment explained that the appeals and revisions that arose from the enactments listed in Schedule A were to be dealt with by the Assam High Court, whereas the appeals and revisions that arose from the enactments listed in Schedule B were to be dealt with by an authority that the Provincial Government could appoint by a general or special order. In accordance with the powers conferred on the Provincial Government by section 3(3) of the 1948 Act, the Government issued from time to time notifications designating individuals to exercise the power of the appellate authority. When the Act became operative on 8 April 1948, the Revenue Secretary was appointed as the appellate authority. Shortly thereafter, on 15 June 1948, the Minister of Excise of the Government of Assam was appointed to the same position. That appointment was promptly challenged on the ground that it contravened section 296(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Assam High Court ultimately declared the appointment invalid. Subsequent to that decision, the Provincial Government issued fresh notifications on 15 September 1952 and on 11 May 1955, each of which expressly superseded the immediately preceding notification.

On 2 June 1955 a new post titled Commissioner of Hills Divisions and Appeals was created. By Notification No. Rex 184/52/39, dated 5 July 1955, the Commissioner of Hills Divisions and Appeals was appointed as the appellate authority, and the earlier notification of 11 May 1955 was cancelled. In the same year the question arose of granting licences and settling country‑spirit shops in various areas for the financial year 1956‑57. Competing claimants submitted applications for those licences. The Deputy Commissioner, acting on the advice of the Advisory Committee, issued settlement orders in favour of certain applicants. The applicants who were dissatisfied with those orders immediately appealed to the Excise Commissioner. The Excise Commissioner, in some instances, affirmed the Deputy Commissioner’s orders, while in other instances he set them aside and directed that licences be issued to different claimants. Those parties who remained dissatisfied with the Excise Commissioner’s decision further appealed to the appellate authority, the procedure being governed by sub‑section (3) of the relevant provision, with sub‑section (2) expressly stated to be without prejudice to the generality of sub‑section (1); sub‑section (3) was described as “without prejudice to the foregoing provisions”, meaning that the provisions of sub‑sections (1) and (2) continued to apply.

Section 5 of the Act prohibited any appeal or revision against orders made by the Assam High Court or by the authority referred to in section 3(3) when that authority exercised its powers of appeal or revision under the Act. Section 6 conferred upon the Assam High Court or the authority mentioned in section 3(3) the power to review its own decision or order, subject to certain conditions. Section 7 dealt with the abolition of the Assam Revenue Tribunal and the disposal of pending cases before that tribunal. It provided that, from the date on which the Act came into force, the Assam Revenue Tribunal would be deemed to have been abolished and the President of the Tribunal, together with its members, would be deemed to have relinquished their posts.

Section 7 provides that, from the date the Act becomes operative, the Assam Revenue Tribunal and all persons serving as its President and members shall be deemed to have vacated their positions as President and members of the Tribunal. Sub‑section 2 further states that any appeal or application for revision that was pending before the Tribunal on the commencement date shall be treated as if it had been instituted before the Assam High Court or before the authority referred to in section 3(3), depending on which jurisdiction the Act transferred to the High Court and the mentioned authority. Such pending matters shall be decided as though they were originally filed before the appropriate court or authority. The Court expressed difficulty in accepting the propriety of the term “deemed” used in sub‑section 1 of section 7, noting that the ambiguity of that wording has generated arguments that will be addressed later. Section 8 empowers the Assam High Court to make rules by issuing a notification in the official Gazette, provided those rules are consistent with the provisions of the Act, for the purpose of implementing the Act. A similar power is granted to the Provincial Government to make rules to guide the authority appointed by it, as contemplated by section 3(3). The Act contains two schedules. Schedule A lists five enactments, namely the first four and the ninth enactments referenced in the schedule of the 1946 Act, while Schedule B comprises the remaining four enactments of that schedule. Under section 3, appeals and revisions arising from the enactments specified in Schedule A are to be dealt with by the High Court, whereas those arising from the enactments listed in Schedule B are to be handled by the authority appointed by a general or special order of the Provincial Government. In exercising the powers conferred by section 3(3) of the 1948 Act, the Provincial Government issued notifications from time to time appointing persons to exercise the power of the appellate authority. When the Act came into force on 8 April 1948, the Revenue Secretary was appointed as the appellate authority. However, on 15 June 1948, the Minister of Excise of the Government of Assam was appointed to that position, a change that was promptly challenged as a flagrant violation of section 296(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and was ultimately declared invalid by the Assam High Court. Subsequent notifications were issued on 15 September 1952 and 11 May 1955, each superseding the previous one. On 2 June 1955, a new post titled Commissioner of Hills Divisions and Appeals was created, and Notification No. Rex‑184/52/39 dated 5 July 1955 appointed the Commissioner of Hills Divisions and Appeals as the appellate authority, cancelling the earlier notification of 11 May 1955. In 1955 the question arose concerning the granting of licences and the settlement of country‑spirit shops in various areas for the fiscal year 1956‑57, which set the stage for the subsequent disputes.

In the year concerned, each of the claimants lodged an application seeking a licence for a country spirit shop. After receiving the applications, the Deputy Commissioner, acting on the recommendation of the Advisory Committee, issued settlement orders that granted licences to certain applicants. The applicants who were not satisfied with the Deputy Commissioner’s decisions promptly filed appeals before the Excise Commissioner. The Excise Commissioner, in reviewing those appeals, sometimes confirmed the Deputy Commissioner’s orders, but on other occasions he overturned those orders and authorised the issuance of licences to different applicants. Those claimants who remained dissatisfied with the Excise Commissioner’s determinations sought a further appeal to the appellate authority that had been created by the most recent notification of the Provincial Government. The appellate authority, in the cases before it, took varied approaches: it upheld the Excise Commissioner’s decisions in some matters, reversed the Excise Commissioner’s rulings and reinstated the Deputy Commissioner’s original settlements in other matters, and in still other instances set aside both the Excise Commissioner’s and Deputy Commissioner’s orders and instead granted licences to third‑party claimants who had also applied for licences. The parties who were unhappy with the appellate authority’s final orders consequently instituted petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking appropriate writs to quash those orders. In response to those petitions, the court issued several Civil Rules directing the respondents to show cause why the writs sought should not be issued. Civil Rules numbered 26, 31, 32 and 33, all dated 1956, were jointly scheduled for hearing before the High Court. During the hearing, the petitioners advanced three principal points of objection. First, they contended that section 3(3) of the 1948 Act was void because (a) it conflicted with section 296(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and (b) it bestowed essential legislative authority on the Provincial Government, resulting in an excessive delegation of legislative power. Second, they argued that Notification No. Rex. 184/52/39, issued on 5 July 1955, was inconsistent with the overall scheme and policy of section 9 of the 1910 Act. Third, they submitted that even assuming the validity of section 3(3) of the 1948 Act, the Provincial Government’s power to appoint an appellate authority ceased once that authority had been appointed. The High Court, addressing the first contention, held that section 296(2) imposed a duty on the Provincial Legislature to constitute a tribunal, and that the Legislature had failed to fulfil this positive duty, thereby leaving the creation of the appellate authority to the Provincial Government in breach of the obligation prescribed by section 296(2). This interpretation of section 296(2) was repeatedly emphasized and formed the central theme of the Court’s reasoning. Moreover, the Court observed that, apart from the breach of section 296(2), section 3(3) of the 1948 Act amounted to an excessive delegation of legislative power to the Provincial Legislature, a power that was originally conferred by sections 99 and 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and read with entries 2, 31 and 40 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act.

The Court also accepted the petitioner’s argument that the Notification issued on July 5, 1955, conflicted with section 9 of the 1910 Act. According to the High Court’s reasoning on the first two issues, it refrained from commenting on the third issue presented. Consequently, the High Court concluded that section 3(3) of the 1948 Act and the challenged Notification were void. It further held that the appellate authority which had been hearing revenue appeals had not been lawfully or validly constituted. Because of this deficiency, the Court declared all decisions of that authority to be nullities. The High Court therefore issued the appropriate writs to set aside the orders made by the invalid appellate authority. A separate set of civil rules was later heard and disposed of by a judgment delivered on June 12, 1956. That later judgment simply affirmed the earlier finding and likewise ordered the quashing of the orders issued under those civil rules. The State of Assam, together with several other parties, subsequently appealed to this Court, presenting the certificate required from the High Court. The principal contention raised by the State of Assam attacked the High Court’s view that section 3(3) of the 1948 Act was invalid on two grounds.

The judgment of the High Court had emphasized that section 296(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 imposed a duty on the Provincial Legislature to establish a tribunal. The present Court found that interpretation to be erroneous and could not accept that reading of the provision. Section 296 was intended to address courts of appeal that dealt with revenue matters. Sub‑section (1) of that section barred members of either the Federal or Provincial Legislature from serving on any tribunal possessing jurisdiction over revenue appeals or revisions. Historically, in several provinces, the authority to hear such appeals lay with the local government immediately before the commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act. The local government effectively comprised ministers, who necessarily were members of the respective Provincial Legislatures. When Parliament imposed the legislative ban, it simultaneously sought to preserve the right of a final appeal in those provinces. To achieve this, Parliament empowered the Governor to constitute a tribunal of persons he, in his individual judgment, considered suitable to exercise the same jurisdiction. Sections 99 and 100 of the Act, together with the entries listed in List II of the Seventh Schedule, already authorized Provincial Legislatures to enact laws concerning the jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Federal Court, intoxicating and narcotic drugs, and duties of excise. Thus, it is clear that Parliament did not intend to restrict the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislatures by allowing the Governor’s tribunal to replace that power.

The Court observed that the legislation intended that the Legislatures of those provinces where appellate jurisdiction was vested in the local government at the time the Act was passed should either be altered or reduced by the Governor’s creation of a tribunal under sub‑section (2). Accordingly, the provision stated that the tribunal established by the Governor to exercise the appellate jurisdiction should remain in force until the Provincial Legislature made “other provision in that behalf.” The final clause of the section clearly identified the time limit up to which the Governor’s tribunal could operate. The purpose of the section was not to restrict the legislative authority granted to the Provincial Legislatures by sections 99 and 100 together with the relevant entries in List II of the Seventh Schedule. Sub‑section (2) of section 296 did not impose any obligation on the Provincial Legislature to enact “other provision in that behalf.” In fact, the Assam Legislature did not enact any such provision until it passed the 1946 Act. The Court could not, with due respect, read into section 296(2) a requirement that the Provincial Legislature must make a provision. On the contrary, it left it entirely to the Provincial Legislatures of the specified provinces to decide whether to enact any law under the noted entries, and the only operative effect of the sub‑section was to empower the Governor to constitute a tribunal and to set a deadline for the continued existence of that tribunal.

The Court noted that counsel appearing for the respondents did not attempt to support the extreme interpretation advanced by the High Court. Instead, they pointed out that the Governor’s tribunal was to continue until “other provision in that behalf” was made by the Provincial Legislature and argued that the words “in that behalf” must refer back to the creation of the tribunal by the Governor. Reading the subsection in that way, they said, would mean that the Governor’s tribunal would remain in force until the Provincial Legislature enacted its own tribunal. The respondents conceded that the Provincial Legislature’s power to form a tribunal did not arise from section 296(2) but from sections 99 and 100 together with the relevant entries in List II of the Seventh Schedule. Nevertheless, they contended that the phrase indicating that the Governor’s tribunal would continue until the Provincial Legislature made “other provision” implied that the legislature was obligated to use its power to constitute a tribunal, thereby making the Governor’s body a temporary measure. The Court could not accept this argument. It reiterated that the Governor was authorized to create a tribunal possessing the same jurisdiction that had immediately prior to the commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935, been vested in the Provincial Government.

The Court observed that the jurisdiction enumerated in Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935, which had previously been vested in the Provincial Government, could be exercised by a tribunal that the Governor might constitute. That tribunal was to continue functioning only until “other provision was made in that behalf.” The Court noted that the phrase “in that behalf” did not have to refer exclusively to the constitution of a tribunal. Counsel for the appellants argued that the words “other provision in that behalf” grammatically pointed back to the immediately preceding words, namely the exercise of the same jurisdiction. In other words, they maintained that the subsection meant that the Governor’s tribunal would keep exercising the jurisdiction until another provision—i.e., a provision for or concerning the exercise of the same jurisdiction—was enacted by the Provincial Legislature. The Court then considered the construction advanced by counsel for the respondents. That construction, it held, would imply that the concluding part of the subsection was intended to place a restriction on the legislative powers of the Provincial Legislatures of the provinces named in the subsection. Under that view, the Legislatures could create a tribunal whenever they wished to exercise the powers listed in the relevant entries, but they would be barred from making any other provision affecting the exercise of that jurisdiction as it existed at the commencement of the Government of India Act, 1935. Consequently, according to that reading, only the Legislatures of those provinces would be prevented from abolishing the right of final appeal, while provinces where such appellate jurisdiction was not exercised by the local government at the relevant date would be free to do so. The Court remarked that a construction leading to such a result should, if possible, be avoided. It further noted that the criticisms raised against the High Court’s construction of section 296(2), although somewhat modified, were not wholly untenable or without substance. Nevertheless, the Court explained that its decision would not rest on those considerations. On a plain reading, section 296(2) was intended simply to empower the Governors of the specified provinces to constitute a tribunal and to set a time limit within which that tribunal could exercise the appellate jurisdiction. The provision did not go beyond that purpose; it was not concerned with the legislative powers of the Provincial Legislatures, which had already been defined by sections 99 and 100 read with List 11 of the Seventh Schedule. Accordingly, section 296(2) imposed no duty on the Provincial Legislatures to enact any law or to place any restriction on their legislative authority. The essential concluding clause of subsection (2) merely fixed a terminus a quo and did not impose any further obligations. Even assuming, for argument’s sake, the construction suggested by counsel for the appellants, the Court found that such an interpretation was unnecessary.

In addressing the contention that section 296(2) of the 1935 Act imposed a duty on the Provincial Legislature to create a tribunal, the Court observed that, for the reasons that follow, that duty had effectively been fulfilled by section 3(3) of the 1948 Act. Consequently, the matter moved to the second issue, which concerned the doctrine of delegation of power. It was argued that, irrespective of whether section 296(2) contained a mandatory command and whether the Provincial Legislature had complied with it, section 3(3) of the 1948 Act should be declared invalid. The argument rested on the premise that the Provincial Legislature had failed to perform its essential legislative functions prescribed by sections 99 and 100 read with the relevant entries of the Seventh Schedule, and had instead transferred those functions to the Provincial Government without laying down any policy or principle to guide the latter's exercise of the power. Reference was made to the 1946 Act, with the claim that it prima facie satisfied the obligations imposed by section 296(2) and, in addition, set out the policy and principle governing the tribunal, namely the number of members, their qualifications, functions, terms of office, remuneration, and that the only authority delegated to the Provincial Government was the selection of tribunal personnel. By contrast, it was asserted that the 1948 Act contained no legislative policy or principle to steer the Provincial Government in the exercise of the delegated authority, thereby effecting an abdication of the Legislature’s essential functions and creating a parallel legislative authority to constitute a tribunal. The High Court was quoted as summarising this position: the Legislature told the Provincial Government, “you may appoint the tribunal whenever you like instead of my doing so.” The submission further maintained that the Legislature could not relinquish its essential legislative powers in this manner.

Elaborate arguments were presented concerning the permissible scope of delegating legislative power, drawing on a range of authorities from English, American, and Indian jurisprudence, including Burke’s case, In be, the Delhi Laws Act 1912, and Raj Narain Singh v. The Chairman, Patna Administration Committee. However, the Court indicated that, given its interpretation of the true meaning and effect of the 1948 Act, it was unnecessary to embark upon a detailed discussion of the complex and contentious doctrine of legislative delegation and its limits, an area where opinions diverge widely. The Court emphasized that a proper construction of the 1948 Act required an understanding of the circumstances and purpose surrounding its enactment. It recalled that the earlier 1910 Act, which dealt with excise law in Eastern Bengal and Assam, had set out a hierarchy of appellate authority, a background that informs the interpretation of the later statutes.

The Act established a hierarchy of appellate authority, as indicated in section 9(2) of that legislation, which was subsequently quoted in the judgment. Later, the Government of India Act 1935, in section 296(2), authorised the Governor to create a tribunal that would exercise the appellate jurisdiction that, immediately before the commencement of that Act, had been exercised by the Provincial Government. The Governor’s tribunal was to continue exercising that jurisdiction until such time as the Provincial Legislature enacted a different provision concerning the same matter. By the time the 1946 Act was passed, the Assam Legislature had indeed made a new provision, assigning the final appellate powers to a tribunal that was constituted by the Provincial Government under the powers conferred upon it by section 3 of the 1946 Act.

The jurisdiction granted to that Tribunal encompassed the authority to entertain appeals and to revise decisions in all revenue cases that arose under the nine enactments listed in the schedule annexed to the 1946 Act, as well as in every case that had been transferred to the Tribunal from the Assam Revenue Tribunal that had been constituted by the Governor, as specified in section 9 of the earlier legislation. The High Court of Assam was formally established on 5 April 1948. The pre‑amble of the 1948 Act declared that its purpose was to transfer both the power and the jurisdiction formerly exercised by the revenue tribunal to the Assam High Court and to an authority that could be appointed by a general or special order of the Provincial Government.

Section 3, which had been quoted earlier, thereby constituted the Assam High Court as the appellate authority entrusted with the jurisdiction to hear appeals and to revise decisions in revenue cases that had been vested in the Provincial Government immediately before 1 April 1937, and especially in all revenue cases arising under the enactments enumerated in Schedule A of the Act. Sub‑section (3) of section 3 further conferred on the Authority, appointed by a general or special order of the Provincial Government, the power to exercise the same jurisdiction for appeals and revisions in matters arising under the enactments listed in Schedule B, as those matters had previously been handled by the revenue tribunal and were vested in the Provincial Government before the same 1937 cutoff date.

When the schedules to the 1948 Act are examined, it becomes clear that the first four items and the ninth item of the schedule to the 1946 Act were transferred to Schedule A of the 1948 Act, while items 5 to 8 of the 1946 schedule were assigned to Schedule B of the 1948 Act. Section 7 of the 1948 Act deemed the Assam Revenue Tribunal to be abolished, and it deemed that the President and the members of that Tribunal had relinquished their respective posts. Sub‑section (2) of the same section directed that any appeals and applications for revision that were pending before the Assam Revenue Tribunal should be transferred either to the Assam High Court or to the Authority mentioned in section 3(3), depending on the particular field of jurisdiction that the 1948 Act had transferred to each body.

In the judgment, the Court explained that section 3(3) transferred the jurisdiction formerly exercised by the Assam Revenue Tribunal, as provided in the 1948 Act, to the High Court and to the authority mentioned in that provision, and it required both the High Court and the authority to determine any appeals or applications for revision as though such proceedings had originally been instituted before the High Court or the authority, as appropriate. Section 8, the Court noted, gave the Provincial Government, among others, the power to make rules for guiding the authority appointed under section 3(3). By examining the relevant provisions, the Court observed that the Assam Legislature had consciously decided to abolish the Assam Revenue Tribunal created under the 1946 Act and to allocate the tribunal’s former powers between two entities: the matters listed in schedule A were assigned to the High Court, while those listed in schedule B were assigned to the authority referred to in section 3(3). During the arguments, one side attempted to discover a rational basis for this division of appellate powers, suggesting that appeals or revisions of interest to the Government were directed to the High Court. The Court rejected this suggestion, noting that the schedules did not support such a rationale because the Government could also be interested in appeals arising under the Assam Forest Regulation, which was placed in schedule B as item (iii). The opposing counsel also claimed that revenue‑related appeals were placed with the High Court, yet the Court pointed out that several enactments listed in schedule B also concerned revenue matters. Consequently, the Court found it futile to try to infer a logical basis for the distribution and held that it was unnecessary to divine any underlying reason. It was sufficient to recognize that the Legislature, exercising its judgment in the interest of efficient administration, had deliberately assigned some of the appellate and revisional functions of the former tribunal to the High Court and the remainder to the authority under section 3(3). The Court then addressed two alternative arguments premised on the notion that the Legislature had acted under a mistake or misapprehension. The first argument asserted that the Legislature mistakenly believed that, although the tribunal established by the 1946 Act was abolished for the purposes of that Act, it continued to exist for the purposes of the 1948 Act, an argument rooted in the perceived artistic use of the word “deemed” in section 7(1) of the 1948 Act. The Court dismissed this contention, emphasizing that subsection (2) of section 7 expressly provided that appeals and applications for revision pending before the Assam Revenue Tribunal were to be deemed instituted before the High Court or the authority referred to in section 3(3), thereby precluding any continuation of the 1946‑Act tribunal for purposes of the 1948 Act.

The Court observed that, under the provisions of the 1948 Act, any appeal or application for revision that was pending before the Assam Revenue Tribunal at the moment the 1948 Act came into force was to be deemed as having been instituted before either the Assam High Court or the Authority mentioned in section 3(3). Consequently, the Court or the Authority was expressly directed to decide such appeals and applications as if they had originally been presented before the Court or the Authority, depending on which body was applicable. This construction demonstrates that the Assam High Court and the Authority constituted bodies distinct from the former Assam Revenue Tribunal. Accordingly, it could not be argued that the tribunal created by the 1946 Act continued to exist for the purposes of the 1948 Act despite its abolition, because subsection (2) of section 7 unequivocally authorises only the High Court and the Authority referred to in section 3(3) to determine the pending appeals and revision applications, and does not empower the 1946‑Act Tribunal to do so.

The Court then considered an alternative contention put forward by counsel. That argument held that, when the legislature enacted the 1948 Act, it proceeded on the premise that the power to establish a tribunal lay with the Provincial Government rather than with the legislature itself. Accordingly, the 1948 Act was said not to be legislation intended to create an appellate tribunal, but merely to allocate the appellate powers enumerated in its preamble. It was further argued that the Act did not itself constitute a tribunal nor did it authorise the Provincial Government to set up a tribunal. Moreover, assuming that the legislature had empowered the Provincial Government to create a tribunal, the argument continued, such a delegation would have amounted to an excess of legislative power. The Court expressed its inability to accept this alternative reasoning.

The Court explained that there is no single prescribed form of expression required for the constitution of a tribunal. While the Assam High Court was undeniably an existing tribunal, apart from the provisions of sections 3(1) and 3(2) it did not function as an appellate authority with jurisdiction to entertain appeals and to revise decisions in all revenue matters covered by the enactments listed in Schedule A to the Act. It is the 1948 Act, through subsections (1) and (2) of section 3, that constitutes the Assam High Court as the appellate authority tasked with exercising such jurisdiction. The Act achieves this simply by stating that the Assam High Court shall exercise the jurisdiction or shall have jurisdiction to entertain appeals and to revise decisions. The Court then asked why, if the language of subsections (1) and (2) suffices to constitute the Assam High Court as an appellate authority, the wording of subsection (3) of the same section should not likewise be interpreted as constituting the Authority referred to therein as an appellate authority empowered to entertain appeals and to revise decisions in matters arising under the enactments listed in Schedule B. The Court noted that subsection (3) has evidently been drafted in a manner that, despite its imperfect language, reflects the legislature’s intention to create an appellate authority for the matters specified in Schedule B.

The Court observed that the sub‑section was drafted in a very inartistically and inaptly manner, yet the intention of its framers was unmistakably to have the legislature itself constitute an appellate authority. It noted that, had the legislature not performed this constitutional act, the abolition of the Assam Revenue Tribunal—effective on the date of the Act—would have created a vacuum in the jurisdiction to entertain appeals and revisions under the enactments listed in Schedule B. Consequently, there would have been no authority to deal with pending appeals, pending revisions, or any future appeals and revisions arising under those statutes. The Court further pointed out that the sub‑section employs the word “appointed” rather than “constituted.” While “appointed” is unsuitable to describe the creation of an authority, it is appropriate to describe the selection of personnel for an already existing authority to exercise its appellate powers. To give a rational meaning to the whole Act, the Court concluded that sub‑section (3) indicates that the legislature itself created the authority and merely left to the Provincial Government the task of appointing persons to man that authority and to perform its duties. The Court said that this method of constituting authorities is a usual practice of Indian legislatures and listed several enactments that follow the same pattern, including the Central Board of Revenue Act 1924, Section 2; the Indian Boilers Act 1923, Section 20; the Bengal Board of Revenue Act 1913, Sections 3 and 4; the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, Section 64; the Factories Act 1948, Section 107; the Schedule Districts Act 1874, Section 6; the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946, Section 4; the Assam Sales Tax Act 1947, Section 30; the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1946, Section 21; the Bengal Raw Jute Taxation Act 1941, Section 21; the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act 1947, Sections 3 and 4; the Garo Hills Regulation 1882, Section 6; the Assam Requisition and Control of Vehicles Act 1950, Section 9; the Assam Adhiars Protection and Regulation Act 1948, Section 9; and the Assam Forest Product Acquisition Act 1950, Section 7.

The Court explained that the term “appointed” does not necessarily mean that a person has already been appointed; it may also signify an appointment that will occur at some future time. Accordingly, when a person is appointed by the Provincial Government after the date of the Act, that person may correctly be described as a person appointed by the Provincial Government. The Court further suggested that even if the legislature itself constituted the authority, it nevertheless delegated essential legislative functions concerning the appointment of members. This observation was made to underscore that the delegation of the power to appoint did not amount to an excessive surrender of legislative authority, but rather completed the process of enabling the newly constituted appellate body to function effectively.

In addressing the contention that the legislature had failed to prescribe any policy or principle concerning the number, qualifications, remuneration or term of service of persons to be appointed to perform the duties of the tribunal, the Court observed that this argument lacked substance. The Court noted that Section 296(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, which empowered the Governor to constitute a tribunal, itself did not set out any specific qualifications for individuals to be appointed as tribunal members. The Court further explained that the very purpose of the tribunal—to hear appeals from the Excise Commissioner—implicitly required that any person appointed to it possess the appropriate capacity and competence to deal with appeals arising from such high‑ranking officials. Accordingly, the Court found no excess in the delegation of legislative authority.

The Court also considered the final submission that the legislature’s intention in enacting the impugned Act was merely to give effect, among other things, to the provisions of the Excise Act and that the Act contained no indication of an intention to repeal the provisions of section 9 of the 1910 Act. The assertion that there was no implied repeal of any part of section 9 was rejected. The Court pointed out that, in Assam, the term “Board” referred to the Provincial Government. Section 296(1) prohibited members of the legislature, including ministers, from exercising any appellate authority, while Section 296(2) authorized the Governor to constitute a tribunal to exercise the appellate jurisdiction that had previously been exercised by the Provincial Government before the commencement of the Government of India Act, 1935. Consequently, the appellate jurisdiction previously vested in the Board under section 9 of the 1910 Act was withdrawn and first transferred to the Governor’s tribunal, subsequently to the Assam Revenue Tribunal established under the 1946 Act, and later, by the 1948 Act, distributed between the Assam High Court and the authority mentioned in section 3(3) of that Act. In these circumstances, the Court found nothing in the impugned Act that conflicted with section 9(2) as amended by section 296 of the Government of India Act, 1935.

The Court then addressed the observation that the Excise Commissioner and the Commissioner of a Division possessed almost co‑ordinate powers under the scheme of section 9, noting that the Commissioner of a Division exercised more limited powers confined to matters specified by the Provincial Government and that section 9 did not provide for an appeal to the Commissioner of a Division against orders of the Excise Commissioner. While acknowledging the accuracy of this statement, the Court reiterated that the “Board,” meaning the Provincial Government, had been superseded by section 296(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, which led to the constitution of the Assam Revenue Tribunal by the Governor. This supersession removed the Board’s appellate authority and placed it within the framework created by the Governor’s tribunal and its successors.

The Court observed that the Governor had been vested with authority to entertain appeals and revisions from the Excise Commissioner. It further noted that the Governor’s tribunal had subsequently been replaced by the Assam Revenue Tribunal created under the 1946 Act, and that this Tribunal in turn had been superseded by two separate authorities, namely the Assam High Court and the authority specified in section 3(3) of the 1948 Act. The Court found no impropriety in the appointment of the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, assuming that this officer is the same person referred to as the Commissioner of a Division, to the role of the authority authorized to hear appeals from the Excise Commissioner. It was also accepted that an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of a Division, in matters expressly prescribed by the Provincial Government, originally lay before the Board, then proceeded to the Governor’s tribunal, thereafter to the Assam Revenue Tribunal, and finally to the tribunal mentioned in section 3(3) of the 1948 Act. The Court held that the mere possibility that a decision of the Commissioner of a Division could be taken up before the authority under section 3(3) does not, in its view, invalidate the Notification which appointed the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals as the authority contemplated by that provision. At most, the Court said, the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals might be disqualified from entertaining appeals against his own order, but such a limitation does not affect his power to entertain appeals from the Excise Commissioner. Moreover, the Court pointed out that under rule 341 of the Excise Rules, any appeal arising from cases decided in the excluded areas by the Commissioner of Hills Division would be directed to the Governor, so the situation of a conflict would not arise. The Court further concluded that there is no repugnancy between the Notification and the so‑called principle or policy of section 9 of the 1910 Act concerning the hearing of appeals from the Excise Commissioner’s decisions, and therefore the point raised lacks substance. No other point of law or fact was urged before the Court. Consequently, for the reasons stated, the Court set aside the judgments of the High Court that had been appealed from and restored those of the appellate authority. All the appeals were accordingly allowed. The Court remarked that the controversy stemmed from the imperfect drafting of the relevant enactment and its premises; although the State of Assam succeeded in its own appeals, the Court made no order for costs in its favour. The successful appellants in the remaining appeals were directed to recover their costs from the respondents in those appeals, including the State of Assam. All appeals were allowed.