The Newspapers Ltd vs The State Industrial Tribunal, U.P on 20 March, 1957

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 213 of 1956

Decision Date: 20 March 1957

Coram: J.L. Kapur, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha

The Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 20 March 1957 in the matter of The Newspapers Ltd versus The State Industrial Tribunal, Uttar Pradesh. The bench comprised Justice J. L. Kapur, Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati and Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha. The petitioner was The Newspapers Ltd and the respondent was The State Industrial Tribunal, Uttar Pradesh. The case is reported in 1957 AIR 532 and 1957 SCR 754. The dispute concerned the interpretation of “industrial dispute” under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U.P. XXVIII of 1947), specifically sections 2 and 3, and also under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), section 2(k). The central issue was whether a disagreement between an employer and a single workman could be classified as an industrial dispute, and whether a governmental reference based on such a classification could be questioned.

The headnote of the judgment stated that a dispute involving only an employer and a single workman does not fall within the definition of “industrial dispute” under the Uttar Pradesh Act. However, the judgment clarified that while an individual grievance is excluded, the situation changes if a body of workmen or a considerable section of them aligns themselves with the individual workman; in such a circumstance the dispute may be deemed an industrial dispute. The Court referred to earlier decisions, notably Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd. v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan (1956 SCR 956) and D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee (1953 SCR 302). The Court expressly disapproved the view taken in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1953 ILLJ 757), which had held that a dispute raised by an individual workman falls within the meaning of an industrial dispute.

In the facts of the present case, the third respondent had been employed as a linotype typist by the appellant company. He was dismissed on allegations of incompetence. No trade union representing the employees of the appellant or unions of workers in similar trades took up his grievance. Nevertheless, the Uttar Pradesh Working Journalists Union, Lucknow, which had no connection with the third respondent, presented the matter before the Conciliation Board in Allahabad. Subsequently the Government, by a notification, referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, directing that among other issues the Tribunal determine whether the termination of the third respondent’s services was wrongful. The appellant challenged the legality of this reference, raising the question of whether a dispute between an employer and a single workman qualifies as an “industrial dispute” within the meaning of the Uttar Pradesh Act.

The Court held that the reference was invalid. It observed that the dispute was not between the employer and his workmen collectively, and the Uttar Pradesh Working Journalists Union could not be characterised as “his workmen” under the Act. Consequently, the reference made by the Government under the Act was improper. While acknowledging that making a reference is an exercise of the Government’s administrative power, the Court affirmed that an aggrieved party may question the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal when the matter referred does not constitute an industrial dispute.

The Court observed that an aggrieved party may question the jurisdiction of an Industrial Tribunal on the ground that the matter referred to it does not constitute an industrial dispute. In support of this proposition, the Court cited the decision in State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy, reported in the 1953 volume of the Supreme Court Reports at page 334. The present appeal was filed under civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 213 of 1956. It arose from the judgment and decree dated 22 September 1954 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 8 of 1954, which itself was based on the judgment and decree dated 6 January 1954 of the same High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 651 of 1953. Counsel for the appellant appeared for the company, while counsel for respondent No. 2 represented the second respondent. The appeal was heard on 20 March 1957, and the judgment was delivered by Kapur J. The appellant company contended that the order of the Industrial Tribunal should be set aside because, in its view, no “industrial dispute” existed within the meaning assigned to that expression by the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter the U.P. Act), and therefore the Uttar Pradesh Government lacked the authority to make the reference that gave rise to the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

The Court explained that “industrial dispute” is defined in section 2 of the U.P. Act by reference to the definition in section 2(k) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. That definition characterises an industrial dispute as “any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non‑employment, the terms of employment, or the conditions of labour of any person.” The factual backdrop involved Tajammul Hussain, identified as respondent No. 3, who was employed by the appellant company as a lino typist. He was dismissed on 8 May 1952 on the ground of alleged incompetence, pursuant to rule 12(ii) of the appellant’s standing orders. It was alleged that his dismissal was welcomed by his co‑workers, that no other workmen raised any grievance, and that no union representing the appellant’s employees or workers in similar trades intervened on his behalf. Nonetheless, the Uttar Pradesh Working Journalists Union of Lucknow, with which respondent No. 3 had no connection, took up the matter before the Conciliation Board in Allahabad. Subsequently, the Uttar Pradesh Government issued a notification on 3 June 1953 referring the controversy to the Industrial Tribunal. The prefatory portion of that notification stated: “Whereas an industrial dispute in respect of the matters hereinafter specified exists between the concern known as Newspapers Ltd., Allahabad and its workmen; and whereas in the opinion of the Governor it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of public order and for maintaining employment…”. The Court proceeded to consider whether the reference was proper under the statutory definition of an industrial dispute.

One of the matters that was referred for consideration was the question of whether the termination of the services of Sri Tajammul Hussain, who worked as a line operator, was wrongful on the part of the management. On 13 February 1953, the State Industrial Tribunal at Allahabad examined the dispute and decided in favour of respondent number 3. The Tribunal ordered that he be reinstated without any interruption in his period of service and further directed that he receive wages for the entire time during which he had been dismissed. The appellant company disagreed with this decision and filed an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. By an order dated 24 February 1953, the Labour Appellate Tribunal upheld the Tribunal’s judgment and also awarded costs against the appellant. Unwilling to accept this result, the appellant company subsequently instituted a petition before the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court, through Justice Bhargava, dismissed the petition on 6 January 1954, and a special appeal against that dismissal was also rejected. The appellant then proceeded to seek a further appeal, invoking a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. The central issue that now arose for determination was whether a dispute that exists between an employer and a single workman can be classified as an “industrial dispute” within the meaning prescribed by the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. To resolve this point, the Court found it necessary to examine the overall structure of the Uttar Pradesh Act together with the rules that have been made under it. The preamble of the Act declares that its purpose is to provide powers for the prevention of strikes and lock‑outs and for the settlement of industrial disputes and other incidental matters. Section 3 of the Act confers specific powers on the State Government for the purpose of preventing strikes, lock‑outs, and similar disturbances. The portion of Section 3 that is relevant to the present appeal provides that, if the State Government, in its opinion, considers it necessary or expedient for the protection of public safety, the maintenance of public order, the supply of essential services, or the preservation of employment, it may, by a general or special order, make provisions for appointing industrial courts, for referring any industrial dispute to a conciliation board or for adjudication in the manner prescribed, and for dealing with any incidental or supplementary matters that appear to be necessary or expedient. Section 23 authorises the State Government to formulate rules that are consistent with the Act in order to give effect to its provisions. Pursuant to clauses (b), (c), (d) and (g) of Section 3 and also under Section 8, the Government issued rules governing Conciliation Boards and Industrial Tribunals in Uttar Pradesh by Notification No. 615 (LL) XVIII‑7 (LL)‑1951 dated 15 March 1951 in Lucknow. Rule 4 of those rules deals with the referral of disputes to Conciliation Boards. The relevant excerpt of Rule 4 states that any workman, any employer, any registered association or trade union of employers, any registered trade union of workmen, or any federation of such associations or trade unions, or, where no registered trade union of workmen exists in a particular concern or industry, the duly elected representatives of the workmen, may, by way of a written application, move a Conciliation Officer of the area for the settlement of any industrial dispute through conciliation, provided the application clearly specifies the dispute or disputes involved.

The Court explained that, under the rule, a group of up to five representatives of the workmen employed in a particular concern or industry may be duly elected by a majority of those workmen at a meeting convened for that purpose. These elected representatives, acting on behalf of the workmen, are authorized to submit a written application to the Conciliation Officer of the relevant area seeking settlement of any industrial dispute through conciliation. The application must expressly set out the industrial dispute or disputes to which it relates. Rule 5, which governs the conduct of conciliation proceedings and the authority to include additional undertakings, contains a proviso stating that if the Conciliation Board, either on its own motion or upon receiving an application, believes that any question involved in the dispute is likely to affect more than one workman within the same concern, industry or business, or more than one concern within the same industry or business that falls within the Board’s jurisdiction, the Board shall expand the proceedings to include every such workman or concern. Moreover, where a registered trade union represents the majority of the affected workmen, that trade union shall also be brought into the proceedings.

The Court then turned to the provisions relating to Industrial Tribunals, noting that Rules 7 through 11‑A prescribe the structure and function of such tribunals. Rule 10 empowers the Government to refer any industrial dispute to an Industrial Tribunal, either on its own motion or after reviewing the report of the Conciliation Board made pursuant to Rule 6. Rule 15(1) governs the representation of parties before a Board, Tribunal or Adjudicator. It provides that parties may, at their discretion, be represented. Specifically, a workman may be represented by (a) an officer of a registered trade union of which the workman is a member; (b) an officer of a federation of trade unions to which that trade union is affiliated; or (c) if the workman is not a member of any registered trade union, by an officer of any registered trade union connected with the industry, or by another workman employed in the same industry, provided the workman has given written authority. The Court observed that the language of Section 36(1) of the Central Act mirrors this provision. Additionally, Rule 27 expressly prohibits strikes and lock‑outs, while Rule 28 confers finality and conclusiveness on orders and directions issued under the Act. The Court further addressed the interpretation of the term “workmen” in the definition of “industrial dispute.” It held that the mere use of the plural form does not, by itself, exclude the applicability of the Act to an individual dispute, because Section 13(2) of the General Clauses Act stipulates that words in the singular include the plural and vice‑versa. However, the Court emphasized that to discern the true meaning of the enactment, one must consider the statute in its entirety, including the legislative intent, the problems the legislation sought to remedy, and the objectives it was designed to achieve. Accordingly, the Act must be construed as a whole, with its purpose determined by interpreting all its constituent parts together.

In construing the Uttar Pradesh Act, the Court emphasized that the provisions must be read as an entire scheme and not by selecting isolated sections or by extracting individual words. The principle of ex visceribus actus applies, as illustrated in the Lincoln College case. Accordingly, the machinery created by the Act is intended to preserve industrial peace so as to avoid disturbance of public safety, public order, the supply of essential services, or the employment of the community. The Act rests on the need to achieve collective harmony between labour and capital through processes of conciliation, mediation and adjudication. Its purpose is to prevent industrial strife, strikes and lock‑outs and to promote peace, not to replace ordinary courts for enforcing private contracts between an employer and a single workman. Consequently, the provisions lead to the conclusion that the Act does not apply to a dispute involving only an individual workman unless that dispute acquires the general characteristics of an industrial dispute, namely that the workmen as a body or a sizable section of them join with the individual to create the situation contemplated by section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Act, which authorises State Government action. The remaining provisions that follow that section merely support the objects specified therein. The use of the word “workman” in the singular in rules 4, 5 and 15 has been argued to bring an individual dispute within the meaning of industrial dispute, but that argument is frail. Rule 4 permits a workman to apply to a Conciliation Officer for settlement of an industrial dispute; however, the meaning sought conflicts with the latter part of the rule which provides that where no registered trade union exists, representation may be by up to five duly elected workmen. The first proviso to rule 5 does not support the argument because it can only be read to mean that, if an industrial dispute exists, all workmen who may be the cause of the dispute or who will be affected by its outcome must receive notice of the proceedings. Likewise, rule 15 merely provides for the representation of “a workman,” even if that person is alone, by an officer of a trade union or another person named in the rule. Moreover, section 13(2) of the General Clauses Act, which governs the interpretation of singular and plural, diminishes the effectiveness of the argument, and the argument loses force in view of rule 26, which states: “During”.

During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding or any proceeding before the Tribunal or an adjudicator concerning a dispute, an employer was prohibited from (a) altering, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned, the conditions of service that applied to them immediately before such proceedings began, or (b) discharging or punishing any workman involved in the dispute, whether the punishment involved dismissal or another form, without the express written permission of the Conciliation Officer of the relevant area, irrespective of whether the dispute was pending before a Board, a Tribunal or an adjudicator. The Court observed that the use of the terms “workmen” and “workman” in the rule indicated that the Act was intended to apply to collective disputes rather than to disputes of an individual nature. This intention was reinforced by the finality and binding effect of awards under rule 28 and, more specifically, by article 18 of the Central Act, which makes awards binding not only on the individuals present or represented but on all workmen employed in the establishment and even on future entrants. The Court noted another objection to interpreting the rules as suggested: such a reading would effectively enlarge the scope of the expression “industrial dispute” and would expand the powers conferred on the State Government under section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Act. The executive, the Court explained, could not, by virtue of its authority to frame rules and regulations, vest itself with powers that the statute itself does not provide and that are inconsistent with the established interpretation of “industrial dispute.” The Court reiterated the fundamental principle that regulations and bye‑laws must be consistent with the statutory purpose and reasoning, and that any regulation contrary or repugnant to the governing statute is ineffective. If the expression “industrial dispute,” as ordinarily understood, denotes a dispute between an employer on one side and a collective of workmen on the other, then that definition cannot be broadened by a statutory rule or regulation issued under the Act or by an executive order. The notification in the present case was issued under sections 3(c), (d) and (g) and under section 8, which respectively deal with the appointment of industrial courts, the reference of any industrial disputes, and incidental or supplementary matters. While the executive may, in exercising these powers, make regulations that are necessary, it may not, under that guise, expand the definition of “industrial dispute,” nor is such an expanded meaning required to achieve the objectives of the Act. Accordingly, the Court held that rules 4, 5 and 15 could not constitute a valid basis for the argument that an individual dispute fell within the definition of “industrial dispute.” Although an award of a tribunal generally binds or affects the rights of the parties to the proceedings, the Court emphasized that awards of Industrial Tribunals have broader implications and may affect the rights of all workmen of the concern or undertaking, including future entrants.

The Court explained that the doctrine of representation expands the definition of “parties” in the Uttar Pradesh and Central Acts, so that a dispute may affect a concern or undertaking as well as future entrants. This interpretative approach, which emphasizes collectiveness rather than individualism, was noted by Latham C. J. in Metal Trades Employers Association v. Amalgamated Engineering Union(1). The Court further observed that rule 26 of the Uttar Pradesh Act and section 33 of the Central Act forbid any alteration of service conditions while proceedings are pending, a restriction intended to preserve discipline and an industrial truce and thereby support the collective character of industrial disputes. In Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd. v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan(2), the Court identified three prevailing views on the meaning of “industrial dispute”: first, that a dispute between an employer and a single workman cannot be an industrial dispute; second, that it can be; and third, that it is not per se an industrial dispute but may become one if taken up by a trade union or a group of workmen. After referring to the conflicting judicial opinions, the Court examined section 2(k) of the Central Act and concluded that, although the language of that provision is broad enough to cover a dispute between an employer and a single employee, the overall scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act is intended to activate the adjudicatory machinery only for disputes that involve the rights of workmen as a class. Consequently, an individual dispute not raised by a union or a collective of workers was not meant to fall within the Act’s adjudicatory jurisdiction.

The Court also cited D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee and others(1), where the meaning of “industrial dispute” was discussed. In that decision, the Court held that the expression conveys to the ordinary mind a dispute that affects large groups of workmen and employers positioned on opposite sides. Yet, the Court recognised that modern social conditions have led capital and labour to organise into groups for collective bargaining, and that a single employee’s case may evolve into an industrial dispute when, as often happens, it is taken up by the trade union to which the employee belongs and there is a concerted demand by the employees for redress. This view aligns with the underlying principle of modern industrial legislation, which favours collective action over isolated individual grievances.

The Court observed that the idea that employees seek redress fits with the fundamental purpose of modern industrial legislation. It noted that the meaning given to the comparable phrase “trade dispute” in English law and to “industrial dispute” in Australian law matched this approach, and that, in the absence of a specific provision stating otherwise or an intention to the contrary, there was no reason to interpret the expression in the Indian statute differently. The Court explained that English decisions held that a dispute involving a single workman did not fall within the definition of “trade dispute,” which in turn corresponded to “industrial dispute” under the Indian Act. It pointed out that the English Trade Disputes Acts of 1906 and 1919, as well as Regulation 58‑AA of the Defence (General) Regulation, 1939, defined “trade dispute” in language that was very similar to the definition of “industrial dispute” in the Indian legislation. Referring to the English case of Conway v. Wade, the Court quoted Lord Shaw’s statement that he could not accept that “trade dispute” necessarily included every personal disagreement between one workman and one or more of his colleagues. Lord Shaw observed that, although a personal dispute might, after a certain stage, be taken up on broader grounds of collective interest and acquire the characteristics of a trade dispute, until that stage was reached the dispute could not be said to be a trade dispute. The Court also cited Lord Wright’s observation in National Association of Local Government Officers v. Bolton Corporation, noting that the same wide‑ranging meaning of “trade” applied in the Industrial Courts Act and in Regulation 58‑AA, both of which dealt with modern employment conditions and collective bargaining. The Court further referred to Ex parte Keable Press Ltd., describing it as an example where an individual dispute evolved into a “trade dispute” because a union struck to enforce the reinstatement of a dismissed workman. It added that the Court of Appeal in R. v. National Arbitration Tribunal interpreted the term “trade dispute” after considering the definition of “dispute.” Turning to Australian jurisprudence, the Court stated that Australian courts, even without a specific statutory definition, had excluded individual disputes from the scope of industrial disputes. It quoted Griffiths C.J.’s remark in Jumbunna Coal Mine v. Victorian Coal Miners Association that an industrial dispute existed when a substantial number of employees in a particular industry banded together to demand from, or refuse to their employers, a change in employment conditions that was being denied to them. The Court also referenced Griffiths C.J.’s description of the characteristics of an industrial dispute in Federated Saw Mills & Co. Employees of Australasia v. James Moore & Son Proprietary Ltd., noting that Griffiths began by stating that it was necessary at the outset to identify the essential features of such a dispute.

In considering the meaning of the expression “industrial dispute” the Court referred to a series of English decisions that were reported in (1) [1943] A.C. 166 at page 185, (2) [1943] 2 All E.R. 633, (3) [1951] 2 All E.R. 828, (4) [1908] 6 C.L.R. 309 at page 332, and (5) [1909] 8 C.L.R. 465 at pages 487 and 488. Those authorities explained how, in the year 1900, persons familiar with the English language understood the term to possess certain distinctive qualities. One passage observed that the word “industrial” conveys two qualities that set such disputes apart from ordinary private disputes between individuals; namely, that at least one side of the dispute consists of a body of persons acting collectively rather than individually. Isaacs J., speaking in George Hudson Ltd. v. Australian Timber Workers’ Union (1), explained that the very nature of an “industrial dispute,” as distinguished from an individual dispute, is to obtain new industrial conditions not merely for the specific employees then working, but as a battle by the claimants who act on behalf of their class rather than solely for themselves or against the respondents alone. Griffths C.J. added that the term “industrial dispute” connotes a real and substantial difference having some element of persistency, and that, if not adjusted, it is likely to endanger the industrial peace of the community, as noted in the Federated Saw Mills case (2) at page 488. Latham C.J., in Metal Traders Employers Association v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (3) at page 403, reinforced the same meaning by stating that industrial disputes are essentially group contests, with an industrial group present on at least one side, and that a claim of an individual employee against his employer does not, by itself, constitute an industrial dispute.

The Court then examined Indian jurisprudence on the same issue. Rajamannar C.J., delivering the judgment in Kandan Textile Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal, Madras and another (4), held that the definition of “industrial dispute” is sufficiently wide to include a dispute between an employer and an individual workman; however, after taking into account section 18 of the Central Act, he expressed the opinion that such an expanded definition could not be read into section 2(k) of the Central Act. Mack J. concurred with Rajamannar C.J.’s decision but observed that when the grievance of an individual workman is taken up by the worker’s union, the dispute acquires the character of an industrial dispute. In the factual matrix before the Industrial Tribunal, two items of difference were referred, one of which concerned the alleged wrongful removal of a workman named Sundaram. The High Court subsequently entertained an objection to the legality of the award on the ground that no industrial dispute existed and that there was no material before the Government to justify a reference under the relevant statutory scheme. The High Court held that a dispute concerning a single workman did not amount to an industrial dispute. The reasoning articulated in the Kandan Textile Ltd. case was later followed in United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Labour, Madras.

Under section 41 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, an individual employee possessed a statutory right of appeal against the employer’s order of dismissal, and this right was set out in clause 41(2) of the same Act. The appellant challenged that statutory right on the ground that the Central Act had removed the power of appeal for an individual worker. The Court held that the statutory scheme still conferred upon an individual workman the right to appeal against his dismissal. In delivering the judgment, Justice Vishwanatha Sastri referred with approval to the distinction drawn in Kandan Textile Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras, between a dispute that is purely individual and one that qualifies as an industrial dispute.

The Court noted a second line of authority that treats such a grievance as falling within the definition of “industrial dispute.” That line of authority was illustrated by a Full Bench decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (3). In that case the principal issue was decided on the basis of section 33‑A of the Central Act, introduced in 1950, which permits an individual workman who has been dismissed in contravention of section 33 of the Act to present his complaint before a tribunal during an industrial dispute. The Court observed that the insertion of section 33‑A did not alter the meaning to be attached to the expression “industrial dispute”; rather, it reinforced the view that an individual grievance does not become part of an industrial dispute merely by reference to that provision. Accordingly, the Court expressed the opinion that the earlier decision, reported at (3) [1953] 1 L.L.J. 757, which held that a dispute raised by an individual workman concerning his personal grievance was an industrial dispute, could not be said to be correctly decided.

The Court then turned to the third category of cases, which maintain that an individual grievance is outside the ambit of an industrial dispute. The first of these authorities was J. Chowdhury v. M. C. Bannerjee (1). In that matter a lino operator had been dismissed on the grounds of negligence and arrears of work, and the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal under the Central Act. The management subsequently moved the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution and section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, and the Court held that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because, after examining sections 10 and 18 of the Central Act, the dispute of an individual workman was not covered by the term “industrial dispute.” A similar conclusion was reached in Bilash Chandra Mitra v. Balmer Lawrie & Co., where a suit for recovery of wage arrears based on an Industrial Tribunal award raised the question of whether an “individual dispute” fell within an “industrial dispute.” Following the judgment in J. Chowdhury v. M. C. Bannerjee (1), Justice Bose held that it did not. The view was again affirmed in N. Assurance Co. v. C. G. I. Tribunal (3), where the Government referred the dismissal of an employee of an Assurance Company and failed to demonstrate that the employee’s grievance had been taken up by an association of employees.

The Court observed that the same principle had previously been adopted in Standard Vacuum Oil Co. v. Industrial Tribunal. It further noted that in Lakshmi Talkies, Madras v. Munuswami and Others, Justice Balakrishna Ayyar had held that an “industrial dispute” arises when a case involving an individual workman is taken up and espoused by a trade union. The Court pointed out that the same view was subsequently reaffirmed in Lynus & Co. v. Hemanta Kumar Samanta. It stated that the approach taken in those decisions accords with the interpretation that the Court has given to the expression “industrial dispute” as defined in both the Uttar Pradesh Act and the Central Act. The Court then listed the authorities relied upon, namely (1) [1935] 55 C.W.N. 256; (2) [1953] A? C.W.N. tog.; (3) [1953] I.L.R. 32 Patna 181; (4) I.L.R. [1952] Trav.Co. 432; (5) [1055] L.L.J. 477; and (6) [1956] 2 L.L.J. 89.

Taking into consideration the whole tenor of the legislation and the decisions of this Court, the Court explained that the decided cases which take a contrary view—that an individual dispute is included within an “industrial dispute”—must be displaced unless there is something peculiar in the facts of the case. The Court emphasized that, although the making of a reference by the Government under the Industrial Disputes Act is an exercise of its administrative powers, that exercise does not destroy the right of an aggrieved party to demonstrate that the matter referred was not an “industrial dispute” and consequently to question the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to grant an award, even though the factual existence of a dispute may not be subject to challenge. The Court cited State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy for this principle.

The Court then observed that the notification issued by the Uttar Pradesh Government on 3 January 1953 was based on the assumption that a dispute existed between “the employer and his workmen.” However, the points of dispute in the reference actually concerned the wrongful termination of the service of only one individual, Tajammul Hussain, who was a lino operator. The Court noted that the language of the first part of the notification indicated that the Government was operating under the misapprehension that the dispute was between the employer and his workmen collectively, which was not the case. Tajammul Hussain could not be described as “work‑men” in the plural, nor could the Uttar Pradesh Working Journalists Union be described as “his workmen,” and there was no indication that the individual dispute had been transformed into an industrial dispute. Accordingly, the Court held that the very basis of the reference was defective and must be declared invalid. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, awarded costs, and ordered that the appeal be allowed.