The Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants vs B. Mukherjea

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 170 of 1956

Decision Date: 10 September, 1957

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, S.K. Das

In this case the Supreme Court of India delivered a judgment on 10 September 1957 concerning a petition filed by the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India against B Mukherjea. The opinion was authored by Justice P B Gajendragadkar, who was joined by Justices Natwarlal H Bhagwati and S K Das. The decision is reported in 1958 AIR 72 and 1958 SCR 371. The dispute arose under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, specifically sections 2(2), 21 and 22, which define the scope of a practising chartered accountant, the power of the High Court to act on a reference from the Council, and the definition of professional misconduct.

The respondent, B Mukherjea, was a chartered accountant and a member of the Institute. He had been appointed liquidator of three insurance companies by order of the High Court. While acting as liquidator he received the companies’ records, cash and securities. The Assistant Controller of Insurance later reported that Mukherjea’s conduct as liquidator was wholly unsatisfactory; he failed to respond to correspondence, his appointment was cancelled and a substitute liquidator was installed. Despite repeated demands he did not return the records, cash or securities. Consequently the Council of the Institute lodged a complaint, conducted an inquiry and found Mukherjea guilty of misconduct. The Council forwarded its report to the High Court under section 21 for appropriate action.

The High Court rejected the reference, holding that the acts for which Mukherjea had been found guilty did not constitute professional misconduct within sections 21 and 22 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that while acting as liquidator Mukherjea was to be regarded as practising as a chartered accountant within the meaning of section 2(2). The Court explained that the definition of misconduct in section 22 is inclusive, allowing the Council to determine that a member’s conduct renders him unfit even if the conduct is not listed in the schedule. The Court concluded that Mukherjea’s behaviour was grossly improper, unworthy and amounted to professional misconduct. The Court further observed that under section 21 the High Court possesses ample authority to adopt any measure necessary to achieve complete justice, including examining the Council’s findings, ordering a fresh inquiry or making its own determination, and is not bound to accept the Council’s findings without review.

The judgment was delivered in Civil Appeal No 170 of 1956, an appeal by special leave from the order of the High Court.

The Calcutta High Court issued an order dated 12 January 1955, exercising its special jurisdiction under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, in Matter No 107 of 1954. The Attorney-General for India, M. C. Setalvad, appeared on behalf of the appellants together with S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath. Counsel Aswini Kumar Ghose, T. S. Venkataraman and K. R. Chaudhury represented the respondents. The judgment was delivered on 10 September 1957 by Justice Gajendragadkar.

The factual background leading to the present appeal was undisputed. The respondent was enrolled as a registered accountant under the Auditors’ Certificate Rules, 1932 on 17 July 1933. When the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 came into force, his name was entered as a member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India on 1 July 1949. On 13 September 1950 he was appointed liquidator of three companies. In that capacity he obtained refunds of sums and securities that had been deposited on behalf of the three companies with the Reserve Bank of India, but he failed to submit any report on the progress of the liquidations. Repeated requests by the Assistant Controller of Insurance for information received no reply. Acting as liquidator he issued a cheque to Shri S. K. Mandal, Solicitor to the Central Government at Calcutta, for the taxed costs in the winding-up of one of the companies; the cheque was returned dishonoured because payment had not been arranged. Finding the respondent’s conduct wholly unsatisfactory and noting his failure to even acknowledge the letters addressed to him, the Assistant Controller of Insurance cancelled his appointment by a letter dated 29 October 1952. The respondent was then directed to surrender all books of account, records and documents to Shri N. N. Das, who had been appointed liquidator in his stead.

Both Shri Das and the Assistant Controller of Insurance made repeated demands that the respondent deliver to Shri Das the assets and records of the three companies. It was common ground that the respondent retained securities valued at Rs 11,950 and a cash sum of Rs 642 on behalf of United Common Provident Insurance Co. Ltd., securities worth Rs 12,100 on behalf of Asiatic Provident Co. Ltd., and securities and cash on behalf of Citizens of India Provident Insurance Co. Ltd. Of these amounts the respondent returned only securities with a face value of Rs 10,000 and Rs 350 of Asiatic Provident Co. Ltd. and United Common Provident Insurance Co. Ltd. respectively, and he failed to produce any further securities or cash held for the three companies. At this point a complaint was lodged against the respondent with the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India in Calcutta.

In this case a complaint was filed against the respondent before the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India in Calcutta. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the disciplinary committee of the Council opened an inquiry. The committee served a notice on the respondent, but the respondent did not file any written statement within the prescribed time. On 1 August 1953 the respondent sent a letter stating that he was ill and could not attend in person, and also asked that the proceedings be postponed. Accordingly the committee adjourned the matter to 29 August 1953. On that date the respondent appeared through counsel, who filed an affidavit on his behalf declaring that the respondent was ready to hand over all cash, books of account and other material to the newly appointed liquidator, but that he was not prepared to render the required accounts. Shri Das, who had been appointed as the liquidator, gave evidence before the disciplinary committee. Although the committee gave the respondent several further opportunities to be present, he neither appeared nor participated in any of the hearings. On 13 September 1953 the committee prepared its report and concluded that the respondent was guilty of gross negligence in discharging his professional duties, specifically for failing to deliver possession of the assets and the books of account of the three companies to the newly appointed liquidator.

The Council examined the committee’s report as mandated by the Act and concurred with the substance of its findings. However, the Council expressed the view that the respondent’s acts and omissions were more serious than simple gross negligence. In compliance with section 21(1) of the Act, the Council forwarded its finding to the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta, where the matter was heard by the learned Chief Justice and Mr Justice Lahiri. By their judgment dated 12 January 1955, the reference was dismissed on the ground that the Act did not provide a basis for taking action against the respondent, although the established facts indicated that “he had been guilty of grossly improper conduct if not dishonesty”. The question that now arose for consideration was the nature, scope and extent of the disciplinary jurisdiction that could be exercised under the Act against the respondent. To resolve this issue the Court found it necessary to examine the structure of the relevant provisions of the Act. The Act, which came into force in 1949, was enacted because the Legislature deemed it necessary to regulate professional accountants and consequently provided for the establishment of the Institute of Chartered Accountants. Section 2, sub-s. (1) (b) defines a Chartered Accountant as “a person who is a member of the Institute and who is in practice”. Section 2, sub-s. (2) provides that a member of the Institute shall be deemed to be in practice when, individually or in partnership …

In this case, the Court noted that the Act defined the circumstances in which a person who works with chartered accountants was deemed to be practising. The definition required that, in consideration of the remuneration received or to be received, the person performed any of the acts described in the four sub-clauses of Section 2(2). The Court identified sub-clause (iv) as the clause applicable to the present dispute. Sub-clause (iv) stated that a member who rendered other services which, in the opinion of the Council, were or could be rendered by a chartered accountant, was to be deemed to be in practice. The Court then explained the remaining structural provisions of the Act. Section 4 directed that the names of chartered accountants were to be entered in a register. Section 5 classified the members of the Institute into two classes, namely Associates and Fellows. Section 6 stipulated that no member could practice unless the Council issued a certificate of practice. Section 7 provided that every member who was practising was to be designated as a chartered accountant and that no person practising accountancy in India could use any other designation, either in addition to or in place of that title. Section 8 enumerated various disabilities that could disqualify a person from having his name entered on the register. Under Section 8, any person who suffered any of the disabilities listed in sub-clauses (i) to (vi) was barred from entry on the register. Sub-clause (v) dealt with the disability that arose when a person was convicted by a competent court, either within India or abroad, of an offence involving moral turpitude punishable by transportation or imprisonment, or of a non-technical offence committed in his professional capacity, unless the court had granted a pardon or the Central Government, upon an application by the person, had removed the disability by written order. Sub-clause (vi) described the disability that resulted when an inquiry found the chartered accountant guilty of conduct rendering him unfit to remain a member of the Institute. The Court then turned to the organisational chapters of the Act. Chapter III set out the constitution of the Council, its committees and its finances. Chapter IV addressed the register of members and the procedure for removal of a chartered accountant’s name from that register as provided in Section 20, sub-clauses (a) to (c). Section 20(2) required the Council to delete from the register the name of any member whom the High Court had found guilty of conduct that made him unfit to be a member of the Institute.

The Court further observed that Chapter V dealt with the matter of misconduct and comprised Sections 21 and 22. Chapter VI concerned the constitution and functions of the Regional Councils, while Chapter VII dealt with the penalties that could be imposed for violations of the Act, and Chapter VIII covered miscellaneous provisions. Section 21 prescribed the procedure to be followed when the Council received information or a complaint concerning a member’s alleged misconduct. The provision required the Council, upon forming the opinion that a member had engaged in conduct which, if proved, would render him unfit to remain a member, or when a complaint was made by or on behalf of the Central Government, to initiate an inquiry in the manner prescribed and to forward its findings to the High Court. The Court quoted the first part of Section 21(1), which began, “Where on receipt of information or on receipt of a complaint made to it, the Council …”. The remaining subsections of Section 21, namely (2), (3) and (4), outlined the powers of the High Court to act on the reference made by the Council under Section 21(1). Section 22 defined the term “misconduct” for the purposes of the Act, stating that conduct which, if proved, would render a person unfit to be a member of the Institute included any act or omission specified in the Schedule, while also affirming that nothing in the section limited the broader powers conferred by the Act.

The provision in Section 21(1) states that when the Council is of opinion that any member of the Institute has committed conduct which, if proved, would render the member unfit to remain in the Institute, or when a complaint is made by or on behalf of the Central Government, the Council must conduct an inquiry in the manner prescribed and must forward the Council’s finding to the High Court. Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 21 set out the powers of the High Court in dealing with such references made to it under subsection (1). Section 22 provides the definition of misconduct. It declares that for the purposes of the Act, the expression “conduct which, if proved, will render a person unfit to be a member of the Institute” includes any act or omission listed in the Schedule. The section further clarifies that nothing in it limits or narrows the power given to the Council by Section 21(1) to inquire into the conduct of any member of the Institute under any other circumstances.

The learned judges of the Calcutta High Court held that the conduct for which the respondent was proved guilty could not be described as professional misconduct in the proper sense and therefore could not attract the provisions of Sections 21 and 22 of the Act. The Chief Justice observed that there is no room for arguing that misconduct unrelated to the exercise of the profession falls within the ambit of the Act, unless such misconduct involves moral turpitude or renders a person unworthy of belonging to a responsible profession. The judges further found that even if they were to accept that the respondent’s misconduct fell under Sections 21 and 22, they could not take action because the Institute had not obtained a finding from the Council that the misconduct was outside the respondent’s professional capacity, and only the Council’s finding is transmitted to the Court. The correctness of these findings was challenged before this Court by the Attorney General, who contended that the Calcutta High Court judges applied an unduly narrow construction to Sections 21 and 22 by holding that the respondent’s conduct did not constitute professional misconduct, and that the technical reason for not taking action was based on a misconception.

The Court examined the nature and extent of the High Court’s powers when hearing references made under section 21, sub-sections (2), (3) and (4). It concluded that the arguments presented by the learned Attorney-General were well founded and required affirmation by this judgment. The first issue to be resolved was whether the respondent’s conduct could be characterised as professional misconduct. To decide that question, the Court considered the provisions of section 2, sub-section (2)(iv) of the Act. According to that provision, a member of the Institute is deemed to be “in practice” when he performs other services that, in the Council’s opinion, may be performed by a chartered accountant. Thus, just as an Institute member who engages in accountancy practice is deemed to be practising as a chartered accountant, the same presumption applies when he renders the other services specified in section 2, sub-section (2)(iv). Identifying which other services fall within the scope of this sub-section requires reference to the regulations made under the Act. Section 30 of the Act empowers the Council to formulate regulations by issuing a notification in the Gazette of India for the purpose of effectuating the object of the Act. The section further mandates that a copy of each regulation be circulated to every member of the Institute. Section 30, sub-section (2) enumerates a variety of subjects on which regulations may be framed, while stating that such enumeration does not limit the general powers conferred by section 30, sub-section (1). Sub-section (4) provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), the Central Government may initially frame regulations for the purposes mentioned in the section, and those regulations are deemed to have been made by the Council. Those initial regulations remain effective from the commencement of the Act until they are amended, altered or revoked by the Council. Regulation 78 is one of the regulations originally framed by the Central Government under section 30, sub-section (4). Regulation 78 states, verbatim, that without prejudice to the Council’s discretion, a chartered accountant may act as liquidator, trustee, executor, administrator, arbitrator, receiver, adviser, or representative for costing, financial and taxation matters, may accept appointments made by Central or State Governments, Courts of law or any legal authority, and may act as Secretary in his professional capacity provided the position is not a salaried full-time employment. The final clause of Regulation 78, permitting an accountant to act as Secretary, was inserted by the Council through a notification dated 22 August 1953. Consequently, when the respondent accepted the appointment as liquidator of the three companies involved, he thereby consented to perform a service expressly covered by Regulation 78.

In this case the respondent accepted an appointment to act as liquidator of the three companies following an order issued by the Calcutta High Court. By performing the duties of liquidator he was providing services that the Council considered capable of being performed by a chartered accountant. Consequently, Regulation 78 had to be interpreted together with section 2, sub-section (2), clause (iv). When the two provisions are read together, it becomes clear that the respondent, while acting as liquidator under the High Court order, must be regarded as being “in practice” within the meaning of section 2, sub-section (2). The Court expressed no difficulty in concluding that chartered accountants who render services that fall within section 2, sub-section (2), clause (iv) are equally entitled to be treated as “in practice” as those whose duties are covered by clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of the same sub-section. If this interpretation is correct, it follows that the respondent’s conduct while discharging his duties as liquidator cannot be separated from his professional conduct as a chartered accountant, even if the term is understood in a narrow sense. Thus, when the respondent functioned as liquidator, every act or omission proved against him in that capacity must be characterised as a professional act or omission. The Court noted that, according to Webster’s New International Dictionary, “practice” means the exercise of any profession or occupation, and therefore any activity performed by a chartered accountant in the role of liquidator, which attracts the provisions of section 2, sub-section (2), must be regarded as conduct attributable to him in the course of his practice. The Court observed that clause (iv) of sub-section (2) of section 2 was deliberately introduced by the Legislature to bring within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the statutory bodies recognized under the Act the conduct of chartered accountants even when they render services in capacities other than that of a chartered accountant in the ordinary sense. The Legislature intended to create a self-contained code of conduct for chartered accountants, and therefore the expression “to be in practice” has been intentionally expanded by virtue of section 2, sub-section (2), clause (iv). On the basis of the facts proved, the Court therefore held that the respondent was clearly guilty of professional misconduct. This conclusion would settle the appeal, because once a finding of professional misconduct is made, the respondent must be dealt with on that basis and an appropriate order must be made under section 21, sub-section (3) of the Act. However, the Court noted that the learned Attorney-General had alternatively argued before it that confining the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction only to cases of professional misconduct, technically…

In addressing the argument raised by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court, the Court observed that those judges had misinterpreted the relevant provisions of the Act and therefore the matter required even a brief examination. Section 21(1) of the Act identifies two distinct categories of cases in which alleged misconduct by members of the Institute may be investigated. When a complaint or information is lodged against a chartered accountant, the Council is not compelled to commence an inquiry immediately. Instead, the Council must first assess the nature of the information or complaint and determine whether, assuming the alleged facts are proven, the member would be unfit to remain in the Institute. In other words, for a private complaint, the Council is required to hold an inquiry only after it is satisfied on a prima facie basis that the alleged facts, if established, would justify the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction because they would render the member unfit. The conduct alleged must be of a character that, if proved, would make the member unsuitable for membership. The second category concerns complaints received by the Council from the Central Government. In such cases, the Council does not have the discretion to apply the prima facie test; rather, it has no jurisdiction to defer the inquiry and must cause an inquiry to be held immediately. After an inquiry is concluded under either scenario, the findings of the Council must be forwarded to the High Court. Section 22 provides a definition of “conduct which, if proved, will render a person unfit to be a member of the Institute.” This definition is inclusive; it encompasses any act or omission listed in the schedule. However, the latter part of Section 22 expressly states that nothing in the section should be interpreted as limiting or restricting the powers conferred on the Council under Section 21(1). Consequently, although the definition in Section 21(1) refers to the acts and omissions enumerated in the schedule, that list is not exhaustive, and it does not curtail the broader authority of the Council that may arise from the language of Section 21(1) itself. The schedule referred to in Section 22 sets out clauses (a) through (v), detailing various acts and omissions. It stipulates that if any of these acts or omissions is proven against a chartered accountant, the accountant shall be deemed guilty of professional misconduct that renders him unfit for membership. Clause (v) is particularly broad, covering situations where an accountant is guilty of “such other act or omission” that the Council may specify by notification in the Gazette of India.

The provision allows the Council to specify, by notification in the Gazette of India, any omission in a chartered accountant’s professional capacity. The Court acknowledged that the respondent’s conduct in the present matter does not correspond to any of the specific acts or omissions listed in the schedule. Consequently, the conduct therefore cannot be said to fall within the first part of section 22 of the statute. However, if the definition contained in section 22 is intended to be inclusive, then the provision must be read broadly. Further, the latter portion of that section expressly preserves the broader powers and jurisdiction granted to the Council to conduct inquiries under section 21, sub-section (1). Consequently, it would be incorrect to limit disciplinary jurisdiction solely to conduct that matches the specific definition in section 22. In this context, the Court found it appropriate to refer to section 8, which addresses disabilities within the profession. Section 8, sub-sections (v) and (vi), provide support for the proposition that disciplinary jurisdiction may be exercised against chartered accountants. This holds even when the conduct does not fall expressly within the inclusive definition set out in section 22. Even if that conduct does not correspond to any provision in the schedule, the Council remains authorized to conduct the inquiry, and any finding against the member would support the High Court taking appropriate action.

Such a finding would subsequently be taken by the High Court under section 21, sub-section (3), for further action. The Court noted that the High Court can impose a penalty on the offending member only if it accepts the Council’s finding; otherwise it cannot act. The Court said that this conclusion is reinforced when the expanded interpretation of the expression ‘to be in practice’ in section 2, sub-section (2) is considered, a point previously discussed. Accordingly, the Court held that it must overturn the Calcutta High Court judges’ conclusion that the respondent’s proven conduct does not fall within sections 21 and 22. The judges had based that view on the contention that the conduct was not connected with the exercise of his profession as a chartered accountant in the narrow sense of that term. The Court then turned to the question of the scope of the High Court’s jurisdiction and powers when it adjudicates references made under section 21, sub-sections (2), (3) and (4). The Calcutta High Court judges expressed the view that, even if they were prepared to adopt a broader construction of the material words in sections 21 and 22, they would lack justification. Accordingly, they said they could not issue any orders against the respondent in these proceedings because the finding that had been referred to the High Court was not sufficient.

In this case, the Court noted that the sole finding recorded against the respondent was that he had committed professional misconduct in the narrow sense of that expression. In other words, the High Court had held that if it were to accept and apply a broader construction of the material words, it would be creating a new case on the reference, and therefore it would not be justified in following such a course. The Court expressed the view that this reasoning was not well founded. Section 21, sub-section (2), sets out the procedure to be followed by the High Court when a finding made by the Council is referred to the Court under Section 21, sub-section (1). Accordingly, the Court must give notice of the date fixed for the hearing of the reference to the parties specified in Section 21, sub-section (1), and must provide those parties with an opportunity to be heard. Section 21, sub-section (3), further provides that the High Court may either pass final orders on the case as it thinks fit or may refer the matter back to the Council for further inquiry, and after receiving a fresh finding it may deal with the case in the manner prescribed by sub-section (2) and pass final orders accordingly. It is clear, therefore, that in hearing references made under Section 21, sub-section (1), the High Court is empowered to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the statutory body for that purpose. The High Court may even refer the matter back to the Council for additional inquiry and may call for a new finding. The Court emphasized that the High Court is not bound in every instance to accept the recorded finding and merely to accept or reject it without further consideration. If, on the facts alleged and proved, the High Court is of the opinion that an alternative finding could be recorded, it may satisfactorily remit the case to the Council with appropriate directions. The powers conferred on the High Court by Section 21, sub-section (8), are sufficiently wide to enable the Court to adopt any course that, in its opinion, will secure complete justice between the parties. Moreover, in the present matter, no technical considerations of that sort could arise because the material facts were never contested by the parties at any stage of the proceedings. The sole dispute between the parties concerned whether, on the proved facts, disciplinary jurisdiction could be invoked against the respondent under the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, the Court held that the learned Judges of the High Court erred in concluding that, even if they had accepted the broader interpretation of Sections 21 and 22, they could not have made an appropriate order against the respondent in view of the specific finding recorded by the Council in the inquiry in question.

The Court indicated that it was now necessary to examine certain judicial decisions that had been brought to its attention. One such decision was G M Oka, In re, reported in 1952 at page 168 of the Commercial Cases. In that case a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that when a chartered accountant appeared before a court of law solely as a witness and not in the capacity of a chartered accountant, any false statement made by him did not automatically give rise to disciplinary proceedings under the chartered accountant’s profession. The Court noted that making false evidence could expose the accountant to an offence of perjury and, if he were convicted, the conviction itself could become the basis for disciplinary action. These observations, the Court observed, supported the view previously taken by the Calcutta High Court. The Court further acknowledged that a conviction of a chartered accountant would attract the provisions of section 8, sub-section a, clause vi, and therefore the Bombay High Court’s conclusion that a conviction could justify disciplinary action was correct. However, the Court pointed out that the remaining remarks on which the respondent relied were obiter dicta, and that the Bombay judgment did not refer to the provision of section 2, sub-clause (iv), nor were other relevant considerations argued before that court. The Court also observed that, aside from the technical arguments presented on behalf of the accountant, the record contained a large volume of additional evidence which conclusively demonstrated the accountant’s misconduct.

The respondent’s counsel, Mr Ashwini Kumar Ghosh, also attempted to rely on the case of Haseldine v. Hosken, reported in 1933 at page 822 of the King’s Bench reports. In that case the solicitor had taken out an indemnity policy covering loss arising from any neglect, omission or error committed in his professional capacity. While the policy was in force the solicitor incurred a loss because he, without realizing it, entered into a champertous agreement. When he claimed indemnity, the court held that the loss did not arise from any professional neglect, omission or error but from a personal speculative venture. The Court stated that this decision did not assist the respondent in the present matter. In assessing whether the respondent was guilty of professional misconduct, the Court confined its analysis to the substantive provisions of the Chartered Accountants Act itself. The observations from the Haseldine case, the Court held, could not aid in interpreting those statutory provisions. Likewise, the Court noted that the decision in Krishnaswamy v. The Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, wherein the court examined whether orders made under section 21 were civil proceedings, offered no guidance relevant to the issues before it.

In this case the Court observed that the question whether orders issued under section 2 of the Act constitute orders passed in civil proceedings was entirely irrelevant to the matters presently before it and offered no assistance in resolving the issues. Consequently the only remaining matter for determination was the appropriate final order to be imposed upon the respondent. The Court held that the respondent’s conduct was wholly unworthy of a practising chartered accountant. The Court noted that the respondent had repeatedly refused to provide prompt replies to letters sent by the Assistant Controller of Insurance, and further had failed to return documents, securities and cash that he had received in his capacity as liquidator. These actions left no doubt, according to the Court, that the respondent was either unable or unwilling to return the amounts, securities and cash and that he was merely employing delaying tactics with the aim of postponing an inevitable unfavorable outcome. The Court characterised the conduct not merely as technically improper but as grossly improper and unworthy, thereby warranting a deterrent order. The Court explained that the respondent had been appointed liquidator by the Calcutta High Court, presumably because of his status as a practising chartered accountant, and that he had derived the benefit of that appointment from that status. By acting as liquidator in a manner that was absolutely unworthy of his professional standing, the respondent rendered himself unfit to remain a member of the Institute. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the interests of justice required that the respondent’s name be removed from the Institute’s register for a period of four years. Regarding costs, the Court directed that the respondent pay the costs incurred by the appellants in the Supreme Court, while each party was to bear its own costs in the proceedings before the lower court. The appeal was therefore allowed. (1) A.I.R. 1953 Madras 79.