Sohanlal vs The Union Of India (Uoi)

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 7 March, 1957

Coram: Imam, J.

In this matter titled Sohanlal versus The Union of India, the judgment was delivered on the seventh day of March, 1957 by the Supreme Court of India. The bench was headed by Justice Imam. The respondent, identified as Jagan Nath, had instituted a petition under article 226 of the Constitution before the Punjab High Court. The High Court entertained the petition and granted the relief sought. Accordingly, the High Court directed that the Union of India and the appellant, Sohan Lal, should immediately restore possession of house number 35, situated in West Patel Nagar, Delhi, to Jagan Nath. Dissatisfied with this order, the appellant applied for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, and such leave was subsequently granted, permitting the appeal to be heard before this Court.

The factual background disclosed that Jagan Nath was a displaced person and a refugee who had arrived from Pakistan. The Government of India had formulated several rehabilitation schemes for such refugees, one of which involved the sale of houses that the Government had constructed in West Patel Nagar specifically for refugee accommodation. The scheme was deliberately limited and did not intend to consider applications from displaced persons who had already received agricultural land allocations in East Punjab. Under this scheme, a small number of dwellings described as “box‑type tenements” were built. The prescribed procedure stipulated that only those displaced persons who had been registered before fifteen August 1948 and who were gainfully employed were eligible to receive a house. An aspirant had to submit an application in the form prescribed, offering to purchase a house in West Patel Nagar. If the applicant appeared prima facie eligible, the authorities could direct him to deposit the sale price of the house with the Treasury, while his eligibility would still be subject to later verification. The act of permitting the deposit did not itself constitute acceptance of eligibility. After the deposit, the applicant might be required to furnish documentary proof of his eligibility. A list would then be prepared of all applicants who had deposited the sale price and whose eligibility had been confirmed. In the event that the number of eligible applicants exceeded the number of houses available, those whose Treasury challans bore later dates would be excluded and would receive a refund of their money. Those whose names remained on the final list were required to pay ground rent by a prescribed deadline. Allocation of a specific house to an eligible applicant was to be made by drawing lots. Jagan Nath had registered himself as a refugee on thirty‑first December 1947. He completed the application in the prescribed form and, after his prima facie eligibility was accepted, he deposited the sum of five thousand six hundred rupees as the sale price. He also paid the ground rent for the plot on which the house was to be erected, having been previously informed that a two‑roomed enclosed verandah “box‑type” house in West Patel Nagar would be allotted to him. He was further told that the determination of the particular house to be allotted would be decided by drawing lots at the site on

On 15 February 1952 at three o’clock in the afternoon a lot was drawn, and as a result house number 35 – the house that is the subject of this appeal – was assigned to Jagan Nath. According to Jagan Nath, on 10 May 1952 the Accommodation Officer, while he was absent, transferred the members of his family together with all of their belongings to the disputed house in a truck, and on that day Jagan Nath and his family entered into possession of the house. He claimed that he was evicted from that house on 27 September 1952 pursuant to a warrant of eviction dated 11 September 1952, which was said to have been issued under section 25 of Ordinance III of 1952. After his eviction, possession of the house was handed over to the appellant on 3 October 1952. The appellant, who was also a displaced person, had filed an application for allotment of a house in West Patel Nagar on 27 February 1952. He had deposited Rs 5,600 as the sale price, had apparently satisfied all the conditions required for the allotment, and the house in dispute was allotted to him on 31 July 1952. The appellant has remained in possession of the disputed house since 3 October 1952. The appellant’s principal contention was that, given the circumstances, the High Court had erred in issuing the order that appeared to be a writ of mandamus. He argued that there was a serious factual dispute between the parties, including the question of whether Jagan Nath had acquired any legal title to the property. Accordingly, a proceeding by way of a writ was inappropriate because the decision would amount to a decree declaring Jagan Nath’s title and ordering the restoration of possession. The appropriate remedy, he said, was to seek a declaration of title in an ordinary civil suit. He further maintained that a writ of mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus could be granted only when the facts were not contested and Jagan Nath’s title was clear. The appellant also contended that a mandamus could not be issued against him, a private individual, because he had lawfully taken possession and there was no evidence that he had colluded with the Union of India. Moreover, the High Court had made no finding that the appellant had acted in concert with the Union of India to cause Jagan Nath’s dispossession. On behalf of Jagan Nath it was submitted that when he entered possession he did not do so as a trespasser, since he had been inducted onto the property by the Accommodation Officer.

In this case the Court observed that the respondent had been appointed as an Accommodation Officer and therefore could not have been removed from the premises in an unlawful manner. Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act No XXVII of 1950) required that a notice be served on any occupier directing him to vacate the premises within fifteen days of the service of such notice before any eviction could be effected. The Court found that this statutory requirement had not been complied with; the respondent had been evicted without any notice and without observing the mandatory procedure prescribed by Section 3. Consequently, the Court held that the eviction was a high‑handed act of the Government that lacked any legal justification. The Union of India, which had carried out the illegal eviction, was therefore directed to restore possession of the disputed property to the respondent. Because the eviction had been carried out at the instance of the appellant, the Court also ordered the appellant to restore possession of the same property to the respondent. In support of this conclusion the Court relied on several decisions of High Courts, namely Khushal Singh v. Shri Rameshwar Dayal, Deputy Commissioner, Delhi (I.L.R. [1954] Punjab 211); G. Kistareddy v. Commissioner of City Police, Hyderabad (A.I.R. [1952] Hyderabad 36); and Mohinder Singh v. State of Pepsu (A.I.R. [1955] Pepsu 60). The Court also referred to observations made in its own judgment in Wazir Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, which endorsed the principle that a person who is in possession of property and is illegally evicted is entitled to have that property restored to him.

The Court further stated that it would not examine the substantive merits of the competing title claims asserted by the appellant and the respondent. To determine which party held the superior right to the property, the Court would have to engage in a factual and legal enquiry more appropriate to a civil suit before a properly constituted court rather than a writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court noted that several questions of fact and law remained in dispute and that, before the respondent could be given possession of the property, the Court would first need to declare that he possessed a valid title to the property and was therefore entitled to recover possession. Such a declaration would amount to passing a decree in his favour. In view of the circumstances that the Court would discuss subsequently, it considered it a serious question whether, in proceedings under Article 226, the Court should make such a declaratory order and order the restoration of the property to the respondent. Finally, the Court observed that the respondent had entered into a transaction with the Union of India concerning the property up to a certain stage, but that no letter of allotment had ever been issued to him. When certain facts later emerged, the Union of India informed the respondent that the property could not be allotted to him because, as a displaced person, he had already been allotted land in East Punjab. This information formed part of the background that the Court would have to consider in determining the rights acquired by the respondent up to the point at which the Union of India denied further allotment.

In the dispute between Jagan Nath and the Union of India, it was necessary to determine what rights Jagan Nath had acquired in the property up to the point when the Union informed him that the property would not be allotted to him. Another issue to be decided was whether Jagan Nath was permitted to take possession of the property on the basis that it had been allotted to him, or whether his entry was based on a misunderstanding caused by the Union being misled by the contents of his application. The Union of India contended that, under the allotment scheme, Jagan Nath was not eligible for a house in West Patel Nagar because it had later emerged that, before filing his application, he had already been allotted agricultural land in the District of Hissar. Satisfied that Jagan Nath was therefore ineligible, the Union declined to allot Tenement No. 35, West Patel Nagar to him and instead allocated that house to the appellant, who was found to be fully eligible. The appellant was subsequently given possession of the property after Jagan Nath’s eviction. The appellant complied with all conditions imposed by the Union, a letter of allotment was actually issued to him, and he entered into possession of the disputed property under the Union’s authority. The question arose as to whether the appellant thereby acquired a legal right to hold the property against Jagan Nath. The Court expressed the view that all of these questions ought to be resolved through a properly constituted suit in a Civil Court rather than by invoking provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Court observed that Jagan Nath’s eviction contravened the explicit provisions of Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction) Act and was therefore illegal. Because the eviction was unlawful, Jagan Nath was entitled to be removed only after following the due process of law. Consequently, a writ of mandamus, or an order of similar nature, could be directed against the Union of India to restore possession of the property to Jagan Nath, from which he had been removed while the property remained in the Union’s possession. However, at the time of the hearing the disputed property was in the appellant’s possession. The High Court had found no evidence or finding that the appellant colluded with the Union of India or that he was aware of the illegality of Jagan Nath’s eviction. The Court noted that, as a general rule, a writ of mandamus is not issued against a private individual; it is directed at a person to compel the performance of a specific act that falls within the scope of his official duties and constitutes a public duty, as explained in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 11, Lord Simonds Edition, page 84. The Court added that, had it been proven that the Union of India and the appellant had colluded, and that their transaction was... (the passage continues).

In this case the Court observed that if an agreement was merely colourable and was made with the purpose of depriving Jagan Nath of his rights, a Court might possess jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus against the appellant. The Court noted that it could not locate a direct authority that dealt with a factual scenario identical to the present one, but it considered that, with respect to election to an office, a mandamus directing restoration, admission, or election to that office will be granted only when the office is actually vacant. The Court explained that where the office is already occupied, the correct remedy is to proceed by way of an injunction or by filing an election petition in order to remove the person who is in possession; a mandamus would be premised on the assumption that no one holds the office. Referring to the decision in R v Chester Corporation ([1855] 25 L.J.Q.B. 61), the Court reiterated the settled rule that when a person has been de facto elected to a corporate office, has accepted the office and has acted in it, the validity of that election and the title to the office may be challenged only through a quo warranto proceeding. Consequently, a mandamus will not lie unless the election can be shown to be merely colourable. The Court expressed that it sees no logical basis for treating this situation differently from a case where a person has entered into genuine, good‑faith possession of property without any knowledge that another individual had been illegally evicted from it. Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court had erred in permitting Jagan Nath’s application under Article 226 of the Constitution and in granting the order it made. The appeal was therefore allowed, the order of the High Court was set aside, and the Court directed that each party bear its own costs in both the Supreme Court and the High Court. The appeal was allowed.