Sohan Lal vs The Union of India

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1954

Decision Date: 7 March, 1957

Coram: Syed Jaffer Imam, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, B. Jagannadhadas, P. Govinda Menon, J.L. Kapur

In this matter the Supreme Court considered the appeal of Sohan Lal against the Union of India, the judgment being pronounced on 7 March 1957. The judgment was delivered by Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, and the bench also comprised Justices Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, B. Jagannadhadas, P. Govinda Menon and J. L. Kapur. The case was cited as 1957 AIR 529 and 1957 SCR 738. The petition concerned the issuance of a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the context of a dispute over title to a house, the legality of the eviction of a displaced person identified only as “J”, and the question of whether a writ could be directed against a private individual who had taken possession of the property without knowledge of any illegal eviction.

The factual background recorded that J, a displaced person, had been found prima facie entitled to the allotment of a house and that the Accommodation Officer had moved J’s family into the house on 10 May 1952, although no formal letter of allotment was ever issued. Subsequently, after certain facts came to light, the Union of India concluded that J was not entitled to the allotment and informed him that the house could not be allotted to him. J was then evicted on 27 September 1952 without the fifteen‑day notice required by Section 3 of the Public Premises Eviction Act (XXVII of 1950). The house was thereafter allotted to Sohan Lal, who took possession on 3 October 1952. J filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab High Court, seeking restoration of possession. The High Court ordered both the Union of India and Sohan Lal to restore possession of the house to J. Sohan Lal appealed this order.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had erred in granting the writ of mandamus. It observed that there existed a serious dispute of fact between the parties concerning whether J had acquired any title to the property and, more broadly, concerning the title itself. Accordingly, the Court concluded that proceeding by way of a writ was inappropriate because the decision would amount to a decree declaring a party’s title and ordering restitution of possession, matters that are properly determined in a civil suit for title. The Court explained that a writ of mandamus may be issued only where the facts are not in dispute and the title to the property is clear. While the eviction of J was illegal due to the failure to give the statutory notice, a writ could have been directed against the Union if the property had remained in its possession. However, no writ could be issued against Sohan Lal, a private individual who had taken possession in good faith without knowledge of any illegal eviction. The Court further noted that if it had been proved that the Union and Sohan Lal had colluded to deprive J of his rights, jurisdiction to issue a writ might have existed, but such collusion was not established. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the writ of mandamus set aside.

In the circumstances where the intention was to deprive J of his rights, the Court might have possessed jurisdiction to issue a writ. However, the Court concluded that such a writ could not be directed against S, because S had apparently taken genuine possession of the house without any knowledge that J had been illegally removed from the premises. The Court applied the precedent set in R. v. Chestey Corporation, (1855) 25 L.J.Q.B. 61. The judgment was rendered in the civil appellate jurisdiction in Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1954. The appeal was taken by way of special leave from the judgment and order dated 30 April 1953, issued by the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi in Civil Writ Application No. 314 of 1952. Counsel for the appellant comprised Ram Lal Anand and S. N. Anand, while counsel for respondent No. 1 consisted of R. Ganpathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, and counsel for respondent No. 2 was A. N. Grover together with K. L. Mehta. The decision was delivered on 7 March 1957 by Justice Imam J. The respondent, Jagan Nath, had filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab High Court, and the High Court had allowed that petition. The High Court ordered that the Union of India, as respondent, and the appellant, Sohan Lal, restore possession of house No. 35 situated in West Patel Nagar, Delhi, to Jagan Nath without delay. The appellant, dissatisfied with that order, obtained special leave to appeal to this Court. Jagan Nath was identified as a displaced person and a refugee from Pakistan. The Government of India had formulated several rehabilitation schemes for refugees, one of which involved the sale of certain houses that the Government had constructed in West Patel Nagar for refugee accommodation. That scheme was not intended to consider applications from displaced persons who had already received agricultural land allocations in East Punjab. A limited number of dwellings, described as “box‑type tenements,” had been built. Under the procedure established to implement the scheme, only those displaced persons who had been registered before 15 August 1948 and who were gainfully employed were eligible to be allotted a house. An aspirant had to submit an application in the prescribed form, proposing to purchase a house in West Patel Nagar. If the applicant appeared prima facie eligible, he could be instructed to deposit the sale price of the house with the treasury, while his eligibility would be verified subsequently. The authority to deposit the sale price did not constitute acceptance of his eligibility. After depositing the price, the applicant might be required to furnish proof of eligibility. A list would then be compiled of all applicants who had deposited the sale price and whose eligibility had been confirmed. If the number of such applicants exceeded the number of houses available, those whose treasury challans bore later dates would be excluded and their money refunded. Those whose names appeared on the final list would be required to pay the ground rent by a specified deadline. A particular

In this case, the Court explained that a house was to be allotted to an applicant by drawing lots. Jagan Nath had registered himself as a refugee on 31 December 1947 and had submitted an application in the prescribed form. After his prima facie eligibility was accepted, he deposited the sum of rupees 5,600 as the sale price and also paid the ground rent for the plot on which the house was to be built. He had been told that he would be allotted a two‑roomed enclosed verandah “box‑type” house in West Patel Nagar. He further received notice that the final allotment would be decided by drawing lots at the site on 15 February 1952 at three o’clock in the afternoon. As a result of the lot drawing, house number 35, the property that later became the subject of this appeal, fell to his lot. According to Jagan Nath, on 10 May 1952 the Accommodation Officer, in his absence, removed the members of his family together with all of their belongings to the disputed house in a truck, and consequently the family entered into possession of that house. However, Jagan Nath was evicted from the disputed house on 27 September 1952 by virtue of a warrant of eviction dated 11 September 1952, which purported to have been issued under section 25 of Ordinance III of 1952. After his eviction, possession of the house was given to the appellant on 3 October 1952. The appellant, who was also a displaced person, had applied for allotment of a house in West Patel Nagar on 27 February 1952, had deposited the same amount of rupees 5,600 as sale price and had apparently complied with all the conditions required for allotment. The disputed house was allotted to the appellant on 31 July 1952, and he had remained in possession of it since 3 October 1952. The appellant’s principal contention was that the High Court had erred in making an order that appeared to be a writ of mandamus, because there existed a serious dispute of fact between the parties and it was uncertain whether Jagan Nath had acquired any legal title to the property. The Court held that proceedings by way of a writ were inappropriate where the decision would amount to a decree declaring Jagan Nath’s title and ordering restoration of possession; the proper remedy for Jagan Nath would have been to seek declaration of his title in an ordinary civil suit. Moreover, a writ of mandamus or an order in its nature could be issued only where the facts were not in dispute and Jagan Nath’s title to the property was clear. The appellant further argued that a writ of mandamus could not be directed against him, a private individual, because he had come into lawful possession and there was no evidence or finding of collusion between him and the Union of India that resulted in Jagan Nath’s dispossession.

The Court observed that a mandamus order could not be directed against the appellant, who was a private individual. The appellant had taken lawful possession of the property and there was no evidence of any collusion between him and the Union of India. Moreover, the High Court had not found that the appellant had acted in concert with the Union of India to dispossess Jagan Nath of the disputed property and cause its allotment to the appellant. On behalf of Jagan Nath, it was submitted that his entry into possession was not as a trespasser because he had been inducted onto the premises by the Accommodation Officer. Consequently, the Court held that Jagan Nath could not have been evicted illegally. Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act No. XXVII of 1950) required that a notice be served on the occupier directing him to vacate the premises within fifteen days from the date of service before any eviction could be effected. The Court found that such notice had not been served and that Jagan Nath had been removed without compliance with the mandatory provisions of section 3. This eviction was described as a high‑handed act of the Government lacking any legal justification. Accordingly, the Court held that the Union of India, which had carried out the illegal eviction, should be ordered to restore possession of the disputed property to Jagan Nath, and that the appellant, being the person at whose instance the eviction was effected, should also be directed to return possession of the property to Jagan Nath. The judgment relied on several authorities, including decisions of the Punjab High Court in Khushal Singh v. Shri Rameshwar Dayal, Deputy Commissioner, Delhi (1), the Hyderabad High Court in G. Kistareddy v. Commissioner of City Police, Hyderabad (2), the PEPSU High Court in Mohinder Singh v. State of PEPSU (1), and observations from this Court’s own decision in Wazir Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh (4). These authorities supported the proposition that a person who is in possession and who has been illegally evicted is entitled to have the property restored to him. The Court further stated that it would not examine the merits of the competing title claims raised by the appellant and by Jagan Nath, because such an inquiry would belong to a civil court hearing a properly instituted suit rather than to a court exercising the writ jurisdiction. The Court noted that there were factual and legal questions in dispute that needed to be resolved before the respective claims of the parties could be decided. Before any order could be made to restore the property to Jagan Nath, the Court said, it would first be necessary to declare that he possessed a valid title to the property and was entitled to recover possession of it.

In effect, granting the relief sought would be equivalent to passing a decree in favour of Jagan Nath. Accordingly, the Court considered whether, in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, it was appropriate to issue a declaration of title and to order that the disputed property be restored to him. The record showed that Jagan Nath had entered into a transaction with the Union of India concerning the property up to a certain point, but that no formal letter of allotment had ever been issued to him. Later, when certain facts became known, the Union of India informed Jagan Nath that the property could not be allotted to him because, as a displaced person, he had already been allotted land in East Punjab. The dispute therefore required a determination of what rights, if any, Jagan Nath acquired in the property up to the moment when the Union of India notified him that the allotment would not be made. Another issue for resolution was whether Jagan Nath was permitted to take possession of the property on the basis that it had been allotted to him, or whether his entry was based on a misapprehension arising from the Union of India being misled by the contents of his application.

The Union of India maintained that, under its allocation scheme, Jagan Nath was not eligible for a house in West Patel Nagar because it was subsequently discovered that he had already been allotted agricultural land in the District of Hissar before filing his application. Satisfied that he was ineligible, the Union of India declined to allot Tenement No. 35, West Patel Nagar to Jagan Nath and instead allotted the house to the appellant, who was found to meet all eligibility criteria. Consequently, the appellant was given possession of the property after Jagan Nath’s eviction. The appellant had complied with every condition imposed by the Union of India, a letter of allotment had been issued to him, and he entered possession of the disputed property under the authority of the Union of India. The Court then asked whether, by these steps, the appellant acquired a legal right to hold the property against Jagan Nath.

In the Court’s view, all the questions concerning title, rights accrued, and the legality of possession should be adjudicated in a properly constituted civil suit rather than through writ proceedings under Article 226. The Court observed that Jagan Nath’s eviction contravened the explicit provisions of Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction) Act and was therefore illegal. Although his eviction was unlawful, the Court noted that he was entitled to be removed only through a lawful process. Accordingly, a writ of mandamus, or an order in the nature of mandamus, could be directed against the Union of India to require the restoration of possession of the property to Jagan Nath, from which he had been evicted. At the time of the hearing, the property remained in the possession of the Union of India, but the disputed premises were actually occupied by the appellant. No evidence or finding was presented indicating that the appellant had colluded with the Union of India or that he possessed knowledge of the illegality of Jagan Nath’s eviction.

The Court noted that the High Court had not produced any evidence showing that the appellant acted in collusion with the Union of India or that he possessed knowledge that the eviction of Jagan Nath was illegal. The Court explained that, as a general principle, a writ of mandamus is not issued to, nor is an order in the nature of mandamus made against, a private individual. Such an order is directed at a person in his official capacity, compelling him to perform a specific act that forms part of a public duty, as stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, volume eleven, Lord Simonds edition, page 84. The Court added that, had it been established that the Union of India and the appellant had conspired and that their transaction was merely a façade intended to deprive Jagan Nath of his rights, a court might have found jurisdiction to grant a writ of mandamus against the appellant. No direct authority was found for a case of this exact nature, but the Court observed that, in matters involving election to an office, a mandamus to restore or admit a person to an office is granted only when the office is vacant. When the office is already filled, the appropriate remedy is an injunction or an election petition to remove the incumbent. The Court cited R v Chester Corporation, which held that it is a fixed rule of law that where a person has been de facto elected to a corporate office, has accepted the position and acted in it, the validity of that election and the title to the office can be challenged only by a quo warranto proceeding. A mandamus will not lie unless the election can be shown to be merely colourable. The Court saw no principle that would distinguish this situation from one in which a person has taken bona‑fide possession of property without any knowledge that another person had been illegally evicted from it. Consequently, the Court concluded that the High Court had erred in permitting Jagan Nath’s application under Article 226 of the Constitution and in the order it issued. The appeal was therefore allowed, the order of the High Court was set aside, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs in both the Supreme Court and the High Court. Appeal was allowed.