Sashi Mohan Debnath And Others vs The State Of West Bengal

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 114 of 1954

Decision Date: 19 November 1957

Coram: Syed Jaffer Imam, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, P.B. Gajendragadkar

Sashi Mohan Debnath and others filed a petition against the State of West Bengal, and the matter was decided on 19 November 1957 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, who sat on a bench together with Justices Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J. L. Kapur and P. B. Gajendragadkar. The case is reported in the All India Reports at 1958 AIR 194 and in the Supreme Court Reporter at 1958 SCR 962. The dispute concerned a Sessions trial where the presiding judge had agreed with the jury’s verdict of not guilty on certain charges while disagreeing with the verdict of guilty on other charges, and consequently made a reference to the High Court under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Act V of 1898, specifically sections 307 and 306.

The Court explained that sections 306 and 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when read together, make it clear that if a Sessions judge disagrees with the jury’s finding on any charge and therefore wishes to refer the matter to the High Court, the judge must refer the entire case against the accused and not only a portion of it. The Court held that a situation where the jury returns a guilty verdict on some charges and a not‑guilty verdict on others does not permit the judge to record a judgment of acquittal in accordance with the jury’s not‑guilty findings while referring the guilty portions to the High Court. Such a partial recording of judgment would contravene the mandatory requirement of section 307(2) of the Code and would effectively prevent the High Court from considering the full evidence and exercising its jurisdiction under section 307(3). The Court cited the decisions in Hazari Lal’s case, (1932) 1 L.R. Pat. 395 and Ramjanam Tewari, (1935) 1 L.R. Pat. 717 as authorities that support this principle, while disapproving the earlier rulings in Emperor v. Jagmohan, 1 L.R. (1947) Allahabad 240 and Emperor v. Muktar, (1943) 48 C.W.N. 547. The judgments in Emperor v. Bishnu Chandra Das, (1933) 37 C.W.N. 1180, King Emperor v. Ananda Charan Ray, (1916) 21 C.W.N. 435 and Emperor v. Nawal Behari, (1930) I.L.R. All. 881 were also considered. Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Court observed that eight persons had been tried in the Court of Session on charges under sections 147 and 304/149 of the Indian Penal Code, and four of them were additionally charged under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty on the charges under section 304/149, but found the accused guilty on the charges under sections 147 and 201. The Sessions judge accepted the not‑guilty verdict and recorded a judgment of acquittal for each accused on those charges, but disagreed with the guilty verdict and consequently made a reference to the High Court. The Court held that this reference was incompetent because it did not include the entire case against the accused, and therefore the High Court was in error in acting upon it. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment had to be set aside. The Court further observed that the appropriate remedy in such a circumstance would be to remit the case back to the trial court for disposal, although it noted that in the present case, due to the long lapse of time and the peculiar circumstances, the reference should be rejected.

In accordance with the law, and because of the considerable lapse of time together with the unusual circumstances that marked the present case, the Court held that the reference had to be rejected. The judgment was rendered in the criminal appellate jurisdiction under Criminal Appeal No 114 of 1954. The appeal arose from the judgment and order dated 21 July 1954 delivered by the Calcutta High Court in Reference No 6 of 1954, which had been made under Section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code by the Additional Sessions Judge of the 24 Parganas at Alipore on 7 June 1954, in Sessions Trial No 2 of May 1954. Counsel appearing for the appellants were S C Isaacs and S N Mukherjee, while the respondent was represented by A C Mitra, D N Mukherjee and P K Bose. The opinion of the Court was delivered on 19 November 1957 by Justice Imam. In this appeal, which was entertained by special leave, the substantive question for determination was whether the reference made by the Additional Sessions Judge of Alipur to the Calcutta High Court under Section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was legally competent, and, assuming it was not, whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to convict or acquit any of the accused who had been tried before the Additional Sessions Judge and a jury.

The trial before the Court of Session involved eight accused, each of whom faced charges under sections 147 and 304/149 of the Indian Penal Code. Four of those accused—identified as accused No 1 Sashi Mohan Debnath, accused No 2 Rajendra Debnath, accused No 3 Manindra Debnath and accused No 6 Rohini Kumar Debnath—were additionally charged with an offence under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial Judge delivered a charge to the jury that was favourable to the accused. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty on the charge under section 304/149, a verdict that the learned Judge accepted and consequently recorded acquittals for all the accused on that count. On the remaining charges under sections 147 and 201, the jury unanimously returned guilty verdicts against the accused charged with those offences. The trial Judge disagreed with that finding and, invoking Section 307 of the Code, referred the matter to the High Court, expressing the opinion that the accused were not guilty of the offences under sections 147 and 201. The High Court partially accepted the reference and, agreeing with the jury’s guilty finding on section 147, convicted Sashi Mohan Debnath, Rajendra Debnath, Sudbanshu Kumar Debnath, Dinesh Chandra Debnath and Bonomali Das, imposing on each a sentence of one year of rigorous imprisonment. The High Court also convicted Sashi Mohan Debnath and Rajendra Debnath under section 201, sentencing each to three years of rigorous imprisonment, with the two sentences ordered to run concurrently. The High Court, however, did not accept the jury’s verdict with respect to the accused Manindra Debnath and

In this appeal, the respondents were Sashi Mohan Debnath, Rajendra Debnath, Sudhanshu Kumar Debnath and Bonomali Das. When the appeal was called for hearing on 12 September 1956, the Court found it necessary to hear the matter in the presence of three additional accused: Manindra Debnath (accused No. 3), Rohini Kumar Debnath (accused No. 6) and Gouranga Debnath (accused No. 8). The order of that day explained fully why notices were issued to these persons, and the notices were duly served on Manindra Debnath and Gouranga Debnath. Regarding Rohini Kumar Debnath, the Court was informed that he could not be located; he had sold all his property, his whereabouts were unknown, and no relative could be identified. None of the three persons mentioned entered an appearance before the Court. The Court noted that it was unnecessary to refer to the factual matrix of the prosecution or the defence, because the only issue remaining for determination was a question of law. Consequently, neither the appellants nor the respondent presented any factual submissions before the Court.

The Court then turned to the question of whether the reference made under section 307 of the Code by the Additional Sessions Judge of Alipur was legally competent. To answer this, the Court first examined the relevant statutory provisions and considered several decisions of the High Courts on the same point. Before undertaking that analysis, the Court outlined some general principles concerning trials by jury and the manner in which a High Court could interfere with a jury’s verdict. The Code indicated that a Sessions trial could be conducted either with assessors or with a jury, depending on whether the offence was triable by assessors or by a jury. The Code even allowed a single trial to involve both kinds of offences, whereby jurors would act as assessors for those offences that required assessors. Although the Code provided for jury trials, it did not obligate the trial judge to accept the jury’s verdict; a judge could disagree with the verdict, but unlike trials with assessors, the judge could not simply record a judgment that contradicted the jury’s view. The legislative scheme intended that the jury’s verdict be treated with sufficient importance to prevent a Sessions judge from overturning it outright, reserving any displacement of the jury’s finding to the High Court, which must weigh both the jury’s opinion and the judge’s observations while considering the entire evidence.

It was held that when the verdict of a jury is to be set aside, such displacement may only be carried out by the High Court, which must accord appropriate weight to the opinions expressed by both the jury and the trial Judge and must do so after a full consideration of the entire evidence on record. In other words, the High Court may effectively replace the jury’s determination only after it has given due regard to the Judge’s view and after it has examined all of the material evidence. Generally, a High Court will not readily disregard a jury’s finding on factual matters because the fundamental principle of a jury trial is that the jury functions as the ultimate arbiter of fact. Consequently, the High Court will not overturn a jury’s verdict merely because it personally disagrees with that verdict. Only if, after a thorough review of the whole evidence, the High Court concludes that no reasonable body of men could have arrived at the conclusion reached by the jury, may it lawfully set aside the verdict. At the time the reference under section 307 was made by the Additional Sessions Judge, the statutory language of section 307 read as follows: “307. (1) If in any such case the Judge disagrees, with the verdict of the jurors, or of a majority of the jurors, on all or any of the charges on which (any accused person) has been tried, and is clearly of the opinion that it is necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case (in respect of such accused person) to the High Court, he shall submit the case accordingly, recording the grounds of his opinion, and, when the verdict is one of acquittal, stating the offence which he considers to have been committed (and in such case, if the accused is further charged under the provisions of section 310, shall proceed to try him on such charge as if such verdict had been one of conviction). (2) Whenever the Judge submits a case under this section, he shall not record judgment of acquittal or of conviction on any of the charges on which (such accused) has been tried, but he may either remand (such accused) to custody or admit him to bail. (3) In dealing with the case so submitted the High Court may exercise any of the powers which it may exercise on an appeal, and subject thereto it shall, after considering the entire evidence and after giving due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and the jury, acquit or convict (such accused) of any offence of which the jury could have convicted him upon the charge framed and placed before it; and, if it convicts him, may pass such sentence as might have been passed by the Court of Sessions.” In interpreting section 307, it is necessary first to examine the introductory words “if in any such case,” which refer back to the situation described in section 306(1), that is, the case tried before the Court of Session by a jury, meaning the whole case and not a fragment of it.

In the situation before the Court of Session, a trial was conducted before a jury, which meant that the entire case against the accused, and not merely a portion of it, was before the court. After the jury returned its verdict, the trial judge was required to examine whether he concurred with that verdict. If the judge agreed with the jury’s finding, he was obliged to deliver his judgment in accordance with the jury’s decision. Conversely, if the judge disagreed with the jury and was convinced that, for the ends of justice, the matter needed to be referred to the High Court, he was required to make such a reference. The Court held that the case to be referred must comprise the whole case against the accused and cannot be limited to any part of it. This interpretation follows directly from the combined effect of sections 306 and 307 of the Code. Section 307(2) expressly forbids a judge who considers it necessary to refer the case to the High Court from recording any judgment of acquittal or of conviction on any of the charges that were tried against the accused. The prohibition is mandatory; consequently, any judge who records a judgment of acquittal or conviction on any of the tried charges contravenes section 307(2), rendering such a judgment illegal. The Court could not accept the argument advanced by counsel for the appellants that the judge’s act of recording a judgment was merely an irregularity. Section 307(3) sets out the powers that the High Court may exercise on the case so submitted. It provides that, although the High Court may exercise any of the powers conferred on it in an appeal, it must consider the entire evidence, give due weight to the opinion of the Sessions Judge and the jury, and then either convict or acquit the accused of any offence for which he was tried. If the High Court convicts the accused of an offence that the jury should have convicted him of, it must pass such a sentence as could have been imposed by the Court of Session. However, before the High Court could exercise the powers granted under section 307(3), the reference made under section 307 had to be made in accordance with law; this requirement was, in the Court’s view, a condition precedent to the High Court’s exercise of its authority. The expression “with the case so submitted” makes it clear that a reference under section 307(1) must relate to the whole case against the accused and not to a fragment of it. For the High Court to be in a position to properly exercise the powers enumerated in section 307(3), it was essential that it consider the entire evidence in the case, which it could not do if the trial judge had already entered a judgment. By entering a judgment, the trial judge thus prevented the High Court from properly exercising its powers under section 307(3), because any subsequent reference would no longer pertain to the entire case against the accused.

In the present case the trial Judge, having accepted the jury’s verdict, recorded a judgment of acquittal for each accused under section 304 of the Indian Penal Code read with clause 149, thereby removing the matter from the High Court’s consideration and preventing the High Court from dealing with the remaining charges framed against the accused. The Court observed that the amendments made to section 307 of the Code in 1923 and again in 1955 support the view that the reference to the High Court must comprise the whole case and not merely a part of it. Before the 1923 amendment, the language of section 307(1) required the trial Judge to refer the entire case concerning every accused on all charges framed against them, even if the Judge agreed with the jury on a particular accused on all those charges. The 1923 amendment replaced the words “the accused” with “any accused person” and added the phrase “in respect of such accused person,” thereby permitting the Judge to accept the jury’s verdict on all charges against a given accused and record a judgment for that accused while referring the case of another accused to the High Court when the Judge disagreed with the jury’s verdict on any charge. The amendment was intended to remove the necessity of referring the whole case, including the case of an accused about whom the Judge concurred with the jury’s verdict on every charge; it would have been unnecessary if section 307(1) originally contemplated only a partial reference. The 1955 amendment completely rewrote section 282 of the Code, providing that a trial could continue with a reduced number of jurors rather than restarting with a newly selected jury. Consequently, subsection 1A was inserted into section 307, directing that where jurors are equally divided on any or all charges against an accused, the Judge must submit the case of that accused to the High Court, recording his opinion on the disputed charge or charges and the grounds for that opinion. This provision makes clear that the entire case must be submitted to the High Court. In the Court’s opinion, the amendments of 1923 and 1955 to section 307 unmistakably indicate that Parliament intended the whole case, not a fragment, to be referred to the High Court.

Section 307, even before its amendment in 1955, when read in a proper manner, yields only one reasonable interpretation. It therefore became necessary to examine the decisions of several High Courts in India that had addressed the same question. The Patna High Court, in the case of Hazari Lal (1), held that, given the language of section 307, a reference made under that provision must relate to the entire case against the accused and not merely to a portion of it; a reference limited to part of the case would be incompetent. The Patna High Court reiterated this position in the subsequent decision of Ramjanam Tewari (2). A similar view was adopted by the three judges of the Calcutta High Court in Emperor v. Bishnu Chandra Das (3); however, two of those judges, while rejecting the reference, ordered the acquittal of the accused. The third judge, Mr. Justice McNair, limited his comment to the observation that the Sessions Judge had rendered himself unable to make a valid reference under section 307 by accepting the jury’s verdict on some of the charges. In the present opinion, the view expressed by the Patna High Court was considered correct and consistent with the provisions of section 307. Nevertheless, counsel for the appellants submitted that, in view of certain rulings of the Calcutta High Court and the Allahabad High Court, once a reference had actually been made, the High Court possessed the authority to hear the matter and to record a judgment. Reference was made to the case of King Emperor v. Ananda Charan Ray (4). It is true that, in that case, the learned judges examined the evidence to determine whether the jury’s verdict was one that a body of reasonable men could have reached. Before undertaking that examination, however, the judges observed that if the officiating Additional Sessions Judge had believed that the interests of justice required a reference to the Court, he would have been better advised to refer the whole case, thereby allowing the Court to consider the entire evidence that had been placed before the jury. As the reference had been limited, the Court was consequently precluded from assessing whether the accused had misappropriated any portion of the sums of Rs 200 and Rs 458. After reviewing the evidence, the learned judges expressed the opinion that, had the Judge considered the matter suitable for a reference under section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he should never have forwarded the case in a manner that tied the hands of the Crown or of the defence by agreeing with the jury’s verdict on the charges framed under sections 406 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code. The judges concluded that the Judge’s approach had foreclosed the Court’s ability to question the jury’s findings and to consider the extensive body of evidence that had originally been presented to the jury.

In this case, the Court observed that the Officiating Additional Sessions Judge had, by agreeing with the jury’s verdict on the charges framed under sections 406 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code, effectively bound both the Court and the defence to that verdict. By doing so, the Judge prevented the Court from scrutinising or looking beyond the jury’s decision and from examining the extensive evidence that had been presented to the jury. Consequently, the Court found it impossible to uphold the reference made by the Officiating Additional Sessions Judge. Considering that the accused had already been acquitted on the charges under sections 406 and 477A, the Court concluded that it should also accept a verdict of not guilty on the charges framed under section 467 read with section 471 and under section 474 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and therefore ordered the acquittal of the accused. The Court noted that this conclusion corresponded with the view expressed by the Patna High Court in the decisions of Hazari Lal and Ramjanam Tewari. The Court further cited the decision in Emperor v. Nawal Behari, where the Allahabad High Court held that when a Sessions Judge refers a matter under section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the reference must encompass the entire case against the particular accused and not merely the charges on which the jury’s finding conflicted with the trial judge’s opinion. This principle aligned with the reasoning of the Patna High Court in the earlier cases. The Court acknowledged that the learned Judges had subsequently examined the evidence, set aside the conviction and sentence imposed under section 193 by the Sessions Judge, and substituted a conviction under the same section by the High Court. However, the Court opined that if a reference under section 307 must relate to the whole case against the accused, the reference in the present matter was defective and therefore the High Court could not lawfully exercise any powers conferred by section 307(3), because the basis for such exercise was absent. The Court then referred to Emperor v. Jagmohan, in which the judges had held that although a partial reference to the High Court was irregular, the High Court could still consider the entire case. The Court disagreed with that view and, irrespective of any assistance it might give to the appellant’s counsel, declared that the Allahabad High Court’s decision was legally erroneous. Lastly, the Court mentioned Emperor v. Muktar, where the judges had opined that a reference was improper when the trial judge had recorded findings on certain charges against the same accused.

The Court observed that in other cases where only certain charges were referred, the defect in the reference was not necessarily fatal and the High Court could have proceeded with those references. However, the Court held that this view could not be sustained when the provisions of section 307 were considered. In the present case, the Court found that the reference made to the High Court was incompetent. Consequently, the High Court should have rejected the reference and should not have recorded any judgment of acquittal or conviction. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and declared that the reference under section 307 to the High Court was incompetent. The Court then considered what consequential order should follow from the conclusion that the reference was incompetent and the appeal succeeded. It was held that the proper course would have been for the High Court to reject the reference as incompetent and to remit the case to the Additional Sessions Judge for disposal according to law. The Court cited the authorities I.L.R. (1947) All. 240 and (1943) 48 C.W.N. 547 in support of this approach.

The Court emphasized the absolute necessity of making a competent reference under section 307 of the Code and of remitting the case to the Court that made the reference as soon as an incompetent reference is discovered, in order to avoid legal complications, waste of time and money, and harassment of the accused. In the present matter, the letter of reference was dated 7 June 1954, more than three years after the occurrence on 21 October 1953. Because of this lapse, the Court will not order that the case be returned to the Additional Sessions Judge of Alipur for disposal, particularly since the judge who made the original reference has retired and it is doubtful that his successor can lawfully deal with the case. In these circumstances, the only order the Court can make is that the incompetent reference be rejected. The appeal was therefore allowed.