Sarwan Singh vs The State Of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeals Nos. 22 and 23 of 1957

Decision Date: 10 April 1957

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, B. Jagannadhadas, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha

In the matter titled Sarwan Singh versus the State of Punjab, the Supreme Court of India issued its judgment on 10 April 1957. The case was decided by a bench consisting of Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice B. Jagannadhadas and Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha. The petitioner was Sarwan Singh and the respondent was the State of Punjab, the appeal being a connected one. The decision was reported in the 1957 Annual Issue Reports at page 637 and in the Supreme Court Reports at page 953.

The factual background involved the conviction of the appellant named G and two others for the offence of murder by the Sessions Court. The convictions were based on the testimony of an approver, who was also a co‑accused, and on a confession made by the first appellant. The Sessions Court held that the approver’s evidence was reliable and that the confession was voluntary and true. On appeal, the Punjab High Court observed that the approver’s testimony against G was highly inconsistent and unreliable, and consequently set aside G’s conviction while affirming the convictions of the other appellants. The appellants then sought special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court examined several points. First, it found that the statement originally given by the approver against the second appellant was wholly inconsistent with the evidence he later presented in court, and that the High Court had not addressed the fundamental question of the approver’s reliability. Second, the Court observed that the magistrate who recorded the confession had not fully complied with the procedural safeguards required to ensure that the confession was made voluntarily. Third, the prosecution’s version of events as narrated by the approver conflicted with the material statements contained in the confession. Fourth, the High Court, in determining the voluntariness of the confession, had proceeded on the assumption that the confession was true, without proper verification.

On these bases, the Supreme Court held that the convictions of the appellants must be set aside. The Court explained that the evidence of an approver must satisfy a double test: the approver must be a reliable witness and his testimony must receive adequate corroboration. Furthermore, the recording of a confession under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a solemn act. The magistrate, in discharging his duties under that provision, must ensure that the conditions of subsection (3) are fully satisfied. When an accused is produced before the magistrate by the investigating officer, it is essential that the accused’s mind be freed from any possible police influence; the accused should be placed in jail custody and allowed sufficient time—generally at least twenty‑four hours—to consider whether to make a confession. Even when a confession is voluntary, the Court emphasized that its truth must be established by comparing it with the remaining prosecution evidence and assessing the probabilities of the case.

Criminal Appeals numbered 22 and 23 of 1957 were filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated 7 August 1956 of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh. Those High Court decisions concerned Criminal Appeals numbered 253 and 250 of 1956 and Murder Reference number 38 of 1956, which themselves arose from the judgment and order dated 21 May 1956 of the Court of Additional Sessions Judge at Ludhiana in Trial number 17 of 1956 and Case number 9 of 1956. The appellant in Criminal Appeal number 22 of 1957 was represented by counsel Gyan Chand Mathur, while the appellant in Criminal Appeal number 23 of 1957 was represented by counsel R. L. Kohli. Counsel Gopal Singh and counsel T. M. Sen appeared for the respondent in both appeals. The judgment was delivered on 10 April 1957 by Justice Gajendragadkar.

Harbans Singh, Gurdial Singh and Sarwan Singh had been charged before the learned Additional Sessions Judge at Ludhiana with the offence of murder punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that they, together with Banta Singh, who later turned approver, had intentionally caused the death of Gurdev Singh by inflicting injuries with a kirpan, a toki and a dang on 23 November 1955 within the limits of the village Sohian, police station Jagraon. The trial judge held that the charge framed against all three accused had been proved beyond reasonable doubt, convicted them of the offence and sentenced each of them to death. On appeal to the Punjab High Court, the convictions and death sentences of Harbans Singh and Sarwan Singh were affirmed, while the conviction of Gurdial Singh was set aside and he was ordered acquitted and discharged. Consequently, Harbans Singh (accused number one) and Sarwan Singh (accused number three) appealed to this Court by special leave. For brief context, the prosecution case stated that the victim, Gurdev Singh, was the brother of Harbans Singh. Their father had left the village years earlier and was apparently no longer alive. Harbans Singh was described as a shirker and a waster, which caused impatience in Gurdev Singh. When Gurdev Singh attempted to improve Harbans Singh, the latter resented these efforts, his irritation grew, and he began to plan his brother’s murder. According to the prosecution, Harbans Singh approached his friends Sarwan Singh and Gurdial Singh, seeking their assistance in the plot. It was also alleged that Gurdial Singh bore animosity toward Gurdev Singh because Gurdev Singh had cut jokes with Gurdial Singh’s sister. A few days before the alleged offence, Harbans Singh and Sarwan Singh were sitting on a canal bank near their village, drinking, when Banta Singh joined them, was asked to partake of the liquor, and was informed of the plan to murder Gurdev Singh.

According to the prosecution, after Banta Singh joined Harbans Singh and the others for a drink, he was also invited to partake of the liquor and was informed of the scheme to murder Gurdev Singh. A few days later the three men reconvened and resolved to obtain weapons to carry out the plan. They approached a man named Rakha, and after negotiations Rakha sold a locally‑made pistol and a cartridge to Sarwan Singh for a price of forty rupees. The conspirators also asked Rakha to become a member of the conspiracy; however, although Rakha did not explicitly refuse, he declined to join them at the relevant time.

On the day the offence was intended to be committed, Sarwan Singh, Gurdial Singh and Banta Singh travelled together by bus and disembarked near the road that leads to the village of Sohian. From there they proceeded on foot until they met Harbans Singh near a minor canal. Harbans Singh instructed the three men to conceal themselves in the bushes and then fetched a bottle of liquor, which all four of them drank. The drinking continued until sunset, at which point Harbans Singh left the location and promised his companions that he would guide his brother, Gurdev Singh, to the spot where they were hidden. He told them that he would signal the approach of his brother by clapping his hands. Acting on this arrangement, Harbans Singh persuaded Gurdev Singh to go ahead. When Sarwan Singh coughs, Gurdev Singh becomes uneasy, fearing that there are people lying in wait. He calls out to his brother Harbans, expressing his suspicion that individuals are concealed nearby. Harbans reassures him that the men will soon join them. In line with the plan, the three concealed assailants then emerged from the bushes and assaulted Gurdev Singh. Harbans Singh also arrived at the scene and participated in the attack.

The prosecution alleges that during the assault Harbans Singh was armed with a kirpan, Gurdial Singh wielded a lathi, the approver Banta Singh used a toki, and Sarwan Singh also employed a kirpan. The attack was described as brutally violent, resulting in sixty‑nine incised wounds and two contused injuries that were inflicted by a blunt weapon. After carrying out this savage assault, the assailants fled the scene. Harbans Singh returned to his village and raised a hue and cry, claiming that his brother had been seized by several persons. He initially identified the alleged assailants as Darshan Singh, Jagat Singh, Gurnam Singh and Banta Singh, all residents of the village of Pona. However, the villagers observed that Harbans Singh showed little inclination to assist the victim or to pursue the attackers. Eventually, the villagers succeeded in persuading him to accompany them, and he joined them in their effort to locate the body.

Harsh Singh reached the location where Gurdev Singh’s corpse lay in a pool of blood and subsequently proceeded to the police station, where he lodged a report at approximately ten‑thirty in the evening. In his statement, he asserted that his brother had been murdered by four individuals from the village of Pona. Acting on this report, police officers arrived at the scene in the early hours of the following morning and initiated a formal investigation. From the outset, the police harboured doubts about the veracity of Harsh Singh’s account and suspected that he and his associates might have been involved in the commission of the offence. Accordingly, Sarwan Singh, Gurdial Singh and Banta Singh were arrested on 25 November, and Harsh Singh was detained on 26 November.

The investigating officer recovered from Sarwan Singh a blood‑stained shirt and chadar, and, based on information supplied by him, also secured a pistol and an empty cartridge from Sarwan’s residence. From Gurdial Singh, a blood‑stained turban was obtained, and his information led to the discovery of a lathi that was also stained with blood. From Banta Singh, a blood‑stained chadar was recovered, and his statements resulted in the retrieval of a kirpan and a toki that had been discarded in a well after the offence. The prosecution further alleged that, on the basis of information provided by Harsh Singh, blood‑stained garments were recovered from Gurdev Kaur, the sister of Gurdial Singh.

On 30 November, Sarwan Singh offered to make a confessional statement, which was recorded on the same day. On 2 December, Banta Singh was granted pardon and consequently became an approver. This sequence of events comprised the prosecution’s case, while the three accused each maintained that they had no connection with the crime.

The learned Sessions Judge found Banta Singh to be a reliable witness. Recognising that Banta Singh was an approver, the judge examined whether his testimony had received the necessary corroboration in material particulars and concluded that it did. The judge also determined that Sarwan Singh’s confession was given voluntarily and was truthful. In his opinion, the testimony of Rakha, together with the other circumstantial evidence relating to the blood‑stained clothing of the accused and the recovery of the weapons, furnished sufficient corroboration of the material particulars. Consequently, the judge arrived at the conclusion that the charge of murder had been proved against all three accused.

On appeal, the learned Judges of the High Court of Punjab held that the evidence supplied by the approver, Banta Singh, against Gurdial Singh was highly discrepant and therefore unreliable. As a result, they concluded that the case against Gurdial Singh had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted him, while the conviction and sentence of the remaining accused were upheld.

In this case, the Court noted that the learned Judges of the High Court of Punjab had held that the evidence of the approver formed the foundation of the prosecution case against the accused Harbans Singh and Sarwan Singh. The Court observed that, in addition to the approver’s testimony, the prosecution had relied upon corroborating circumstantial evidence, which had already been discussed in earlier portions of the judgment, and upon the confession made by Sarwan Singh. Because the Court found that these additional pieces of evidence supported the approver’s statements, it concluded that there was no difficulty in affirming the orders of conviction and the sentences that had been imposed on the two accused persons. The present appeals, filed by the two appellants, challenged precisely this view. The Court further explained that the appeals were presented under special leave pursuant to Article 136 of the Constitution. Consequently, the appellants normally could not raise questions of fact before the Supreme Court. The Court observed that, on the face of the record, the convictions and sentences were based on concurrent findings of fact. Therefore, the Court would be reluctant to disturb those findings unless it was satisfied that the findings were tainted by an error of law or that the conclusions drawn by the lower courts were so obviously contrary to well‑established judicial principles that they could be described as wholly unjustified or even perverse.

The Court then turned to the specific submission made on behalf of Harbans Singh. Counsel argued that the judgment of the High Court suffered from a serious infirmity because, in dealing with the approver’s evidence, the learned Judges had failed to address the preliminary question of whether the approver was a reliable witness. The Court recalled that the problem of an approver’s testimony had been examined repeatedly by the Privy Council and by Indian courts. It affirmed that, under the Indian Evidence Act, an accomplice is a competent witness, but the fact that the accomplice participated in the commission of the offence casts a serious stain on his evidence. Consequently, courts are naturally cautious in relying on such tainted evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars by independent evidence. The Court clarified that the independent corroboration need not cover the entire prosecution story or every material particular, for that would render the accomplice’s evidence useless. At the same time, it would be unsafe to rely on an approver’s testimony merely because it is corroborated by minor or incidental details, as such limited corroboration does not provide the assurance required to accept the main narrative disclosed by the approver. The Court emphasized that before the court can consider the adequacy of corroboration, it must first determine whether the approver, even as an accomplice, is a reliable witness – a test that applies to all witnesses. If the approver fails this reliability test, the matter ends there, and no question of corroboration arises. Accordingly, the Court explained that the appraisal of an approver’s evidence must satisfy a double test: first, the approver must be shown to be reliable; second, if that test is satisfied, the evidence must receive sufficient corroboration, a requirement that is special to cases involving weak or tainted evidence. The Court found the contention of counsel to be well‑founded, having carefully examined the High Court’s judgment and finding no indication that the learned Judges had considered the approver’s character or reliability.

In this case, the Court explained that if the initial inquiry shows that the approver is not a reliable witness, the issue ends at that point and the court need not examine whether the approver’s testimony is corroborated. In other words, the assessment of an approver’s evidence must satisfy a two‑fold test. First, the approver’s statement must establish that he is a trustworthy witness, a requirement that applies to every witness. Only when this primary test is met does the second, special test arise, requiring that the approver’s testimony be sufficiently corroborated because such evidence is inherently weak or tainted. Mr. Kohli argued that the learned Judges of the High Court of Punjab failed to address the primary question of reliability, rendering their appraisal of the approver’s evidence seriously defective. The Supreme Court found this contention well‑founded. After a careful reading of the High Court’s judgment, the Court observed that there was no indication anywhere in the judgment that the judges evaluated the character of the approver’s evidence or concluded that the approver was a reliable witness. The only passage dealing with the issue stated, “since the main evidence in the case consists of the testimony of the approver it is necessary to consider the case of each J. appellant individually.” The Court noted that this observation is vulnerable to the criticism raised by Mr. Kohli. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the argument concerning the unexamined character of the approver’s evidence cannot be dismissed as merely academic or theoretical, because the approver’s testimony is so thoroughly inconsistent that it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the approver is wholly unreliable. The Court also pointed out that the High Court judges themselves had criticised the approver’s evidence in the prosecution case against Gurdial Singh, ultimately finding the approver’s account unreliable and holding that, although circumstantial evidence raised some suspicion against Gurdial Singh, it was insufficient to sustain a conviction. The Court reasoned that if the approver’s account against one accused was found to be wholly discrepant, that finding should have compelled the court to scrutinise his statements concerning the other accused with greater caution. Furthermore, the Court expressed regret that the High Court judges apparently did not focus on the even more serious inconsistencies in the approver’s testimony regarding the role attributed to Harbans Singh in the commission of the offence. In the approver’s evidence before the trial court, he had…

In this case, the approver had unequivocally implicated Harbans Singh in the commission of the offence, but the record showed that his testimony was internally inconsistent. During cross‑examination, it was demonstrated that the very first statement he gave to the investigating officer on 25 November contained assertions that were wholly at variance with the narrative he later presented at trial. In that initial statement, the approver asserted that only three persons—himself, Sarwan Singh and Gurdial Singh—were involved in the offence and he expressly declared that Harbans Singh had not taken part in the murder of Gurdev Singh. By contrast, the version he narrated at trial was contradictory on almost every material point concerning Harbans Singh’s participation. At trial, the approver claimed that Gurdial Singh possessed a lathi, that Gurdial Singh subsequently seized a kirpan from Sarwan Singh, used it to murder Gurdev Singh, and that after this killing Harbans Singh himself struck the victim’s neck with the kirpan. Yet, in his statement to the police, the approver had maintained only that Gurdial Singh was carrying a kirpan, without any reference to Harbans Singh’s alleged blow. Although several other minor discrepancies emerged during cross‑examination, the Court focused on the more serious contradictions. The Court concluded that the contradictions concerning the prosecution’s case against Gurdial Singh, together with the deeper inconsistencies regarding Harbans Singh, indicated that the approver showed no regard for truth. It was noted that the approver’s second statement, recorded on 29 November, substantially altered his earlier account by bringing Harbans Singh into the crime, and that this later statement aligned with his testimony at trial. However, the Court emphasized that merely three days after recording the second statement, the approver was granted a pardon and his statement was formally recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the same day. Consequently, the accused could reasonably argue that the additions made in the later statement were motivated by the promise of a pardon. Moreover, given the affirmative content of the first recorded statement, the Court observed that the subsequent allegations against Harbans Singh represented not merely supplemental details but purposeful enhancements intended to implicate him. If the later statements had only added new facts absent from the original, the situation might have been viewed differently, but the omissions have

It was observed that, although omissions do not always have the same effect as direct contradictions, in the present case the two sets of statements were entirely inconsistent and could not be reconciled, creating a serious defect in the witness’s credibility. The Court noted with regret that the learned Judges of the High Court had not been alerted to this issue and consequently had not examined the preliminary question of whether the approver, Banta Singh, could be regarded as a reliable witness. The Court emphasized that competence as a witness does not automatically confer reliability, and that an approver must satisfy the stricter test of reliability before any consideration of corroboration of his testimony is undertaken by criminal courts. The Court further held that if the approver’s evidence were to be discarded as unreliable, the prosecution’s case against Harbans Singh would inevitably collapse.

The Court acknowledged that the prosecution relied on certain circumstances. The testimony of Rakha (P.W. 8) indicated that Harbans Singh and the other accused had been involved in purchasing a pistol from Rakha. However, the pistol in question had not been used in the alleged offence, rendering the circumstance difficult to explain. While the purchase could raise suspicion against Harbans Singh, the Court stressed that suspicion alone, however strong, cannot substitute for proof. Likewise, Harbans Singh’s injuries and his suspicious conduct immediately after the alleged offence could generate further suspicion, but without the approver’s evidence those suspicious facts could not have any operative effect in a criminal trial.

The Court also examined the discovery of clothing allegedly made at Gurdev Kaur’s residence. Since Gurdev Kaur had not been examined, the Court could not rely on that evidence, although the recovery of a kirpan and a red scabbard from the site was undeniably significant. In the Court’s opinion, if the approver’s testimony were rejected as unreliable, none of the remaining evidence on which the prosecution relied could sustain Harbans Singh’s conviction for murder. Consequently, the Court concluded that the High Court’s finding that the murder charge had been proved against Harbans Singh was tainted by a serious infirmity and therefore had to be set aside.

The Court further observed that the High Court had not addressed the initial legal question before evaluating the merits of the approver’s evidence, nor had it considered the manifest inconsistencies in the approver’s account. As a result, the appellant was entitled to challenge the validity of the High Court’s conclusion. Accordingly, the Court held that Harbans Singh’s appeal must be allowed, the conviction and accompanying order of sentence must be vacated, and he must be acquitted and discharged.

The Court set aside the sentence that had been passed against the first appellant, ordering his acquittal and discharge, and then turned to the matter of the third accused, identified as Sarwan Singh. It was observed that the High Court’s conviction of Sarwan Singh rested, according to its own judgment, on the evidence of an approver which the High Court said was “corroborated in every particular by his own confessional statement.” In addition, the High Court had relied upon other circumstantial evidence that had been described earlier in the judgment when the prosecution’s case was outlined. The Court noted that if the approver were found to be an unreliable witness, the foundation of the High Court’s reliance on that approver’s evidence in the proceedings against Sarwan Singh would be seriously undermined. Consequently, if the approver were deemed unworthy of credit, the question of whether Sarwan Singh’s own confession corroborated that approver’s evidence could not be properly considered. The Court acknowledged that Sarwan Singh had indeed made a confession, and that, in principle, a court could convict an accused solely on the basis of a confession even if the accused later retracted it. However, the Court also recognized that ordinarily courts require some corroboration of a confessional statement before convicting a person on that basis, and that the extent of needed corroboration is a factual question to be determined in light of the particular circumstances of each case. In the present matter, the learned Sessions Judge had examined the voluntariness of Sarwan Singh’s confession and had ruled in favour of the prosecution. The High Court’s judgment indicated that the appellate judges concurred with the trial judge because, in their view, the evidence of the Magistrate who recorded the confession demonstrated that the confession was voluntary. This view was robustly contested before the Supreme Court by counsel for Sarwan Singh, identified as Mr. Mathur. The Court observed that the question of whether the confession was voluntary is prima facie a question of fact, and that it would be hesitant to disturb a factual finding unless convinced that the impugned finding was arrived at without applying the correct legal tests. As with the approver’s testimony, the Court found that the lower courts had apparently failed to consider several salient and serious features that bore directly on the issue of the confession’s voluntariness. The record shows that Sarwan Singh was arrested on 25 November; his clothing was discovered to be stained with blood, and he was alleged to have been prepared to assist the prosecution by making a statement that led to the discovery of incriminating articles.

On the day of his arrest, that is, on 25 November, the prosecution obtained a statement from Sarwan Singh that led to the discovery of incriminating articles. After this initial encounter, the accused remained in police custody without any apparent justification or explanation until 30 November. This fact, the Court observed, must be taken into account when assessing whether the confession later recorded was truly voluntary. The events of 30 November proved to be even more significant. On that day the accused was taken to the Magistrate, identified as Mr Grover, for the purpose of recording his confessional statement. According to the magistrate’s testimony, the accused was produced before him at approximately 2:30 p.m. He was then allowed roughly half an hour to consider the statement he intended to make, after which the confessional statement was formally recorded. The magistrate acknowledged that he asked the accused to provide the answers prescribed by the circulars issued by the High Court of Punjab. When the magistrate was later questioned as to why he did not allocate a longer period for the accused to reflect before the statement was recorded, he responded candidly that the accused appeared to insist on making the statement immediately. The police Sub‑Inspector who escorted the accused to the magistrate’s office was observed standing on the verandah outside the closed doors of the magistrate’s chamber. Although the doors remained shut, the presence of the Sub‑Inspector outside the room was nonetheless noted.

After the confessional statement was completed, the Sub‑Inspector re‑entered the magistrate’s room. At that point the accused displayed visible injuries, yet the magistrate did not inquire about the origin or cause of those injuries. In light of these surrounding circumstances, the Court considered whether the confession could be regarded as voluntary. The Court emphasized that recording a confession under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a solemn act, and that the magistrate must ensure that the requirements of sub‑section (3) of that provision are fully satisfied. While it is necessary to put the questions prescribed by the High Court circulars, those questions must not become a mere mechanical exercise. No element of casualness may be permitted to intrude, and the magistrate must be absolutely convinced that the accused’s statement is, in fact, the product of a free and voluntary will. The Court further invited the High Court of Punjab to review the existing circulars and, if appropriate, to incorporate amendments and additions similar to those adopted by the High Courts of Uttar Pradesh, Bombay and Madras, thereby ensuring that the procedural safeguards for recording confessions remain robust and effective.

The Court observed that the procedural circulars issued by the High Court of Punjab should be revised in view of similar circulars issued by the High Courts of Uttar Pradesh, Bombay and Madras. The purpose of posing questions to an accused who offers to confess is to obtain a guarantee that the confession is not the result of any inducement, threat or promise relating to the charge, as required by section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Court stressed that when an investigating officer produces an accused before a magistrate, it is essential that the accused’s mind be completely free from any possible police influence. The most effective method of achieving that freedom, the Court said, is to place the accused in jail custody and to allow him sufficient time to consider whether he wishes to make a confession. While the Court recognised that it is difficult to prescribe a rigid rule for the period of time that must be allowed, it stated that, as a general principle, a minimum of twenty‑four hours should be given to an accused to decide whether to confess. Moreover, if there are circumstances that suggest the accused may have been persuaded or coerced, an even longer period should be permitted before recording any statement.

Applying these principles to the present case, the Court held that it was impossible to accept the view that the accused, Sarwan Singh, was afforded adequate time to reflect on his decision. The Court noted that a magistrate possessing sufficient criminal experience would have immediately granted a longer period to Sarwan Singh, especially because the magistrate observed that the accused was eager to make a confession without delay. The magistrate himself had acknowledged that he would have allowed more time had the accused not insisted on an immediate confession. The Court said that such insistence should have alerted the magistrate to possible police pressure or inducement. The failure of the learned magistrate to grant sufficient time was not considered by the Sessions Judge and was wholly ignored by the High Court judges. In addition, none of the lower courts examined the fact that Sarwan Singh was apparently kept in police custody without justification between 26 November and 30 November. After careful consideration of all relevant facts, the Court concluded that the High Court’s omission of these material facts created a serious legal infirmity in its finding that Sarwan Singh’s confession was voluntary.

The Court concluded that the finding that the confession was voluntary must be set aside, because even if a confession is voluntarily made, the prosecution must also prove that the confession is true; to determine truth, the confession must be examined and compared with the remainder of the prosecution’s evidence and with the probabilities of the case. In the present matter, the Court observed that several material statements contained in the confessional statement were not substantiated by the evidence. The accused claimed that when Gurdev Singh was assaulted, he and his brother Harbans Singh were walking together, whereas the prosecution narrative, as given by the approver, stated that Harbans Singh first contacted his accomplices and informed them that he would lure Gurdev Singh to a spot where the accomplices lay in wait. The prosecution further alleged that when Gurdev Singh suspected the presence of persons nearby, he shouted to Harbans Singh, and the assault began before Harbans Singh could arrive. This version is inconsistent with the confession, which said that Dial Singh struck Gurdev Singh on the head with a front blow. The medical report, however, did not show any corresponding head injury on the victim. The accused also asserted that he took the kirpan first used by Harbans Singh and inflicted two blows on Gurdev Singh’s thigh; again, the medical evidence did not reveal injuries on the thigh that would support this claim. Moreover, the accused said that the kirpan’s handle broke and that he injured his finger with it, a statement that is not easily reconciled with the medical findings concerning the finger wound. The Court noted that the High Court judges had failed to notice these contradictions between the confession and the principal prosecution evidence presented by the approver, and that after deeming the confession voluntary, the High Court had apparently assumed its truth, which the Court identified as another infirmity in the lower court’s conclusion. The Court then turned to the injuries sustained by the accused, which were described by the examining doctor as follows: a superficial incised wound with a scab measuring three‑eighths of an inch by one‑twelfth of an inch on the left side of the face just above the left moustache; an abrasion with a scab measuring one‑half inch by one‑quarter inch on the outer surface of the middle digit of the left ring finger; an abrasion with a scab measuring one‑eighth inch by one‑eighth inch on the outer surface of the middle digit of the left little finger; and an abrasion with a scab measuring one‑quarter inch by one‑quarter inch on the outer surface of the terminal inter‑digital joint of the left little finger. All of these injuries were simple, of about two days’ duration, with the first caused by a sharp‑edged weapon and the remaining injuries caused by a blunt instrument.

In this case, the Court examined the medical description of the injuries that were recorded on the accused. The injuries included a lesion on the terminal inter‑digital joint of the left little finger, a superficial incised wound with a scab measuring three‑eighths of an inch by one‑twelfth of an inch on the left side of the face, an abrasion with a scab measuring one‑half inch by one‑quarter inch on the outer surface of the middle digit of the left ring finger, an abrasion with a scab measuring one‑eighth inch by one‑eighth inch on the outer surface of the middle digit of the left little finger, and an abrasion with a scab measuring one‑quarter inch by one‑quarter inch on the outer surface of the terminal inter‑digital joint of the left little finger. All of these injuries were described as simple injuries that had been present for roughly two days. The report indicated that the first injury had been caused by a sharp‑edged weapon while the remaining injuries had been caused by a blunt weapon. During cross‑examination, Dr Singh conceded that injury 1 could plausibly have been inflicted by a razor blade, a suggestion put forward by counsel for the accused, and that injuries 2 to 4 could have resulted from rubbing against a hard substance. Consequently, the medical evidence did not allow the Court to reject the accused’s explanation of the injuries as unreasonable or manifestly false.

The Court then turned to the evidence of blood‑stains found on the shirt and chadar that the accused was wearing. If the explanation offered by the accused for his injuries was not unreasonable, the presence of blood on his garments could not be pressed as decisive proof against him. The testimony of a witness identified as Rakha concerning negotiations and the purchase of a pistol suggested that the accused had been in contact with the alleged criminals, but such contact fell far short of establishing the charge of murder. Moreover, the Court observed that, assuming the pistol had indeed been purchased, it was difficult to comprehend why it had not been employed in the alleged crime.

Further evidence related to a pair of shoes discovered at the scene. The shoemaker, identified as Santa Singh, testified that he had recognised the shoes as belonging to the accused on the night of the incident and that he had previously manufactured similar shoes, although not in large numbers. However, during the examination under section 342 of the Code, no question was put to the accused about the shoes, and it was possible that the accused might have demonstrated that the shoes did not fit his feet. The Court noted that the failure to provide the accused an opportunity to explain this circumstance under section 342 supported his contention that this piece of evidence should not be used against him. In addition, like Rakha’s testimony, the identification of the shoes represented only a minor circumstance when measured against the serious charge of murder for which the accused was on trial.

Finally, the Court concluded that if the approver’s testimony were discarded as unreliable and the accused’s withdrawn confession were excluded because it was not voluntary or truthful, the remaining circumstantial evidence would be insufficient to sustain the murder charge. Accordingly, the conviction by the High Court was held to be erroneous. The Court expressed regret that a murder of such a cold‑blooded and cruel nature might go unpunished, and it referred to the submission of counsel that, while there may be an element of truth in the prosecution’s narrative, the gap between “may be true” and “must be true” required unimpeachable evidence. Mr.

Gopal Singh contended that, if the prosecution case is taken as a whole, it may be true; nevertheless, the leap from a mere possibility of truth to the certainty that the story must be true creates a considerable distance. He argued that the entire length of that distance has to be bridged by evidence that is lawful, reliable and beyond any doubt. The Court carefully examined each of the submissions presented by Gopal Singh. After this careful consideration, the Court concluded that it could not regard the approver as a witness whose testimony could be trusted, nor could it accept that the confession of Sarwan Singh was given voluntarily or reflected the truth. Consequently, the Court held that the appeal filed by Sarwan Singh must succeed. The judgment therefore set aside the order of conviction and the sentence that had been imposed on him, and ordered that he be acquitted and discharged. Apppeals allowed.