Sarjug Rai And Others vs The State Of Bihar

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 165 of 1957

Decision Date: 28 October, 1957

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur

In the matter of Sarjug Rai and others versus the State of Bihar, the Supreme Court rendered its decision on the 28th of October, 1957. The judgment was authored by Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, who sat on the bench together with Justice J. L. Kapur. The citation for this decision appears as 1958 AIR 127 and 1958 SCR 768. The case concerned the provisions of the Criminal Revision—Enhancement of Sentence—Power of High Court, specifically the question of whether a High Court could increase a sentence beyond the maximum term that a trial court was authorised to impose under sections 31 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898. The headnote records that the appellants had been tried before an Assistant Sessions Judge for the offence of dacoity punishable under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code. At that time, section 31(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permitted the Assistant Sessions Judge to impose a maximum of seven years’ rigorous imprisonment. The trial judge convicted the appellants and sentenced each of them to five years’ rigorous imprisonment. The convicted parties appealed to the High Court, which, exercising its revisional jurisdiction, issued a notice to the appellants calling for an explanation as to why their sentence should not be enhanced. The High Court ultimately dismissed the appeal and increased the sentence to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment for each appellant. The Supreme Court held that the High Court possessed the authority, under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to enhance the sentence beyond the ceiling that the trial court could have originally imposed. The decision also referred to the precedent set in Bed Raj v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 1955 at 2 SCR 583.

The criminal appeal, numbered 165 of 1957, proceeded by way of special leave from the judgment and order dated 4 August 1955 of the Patna High Court, which had been issued in Criminal Appeal No. 699 of 1953 together with Criminal Revision No. 205 of 1954, arising from the judgment and order dated 12 December 1953 of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Second Court Chapra, in Trial No. 70 of 1953. Counsel G. C. Mathur represented the appellants, while counsel S. P. Varma appeared for the respondent, the State of Bihar. The sole issue for determination before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court, acting in its revisional capacity, had the power to increase the sentence beyond the maximum term the trial court could have imposed on the accused. The facts established that the appellants, together with two other individuals, had been tried before the Assistant Sessions Judge of Chapra in the district of Saran on the charge of dacoity under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial judge convicted the seven appellants and sentenced each to five years’ rigorous imprisonment on 12 December 1953; the remaining two accused were acquitted. The convicted appellants filed an appeal to the Patna High Court. While entertaining the appeal, the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, required the appellants to show cause why, if their convictions were upheld, the sentence should not be enhanced. The appeal and the question of sentence enhancement were heard together by a Division Bench of that Court. By its judgment dated 4 August 1955, the High Court dismissed the appeal of two of the appellants, acquitting them, but upheld the convictions of the remaining six. Observing that the offence of dacoity had “increased tremendously” and was a “very heinous offence as innocent persons, while sleeping in their houses, are attacked and their belongings are taken by force,” the High Court concluded that a five-year term was “extremely inadequate.” Consequently, it enhanced the sentence to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment for each of the six appellants and obtained special leave to appeal, limiting the question before this Court to whether the High Court had jurisdiction to enhance the sentence beyond the statutory maximum permitted to the trial court.

In the appealed proceedings, the High Court required the appellants to demonstrate why their sentences should not be increased if their convictions were upheld. The appeal and the question of sentence enhancement were heard together by a Division Bench of that Court. By its judgment and order dated 4 August 1955, the High Court set aside the convictions of two appellants, acquitting them, while sustaining the convictions of the remaining six appellants. Concerning the sentence, the High Court observed that the offence of dacoity had increased tremendously and described it as a very heinous crime in which innocent persons sleeping in their homes were attacked and their belongings taken by force. The Court therefore concluded that a term of five years’ rigorous imprisonment was extremely inadequate and increased each sentence to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment. Special leave to appeal was granted, limited solely to the question of whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to enhance the sentence beyond the maximum that the trial court could impose. The dacoity that formed the basis of the charge against the appellants occurred during the night of 1 to 2 July 1952 in the house of Ranjit Bahadur, who was a minor. After midnight, sixteen or seventeen armed dacoits forced open the main entrance door with an axe, entered the dwelling, broke open boxes, tampered with an iron safe and removed articles valued at twenty thousand rupees. The occupants of the house were over-powered; some managed to escape and raise a large fire, which was the customary alarm against the invading dacoits. In response, several villagers arrived but, fearing gunfire, did not confront the dacoits directly; instead they threw brickbats, after which the dacoits fled with the stolen property. The Court noted that the incident represented a serious occurrence affecting the lives and fortunes of the house’s occupants, and therefore the High Court had adopted a very serious view of the offence. Counsel appearing as amicus curiae for the appellants argued first that the High Court had exceeded its powers by raising the sentence from five to ten years, because the trial court could not lawfully impose a term exceeding seven years. The counsel alternatively contended that the High Court had failed to heed the dictum of this Court in Bed Raj v. State of Uttar Pradesh while enhancing the sentence. Finally, the counsel asserted that, under the circumstances of this case, a ten-year rigorous imprisonment term was excessively harsh.

In its opinion, the Court found no merit in any of the contentions raised. The special leave that had been granted was based on the question of whether the High Court possessed the authority to impose a sentence that exceeded the maximum term the learned Assistant Sessions Judge could have imposed under section 31(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial judge, acting under that provision, was limited to a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven years. The argument put forward was that, consequently, the High Court could at most raise the sentence from five years to seven years and no further. This line of reasoning was premised on the assumption that the Assistant Sessions Judge had been entrusted with the trial fully aware that the maximum punishment permissible on conviction was seven years. The Court noted that, in its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court’s power is confined to correcting errors made by the trial judge. Accordingly, at most, the High Court could direct that the trial judge should have imposed the highest punishment that the Code authorized, but it could not, at the revisional stage, demand a sentence exceeding seven years of rigorous imprisonment. The Court then examined the source of the High Court’s power to enhance a sentence, which is contained in sub-section (1) of section 439 of the Code. This sub-section confers upon the High Court the same powers as an appellate court under the Code, including the authority to increase the punishment. Importantly, sub-section (1) does not contain any wording that limits the extent of such enhancement. Therefore, the High Court may impose any sentence up to the maximum penalty prescribed by the Indian Penal Code for the offence in question, including, in the present case, the maximum term of life imprisonment under section 395 of the IPC. The Court considered whether any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure imposes a restriction on that power. It concluded that the fact that the trial was conducted by a court with a limited sentencing jurisdiction does not impose a ceiling on the High Court’s power to award a proper and adequate sentence. The Legislature’s intention not to limit the High Court’s authority in a trial conducted by a Court of Session is evident from sub-section (3) of section 439, which provides: “(3) Where the sentence dealt with under this section has been passed by a Magistrate acting otherwise than under section 34, the Court shall not inflict a greater punishment for the offence, which, in the opinion of such Court, the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for such offence by a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class.” This provision shows that the only limitation on the High Court’s power to enhance a sentence applies when the original sentence was passed by a magistrate acting under section 34, and not when the sentence originates from a court of session or an Assistant Sessions Judge, whose sentencing powers are comparable to those of a specially empowered magistrate under section 30. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the High Court was fully competent to impose a sentence of life imprisonment in this case.

Section 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, in the ordinary course, a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class may impose a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years, and it does not refer to any fine. In certain specified areas, however, section 30 authorises the Government to empower a District Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class to try, as a magistrate, all offences that are not punishable with death. A magistrate who is empowered under section 30 may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term of up to seven years. Consequently, the authority of an Assistant Sessions Judge under section 31(3) and that of a magistrate specially empowered under section 30 to impose imprisonment are essentially the same, because the language of section 31(3) and section 34 is almost identical. Examining the wording of section 439(3) shows that the only restriction on the High Court’s power to impose punishment relates to cases tried by magistrates who are not specially empowered under section 30 and therefore possess only the lower sentencing powers prescribed in section 34. Sub-section (3) of section 439 does not place any limitation on the High Court’s authority in matters dealt with by a magistrate who has been specially empowered under section 30. As a result, in such cases the High Court is capable of imposing a sentence that exceeds the maximum that could be imposed by that magistrate. The provision makes no reference to trials conducted by a Court of Session.

The Court observed that if the High Court can enhance a sentence beyond the maximum that a specially empowered magistrate acting under section 34 could award, there is no justification for limiting the High Court’s power to increase a sentence when the trial was conducted before an Assistant Sessions Judge, as the appellants suggested. Section 439(3) therefore confirms that there is no restriction on the High Court’s power to raise a sentence to the maximum prescribed by the Indian Penal Code, except in cases tried by magistrates who are not specially empowered under section 30 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Counsel for the appellants correctly pointed out that some reported decisions of various High Courts have been contrary to the appellants’ argument and that no decision supports their position. In the Court’s view, the Code of Criminal Procedure contains no provision that limits the High Court’s power in the manner proposed by the appellants, and there are no reasons to oppose the view adopted by the High Courts on this point. The case cited by the appellants in support of their second contention was also considered.

In this case, the Court observed that the decision in Bed Raj v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (1) reached a conclusion that was consistent with the observations made on page 584, where it was stated: “Now, though no limitation has been placed on the High Court’s power to enhance, it is nevertheless a judicial act and, like all judicial acts involving an exercise of discretion, must be exercised along well-known judicial lines.” Turning to the second contention, the Court affirmed that the determination of a sentence is a matter of discretion that must be exercised in a judicial manner; that is, the sentence imposed by the trial court should not be altered lightly and should not be increased unless the appellate court, after considering the entire set of circumstances revealed by the evidence, concludes that the original sentence is inadequate. Regarding the present matter, the High Court, relying on the authority cited as (1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 583, observed that the incidence of the offence of dacoity has risen to such an extent that, in proven cases of serious dacoity such as the one before it, a deterrent punishment is warranted. Consequently, the High Court found it justified to impose a term of ten years’ rigorous imprisonment. After reviewing the facts disclosed in the case, the Court held that it could not be said that the sentence enhanced by the High Court was excessive. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the order of the High Court was upheld.