S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar vs S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 203 of 1956

Decision Date: 28 November 1957

Coram: S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, Gajendragadkar J.

In the matter styled S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar versus S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, the judgment was delivered on 28 November 1957 by a bench of the Supreme Court of India consisting of Justices S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, with the Chief Justice presiding. The petitioner in the case was S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar and the respondent was S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar. The case is reported in the 1958 volume of the All India Reporter at page 228 and in the 1958 Supplementary Court Reports at page 1015. The legal issues revolved around the computation of court fees under section 7 of the Court‑Fees Act, 1870 (VII of 1870), particularly clause IV(b), and the determination of the value of the plaintiff’s claim for jurisdictional purposes under section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 (VII of 1887). The headnote of the judgment explained that the valuation chosen by the plaintiff for his claim governs both the court‑fee calculation and the jurisdictional value, and that once the plaintiff elects a valuation, that same amount must be used for both purposes.

The Court observed that when a suit falls within section 7(IV)(b) of the Court‑Fees Act and the plaintiff fails to state a specific valuation of his claim, the plaintiff should ordinarily be allowed to amend the plaint to set out the amount at which he wishes his claim to be valued. The Court noted that a value fixed for jurisdiction cannot be binding for the calculation of court fees and must be altered if necessary, citing the earlier decision in Karam Ilahi v. Muhammad Bashir, AIR (1949) Lah. 116. Applying this principle, the Court set aside the order of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court, which had held that the valuation placed in the plaint for jurisdictional purposes should also be taken as the valuation for court‑fee purposes and had directed the appellant to pay court fees on a sum of Rs 15,00,000 both on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal. The Supreme Court allowed the appellant to pay court fees based on the amount at which he actually valued his relief. Furthermore, the Court examined rule 0.11, r. 1 of the High Court Fees Rules, 1933, framed by the Madras High Court, and found that section 12 of the Court‑Fees Act applied to the original side of the Madras High Court, thereby giving the Division Bench authority to assume jurisdiction and to pass appropriate orders. However, because there was no evidence that the Chamber judge sitting on the original side had been expressly or specially empowered by the Chief Justice to decide the matter, the Court concluded that the Chamber judge lacked jurisdiction under section 5 of the Court‑Fees Act to pass a final order on the court‑fee issue.

In this case the Court noted that the appellant had filed a civil appeal by special leave challenging an order of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated 25 January 1955. That order required the appellant to pay court fees calculated on a valuation of fifteen lakh rupees for both his plaint and his memorandum of appeal. The appeal raised important questions of law concerning the provisions of the Court Fees Act, which the Court referred to as “the Act”. The appellant was represented by counsel for the appellant, while the respondent was represented by counsel for the respondent. An intervener also appeared before the Court through counsel for the intervener. The judgment was delivered on 28 November 1957 by Justice Gajendragadkar.

The factual background presented by the Court showed that the appellant had instituted Civil Suit No. 311 of 1951 in the Original Side of the Madras High Court, seeking partition of a joint‑family property, a division of certain assets, and an account of the joint‑family estate managed by the respondent. The appellant was the son of Subbiah Chettiar. The Court explained that Subbiah had been adopted in 1922 by Lakshmi Achi, who was the widow of the paternal uncle of the respondent. By virtue of that adoption Subbiah became a coparcener in his adoptive family, and consequently the appellant claimed a right to a share of the joint‑family property and its assets as Subbiah’s son. The plaint alleged that Subbiah had previously filed a suit for partition of his share and had obtained a decree in the trial court. The respondent had appealed that decree to the High Court, but before the appeal was decided the parties settled the dispute amicably. Under that settlement Subbiah agreed, for a specified sum and the delivery of possession of certain sites, to release all of his claims and those of his son, the present appellant, with respect to the properties that were the subject of the suit. The appellant contended that this compromise did not bind him personally, and therefore he sought to recover his share notwithstanding the earlier transaction between his father and the respondent. In the plaint the appellant valued the claim for accounts at one thousand rupees, relying on section 7(iv)(f) of the Act, and he paid a court fee of rupees 112‑7‑0 on an ad valorem basis for that amount. For the relief of partition he paid a fixed court fee of one hundred rupees under Article 17‑B of Schedule II of the Act.

For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, the appellant assigned a value of fifteen lakh rupees to his share. The Registry, after reviewing the plaint, was inclined to hold that the plaint should have incurred court fee under section 7(v) of the Act in relation to the claim for partition. Because the appellant contested this view, the matter was forwarded to the Master of the Court, who acted as the taxing officer pursuant to the Madras High Court Fees Rules, 1933. The Master considered the issue raised by the Registry to be of some importance and, consequently, referred the dispute to a Judge sitting on the Original Side under section 5 of the Act. That reference was decided by the Chamber Judge, Krishnaswamy Naidu J., on 18 October 1951. The learned judge held that the appellant was not bound to set aside the earlier compromise decree entered into by his father and the respondent, and that the plaint was governed by Article 17‑B of Schedule 11. Accordingly, the court fee that the appellant had paid in respect of his claim for partition was deemed proper. Subsequently, the respondent was served and he filed a written statement raising several objections to the appellant’s claims for partition and accounts. One of the respondent’s principal contentions was that the compromise and the release deed executed by the appellant’s father, together with the decree that was later passed, constituted a fair and bona‑fide settlement of the disputed claim, and that, because they amounted to a settlement of the appellant’s father’s claim, the appellant himself was bound by them. The trial judge, Ramaswamy Gounder J., who heard the suit, examined this contention as a preliminary issue. He concluded that there had indeed been a fair and bona‑fide settlement of the dispute by the appellant’s father, who acted as manager of his branch, and therefore the appellant was bound by the compromise decree. As a result, the appellant’s suit was dismissed on 22 September 1953. The appellant then filed a memorandum of appeal on 1 December 1953, which bore the same court fees as the original plaint. Upon examination of the memorandum, the Registry again questioned the adequacy of the fees paid, contending that the appellant should have paid court fees under section 7(v) of the Act because his claim for partition was, in substance, a claim for recovery of possession based on title within the meaning of that provision. The matter was again referred to the Master, who this time referred it to the Taxation Judge under section 12(2) of the Act. Consequently, the Chief Justice constituted a bench of two judges to consider the reference. The judges hearing the reference did not deem it necessary to decide whether section 12 of the Act applied to the appeal; instead, they dealt with the reference as one made under section 5 of the Act.

The Court observed that the provisions of the Act were applicable to the appeal that was before it, and it dealt with the reference that had been made under section 5 of the Act. The appellant argued before the Division Bench that the order issued by Justice Krishnaswami Naidu was final because it had been passed under section 5. The learned judges rejected that contention. They held that the record did not show that Justice Krishnaswami Naidu had been nominated by the Chief Justice to hear the reference under section 5, either by a general order or a special order, and therefore the order could not be said to have attained finality under section 5. Turning to the merits, the judges agreed with the view expressed by Justice Krishnaswami Naidu and concluded that section 7(v) of the Act did not apply to the appellant’s claim for partition. The judges further held that Article 17‑B of Schedule II was also inapplicable. Consequently, they applied the provisions of section 7(iv)(b) of the Act and directed the appellant to state the monetary value of the relief sought for partition in accordance with that section. The Court explained that this direction was necessary because, in the original plaint, the plaintiff had not specifically mentioned the value of the relief sought for partition; he had merely indicated that he was paying a court fee of Rs 100 pursuant to Schedule II, Article 17‑B. The plaintiff had instead valued his entire claim for jurisdiction at Rs 15,00,000.

In compliance with the Court’s direction, the appellant assigned a value of Rs 50,000 to his relief to enforce his right to share in the joint‑family properties, paid the deficit court fee of Rs 1,662‑7‑0, and re‑presented his memorandum of appeal on 7 May 1954. However, the dispute over court fees did not end there. The Registry raised a further objection, contending that because the appellant had valued his relief for jurisdictional purposes at Rs 15,00,000 in the suit, he could not assign a different value to the same relief in the memorandum of appeal under section 7(iv)(b) without formally amending the valuation set out in the plaint. The appellant rejected the Registry’s view, and the matter was again referred to the Court for a ruling. The appellant then offered to file an application for a formal amendment of his plaint, proposing to replace the Rs 15,00,000 jurisdictional value with Rs 50,000. He lodged this application on 18 October 1954. The application was opposed by the respondent and by the Assistant Government Pleader on behalf of the State. The learned judges who heard the application held that once a value had been given initially for jurisdictional purposes, the appellant was precluded from providing a different value at a later stage. Accordingly it was

In this case the Court held that the amount of fifteen lakh rupees, which had been stated in the plaint as the value of the appellant’s claim for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, must also be treated as the value supplied by the appellant for the calculation of court fees under section 7(iv)(b) of the Act. Consequently, the application filed by the appellant seeking a formal amendment of the valuation set out in the plaint was rejected. The learned judges further claimed that they were exercising their authority under section 12(2) of the Act and therefore directed that the appellant should pay the deficit of court fees calculated on the basis of fifteen lakh rupees not only on his memorandum of appeal but also on his original plaint. This direction formed the basis of the present appeal. The first argument advanced by counsel for the appellant, Shri Krishnaswamy Ayyangar, was that the order issued by the learned Chamber Judge on 18 October 1951 was final according to section 5 of the Act. By that order the Chamber Judge had concluded that the plaint filed in the present suit did not attract the provisions of section 7(v) of the Act and that the appropriate court fee was to be determined by Article 17‑B of Schedule II of the Act. Since the appellant had already paid the fixed court fee of one hundred rupees under that provision, no objection could be raised on the ground that the court fee was insufficient. If that order had indeed been passed under section 5, it would unquestionably have been final. Section 5 of the Act prescribes the procedure to be followed when a dispute arises concerning the necessity or amount of court fee. When a difference emerges between an officer whose duty is to ensure the payment of any fee under Chapter III and a suitor regarding the need to pay the fee or its quantum, the matter must be referred to the taxing officer, whose decision is deemed final. The section further provides that if the taxing officer, to whom the dispute is referred, considers the question to be of general importance, he may refer the point to the final decision of the Chief Justice of the High Court or to any judge of the High Court appointed by the Chief Justice, either generally or specially for that purpose; and it is clear that any decision rendered by the Chief Justice or such appointed judge would be final. However, the Division Bench, when it later examined the record, found that no general or special order existed that would have authorised the exercise of jurisdiction under section 5 by Justice Krishnaswamy Naidu. It was also noted that counsel for the appellant had asserted that the practice of the Madras High Court was to refer disputes concerning proper court fees between suitors on the Original Side and the Registry to the Chamber Judge, and that the Chamber Judge on the Original Side was generally assumed to be appointed for dealing with such disputes. The Court could not accept that assumption without clear evidence from the record that Justice Krishnaswamy Naidu had, at the relevant time, been appointed either generally or specially to act under section 5; therefore, the order passed by him could not be considered final.

In the present suit, the Court observed that it could not accept the presumption that disputes concerning proper court fees between suitors on the Original Side and the Registry were automatically referred to the Chamber Judge, as had been alleged to be the usual practice in the Madras High Court. The Court noted that it was necessary to be satisfied from the record that Justice Krishnaswamy Naidu had, at the material time, been appointed either generally or specially to act under section 5 of the Act. Because the record failed to demonstrate any such general or special order, the Court found it difficult to accept the argument that the order issued by Justice Krishnaswamy Naidu in the present proceedings possessed finality. The Court expressly conceded that the record did not show any general or special order contemplated by section 5, and consequently held that the learned judges of the Division Bench were correct in refusing to attach finality to the order passed by Justice Krishnaswamy Naidu.

The appellant thereafter contended, through counsel, that the Division Bench erred in exercising jurisdiction under section 12(2) of the Act when it directed the appellant to pay additional court fees on the plaint, based on a valuation of Rs 15,00,000. The appellant argued that section 12 did not apply to appeals arising from judgments and decrees handed down in suits on the Original Side of the Madras High Court. While the Court acknowledged that the levy of fees in High Courts on their Original Sides was governed by section 3 of the Act, it observed that, if the matter were decided solely on the basis of the Act, none of the provisions contained in Chapter III could be applied either to suits filed on the Original Side or to appeals from judgments and decrees in such suits. Nevertheless, the Court recognised that it was common ground that court fees on plaints filed on the Original Side were leviable under the relevant provisions of Chapter III, and that this levy was authorised by Order 11, rule I of the High Court Fees Rules, 1933. Consequently, the Court found it necessary to examine which provisions of the Act had been extended to suits filed on the Original Side. While the authority and jurisdiction of the Madras High Court to enact rule I of Order 11 were undisputed, the effect of that rule remained in dispute. The appellant maintained that the rule merely contemplated the levy of certain specified court fees indicated in the provisions expressly made applicable to the Original Side, and that no other provision of the Act had been extended, thereby rendering the Division Bench’s reliance on section 12(2) erroneous. The Court, however, was not persuaded that this argument was well‑founded.

The Court was not persuaded that the appellant’s contention was well‑founded. Order II, rule I of the Madras High Court Fees Rules, 1933 provides that the fees and commissions listed in Appendix II shall be charged by the Registrar, Sheriff, the Reserve Bank of India and the Imperial Bank of India, as appropriate, on the various documents, matters and transactions specified as chargeable. For other documents, including memoranda of appeal, the Registrar shall apply the law then in force concerning court‑fees with respect to the scale of such fees, the manner of their levy, the refund of such fees and every other respect, in the same way and to the same extent as it applies to similar documents filed in original proceedings in a District Court and in appeals from decrees and orders of a District Court; this provision was added by rule 0 C No 2219 of 1949. It follows uncontroversially that, by operation of this rule, sections 7(iv)(a) through (f) of the Act together with the proviso and Article 17‑B of Schedule II of the Act are made applicable to suits filed on the Original Side of the High Court. The portion of the order introduced in 1949 expressly extends to suits and appeals on the Original Side the provisions of the Act relating to the scale of fees, the manner of their levy and the refund of fees, and it further makes the relevant provisions operative in “every other respect”. The expression “in every other respect” clearly contemplates that section 12, which confers on an appellate court the authority to examine the adequacy of court fees paid not only on the memorandum of appeal but also on the plaint in the suit before the appellate court, is intended to apply. It would be illogical to apply the Act’s fee‑levying provisions to plaints and memoranda of appeal while denying the appropriate court jurisdiction to determine whether the fees paid are sufficient. The power to entertain claims for refund of court fees is specifically mentioned; a refund claim may arise, for example, where an excess fee has been paid. Consequently, sections 13, 14 and 15 must be applied in such cases. If a litigant is entitled to obtain a refund of court fees under the relevant provisions, there is no reason why the court should not also be empowered to consider questions of inadequate or insufficient payment of court fees.

The court stated that it could entertain a question concerning the inadequate payment of court fees. Logically, if a claim for the refund of excess court fees could be entertained and ordered in these proceedings, then a claim involving deficient or insufficient court fees could likewise be considered and an order could be made requiring the party to pay the shortfall. Such matters, the court observed, fall within the expression “in every other respect” previously referred to. Accordingly, the court held that the learned judges of the lower court were justified in assuming jurisdiction under sub‑sections (1) and (2) of section 12. Section 12 contains two distinct parts. Sub‑section (1) provides that the question of the proper payment of court fees on either a plaint or a memorandum of appeal shall be decided by the court in which that plaint or memorandum is filed, and that the decision of that court is final between the parties to the suit. Sub‑section (2) confers on a court of appeal, reference or revision the jurisdiction to consider the adequacy of the court fee paid on the plaint whenever the suit containing that plaint comes before such a court, and, if the court is satisfied that the proper court fee has not been paid, it may pass an order requiring the party to pay the additional amount that would have been payable had the question been correctly decided at the first instance. The court noted that the decision of Justice Krishnaswamy Naidu could not attract the finality mentioned in section 5 of the Act; therefore, the Division Bench was free to examine the correctness of the view taken by the learned Chamber Judge. Satisfied that the plaint did not fall within Article 17‑B of Schedule II, the Division Bench was entitled to pass appropriate orders under sections 12(1) and 12(2). The appellant, however, contended that the learned judges erred in directing him to pay court fees on the basis of a value of Rs 15,00,000 for both his plaint and his memorandum of appeal. He argued that this decision conflicted with an earlier order directing that the proper court fee on the memorandum of appeal should be determined under section 7(iv)(b) of the Act. That earlier order, passed by the Division Bench under section 5, was final between the parties. It granted the appellant leave to value his claim for partition and to exercise his option by fixing the valuation at Rs 50,000. The appellant maintained that the valuation thus made should be treated as the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction, and that only on the basis of that valuation could he be justly required to pay court fees on both the plaint and the memorandum of appeal. Consequently, the learned judges were, in the appellant’s view, in error in not

In this case, the appellant sought permission to amend his plaint so that the pleading would conform with the requirements of section 7, sub‑section (iv) of the Act; that request constituted the essence of the appellant’s contentions. Conversely, counsel for the Intervener – the Advocate‑General of Madras – and counsel for the respondent advanced the position that both the plaint and the memorandum of appeal should be valued for the purpose of determining court fees under section 7(v) of the Act. Both sides acknowledged that the assessment of court fees must be based on the allegations set out in the plaint and that the fee calculation cannot be affected by the defenses pleaded in the written statement or by the ultimate merits of the suit.

The respondents argued that when the material allegations in the plaint are examined collectively and fairly, it appears that the plaintiff has been deprived of enjoyment of the properties that are the subject of the suit. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim for partition, in substance, amounts to a claim for possession of the suit properties, which they contend brings the suit within the ambit of section 7, sub‑section (v) of the Act. The question of the appropriate court fee on plaints where Hindu plaintiffs assert claims for partition under diverse circumstances has produced several contradictory decisions in the High Courts of India. However, the Court was not required to decide whether section 7(v) applies to the present suit or whether the suit falls under section 7(iv)(b).

The Court observed that the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court, which held that the memorandum of appeal should be taxed for court fee purposes under section 7(iv)(b) of the Act, is final under the provisions of section 5 of the Act and therefore cannot be reopened at this stage. It was noted that when the Division Bench examined the matter on reference made by the Master under section 5, the respondent may not have been heard. Typically, disputes between a litigant and the Registry regarding court fees arise at the initial stage of filing the plaint or the appeal, and the defendant or respondent is usually not interested in such a dispute unless the fee issue also raises a question of jurisdiction of the court to try the suit or entertain the appeal.

The Court further remarked that there is no doubt that the question concerning the adequacy of the court fee payable on the appellant’s memorandum of appeal was properly referred by the Master to the learned Chief Justice of the Madras High Court and was decided by the Division Bench of that High Court in accordance with the order made by the Chief Justice. In such circumstances, the decision reached by the Division Bench is to be treated as final under section 5 of the Act.

The order issued by the Division Bench was to be regarded as final under section 5 of the Act; accordingly, the Court did not permit the merits of that order to be examined in the present appeal. The Court therefore considered the appellant’s claim that the court fees payable on his memorandum of appeal should be assessed in accordance with section 7(iv)(b) of the Act. The remaining issue for determination was whether the Division Bench was justified in directing the appellant to pay court fees both on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal, based on a valuation of fifteen lakh rupees. The Court held that the appellant was correct in contending that the order was erroneous in law. Section 7, subsection (iv)(b) deals with suits that seek to enforce a right to share in any property on the ground that the property is joint family property, and provides that the amount of fees payable on such plaints is “according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal.” Furthermore, section 7 authorises that in all suits falling under subsection (iv) the plaintiff must state the amount at which the value of the relief is sought. When the scheme for computing fees in the various sub‑sections of section 7 is examined, it becomes clear that for suits covered by subsection (iv) a departure has been made, granting the plaintiff liberty to value his claim for the purpose of court fees. The rationale for this provision is that where the plaintiff is permitted to assign a valuation to his claim, it is inherently difficult to determine the amount with precision or certainty. For example, in a partition suit the plaintiff seeks to enforce his right to a share in property on the basis that the property is joint family property, meaning the plaintiff holds an undivided interest in the whole. By filing a partition claim, the plaintiff asks the court to convert that undivided interest into specific, separate parcels of property for his exclusive benefit. Such conversion cannot be readily expressed in monetary terms with exactness. Accordingly, the legislature allowed the plaintiff to assign a value for the purpose of calculating court fees. In effect, for suits governed by section 7(iv)(b) the value that the plaintiff states for his partition claim is ordinarily to be accepted by the court when determining the appropriate court fees.

In this case, the Court explained that the question of whether the plaintiff has an absolute right or merely an option to assign any valuation to his relief under the provisions of the section is irrelevant for the present circumstances. The Court noted that the issue which often requires determination is the value to be taken for the purpose of jurisdiction in suits of this kind. To resolve that issue, the Court said that it is necessary to read section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act together with section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. Section 8 provides that, except for the suits specifically excluded in paragraphs 5, 6 and 9 and clause (d) of paragraph 10 of section 7 of the Court Fees Act, where court fees are payable ad valorem under the Act, the value used to compute the court fees and the value required for jurisdictional purposes shall be identical. Consequently, for suits that fall within section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act, the value determined for the computation of court fees is also the value that determines jurisdiction, as the Court observed. The Court emphasized that this provision makes the jurisdictional value dependent upon the valuation that the plaintiff elects for the purpose of court fees, and that this dependence is natural. The computation of court fees in such suits depends on the valuation placed by the plaintiff on his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and assigns a monetary value to his claim for the purpose of court fees, that same figure becomes the basis for ascertaining jurisdiction. While the Court affirmed that the values for court fees and for jurisdiction must coincide, it stressed that the plaintiff’s stated valuation for court fees is the controlling figure. Therefore, the amount at which the plaintiff values the relief sought for court‑fee purposes determines the jurisdictional value, and not the other way round. The Court also observed that, according to the appellant, it was unnecessary to mention a valuation of Rs. 15,00,000 for jurisdictional purposes because, in plaints filed before 1953 on the Original Side of the Madras High Court, no jurisdictional valuation was required. The Court further noted that a plaintiff’s failure to state the amount of his valuation often occurs because, in partition suits, the plaintiff attempts to benefit from Article 17‑B of Schedule II regarding court‑fee payment. When the plaintiff intends to pay the fixed fee prescribed by that article, he and his advisers frequently refrain from specifying any valuation.

In this matter, the Court observed that it is unnecessary to state the amount of relief sought for the purpose of court fees when only the valuation for jurisdiction is mentioned. Frequently the plaint does not fall within the provisions of Article 17‑B of Schedule II, and consequently the court fee must be paid under Section 7(iv)(b) or Section 7(v) of the Act. When the Court determines that the suit is covered by Section 7(iv)(b) or Section 7(iv)(c), it ordinarily grants the plaintiff liberty to amend the plaint to specify the exact amount at which the claim is valued for payment of court fees. The Court held that it would be unreasonable and improper to bind the plaintiff by the valuation made solely for jurisdictional purposes and to treat that same figure as the valuation for court‑fee calculation. The Court noted that this approach aligns with the view expressed in the Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in Karam Ilahi v. Muhammad Bashir (1). The Court also referred to Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, which requires the plaintiff to first value the claim for court‑fee purposes, and provides that the jurisdictional value is to be determined on the basis of that claim. Accordingly, the Court found that the learned judges of the Madras High Court (1) A.I.R. (1949) Lah. 116 were in error when they held that the jurisdictional valuation shown in the plaint should also be taken as the valuation for payment of court fees on both the plaint and the memorandum of appeal. Because the earlier decision had concluded that the present suit fell under Section 7(iv)(b), the Court should have permitted the appellant to amend the valuation for court‑fee purposes not only in the memorandum of appeal but also in the plaint. Consequently, the Court set aside the order under appeal and directed that the plaintiff be permitted to state a value of Rs. 50,000 for the relief sought, for the purpose of Section 7(iv)(b) of the Act. The counsel for the appellant orally requested liberty to make the appropriate amendment in the plaint, and the Court granted that request. As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the appellant was directed to pay additional court fees on the plaint based on the Rs. 50,000 valuation within two months from the date of the order. Since the appellant had already paid sufficient court fees on the memorandum of appeal, no further order was needed in that regard. No order as to costs was made, and the appeal was allowed.