S. A. Venkataraman vs The State (And Connected Appeal)

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1956

Decision Date: 3 December 1957

Coram: Syed Jaffer Imam, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur

In the case titled S. A. Venkataraman versus The State, together with a connected appeal, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 3 December 1957. The judgment was authored by Justice Syed Jaffer Imam and the bench included Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and Justice J. L. Kapur. The parties are identified as the petitioner, S. A. Venkataraman, and the respondent, The State, with the appeal being filed under special leave. The citation for this decision is reported as 1958 AIR 107 and 1958 SCR 1040. The matter concerned provisions of the Criminal Trial—Public Servant Accused of Criminal Misconduct—Dismissal from Service before Taking of Cognizance by Court—Sanction to Prosecute, if Necessary—Interpretation, specifically Sections 5(2) and 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act II of 1947). The headnote records that the appellant, a public servant, had been dismissed from his service following a departmental inquiry and was subsequently charged with the offence of criminal misconduct under Section 5(2) of the Act and convicted. No sanction under Section 6 of the Act had been produced before the trial court. The appellant contended that the court could not take cognance of the offence without a proper sanction. The Court held that a sanction under Section 6 was not required for the prosecution because the appellant was no longer a public servant at the time the court was called upon to take cognizance. The Court explained that when interpreting statutory provisions, a court must first give effect to the natural meaning of clear words, and only in cases of ambiguity may it look to legislative intent. A general power to take cognizance of an offence, once vested in a court, is limited only by express prohibitions in the law. The Court found that the wording of Section 6(1) is clear, particularly the phrase “of the authority competent to remove him from his office,” which applies only to a person who remains a public servant removable by a competent authority. Consequently, the Court concluded that for Section 6 to apply, the accused must still be a public servant at the time cognizance is sought. The judgment falls under criminal appellate jurisdiction, being Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1956, an appeal by special leave from a Punjab High Court judgment dated 12 May 1955 in Criminal Appeal No. 52‑D of 1954, which itself arose from a Special Judge in Delhi’s judgment dated 6 December 1954 in Corruption Case No. 1 of 1954. Counsel for the appellant appeared on behalf of S. A. Venkataraman.

Counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1956 and counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1956 appeared for the appellant, while counsel for the respondent in both appeals appeared for the respondent. The judgment dated 3 December 1957 was delivered by Justice Imam. A question of law common to both appeals, granted by special leave, required determination, and therefore the appeals were heard together. The special leave granted in Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1956 was confined to the issue of whether the trial court possessed jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence for lack of a sanction under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (the Act). Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1956 was not so limited; additional points were raised for consideration, and reference to those points would be made when that appeal was specifically addressed. The common legal question in the two appeals was whether a sanction under section 6 of the Act was indispensable before a court could take cognizance of an offence alleged to have been committed under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code or under section 5(2) of the Act, when the alleged offender was not a public servant at the time the court was asked to take cognizance but was a public servant at the time the offence was allegedly committed. In Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1956, the appellant had been convicted under section 5(2) of the Act and sentenced by the Special Judge, Delhi, to six months’ simple imprisonment. He appealed the conviction and sentence to the Punjab High Court. The High Court, while admitting the appeal, issued a notice to the appellant to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced. Ultimately the High Court dismissed the appeal and increased the sentence from six months’ simple imprisonment to two years’ rigorous imprisonment. Because the special leave in this appeal was limited to the jurisdictional question, it was unnecessary to set out the prosecution case against the appellant. In Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1956, the appellant had applied to the Allahabad High Court under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings pending before the Special Judge; that application was dismissed, and the present appeal was filed against the order dismissing the application. It was admitted that at the time the Special Judges purported to take cognizance, the appellants were not public servants and that no order of sanction under section 6 of the Act by a competent authority was on the record. However, at the time the offences were alleged to have been committed, the appellants were public servants. Section 6 of the Act provides: “6. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under section 161 or section 164 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under sub‑section (2) of section 5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction, (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.”

Section 6 of the Act provides that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under section 161, section 164 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), or under sub‑section (2) of section 5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction. The provision further specifies that the sanction must be given by: (a) the Central Government, where the person is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government; (b) the State Government, where the person is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government; or (c) the authority competent to remove him from his office, in the case of any other person. Sub‑section (2) adds that if any doubt arises as to whether the previous sanction required under sub‑section (1) should be given by the Central Government, the State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by the Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. It is not contested that when a court attempts to take cognizance of offences punishable under sections 161, 164, 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under section 5(2) of the Act, and the alleged offender is a public servant, the court may not proceed unless a sanction by the competent authority has previously been accorded. The real controversy in these appeals, however, is whether such a sanction is required before a court can take cognizance when the person before the court is no longer a public servant at the time cognizance is sought, although the offence is alleged to have been committed while he was a public servant. To resolve this issue, the language of section 6 of the Act must be interpreted. The appellants argued that a proper construction of section 6 makes the status of the accused at the time of commission of the alleged offence the essential consideration, not his status at the time the court is called upon to take cognizance. Accordingly, they maintained that a sanction under section 6 is necessary before any court may take cognizance, even if the accused has ceased to be a public servant at that later stage. Conversely, the Solicitor‑General contended that a correct interpretation of section 6 requires that, not only must the offence be committed by a public servant, but that the person must still be a public servant removable by a competent authority at the time the court is asked to take cognizance. Before undertaking the construction of section 6, it is necessary to refer to certain submissions made on behalf of the appellants.

The Court examined the submissions advanced by counsel for the appellants. It was argued that when a court interprets a statutory provision, it must seek to discover the legislature’s intention. This task requires looking not only at the literal wording but also at the social circumstances that prompted the enactment and the wrong the statute was intended to remedy. The court therefore must give effect to the written words while also supplying the necessary context so that the legislative purpose is given life. Counsel also relied on various decisions that interpreted section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Further reference was made to Article 361 of the Constitution and to section 197A of the Code of Criminal Procedure to support the construction proposed with respect to the language used in section 6 of the Act. In construing any statutory provision, the court’s first duty is to give effect to the natural meaning of the words, provided those words are clear. Only where the language is ambiguous may the court look beyond the text, consider the entire statute, and examine the circumstances and purposes that led to its enactment in order to ascertain legislative intent. Counsel cited the observations of Lord Justice Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, relying on them to support the appellant’s position. However, those observations were made in the context of an ambiguous statutory provision, and cannot be taken to mean that when the language of a statute is unambiguous the court is required to go beyond giving effect to the words themselves. Counsel also referred to Article 361 of the Constitution and to section 197A of the Code, but the Court found no assistance from those provisions in interpreting section 6 of the Act. Additionally, counsel placed reliance on two earlier decisions: the Nagpur High Court judgment in S. Y. Patil v. Vyankatswami and the decision of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind in Suganchand v. Seth Naraindas. Those cases were invoked to argue that even if a person had ceased to be a public servant before prosecution began, such a person remained protected by section 197 of the Code and that a sanction was required before a court could take cognizance. The Court notes that, with respect to section 197 of the Code, those two decisions do lend support to the submissions made by counsel for the appellants.

The Court observed that the earlier judgment of a single Judge of the Nagpur High Court was later overruled by a Division Bench of the same Court in The State v. Hifzul Rahman (1). That later decision expressly held that a person accused of an offence must be a public servant at the moment the accusation is made, and that Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides no protection to a former public servant who has ceased to hold office. The Court then referred to the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Prasad Chandra Banerji v. Emperor (2), which reiterated that the protection under Section 197 applies only to an individual who remains a public servant at the time the prosecution is instituted. The Calcutta Court explained that the provision does not extend to a person who is no longer in public service when the prosecution starts, even though he occupied public office at the time the alleged offence was committed. Consequently, the Calcutta Court ruled that no sanction under Section 197 was required to prosecute someone who had left public service before the prosecution was launched. A similar conclusion was reached by the Bombay High Court in Imperator v. Joshi (3), and by a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Suraj Narain Chaube (4). Collectively, these rulings indicate a consensus among the High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay, Allahabad and Nagpur that Section 197 offers no shield to a person who is not a public servant at the time of accusation, despite having been a public servant when the offence was alleged to have been committed.

The Court further noted the decision of the Punjab High Court in The State v. Gurcharan Singh (5), which was brought to its attention. That judgment held that, because of the similarity in the wording of Section 197 of the Code and Article 6 of the Act, the same principles should apply to both provisions. Relying on the earlier decisions of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts, the Punjab Court explained that the protection afforded by Section 197 of the Code is available only to a person who is still in public office, and it ceases to be available once the individual has been discharged from service before prosecution. The Court cited the relevant authorities: (1) I. L. R. (1951) Nag. 764; (2) 1. L. R. (1944) 1 Cal. 113; (3) I. L. R. (1947) Bom. 706; (4) 1. L. R. (1938) All. 776; (5) A. I. R. (1952) Pun. 89. These cases, the Court observed, help illuminate why a public servant who is still in office cannot be prosecuted for offences committed in that capacity without a prior sanction, and they may indirectly assist in interpreting the language of Article 6 of the Act. However, the Court emphasized that Article 6 must be construed based on its own wording, independent of any interpretative constructions derived from the decisions on Section 197 of the Code.

Before attempting to interpret the words contained in section 6 of the Act, the Court considered the power that is vested in a criminal court to take cognizance of an offence. Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers a general authority on any criminal court to take cognizance of offences, but this general power becomes unavailable in certain situations because sections 195 to 199 of the Code expressly prohibit its exercise unless the conditions specified in those provisions are satisfied. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (Act XLVI of 1952) created a class of Special Judges who are empowered to try offences that fall under sections 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 or 165A of the Indian Penal Code, or under clause 5(2) of the Act. These Special Judges may take cognizance of the relevant offences without the accused first being committed to their jurisdiction for trial. However, the Court noted that the exercise of this general power of taking cognizance is prohibited when the offence in question is committed by a public servant under sections 161, 164 or 165 of the Indian Penal Code, or under clause 5(2) of the Act, unless a previous sanction has been obtained from a competent authority.

The Court expressed the view that when a legislature grants a court a general power to take cognizance of an offence, any restriction placed on that power by a statutory provision must be interpreted strictly according to the terms of the restriction. By legislating a prohibition on taking cognizance unless particular conditions are fulfilled, the legislature did not intend to condone the offence; rather, it sought to ensure that prosecution for offences covered by the prohibition could not commence without compliance with those conditions. In the case of a public servant, those conditions typically require a prior sanction from the Central Government, the State Government, or the authority that has the power to dismiss the servant. Such an authority is directly interested in the matter because it must decide whether to grant or withhold its sanction for prosecuting one of its own employees. The authority may refuse sanction on the basis that the prosecution is frivolous, vexatious, or contrary to the public interest, and without this safeguard a public servant might be unable to perform official duties efficiently. The purpose of the Act, as the Court observed, was to suppress bribery and corruption; its provisions are stringent, and they even introduced presumptions of guilt for offences under sections 161 and 165A of the Indian Penal Code.

According to section 4 of the Act, a presumption of guilt arose against a public servant unless the accused was able to prove the contrary. Section 5 of the Act introduced a new offence that covered criminal misconduct committed by a public servant, an offence that was not encompassed by any of the existing provisions of the Indian Penal Code relating to bribery or corruption. Sub‑section (2) of that section provided that the offence could be punished by imprisonment for a period that could extend up to seven years, by a fine, or by both imprisonment and fine. Sub‑section (3) specified that a court was required to presume that the accused had committed misconduct if it was established that either the accused himself or any person acting on his behalf possessed pecuniary resources or property that could not be satisfactorily explained by the accused and that were disproportionate to the known sources of his income. These provisions demonstrated the legislature’s intention to treat corruption by public servants more severely than had previously been the case and to refuse to tolerate such conduct in any form.

The judgment observed that, had section 6 been placed within the Act, it would be evident that a court could take cognizance of an offence under section 161, section 164 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code, or under subsection (2) of section 5, even when the person who committed the offence was no longer a public servant at the time the case was brought before the court. The simple fact that the individual had ceased to hold public office after committing the crime would not relieve him of criminal liability. Section 6 expressly prohibited a court from taking cognizance of such an offence without first obtaining a sanction while the accused was still a public servant. The question, however, was whether that prohibition continued to operate after the public servant had left office. To resolve this issue, the Court needed to examine and interpret the language of section 6 and to state its view on the matter.

In reviewing the text of section 6, the Court found that two conditions had to be satisfied before the section could be invoked. First, the offence in question must have been committed by a public servant. Second, the public servant must be employed in the affairs of the Union or a State and must not be removable from his position except by, or with the sanction of, the Central Government, the State Government, or any other competent authority authorized to remove him. Both conditions must exist in order to prevent a court from taking cognizance of the offence mentioned in section 6 without first obtaining the required sanction from the appropriate government or authority. If either condition were missing, the essential prerequisites of the section would be absent, and the section would not bar a court from taking cognizance of the offence without a prior sanction. The Court further noted that an offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code could be committed by a public servant.

Section 6 of the Act is limited to an offence that is committed by a public servant, and it does not extend to a person who is merely expecting to become a public servant. Consequently, when a court is approached to take cognizance of an offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and the accused, at that moment, holds the position of a public servant but was only an aspirant to that position at the time the offence was committed, the court does not require any prior sanction because the provisions of section 6 would not apply.

In the opposite situation, where the offence under section 161 was committed by a person who was a public servant at the time of the act, but that person had ceased to be a public servant when the court was asked to take cognizance, one of the two conditions necessary to invoke section 6 of the Act is missing. As a result, the requirement of a prior sanction is again unnecessary.

The language of section 6(1) is clear and must be given its ordinary effect. There is nothing in the wording of section 6(1) that even remotely suggests that a previous sanction is indispensable before a court may take cognizance of the offences mentioned therein in the case of a person who had ceased to be a public servant at the time the court was approached, although that person was a public servant at the time of the commission of the offence.

It was submitted that clause (c) of section 6(1) refers to persons other than those described in clauses (a) and (b). The phrase “is employed” does not appear in clause (c), and the argument was that this omission would make clause (c) applicable to a person who had ceased to be a public servant even though he was a public servant when the offence was committed. That construction of clause (c) cannot be accepted. The expressions “in the case of a person” and “in the case of any other person” must be understood as referring to a public servant, keeping in view the first paragraph of the sub‑section.

Accordingly, clauses (a) and (b) cover a public servant who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or a State and who is not removable from office except by or with the sanction of the Central Government or the State Government. Clause (c) therefore covers any other public servant who may be removed from his office by a competent authority. The essential words in clause (c) are “of the authority competent to remove him from his office”. A person who has ceased to be a public servant is not a person removable from any office by such an authority.

Section 2 of the Act defines “public servant” for the purposes of the Act as a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. Under clause…

Clause (c) provides that any person who was a public servant at the moment a court was asked to take cognizance, but who does not fall within the description of a public servant under clauses (a) and (b), may rely on section 6 and may object to the court taking cognizance without first obtaining the required sanction.

The parties further argued that sub‑section (2) of section 6 indicates that the relevant factor is the accused’s status at the time the offence was committed, not his status when the court was asked to take cognizance. This sub‑section was added to the Act by the Prevention of Corruption (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, and it was intended to finally resolve any uncertainty about which authority must grant the sanction when a public servant who committed an offence under section 6(1) remains a public servant at the time the court is asked to take cognizance.

For illustration, the Court noted that it is not difficult to imagine a situation where a public servant first employed by a State Government later becomes employed by the Central Government, and a dispute arises as to which Government should grant the sanction for his prosecution. Sub‑section (2) settles this difficulty by directing that, whenever a doubt arises, the authority competent to remove the servant from his office at the time of the commission of the offence is the authority that must grant the sanction.

The Court observed that if the construction placed on the provisions of sub‑section (1) is accepted, there is nothing in sub‑section (2) that conflicts with that construction. Moreover, the language of sub‑section (2) does not contain the meaning suggested by the appellants, nor does it aid in interpreting the provisions of sub‑section (1).

The Court held that the words “is employed” and “is not removable” in clauses (a) and (b), and “competent to remove him from his office” in clause (c), cannot be read as “was employed”, “was not removable”, or “would have been competent to remove him from his office”. To read them in that way would amount to substituting the Court’s own language for the statutory language contained in those clauses.

Reference was made to Criminal Appeal No 122 of 1954, dealt with in a separate judgment, where a similar question had arisen. In that appeal, the appellant contended that two defects in section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were intended to be remedied by the Act: first, that section 197 did not apply to a public servant who had ceased to be a public servant at the time cognizance of an offence was taken; and second, that an offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code committed by a public servant was not covered by section 197 because such an offence could not be said to have been committed while the servant was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty, taking into account decisions of Indian courts and the Privy Council.

The Court observed that earlier authorities had suggested two defects in the Code of Criminal Procedure: first, that section 197 did not apply to a public servant who had ceased to be a public servant at the time cognizance of an offence was taken; and second, that an offence punishable under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, when committed by a public servant, was excluded from section 197 because it could not be said to have been committed while the servant was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. The Court examined these propositions in light of the decisions of Indian courts and the Privy Council and concluded that they did not assist in construing section 6 of the Act.

The Court noted that the language of section 197, as interpreted in earlier judgments, was based on the specific wording of that provision at the time those judgments were delivered. Those decisions emphasized the phrases “when any person who is a judge within the meaning of section 19 of the Indian Penal Code …” and “when any public servant who is not removable from his office …”. The judgments held that the person must still be a public servant at the moment the court is asked to take cognizance, even though the offence may have been committed while the person was a public servant. The Court stressed that, unlike section 197 of the Code, section 6 of the Act does not contain the words “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty”. Consequently, the absence of those words provides no guidance for interpreting section 6.

Applying the ordinary meaning of the words used in section 6, the Court reasoned that the provision can apply only when, at the time a court is asked to take cognizance, the offence has been committed by a public servant who remains a public servant and is removable from office by a competent authority. The Court therefore concluded that both conditions—the accused being a public servant at the time of cognizance and the servant being removable—must be satisfied before the provisions of section 6 can be invoked.

In the appeals presently before the Court, it was admitted that the appellants had ceased to be public servants at the time the court took cognizance of the alleged offences. Accordingly, the Court held that section 6 of the Act did not apply to them, and the prosecutions were not invalidated by the absence of a prior sanction from a competent authority.

Regarding Criminal Appeal 25 of 1956, the Court noted that, in addition to the question of whether the court could take cognizance without a prior sanction, additional grounds had been raised for quashing the prosecution pending against the appellant. The appellant had been appointed Deputy Assistant Director Enforcement in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce on 25 March 1949 and promoted to Assistant Director on 14 July 1949. The matter before the Court therefore required consideration of both the statutory construction of section 6 and the procedural propriety of the prosecution.

The appellant had been appointed to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce on 25 March 1949 and was subsequently promoted to the position of Assistant Director on 14 July 1949. It was alleged that on 11 September 1951 he accepted a payment of Rs 10,000 as a bribe, which represented a partial instalment of an agreed total of Rs 30,000. Following these allegations an inquiry was conducted under Rule 55 of the Civil Service Rules, and as a result of that inquiry the appellant was dismissed from service on 25 September 1953. During the period between the inquiry and the dismissal, correspondence appears to have taken place between the appellant and the Government. On 18 September 1952 a final report was filed with the court under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That report indicated that although the investigating authorities recommended that a prosecution be instituted, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry had directed that the appellant should be dealt with through departmental proceedings rather than through criminal prosecution. The very next day, on 19 September 1952, the presiding magistrate issued an order that closed the criminal investigation, discharged the appellant from bail, and directed that the seized amount of Rs 10,000 be returned to the complainant. Despite this closure, the prosecution was revived on 11 February 1954, based on the same evidentiary material and the same allegations, but it proceeded on the basis of a fresh complaint.

On behalf of the appellant it was contended that once a sanction for prosecution had been refused, the prosecution could not be revived at any later stage. The argument asserted that a refusal of sanction barred any subsequent grant of sanction, that a prosecution which had been dropped could not be reinstated where a prior sanction was a statutory prerequisite, and that any promise by the Government not to prosecute should preclude reconsideration of the matter. It was further urged that allowing the prosecution to be reopened after its withdrawal amounted to an abuse of the court’s process. The Court examined the correspondence cited in the petition for special leave and placed it on the record. The Court found that the correspondence did not contain any statement that the Government had positively refused to grant sanction for the prosecution. The documents merely showed that the Government elected to pursue the matter through departmental channels. Consequently, it could not be said that the Government had expressly declined to provide sanction for a criminal prosecution. Rather, the Government appeared to be awaiting the outcome of the departmental inquiry. If that inquiry were to clear the appellant, the necessity for granting sanction would disappear. Conversely, if the departmental inquiry were to substantiate the allegations, the Government would possess additional material beyond that obtained by the police, which could influence its decision on whether to grant or withhold sanction. The Court therefore concluded that it was not permissible to infer from the correspondence any pledge by the Government not to prosecute, as had been suggested by the appellant’s counsel.

In this case the Court noted that a final report had been prepared and that the proceedings were withdrawn before a Magistrate. At the time the withdrawal was effected the appellant was still employed as a public servant, and consequently the Magistrate was prohibited by section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and by section 5(2) of the relevant Act from taking cognizance of the alleged offence without first obtaining a sanction. The effect of the withdrawal therefore amounted merely to the discharge of the appellant. The Court explained that a discharge of this kind does not bar the institution of fresh proceedings on the basis of a new complaint. On 11 February 1954 a fresh complaint was lodged, and by that date the appellant had ceased to be a public servant; as a result the court was able to assume jurisdiction and take cognizance of the matter without requiring any prior sanction. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether a positive refusal of sanction would prevent the granting of a later sanction, because the material before it demonstrated that no such positive refusal had ever been made. Furthermore the Court was satisfied that the facts did not show any abuse of the court’s process and that the provisions of section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure were inapplicable. Since the submissions raised in the appeals were not established, the Court dismissed the appeals.